University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Books

Faculty Scholarship

1904

Illustrative Cases on Equity Jurisprudence
Harry B. Hutchins

University of Michigan Law School

Robert E. Bunker

University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/books/81

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/books
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Legal Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Hutchins, Harry B., and Bunker, Robert E. Illustrative Cases on Equity Jurisprudence. 2nd ed. St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1904.

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Books by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Illustrative cases on equity jurisprudence /
Hutchins, Harry B. (Harry Burns), 1847-1930.
St. Paul : West Publishing Co., 1904.
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo1.ark:/13960/t5w671p29

Public Domain
http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd
We have determined this work to be in the public domain,
meaning that it is not subject to copyright. Users are
free to copy, use, and redistribute the work in part or
in whole. It is possible that current copyright holders,
heirs or the estate of the authors of individual portions
of the work, such as illustrations or photographs, assert
copyrights over these portions. Depending on the nature
of subsequent use that is made, additional rights may
need to be obtained independently of anything we can
address.

•fSfK^vi :.'^'^^'w:
.<■<.

•'*ns*,

m

iiara^all iEqutty ffiollerttntt

dift 0f
IE. 3I.^iiar0lfaU.

?C.2].

/

/

1. 1034

CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

3

1924

084 263 213^

COFVllIGHT,

1902,

BT

WEST PUBLISHING

Copyright,

COMPANY.

1903,

By

WEST PUBLISHING

COMPANY.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.
MAXIMS OF EQUITY.
1. Southern

ford

California K. Co. v. Ruther-

2. Rees v. City of Watertown
3. Dibrell v. Carlisle
4. Speidel v. Henrici
5. Hawker v. Moore
6. Economy Sav. Bank v. Gordon
7. Rice V. Rice
8. Comstock T. Johnson
9. Brown, Bonnell & Co. v. Lake

Iron Co

Appeal
10. Bleakley's
11. Kahn v. Walton
Craig
12.
Leslie
v.
13. Wyman v. Ft. Dearborn
Chicago

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Stlnchfield
McLarren

Page

3
5
9
15
17
19

Superior

Nat. Bank of

Milliken
Brewer
Tillman

v.
v.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Witt

I.Craig

28
31
32
39

5. Keeble v. Keeble

^.

1.
2.
3.

44
47
49

Galbraith t. Lunsford
Starry v. Korab

57
60
61
62
68

9. Erkens t. Nicolin

.1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

70
72
75
77

80
84
86
90
92
97

Grymes v. Sanders
217
Riegel v. American Life Ins. Co.
221
Newton v. ToUes
225
Dambmann v. Schulting
227
Conner v. Welch
230
Park Bros. & Co. v. Blodgett & Clapp
Co
234

MISTAKE— PAROL EVIDENCE
CORRECT.

101
109

H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)

238
244
246
248
254
262

FRAUD— JURISDICTION OF EQIHTY.

112

117
122

1.
2.
3.

Miller v. Scammon
Buzard v. Houston
Teft v. Stewart

265
268
271

ACTUAL FRAUD.
123
128
129

131
132
184
136

SATISFACTION.
1. Strong V. Williams
2. Deichman v. Arndt

TO

Walden v. Skinner
Metropolitan Lumber Co. v. Lake Saperior Ship Canal, Railway & Iron C«.
3. Hitchins v. Pettingill
4. Hunter v. Bilyeu
5. Glass V. Hulbert
6. Davis V. Ely

98

National

182
188
191
193
197
208
212
213
216

MISTAKE OF FACT.

ELECTION.
1. Penn v. Guggenheimer
2. Fitzhugh V. Hubbard
3. Wilbanks v. Wilbanks...
v. Jones
4. Rogers
5. Konvalinka v. Schlegel
6. Reed v. Dickerman
7. Van Dyke's Appeal

171
173

MISTAKE OF LAW.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

4.
5.

166

1.
2.

Houston T. Timmerman

L Horn v. Cole
2. Dickerson v. Oolgrove
3. Continental Nat. Bank v.
Bank of Commonwealth

163

1. Hunt V. Rousmanier's
Adm'rs. .. .177,
2. Jordan v. Stevens
3. Stafford v. Fetters
4. Green v. Morris & E. R. Co
5. Griswold y. Hazard
6. Marshall v. Westrope
1
7. Renard v. Clink
German Ins. C«...
8. Titus y. Rochester

LIS PENDENS.
1.

160

Kopper T. Dyer
Patton V. Campbell
Brewer v. Herbert

PRIORITIES AND NOTICE
1. Heyder v. Excelsior Building & Loan
Ass'n
2. Phillips
V. Phillips
3. Knapp v. Bailey
4. Kirsch y. Tozier
5. Knobloch v. Mueler
6. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore v.
Whittington
7. Williams*! v. Brown
vT Burnett
8. Thomas
9. Pringle t. Dunn
10. Deason v. Taylor

39
157

ACCIDENT.

PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
Bwing V. Litchfield
Craig v. Hukill
Kunkle v. Wherry
4. Jaguith v. Hudson

140
150
152
155

y.
Leslie
2. Keep v. Miller
3. Wheless v. Wheless
4. Prentice v. Janssen

53
55

1.
2.
3.

144

V.
v.

CONVERSION AND RECONVERSION.

23
26

51

Clements v.
Hart v. Sansom
Adams v. Messenger

Pago

Tates
'.
Edwards
Rainier's Ex'rs
Roquet v. Eldridge
Rogers t. French
Clark v. Jetton

3. De

140
142

(iii)

Hicks

V. Stevens
Helps
Stimson
v.
Mitchell V. McDougall

Southern

Development

Silva
Prewett v. Trimble
V.

Co.

Hadcock v. Osmer
Borders v. Kattleman
Dambmann v. Schulting
Neill V. Shamburg

Porter

V.

Woodruff

of Nevadaj

273
277
279
282
287
289
292
227'

294
296

TABLE OP CONTENTS.

IV
11. Virginia
12. Zahn v.

302
304

CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.
1. Phillips V. Pullen
2. Rakestraw v. Lanier
3. Cowee v. Cornell
4. Allore v. Jewell
5. Oreene v. Roworth
6. Brown v. Pierce
7. Francis v. Wilkinson
8. Ross V. Conway
9. Tate v. Williamson
10. Price v. Thompson
11. Elmore v. Johnson
12. Solinger v. Earle
13. Hanover
Nat. Bank of
York V. Blake
14. Chandler v. HoUingsworth

308

310
316
320
323
326

City of New

331
335
337
340
343
351
353
357

EXPRESS TRUSTS.
Hutchins v. Van Vechten
Urann v. Coates
3. Bates v. Hurd
4. McVay v. McVay
3. Danser v. Warwick

364
366
368
370
372
374

1.
2.

6. Tobias

v.

Ketchum

EXPRESS TRUSTS— PRECATORY

8. Mitchell v. Read
9. Ryan v. Dox
10. Edwards v. Culbertson
11. O'Hara, In re
12. Cvirdy v. Berton

DUTIES AND U:ABII.ITIES OF TRUSTEES.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Weall, In re
Hun V. Cary
King V. Talbot
Lamar v. Micou
Simmons v. Oliver
Harvard College v. Amory

504
507
511
515
524
526
Bentley v. Craven
580
Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. R. Co. . . 531
Rich V. Black
535
Bent V. Priest
537
Cook V. Gilmore
542
Schell, In re
543
Van Alen v. American Nat. Bank.... 545
Waterman v. Alden
549
Barker's Trusts, In re
554

MORTGAGES.
1. Chick V. Willetts
2. Barrett v. Hinckley
3. Ladue v. Detroit &

WORDS.
1. Warner v. Bates
2. Hess V. Singler
3. Clay V. Wood

377
380
382

EXPRESS TRUSTS— VOI.UNTART
TRUSTS.
1. Richards v. Delbridge
2. Young V. Young.
.'
3. Webb's Estate, In re
4. Martin v. Funk
5. Beaver v. Beaver.
6. Bath Sav. Inst. v. Hathorn

TRUSTS— ACTIVE
1.

Kirkland

v.

385
387

392
393
396
400

AND PASSIVE.

Cox

404

v. McCormack

TRUSTS— PUBI.IC

OR

407

CHARITABI<E.

Jackson y. Phillips
Allen v. Stevens
3. Hunt V. Fowler

410
431
438

1.
2.

RESULTING TRUSTS.
1. Skellenger's Ex'rs v. Skellenger's
2. Bond V. Moore
S. Gould V. Lynde

Ex'r.

. 442

Botsford v. Burr
Dyer v. Dyer
6. Cook v. Patrick
Hagan
7.
v. Powers
4.
5.

1. Ferris v. Van Vechten
2. Little v. Chadwick
3. Slater v.
4. Nonotuck
5. American

er

Oriental Mills
Silk Co. v. Flanders
Sugar Refining

6. Cavin v. Gleason
7. Newton v. Porter

Co. v. Fanch-

461
465
466
468
471
475
477

M. R. Co

SUBROGATION.
1.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

444
446
24.
447
25.
452
26.
455
27.
459 28.

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

555
557
562

Mtna, Life Ins. Co. of Hartford
Town of Middleport

SPECIFIC

POWERS IN TRUST.
1. Deltmey

Page
480
488
493
495
501

Page

Land Co. v. Haupt
McMillin

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

PERFORMANCE
TRACTS.

Pusey V. Pusey
MolUnenx's Case

Hall

v.

OF CON-

Warren
Rindge v. Baker
Adderly v. Dixon
Hodges V. Kowing
Porter v. Frenchman's Bay & Mt. D.
Land & Water Co
Bumgardner v. Leavitt
Welty V. Jacobs
Jones V. Newhall
Fothergill v. Rowland
Danforth v. Philadelphia & C. M. S. L.
R. Co
Southern Exp. Co. v. Western North
Carolina R. Co
McCauU V. Braham
Clarke v. Price
Lumley v. Wagner
Montague v. Flockton
Donnell v. Bennett
Wm. Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers
Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Bwing. .
Allegheny Base Ball Club v. Bennett. .
McGowin y. Remington
Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co. v. Coney
Island & B. R. Co
Willard v. Tayloe
Fish V. Leser
Stone v. Pratt
Thompson v. Winter
Falcke v. Gray
Brewer v. Herbert
Paine v. Meller
Gould v. Murch
Marks v. Tichenor
Bostwick v. Beach
Lewis v. Hawkins
Bissell v. Heyward
Wetzler v. Duffy
Phinizy v. Guernsey
V.

Leonard

Graybill

v.
v.

Crane

Braugh

568

573
574
575
578
584
585
587
588
592
595
599
602
604
607
612
614
622
627
629
631
635
637
641
644
650
652
654
655
173

659
661
662
663
665
667
669
671
675
677

TABLE OF CONTENTS.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Page
679
Kelsey v. Crowther
681
Combs v. Scott
682
Frame v. Frame
686
Cheney v. Libby
695
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Durant 701
HafEey v. Lynch
703
Gotthelf v. Stranahan
706
Corbin v. Tracy
709
Hicks V. Turck
711
Gage v. Fisher
713
New England Trust Co. v. Abbott
720
Conger v. New York, W. S. & B. R.
Co
723
Ross V. Parks
724
Johnston v. Trippe
726
O'Connor v. Tyrrell
730
Sharkey
Grubb v.
732

Hall

V.

Hall

INJUNCTIONS.
1. Rogers Locomotive
& Machine
V. Erie R. Co
2. Whitecar v. Michenor
3. Watson v. Sutherland
4. McHenry v. Jewett
5. Steinau t. Cincinnati Gas-Light

Co

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Works

& Coke

Manhattan Manufacturing & Fertilizing Co. V. New Jersey Stock- Yard &
Market Co
Godfrey v. Black
McClurg, Appeal of
William Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers. .
Lumley v. Wagner
Grand Rapids School Furniture Co. v.
Haney School Furniture Co
O. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski
Buncombe v. Felt
Griffith v. Hilliard

REFORMATION.
1. Purvines v. Harrison
2. Welles v. Yates

744

Town of Venice

v. WoodrufE

Marks....

782

794

RECEIVERS.

L

Booth V. Clark
Davis V. Gray
Flowers, In re
Semple v. Plynn
Simmons Hardware Co.

2.
3.
4.
5.
v. Waibel
6. Schuyler's Steam Towboat Co., In re. .
Louis,
7. St.
K. & S. R. Co. v. Wear
8. Childers
v. Neely
9. Fechheimer v. Baum
10. Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River Wa11.
12.
13.

14.

Whitney

& Irrigation Co

Hanover Nat. Bank
State of Montana v. Second Judicial
District Court of Silver Bow County
Merchants'
& Manufacturers' Nat.
Bank of Detroit v. Kent Circuit
Judge
Mercantile Trust Co. of New York v.
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co
Belding v. Meloche
Marshall & lUsley Bank v. Cady
v.

747 15.
749 16.
751 17. Wiedemann v. Sann
629 18. Stetson v. Northern Inv. Co
614 19. First Nat. Bank v. Illinois Steel Co...
20. Central Trust Co. v. New York City &
N. R. Co
753
755 21. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Grape
Greek Coal Co.
760
762 22. Hanna v. State Trust Co
764 23. Howarth v. EUwanger
Wheelock v. Noonan
766 24. Wyman v. Eaton
Wilson V. City of Mineral Point
25. American Biscuit & Mfg. Co. v. Klotz
Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh
767 26. Haywood v. Lincoln Lumber Co
Sherry v. Perkins
770 27. Bank of Florence v. United States Savings & Loan Co
Vegelahn v. Guntner
773
Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey... 779 28. Colton V. Drovers' Perpetual Building

Crawford v. Tyrrell
Weinstock, Lubin & Co. t.

788
790

CANCELLATION.
1.

terworks

734
738
741
743

Paga

& Loan Ass'n
t. Pittsburg Goal R. Co

783 29. Bailey

797
804
815
816
817
820
823
833
837
844
845
849
855
858
862
864
867
869
871
876
879
881
886
888
891
894
897
899
903

CASES REPORTED.
Page

Adams v. Messenger (17 N. E. 491, 147
55
Mass. 185)
584
Adderley v. Bixon (1 Sim. & S. 607)
Town
iEtna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
of Belmont (8 Sup. Ct. 62», 124 U. S.
568
534)
iBtna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Town
of Middleport
(8 Sup. Ot. 625, 124 U.
„
568
S. 534)
iBtna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Town
of Milford (8 Sup. Ct. 625, 124 U. S. 534) 568
Allegheny Base-Ball Club v. Bennett (14
635
Fed. 257)
Allen V. Stevens (55 N. B. 568, 161 N. Y.
481
122)
320
Allore V. Jewell (94 U. S. 506)
American Biscuit & Mfg. Co. v. Klotz (44
891
Fed. 721)
Co. v. Fancher
American Sugar-Refining
471
(40 N. E. 206, 145 N. Y. 552)
504
Andrews v. Weall (42 Ch. Div. 674)

Chicago, M.
pot St. R.

& St. P. K. Co. ▼. Union
& T. Co. (46 N. W. 676,

De44

Fas*

701
Minn. 361)
555
Ohiclf V. Willetts (2 Kan. 384)
Childers v. Neely (34 S. E. 828, 47 W. Va.
833
70)
City of Baltimore v. Whittington (27 Atl.
84
984, 78 Md. 231)
155
Clark V. Jetton (5 Sneed, 229)
612
Clarke v. Price (2 Wils. Oh. 157)
day V. Wood (47 N. E. 274, 153 N. Y. 134) 382
Clements v. Tillman (5 S. B. 194, 79 Ga.
51
451)
Oolton V. Dover Perpetual Building &
Loan Ass'u of Baltimore (45 Atl. 23, 90
899
Md. 85)
Combs V. Scott (45 N. W. 532, 76 Wis.
682
662)
26
Comstock V. Johnson (46 N. Y. 615)
Conger "v. New York, W. S. & B. R. Co.
723
(23 N. B. 983, 120 N. Y. 29)
Conner v. Welch (8 N. W. 260, 51 Wis.
230
431)
Bailey v. Pittsburgh Coal K. Co. (21 Atl.
Nat. Bank v. National Bank
Continental
903
72, 139 Pa. 213)
112
of Commonwealth (50 N. Y. 575)
Bank of Florence v. United States Savings
V. Gilmore
(24 N. E. 524, 133 111.
& Loan Co. (16 South. 110, 104 Ala. 297) 897 Cook
542
139)
554
Barker's Trusts, In re (1 O. Div. 43)
Cook V. Patrick (26 N. B. 658, 135 111.
Barrett v. Hinckley (14 N. E. 863, 124 111.
455
499)
557
32)
709
Corbin v. Tracy (34 Conn. 325)
368
Me.
Bates V. Hurd (65
180)
316
Cowee V. Cornell (75 N. Y. 91)
836,
Atl.
Bath Sav. Inst. v. Hathorn (33
Craig V. Hukill (16 S. B. 363, 37 W. Va.
400
88 Me. 122)
60
52ff)
Beaver v. Beaver (22 N. B. 940, 117 N. Y.
39
Craig V. Leslie (3 Wheat. 563-576)
396
421)
Crawford v. Tyrrell (28 N. E. 514, 128 N.
Belding v. Meloche (71 N. W. 592, 113
782
Y.
862 Curdy341)
Mich. 223)
v. Berton (21 Pac. 858, 79 Cal. 420) 501
537
Bent V. Priest (86 Mo. 475)
530
Bentley v. Craven (18 Beav. 75)
227
Dambmann v. Scbultiug (75 N. Y. 55)
Bissell V. Heyward (96 U. S. 580, 24 L.
Danforth v. Philadelphia & 0. M. S. L. R.
667
Ed. 678)
602
Co. (30 N. J. Eq. 12)
31 Danser
Bleakley's Appeal (66 Pa. 187)
v. Warwick (33 N. J. Eq, 133). .. 372
444
Bond V. Moore (90 N. C. 239)
Davis v. Ely (10 S. E. 138, 104 N. 0. 16) 262
Booth y. Clark (17 How. 322, 15 L. Ed.
804
Davis V. Gray (16 WaU. 203)
797
97
164)
Deasou v. Taylor (53 Miss. 697)
Borders v. Kattleman (31 N. B. 19, 142 111.
799,
49
N. J.
Deichman v. Arndt (22 Atl.
oo\
292
142
Eq. 106)
Bostwick V. Beach' (12 N." B.' 32,' 'lOS isf.' Y.
Delaney v. McCormack (88 N. Y. 174).... 407
663 De Witt V. Yates (10 Johns. 156).
144
661)
447 Dibrell v. Carlisle (48 Miss.
Botsford V. Burr (2 Johns. Ch. 405)
9
691)
Brewer v. Herbert (30 Md. 301, 96 Am.
109
Dickerson v. Colgrove (100 U. S. 578)
173
Dec. 582J
627
Donnell v. Bennett (22 Ch. Div. 835)
326 Duncombe v. Felt (45 N. W. 1004, 81
Brown v. Pierce (7 Wall. 205)
Brown, Bonnell & Co. v. Lake Superior
760
Mich. 332)
Iron Co. (10 Sup. Ot. 604, 134 U. S. 530) 28 Dyer v. Dyer (2 Cox, (3h. 92)
452
Bumgardner v. Leavitt (13 S. B. 67, 35 W.
Dyer v. Kopper (9 Atl. 4, 59 Vt. 477)
166
588
Va. 194) ...'
Buzard v. Houston (7 Sup. Ct. 249, 119 U.
Economy Sav. Bank v. Gordon (45 Atl.
268
S. 347)
19
176, 90 Md. 486)
Edwards v. Culbertson (16 S. E. 233, 111
C.ivin V. Gleason (11 N. E. 504, 105 N. Y.
N. 0. 342)
493
475 Edwards v. Rainier's Bx'rs (17 Ohio St.
256)
146
Central Trust Co. v. New York City & N.
597)
R. Co. (18 N. E. 92, 110 N. Y. 250)
876 Elmore v. Johnson (32 N. B. 413, 143 111.
Chandler v. HoUingsworth
343
(3 Del. Ch. 99) 357
513)
Cheney v. Libby (10 Sup. Ct. 498, 134 U.
Erkens v. Nicolin (40 N. W. 567, 39 Minn.
S. 68, 33 L. Ed. 818).
695
216
461)
Chicago, M. & St. P. B. Co.- v. Duraut (46
Swing T. Litchfield (22 S. E. 362, 91 Va.
N. W. 676, 44 Minn. 361)
701
57
575)
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Hospea (46
N. W. 676, 44 Minn. 361)
701
Falcke v. Gray (4 Drew. 651)
655
CJhicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Staples (46
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Grape Creek
N. W. 676, 44 Minn. 361)
Coal Co. (50 Fed. 481)
701
879

H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)

(vi)

CASES REPORTED.

vu
Page

Page

248
837 Hunter V. Bilyeu (30 111. 228)
Feehheimer v. Bavun (37 Fed. 167)
461 Hutchins v. Van Vechten (35 N. B. 446,
Ferris v. Van Vechten (73 N. Y. 113)
364
140 N. Y. 115)
First Nat. Bank of Joliet y. Blinois Steel
871
Co. (51 N. B. 200, 174 111. 140)
650 Jackson v. Phillips (14 Allen, 539)
410
Fish V. Leser (69 111. 394)
128 Jaquith v. Hudson (5 Mich. 123)
62
IMtzhugh T. Hubbard (41 Ark. 64)
Flowers, In re (1 Q. B. Div. 14)
815 Johnston v. Trippe (33 Fed. 530)
726
Fothergill v. Rowland (L. R. 17 Eq. 132) 599 Jones V. Newhall (115 Mass. 244)
595
188
Frame v. Frame (9 S. E. 901, 32 W. Va.
Jordan v. Stevens (51 Me. 78)
686
463)
Kahn v. Walton (20 N. B. 203, 46 Ohio
Francis v. Wilkinson (35 N. E. 150, 147
32
331
St. 195)
111. 370)
Keeble v. Keeble (5 South. 149, 85 Ala.
Gage V. Fisher (65 N. W. 809, 5 N. D. 297) 713
68
552)
Galbraith v. Lunsf ord (9 S. W. 365, 87
Keep V. Miller (6 Atl. 495, 42 N. J. Eq.
.....157
Tenn. 88)
117
lOD)
Kelsey v. Crowther (27 Pac. 695, 7 Utah,
Gardner t. Trustees of Village of Newi
681
burgh (2 Johns. Ch. 162)
767
519)
254 King V. Talbot (40 N. Y. 76)
511
Glass V. Hulbert (102 Mass. 24)
Godfrey v. Black (17 Pac. 849, 39 Kan.
Kirkland v. Cox (94 111. 400)
404
749 Kirsch v. Tozier (38 N. E. 375, 143 N. Y.
193)
77
Gotthelf V. Stranahan (34 N. E. 286, 138
390)
706 Knapp v. Bailey (9 Atl. 122, 79 Me. 195)
75
N. Y. 345).
446 Knobloch v. Mueler (17 N. B. 696, 123 111.
Gould v. Lynde (114 Mass. 366)
661
80
Gould V. Murch (70 Me. 288)
554)
Konvalinka v. Schlegel (9 N. B. 868, 104
Grand Rapids School Furniture Oo. v.
Haney School Furniture Co. (52 N. W.
N. Y. 125).
132
753 Kopper v. Dyer (9 Atl. 4, 59 Vt. 477)
166
1009, 92 Mich. 558)
Graybfll v. Braugh (17 ». E. 558, 89 Va.
Kunkle v. Wherry (42 Atl. 112, 189 Pa.
677
61
198)
895)
Green v.- Morris & E. R. Co. (12 N. J. Eq.
193 Ladue v. Detroit & M. R. Co. (13 Mich.
165)
Greene t. Roworth (21 N. E. 165, 113 N.
562
380)
323 Lamar v.Micou (5 Sup. Ct. 221, 112 U. S.
Y. 462)
515
Griffith V. Hilliard (25 Atl. 427, 64 Vt.
452)
762 Leonard v. Crane (35- N. E. 474, 147 III. 52) 675
643)
Lewis V. Hawkins (23 Wall. 119, 23 L.
GrUwold V. Hazard (11 Sup. Ct. 972, 141
197
Ed. 113)
665
U. S. 260)
Little V. Chadwick (23 N. E. 1005, 151
Grubb V. Sharkey (20 S. B. 784, 90 Va.
732
Mass. 109).
465
831)
Grymes v. Sanders (93 U. S. 55)
217 Lnmley v. Wagner (1 De Gex, M. & G.
614
604)
Hadcock v. Osmer (47 N. E. 923, 153 N.
289
McCaull
V.
Braham
607
Y. 604)
(16 Fed. 37)...
McClurg, Appeal of (58 Pa. 51)
Hafeey v. Lynch (38 N. E. 298, 143 N. Y.
751
Remington
McGowin
703
Pa.
v.
637
(12
56)
241)
McHenry v. Jewett (90 N. Y. 58)
Hagan v. Powers (72 N. W. 771, 103
743
Iowa, 593)
459 McLarren v. Brewer (51 M6. 402)
49
Hall v: Hall (16 N. B. 896, 125 111. 95). . . . 679 McVay y, MeVay (10 Atl. 178, 43 N. J.
Eq..47)
Hall r. Warren (9 Ves. 605)
575
370
Manhattan Manufacturing & Fertilizing
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey (32 S.
Co. V. New Jersey Stock- Yard & Market
W. 1106, 131 Mo. 212)
779
Go. (23 N. J. Bq. 161),
Hanna v. State Trust Co. (16 O. O. A. 586,
747
70 Fed. 2)
881 Marks v. Tichenor (4 S. W. 225, 85 Ky.
,
.
Hanover Nat. Bank of City of New York
662
536)
V. Blake (37 N. B. 519, 142 N. Y. 404). . 353 Marshall v. Westrope
(67 N. W. 257, 98
Iowa, 324)
Hart' V. Sansom (3 Sup. Ct. 586, 110 V.
208
53 Marshall & lUsley Bank v. Cady (77 N. W.
S. 151)
831, 75 Minn. 241)
Harvard College v. Amory (9 Pick. 446). . 526
864
Martin v. Funk (75 N. Y. 134)
Hawker v. Moore (20 S. B. 848, 40 W.
393
17 Mercantile
Trust Co. of New York v. MisVa. 49)
souri, K. & T. R. Co. (36 Fed. 221). . . . 858
Haywood v. Lincoln Lumber Co. (26 N.
894 Merchants'
& Manufacturers'
Nat. Bank
W. 184, 64 Wis. 639)
of Detroit v. Kent Circuit Judge (5 N.
380
Hess v. Singler (114 Mass. 56)
; . . . . 855
Building
Heyder v. .Excelsior
Loan Ass'n
W. 627, 43 Mich. 292)
Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing (42
No. 2 of City of Newark (8 Atl. 310, 42
Fed. 198)
70
N. J. Eq. 403)
631
Metropolitan
Lumber Co. v. Lake Superior
Hicks V. Stevens (11 N. E. 241, 121 111.
Shii)-Canal, Railway & Iron Co. (60 N.
273
186)
W. 278, 101 Mich. 577)....
Hicks V. Turck (40 N. W. 339, 72 Mich.
244
'.
711 Miller v. Scammon (52 N. H. 609)
265
311)
246 Mitchell V. McDougall (62 111. 498)
Hitchins v. Pettingill (58 N. H. 386)
279
Mitchell V. Read (61 N. Y. 123)
Hodges V. Kowing (18 Atl. 979, 58 Conn.
480
585 Mollineux's Case (Latch, 172)
574
12)
Montague v. Flockton (L. R. 16 Eq. 18^ 622
101
Horn V. Cole (51 N. H. 287)
Munson v. Syracuse, G. & 0. R. Co. (8 N.
Houston V. Timmerman (21 Pac. 1037, 17
98
E. 355, 103 N. Y. 58)
Or. 499)
531
886
Howarth v. Ellwanger (86 Fed. 54)
886 Neill V. Shamburg (27 Atl. 992, 168 Pa.
Howarth v. Kent (86 Fed. 54)
; 294
886
Howarth v. Woodworth (86 Fed. 54)
'.
263)
Cary
507 New England Trust Co. v. Abbott (38 N.
Hun V.
(82 N. Y. 65)
331,
432,
17
N.
E.
162
Fowler
N.
E.
E.
(12
Mass. 148)
Hunt V.
720
438 Newton v. Porter (69 N. Y. 133)
491, 121 111. 269}
477
Peters,
Adm'rs
Newton
v.
Rousmaniere's
ToUes
H;
V.
Atl.
Hunt
1092, 66 N.
(1
(19
182
136)
1)
225
Nonotnck Silk Co. v. Flanders (58 N. W
Hunt V. Rousmauier's Adm'rs (8 Wheat.
87
383,
177
Wis.
237)
174)
468

....

\....

"

OASES REPORTED.

vm
O'Connor v. Tyrrell

(30 Atl. 1061, 53 N.

J.

Page

Eq. 15)
730
Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co. (55 Pac. 385, 18
Utah, 279)
844
O'Hara, In re (95 N. X. 403)
495
O. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski (72 N.
114
140,
Mich. 149)
W.
755
Paine v. Meller (6 Ves. 349)
Park Bros. & Co. t. Blodgett & Clapp Co.
(29 AO. 133, 64 Conn. 28)
Patton V. Campbell (70 111. 72)
Penn v. Guggenheimer (76 Va. 839)
Phillips T. Phillips (4 De Gez, F. & J.
208)

Phillips V. PuUen
Eq. 5)
Phinlzy v. Guernsey

(16

Atl.

(36 S.

E.

J.

9, 45 N.
796, 111

6a.

346)

659
234
171

123
72

308
671

Page

Speldel V. Henrici (7 Sup. Ct. 610, 120 U.
S. 377)
Stafford v. Fetters (8 N. W. 322, 55 Iowa,
484)
Starry v. Korab (21 N. W. 600, 65 Iowa,
267)
State V. Second Judicial District Court of
Silver Bow County (39 Pac. 316, 15
Mont. 324)
Steinau v. Cincinnati Gas-Light & Coke
Co. (27 N. E. 545, 48 Ohio St. 324)
Stetson V. Northern luv. Co. (70 N. W.

15
191

122
849
744

869
595, 101 Iowa, 435)
Stimson v. Helps (10 Pac. 290, 9 Colo. 33) 277
47
Stinchfield r. Milliken (71 Me. 567)
652
Stone V. Pratt (25 111. 16)
140
Strong V. Williams (12 Mass. 391)
(2 Oh. App. 55)
Mich. 367)
Thomas v. Burnett (21 N. E. 352, 128

Tate
Teft

V. Williamson
V. Stewart (31

337
271

111.
Porter t. Frenchman's- Bay & Mt. D. Land
90
& Water Co. (24 Atl. 814, 84 Me. 195).. 587
37)
Porter t. WoodrufE (36 N. J. Eq. 174)
296 Thompson v. Wmter (43 N. W. 796, 42
654
Prentice v. Janssen (79 N. Y. 478)
163
Minn. 121)
Thum Co. V. Tloczynski (72 N. W. 140, 114
Prewett v. Trimble (17 S. W. 356, 92 Ky.
755
287
Mich. 149)
176)
Price V. Thompson (1 S. W. 408, 84 Ky.
Titus V. Rochester German Ins. Co. (31 S.
Ky.
97
127,
W.
213
340
567)
219)
Pringle v. Dunn (37 Wis. 449)
92 Tobias v. Ketchum (32 N. Y. 319)
374
Prospect Park & 0. I. R. Co. v. Coney
Tolles V. Newton (19 Atl. 1092, 66 N. H.
Island & B. R. Co. (39 N. E. 17, 144 N.
...225
136)
Y. 152)
641 Town of Venice v. Woodruff (62 N. Y. 462) 794
Purvines v. Harrison (37 N. E. 705, 151
111. 219)
788 Uranu v. Coates (109 Mass. 581)
366
Pusey V. Pusey (1 Vern. 273, White &,T.
Lead. Cas. Eq. 1109)
Alen
American
Bank
573 Van
v.
Nat.
(52 N.
Y. 1)
545
Van Dyke's Appeal (60 Pa. 481)
136
Rakeetraw v. Lanier (30 S. B. 735, 104
Ga. 188)
310 Vegelahn v. Guntner (44 N. E. 1077, 167
Reed v. Dickerman (29 Pick. 146)
134
Mass. 92)
773
Rees V. City of Watertown (19 WaU. 107)
5 Virginia Land Co. v. Haupt (19 S. E. 168,
Renard v. Clink (51 N. W. 692, 91 Mich. 1) 212
90 Va. 533)
302
Rice v. Rice (2 Drew. 73)
23
Rich V. Black (33 Atl. 880, 173 Pa. 92). . 535 Walden v. Skinner
238
(101 XJ. S. 577)
Richards T. Delbridge (L. R. 18 Eq. ll). . 385 Warner v. Bates
377
(98 Mass. 274)
Riegel v. American Life Ins. Co. (25 Atl.
Waterman
v. Alden (32 N. B. 972, 144 111.
221
1070, 153 Pa. 134)
i.
549
90)
Rindge t. Baker (57 N, Y. 209, 15 Am.
Watson V. Sutherland (5 Wall. 74)
741
Rep. 475)
578 Weall,
In re (42 Ch. Div. 674)
504
Rogers v. French (1& Ga. 316)
152
Webb's Estate, In re (49 Cal. 541)
392
Rogers v. Jones (3 Ch. Div. 688)
131
Weinstoek, Lubin & Co. v. Marks (42 Pac.
Rogers Locomotive & Machine Works t.
142, 109 Cal. 529)
783
Erie R. Co. (20 N. J. Eq. 379)
734
Welles V. Yates (44 N. Y. 525)
790
Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers (20 Ati. 467, 58
Jacobs
Welty
V.
N.
111.
B. 723, 171
(49
Conn. 356)
629
592
624)
Roquet r. Bldridge
(20 N. E. 733, 118
Wetzler v. Duffy (47 N. W. 184, 78 Wis.
150
Ind.147)
.'
669
170)
Ross V. Conway (28 Pac. 785, 92 Cal. 632) 335
v. Noonan (15 N. B. 67, 108 N.
Ross V. Parks (8 South. 368, 93 Ala. 153) 724 Wheelock
■
Y. 179)
764
Ryan v. Dox (34 N. Y. 307)
488 Wheless

St. Louis,

K.

& S, E. Co. v. Wear

S.

v.

Tenn.

Wheless

(21

S.

W.

595,

92

293)

IfiO

Whitecar v. Michenor (37 N. J. Eq. 6)
738
Whitney v. Bank of Greenville (15 South.
Schell, In
33,
71
Miss.
845
1009)
Schuyler's Steam Towboat Co., In re (32
Whitney v. Hanover Nat. Bank, two cases
N. EJ. 623, 136 N. 'Y. 169)
820
33,
South.
71
(15
845
Miss.
1009)
Semple v. Flynn (10 Atl. 177).
816
Wiedemann v. Sann (31 Atl. 211)
867
Sherry v. Perkins (17 N. E. 307, 147 Mass.
Wilbanks v. Wilbanks (18 111. 17)
129
212j
770
Willard v. Tayloe (8 Wall. 557)
644
Simmons v. Oliver (43 N. W. 561, 74 Wis.
Wm. Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers (20 Atl.
524
633)
...;... 629
467, 58 Conn. 356)
Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel (47 N.
Williamson v. Brown (15 N. Y. 354)
86
W. 814, 1 S. D. 488)
817
Wilson V. City of Mineral Point (39 Wis.
Skellenger's Ex'rs v. Skelleuger's Ex'r (32
160)
766
N. J. Eq. 659)
442 Wyman
v. Eaton (77 N. W. 865, 107 Iowa,
Slater v. Oriental Mills (27 Atl. 443, 18
\
:
214)
:
888
R. L352)
:... 466 Wyman- v. Ft. Dearborn Nat. Bank
(54 N.
Solinger v. Earle (82 N. Y. 393)
351
E. 946, 181 111. 279)
44
Southern California R. Co. v. Rutherford

W.

357,

135 Mo. 230)
re (53 N. Y. 263)

(36

823
543

(62 Fed. 796)..
3
Southern Development Co. of Nevada v.
Silva (8 Sup. Ct. 881, 125 XJ. S. 247... 282
Southern Exp. Co. v. Western North Carolina R. Co. ©9 U. S. 191)
604

Young
Zahn
146)

V.
V.

Young

N. Y. 422)

(80

McMillin

(36

:

Atl.

387

188,
'.

179 Pa.

304

ILLUSTRATIVE

CASES

ON

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
H.& B.B(j.(2d

E3d.)

0)*

/

[//

^

^Cyt^^^JU-^

..^■cyC^

-;^^t>^CLL*T-v-C

^--'C^c^

,XX-n^

-ci(C-ot/

-tv^-Zow^

-v^

—

Uu^ —

''''

-^Cct^-trt^

/

.
'>^•'-^*^'«-^

C^^.

/) '^

MAXIMS Of'^bIqUITY.

Vv

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RY.
RUTHERFORD et al.
(62 Fed.

CO.

v.

7i)6.)

Circuit Court, S. D. California. June 30, 1894.
Suit by the Southern California Railway
Company, a corporation of the state of California, against C. C. Rutherford and others
for injunction.
W.

J.

Hunsaker, for complainant.

ROSS, District Judge. Time does not admit of an extended statement of the facts of
the case or of the reasons for awarding the
The bill shows,
injunction
applied for.
among other things, that the complainant
railway company is one link in a "through line
I of road extending from National City, San
' "Di_ego county, Can
^to the city of ChicagoT ln
the state oFlllinoisT engaged in the trinsother things, of interstate
; portation, among
commerce
and the mails of the United
its connecting roads being the Ati States;
1 lantic & Pacific and the Atchison, Topeka &
That there
F6 Railroad Companies.
I Santa
is a valid existing contract between the complainant company and its connecting companies and the Pullman Palace Car Company by which all regular passenger trains
running over the said through line of road,
including that of the complainant, carrying
the mail and passengers, shall carry Pullman
cars.
That the defendants are in the emt ploy of the complainant company, and were
by it to, among other things,
employed
handle and operate its trains so engaged in
carrying the United States mail and passengers and freight between National City, Cal.,
and Chicago, 111., and to and from intermediate pomts, and from the time of their employment up to the time of the commission
of the acts complained of by the complainant were duly accustomed
to handle and
operate such trains, including Pullman cars.
/'That subsequently the defendants, although
remaining In the employment of the complainant company, refused, and still refuse,
to handle or operate any train of cars of the
complainant company to which a Pullman
\car is attached; and because of the discharge by the receivers in possession
and
control of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa FS
Railroad Company of certain employes of
theirs for refusing to handle or operate any
train of that road to which a Pullman car
is attached, the defendants to the present
.bill, while remaining in the employment of
refused, and still
the complainant company,
refuse, to handle or operate any of the trains
of tlje complainant company engaged in carrying the mall of the United States and in
which
Interstate commerce,
the aforesaid
their regular and accustomed duties as such
employes required, and still require, them to
Undoubtedly, in the
and handle.
operate
absence of a valid existing contract obligating the defendants to remain in the employment
of the complainant company, they

would ordinarily have the legal right to quit
the employment and cease work at any time. __
But the bill alleges that the defendants continue in the employment of the complainant
company,
and yet refuse m perform their
regular and accustomed duties as such employes; and it further shows that such refusal subjects and will continue to subject
of suits
the complainant to a multiplicity
and to great and Irreparable damage, in that
there is an existing valid contract requiring
complainant to attach a Pullman car or cars
on all of its through trains for the carriage
of passengers and the mail, and alsa retards
and interrupts the complainant in the transmission of the United States mail and the in*^
terstate commerce aforesaid.
It is manifest that for this' state of affairs
the law— neither civil or criminal— affords an
adequate remedy.
But the proud boast of
equity is, "TTM ji^s, ihi i-PTpen|inm:" It is the .—
maxim which forms the root of all equitable
Why should not men who redecisions.
main in the employment of another perform
the duties they contract and engage to perform? It is certainly just and right that
they should do so, or else quit the employAnd where the direct result of such
ment.
refusal works irreparable damage to the employer, and at the same time interferes with
the transmission of the mail and with commerce between
the states, equity, I think,
will compel them to perform the duties pertaining to the employment so long as they
continue in it. If I unlawfully obstruct by
a dam a stream of flowing water, equity, at
the suit of the party Injured, will compel me
by Injunction, mandatory in character, to remove the dam, and, prohibitory in character, from further interfering with the flow
of the stream; and if I unlawfully erect a
wall shutting out the light from another,
equity will compel me to tear it down, and to
refrain from further interference with the
other's rights.
It is true that such cases are
not precisely like the present one, yet the
principle upon which the court proceeds in
such
cases is not substantially different.
And if it be said that there is no exact
precedent for the awarding of an injunction
in the present case, I respond, in the language of the court In the case of Toledo,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed.
"Every just order or rule known to^
751:
equity courts was born of some emergency,
to meet some ne* conditions, and was therefore, in its time, without precedent.
If
based on soun^ principles, and beneficent
results follow their enforcement,
affording
necessary relief to the one party witliout imposing illegal burdens on the other, new
remedies
and unprecedented
orders are not
unwelcome aids to the chancell.r to meet
the constant and varying demands for equitable relief."
Moreover, the rights of. the public in a*
be considered.
case__fif__this" _sort _sKu!d
'Railroads," said the supreme court in tKe

\

y

MAXIMS OF EQUITY.
v. St Louis, 138 tJ. S. 50, 11 Sup.
"are common carriers, and owe duties to the public. The rights of the public
in respect to these great highways of communication should be fostered by the courts;
and it is one of the most useful functions of
a court of equity that its methods of procedure are capable of being made such as
to accommodate
themselves to the development of the interests of the public, in the
case of

Ct.

243,

Joy

progi-ess of trade and traflBc, by new methods
of intercourse and transportation."
For the reasons thus hastily and briefly
stated, I shall award an injunction requir-^
ing the defendants to perform all of their
regular and accustomed
duties so long as
they remain in the employment of the complainant company, which injunction, it may
be as well to state, will be strictly and rigidly/
enforced.

MAXIMS OF EQUITY.
RBES

v.

OITT OF WATERTOWN.
(19

Wall.

107.)

Supreme Court of the United

States.

1873.

Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion

of the court.
This case is free from the objections usually made to a recovery upon municipal bonds.
It is beyond doubt that the bonds were
issued by the authority of an act of the legislature of the State of Wisconsin, and in the
manner prescribed by the statute.
It is not
denied that the railroad, in aid of the construction of which they were issued, has
been built, and was put in operation.
Upon a class of the defences interposed in
the answer and in the argument it is not
The theories
necessary to spend much time.
They
upon which they proceed are vicious.
are based upon the idea that a refusal to pay
an honest debt is justifiable
because
it
would distress the debtor to pay it. A voluntary refusal to pay an honest debt is
in a commercial commua high offence
nity and is just cause of war between nations. So far as the defence rests upon these
principles we find no difficulty in overruling it.
There is, however, a grave question of the
power of the court to grant the relief asked
for.
We are of the opinion that this court has
not the power to direct a tax to be levied
for the payment of these judgments.
This
power to impose burdens and raise money is
the highest attribute of sovereignty, and is
exercised, first, to raise money for public
purposes only; and, second, by the power of
legislative authority only. It is a power
that has not been extended to the judiciary.
Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State
in the exercise of this authority at once so
delicate and so important.
The question is
not entirely new in this court.
In the case of Supervisors v. Rogers,* an
order was made by this court appointing the
marshal a commissioner, with power to levy
a tax upon the taxable property of the
county, to pay the principal and interest of
certain bonds issued by the county, tlie payment of which had been refused. That case
was like the present, except that it occurred
m the State of Iowa, and the proceeding was
taken by the express authority of a statute
of that State. The court say: "The next
question is as to the appointment of the
marshal as a commissioner to levy the tax
in satisfaction of the judgment.
This depends upon a provision of the code of the
State of Iowa. This proceeding is found in
a chapter regulating proceedings in the writ
of mandamus, and the power is given to the
court to appoint a person to discharge the
duty enjoined by the peremptory writ which
the defendant had refused to perform, and
for which refusal he was liable to an at•7 Wallace,

175.

tachment, and is express and unqnalifled.
The duty of levying the tax upon the taxable property of the county to pay the principal and interest of these bonds was specially
enjoined upon the board of supervisors by
the act of the legislature that authorized
their issue, and the appointment of the marshal as a commissioner in pursuance of the
above section is to provide for the performance of this duty where the board has disobeyed or evaded the law of the State and
—
the peremptory mandate of the court."
The State of Wisconsin, of which the city
of Watertown is a municipal corporation, has
The case of Supervisors
passed no such act.
v. Rogers is, therefore, of no authority in
the case before us. The appropriate remedy^
of the plaintiff was and is a writ of raanThis may be repeated as often as
damus.f
the occasion requires. It is a judicial writ,
a part of a recognized course of legal proIn the present case it has been
ceedings.
thus far unavailing, and the prospect of its
future success is, perhaps, not flattering.
However this may be, we are aware of no
authority in this court to appoint its own
officer to execute the duty thtis neglected by
the city in a case like the present.
In Welch v. St. Genevieve* ai a Circuit Court
for the district of Missouri, a tax was ordered
to be levied by the marshal under similar
circumstances.
We are not able to recognize
the authority of the case. No counsel appeared for the city (Mr. Reynolds as amicus
CMn'cBonly); no authorities are cited which
sustain the position taken by the court;
the power of the court to make the order is
disposed of in a single paragraph, and the
execution of the order suspended for three
months to give the corporation an opportunity to select officers and itself to levy and
collect the tax, with the reservation of a
longer suspension if it should appear advisable.
The judge, in delivering tlie opinion
of the court, states that the case is without
precedent, and cites in support of its decision no other cases than that of Riggs v.
Johnson County,** and Lansing v. Treasurer.X The first case cited does not touch
the present point.
The question in that
case was whether a mandamus having been
issued by a United States court in the regular courae of proceedings, its operation could
be stayed by an injunction from the State
court, and it was held that it could not be.
It is probable that the case of Superoisors v.
Rogers^ was the one intended to be cited.
This case has already been considered.
The case of Lansing v. Treasurer (also
cited), arose within the State of Iowa.
It
fell within the case of Supervisors v. Rogers,
tElggs
*10 Am.
372.

Johnson County,
Law Reg. (N. S.)

V.

6 Wallace, 193.
512, Fed. Cas. No. Vi '

•*6 Wallace, 166.
t9 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 415, Fed. Cas. No. 1(^688.
S7 Wallace, 176.
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Is presented in a specific form.
It L? of a
statutory character.
The remedies for the collection of a debt
are essential parts of the contract of indebtedness, and those in existence at the time
it is incurred must be substantially preThus a statute proserved to the creditor.
bibiting the exercise of its taxing power by
the city to raise money for the payment of
But it is
these bonds would be void.'*
otherwise of statutes which are in existence
at the time the debt is contracted. Of
these the creditor must take notice, and if
all the remedies are preserved to him which
were in existence when his debt was contracted he has no cause of complaint.f
By section nine of the defendant's charter
It is enacted as follows: "Nor shall any
real or personal property of any inhabitant
of said city, or any individual or corporation,
be levied upon or sold by virtue of any execution issued to satisfy or collect any debt,
obligation, or contract of said city."
If the power of taxation is conceded not
to be applicable, and the power of the court
is invoked to collect the money as upon an
execution to satisfy a contract or obligation
of the city, this section is directly applicable
The process or
and forbids the proceeding.
order asked for is in the nature of an execution ; the property proposed to be sold is that
As a' part of this theory, the plaintiff of an inhabitant of the city; the purpose to
argues that the court has authority to direct which it is to be applied is the satisfaction
the amount of the judgment to be wholly of a debt of the city.
The proposed remedy
made from the property belonging to any in- is in direct violation of a statute in existence
habitant of the city, leaving the citizens to when the debt was incurred, and made known
settle the equities between themselves.
to the creditor with the same solemnity as
This theory has many difliculties to en- the statute which gave power to contract
counter. ^In seeking to obtain for the plain- the debt. All lavys in existence when the
tiff his just riglits we must be careful not to contract is maile are necessarily referred to
invade the rights of othersS If an inhab- in it and form a part of the measure of the
itant of the city of Watertown should own obligation of the one party, and of the right
a block of buildings of the value of $20,- acquired by the
other.|
000, upon no principle of law could the
But independently of this statute, upon
whole of the plaintiff's debt be collected the general principles of law and of equity
from that property. Upon the assumption jurisprudence, we are of opinioji that we canthat individual property is liable for the pay- not grant the relief asked for.C The plaintiff!
ment of the corporate debts of the munici- invokes the aid of the principle that all legal
remedies having failed, the court of chancery
pality, it is only so liable for its proportion
ate amount.
The inhabitants are not joint must give him a remedy; that there is a
and several debtors with the corporation, nor wrong which cannot be righted elsewhere,
does their property stand in that relation to and hence the right must be sustained in
the corporation or to the ere.lilor.
This is chancery. The difficulty arises from too
not the theory of law, even in regard to tax- broad an application of a general principle.
ation. The block of buildings we have sup- The great advantage possessed by the court
posed is liable to taxation only upon its of chancery is not so much in its enlarged
value in proportion to the value of the entire jurisdiction as in the extent and adaptabilproperty, to be ascertained
ity of its remedial powers. ^Generally its
by assessment,
and when the proportion is ascertained and
jurisdiction is as well defined and limited as
paid, it is no longer or further liable; It is that of a court of
law.^ It cannot exercise
is discharged.
The residue of the tax is to jurisdiction when there is an adequate and
be obtained from other sources.
There may complete remedy at law. It cannot assume
be repeated taxes and assessments
to make control over that large class of obligations
up delinquencies, but the principle and the
called imperfect obligations, resting upon
general rule of law are as we have stated.
•Van Hoffman u. City of Quinoy, 4 Wallace, 533.
In relation to the corporation before us,
tCooley, Constitutional Limitations, 385, 387.
this objection to the liability of individual
tCooley, Constitutional Limitations, 385,
property for the payment of a corporate deht
and was rightly decided because authnrized
by the express statute of the Istate of Iowa.
It offered no precedent for the decision of a
case arising in a State where such a statute
does not exist.
These are the only anthorities upon the
power of this court to direct the levy of a tax
under the circumstances existing in this case
to which our attention has been called.
The plaintiff insists that the court may
accomplish the same result under a different name, that it has jurisdiction of the persons and of the property, and may subject
the property of the citizens to the payment
of the plaintiff's debt without the intervention
of State taxing officers, and without regard
His theory is that the court
to tax laws.
should make a decree subjecting the individual property of the citizens of Watertown
to the payment of the plaintiff's judgment;
direct the marshal to make a list thereof
from the assessment rolls or from such other
sources of information as he may obtain; report the same to the court, where any objections should be heard; that the amount of
the debt should be apportioned upon the several pieces of property owned by individual
citizens; that the marshal should be directed
to collect such apportioned amount from
such persons, or in default thereof to sell
the property.
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The difficulty and the embarrassment aris-

ing from an apportionment or contribution
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among those bound to make the payment we
do not regard as
serious objection.
Contribution and apportionment are recognized
beads of equity jurisdiction, and
be assumed that process could issue directly
against the citizens to collect the debt of the
city,
court
equity could make the apportionment mole conveniently than could a
court of law.f

3

•See the oases collected In Cooley's Constlttt
tional Limitations, 240-245.
IRussell V. Men of Devon, Term R. 667.
See Emerio v. Gilman, 10 California, 408, wher*
all the cases are collected.
•SCooley'B Constitutional Limitations, 240.
tl Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
470 and onwards.
§

%

S

tl Equity Jurisprudence, 61.
IHeardu Stanford, Cases Tempore Talbot, 174.
60.
•1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
•* Wester velt v. Gregg, 13 New York, 209.

of the town, naming it; the individual Inhahsaid, may and do appear and deitants,
held that the
fend the suit, and hence
individual inhabitants have their day in
court, are each bound by the judgment, and
that
may be collected from the property of
This is local law peany one of them.*
not the law of
culiar to New England. It
It
this country generally, or of England.||
has never been held to be the law in New
York, in New Jersey, in Pennsylvania, nor,
as stated by Mr. Cooley, in any of the W.estrests upon the rule
em States.f So far as
that these municipalities have no common
fund, and that no other mode exists by
which demands against them can be enforced,
he says that it cannot be considered as applicable to those States' where provision is
made for compulsory taxation to satisfy
town or city.§
judgments against
The general principle of law to which we
have adverted is not disturbed by these
references. It
applicable to the case before us. Whether, in fact, the individual
defence to the debt, or by way of exhas
not im>
emption, or is without defence,
To assume that he has none, and
portant.
therefore, that he is entitled to no day in
court, is 'to assume against him the very
point he may wish to contest.
Again, in the case of Smerio v. Gilman,
is said: "The inhabitants of
before cited,
county are constantly changing; those who
contributed to the debt may be non-residents
upon the recovery of the judgment or the
levy of the execution. Those who opposed
the creation of the liability may be subjected to its payment, while those, by whose
fault the burden has been imposed, may be
. .
.
entirely relieved of responsibility.
*To enforce this right against the inhabitants
of county would lead to such multiplicity
of suits as to render the right valueless/J
We do not perceive, if the doctrine concorrect, why the money might
tended for
not be entirely made from property owned by
the creditor himself, if he should happen to
own property within the limits of the corporation, of sufficient value for that pur-

t

a

a is

"||

jonscience and moral duty only, unconnected
with legal obligations. S Judge Story says.f
"There are cases of fraud, of accident, and
of trust which neither courts of law nor of
equity presume to relieve or to mitigate," of
which he cites many instances. Lord Talbot says:| "There are cases, indeed, in which
a court of equity gives remedy where the
law gives none, but where a particular
remedy is given by law, and that reme^iy
bounded and circumscribed by particular
rules, it would be very improper for this
court to take It up where the law leaves it,
and extend it further than the law allows."
Generally its jurisdiction depends upon
legal obligations, and its decrees can only enforce remedies to the extent and in the mode
by law established. With the subjects of
fraud, trust, or accident, when properly before it, it can deal more completely than can
These subjects, however,
a court of law.
may arise in courts of law, and there be well
^sposed of.*
£X court of equity cannot, by avowing that
there is a right but no remedy known to the
law, create a remedy in violation of law, or
even without the authority of law!
It acts
upon established principles i(Bi only, but
through established channels. Thus, assume that the plaintiff is entitled to the payment of his judgment, and that the defendant neglects its duty in refusing to raise the
amount by taxation, it does not follow that
this court may order the amount to be made
from the private estate of one of its citizens.
This summary proceeding would involve a
violation of the rights of the latter. He has
never been heard in court. He has had no
opportunity to establish a defence to the
debt itself, or if the judgment is valid, to
show that bis property is not liable to its
payment. It is well settled that legislative
exemptions from taxation are valid, that
such exemptions may be perpetual in their
duration, and that they are in some cases beThe proceedyond legislative interference.
would violate that fundaing supposed
mental principle contained in chapter twenty-ninth of Magna Charta, and embodied in
the Constitution
of the United States, that
no man shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law — that is, he must
be served with notice of the proceeding, and
have a day in court to make his defence.**
"Due process of law (it is said) undoubtedly means in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules and forms
which have been established for the protecIn the New Engtion of private rights.
judgment obheld that
land States it
town may be levied upon
tained against
and made out of the property of any inhabitant of the town. The suit in those States
is brought in form against the inhabitants

8
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We apprehend, also, that there Is some
contusion in the plaintiff's proposition,
upon which the present jurisdiction is
claimed.^ It is conceded, and the authorities are too abundant to admit a question,
that there is oo chancery jurisdiction where
there is an adequate remedy at law.^The
writ Qf mandamus is, no doubt, the regular
remedy in a case like the present, and ordinarily it is adequate and its results are
satisfactory^ The plaintiff alleges, however,
in the preset case, that he has issued such
a writ on three different occasions; that,
by means of the aid afforded by the legislature and by the devices and contrivances set
forth in the bill, the writs have been fruitless; that, in fact, they afford him no remedy.
The remedy is in law and in theory adequate and perfect. The difficulty is In its
execution only. The want of a remedy and
the inability to obtain the fruits of a remedy
«re quite distinct, and yet they are confounded in the present proceeding. To illustrate: the writ of habere facias possessionem is the established remedy to obtain
tlie iruits of a judgment for tlie plaintiff in
ejectment. It is a full, adequate, and comNot many years since there
plete remedy.
existed in Central New York combinations of

settlers and tenants disguised as Indians,
and calling themselves such, who resisted
the execution of this process in their counties,
and so effectually that for some years no
landlord could gain possession of his land.
There was a perfect remedy at law, but
through fraud, violence, or crime its execution was prevented. It will hardly be argued
that this state of things gave authority to invoke the extraordinary aid of a court of
chancery. The enforcement of the legal
suspended by
remedies
was temporarily
means of illegal violence, but the remedies
remained as before. It was the case of a
miniature revolution.
The courts of law
lost no power, the court of chancery gained
none. The present case stands upon the
same principle. VChe legal remedy is adequate and complete, and time and the law
must perfect its execution.N
Entertaining the opinion that the plaintiff
has been unreasonably obstructed in the pursuit of bis legal remedies, we should be quite
willing to give him the aid requested it the
law permitted it. We cannot, however, find
authority for so doing, and we acquiesce in
the conclusion of the court below that the
bill must be dismissed.
JUDGMBNT AFFIRMED.
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DIBRBLL

y.

CARLISLE

et al.

(48 Miss. 691.)
Supreme Court of Mississippi.

1873.

Appeal fromi chancery court, CMckasaw
county; Bradford, Chancellor.
in the court below,
The complainant
Charles C. Dibrell, filed his biU to the April
term, 1868, alleging that on the 4th December, 1866, William F. Walker, then largely
indebted in a sum exceeding $60,000 to his
wife, Eliza E. Walker, on account of her
separate estate, executed and delivered a
deed of conveyance to one Thomas J. Denton,
a citizen of said county, and his successors
in office, as trustee for said Eliza, and the
heirs of her body, by which he granted, bargained, and sold to said trustee certain real
and personal property particularly described
in the bUl, and states its value at $29,942,
and that it was intended to be, and was
received by the parties ag, a payment to that
extent on the indebtedness of Walker to his
wife. The deed is filed as an exhibit to the
bill.
It is further stated in the bill that Denton,
the trustee, accepted the trust, entered immediately upon the discharge of his duties,
residing within a few miles of the property
transferred to him, ready at all times to do
and perform all acts contemplated in the
deed, until the 4th March, 1868; that on the
6th of March, 1868, under the provisions of
said deed, the complainant was duly and
legally appointed as successor to said Denton by the probate judge of said county;
that on the 20th March, 1867, the said William F. Walker, confederating with Henry
G. Hmnphrles and E. K. Carlisle, commission merchants and citizens of Mobile, Ala.,
to divest the said Eliza of her equitable interest in said lands, induced her to execute
jointly, with her husband, a mortgage on
said lands, to secure the payment of an asserted debt of $7,337.64, which the said WilUam F. had contracted with said Humphries
& Carlisle, maturing on the 19th December,
1867; that said deed of mortgage authorized
Carlisle & Humphries, in default of payment of said debt, upon giving 30 days' notice, to sell said lands at auction and divest
the title from the trustee and the said Eliza,
and forever bar her equity of redemption.
The mortgage is filed as an exhibit to the
bill.
It is further charged that said Humphries
& Carlisle were fully apprised of the true
condition of the title to the land when they
affected the negotiation; that they were ex>
pressly notified of the deed of trust first
mentioned, and knew that the property they
were seeking to incumber was trust property, settled upon the said Eliza and the
heirs of her body; that she was ignorant of
the legal effect to be given to the deed of
mortgage by the draftsman; that but a small
portion of the debt claimed was for her

9

family supplies and necessaries, wearing apparel of herself or children, or their education, or household furnitm-e, or carriages and
horses, buildings on her land and premises,
or repairs thereof, or materials, work, anc
labor for the benefit and Improvement of her
separate estate.
The bill "protests against another clause
of the said deed of mortgage, as being not
only manifestly against his . rights, but in
direct violation of the deed from said Walker to complainant's predecessor"; alleges that
the land in the deed is estimated at $20,750;
that indebtedness in the mortgage is $7,337.64, far less than the value of the land;
charges that, since the execution
of the
mortgage,
said William F. has raid $1,800
or $2,000 to Carlisle & Humphries, which
should have been credited on said indebtedness, and that the mortgage
provides that
the surplus from the land sale shall be paid
to Walker and wife, and not to the trustee,
the complainant
The bill fm-ther states that said Humphries & Carlisle, by their agent and attorney,
J. N. Carlisle, Esq., have advertised the lands
for sale under the mortgage, and also about
6,000 bushels of corn, on the second Monday
in March, 1868.
A copy of the advertisement is filed as an exhibit.
H. G. Humphries, E. K. Carlisle, J. N.
Carlisle, and William F. Walker are made
defendants, and injunction, etc., prayed for
to restrain the sale.
There is also a prayer
for discovery, by Humphries & Carlisle, of
the amount due them, and that on final hearing the injunction be made perpetual, that
the mortgage be canceled.
On the 6th March, 1868, the chancellor indorsed on the bUl his fiat for injunction, upon the complainant entering into bond with
sureties in the sum of $2,000. The bond was
given, and writs of injunction and subpcena
issued.

Exhibit No.

1, referred to in the bill, is
follows:
"The State of Mississippi, Chickasaw County. This Indenture, made and entered into
this 4th day of December, 1866, between
WUliam' F. Walker, of the first part, Eliza
K. Walker, his wife, of the second part,
each of the county and state aforesaid, and
Thomas J. Denton, of the same county and
state, of the third part, witnesseth: That the
said party of the second part, having been
the owner In her own right at the time of
her marriage, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, with
the said party of the first part, of a large
personal estate, which was received by, controlled, possessed, used, and enjoyed by him,
as hereinafter set forth, that is to say, thirtythree negro slaves, which went into his possession on the first day of January,
1854,
and were worked and controlled in raising
cotton, etc., and whose hire was worth as
stated," etc. The deed them proceeds to give
the names and value of the hire of each

as
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for

eleven years, the aggregate hire
at $34,250, and continues: "And the
said party of the second part having received
large sums of money from the separate estate of the said Eliza, as follows: The sum
of fifteen thousand dollars on the first day
of January, 1854; seven thousand dollars on
the 1st July, 1855, and six thousand dollars
on the 1st July, 1866, amounting to twentyeight thousand dollars; and the said William F. having assumed the entire managem'ent and control of the separate estate of
the said Eliza, and with the funds realized
from the proceeds raised by her negro slaves
as aforesaid, and with the cash received by
him as above set forth, he purchased real
and personal property as hereinafter described and valued, that is to say," etc.
The
deed here describes the tract of land in controversy, and a number of mules, horses,
wagons, carriage and harness, farming utensils, carpenters' and blacksmiths' tools, household and kitchen fm-niture, jewelry, plate,
stock hogs, etc., valued at $8,192, and proceeds:
"And the said William F. being
anxious to secure, so far as he has the ability to do so, the payment of this debt he
owes to his wife, amounting to the sum of
sixty-two thousand two hundred and fifty
dollars, taking the hire of the negro property as the basis of his liability for their
Now, in consideration
use and employment.
of the premises, and for and in consideration of the sum of ten dollars, paid by the
said party of the third part, the receipt of
which Is hereby acknowledged, the said party of the first part hath granted, bargained,
and sold, and by these presents doth grant,
bargain, and sell, unto the said party of the
third part, all the real and personal property above described,
to wit" (giving description of land and personal property before referred to): "In trust, nevertheless, for
the use, benefit and behoof of the said party
of the second part and the heirs of her body
forever, who are to retain the possession,
management,
direction, apd control of the
property conveyed.
The said trustee or his
successor, to be designated by the judge of
the probate court of the county and state
aforesaid, in term time or in vacation, to
take such possession
or direction as may
then be necessary for faithfully carrying out
this trust according to its true intent and
meaning,
such as bringing and defending
suits, executing bonds, signing papers, or appointing an attorney in fact to do and per
form whatever may be necessary and proper
to be done in protecting and defending the
said estate to the party of the second part
and the heirs of her body." The deed then
states that the property conveyed, valued at
$29,942, "is intended to be to that extent in
part payment of the sum of $62,250, the
amount admitted to be due," etc., and concludes with warranty of title, etc.
Exhibit No. 2 of the bill is in the words
and figures following:
negro

■valued

"The State
Chickasaw
of Mississippi,
County. This deed of mortgage, made the
this 20th day of March, 1867, between W. F.
Walker, with B. K. Walker, his wife, both
of the county of Chickasaw and state of
Mississippi, of the first part, and E. K. Carlisle, with H. G. Humphries, commission
merchants, of Mobile and state of Alabama,
of the other, witnesseth: That whereas the
said W. F. Walker, ^vith B. R. Walker, his
wife, are indebted to the said E. K. Carlisle
and H. G. Humphries in the sum of seventythree hundred and thirty-seven dollars and
sixty-four cents, said sum of money being
advanced to said W. F. Walker and E. R.
Walker on their crop of cotton, to be raised
in and during the year. Anno Domini, 1867,
on the plantation under the superintendence
of W. F. Walker, Jno. D. Poyner, and Thos.
McCarthy.
Said sum of money is further
secured by their certain promissory notes,
bearing date the nineteenth day of January,
A. D. 1867, for the said sum of seventythree hundred and thirty-seven dollars and
sixty-four cents, subscribed with their hands
and delivered to the said E. K. Carlisle and
H. G. Humphries, whereby the said W. F.
Walker and E. R. Walker promised to pay the
said Carlisle & Humphries, or order, seventythree hundred and thirty-seven dollars and
sixty-four cents, on or before the nineteenth
day of December, 1867, for value received.
And whereas, the said W. F. Walker and E.
R. Walker, his wife, are willing to give this
deed for satisfaction of what may be due
and unpaid to the said Carlisle & Humphries
on the nineteenth day of December,
1867,
next: Therefore the said W. F. Walker and
B. R. Walker bargain, sell, alien, and convey
to the said Carlisle & Humphries all those
tracts or parcels of land situated and lying
in the county of Chickasaw and state of
Mississippi, known and described as the west
half of section twelve, in township thirteen,
range five east, and the west half of section
thirteen, to'n-nshjp thirteen, range five east,
containing six hundred and seventy acres,
more or less; also convey all the cotton crop
that is raised on said lands or plantation under the direction or superintendence of W. F.
Walker, .John D. Poyner, and Thomas McCarthy, which said cotton is to be shipped to
said Carlisle & Humphries aforesaid as soon
as is practicable after ginning and baling the
same; to have and to hold the same with all
the rights and appurtenances to the said Carlisle & Humphries, their heirs, executors, and
administrators. But this conveyance is upon
condition, if the said W. F. Walker and E. R.
Walker shall, on or before the nineteenth
day of December, 1867, well and fully pay
the said sum of money, then this deed Is to
cease and to be void; but if after that day
said sum, with any part thereof, be unpaid,
then it shall be lawful for the said Carlisle
& Humphries, or their legal representative,
after giving thirty days' notice by advertisement in some newspaper in Chickasaw coun-
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cause, day, and place of sale, to
proceed to sell at public auction at Okolona
the mortgaged property, or a sufficiency

thereof, for cash to the highest and best bidder, and out of the proceeds, after defraying
the cost of advertisement and sale, they may
retain the full amount of mortgage money
due, and if there be a surplus they are presently to pay It to W. F. Walker and B. E.
Walker, or their legal representatives, and to
make to the vendee or vendees a deed of
conveyance, transmitting the quit of purchase
of all right, title, or interest of the parties
and their heu:s, or of all claiming under
them, and thereupon all the right and title
of the W. F. Walker, with E. E. Walker, his
wife, to redeem, shall be as effectually barred and foreclosed as if upon a decree in
equity; and the said W. F. Walker, with B.
R. Walker, his wife, hereto put their names
and seals, the day and date aforewritten.
"[Signed]
W. F. Walker.
[Seal.]
"B. E. Walker.
[Seal.]"
Carlisle & Humphries filed their answer,
averring that they knew nothing of the existence of the debt alleged .to be due Eliza
E. Walker by W. F. Walker, her husband,
except what they learn from the said exhibit
No. 1 In the bill, and that they believe the
debt fictitious; that there was no valid consideration in law or equity passing from said
Eliza to said W. P. Walker for the conveyance; that said conveyance is fraudulent and
made with the intent to defraud the creditors of said W. F.; that the appointment of
T. J. Denton as trustee was merely nominal,
and for the better serving to cloak and conceal the said property and more effectually
defrauding the creditors of the said W. F.;
that said Denton, under a provision in the
deed of trust, appointed the said W. P. his
attorney In fact, clothing him with full power to act in all things pertaining to said
trusteeship, as if he, the said W. F., had
been trustee; that the said W. P. executed
the said mortgage in the biU mentioned as
such attorney in fact; that the complainant,
O. C. Dibrell,. ignoring the action of his predecessor, Denton, filed his bill with the intent to deprive respondents of their rights
and powers vested in them as mortgagees;
that said T. J. Denton, being aware of the
execution of said attorneyship to W. P. Walker, refused to join in said bill of complaint,
but, actuated by the dictates of honor and
honesty, decliued entering Into such fraudulent interference with respondents' rights;
by Carlisle
denies
all confederating
&
Humphries to defeat Mrs. Walker's interest
in said lands; denies inducing her to join
her husband in executing the mortgage; alleges that the mortgage was made by W. P.
Walker, as attorney in fact for the trustee
and by Mrs. Walker, freely and voluntarily,
without any persuasion, and by her so acknowledged In a private examination by an
oflScer authorized to take such acknowledgment; denies all knowledge of the trust un-

1]

der which Mrs. Walker held the lands, and
to
supposed W. P. Walker fully empowered
convey or incumber them.
Eespondents assert that the $7,337.64 was
money actually advanced to the said W. P.
Walker and his wife during the year. 1867,
for the necessary supplies of the plantation
of said Walker and wife, and believe that it
was used for them and their children; denies
that the property mortgaged is and was
worth $20,750, but insists that its value at
the date of the mortgage and now does not
exceed respondents' debt; denies that the
execution of the mortgage was against the
rights of the trustee, Dibrell; alleges that
W. P. Walker was notoriously acting as the
agent of his wife, and with the knowledge
and consent of Denton, trustee; that, if the
allegations In complainant's bill be true, said
preWalker, under false and fraudulent
tenses, obtained respondents'
money;
that
said Walker and wife have never paid but
$873.20, and this amount was duly credited
Eespondents say that they are
on the debt.
complainant,
led to believe
that Dibrell,
through the solicitation and procurement of
W. P. Walker, accepted the appointment of
trustee, and, without a knowledge of what
his predecessor had done, has filed this bill
and made the representations and allegations
therein from false representations of W. P.
Walker;
that DibrelVs action is in direct
contravention of the action of his predecessor, Denton; that W. P. Walker's interest is
not with respondents as defendants in this
suit, but identified with the complainant;
and that he cunningly devised his joinder
with respondents as defendant for fraudulent purposes.
Eespondents insist that the advances made
by them were solely on the credit of Mrs.
Walker and her children, the beneficiaries of
the pretended
deed of trust, and for their
benefit and use, and not on the credit of W.
P. Walker; that he was insolvent and unable
to obtain credit at the time; that the writ
of injunction was illegally issued because of
the want of good sureties on the bond; that
said bond has no date and bears no evidence
of having been duly executed as the law directs; that the fiat only requires a bond for
$2,000, whilst the amount of Indebtedness
enjoined is $6,464.36, and the bond is not
in double the sum so enjoined.
The mortgage referred to in the bill as
Exhibit No. 2 is made an exhibit in the answer also. Another exhibit to the answer
consists of an account of the debts due by
W. F. and Eliza Walker to Carlisle & Humphries, showing balance of $7,337.64.
Exhibit
C ig as follows:
"The State of Mississippi, Chickasaw County. To whom these presents
may come,
greeting: Know ye that I, Thos. J. Denton,
reposing entire confidence in the probity and
integrity of W. P. Walker, a citizen of the
county of Chickasaw and state of Mississippi,
do by these presents constitute him my true
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and lawful attorney in fact for me as trustee, appointed under a deed executed by the
said Walker in favor of Eliza R. Walker
and the heirs of her body as cestui que trust,
on the 4th day of December, 1S66, conveying
property valued at $29,real and personal
and in my name to sign all papers,
942,
bonds, affidavits, contracts, and to make, do,
and perform all and every act necessary or
proper to be made, done, or performed for the
protection of said trust estate, or for carrying
out the true intent and meaning of said trust
deed, and to every act in the premises which
I could do if personally present, and hereby
ratify and confirm whatever he may lawfully

I

Given under my hand
do in the premises.
and seal this the 4th day of December, 1866.
"[Signed]
T. J. Denton. [Seal.]"
This power of attorney was acknowledged
in Chickasaw county.

and recorded

J.

A. On- and Harris & Withers, for appelGholson & Hooper, James T. Harrison,
and George L. Potter, for appellees.
lant.

PEYTON, J. This was an injunction bill
brought by the appellant in the chancery
court of Chickasaw county to restrain the
appellees, E. K. Carlisle and H. G. Humphries, from executing a power of sale contained in a mortgage given to them by William
F. Walker and Eliza R. Walker, his wife.
The material facts of the case are these:
William P. Walker, being indebted to his
wife, Eliza R., in a large amount of money,
on the 4th day of December, 1866, conveyed
to one Thomas J. Denton certain real and
personal estate situated in the said county
of Chickasaw, In this state, in trust for the
use of the said Eliza R. Walker and the
heirs of her body forever, which deed of conveyance was duly acknowledged and recorded.
on the 20th day of March, A. D.
the said William F. Walker and Eaiza
R., his wife, made and executed their deed
of mortgage of six hundred and seventy acres
of the land, covered by the said deed of trust,
to said Carlisle & Humphries, to secure the
payment of a promissory note for $7,337.64,
made by said Walker and wife, dated the
19th day of January, 1867, and payable to
said Carlisle & Humphries on the 19th day of
December,
1867.
The said mortgage deed,
which was duly acknowledged and recorded,
gives to the mortgagees a power of sale of
the mortgaged property in default of payment
of the note at maturity.
The note not having been paid, the mortgagees were proceeding to sell the property,
when they were enjoined from so doing by
the appellee, who was appointed trustee, vander a power in the deed creating the trust
estate, to succeed the original trustee, who
had resigned the trust.
The appellees, Carlisle & Humphries, In
their answer, admit the conveyance in trust
as set forth in the bill of complaint, but deny
that there was any valid consideration there-

That

1867,

for, and insist that It was made to hinder,,
delay, and defraud creditors.
They admit
the execution of the mortgage stated in the
bill, and insist that they had a right to sell
the mortgaged property to pay the amount
They aver
due on the debt therein specified.
that the amount specified in the said note
was actually advanced by
and mortgage
them to the said W. F. and E. R. Walker for
the necessary supplies of the plantation of
the said Walker and wife, and that they believe that the said money was used by the
said Walker and wife for the use and benefit
of the said B. R. Walker and her children,
and that the advances were made solely on
the credit of Mrs. E. R. Walker, and not on
that of her husband, who was insolvent and
imable to obtain credit at the time the advances

were

made.

The appellees, Carlisle & Humphries, moved the court below to dissolve the injunction
The
on bill, answer, exhibits, and proofs.
motion was sustained and the injunction disAnd from this decree the cause is
solved.
brought to this court by appeal on the part
of the appellee.
This record presents three important questions for our consideration:
take
(1) What interest does Mrs. Walker
under the conveyance to a trustee for the
use of herself and the heirs of her body forever?
ynth her
(2) Where the wife has joined
husband in a mortgage of her separate estate
to pay the debt of her husband, can the corpus of that estate, under the existing laws,
be subjected in a court of equity to the payment of such debt?
estate of Mrs. Walker
(8) Is the separate
liable in equity to the payment of the debt
specified in the mortgage or any part thereof?
The first question involves the construction
of the limitations in the deed creating the
trust estate. It is a common maxim that
equity follows the law: IDquitas sequitur
legem.
Where a rule of the common or statute law is direct and governs the case with
aU its circumstances or the particular point,
a court of equity is as much bound by it as
a court of law, and can as little justify a departure from it. A court of equity cannot
disregard the canons of descent.
In general,
in courts of equity, the same construction
and effect are given to perfect trust estates
as are given by courts of law to legal estates.
The incidents, properties, and conse-_
quences of the estates are the same.
The"
same restrictions are applied as to creating
estates and bounding perpetuities and giving
absolute dominion over property. The same
modes of construing the language and limitations of the trusts are adopted.
1 Story, Eq.
(Redf. Ed.) pp. 53-55, i 64.
The words "heirs of the body," in the cooveyance of a legal estate, are words of limitation of the estate to the donee, and not
words of purchase for the heirs of the body.
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Warren v. Haley, Smedes & M. Oh. 647.
These words create an estate In fee tail,
which, by our statute, is converted into an
estate in fee simple. Bev. Code, p. 307, art.
3. And, if it be true that the same modes of
construing the language and limitations of
trust estates are adopted as apply to legal
estates, we cannot resist the conclusion that
Mrs. Walker takes, under the terms of the
deed, the entire trust estate absolutely.
With regard to the second question it may
be remarked that it is a familiar rule of equity jm-isprudence that general debts or general personal engagements of a married woman, contracted during coverture, are not
chargeable upon her separate estate; and, unless a feme covert who contracts a debt or
enters into an engagement designs that such
engagement or debt shall constitute a charge
upon her separate estate, a court of equity
to enforce
wiU not entertain jurisdiction
payment thereof out of such separate estate.
When real property is conveyed absolutely
to the separate use of a married woman, she
can dispose of the trust estate only in the
mode and manner prescribed by the instrument creating the trust estate, and, if none be
prescribed and limited therein, then in accordance with the provisions of the statute.
Prior to the adoption of our present Code,
in 1857, it has been repeatedly decided by
this court that the wife may bind the corpus
of her separate estate, by deed in trust or
mortgage, as a security for the debts of her
husband. James v. Fisk, 9 Smedes & M.
144; Sessions v. Bacon, 23 Miss. 272; Armstrong V. Stovall, 26 Miss. 280; Euss T. Wingate, 30 Miss. 445; Stone v. Montgomery, 35
Miss. 83-105;
Prewett v. Land, 36 Miss.
495.
Since

the adoption of the Code, a married
woman has no power to incumber the corpus
of her separate estate by deed of trust, mortgage, or otherwise, for the debt of her husband, but only the income thereof. The statute expressly proA^des that no conveyance or
incumbrance for the separate debts of the
husband shaU be binding on the wife beyond
the amount of her income.
Rev. Code, p.
336, art. 23. This is a wise provision intended to secure to the wife the enjoyment of
her separate estate against any possible contingency of loss through the fraud, force, or
undue influence of her husband.
The solution of the third question depends
upon the facts of the case as they may be
developed
and established by the evidence.
With a view to the more beneficial enjoyment and productiveness of the separate estate of a married woman, the law has provided that all contracts made by the husband
and wife, or by either of them, for supplies
for the plantation of the wife, or for the
employment of an agent to superintend the
planting operations, may be enforced, and
satisfaction had out of her separate estate.
And all contracts made by the wife, or by
for family
the husband with her consent,
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supplies or necessaries, wearing apparel of
herself and children, or for their education,
or for household furniture, or for carriage
and horses, or for buildings on her land or
premises, and the materials therefor, or for
work and labor done for the use, benefit, or
Improvement of her separate estate, shall be
binding on her, and satisfaction may be had
out of her separate property. Bev. Code, p.
336, art 25.
And it has been decided that a
married woman is liable on a promissory
note given by her for a horse purchased by
her for the supply and use of her plantation,
Robertson v. Ward, 12 Smedes & M. 490.
This adjudication was made under the act
of 1846, which made the income only of her
separate estate liable to the payment of the
And, under the act of 1857, this court
debt.
has decided that the wife is liable out of the
corpus of her separate estate to the payment
of a note given by herself and husband for
money advanced for the purpose of purchasing supplies for her plantation, and which
was actually applied to that purpose.
Bowman V. Thomas E. Helm. These cases are
regarded as coming within the equity of the
respective
statutes under which the debts
were contracted.
It results, therefore, from this view of the
law, that Mrs. Walker is liable to payment
out of her separate estate for the amount of
supplies furnished by Carlisle & Humphries
for her plantation, and for the amount of
the money advanced by them to Walker, or
Walker and wife, for the purchase of supplies for her plantation, or the improvement
of her separate estate, and which were actually applied to that use and purpose.
And
for that portion of the debt secured by the
mortgage,
which was not applied to these
purposes, she is liable to payment out of the
only of her separate estate.
income
The
record contains no evidence as to what portion of the debt secvffed by the mortgage
was for supplies actually furnished by Carlisle & Humphries for the plantation of Mrs.
Walker, or which was applied to the purchase of such supplies.
Nor is there any
proof as to what amount of the money advanced by Carlisle & Humphries was applie'd
by Walker to his own use.
The most appropriate remedy of Carlisle
& Humphries will be found in a court of
eqiiity, in which an account can be taken of
what portion of the note secured by the
mortgage was for supplies for Mrs. Walker's plantation, and what part of the money
was advanced by them for the purchase of
such supplies, and which was actually so
applied, and what part of the same was used
by Walker for his own purposes.
When
these facts are ascertained,
the court will
made a decree in accordance with the principles above laid down, subjecting the separate estate of Mrs. Walker to sale to pay
for the supplies for her plantation, and decreeing that the trustee of the estate and
Mrs. Walker pay to Carlisle & Humphries

u
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the amount of the debt, secured by the mortgage, found due them by William F. Walker, out of the income of her separate estate.
It is insisted by some of the counsel of the
appellees that the mortgage was void because
the trustee did not join in the mortgage deed.
In a case free from
This was not necessary.
fraud or imdue influence, a married woman
can bind her separate property without the
trustees, unless their assent be made necessary by the instrument which gave that
And in the case at bar the charge
property.
made upon the separate estate by the wife
is totally unrestrained by the deed creating
the trust estate, and is valid and binding,
and a court of equity is bound to enforce it,
so far as to subject the separate estate to
the payment for supplies for carrying on the
wife's plantation, and so far as she was
surety for her husband, and had mortgaged
her property to pay his debt, to subject the
rents, issues, and profits of her separate estate to the payment of that debt.
With respect to the duty of trustees in
relation to real property, it is still held, in
conformity to the old law of uses, that pernancy of the profits, execution of estates, and
defense of the land, are the three great properties of the trust.
Therefore a court of
chancery will compel trustees (1) to permit
the cestui que trust to receive the rents and
profits of the land; (2) to execute such conveyances aa the cestui que trust shall direct;
the title of the land in any
(3) to defend
court of law or equity.
Tiff. & B. Trusts,
815.

A cestui que trust may lawfully dispose of
his trust estate, notwithstanding his title is
contested by the trustee, for the latter can
never disseize the former of the trust estate;
but, so long as it continues, the possession of
the trustee is treated, at least in a court of
equity, as the possession of the cestui que
trust Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. 475, Fed.
Cas. No. 787.
It is insisted that the power of sale contained in a mortgage deprives the mortgagor
of his equity of redemption, and therefore
cannot rightfully be exercised.
The principle
seems to be now well established,
though

great doubt and discussion, that a
clause may legally be inserted in the mortgage deed empowering the mortgagee,
upon
breach of condition, to mal^e sale of the
mortgaged premises, to pay his debt from the
proceeds,
and account with the mortgagor
for the balance.
The power of sale is to
apply solely to the remedy, and not to impair
any right of the mortgagor.
The power of
sale does not bar the mortgagee's right to
foreclose by judicial proceedings.
The remedy is cumulative merely, and in no respects
affects the jurisdiction or proceedings
of a
1 Hil. Mortg. 128, 129.
court of chancery.
And such sale, made after the law day or
breach of condition, and in pursuance of the
terms of the mortgage, vests in the purchaser all the title conveyed by the mortgage, free from the right of redemption.
There is nothing in the record tending in
any way to impeach the validity of the
mortgage.
There is no evidence of any undue influence
or improper conduct or control on the part of the husband to obtain
the wife's assent and signature to the mortgage deed.
And the debt in question was
not incurred for the husband alone, or for
unworthy purposes.
It was for money advanced and articles supplied, partly for the
family, partly for the use of Mrs. Walker,
and partly for the benefit of the trust estate.
We can, therefore, perceive no good
reason why the mortgage should not be enforced against the separate estate or Its income, according to the nature, extent, and
character of the liability, when ascertained
after

by proof.
It is objected that the mortgagees had no
right to sell the corn advertised, under the
power of sale contained in the mortgage
deed, for the reason that there was no corn
mortgaged.
This objection is well taken, for
it is very clear that the mortgagees can sell
under the power only the property covered
by the mortgage.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion,
we think the court below erred in dissolving
the injunction.
The decree must therefore be reversed and
cause remanded.
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SPBIDEIi
(7 Sup. Ct
Supreme

et al. v.
610,

HENRICI.

120 U. S. 377.)

Court of the United States.

March

7, 1887.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Western District of
Pennsylvania.
Wm. Reinecke, Geo. Hoadly, E. M. Johnson,
and Edwd. Colston, for appellants.
George Shiras, Jr., for appellees.

GRAY, J. This bill was filed against the
trustees of the Harmony Society, an unincorporated association of persons living together as a community, by a former member
of the society, claiming a share in property
The bill is
..^In the hands of the trustees.
sought to be maintained on the ground that
the trust was not a charity, in the legal
sense, and the members of the society were
equitable tenants in common of the property
held in trust. The learned counsel for the
appellants differ in theif views of the trust;
the one insisting that it was unlawful, because founded in fraud and against public
policy, and should therefore be dissolved;
and the other contending that it was a lawful and continuing trust.
We have not
found it necessary to consider which of
these is the sound view, because we are of
opinion that the plaintiff did not show himself to be entitled to involie the interposition of a court of equity.
As a general rule, doubtless, length of
time is no bar to a trust clearly established,
and express trusts are not within the statute of limitations, because the possession of
the trustee is presumed to be the possession
of his cestui que trust. Prevost v. Grata, 6
Wheat. 481, 497; Lewis v. Hawkins, 23
Wall. 119, 126; Railroad Co. v. Durant, 95
U. S. 576.
But this rule is, in accordance
with the reason on which it is founded, and
as has been clearly pointed out by Chancellor Kent and Mr. Justice Story, subject
to this qualification: that time begins to run
against a trust as soon as it is openly disavowed by the trustee insisting upon an adverse right and Interest which is clearly and
unequivocally made known to the cestui que
trust; as when, for instance, such transactions take place between the trustee and the
cestui que trust as would, in case of tenants
in common, amount to an ouster of one of
them by the other. Kane v. Bloodgood, 7
Johns. Ch. 90, 124; Robinson v. Hook, 4
Mason, 139, 152, Fed. Cas. No. 11,956; Baker
v. Whiting, 3 Sum. 475, 486; Oliver v. Piatt,
This qualification has been
3 How. 333, 411.
often recognized in the opinions of this court,
and distinctly affirmed by its latest judgWillison v. Watment upon the subject
kins, 3 Pet. 43, 52; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet
177, 223; Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 202, 218;
Bacon v. Rives, 106 U. S. 99, 107, 1 Sup. Ct
3; Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 151, 5 Sup.
In the case of an implied or conCt. 1181.
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structive trust unless there has been a
fraudulent concealment of the cause of action, lapse of time is as complete a bar in
equity as at law. Hovenden v. Annesley,
2 Schoales & L. 607, 634; Beckford v. Wade,
In such a case. Chief Justice
17 Ves. 87.
Marshall repeated and approved the statement of Sir Thomas Plumer, M. R., in a
most important case in which his decision
was affirmed by the house of lords, that,
'"'both on principle and authority, the laches
and non-claim of the rightful owner of an
equitable estate, for a period of 20 years,
(supposing it the case of one who must within that period have made his claim in a court
of law, had it been a legal estate,) under no
disability, and where there has been no
fraud, will constitute a bar to equitable re-^
lief, by analogy to the statute of limitationSj
if, during all that period, the possession has
adverse,
been under a claim xmequivocally
and without anything having been done or
said, directly or indirectly, to recognize the
title of such rightful owner by the adverse
possessor."
Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat.
152, 174; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. &
W. 1, 175, and 4 Bligh, 1. Independently of''
any statute of limitations, courts of equity
uniformly decline to assist a person who has
slept upon his rights, and shows no excuse
for his laches in asserting them. A "A court
of equity," said Lord Camden, "has always
refused its aid to stale demands, where the
party slept upon his rights, and acquiesced
for a great length of time.^ Nothing can call
forth this court into activity but conscience,
good faith, and reasonable diligence^ where
these are wanting, the court is passive, and
does nothing.
Laches and neglect are always discountenanced,
and therefore, from
the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was
always a limitation to suits in this court."
Smith V. Clay, 2 Amb. 645, 3 Brown, Ch.
640, note.
This doctrine has been repeatedly recognized and acted on here. Piatt v.
Vattier, 9 Pet. 405; McKnight v. Taylor, 1
How. 161; Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How.
189; Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 234; Badger
V. Badger, 2 Wall. 87; Hume v. Beale,
17
Wall. 336; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178;
Sullivan v. Railroad, 94 U. S. 806; Godden v.
Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201. In Hume v. Beale,
the court in dismissing, because of unexplained delay in suing, a bill by eestuis que
trust against a trustee under a deed, observed that it was not important to determine whether he was the trustee of a mere
dry legal estate, or whether his duties and
responsibilities extended fm'ther. 17~ Wall.
348. See, also. Bright v. Legerton, 29 Beav.
60, and 2 De Gex, F. & J. 606.
When the
bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff,
by reason of lapse of time and of his own
laches. Is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer. Maxwell
V. Kennedy, 8 How. 210; National Bank v.
Carpenter, 101 U. S. 567; Lansdale v. Smith,
106 U. S. 391, 1 Sup. Ct. 300.
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The allegations of this bill, so far as they
are material to the defense of laches, are In
The Harmony So.substance as follows:
ciety Is a voluntary association, formed In
1805 by the plaintiff's parents and other
heads of families, who had emigrated from
Germany under the leadership of one Rapp,
and become subject to his control in both
spiritual and temporal affairs. In that year,
Rapp, for the purpose of acquiring absolute
dominion over their means and mode of living, falsely and fraudulently represented to
them that they could not be saved from
eternal damnation except by renouncing the
plan of a separate home for each family,
yielding up aU their possessions, as had been
done by the early Ohristians, and laying
them at the feet of Rapp as their apostle, to
be put into a common fund of the society, and
thenceforth living as a community under his
control, receiving in return only the necessaries of life; and they, Induced by and relying on his false and fraudulent representations, immediately yielded up all their possessions to the common fund of the society,
and placed the fund in his keeping as their
trustee, and thenceforth lived as a community or common household, submitted themselves and their families to do for the community such work as he directed, allowed
the avails thereof to form part of the common fund, and relinquished to him and his
successors m the leadership of the community the management of the trust fund and
the control of their own persons and those
of their wives and children, and received
only the necessaries of life in return. Rapp
received and accepted the trust fund, and all
the accretions to it by the work of the in-

habitants of the community or otherwise,
not as his own, but in trust for the members
of those families and the contributors to the
fund, and for their common benefit; and always, up to his death in 1847, recognized
and acknowledged said trust, and disclaimed
any greater interest in the fund than that of
any other contributor, and any other right
to Its management and control than by virtue of his leadership of the community. In
1807 Rapp obliged his followers to abjure
matrimony, and theqceforth did not permit
them to marry in the community, and compelled any one about to marry to leave it.
The plaintiff was born in the community in
1807, and was reared in and as a part of it,
under Rapp's teachings and control, and
faithfully worked for it from the age of 12
to the age of 24 years, and allowed the avails
of his work to become part of the common
fund, and received in return nothing but the
necessaries
of life, which were of far less
value than the avails of his work; and in
1831, being about to marry, had to leave and
did leave the community. The trust fund
so received and accepted by Rapp, with its
profits, interest, and accretions, now amounts
to $8,000,000, and yields an annual Income
of $200,000, and is held by the defendants
on the same trust on which Rapp held it in

his life-time; and neither Rapp nor the defendants ever rendered any account to the
plaintiff or to the beneficiaries of the fund,
although the plaintiff, before bringing this
suit in May, 1882, demanded of the defendants an account and a settlement of his
share.
The trust on which Rapp, and the
defendants as his successors, held the common fund of the Harmony Society, is described In one place in the bill as "for the
members of said families and the contributors of said fund, and for their common benefit;" that is to say, as is clearly explained
by what goes before, in trust for then: common benefit as a community, living together
in the community, working for the community, subject to the regulations of the
community, and supported by the community. This was the "said trust," which, as
the bill afterwards alleges, Rapp, up to his
death, and his successors, until the bringing
of this suit, "always recognized and acknowledged." The constant avowal of the
trustees that they held the trust fund upon
such a trust is wholly Inconsistent with and
adverse to the claim of the plaintiff that
they held the fund in trust for the benefit
of the same persons as Individuals, though
withdrawn from the community, living by
themselves,
and taking no part in its work.
The plaintiff, upon his own showing, withdrew from the community in 1831, and
never returned to it, and, for more than 50
years, took no step to demand an account
of the trustees, or to follow up the rights
which he claimed In this bill. If he ever
had any rights, he could not assert them
after such a delay,—not on the groimd of
an express and lawful trust, because the express trust stated in the bill, and constantly
avowed by the trustees during this long period, was wholly inconsistent with any trust
which would sustain his claim; not on the
ground that the express trust stated in the
bill was unlawful and void, and therefore
the trustees held the trust fund for the benefit of all the contributors in proportion to
the amounts of their contributions, because
that would be an implied or resulting trust,
and barred by lapse of time. In any aspect of the case, therefore. If it was not
strictly within the statute of limitations,
yet the plaintiff showed so little vigilance
and so great laches, that the circuit court
rightly held that he was not entitled to relief in equity.
It Is proper to add that this decision does
not rest in any degree upon the judgments
of the supreme court of Pennsylvania and
of this court, in the cases cited at the bar,
in favor of the trustees of the Harmony
Society in suits brought against them by
other members, because each of those cases
differed in its facts, and especially in showing that the society had written articles of
association, which are not disclosed by this
bill. Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts, 351; Baker
v. Nachtrleb, 19 How. 126.
Decree affirmed.
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HAWKER

T.

MOORE

et al.

(20 S. E. 848, 40 W. Va. 49.)
Supreme

Court of Appeals

of West Virginia.

Dec. 8, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Harrison county.
Bill by Owen Hawker against Wilson
Moore and others.
From a decree for plaintiff, defendant Moore appeals.
Affirmed.

J. Philip

Clifford, for appellant

sel, t<x appellee.

John Baa-

HOLT, J. In this case the circuit court of
Harrison county, by decree entered on the
27th day of January, 1893, set aside as fraudulent the deed made by appellant, Wilson
Moore, on the 1st day of September,
1880,
to Elam F. Piggatt, for the 25 acres of land
mentioned,
and decreed the sale thereof to
pay plaintiff's judgment, from which defendant Moord obtained this appeal.
The facts are as follows:
On the 15th day
of October, 1880, the Merchants' National
Bank of West Virginia, at Clarksburg, was
the holder -of a promissory note given to the
bank by James Hawker, the principal therein, and the defendant Wilson Moore, and
plaintiff, Owen Hawker, as his sureties, and
the bank on that day obtained a judgment
thereon against the three parties named.
James Hawker, the principal, was insolvent,
and plaintiff, Owen Hawker, was compelled
to satisfy and pay the judgment
Therefore
plaintiff was entitled to contribution from his
cosurety, defendant Moore, of one-half the
amount of the judgment tiius paid, and to
that extent to be substituted to the judgment
lien of the bank against his real estate.
Where one has been compelled to pay the
debt of another, equity, as far as it can be
done without just ground of complaint on
the part of others, substitutes him to all the
rights and remedies of the creditor against
such debtor.
This doctrine of subrogation
has been applied freely In this state, and to
its full extent upon the general principles of
equity, without the aid of any statute; and,
having taken this correct view in the beginning, there has so far never been any need of
any statute to correct any misstep in improper restraint of its application upon the supposition that a debt once paid must thereafter be treated as nonexistent vmder all clr.
cumstances,
and to all intents and for all
The doctrine, as it has been expurposes.
pounded and applied in our courts, has nothing of form, nothing of technicality, about
it; and he who, in administering it, would
stick in the letter, forgets the end of its creation, and perverts the spirit which gave it
birth.
It is the creature of equity, and real
Enders v.
essential justice is its object
Brune (1826) 4 Rand. (Va.) 438, 447; McNiel
v. Miller (1887) 29 W. Va. 480, 2 S. B. 335;
Robinson v. Sherman (1845) 2 Grat 178; 2
Bart Suit in Eq. 1051. The doctrine is emH.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)—2
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Inently calculated to do exact justice between
persons who are bound for the performance
of the same duty or obligation, and is one,
and
therefore, which is much encouraged
"Equality is equity" is on this
protected.
branch its maxim. It springs naturally out
of the two equities of contribution and exoneration, and is in fact one of the means by
Bisp. Pr.
which those equities are enforced.
Eq. (4th Ed.) § 385; Bering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Cox, 318; Pendlebury v. Walker,
4 Younge & O. Exch. 441; Steel v. Dixon, 17
Ch. Div. 825; Brett, Lead. Cas. in Mod. Eq.
See Ferguson v. Gibson,
(2d Ed.) 285, notes.
L. R. 14 Eq. 379; Forbes v. Jackson, 19 Ch.
Div. 615, under the mercantile law amendment. Act 19 & 20 Vict c. 97, § S; 2 Beach,
Here the plaintiff has
Mod. Eq. Jur. § 809.
paid off the judgment, and asks the court to
give him the benefit of the creditor's lien.
Who can object to this? Who is injured by
it? Not the bank, for they have received
their debt from the plaintiff, and justice
binds them to give the plaintiff their vantage
ground. Not the principal debtor, for he is
insolvent, and has no interest In the matter.
Not the cosurety, for it is by his fault that
plaintiff had to bear. In the first instance, the
whole burden. If he had paid his half, and
equality is equity, there would have been no
occasion to ask the court to compel him to
pay; and it does not He with him to say that
plaintiff shall not occupy a vantage ground
that enables him, by process of law, to en.
force the performance of this duty. The other creditors cannot complain, for the debt has
in truth not been paid, because not paid by
the one ultimately bound, but by others, who
became his unwilling creditors in due course
of law. But if there should be any one who,
by any rule of strict law, or in equity and
good conscience, stands on higher ground, or
for any reason has a better right, he will not
be displaced, or his right disturbed; for that
is the essence of the doctrine. See Pott v. Nar
thans (1841) 1 Watts & S. 155; Eddy v. Traver (1837) 6 Paige, 521; Gross v. Davis, 87
Tenn. 226, 11 S. W. 92, and 10 Am. St R.
Sheld. Subr. (2d Ed.) § 137; Id.,
635, notes;
p. 209, § 140; 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.
189; Thomas v. Stewart (1888) 117 Ind. 50,
18 N. B. 505; Crumlish's Adm'r v. Improvement Co., 38 W. Va. 390, 18 S. B. 456, and 23
L. R. A. 120, note 7; Dugger v. Wright
(1888) 51 Ark. 232, 11 S. W. 213.
It would answer no useful purpose to take
up the testimony and show that it justifies
the decree complained of. The fair conclusion to be drawn is that the deed of September 1, 1880, from defendant Moore to E.
F. Piggatt, conveying the tract of land of
25 acres in the bill and proceedings mentioned, waa made by Moore to hinder and delay
his creditors; and that Piggatt took it, was
holding it for him, on some sort of secret
trust the full terms of which do not appear.
But Moore continued to occupy and use the
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land as bis owb, as he bad always done,
without the payment of any rent; and after
B. P. Plggatt's death this tract of 25 acres
was, by reason thereof, treated as not be

longing to his estate, and was omitted when
partition came to be made of bis lands among
his heirs.
Therefore the decree complained
of is affirmed.
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ECONOMY SAV. BANK
(45

Ati.

Court of Appeals

v.

GORDON

90 Md.

486.)

of Maryland.

Jan.

176,

10,

et al.

1900.

Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore
city; Henry Stockbridge, Judge.
Suit by Douglas H. Gordon and others
against the Economy Savings Bank and others.
Decree for complainants.
Defendant
bank appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before McSHERRY, C. J., and

PAGE,

FOWLER,

and BRISCOE,

JJ.

BOYD, SCHMUCKER,

Daniel L. Brinton, for appellant.
Arch.
H. Taylor, E. P. Keech, Jr., and Foster &
Poster, for appellees.
SCHMUCICER, J. On July 30, 1897, Cecil
R. Atkinson executed a mortgage upon a
warehouse owned by him, on South Howard
street, in Baltimore city, to Alonzo J. Steers,
which recited that he was indebted to Steers
"in the full sum of fifteen thousand dollars,
payable February 10th, 1898," and that It
was executed to secure th€i payment of this
debt, with interest thereon.
The mortgage
was in due form, was regularly acknowledged, and had attached^to it a proper affidavit
as to the bona fides of the consideration
therein stated, and it was recorded on the
day after its date.
No note accompanied
the mortgage,
but it contained a covenant
to pay the mortgage debt and interest.
About the same time Steers, the mortgagee,
applied to the American National Bank to
lend him ?8,000, offering to assign the mortgage as security for the loan.
Schott, the
cashier of the bank, explained to him that
a national bank could not lend money upon
real-estate security, but informed him that
the appellant savings bank, of which he
(Schott) was treasurer, had some money on
hand, aild would lend him $5,000 upon the

mortgage, if the security proved to be ample, but the matter must first be referred
by the appellant to a committee, who would

investigate and report upon the security.
Steers assented to the terms suggested by
Schott, and a committee from the appellant
went upon the mortgaged premises and examined them, and reported favorably upon
the loan, provided there were no incumbrances upon the property prior to the mortgage.
The matter was then referred by the
appellant to its attorney to examine the title, Steers placing the mortgage in its hands
for that purpose. The attorney examined
the title, and reported favorably upon it,
whereupon the appellant, on August 6, 1897,
lent the $5,000 to Steers, and at the same
time took from him an assignment of tlie
mortgage as security for the loan. The $5,000 so loaned w^s given to Steers in the
check of the appellant to his order upon the
American National Bank, in which the appellant had on deposit at that time more than
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the amount of the check.
Steers indorsed
the check to the Eastern Electric Company,
which at once deposited it to its own credit
in the bank upon which it was drawn, and
the $5,000 was passed to the credit of the
electric company, and charged to the appellant upon the books of the bank. The money
was then used by the electric company, to
tlie extent of $2,000, in the payment of a
loan which had been made by one Myerdick
upon a previous unrecorded assignment of
the Atkinson mortgage, and the remaining
$3,000 was almost entirely paid to the American National Bank in satisfaction of obligations due to it by the Eastern Electric Company or by George H. Atkinson, a brother of Cecil
R. Atkinson, the mortgagor.
Steers subsequently assigned his equity in the $15,000 mortgage to one 0. S. HInchman as collateral security for a loan of $2,000. It appears from
the record that Cecil R. Atkinson, the mortgagor, and his four brothers, William J.,
George H., Harry, and Richard F., were promoters by profession, and together operated
and controlled the Eastern Electric Company
and other kindred corporations, all of which
proved
to be speculative enterprises, and
soon became insolvent and passed into the
Steers, who was put upon
hands of receivers.
the stand by the appellees, testified that the
consideration
for the $15,000 mortgage from
Atkinson to him consisted of $10,000 of Best
of
Telephone
Company
bonds and $5,000
Best Telephone Company stock, which he had
let Atkinson have prior to the execution of
the mortgage; but his testimony was so inconsistent and contradictory in its different
portions that it cannot be accepted as reliable. The whole testimony touching the
consideration for the mortgage leads to the
conclusion that there was no substantial consideration for it, but that it was executed to
provide a means of raising money to assist
the Atkinson brothers in staving off the impending insolvency of the Eastern Electric
and Best Telephone Companies, and the other enterprises which they were then attempting to keep afioat.
On December 29, 1897,
nearly five months after the loan of the $5,000 to Steers by the appellant, and the assignment to the latter of the mortgage,
Douglas H. Gordon, one of the appellees, obtained a judgment for $5,442.30 against the
mortgagor, Cecil R. Atkinson, and his brother William J. Atkinson, on a note given by
them to him on November 13, 1806, for a
loan which he then made to them upon Best
Telephone Company bonds and stock as collateral. Gordon testified that at the time he
made this loan William J. Atkinson stated
that his brother Cecil R. owned the Howard
street warehouse, and he (Gordon) suggested
that he be given a mortgage on the warehouse as security for the loan about to be
made by him.
W. J. Atkinson declined to
procure the mortgage, saying that it would
Injure his brother's credit, but stated that
Gordon would have the benefit of the proper-
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ty by having its owner, Cecil R. Atkinson,
upon the note.
Gordon testified that he relied on this statement of William J. Atltinson
in making the loan. Harry W. Boureau, the
other appellee, obtained a judgment for $503.80 against William J. Atkinson and Cecil B.
Atkinson on September 29, 1897. On December 18, 1897, after Boureau had obtained his
judgment, and after Gordon had sued the Atkinsons, but before he had gotten his judgment, the appellees
instituted the present
case, which is a creditors' suit in equity
against the appellant, Cecil R. Atkinson,
Steers, and Hinchmaa. The bill of complaint
'alleged that the mortgage from Atkinson to
Steers, and the successive assignments
of it
by him to the appellant and Hinchman, were
ail without consideration and fraudulent, and
prayed to have them declared void. The appellant answered the bill, denying its material allegations, and setting up its title to the
mortgage to the extent of the $5,000 loaned
on it, and interest, as a bona fide purchaser
for value, without notice of any infirmity in
it.
Neither Hinchman nor Steers answered,
and a decree pro conf esso was entered against
tliem.
The case against the appellant camb
regularly to a hearing, and the court below
at first filed an opinion sustaining the appellant's claim; but upon a rehearing of the
case the learned judge changed his views of
the case, and filed another opinion, of a contrary tenor, and signed the decree appealed
from, denying the appellant's claim to a lien
on the property, and directed it to be sold for
the benefit of the creditors of the mortgagor.
In his second opinion the learned judge held,
upon the authority of the Cumberland Coal &
Iron Co. Case, 42 Md. 598, that the appellant, although he found it to be a bona fide
purchaser for value of the mortgage, without
notice, was not entitled to a lien for its loan
to Steers, and interest, made upon the faith
of the mortgage, because the latter, not being
accompanied by a negotiable obligation, was
a mere chose in action, which the appellant
must be treated as having taken subject to all
equities that might have been urged against
it in the hands of Steers, the mortgagee.
Under the facts of the case, the appellant
must be regarded as a bona fide purchaser for
value of the mortgage, without notice.
It advanced its $5,000 upon the mortgage in the
ordinary course of business, after a careful
inquiry into the value of the property, and an
investigation of the title upon the public records. It was not concerned in the disposition
made by Steers of the borrowed money, not
one dollar of which went back Into its hands,
or was expended for its benefit.
It was not
put upon inquiry as to the bona fides of the
mortgage by the fact that Schott, Its treasurer, was also cashier of the American National
Bank, where Steers and the Eastern Electric
Company and one or more of the Atkinson
brothers kept their accounts, and that h6
might have seen by an examination of the
books of the bank what disposition was made

of the borrowed money.
There was in fact
nothing in the use made of the money to suggest any infirmity in the mortgage.
is,
The next question to be determined
what are the rights of the appellant, as such
bona fide purchaser, against the claims of the
As there was no attempt by Steers
appellees?
to assign the mortgage debt to one person, and
the mortgage to another, we are not called
upon to consider the relative equities of one
who claims as assignee of the debt, and another who claims as assignee of the mortgage,
as the court were in the cases of Clark v.
Levering, 1 Md. Ch. 178, and Byles v. Tome,
39 Md. 461, which were In part relied on by
the appellees.
What we have to consider is"
the attitude of the appellant, as the bona fide
purchaser of both debt and mortgage, towards
the creditors of the mortgagor, who were such
was made.
at the time the mortgage
The
mortgage was not given to secure an actuaf"
indebtedness of $15,000, as It professes on its
Its execution was eviface to have been.
dently a means adopted by the parties to it
to clothe Steers, the mortgagee, with the appearance of a good title to a large debt secured
by a valid mortgage, in order to enable him
to raise money upon it. It was not fraudulent. In the sense that its execution had been
procured by fraud, misrepresentation,
or constraint practiced on the owner of the land
who executed it, as was the case in Bank v.
Copeland, 18 Md. 305, and Cumberland
Coal
& Iron Co. V. Parish, 42 Md. 598, in each of
which the defrauded mortgagor was protected
in equity against the assignee of the fraudulent mortgage. In the present case the execution of the mortgage was the voluntary and
deliberate act of the mortgagor, from which
he had no equity to be relieved, even as against
the mortgagee.
Snyder v. Snyder, 51 Md. 77;
Cushwa V. Cushwa'B Lessee, 5 Md. 44. We
have therefore no question before us of subjecting the rights of the appellant, as assignee
of the mortgage, to any equities to which the
assignor would have been liable In favor of
the mortgagor;
for here it is plain that there
were no such equities.
The present mortgag^''
Is to be regarded as fraudulent only in the
sense that, having been made to secure a
simulated,
and not a real. Indebtedness, it
operated to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of the mortgagor, and was therefore obnoxious to the provisions of the statute of
13 Bliz. e. 5.
The real question in the case is'
thus narrowed down to a comparison of the
relative strength of the claims on the mortgaged property of the appellant, as assignee
of the specific Uen of the mortgage, and the
appellees, as subsisting general creditors of
the mortgagor, having reduced their debts to
judgments after the assignment of the mortgage had been made.
If the conveyance under consideration had been a fraudulent defid.
histead of a mortgage, the right of the appellant, as a bona fide purchaser,
to a lien on
the property for the $5,000 advanced, and Interest, could not seriously be questioned.
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Cone V. Cross, 72 Md. 102, 19 Atl. 381; Hull
V. William
Deerlng & Co., 80 Md. 432, 31
Atl. 416; Hinkle v. Wilson, 53 Md. 293;
Worthington v. Bullitt, 6 Md. 198. The broader and more general proposition that a bona
fide purchaser,
without notice, under a deed
from a fraudulent grantee, takes a good title,
which Is not impaired by the fact that judgments were obtained against the fraudulent
grantor prior to the conveyance by the f raudi>lent grantee, is well sustained by authority.
L^ 4 Kent, Gomm. 464; Sleeper v.
Chapman, 121
Mass. 404; Phelps v. Morrison, 24 N. J. Eq.
195; Totten v. Brady, 54 Md. 170; Swan v.
Dent, 2 Md. Gh.
(note 9, Brantly's Ed.);
Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 369.
In the case of
Bank v. Brooke, 40 Md. 257, the title of a
bona fide purchaser of a mortgage note to the
lien of the mortgage securing it was upheld
against the suit of the creditors of the mortgagor, although It was admitted that the note
and mortgage had been given in prejudice of
the rights of his creditcffs, and would have
been void as against them in the hands of the
mortgagee.
The fact that the mortgage in
that case was accompanied by a promissory
note distinguishes
it from the case at bar,
but the circumstance
of the negotiability of
the mortgage debt was not expressly mentioned or dwelt upon in the court's opinion.
See, also, Danbury v. Robinson, 14 N. J. Eq.
218, 219.
A bona fide mortgagee from a fraudulent
grantee has in a number of cases been held
to be entitled to protection, to the extent of
the debt due him, against the creditors of the
fraudulent grantor, upon the ground that a
~Biortgagee is to be treated as a purchaser, to
the extent of his interest, within the meaning of the term "purchaser" as used in statutes such as that of 13 BJiz. c. 5; and this
where the mortgage was not accompanied by
a negotiable instrument. Ledyard v. Butler,
9 Paige, 136, 137; Murphy v. Brlggs, 89 N. Y.
451; Shorten v. Drake, 38 Ohio St. 76; Moore
V. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41.
If the mortgage in the
present case had been made directly from
Cecil K. Atkinson to the appellant, no question could be made by Atkinson's creditors as
to the appellant's lien upon the mortgaged
property to the extent of the money advanced
bona fide upon the faith of the property at
the time the mortgage
was made. When,
therefore,
Atkinson clothed Steers with the
appearance of a good mortgage title of record to the property, for the purpose of enabling him to raise money upon the mortgage,
and the appellant, relying upon this appearance of good title in Steers, after a careful
examination of the public records, and a failure to find any prior Incumbrances upon the
p» property, parted with its money in good faith,
it Is entitled to the favor of a court of equity
in the consideration of the relative equities of
the parties to the controversy. This court, In
Seldner v. McCreery, 75 Md. 296, 23 Atl. 643.
said, "Where title is perfect on its face, and
J
no known circumstances exist to impeach it
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or put a purchaser on Inquiry, one who buys
bona fide and for value occupies one of the
most highly favored positions
in the law."_>
The appellant did not trust to the personal
responsibility of the mortgagor, but lent its
money upon the faith of the particular property covered by the mortgage, and required
an assignment of the mortgage at the time
of so doing.
On the contrary, the appellees
trusted to the mortgagor, or to such other collaterals as he lodged with them; and the appellee Gordon, although
he knew when he
lent his money that Cecil B. Atkinson owned
the Howard street warehouse, did not insist
upon having a lien on it for his loan, but
deliberately relied, so far as the warehouse
was concerned, upon his rights as an ordinary
creditor of its owner.
The equities of the ap^*"
pellant are at least equal to those of the appellees, and, having the' legal title to the
warehouse, it has the stronger claim thereon,
under the familiar principle that where eqtiities are equal the legal title must prevail,^^,>t»
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 417; Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 370;
Townsend v. Little, 109 V. S. 512, 3 Sup. Ct.
357, 27 L. Ed. 1012; Black v. Cord, 2 Har. &
G. 103; Bassett v. Noteworthy, 2 Lead. Cas.
Eq. (4th Am. Ed.) 1. In Dyson v. Simmons,
48 Md. 214, it was held, upon the authority
of many cases there cited', that If a party
makes, or affects to make, a mortgage which
proves to be defective by reason of some informality or omission, even on the part of the
mortgagee
himself, the conscience
of the
mortgagor is bound, and equity will recognize
and enforce the lien of the defective' mortgage, and give it precedence over the subsisting creditors of the mortgagor, and also
over judgments obtained against him after
the date of the mortgage.
General creditors
have no lien on the property of the debtor,
and a judgment is only a general lien, and is
for that reason subordinate to the prior specific equitable lien of such a defective mortgage. The case at bar does not come directly within the principle asserted in the lastcase, but it is certainly one in
mentioned
which, by reason of its peculiar facts, the
conscience of the mortgagor was especially
bound to the appellant; and we think that
the same course of reasoning might well be
applied, within proper limits, to the appellant's protection.
This court has frequently been called upon
to assert and define the rights of the creditors of a grantor,
as against a conveyance
made by him which, by reason of inadequacy
or want of consideration, or even by design,
operated to hinder, delay, or defraud them.
The court has not hesitated to sti-ike down
such conveyances at the suit of the creditor,
holding that one cannot make a voluntary conveyance of his property, as against the rights
of subsisting creditors, nor can he, as against
such creditors, sell it for a consideration that
bears no adequate relation to its real value.
When, however, in such cases, the rights of
parties,
even if they were the immediate
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grantees under the conveyance, who had in
good faith parted with value in reliance upon
the conveyance,
have had to be measured
against those of the creditors, it has uniformly been held that, in order to do full justice
to all the parties In such cases, a court of
equity, in setting aside the deed, will allow it
to stand as security for the consideration actually paid, and apply the balance to the payment of the vendor's debts.
These propositions were distinctly upheld in the cases already cited of Cone v. Cross, Hull v. William
Deering & Co., Hinkle v. Wilson, and Worthington V. Bullitt. We regard the principle of
the last-mentioned cases, in none of which
was the position of the party claiming under
the conveyance strengthened by any element
of negotiability in the subject-matter
of the
thing assigned to him, as properly applicable
to the one at bar.
The mortgaged property
should be sold, and the proceeds of sale, after
deducting proper expenses, applied first to the
payment of the $5,000 lent by the appellant to
Steers, with interest thereon, and then to the
payment of the creditors of Cecil R. Atkinson,
the mortgagor, who have come or may comp
into the case, according to their legal priorities.
We do not mean by this decision to disturb
the authority of the Cumberland Coal & Iron
Co. Case, upon which the learned judge below mainly relied in changing his opinion, nor

that of the Copeland Case. In each of those
cases the issue on trial was between the owner of property, who had been fraudulently induced to execute a mortgage upon It, and an
assignee of the fraudulent mortgage, and they
were both cases of flagrant fraud In fact.
The rights of the creditors of the grantor
were not in issue in either case. In the
Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. Case the court
asserted the proposition that the transfer of
a mortgage is so far within the rule which
applies to choses in action, that when the assignment is made without the concurrence of
the mortgagor, as in that case, the assignee
talses subject to the same equities and defenses to which the assignor was liable. We
do not, however,
understand the court, by
what was said in that opinion, to intimate
that, when the equities in behalf of the creditors of the mortgagor in such a case came
to be asserted, their claims would be enforced, without regard to the proposition, so
frequently upheld by this court in setting
aside fraudulent conveyances
at the suit of
the creditors of the grantor, that, in order to
do justice to all parties in such cases, the conveyances will be allowed to stand as security
actually paid on the
for the consideration
faith of it by the party holding the legal title
reverse<J,
under it.
Decree
and cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.
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The VICE-CHANCE5LLOR took time to
consider, and on the 12th January delivered
the following judgment:
The question to . be decided in this case is
whether the equitable interest of the plalntifCs in respect of the vendor's lien for unpaid
purchase
money Is to be preferred
to the
equitable Interest of the defendant Ede as
equitable mortgagee.
^ What is the rule of a court of equity for
determining the preference as between persons having adverse equitable interests? The
rule is sometimes expressed in this form,
"As between persons having only equitable
interests,
qui prior est .tempore potior est
jure." This is an incorrect statement of the
>^
rule, for that proposition is far from being
universally true. In fact not only is it not
universally true as between persons having

/

only equitable interests, but it is not universally true even where their equitable interests are of precisely the same nature, and
in that respect precisely equal, as in the comfor
mon case of two successive assignments
valuable consideration
of a reversionary interest in stock standing in the names of
trustees, where the second assignee has given
notice and the first has omitted it.
Another form of stating the rule is this,
"As between persons having only equitable
interests, if their equities are equal, qui prior
This form of
est tempore potior est jure."
stating the rule is not so obviously incorrect
as the former; and yet even this enunciation
of the rule (when accurately considered)
seems to me to involve a contradiction, for,
when we talk of two persons having equal
or unequal equities, in what sense do we use
For example, when we
the term "equity?"
say that A. has a better equity than B.,
what is meant by that? It means only that,
according to those principles of right and
justice which a court of equity recognizes
and acts upon, it will prefer A. to B., and
will interfere to enforce the rights of A. as
against B., and therefore it is impossible,
(strictly speaking) that two persons should
have equal equities, except in a case in
which a court of equity would altogether refuse to lend its assistance to either party as
If the Court will interagainst the other.
fere to enforce the right of one against the
other on any ground whatever, —say on the
ground of priority of time,—how can it be
said that the equities of the two are equal?
i. e., in other words, how can it be said that
the one has no better right to call for the inof a court of equity than the
terference
other? To lay down the rule therefore with
perfect accuracy, I think it should be stated

in some such form as this, "As between per- (
sons having only equitable interests, if their /
equities are in all other respects equal, prlor-j
ity of time gives the better equity, or qui)
i—-r
prior est tempore potior est jure."
I have made these observations, not of
course for the purpose of a mere verbal criticism on the enunciation of a rule, but in order to ascertain and illustrate the real meaning of the rule itself, and
think the meaning is this, that, in a contest between persons having only equitable interests, priority
of time is the ground of preference last resorted to, i. e., that a court of equity will
not prefer the one to the other, on the mere
ground of priority of time, until it finds upon
an examination of their relative merits that
there is no other sufficient ground of preference between them, or, in other words, that
their equities are in all other respects equal,
and that, If the one has on other grounds a
better equity than the other, priority of time
Is Immaterial.
In examining into the relative merits (or
equities)
of two parties having adverse
equitable Interests, the points to which the
court must direct its attention are obviously
these, the nature and condition of their respective equitable
interests, the circumstances and manner of their acquisition, and the
whole conduct of each party with respect
thereto.
And in examining Into these points
It must apply the test, not of any technical
rule or any rule of partial application, but the
same broad principles of right and justice
which a court of equity applies universally in
deciding upon contested rights.
Now in the present case each of the parties in controversy has nothing but an equita\
ble Interest; the plaintiffs' interest being a
vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money, and
the defendant Ede having an equitable mortLooking at these two species of
gage.
equitable interests abstractedly, and without
reference to priority of time, or possession of
the title deeds, or any other special circumstances, is there anything in their respective
natures or qualities which would lead to the
conclusion
that In natural justice the one Is
better, or more worthy, or more entitled to
protection than the other?
Each of the two equitable interests arises
out of the forbearance by the party of money
due to him. There is, however, this difference between them, that the vendor's lien for
unpaid purchase money is a right created by
a rule of equity, without any special contract. The right of the equitable mortgagee
is created by the special contract of the parties.
I cannot say that in my opinion
this
'
constitutes any sufficient ground of preference, though, if it makes any difference
at
all, I should say it is rather in favor of the
equitable mortgagee. Inasmuch as there is no
constat of the right of the vendor to his lien
for unpaid purchase money imtil It has been
declared by a decree of a court of equity,
whereas there is a clear constat of the equl-
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table mortgagee's title immediately on the
do not see in
contract being made; but
this any sufficient ground for holding that
the equitable mortgagee has the better equity. So far, then, as relates to the nature
and quality of the two equitable interests abstractedly considered, they seem to me to
stand on an equal footing; and this I conceive to have been the ground of Lord Eldon's decision in Mackreth v. Symmons,
15
Ves. 329, where, in a contest between the
vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money and
the right of a person who had subsequently
obtained
from the purchasers
a mere contract for a mortgage, and nothing more, he
decided in favour of the former, as being
prior in point of time.
If, then, the vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money, and the right of an equitable
mortgagee by mere contract for a mortgage,
are equitable interests of equal worth in respect of their abstract nature and quality,
is there anything in the special circumstances of the present case to give to the one
a better equity than the other?
One special circumstance that occurs Is
this, that the equitable
mortgagee
has the
possession of the title deeds.
The question
therefore arises, between two persons having
equitable interests of equal worth, does the
possession of the title deeds by one of them
give him the better equity? In Foster v.
Blackstone, 1 Myl. & K. 307, Sir John Leach,
M. R., says, "A declaration of trust of an
outstanding term, accompanied by a delivery
of the deeds creating and continuing the
term, gives a better equity than a mere
declaration of trust to a prior incumbrancer."
That is a case in which the two parties have
equitable interests
in the term of precisely
the same nature, viz., a declaration of trust
of the term without an actual assignment;
and there the delivery of the deeds to the
subsequent Incumbrancer gives him the better equity.
To the same effect is the decision in Stanhope v. Lord Vemey, according
to Lord St. Leonards' view of it, as reported
in Butl. Co. Lltt. p. 290, 1 Mylne & K. note 1,
§ 15 (which seems a more satisfactory report than that in 2 Eden, 81). Lord St
Leonards, 3 Sugd. Vend. 218, states it thus,
"In Stanhope v. Earl Vemey, Lord Northington held that a declaration of trust of a
term in favour of a person was tantamount
to an actual assignment,
unless a subsequent incumbrancer, bona fide and without
notice, procured an assignment,
and that
the
custody
of the deeds respecting
the
term, with the declaration of the trust of it
in favour of a second incumbrancer, was
equivalent to an actual assignment of it, and
therefore gave him an advantage over the
first incumbrancer, which equity could not
take from him." The same doctrine appears
to be recognized
by Lord Eldon in Maundrell V. Maundrell, 10 Ves. 271, where he
says, "It is clear, with regard to mortgagees
and Incumbrancers, that if they do not get

I

in the satisfied term in some sense, either
taking an assignment, making the trustee a
party to the instrument, or taking possession
of the deed creating the term, that term cannot be used to protect them against any person having mesne charges or incumbrances,"
implying that taking possession of the deed
creating the term would confer on a subsequent incumbrancer such right of protection
by means of the term. We have here, then,
ample authority for the proposition, or rule
of equity, that as between
two persons
whose equitable interests are of precisely the
same nature and quality, and in that respect
precisely equal, the possession of the deeds
gives the better equity; and, applying this
rule to the present case, it appears to me
that, the equitable interests of the two parties being in their nature and quality of
equal worth, the defendant having possession of the deeds has the better equity, and
that there Is, therefore, in this case, no room
for the application of the maxim, "Qui prior
est tempore potior est jure," which is only
applicable where the equities of the two parties are in all other respects equal. I feel
all the more confidence In arriving at this
conclusion inasmuch as it Is In accordance
with the opinion expressed
by Lord St
Leonards in his work on vendors and purchasers;
and I have no doubt that in Mackreth V. Symmons, if the equitable mortgagee
had, in addition to his contract for a mortgage, obtained the title deeds from his mortgagor. Lord Eldon would have decided in his
favour.
I must however, guard against the supposition that I mean to express an opinion
that the possession of title deeds will in all
cases and under all circumstances give the
better equity. The deeds may be In the
possession of a party in such a manner and
under such circumstances as that such possession will confer no advantage whatever.
For example, in Allen v. Knight 5 Hare, 272
(affirmed by the Lord Chancellor and reported on appeal in 11 Jur. 527), the deeds had
been delivered to the first equitable mortgagee, and by some unexplained means they
had got back into the possession of the mortgagor who delivered them to a subsequent
equitable mortgagee.
It was insisted by the
latter that it must be presumed that it was
by the fault or neglect of the first mortgagee
that the deeds had got out of his possession,
or that at all events the court should direct
an inquiry as to the circumstances. But the
court held that the onus lay on the second
mortgagee of proving such alleged fault or
neglect of the first mortgagee;
and, as he
had failed to prove it the court could not
presume it nor du-ect an inquiry on the subject, and decreed in favour of the first mortgagee.
think It may be clearly Inferred
from this case that if the first mortgagee had
never had the deeds delivered to him, or if
it had been proved that the deeds had got
back to the mortgagor through his fault or
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Qeglect, the decision would have been in favour of the second mortgagee who had the
deeds.
So the deeds may have come into the
hands of a subsequent equitable mortgagee
by means of an act committed by another
person which constituted a breach of an express trust as against the person having the
prior equitable interest
In such a case it
would be contrary to the principles of a court
of equity to allow the subsequent mortgagee
to avail himself of the injury which had been
thus done to the party having the prior equitable estate or interest.
Indeed it appears to me that in all cases of
contest between persons having equitable interests the conduct of the parties and all the
circumstances must be talien into consideration, in order to determine which has the better equity; and, if we take that course in
the present case, everything seems in favour
of the defendant, the equitable mortgagee.
The vendors,
when they sold the estate,
chose to leave part of the purchase money
unpaid, and yet executed and delivered to
by which they
the purchaser a conveyance,
declared in the most solemn and deliberate
manner, both in the body and by a receipt
indorsed, that the whole purchase money had
They might still have rebeen duly paid.
quired that the title deeds should remain in
their custody, with a memorandum by way of
equitable mortgage as a security for the unpaid purchase money, and. If they had done
so, they would have been secure against any

subsequent equitable incumbrance; but that
they did not choose to do, and the deeds were
delivered to the purchaser. Thus they voluntarily armed the purchaser with the mesins
of dealing with the estate as the absolute legal and equitable owner, free from every
shadow of incumbrance or adverse equity.
In truth it cannot be said that the purchaser in mortgaging the estate by the deposit
of the deeds has done the vendors any wrong,
for he has only done that which the vendors
authorized' and enabled him to do. The defendant, who afterwards took a mortgage,
was in effect invited and encouraged by the
vendors to rely on the purchaser's title.
They had, in effect, by their acts, assured the
mortgagee that, as far as they (the vendors)
were concerned, the mortgagor had an absolute indefeasible title both at law and in
equity.
The mortgagee was guilty of no negligence.
He was perfectly justified in trusting to the
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security of the equitable mortgage by deposit
of the deeds, without the slightest obligation
to go and inquire of the vendors whether
they had received all their purchase money,
when they had already given their solemn
assurance in writing that they had received
every shilling of it and had conveyed the
estate and delivered over the deeds; and I do
not think that the fact of the conveyance
bearing date only the day before the mortgage imposed on him anj' such obligation.
The defendant omitted nothing that was necessary to constitute a complete and effectual
equitable mortgage; and although the mortgage was taken, not for money actually advanced at the time, but for an antecedent
debt, the forbearance of that debt constitutes
a full and sufficient valuable consideration.
Upon a comparison then of the conduct of
the two parties, and a consideration of all
the circumstances of the case, and especially
the fact of the possession of the deeds, which
the mortgagee acquired with perfect bona
fides, and without any wrong done to the
vendors, I am of opinion that the equity of
the mortgagee is far better than that of the
vendor, and ought to prevail.
I may, in conclusion, venture to make the
suggestion that the point now under consideration is often put by text-writers in a form
calculated to mislead, when it is propounded
in reas a question whether the vendor,
spect of his lien for unpaid purchase money,
or an equitable mortgagee, ought to be preferred, or when an opinion is expressed that
ttie one or the other has the better equity.
If I am right in my view of the matter, neither the one nor the other has necessarily
and under all circumstances the better equity. Their equitable Interests, abstractedly
considered,
are of equal value in respect of
their nature and quality; but whether their
equities are in other respects equal, or whether the one or the other has acquired the better equity, must depend upon all the circumstances of each particular case, and especially the conduct of the respective parties. And
among the circumstances which may give
to the one the better equity the possession
of the title deeds is a very material one.
But if, after a close examination of all these
matters, there appears nothing to give to the
one a better equity than the other, then, and
then only, resort must be had to the maxim,
"Qui prior est tempore potior est jure," and
priority of time then gives the better equity.
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COMSTOCK

V.

JOHNSON.

(46 N. Y. 615.)
Court of Appeals of New York.

1871.

Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme court in the Sixth judicial
district, alHrming judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon the decision of the court
special term.
action was brought to restrain the
defendants from diverting or vrithholding the
waters of their mill dam and flume on the
Oaks creek, In the town of Otsego, from
flowing to the carding machine and fulling
mill of the plaintiff, situated on said creek below said mill dam.
Prior to the 24th of January, 1824, William
Johnson and James Johnson were the owners of lands on both sides of said creek, upon
which were a dam, grist mill, a saw mill,
and a carding machine and clothing works,
all run by water power from the same dam,
On the
and all owned by said Johnsons.
24th of January, 1824, the Johnsons conveyed
to one Plumb the carding machine and clothing works, and the land whereon they stood,
the terms of the deed in respect to the subject of the conveyance being as follows:
"Those certain pieces or parcels of land,
with the messuages and tenements thereon,
situate, lying, and being in the town of Otseand being the same on which
go, aforesaid,
the carding machine, and clothing works and
shops, now occupied, etc., now stand, with
the privilege of drawing from some convenient place from the mill dam, situate onOaks creek, immediately above said carding
and clothing works, a suflScient
machine
quantity of water for the use of said works:
provided, nevertheless, that said works do not
draw more than a fair proportion of the water from the grist mill, which is situated on
the same dam; that is, in time of scarcity of
water the said works shajl be permitted to
card and full the same length of time that the
grist mill grinds; and provided that no more
machinery shall be put in operation for carding than a breaker, a roller, a picker, all to be
and
single, together with the hereditaments
j^ppurtenandes thereunto belonging or appertaining; the grist mill to have all the water
on Sundays, except what will be necessary to

^at

This

scour cloth."
Plumb entered into possession of said carding machine and clothing works at the date
of the deed to him, and used the open
ground in front of the same as a means of
access thereto, and for piling wood for the
works, and continued to occupy and enjoy
the same until April 1, 1842, when he conveyed the same premises and rights to the
plaintiff, by a deed describing the subject
of conveyance in the same manner as in the
said deed to him, from the date of which
deed to the time of the trial the plaintiff has
been in possession of the premises so occuand enjoypied by said Plumb, occupying
For about
ing them in the same manner.

nine years past, the plaintiff has discontinued
his fulling works, but still runs his carding
machines with the water drawn from said
dam.
the same length of time, and
of the clothing
the discontinuance
works, the plaintiff has every spring drawn
water for a few days from the dam for the
purpose of operating a buzz or circular saw
for sawing his own (and last spring his son's)
fire wood, and has been accustomed to run
said saw and saw wood in front of the clothing works and carding machine shop, about
thirteen and one-fourth fe(?t from the same,
upon the open grounds In front of the same,
being land not conveyed to said Plumb or to
the plaintiff, but which belongs to the defendants,
and constituting a part of their
grist-mill yard, where teams of customers
drive up to the grist mill and the clothing and
carding machine works, and have been so used
since the giving of said deeds. The saw was
placed at a point thirteen and one-fourth feet
from the center of the highway leading across
the creek, and horses going to the plaintiff's
grist mill and along the said highway were
sometimes frightened by plaintiff's saw.
Less water was used by plaintiff in operating his saw than was necessarily used for
operating his mill before it ran down.
On the 13th of April, 1867, the plaintiff was
running his saw as aforesaid, when the defendants shut off the water from the plaintiff, so that he could not run so much, claiming that he (the plaintiff) had no right to the
They also shut the
water for that purpose.
water off from the carding machine by firmly nailing a plank over the mouth of the trunk
conveying
the water from the big flume to
the carding machine, declaring to the plaintiff at the same time that he had forfeited his
right to the water.

For about

since

CHURCH, C. J. The principal question
in this case, involving the construction of the
grant of water, was correctly decided in the
court below. It is well settled in tjiis State
that the terras used in this grant are to be
taken as a measure of the quantity of water
granted, and not a limitation of the use to
the particular machinery specified.
( Wakely
V. Davidson, 26 N. Y., 387; Cromwell v.
Selden, 3 id., 253.)
It was found by the court
that, at the time the defendant shut the water
off, he asserted that the plain tiS had forfeited
his right to the water, and claimed a right to
shut it off. In this he was mistaken. In depriving the plaintiff of the use of the water
under an assertion of forfeiture, he rendered
himself amenable to the process of the court
for the protection of the plaintiff's rights.
The judgment enjoining the defendants from
depriving the plaintiff of the quantity of water to whicl) lie was entitled under his deed,
cannot be disturbed.
The only serious question in the case relates to the use of the buzz
saw in front of the mill. The plaintiff did
not, by his deed, acquire the title to the land
in front of the mill, because the description
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is limited to the land upon which the mill
stands i but he did acquire an easement in
such land for the purpose of ingress and
egress, and also for the purpose of piling and
sawing wood for the use of the mill, as it had
been used and enjoyed for forty years. Everything necessary for the full and free enjoyment of the mill passed as an incident, appurtenant to the land conveyed. (2 Kent's
Com., 467; Blaine's Lessee v. Chambers, 1
Serg. & Rawle, 174.) But this would not authorize the plaintiff to erect and use machinery upon this land not necessary to the
use of the mill, as it had been used, and would
not authorize the use of the buzz saw upon
that land.
The objection is not that the
plaintiff propelled the buzz saw with the water from the dam, as he had the right to use
the water for any machinery and in any place
which he was entitled to occupy; but he could
not occupy the space in front of the mill for
that purpose. At the time the water was
shut off by the defendants, it was being used
only to propel this saw ; and it is claimed that
the defendants were justified in shutting off
the water from that machinery; and for that
reason the judgmest should be reversed, or,
at least, that it should be modified so as to
restrain the plaintiff from using his buzz saw
on the defendants' premises. As we have
seen, the judgment against the- defendants la
fully warranted by the findings; and thequestion is, whether any modification should bo
made against the plaintiff.
It is a rule of
equity that he who asks equity must do equity.
The plaintiff was in fault in using the
buzz saw on the defendants' premises. It is
said that this was an independent transaction, for which the defendants might have
an action ; and this was the view of the court
below. The rule referred to will be applied
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when the adverse equity grows out of the
very controversy before the court, or of such
circumstances as the record shows to be a part
of its history, or is so connected with the
cause in litigation as to be presented in the
pleadings and proofs, with full opportunity
afforded to the party thus recriminated to explain or refute the charges. {Tripp v. Cook,
26 Wend., 143; McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Oow.,
190; Caslei- v. Shipman, 35 N. Y.. 533.)
All the facts connected with the right; of
the plaintiff to use the buzz saw were not
only spread out upon the record, but were in
fact litigated upon the trial, and, as to his
strict legal rights, are undisputed; aud we
cannot say that, but for his use of the saw on
the defendants' premises, the water would
not have been shut off. Whether this was
so or not, the controversy in relation to his
right to use the saw was involved in the litigation, and was intimately connected with
the wrongful act of the defendants ; and, being so, it is proper to apply the equitable
rule. It is not indispensable to the application of this rule that the fault of the plaintiff
should be of such a character as to authorize
an independent action for an injunction
against him. The plaintiff, in strictness,
was in the wrong in placing his buzz saw in
The defendants were in
front of the mill.
the wrong in shutting off the water, and esI peciallyin asserting a forfeiture; and, as both
! parties are in court to insist upon their strict
legal rights, we thinksubstantial justice will
be done by modifying the judgment so as to
enjoin the plaintiff from using the buzz saw
on the land in front of his mill, and, as modified, judgment affirmed, without costs to
either party against the other in this court.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly.
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Supreme Court of the United States.

April

7,

1800.

Appeal Irotn the circuit court of the Unitea
States for the nortliern district of Ohio.
Henry Craw foi d, lor appellant.
Francis
Wing, C. C. Baldwin, S. iSbellabarger, and
J. M. Wilson, for appellees.

Bkewer, J. On February 20, 1883, two
of the appellees, the Lake Superior Iron

Company and the JacksojQ Iron Company,
together with the Negaunee Concentrating
Company, filed their bill against the appellant, -iii the circuit court of the United
States for the northern district of Ohio.
Tlie appellant was a corporation, created
under the laws of the state of Ohio, and
each of the complainants was a creditor;
two holding claims evidenced by notes
not then due, and the other, the Negaunee
Concentrating Company, holding a judgment. The prayer of the bill was for the
appointment of a receiver to take charge
of the property and assets of the defendant,
and for such other and further relief as
■was proper.
On the same day the defendant entered its appearance, and accepted
service of notice of a motion for the appointment of a receiver; and Fayette
I3rown was thereupon immediately appointed receiver. On the next day subpoena was served on the defendant.
On
March i!8th a supplemental bill was filed
making other parties defendants, and on
June 14th an order pro confesso was en.tered against all of the defendants in the
original and supplemental bills. On April
23d an order was entered directing all creditors to file their claims by petition, and
on October 20th nearly every creditor had
appeared and filed his petition. On July
17th an order was entered appointing a
special master to report on the claims of
creditors, and marshal the liens thereof.
Up to the 23d of November the appellant
made no opposition to the proceeding, and
apparently assented to the action which
was being taken by the creditors, looking
to the appropriation of its property to the
payment of their claims.
On that day a
change took place in its attitude towards
this suit. It went into the state courts,
and confessed judgment in behalf of several of its creditors ; and on the 24tb deposited in the registry of the circuit court money enough to pay off the judgment in favor
of the concentrating company, and filed
two pleas,— one setting forth the fact of
payment, and the other that the original
and supplemental bills disclosed that the
complainants had a plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law, and that therefore the court, sitting as a court of equity,
had no jurisdiction; and praying a dismissal of the bills. Subsequently, on December 18th, it filed a motion to discharge
the receiver. This motion was overruled,
the pleas seem to have been ignored, the
master reported upon the claims presented, and on February 23, 1886, the court en-

tered a decree which, finding the indebtedness to be as stated by the master, also
what property was In possession of the receiver, decreed that upon default in the
-payment of those debts the property be
From this
sold in satisfaction thereof.
decree the defendant has brought this appeal, and its principal contention Is that
the circuit court had no jurisdiction whatever over the subject-matter of the suit,
because it appeared upon the face of the
bills, original and supplemental, that the
complainants had a plain, adequate, d.nd.
complete remedy at law.
As heretofore stated, the bill showed
that two of the complainants held claims
not yet due, and thethirdonlya judgment,
with no execution. The supplemental bill
alleged that execution had, since the filing
of the original bill, been issued on that
judgment, and returned nulla bona. The
original bill, besides disclosing the nature
of complainants' claims, set forth that
they were proceeding not alone in their
own behalf, but in that of all other creditors, whose number was so great as to
make it impossibleto join them as parties.
It then averred the insolvency of the defendant; that it was engaged in large and
various business, manufacturing, and mining ; that its plant and good- will was of
great extent and value; and that it employed operatives
to the number of at
least 4,000; and then alleged as follows:
"And your orators further say that vexatious litigation has been commenced
against the said defendant, and many
more such are threatened, and that such
litigations are accompanied by attachments and seizures of property, and such
threatened litigations will also be accompanied by attachments
and seizures, and
that such attachments and seizures will
give to those creditors who are pursuing
them undue and unfair advantage and
priority over your complainants, whose
claims are not yet due, and make them irreparable injury and damage; that if such
litigations be further instituted and its
property seized in attachment, as it already has been, there is great dangler that
the valuable property of the defendant will
be irreparably injured, and to a great extent destroyed; and your orators say that
such seizures and interference with the
business and the property of the defendant
would wholly destroy the value of the
good-will of the company as an asset, and
wholly break up its long-established business, and thereby cause detriment and irreparable injury to your orators and all
other creditors.
And your orators further
say that, unless this court shall interfere
and protect and preserve the property and
assets of said defendant by putting it into
the hands of a receiver, the said property
will be in great danger of destruction and
dissipation by the large number of operatives who would necessarily be discharged
and left without work or means of obtaining it ; and such operatives, by reason of
the great distrust they already have, and
on account of a fear that they will not in
tutiare receive remuneration, will abandon
their employment, and thereby cause a
stoppage of the extensive business of said

•
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defendant, to the extent that the creditors
of said defendant would not be able to
realize one-half of the amount upon the
several claims that they would if the said
business of the defendant were continued,"
The appellees, while admitting the general rule to be that creditors must show
that they have exhausted legal remedies
before coming into a court of equity, insist
that the bill disclosed a case in equity on
two grounds : First, that upon the insolvency of a corporation its properties become
a trust fund forthe benefit of its creditors,
which can be seized and disposed of by a
receiver, and in equitable proceedings ; and,
second, that the vast interests and properties of this corporation, with their threatened disintegration through several attachment suits, justified the interference of
a court of equity to preserve, for the benefit of creditors, that large value which resulted from the unity of the properties.
In
support of these propositions counsel cite,
as especially applicable.Terry v. Anderson,
95 U. S. 628 ; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois M.
Ky. Co., 117 U. S. 434, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 809;
Sage V. Railroad Co., 125 U. S. 361, 8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 887; Mellen v. Iron -Works, 131 U.
S. 352, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781; Barbour v Bank,
45 Ohio St. 133, 12 N. E. Rep. 5; Rouse v.
Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, 22 N. E. Rep. 293.
But were it conceded that the bill was
defective; that a demurrer must have been
sustained; and that the appellant, if it had
so choseTi to act in the first instance, could
have defended its possession, and defeated
the action, — still the decree of the circuit
court must be sustained. Whatever rig h t s
of o bjection a.nd defense theap peiia.nt, harl.
It losTtiy 'inactionandacgni^ipceTice.
ObViouslycnt! piucesaings naff were with its
Immediately on filing the bill it
consent.
entered its appearance ; and the same day
objectL receiver was appointed, without
tion on its part. It suffered the bills to be
taken pro confesso. It permitted the receiver to go on in the possession of these
properties for nine months, transacting
large business, entering into many contracts, and assuming large obligations,
without any intimation of a lack of authority, or any objection to the proceedings.
After a lapse of nine months, suddenly its
policy changed; it contested where theretofore it had acquiesced. And this, not because of any restored solvency or purpose
to resume business, but with the evident
Intent to prevent the equality among creditors which the existing equitable proceedings would secure, and to give preference
to certain creditors ; for clearly it was the
thought of the president of the corporation, himself the owner of a large majority
had
of its stock, whose management
wrought its financial ruin, that after the
setting aside of the equitable proceedings
the lien of the confessed judgments would
attach, and thus those favored creditors
would be preferred.
So the case stands in this attitude : The
corporation was insolvent. Its extensive
and scattered properties had been brought
into single ownership, and so operated together that large benefit resulted in preserving the unity of ownership and operation. Disintegration was threatened
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through separate attacks, by different
The
creditors, on scattered properties.
preservation of this unity, with its consequent value, and the appropriation of the
properties forthe benefit of all the creditors
equally, were matters deserving large conCertain
sideration in any proper suit.
creditors, acting for all, initiated proceedings looking towards this end. In such
proceedings the corporation acquiesced.
Substantially all of the creditors came inAfter months had
to the proceedings.
passed, much business had been transacted and large responsibilities

_j

assumed, the

corporation, for the benefit of a few creditors and to destroy the equality between
all, comes in with the technical objection
that the creditors initiating the proceed-

ings should have taken one step more a^r'
law before coming into equity. But the
maxim, "He who seeks equity must do
"^
equity, " is as appropriate to the conduct
of the defendant as to that of the complainant; and it would be strange if a
debtor, to destroy equality and accomplish
partiality, could ignore its long acquiescence, and- plead an unsubstantial technicality to overthrow protracted, extensive,
and costly proceedings carried on in reliance upon its consent. Surely no such imperfection attends the administration of a
court of equity. Good faith and early assertion of rights are as essential on the
part of the defendant as of the complainant. This matter has recently been before
this court in Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U S.
354, 395, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486, and was carefully considered, and the rule, with its limitations, thus stated: '"The rule as stated
inl Daniell's Chancery Practice, (4th Amer.
Ed.) 555, is that if the objection of want of

jurisdiction inequityisnottaken

in proper

time, namely, before the defendant enters
into his defense at large, the court, having
the general jurisdiction, will exercise it;
and, in a note on page 550, many cases
^
are cited to establish that, ' if a defendant
in a suit in equity answers and submits to
"^
the jurisdiction of the court, it is too late
for him to object that the plaintiff has a
plain arid adequate remedy at law. This
objection should be taken at the earliest
opportunity.
The above rule must be
taken with the qualification thatitis competent for the court to grant the relief
sought, and that it has jurisdiction of the
• * * It was held in
subject-matter.'
Lewis V. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, that if the
court, upon looking at the proofs, found
none at all of the matters which would
make a proper case for equity, it would be
the duty of the court to recognize the fact,
and give it effect, though not raised by the
pleadings nor suggested by counsel. To
the same effectis Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall.
211.
The doctrine of these and similar
cases is that the court, tor its own protection, may prevent matters purely cognizable at law from being drawn into chancery
at the pleasure of the parties interested ;
but it by no means follows, where the subject-matter belongs to the class over which
a court of equity has jurisdiction, and the
objection that the complainant has an adequate remedy at law is not made until
the bearing in the appellate tribunal, that
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the latter can exercise no discretion in the
disposition of such objection. Under the
circnmstanceB of this case, it comes altogether too late, even though, if taken in
limine, it might have been worthy of attention. " See, also, Kilbourn v. Sunder-

land, 130 U. S. 505, 9Sup. Ct. Rep. 594 ; Union
Trust Co. V. Illinois M. Ry. Co., 117 U. S.
434-468, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 809.
Further comment is unnecessary.
The ruling of the circuit court was correct, and its decree is
therefore aflflrmed.

187.)

paper.

a

Bleakley paid the $820 to Elinnear, and
now claims a decree for this sum, before
specific performance shall be decreed to Lamberton,
who purchased Irvin's title at the
sheriff's sale. Kinnear does not resist specific performance, but stands ready to convey to Lamberton, whenever the covinous
assignment to Bleakley is put out of his
way. It is Bleakley who resists the decree
until he is refunded the $820, paid upon the
footing of the fraudulent agreement with Irvin, to defeat Lamberton's judgment. Bleakley is made a party to the bUl only for the
purpose of putting aside the covinous assignment to enable Kinnear to convey to
Lamberton. The question then Is whether
a chancellor would require Lamberton to recondition to
fund the $820 to Bleakley, as
setting aside the assignmeiit and entitling
Lamberton to specific performance of Kinnear.

a

But clearly Bleakley cannot demand repayment of Lamberton either at law or equity.
And first he is not entitled to subrogation to
matKinnear's rights. Subrogation is not

If

a

it

The facts of this case ara
few. Robert IJamberton was the owner of a
judgment for $31,000, entered against Samuel P. Irvltt on the 8th day of June, 1865.
Irvin had purchased of P. D. Kinnear, Esq.,
lot No. 449 in Franklin at $2600, of which
unpaid, and would fall
?820 only remained
due on the 6th of August, 1865, with a provision for forfeiture of the contract in case
of non-payment for thirty days after
fell
due. On the 19th of July, 1865, Irvin assigned his contract to James Bleakley,
binding him to pay the $820 to save the forfeiture, and with the admitted understanding that Irvin should refund the $820 to
Bleakley, settle his Indebtedness to the bank,
of which Bleakley was cashier, and that
then Bleakley should reconvey to Irvin's
wife. But the assignment was antedated to
the 1st of May, 1865, thurf overreaching Lamberton's judgment. The master finds that
this was done to defraud the plaintiff. The
finding is ably vindicated In the opinion of
Judge Trunkey. The absolute character of
security, the agreethe paper, though but
ment to reconvey to Irvin's wife instead of
himself, and the attempt of Bleakley to use
the paper to defeat the sherifC's sale of the
property by Lamberton on his judgment,
evince the true motive for antedating the

a

Oct. 27, 1870.

J.

it

AGNEW,

a

St

5

(66 Pa.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ter of contract but of pure equity and benevKyner v. Kyner,
olence.
Watts, 221; Wallace's Appeal,
Pa. St. 103. On what pretence, in foro conscientiEB, can a party attempting to carry out a scheme of fraud
against another, by a payment, claim compensation of the party he has attempted to
defraud? Conscience and benevolence revolt
at such an Iniquily. Again Bleakley did not
recognise
Kinnear's title by the payment.
He did not profess to bargain for it, and
Kinnear did not profess to sell it to him.
His act was simply a payment and no more,
made by him because of Irvin's duty to pay,
by Kinnear because of his
and accepted
right to receive from Irvin. Besides the payment was accepted by Kinnear in ignorance
of the attempted fraud. There can be no
legal intendment therefore of
bargain on
Kinnear's part to vest his right to receive
the money In Bleakley. As to Lamberton
the payment by Bleakley was not only fraudulent and intended to displace his judgment,
but it was also voluntary. It was not paid
at Lamberton's request nor for his use and
benefit; but on the contrary was intended
to defeat his right, as
creditor by overlapping his judgment, by means of the covBleakley is therefore neiinous transfer.
ther a purchaser, nor a creditor of Lamberton, nor an object of benevolence,
but is
forced upon the record to compel him to put
out of the way the fraudulent barrier to
Kinnear's specific performance to Lamberton. He cannot, thus standing before a chancellor, ask him to make repayment to him
a condition to a decree to remove the fraudulent obstruction he threw in the way. The
payment is one of the very steps he took to
consummate
the fraud upon Lamberton. If
he have a legal right of recovery he must
resort to his action at law, and
he can
have none,
is a test of his want of equity.
And in addition to all this,
Is a rule that
a chancellor will not assist a party to obtain
any benefit arising from a fraud. He must
come into a court of equity with clean hands,
It would be a singular exercise of equity,
which would assist a party, who had paid
money to enable him to perpetrate a fraud,
to recover his money, just when the chancellor was engaged In thrusting out of the
way of his doing equity to the injured party,
the very instrument of the fraud. Who does
iniquity shall not have equity. Hershey v.
Weiting, 50 Pa. St 244, 245.
We are therefore of opinion the court committed no error in refusing compensation^
and the decree of the court below is confirmed.
6
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KAHN

V.

WALTON

(20 N. B. 203, 46 Ohio
Supreme Court of Ohio.

et al.

St

195.)

Jan. 8,

1889.

Error

to circuit court, Greene county.
On the 15th day of Februai-y, 1882, Moses
A. Walton commenced his action in the court
of common pleas of Greene county against
the plaintiff in error, Charles Kahn, Jr., and
the Citizens' National 'Bank, of Xenla, to enjoin the bknlc from paying two checks, one
for $1,500 and the other for $500, dra-wn by

him upon the bank in favor of Kahn. The
petition alleges "that on the 14th day of February, A. D. 1882, the defendant, Charles
Kahn, Jr., by fraud and misrepresentation,
obtained from the plaintiff his two certain
checks of that date for the sums of $1,500
and $500, respectively, drawn by him upon
the Citizens' National Bank of Xenda, a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of
the United States;
that said checks were
given and are wholly without consideration,
and the plaintiff received no value therefor
whatever; that defendant, Kahn, is about to
present the same for collection, and the bank
is about to, and will, unless restrained by the
order of the court, pay the checks, which,
will be an irreparable Injury to the plaintiff,
and for which he has no adequate remedy
at law; that Kahn is not a resident of said
county, and has no property therein, and
who is, as plaJntifC is informed and believes,
wholly insolvent." The petition prays "that
s^
the bank be restrained and enjoined from
paying said checks, and that they may be
ordered to be canceled and delivered up to
the plaintiff; and for all other and further
relief to which in equity he may be entitled."
At the commencement of the action, the
plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction as
prayed for, and on the 6th day of March
amended his petition by adding to its averments the following:
"That no consideration exists for said check in said petition
mentioned
other than certain gaming contracts entered Into by said plaintiff on or
day of February, 1882, in
about the
the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, with the said
Kahn, a broker and commission merchant of
said city, for the purpose of speculating In
the price of wheat, pork, and lard, and which
said contracts made by said Kahn were in
violation of the statute of gaming, and
against public policy, and were false and
feigned, and by which he undertook in form
to buy and sell wheat, pork, and lard for
and with this plaintiff, without intending
thereby either to receive or deliver said
y wheat, pork, or lard, but solely to wager In
the market price thereof, and to pay or receive the difference between the price In the
contracts and the market rates at any time
during the month of March, 1882, at the option of said Kahn, whichever the same
would be; that said contracts were made as

a cover for gambling in the prices of wheat,
pork, and lard; that no wheat, pork, or lard
was actually to be delivered or received, but
the difference In price only was to be paid
on the one side or received on the other at

any time during the said month of March,
at the option of said Kahn; tliat In pursuance of the said gaming contracts, and In
addition to the execution and delivery of
said checks, this plaintiff delivered and paid
to said Kahn the sum of $500; that no consideration for the payment of said sum of
$500 passed to the plaintiff other than that
set forth aforesaid; that the said Kahn received to the plaintiff's use said sum of $500
so lost and paid to said defendant, and said
defendant, Charles Kahn, Jr., is Indebted to
plaintiff In the said sum of $500, with inday of February, 1882.
terest from the
Wherefore plaintiff prays as in his original
petition, and for judgment against said defendant Kahn, for said sum of $500, with
Interest from February —, 1882." The temporary Injunction was, on motion of the defendant, Kahn, dissolved, and the plaintiff
appealed to the district court, where, on the
28th of April, 1882, the plaintiff, by leave of
that court, filed another amendment to his
petition, adding the following
averments:
"That at the time of the execution and delivery of the said checks the plaintiff had on
deposit with said bank sufficient money to
pay said checks; that prior to the presentation thereof said Kahn, who Is insolvent, by
his agent, made inquiry of said other defendant as to whether said checks were good
and would be paid on presentation; to which
Inquiry said bank made answer that said
checks were good, and would be paid, and
said bank claims to have certified to said
checks, and bound Itself thereby to pay the
same; that prior to the filing of the petition
herein, and the allowance of said restraining order, this plaintiff requested and notified said bank not to pay said checks; but
said bank refused said request, and threatened to, and will, unless restrained, pay said
checks."
The defendant, Kahn, then answered, admitting "the corporate character of said
bank; that said Kahn was about to present
said checks for collection; his non-residence;
that plaintiff had said money on deposit In
said bank; said Inquiries whether said
checks would be honored, and the response
of said bank that they would; that said
bank claims to have certified the same, and
bound Itself to pay the same, and said notification to said bank not to pay the same,
and the refusal of said bank; that a contract was made between said Kahn and
plaintiff for the sale of property; that sales
were made, and $500.00 cash and said checks
were paid thereon.
But said Kahn denies
each and every other allegation of said petition."
The record shows that at the April term,
1884, of the district court the cause was by
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consent of the parties submitted to tlie court
upon the pleadings and evldeuce, and the
court found the equities of the case in favor
V of the plaintifC and against said defendant,
Kahn, made the injunction perpetual, and
udjudged the costs against Kahn. A motion
for a new trial, filed by Kahn, was overruled, and a bill of exceptions was duly taken, containing all the testimony given on the
trial of the cause. It also appears in the bill
of exceptions that at the close of the testimony the defendant, Kahn, requested the
court to find the facts, and state its conclusions of law and of fact separately, and also
to find "the following
conclusions of fact:
be(1) Whether there was any agreement
tween the plaintiff and Charles Kahn, Jr.,
that the property purchased should not be
delivered; but that simply the difference, if
any, between the price at which the property
was purchased and the price at whicji it
should rale in March, 1882, should be paid.
(2) Whether Charles Kahn, Jr., N. B. Ream
& Co., or the persons of whom the property
was purchased in January, 1882, intended
that it should not be delivered, and that
simply the difference, if any, between the
price at which it should rule in March, 1882,
and the price at which it was purchased
should be paid, and who so intended.
(3)
Whether the court finds that simply the
difference was to be paid, and no' property
delivered, from the circumstances of the
transaction, and, if so, what are the circumstances upon which said finding is predicated? (4) Whether the price of said property on the Chicago Board of Trade, in March,
1882, was more or less than the purchase
price In January, 1882, and, if less, how
much less. (5) Whether, by the terms of the
contract between the plaintiff and Kahn, or
by reason of notice to plaintiff, Kahn was
justified in selling said property on March 1,
1882.
(6) Whether the persons of whom the
property was purchased in January, 1882, or
their brokers, N. B. Ream & Co., had the
property on hand ready to deliver on March
1, 1882, and whether they gave Kahn notice,
and whether Kahn gave plaintiff notice of
their readiness to deliver the property, and
that it would be sold March 1, 1882, If plaintiff would not take it. (7) Upon whom the
court finds the burden of proof rests to establish the character of the transaction;
whether it was or was not a gambling transaction. (8) Whether Charles Kahn, Jr., was
simply a broker, agent, and employe of plaintiff in causing the purchase and sale of said
property on commission, without any interest in the profit or loss In the transaction."
And it further appears from the bill of exceptions that the court, in response to the
foregoing request, found as follows:
"Answer to Requests 1 and 2. We find
that the transactions in which the parties
were engaged were mere speculations or ventures on the future prices of the products
named in the pleadings, without any intenH.& B.BQ.(2d Ed.)—3

.
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tion on the part of Walton, Kahn, or Ream
& Co. that the property would be either paid
for or delivered, but that the intention was
that settlements between buyer and seller
would be made on the differences between
the market prices at the date named for delivery and the prices named in the contracts;
that this was understood by all parties interested in the deals; that the same were gambling transactions, and illegal.
"Answer to Request 3. We find the foregoing facts from all the circumstances in the
case and surrounding the transactions, and
particularly from the fact that if any inquiry had been made it would have developed the fact that Walton was wholly unable to pay one-fourth the amotnt of the
price of the property ostensibly purchased,
(being $43,000,) and that in fact said Walton was not worth over $3,000 or $4,000 at
the time.
"Answer to Requests 4 and 5. We find
that in March, 1882, the price of property
in the deals mentioned had deembraced
clined to an extent that absorbed the margins put up, and that, under the rules of
the Board of Trade of Chicago, Kahn was
justified in selling whatever interest Walton
had in any property under his (Kahn's) conti'ol; but we have not regarded this as an
important fact in the case.
"Answer to Request 6. We find it probable
that Ream & Co. had control of an amount
of property equal in bulk and quality to that
named in the several contracts, and could
have delivered it on demand March 1, 1882;
but we furtlaer find that in said deals they
had no intention of so delivering it, nor had
Kahn any intention of receiving it Ream
& Co. gave Kahn notice, and Kahn gave
Walton notice, of their readiness to deliver
the property, and that it would be sold
March 1st if plaintiff did not take it; but
this was done after the commencement
of
this suit, and with, knowledge that it would
not be so taken by plaintiff.
"Answer to Request 7. Upon the plaintiff.
"Answer to Request 8. Kahn was, as between plaintiff and defendant, a broker
agent, interested only to the amount of his
commissions.
"We further find that after' the checks
named in the pleadings were delivered to
Kahn, a bank in Cincinnati telegraphed the
Citizens' National Bank of Xenia as follows:
'Are M. A. Walton's checks for $2,000 goodV
To which said Citizens' Bank sent an answer
'Yes, sir.' We find that this
as follows:
does not amount to 'certifying' the checks,
and the Citizens' Bank did not thereby become bound to the holders of the checks for
the amounts. We find that the contract was
not executed by the giving of the checks,
and that by enjoining the payment of the
checks we simply stop the carrying out of a
gambling contract, and thereby leave the
parties where we find them."
Judgment having been rendered against
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Kahn, as before stated, he prosecutes error
to this court to reverse the same, upon the
grounds that the conclusions of law are not
supported by the facts found, and the evidence does not sustain the finding of facts.
Jordan

& Jordan,

for

plaintiff

in error.

John Little, for defendants in error.
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WILLIAMS, J. The evidence tends to
prove the facts found by the district court,
and as this court is not required to determine the weight of the evidence, the facts
'so found will, in the disposition, of the case,
be regarded as established by the evidence.
The case shown by these facts, and those
admitted by the pleadings, is that Kahn was
doing
a commission broker in Cincinnati,
business with and for Ream & Co., brokers
and commission merchants in Chicago, and
bought of or through them wheat and pork
for future delivery, so called, on Walton's
The transactions were mere specaccount.
ulations or ventures on the prices of the
named, without any intention
commodities
on the part of the parties concerned, that the
property should either be delivered or paid
for; but all the parties understood and intended that settlements should be made between them, on the differences between the
market prices, at the dates fixed for delivery, and those named in the contracts.
Kahn was to have a commission for his
margins on the
services, and he advanced
deals.
Walton was loser, and drew his two
checks, amounting to $2,000,
on the bank
where he had funds, payable to Kahn, for
moneys paid by him on the deals and losses.
Walton also paid Kahn $500 in money on
Kahn telegraphed to the
the same account.
bank, inquiring if Walton's checks for the
amount of those drawn to him were good,
and received an affirmative answer. Walton notified the bank not to pay the checks,
and before their presentation brought his
action to enjoin their payment.
1. Upon this state of the case, the first inquiry naturally is, were the speculative transactions in which the parties engaged in the
nature of wagers, and, for that reason, illegal? In the determination of this question
it Is not deemed material whether they fall
within the provisions of our statutes against
gaming and wagering, or do not; for it is
generally held in this country that wagering contracts, though not prohibited by statute, are illegal, and void as against public
policy, and the great weight of authority
is to the effect that contracts of the kind
the district court found those involved in
this case to be are void as wagering agreements.
This has been held by the courts
of last resort in every state where the question has been presented,
and by the supreme court of the United States.
The rule
generally accepted is that contracts for the
sale of personal property to be delivered in
the future are valid if the parties really in-

tend and agree that the property is to be delivered by the seller, and the price is to be

paid by the purchaser, though the seller has
not the goods, nor any other means of getting them, than to go into the market and
buy them.
But if the real intent be merely to speculate on the rise and fall of prices,
and the goods are not to be delivered, but
one party is to pay to the other the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods at the date fixed for
executing the contract, then the contract
partakes of the nature of a wager, and is
void.
Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 4 Sup.
Ct. 160; Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671,
6 Sup. Ct. 537; Mann v. Bishop, 136 Mass.
495; Gregory v. Wendell, 40 Mich. 432; Cole
v. KirV. Milmine, 88 111. 349; Kingsbury
wan, 77 N. Y. 612; Lowry v. Dlllman, 59
Wis. 197, 18 N. W. 4.
2. The facts found by the district court
plamly define Kahn's relation to the unlawful agreements.
He was directly connected
with them, and, with full knowledge of their
character, performed services and expended
It
money to promote and forward them.
was his intention, as well as the intention
of the other parties, that the property should
not be delivered or paid for, but that the
differences in the prices should be adjusted
in money.
It is true, Kahn was the broker,
and had no pecuniary Interest in the business except his commissions, and the repayment of whatever sums he might advance
for margins, and to pay losses as the busiHe, nevertheless,
negotiness progressed.
ated the wagering contracts, and was part}'
to them.
The legal effect of such relation
to contracts of that nature was determined
The
in the ease of Irwin v. Williar, supra.
"In
conclusion of the court is thus stated:
Rountree v. Smith, 108 U. S. 269, 2 Sup. Ct.
630, it was said that brokers who had negotiated such contracts, suing, not on the contracts themselves,
but for services performed, and money advanced for defendant,
at his request, though they might, under
some circumstances, be so connected
with
the immorality of the contract as to be affected by it, they are not in the same position as a party sued for the enforcement of
the original agreement.
It is certainly true
that a broker might negotiate such a contract without being privy to the illegal intent of the principal parties to it, which renders it void; and in such case, being innocent of any violation of law, and not suing
to enforce an unlawful contract, has a meritorious ground for the recovery of compensation for services and advances.
But we
are also of the opinion that when the broker
is privy to the unlawful design of the parties, and brings them together for the very
pm-pose of entering Into an illegal agreement, he Is particeps criminis, and cannot
recover for services rendered or losses incurred by himself on behalf of either in
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forwarding the transaction."
We accept tbis
as a sound and wholesome rule, and under
its operation the checks given by Walton to
Kahn for services rendered and losses paid
by him In the unlawful enterprise are tainted with the vice of their origin, and are sub-_
Ject to aU the infirmities of securities given
for illegal considerations.
3. It is contended
that the drawing of the
checks by Walton on the bank, where he
had sufBclent funds to pay them, and the
bank's response to the inquiry of Kahn's
agent that checks to their amount were
good, was a specific appropriation of the
funds, and amounted to payment of the debt
for which they were drawn, whereby the
A check,
contract became fully executed.
being simply a written order of a depositor
(^^ to his banker to make a certain payment out
'
of his funds, is executory, and, of course,
revocable at any tim-e before the bank has
paid it or committed itself to its payment.
It operates, it is true, as an assignment of
the fund on wliich it is drawn pro tanto, and
binds the bank to its payment out of the
fund when presented, unless revoked; but
it is not itself payment of the debt for
which it is drawn, unless it be so agreed
between the parties. Ordinarily it is only
and the debt is not
a means of payment,
extinguished unless and until the check be
paid, or the holder be guilty of laches, which
may "operate as a discharge of the drawer.
The bank Is the agen^ of the drawer. Its
duty is to pay his money as he directs. It
owes no duty to the holder except under the
drawer's directions, until, by virtue of those
directions, it assumes some obligation to the
holder. Up to that time the latest order
But after the
from the drawer governs.
bank has paid the check, or placed itself
under an obligation to pay it, the drawer's
power of revocation is ended. This obliIt
gation may be incurred by acceptance.
is sometimes said that the legal effect of the
is to place the holder of the
acceptance
By the
check in the position of a depositor.
a new and specific engagement
acceptance
is entered into by the bank, which is to unconditionally pay the sum named to the legal
The acceptance or cerholder of the cheek.
tification is sometimes evidenced by writing
the word "good" on the check by the authorized officer or agent of. the bank; but
no particular mode or form is necessary, and
it is generally held that a verbal acceptance
But whatever the word or
is sufficient.
form employed, there must be enough to
of the particular
indicate the acceptance
V

check.
It is manifest there was no acceptance

or
certification of the checks in question in this
beThe telegraphic correspondence
case.
tween the bank and Kahn's ag«nt amounted
to no more than an assurance that valid
checks to the amount stated, drawn by Walton, or that might be drawn by him, were
No particular checks were menthen good.
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tioned in the inquiry, nor any intimation
given that the inquirer had received, or was
about to receive, such checks; nor had the
bank any means of identifying the checks
to which the inquiry related. Its telegram,
therefore, did not commit the bank to the
payment of any particular check.
At most
it was information that Walton had, at its
date, money on deposit to the amount stated,
subject to check.
Espy v. Bank, 18 Wall.
If, therefore, before the checks were
(504.
presented
for payment, and before they
were certified or accepted by the bank, or
it otherwise became committed to their payment, Walton revoked them, and notified
the bank not to pay them, as he claims, and
as the district court found he did, his defensive remedy at law would appear to be
adequate.
4. But what standing has the plaintifC
in
The transactions upon
a court of equity?
which he founds his claim for relief were
unlawful, and the remedy he seeks is protection against the consequences of his own
participation in them.
In such cases equity
keeps its hands ofC, and leaves the parties
It is a fundamental
where It finds them.

■,

rule of equity that parties wanting its aid:"^
must come with clean hands.
Courts of
equity require honesty, good faith, and legality in transactions between men, and if
a party would pursue his remedy therein,
his demand must not rest on a violation of
law for its foundation, or arise from his own
Illegal acts, or conduct contra bonos morals.
3 Wait, Act. &
1 Wait, Act. & Def. 153;
Def. 685. It was said by Lord Mansfield, in
Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341, that "no-^'
court will lend its aid to a man who founds
his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating,
or otherwise, the cause of action appears to
arise ex tm'pl causa, or the transgression of
a positive law of this country, there the
court says he has no right to be assisted.
It is upon that ground the court goes, not
for the sake of the defendant, but because
they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So, If the plaintiff and defendant were
to change sides, and the defendant was to
bring his action against the plaintiff, the
latter would then have the advantage of It;
for where both are equally In fault, potior
In Atwood v.
est conditio defendentis."
FIsk, 101 Mass. 363, which was a bill in
equity to compel the surrender and cancellation of a note, and mortgage given to secure Its payment, on the ground that the
consideration for them was illegal, the court,
in denying the relief sought by the bill, declares it to have long been settled "that the — \
law will not aid either party to an illegal
contract to enforce it against the other;
neither will it relieve a party to such a contract who has actually fulfilled it, and who
seeks to reclaim his money or whatever articles of property he may have applied to such
The meaning of the familial
a purpose.
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of the winner and loser, so far as to their
right in becoming active movers upon such
contracts in the courts; the one seeking to
court of
enforce them by the judgment of
law, the other seeking by the aid of
court
of chancery to have them delivered up and
They axe equally repelled upon
canceled.
reason and authority."
It was said by this court, in Roll v.
Raguet, Ohio, 400, that "whenever an agreeappears
to be illegal. Immoral, or
ment
against public policy,
court of justice leaves
the parties as it finds them. If the agreement be executed, the court will not rescind
it; if executory, the court will not aid in its
execution."
This was again held In Raguet
And see Raguet
p. 77.
Ohio, pt.
V. Roll,
Ohio, pt
p. 70. The doctrine of
V. Roll,
these cases has recently been approved and
enforced by this court.
McQuade v. Rosecrans, 36 Ohio St. 442; Williams v. BngleAnd in Thomas v.
brecht, 37 Ohio St. 383.
Oronise, 16 Ohio, 54,
Is laid down as "a
universal principle both in law and equity
that where an agreement is founded upon
consideration illegal, Immoral, or against public policy, a court will leave the parties where
finds them." In Hooker v. De Palos, 28
Ohio St. 251, the same doctrine is announced
in the following language:
"The maxim 'Ex
turpi causa non oritur actio' is an old and
familiar one, resting on the clearest principles of public poBcy, and never to be IgIn accordance with this maxim nothnored.
ing is better settled than that, in regard to
contracts, which are entered into for fraudulent or Illegal purposes, the law will aid neither party to enforce them while they remain
executory,
either in whole or in part, nor,
when executed, will it aid either party to
place himself in statu quo by
rescission,
but will In both cases leave the parties where
it finds them. It is true that particular statutes have been from time to time enacted In
this state as well as In many of our sister
states, which are to some extent In contravention of this common-law doctrine.
The
statutes of this state which allow money won
by gaming or betting to be recovered back by
the loser, furnish an example of this kind.
But such statutes are a recognition of the
established
rule that no recovery could be
had in such eases at common law.
They are
exceptional In their character, are in derogauon of the common law, and therefore are to
be construed
strictly, and not extended by
implication beyond the particular cases of
illegality for which they provide." The statutes adverted to change the common law so
far as to give the loser the right 1;o recover
back what he has lost, and provide
remedy therefor,
but no further. In all other
respects the common law governs.
Whether
the statutes have any application to contracts
like those under discussion need not now be
decided, for If
be granted that they have,
yet, since they make no provision for equitable actions for injunctions, the right to such
a

a

It

Is

a

a

it,

maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio deC^fendentis is simply that the law leaves the
parties exactly where they stand; not that
it prefers the defendant to the plaintiff, but
that it will not recognize a right of action
founded on the Illegal contract in favor of
They must
either party against the other.
settle their own questions in such cases
without the aid of the courts." The statement of the rule by OhanceUor Walworth,
in Harrington v. Bigelow, 11 Paige, 349,
may be applied directly to this case. He
says: "Where both parties have been engaged in an illegal transaction, the court
will not lend its active aid to the one party
to get rid of the securities taken upon the
illegal transaction, nor will it aid the other
party in retaining them, but will leave both
to their strict technical rights."
In Weakley v. Watkins, 7 Humph. 356, It
is held that "no court of chancery will entertain a bill to cancel an obligation, the
consideration of which was a violation of
chastity, compounding a felony, smuggling
of goods, gaming, false swearing, or the
'
commission of any crime, or a breach of
good morals."
This was a bill in chancery
tiled by Weakley against Watkins and Ferguson to obtain the cancellation of a note
under seal executed upon a gaming considA demurrer was filed to the bill,
eration.
"It is
and the court in the opinion says:
upon the
true that a court of chancery,
principle of quia timet, will order said instruments to be delivered up and canceled.
But this is when the complainant has been
imposed upon, and executed an instrument
void for fraud, accident, mistake, or other
cause, which renders it iniquitous and unjust that it should be enforced against him,
he has himand when, in the execution of
self been guilty of no violation of law or
good morals. But this principle has never
been held applicable to instruments knowingly executed in violation of good morals
or express prohibition, either by common or
statute law. For instance, no court of chancery will entertain
bill to cancel an obligation,
the consideration of which was
violation of chastity, compounding a felony,
the smuggling of goods in violation of the
revenue law, gaming, false swearing, etc.;
The
and this for very obvious reasons.
complainant shall not be permitted to charge
himself with crime, and obtain relief out of
it; and because pubUc policy requires that
the execution of all such contracts shall be
discouraged,
which cannot be more effectually done than by repelling aU actions upon
them in courts of justice. In contracts of
the kind now under consideration we have
and void, as
held that they are inoperative,
contrary to good morals and positive enactment, and that, as such, they are not fit
subjects for the action of a court. It
tme that in the cases we have heretofore
had the attempt has been to enforce them,
but we can see no difference in the position

it
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by consideramost be determined
tions independent
of tlie statutory regulaVeach v. Elliott, 1 Ohio St 139;
.tions.
Thomas v. Cronise, 16 Ohio, 54.
The legislature, apparently recognizing the
inapplicability of the statutes theretofore in
force to such contracts and transactions, enacted that of May 4, 1885, (82 Ohio Laws, p.
r^ 254,) which declares all contracts for the sale
of grain, provisions, and other specified articles, when there is no intention to deliver
or pay for the articles sold, to be void, and
makes them gambling and criminal acts.
This
statute, having been passed after the contracts
between
the parties were made, of course
remedy

cannot

If it

affect

the decision

of the case,

and.

were otherwise, they do not confer upon
the plaintiff the right to maintain the action
prosecuted
by him. Precisely what effect
has been given the English statutes in the
decisions of the courts of that country upon
this subject is not very clear.
It is, nevertheless, true that parties to gaming securities
were expressly authorized by statute to go
into chancery
for discovery,
which gave
ground for the application of the familiar
rule that courts of chancery, having jurisdiction for one purpose, will retain the case for
final relief. In the case of Rawden v. Shadwell, 1 Amb. 268, which was a bill for discovery and cancellation,
the report states:
"Lord Hardwicke decreed with great clearness, and said that by St. 9 Anne all secm-Ities for money won at play are made void.
Consequently the payment under any such security cannot be supported."
And Baker v.
Williams is referred to In the report as an
authority for the decree. In the note to the
case it Is said that the statute of 9 Anne
"gives leave to come into a court of chancery for discovery;" and Sir J. Jekyll, M. E.,
in the note, citing Baker v. WlUlams, said:
"And if it [the note] was put In suit at law,
no doubt but the party might make a defense against It under the act; but that is no
objection against coming Into this court,
[chancery,] for the person giving the note is
entitled to a discovery here. It could not be
the intention of the legislature that, after
the discovery,
he should be sent to another
court for relief.
So it is that upon the discovery of assets the court grants relief withAnd it may
out sending the party to law."
be noticed that in Woodson v. Barrett, 2 Hen.
& M. 88, the supreme court of Virginia followed Rawden v. Shadwell, under a statute
which was an exact copy of 9 Anne, except
that the word "contract" was inserted in it,
which was omitted in the statute of Anne.
And the case Is followed by the same court
in Skipwith v. Strother, 3 Rand. (Va.) 216.
In this respect the statute of Anne differs essentially from ours.
The only actions provided for by our statute are the purely legal ones
to recover back the money lost, and for the
conversion of the goods won of the plaintiff.
Xo suit in equity is authorized or contemplated.
The provision of the statute that the

plaintiff may annex to his petition In the
legal actions it permits Interrogatories for
discovery at once removes
the necessity
and cause for recourse
to equity, and the
statute which created the right having especially prescribed the legal remedies mentioned, and none other, they must be deemed

exclusive.
It cannot be denied, however, the
courts have differed
in the application of
these kindred maxims, "ex turpi causa non
oritur actio," and "in pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis;" especially to gaming securities, which, it has been held by some
courts, are so far excepted from the operation of the maxims that equity will decree
The
and canceled.
them to be surrendered
reasons given for so holding are that "the
circulation of gaming bonds Is no less to be
discountenanced than the giving of them, and
no means are more likely to prevent the giving of them than to put an effectual stop to
their circulation;" and that because the losers
are permitted to defend against securities
given by them, on the ground that they were
given for a gaming consideration,
courts of
equity should entertain suits for their cancellation.
These appear to be arguments not so much
in favor of the asserted exception as against
the maxims themselves,
for it is apparent
that the same reasoning would, in the same
measure, exclude from their operation every
contract and security founded upon any other
Illegal consideration.
The circulation of all
bonds and securities given for any illegal or
immoral consideration Is quite as much to be
discountenanced
as the giving of them,— gaming bonds and securities, no more than others; and if putting a stop to the circulation
of gaming bonds, by a resort to a court of
equity to compel their surrender and cancellation, be the most effective means of preventing the giving of them, then the same
means should be permitted and adopted, and
for the same reason, to accomplish the same
end, with regard to bonds and securities
given for any other illegal consideration.
And
if because parties may defend against securities given by them, on the ground that they
were given for a gaming consideration, is a
valid reason why a court of equity should entertain a suit for the cancellation of such securities. It is an equally valid reason why
that court should entertain suits for the cancellation of instruments founded upon any
other illegal consideration; for such consideration may also be made a ground of deSuch is the logical result of
fense to them.
the argument In favor of the exception contended for; and some English cases have
In Neville v. Wilkingone to that extent.
son, 1 Brown, Ch. 547, Lord Chancellor Thurlow is reported to have said "that In all cases
where money was paid for an unlawful purpose, the party, though particeps
crimlriis,
might recover at law, and that the reason
was that if courts of justice mean to prevent
the perpetration of crimes it must be not by
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allowing a man who has got possession to remain in possession, but by putting the parties back to the state In which they were before." But Mr. Justice Story, referring to
the words of the lord chancellor, says: "This
is pushing the doctrine to an extravagant extent, and effectually
subverting the maxim
'in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.'
The ground of reasoning upon which
his lordship proceeded is exceedingly
questionable in itself, and the suppression of illegal contracts is far more likely in general to
be accomplished by leaving the parties without remedy against each other, and by thus
introducing a preventive check naturally connected with a want of confidence, and a sole
And so, acreliance upon personal
honor.
cordingly, the modern doctrine is established."
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 298.
The difference
between the earlier cases and the current authorities on the subject is pointed out in the
following note to this section:
"I say at
present,

for

there has been considerable fluctuation of opinion, both in courts of law and
equity, on this subject.
The old cases often
gave relief, both at law and in equity, where
the party would otherwise derive an advantage from his iniquity.
But the modern doctrine has adopted a more severely just, and,
probably, politic, moral rule, which is to leave
the parties where it finds them, giving no
relief and no countenance to claims of this
sort." Mr. Blspham, in his Principles of
Equity, (section 223,) says:
"The rule, both
at law and in equity, in regard to gambling
transactions, now seems to be that the' courts
will not only refuse to lend their aid for the
purpose of enforcing such contracts, but they
will not assist the losing party in setting the
contract aside, or recovering back the money paid.
The maxim applicable to such cases
The
is potior est conditio possidentis."
opinion of the supreme court of Massachusetts, in the case of Atwood v. Fisk, beIt is there
fore cited, is to the same effect.
that "the
stated as the prevailing doctrine
suppression
of illegal contracts is far more
likely in general to be accomplished by leaving the parties without remedy against each
other; and so the modern doctrine is established that relief is not granted where the
parties are in pari delicto."
A review of all
the authorities would occupy much space and
be of little practical value.
The test for determining when the objection that the parties are in pari delicto can
be sustained
is whether the plaintiff can

.d
I
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make out his case otherwise than through
the medium and by the aid of the illegal
transaction to which he was himself a party,
and, when applied to this case, is conclusive
against the plaintiff. He asserts that he
knowingly entered into an unlawful engagement; one contrary to good morals and
against public policy.
He entered into it
with knowledge that either he or the other
party must lose, and with the intention of
reaping the fruits of his unlawful venture, if
he should prove to be the winner. His exHe lost, paid
pectations were disappointed.
part of the loss, and, for the purpose of making further payment, drew his check on a
bank in which he had sufficient funds on deposit to pay them.
These checks he delivered to the winner, or his agent, and, having
gone thus far, he appeals to a court of equity
to Interfere in his behalf, and interpose Its
extraordinary aid by injunction to stop their
payment.
After he lost, he might have refused further to act, and still be safe, and If,
by giving the checks, the other party has acquired an advantage over him, it results from
his voluntary act on the executor of his illegal enterprise.
We fail to perceive how to
relieve parties in cases like this from the
in which their own wrongful
consequences
conduct has involved them would tend to disadventures,
promote
good
courage
such
morals, Increase respect for the law, or accord with a sound public policy.
In reaching this conclusion, we have not
overlooked the rule that a party who advances money upon an undertaking or agreement to do an act that is illegal, immoral, or

against public policy, may, at any time before

the wrongful act is done, and while the agreement or undertaking remains wholly unexecuted, repent and retract.
He may wholly
rescind the contract, prevent the act from being done, and recover back.
The law encourages such repentance
and abandonment
of the unlawful undertaking, and will aid the
party, because it tends to prevent wrongdoing.
But to be eflSicacious
the repentance
must be timely, and it comes too late aftei
the unlawful act has been done, and the undertaking in whole or in part performed.
Then the law will assist neither party In its
further execution, nor to undo what has been
done in its execution.
Hooker v. De Palos,
28 Ohio St. 251.
Judgment reversed and petition dismissed.

MINSHALL

and

SPEAR,

JJ.,

dissent.
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Robert Craig's will contained the following clause: "I give and bequeath to my
brother, Thomas Craig, of Baith parish, Ayrshire, Scotland, all the proceeds of my estate, t)oth real and personal, which I have
herein directed to be sold, to be remitted to
him, according as the payments are made."
Thomas Craig being an alien, the question
was, could he take the proceeds of this land,
which had been devised to one Leslie, in
trust, the proceeds from the sale of which
were to be paid to him!
Mr. Justice WASHINGTON
delivered the
opinion of the court The incapacity of an
alien to take, and to hold beneficially, a legal or equitable estate in real property, is
not disputed by the counsel for the plaintifC; and it is admitted by the counsel for
the state of Virginia, that this incapacity
does not extend to personal estate. The only inquiry, then, which this court has to
make is, whether the above clause in the
will of Robert Craig is to be construed, under all the circumstances of this case, as a
bequest to Thomas Craig of personal property, or as a devise of the land itself.
Were this a new question, it would seem
extremely difficult to raise a doubt respecting It The common sense of mankind would
determine, that a devise of money, the proceeds of land directed to be sold. Is a devise
of money, notwithstanding it is to arise out
of land; and that a devise of land, which a
testator by his will directs to be purchased,
will pass an interest in the land itself, without regard to the character of the fund out
of which the purchase is to be made.
1 The settled doctrine of the courts of equity corresponds with this obvious construction of wills, as well as of other instruments,
whereby land Is directed to be turned into
money, or money into land, for the benefit of
those for whose use the conversion is inIn the case of Fletcher
tended to be made.
V. Ashburner, 1 Brown, Ch. 497, the master
of the rolls says, that "nothing is better established than this principle, that money
directed to be employed in the purchase of
land, and land directed to be sold and turned into money, are to be considered as that
species of property into which they are directed to be converted, and this, in whatHe
ever manner the direction is given."
adds, "the owner of the fund, or the contracting parties, may make land money or
The cases establish this rule
money land.
This declaration is well waruniversally."
ranted by the cases to which the master of
1 Equity considers
land, directed to be sold
and converted into money, as money; and money di-ected to be employed in the purchase of
land as land.
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the rolls refers, as well as by many others.
See Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. Wms. 320; Yates
V. Compton,
Id. 308; Trelawney v. Booth,
2 Atk. 307.
The principle upon which the whole of
this doctrine is founded is, that a court of
equity, regarding the substance, and not the
mei'e forms and circumstances of agreements
and other Instruments, considers things directed or agreed to be done, as having been
actually performed,
where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent a performance. This qualification of the more concise and general rule, that equity considers
that to be done which is agreed to be done,
will comprehend the cases which come under this head of equity.
2 Thus, where the whole beneficial Interest
in the money in the one case, or In the land
in the other, belongs to the person for whose
use It is given, a court of equity will not
compel
the trustee to execute the' trust
against the wishes of the cestui que trust,
but will permit him to take the money or
the land, if he elect to do so before the conand this
version has actually been made;
election he may make, as well by acts or
clearly Indicating a determinadeclarations,
tion to that eifect, as- by application to a
court of equity. It is this election, and not
the mere right to make it, which changes
the character of the estate so as to make It
real or personal, at the will of the party entitled to the beneficial Interest.
If this election be not made in time to
stamp the property with a character different from that which the will or other instrument gives it, the latter accompanies It,
with all its legal consequences.
Into the
hands of those entitled to It in that char8 So that in case of the death of the
acter.
cestui que trust, without having determined
his election, the property will pass to his
heirs or personal representatives,
In the same
manner as it would have done had the trust
been executed, and the conversion actually
made In his lifetime.
In the case of Kirkman v. Milles, 13 Ves.
338, which was a devise of real estate to
trustees upon trust to sell, and the moneys
arising as well as the rents and profits till
the sale, to be equally divided between the
testator's three daughters, A. B. and C. The
estate was, upon the death of A. B. and C,
considered and treated as personal property,
notwithstanding the cestui que trusts, after
the death of the testator, had entered upon,
2 Where the whole beneficial interest in the
land in one case, or in the money in the other,
belongs to the person for whose use it is given,
a court of equity will permit the cestui que
trust to take the money or land at his election,
if he elect before the conversion is made.
8 But if the cestui que trust die, without having determined his election, the property will
pass to his heirs or personal representatives, in
the same manner as it would have done if the
conversion had been made, and the trust executed in his lifetime.
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and occupied the land for about two years
prior to their deaths; but no steps had been
taken by them, or by the trustees, to sell,
nor had any requisition to that effect been
made by the former to the latter. The master of the rolls was of opinion, that the occupation of the land for two years was too
He adds:
an election.
short to presume
"The opinion of Lord Rosslyn, that property was to be taken as it happened to be at
the death of the party from whom the representative claims, had been much doubted
by Lord Eldon, who held that without some
as being in the
act, it must be considered
state in which it ought to be; and that Lord
Rosslyn's rule was new, and not according
to the prior cases."
The same doctrine is laid down and maintained in the case of Edwards v. Countess
of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 171, which was a
covenant on marriage to invest £10,000, part
of the lady's fortune, in the purchase of land
in fee, to be settled on the husband for life,
remainder to his first and every other son
in tail male, remainder to the husband in
fee. The only son of this marriage having
and the
died without issue, and intestate,
investment of the money not having been
made during his life, the chancellor decided
that the money passed to the heir at law;
that it was in the election of the son to
have made this money, or to have disposed
of it as such, and that, therefore, even his
parol disposition of it would have been regarded;
but that something to determine
the election must be done.
* This doctrine,
so well established by the
cases which have been referred to, and by
many others which it is unnecessary to mention, seems to be conclusive upon the question which this court is called upon to decide, and would render any farther investigation of it useless, were it not for the case
of Roper v. Radeliffe, which was cited, and
mainly relied upon, by the counsel for the
state of Virginia.
The short statement of that case is as follows: John 'Roper conveyed all his lands to
trustees and their heirs, in trust, to sell the
same, and out of the proceeds, and of the
rents and profits till sale, to pay certain
debts, and the overplus or the money to be
paid as he, the said John Roper, by his -will
or otherwise, should appoint, and for want
of such appointment,
for the benefit of the
said John Roper, and his heirs.
By his will
reciting the said deed, and the power reserved to him in the surplus of the said real
estate, he bequeathed
several pecuniary legacies, and then gave the residue of his
real and personal
estate to William Constable and Thomas Radeliffe, and two others,
and to their heirs. By a codicil to this will,
he bequeathed other pecuniary legacies; and
the remainder, whether in lands or personal
* The case of Roper v. Radeliffe,
examined.

9 Mod. 1G7,

he gave to the said W. C. and T. R.
Upon a bill filed by W. O. and T. R. against
the heir at law of John Roper, and the other trustees, praying to have the trust executed, and the residue of the money arising
from the sale of the lands to be paid over
to them; the heir at law opposed the execution of the trust, and claimed the land as
a resulting trtist, upon the ground of the incapacity of Constable and Radeliffe to take,
they being papists. The decree of the court
of chancery, which was in favour of the
was, upon appeal to the bouse of
papists,
lords, reversed, and the title of the heir at
law sustained; six Judges against five, being in his favour.
Without stating at lai;ge the opinion upon
which the reversal took place, this court will
proceed, 1st. To examine the general principles laid down in that opinion; and then,
2d. The case itself, so far as it has been
pressed upon us as an authority to rule the
question before the court.
In performing the first part of this undertaking, it will not be necessary to question
any one of the premises laid down in' that
opinion. They are, 1. That land devised to
trustees, to sell for payment of debts and
This is
legacies, is to be deemed as money.
the general doctrine established by all the
cases referred to in the preceding part of
this opinion. ° 2. That the heir at law has
a resulting trust in such land, so far as it is
of value, after the debts and legacies are
paid, and that he may come into equity and
restrain the trustee from selling more than
is necessary to pay the debt and legacies; or
he may offer to pay them himself, and pray
to have a conveyance of the part of the
land not sold in the first ease, and the whole
in the latter, which property will, in either
case, be land, and not money.
This right
to call for a conveyance
Is very correctly
styled a privilege, and It Is one which a
court of equity will never refuse, unless
there are strong reasons for refusing it. The
whole of this doctrine proceeds upon a principle which is incontrovertible, that where
the testator merely directs the real estate to
be converted into money, for the purposes
directed In his will, so much of the estate,
or the money arising from It, as is not effectually disposed of by the wiU, (whether
it arise from some omission or defect in the
will itself, or from any subsequent accident,
which prevents the devise from taking effect,) results to the heir at law, as the old
estate,

" Land, devised to trustees,
to sell for payment of debts and legacies, is to be deemed as
money.
The heir at law has a resulting trust in such
lands, after the debts and legacies are paid, and
may come into equity and restrain the trustee
from sellmg more than sufficient to pay them,
or may offer to pay them himself, and pray a
conveyance of the part of the land not sold in
the first case, and the whole in the latter, which
property in either case will be land, and not
money.
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was the case of
20, where the
testator having two sons, A. and B., and
three daughters, devised his lands to he sold
to pay his debts, &c., and as to the moneys
arising, by the sale, after debts paid, gave
£200 to A. the eldest son, at the age of 21,
and the residue to his four younger children.
A. died before the age of 21, in consequence
of which the bequest to him failed to talie
effect. The court decided
that the £200
should be considered as land to descend to
the heir at law of the testator, because it
was in effect the same as if so much land
as was of the value of £200 was not directed
to be sold, but was suffered to descend.
The
case of Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Brown, Ch.
503, Is one of the same l^ind, and estabSo, likewise, a
lishes the same principle.
money provision under a marriage contract,
to arise out of land, which did not take effect, on account of the death of the party for
whose benefit it was intended, before the
time prescribed, resulted as money to the
grantor, so as to pass under a residuary
clause in his will. Hewitt v. Wright, 1
Brown, Ch. Cas. 86.
6 But even
in cases of resulting trusts,
for the benefit of the heir at law, it is settled that if the intent of the testator appears to have been to stamp upon the proceeds of the land described to be sold, the
quality of personalty, not only to subserve
the particular purposes of the will, but to
all intents, the claim of the heir at law to
a resulting trust is defeated, and the estate
is considered to be personal. This was decided in the case of Yates v. Compton, 2 P.
Wms. 308, in which the chancellor says, that
the intention of the will was to give away
all from the heir, and to turn the land into
personal estate, and that that was to be
taken as it was at the testator's death, and
ought not to be altered by any subsequent
accident, and decreed the heir to join in the
sale of the land, and the money arising therefrom to be paid over as personal estate to
the representatives of the annuitant, and to
those of the residuary legatee.
In the case
of Fletcher v. Ashburner, before referred to,
the suit was brought by the heir at law of
the testator, against the personal representatives and the trustees claiming the estate
upon the ground of a resulting trust. But
the court decreed the property, as money, to
the personal representatives of him to whom
the beneficial interest In the money was bequeathed,
and the master of the rolls observes, that the case of Bmblyn v. Freeman,
and Cruse v. Barley, are those where real
estate being directed to be sold, some part
3

Such

P. Wms.

• But if the Intent of the testator appears to
have been to stamp upon the proceeds of the
land directed to be sold, the quality of personalty, not only for the particular purposes of the
will, but to all intents, the claim of the heir at
law to a resulting trust is defeated, and the estate is considered to be personal.
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of the disposition has failed, and the thing
devised has not accrued to the representative, or devisee, by which something has resulted to the heir at law.
It is evident, therefore, from a view of the
above cases, that the title of the heir to a
resulting trust can never arise, except when
something is left undisposed
of, either by
some defect in the will, or by some subsequent lapse, which prevents the devise from
taking effect; and not even then, if it appears that the intention of the testator was
to change the nature of the estate from land
to money, absolutely and entirely, and not
merely to serve the purposes of the will.
But the ground upon which the title of the
heir rests is, that whatever is not disposed
remains to him, and partakes of the old use,
as if it had not been directed to be sold.

The third proposition laid down in the
of Roper v. Radcliffe, 9 Mod. 167, Is,
that equity will extend the same privilege
to the residuary legatee which is allowed
to the heir, to pay the debts and legacies,
and call for a conveyance of the real estate,
or to restrain the trustees from selling more
than is necessary to pay the debts and legacase

cies.

7 This
been admitted in
has. In effect,
the preceding part of this opinion; because,
if the cestui que trust of the whole beneficial interest in the money to arise from the
sale of the land, may claim this privilege,
it follows, necessarily, that the residuary
legatee may, because
he is, in effect, the
beneficial owner of the whole, charged with
the debts and legacies, from which he will
be permitted to discharge it, by paying the
debts and legacies, or may claim so much of
the" real estate as may not be necessary for
that purpose.
8 But the court cannot accede to the conclusion, which, in Roper v. Radcliffe, is deduced from the establishment of the above
principles. That conclusion Is, that in respect to the residuary, legatee, such a devise
shall be deemed as land in equity, though in
respect to the creditors and specific legatees
it Is deemed as money. It is admitted, with
this qualification, that if the residuary legatee thinks proper to avail himself of the
privilege of taking it as land, by making an
election in his life time, the property will
then assume the character of land. But If
he does not make this election, the property
retains the character of personalty to every
intent and purpose. The cases before cited
T Equity will extend the same privilege
to
the residuary legatee which is allowed to the
heir, to pay the debts and legacies, and call for
a conveyance of the real estate, or to restrain
the trustees from selling more than is necessary
to pay the debts and legacies.
8 The conclusion— which,
in Roper v. Radcliffe, is deduced from the above prmciples, that
in respect to the residuary legatee such a devise
shall be considered as land in equity, though in
respect to the creditors and specific legatees, it
is deemed as money —denied.
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seem to the court to be conclusive upon this
point; and none were referred to, or have
come under the view of the court, which
sanction the conclusion made In the unqualified terms used in the case of Eoper v. Rad-

cliffe.

As to the Idea that the character of the estate is affected by this right of election,
whether the right be claimed or not, it appears to be as repugnant to reason, as we
think it has been shown to be, to principle
and authorities. Before any thing can be
made of the proposition, it should be shown
that this right of privilege of election is so
indissolubly united with the devise, as to
constitute a part of it, and that it may be
exercised in all cases, and under all circumstances.
This was, indeed, contended for
with great ingenuity and abilities by the
counsel for the state of Virginia, but it was
not proved to the satisfaction of the court.
It certainly is not true, that equity will
extend this privilege in all cases to the cestui
que trust It will be refused if he be an infant. In the case of Seeley v. Jago, 1 P.
Wms. 389, where money was devised to be
laid out in land in fee, to be settled on A.
B. and C, and their heirs, equally to be divided: On the death A., his infant heir,
together with B. and C, filed their bill,
claiming to have the money, which was decreed accordingly as to B. and C; but the
share of the infant was ordered to be put
out for his benefit, and the reason assigned
was, that he was incapable of making an
election, and that such election, if permitted,
would, in case of his death, be prejudicial
to his heir.
In the case of Foone v. Blount, Cowp.
Lord Mansfield, who is compelled to
467,
acknowledge the authority of Roper v. Radcliffe in parallel cases, combats the reasoning
of Chief Justice Parker upon this doctrine
of election, with irresistible force. He suggests, as the true answer to it, that though
in a variety of cases this right exists, yet it
was inapplicable to the case of a person
who was disabled by law from taking land,
and that therefore a court of equity would,
in such a case, decree that he should taie
the property as money.
This ease of Walker v. Deime, 2 Ves. Jr
170, seems to apply with great farce to this
part of our subject The testator directed
money to be laid out In lands, tenements, and
hereditaments, or on long terms, with limitations applicable to real estate. The money
not having been laid out, the crown, on failure of heirs, claimed the money as land. It
was decided that the crown had no equity
against the next of kin to have the money
laid out in real estate in order to claim it by
It was added that the devisees, on
escheat.
becoming absolutely entitled, have the option given by the will; and a deed of appointment by one of the cestui que trusts,
though a feme covert, was held a sufficient indi''ation of her intention that it should con-

tinue personal against her heir claiming it as
inefCectually disposed of for want of her examination. This case is peculiarly strong,
from the circumstance, that the election is
embodied
in the devise itself; but this was
not enough, because the crown had no equity
to force an election to be made for the purpose of producing an escheat.
Equity would surely proceed contrary to
its regular course, and the principles which
universally govern it, to aJlow the right of
election where it is desired, and can be lawfully made, and yet refuse to decree the
upon the application of the alien,
money
upon no other reason, but because, by law,
he is incapable to hold the land: In short, to
consider him in the same situation as if he
had made an election, which would have
been refused had he asked for a conveyance.
The more just and correct rule would seem
to be, that where the cestui que trust is incapable to take or to hold the land beneficially, the right of election does not exist, and
consequently, that the property is to be considered as being of that species into which
it is directed to be converted.
Having made these observations upon the
principles laid down in the case of Roper v.
Radcliffe, and upon the arguments urged at
the bar in support of them, very few words
will suffice to show that, as an authority. It is
inapplicable to this case.
» The incapacities of a papist under the
English statute of 11 & 12 Wm. III., c. 4, and
of an alien at common law, are extremely
dissimilar. The former is incapable to take
by purchase, any lands, or profits out of
lands; and all estates, terms, and any other
interests or profits whatsoever out of Istuds,
to be made, suffered, or done, to, or for the
use of such person, or upon any trust for
him, or to, or for the benefit, or relief of any
such person, are declared by the statute to
be utterly void.
Thus, it appears that he cannot even take.
His incapacity is not confined to land, but to
any profit, interest, benefit, or relief. In or
out of it. He is not only disabled from taking or having the benefit of any such interest, but the will or deed itself, which attempts to pass it, is void. In Roper v. Radcliffe, it was strongly insisted, that the money
given to the papist, which was to be the proceeds of the land, was a profit or interest
out of the land. If this be so, (and it is not
material in this case to affirm or deny that
position,) then .the will of John Roper in
relation to the be^juest to the two papists,
was void under the statute; and if so, the
right of the heir at law of the testator, to
the residue, as a resulting trust, was incontestable. The cases above cited have fully
established that principle. In that case, too,
the rents and profits, till the sale, would have
belonged to the papists, if they were capable
» The case of Roper v.
RadclifEe distinguished
from the present case.
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of taking, which brought the case still more
strongly within the statute; and this was

much relied on, not only in reasoning upon
the words, but the policy of the statute.
10 Now, what ^s the situation of an alien?
He cannot only talie an interest in land, but
a freehold interest in the land Itself, and
may hold it against all the world but the
king, and even against him until office found,
and he is not accountable for the rents and
profits previously received." In this case
the will being valid, and the alien capable
of taking under it, there can be no resulting
trust to the bMr, and the claim of the state
is founded solely upon a supposed equity, to
have the land by escheat as if the alien had,
or could upon the principles of a court of
equity, have elected to take the land instead
of the money. The points of difference between the two cases are so striking that it
would be a waste of time to notice them in
detail.
It may be further observed, that the case
of Roper v. Radcliffe has never, in England,
been applied to the case of aliens; that its
authority has been submitted to with reluctance, and is strictly confined in its application to cases precisely parallel to it.
Lord Mansfield in the case of Foone v.
Blount, speaJis of it with marked disapprobation; and we know, that had Lord Trevor
10 An alien may take, by purchase, a freehold,
or other interest in land, and may hold it
against all the world except the king; and even
and is not acagainst him until office found;
countable for the rents and profits previously
received.
11 Vide 3 Wheat IZ
Jackson ei dem. State
of New York v. Clarke, note c.
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been present, and declared the opinion he
had before entertained, the judges woHild
have been equally divided.
The case of the Attorney General and Lord
Weymouth, Amb. 20, was also pressed upon
the court, as strongly supporting that of
Roper v. Radcliffe, and as bearing upon the
present case.
The first of these propositions might be
admitted; although It is certain that the
mortmain act, upon which that case was
decided, is even stronger in its expression
than the statute against papists, and the
chanceUor so considers it; for he says,
whether the surplus be considered as money
or land, it is just the same thing, the statute
making void all charges and encumbrances
on land, for the benefit of a charity.
But if this case were, in all respects, the
same as Roper v. Radcliffe, the observations
which have been made upon the latter
would all apply to it It may be remarked,
however, that in this case, the chancellor
avoids expressing any opinion upon the question, whether the money to arise from the
sale of the land, was to be taken as personalty or land; and, although he mentions the
case of Roper v. Radcliffe, he adds, that he
does not depend upon it, as it is immaterial
whether the surplus was to be considered as
land or money under the mortmain act
Upon the whole we are unanimously of
opinion, that the legacy given to Thomas
Craig, in the will of Robert Craig, is to be
considered as a bequest of personal estate,
which he is capable of taking for his own
benefit.

Certificate accordingly.

u
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FT. DEARBORN

NAT. BANK

et al.
(54

N.

Ew 946, 181

Supreme Court of

Illinoia

III.

279.)

Oct. 16, 1899.

Appeal from appellate covirt. First district.
Bill by Walter Wyman against the Ft
Dearborn National Bank and others.
From
a decree of the superior court of Cook county
in favor of complainants,
defendants sued
out a writ of error to the appellate court,
■where the decree was reversed.
80 111. App.
150.

Plaintiff

appealed.

Reversed.

On September 1, 1896, the First National
Bank %t Helena, Mont., drew its check upon
the Ft Dearborn National Bank of Chicago
for $10,000, in favor of appellant J At the
time this check was given, the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank had in its possession, on deposit to the credit of the First National Bank
of Helena, $20,523.67. The Ft Dearborn
National Bank at the same time held a certificate of deposit of date May 15, 1895, from
the First National Bank of Helena, in the
sum of $25,000, which latter was secured by
collateral for the face amount of $30,000 of
notes taken by the First National Bank of
Helena and indorsed to the Ft Dearborn
National Bank. The Helena bank was indebted to the Ft. Dearborn National Bank,
on account $649.89. On the 4th day of September, 1896, the Helena bank was placed
in the hands of a receiver, and on the same
day the Ft. Dearborn National Bank transferred the account on deposit with it to the
amount of $20,523.67 to itself, and credited
its certificate of deposit with that amount
debiting the Helena bank with the same sum,
and leaving a balance due the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank of $2,321.39, with interest
thereon.
On the 5th day of September the
check drawn in favor of appellant was presented for payment to the Ft Dearborn National Bank, which was refused.
On the
21st day of January, 1897, the appellant filed
in the superior court of Cook county his bill,
making the Ft. Dearborn National Bank and
the receiver of the Helena bank defendants,
and sought to marshal assets.
To this bill
of complaint a demurrer was interposed and
overruled. Subsequently
the defendants
to
the bill filed an answer, and the cause was
upon bill and answer, and a desubmitted
cree was entered
in accordance with the
prayer of the bill, to reverse which the defendants sued out a writ of error to the appellate court for the First district where the
decree was reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill, whereupon the appellee
in the appellate court
prosecuted this appeal.
Peckham, Brown & Packard, for appellant
Gilbert & Fell, for appellees.

It

PHILLIPS, J.
is Insisted

(after stating the facts).
by the appeUant that by the

execution and delivery of its check for $10,000 against the deposit account of the Ft.
Dearborn National Bank the First National
Bank of Helena assigned and transferred
to the appellant from that deposit account,
an amount sufficient to pay the check on
September 1, 1896, the time at which it was
drawn; and as sustaining this contention
appellant cites National Bank of America v.
Indiana Banking Co., 114 111. 483, 2 N. E.
401; Abt V. Bank, 159 lU. 467, 42 N. E. 856;
and Gage Hotel Co. v. Union Nat Bank,
The principle is
. 171 lU. 531, 49 N. E. 420.
i clearly
established by the foregoing ' and
I other authorities in this state that the check
jof a depositor upon his banker, delivered
to another for value, transfers to that other
I
jthe title to so much of the deposit as the
! check
calls for, and the banker becomes
the
holder
of the money for the use of the
I
/ holder of the check, and is bound to account
[ to him for the amount thereof, provided the
party drawing the check has funds to that
\ amount on deposit, subject to his check, at
Munn v.
Uhe time the same is presented.
Burch, 25 111. 21.
The check operates as an
absolute assigument of the fund on which
it is drawn from the time it is delivered,
as between the drawer and the payee, and
the bank is bound as soon as the check is
presented, and whatever sum stands upon
the books to the credit of the depositor at
the time of such presentation Is absolutely
assigned to the holder of the check.
Bickford V. Bank, 42 111. 238; Brown v. Leckie,
43 111. 497; Fourth Nat Bank v. City Nat
Bank, 68 111. 398; Union Nat. Bank v. Oceana Co. Bank, 80 111. 212; Bank v. Jones, 137
111. 634, 27 N. E. 533; Niblack v. Bank, 169
111. 517, 48 N. E. 438.
And the relation existing between the drawer, the check holder,
and the banker becomes such, when there
are sufficient funds on deposit to meet the
cheek at the time of presentation, that, because such funds were appropriated at the
tjpie of the drawing of the check, the con-^
tract to be Implied between the depositor,
the banker, and the check holder Is that the
check holder, whoever he may be, may have
his action, and recover against the bank the
amount, pro tanto, of the check.
Gage Hotel Co. V. Union Nat. Bank, supra.
In the
latter case It was said (page 536, 171 111.,
and page 422, 49 N. E.):
"If the funds are
In the bank when the check Is drawn, the
drawing
an appropriation, as between the
drawer and the payee, of the sum of money
named In the check, which Is to lie in the
bank vmtil called for by a presentation of
the check.
It is true that in such a case
there is no privity between the bank and the
check
holder until presentment and that
priomy^ in drawing a check does not give
priority of ^igEtTojthe Tund as againstljthe
bffiEerTbut that such priority of ripiTls determmed by the order of presentation." It
was held In Niblack v. Bank, supra (page
521, 169 lU., and page 439, 48 N.
E.): "It
is_

/
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is also the law, where a bank holds a demand note, or a note past due, it has the
right to charge such obligation up against
the maker's deposit account;
and, if it does
so before a check drawn by the depositor
is presented for payment, it will be entitled
to hold the deposit against any check afterwards presented." In this case, on the 4th
of September— at least one day before the
presentment
of the check for payment— the
Chicago bank transferred the account, and
by proper entries on its books credited the
Helena bank with all the money held by it
to the credit of the latter bank, which credit was made on a certificate of deposit, which
was, in effect,
a demand
note.
Hunt v.
Divine, 37 HI. 131; Tripp v. Curtenius, 36
Mich. 494. Appropriating the deposit fund
in good faith, in pursuance of strict legal
rights, for the purpose of protecting its own
Interests,
and without notice of the appropriation of the money by drawing the check
in favor of appellant, was not a wrongful
act, but one authorized by law, and absolutely transferred the legal and equitable right
to the fund so deposited to the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank, the check not having been
presented to it, nor it having any notice of
the same, until the day after the transfer
Under the recognized rule
/ of the account.
in this state there was between the Helena
bank and the payee of the check an absolute assignment of 510,000, then on deposit
with the Ft. Dearborn National Bank, and
no right existed in the Helena bank to change
that deposit in any way, or to so draw
against it as to prevent the assignment pro
tanto from being carried out. It is clear that
the holder of the check had an interest in
the fund so assigned, while it is equally clear
that until the bank had notice it could pay
subsequently drawn checks, or credit the
amount of the deposit on any overdue paper
of its own. The equitable interest of the
check holder, however, remained the same.
It is a principle controlling the marshaling
of securities that where one creditor can
resort to two funds, and another to one of
them only, the former must seek satisfaction
out of that fund which the latter cannot
touch. In Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1414, it is said:
"If, therefore, the prior creditor resorts to
fund, the subsequent
the doubly-charged
creditor wiU be substituted, as far as possiThese rules must be takble, to his rights.
en with the modifications and exceptions
that in their application the paramount incumbrancer shall not be delayed or inconvenienced in the collection of his debt,
•
•
* that the rights of third parties
shall not be prejudiced, and that the parties
themselves are creditors of the same debtor." Numerous authorities are there cited
The prinas sustaining these pfopositions.
ciple of marshaling securities has been frequently applied to cases where there Is an
equitable interest or lien on collateral securities. In Colebrooke on Collateral Securities
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(section 98): "By this rule, a creditor having a lien upon two funds for the
payment of his debt, and a subsequent creditor a lien upon one only of such funds, the
former is required to exhaust his remedy
against the fund which is especially for his
security before resorting to that In which
the subsequent creditor is interested. The
rule, however, is never enforced in cases
where it would cause an injury or damage
to the creditor holding such liens upon separate funds, or would work injustice to
other parties. The rule was applied where a
merchant had forwarded his note to a broker
for sale, and the proceeds, less commissions,
remitted.
The broker fraudulently pledged
the note, with other collaterals, to a bank,
to secure a loan to himself, of which the
merchant received nothing. The merchant,
learning of the misappropriation, gave notice to the bank, and claimed to be subrogated to any surplus arising from other
securities held by it after the payment of
Subsequently, and before the mathe loan.
turity of thft loan, the note fell due, and was
paid without suit. Upon realizing the other
securities, the bank held a surplus in its
hands.
The merchant was entitled to be
paid from such surplus, his voluntary payment not affecting his right of recovery."
This principle Is sustained by Parwell v.
Bank, 90 N. Y. 483. In that case the merchant had an equitable Interest in collaterals, which, with his note, were put up to
secure the loan to the broker by reason of
the broker's misappropriation of the note,
and it is not, equitably, a stronger case for
the marshaling of assets than where, as in
this case, the bank had as security for its
certificate of deposit and for its account
due notes aggregating about $30,000, and a
deposit of over $20,000. Here, $10,000 of the
amount deposited having been equitably assigned to the complainant, by reason of its
appropriation by the bank before receiving
notice of the drawing of the check the complainant was deprived of all interest in the
deposit, and the Helena bank, or Its receiver
(who could have no greater interest than
the bank itself), received the benefit of th*
application of the deposit by the Ft Dearborn National Bank on Its certificate of deposit, and the complainant, as holder of the
check, had such an Interest in the sum deposited that he should be SiUbrogated, as
against the Helena bank or its receiver, to
the notes held by the Ft. Dearborn National
Bank after the payment of the residue due
the latter bank; and this principle of subrogation Is applicable because, by reason of
the appropriation of the fund by the bank
with which the deposit was made to the
payment of a debt for 'which It held two distinct characters of securities, one of those
securities is, to an extent sufficient to pay
the complainant, released from liability so
far as the Ft. Dearborn National Bank was
concerned, and the latter bank had lawfully

it is said
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used 510,000 of a deposit theretofore assigned to the complainant by the Helena bank.
2 Beach, Mod. Eq. Jur. § 784; 1 Story, Eq.

Jur.
It

§§ 635,

636.

is a maxim of equity that "equity re
gards and treats that as done which in good
conscience ought to be done," and in writing
of this maxim Mr. Pomeroy, in his work on
Equity Jurisprudence (section
365),
says:
"The principle involves the notion of an equitable obligation existing from some cause; of
a present relation of equitable right and duty
subsisting between two parties;
a right held
by one party, from whatever cause arising,
that the other should do some act, and the
corresponding
duty— the 'ought'— resting upon
Equity does not rethe latter to do such act.
gard and treat as done what might be done
or what could be done, but only what ought
to be done. Nor does the principle operate Id
favor of every person, no matter what may
be his situation and relations, but only in favor of him who holds the equitable right to
have the act performed,
as against the one
upon whom the duty of such performance has
A court of equity, acting upon
devolved."
this fundamental principle, may go beneath
the appearance of things, and deal with the
real facts, where the interest is a purely equitable one, recognized by courts of equity alone.
When, therefore, a prior incumbrancer of two
funds, by his election of remedies, deprives a
junior incumbrancer, who has a lien upon one
of the funds only, from reaching the particular fund on which he has a lien, the junior
incumbrancer, to the extent of his lien, should
inbe substituted to the lien of the paramount
cumbrancer upon the other fund bound, as
against the debtor and all claiming under him
Gibson
by lien or title subsequent in time.
V. Seagrim, 20 Beav. 614; James v. Hubbard,
1 Paige, 228; CSowes v. Diclienson,
5 Johns.
Oh. 235.
Under a bill for marshaling securities relief may be had In that character of
case. The Ft. Dearborn National Bank had

a right to apply the deposit In payment of the
pro tanto to the extent of the
indebtedness
deposit, and deprive the check holder of any
part of that deposit as a fund assigned to him:
but he had such an equitable interest in that
by the
fund, by reason of its assignment
check, that he Is entitled to be subrogated to
the extent of his check, with interest thereon
from the time it was presented, to the fund to
be derived from the collection or sale of the
collateral securities held by the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank as security on its certificate of
deposit and bank account, after the residue Is
paid to it. The superior court erred in decreeing that the Ft. Dearborn National Bank
should deliver to the receiver of the First
National Bank of Helena the collateral notes,
but did not err in decreeing that from the proceeds of the same there should first be paid
Bank the
to the Ft. Dearborn National
amount, including Interest, due It, and to pay
to Wyman the amount due on said check and
interest, and to retain the balance as part of
the assets of the First National Bank of
Helena.
Nor was there error in the decree of
the superior court in directing, if there was
not enough to pay Wyman in full, the amount
unpaid should be allowed as a claim against
said First National Bank of Helena, to be
paid in due course of administration of Its
assets, and that the receiver pay the costs.
It was error In the appellate court for the
First district to reverse the entire decree of
the superior court, and remand the cause with
directions to dismiss the bill. So far as the
superior court decreed that the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank deliver to the receiver of the
First National Bank of Helena the collateral
notes, its decree Is reversed, but in all other
respects the decree of said court Is affirmed.
For the error of the appellate court for the
First district In reversing the entire case, and
remanding with directions to dismiss the bill,
its decree is reversed, and the cause Is reReversed and remanded.
manded.
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STESrCHFIELD

v.

MILLIKEN.

(71 Me. 567.)

Supreme

Judicial

Court of Maine.

December,

1880.

J.

PETERS,
The following fads are deThe
ducible from the evidence in this case:
complainant purchased of the defendants,
certain steam-mill machinery, for removal
from Hallowell to Danlorth, in this State.
There was at the time a verbal agreement,
that the complainant should build a mill, and
put the machinery into it, on a lot of land in
Danforth, bought by him of one Eiissell, who
was to deed the lot directly to the defendants.
The complainant was also to procure a deed
of his home (another) lot to the defendants
from the heirs of H. E. Prentiss, who held
an absolute title thereof as security for the
complainant's indebtedness to them, tnere
being a small balance only unpaid, which the
Tlie dedefendants were to pay for him.
fendants were to give an s^greement, to convey to the complainant if he paid his indebtedness to them according to the tenor of certain notes to be given.
On June 15, 1875, the complainant gave to
the defendants a mortgage on the machinery
as personal property to secure the notes hereafter named, in order to protect a lien thereon until the machinery should be put into the
mill to be built, and become a part of the
real estate.
And there was embodied in this
mortgage, an agreement of the complainant
to build the mill and put the machinery into
it. On June 16, 1875, Russell conveyed the
On August 2,
mill lot to the defendants.
1875, Prentiss conveyed the home lot to them,
they paying the balance of the Prentiss claim.
On August 4, 1875, the defendants gave a
writing to the complainant, agreeing to convey the property to him upon the condition
that he would pay to them his notes on one,
two, three, and five years, re-spectively, with
The notes were given for the
interest.
amount payable for the machinery, the sum
paid to Prentiss, and for other loans and adwent on and
vances. The complainant
erected and completed a mill on the Russell
lot, and the steam-mill machinery became a
part of it.
The complainant seeks to redeem the property, claiming the transaction to be a mortThe defendants contend that the
gage.
transaction was not a mortgage, that it was
s conditional sale.
It was not a legal mortgage: Because the
Warren v, Zovis,
has no seal,
defeasance
And because the papers
53 Maine, 463.
were not between the same parties. At law,
the conveyance must be made by the mortgager and the defeasance by the mortgagee.
Shaw y. Erskine, 43 Maine, 371.
But the transaction was in equity a mortThe criterion
gage — an equitable mortgage.
is the intention of the parties. In equity,
this intention mav be ascertained from all
pertinent tacts either within or without the

Where th«
written parts of the transaction.
intention is clear that an absolute conveyance is taken as a security for a debt, it is in
equity a mortgage. No matter how much
the real transaction may be covered up and
The real intention
governs.
disguised.
"If a transaction resolve itself into a security, whatever may be its form, and whatever
name the parties may choose to give it, it is
in equity a mortgage." Flagg v. Mann, 2
Sumn. 533, Fed. Cas. No. 4,847.
The existence of a debt is well nigh an inThe infallible evidence of the intention.
The defendants
tention here is transparent.
have a debt and held the property as a security for its collection. A legal mortgage
I
avoided; an equitable mortgage was
I was
•made.

Although different at law, in equity a
mortgage is not prevented because the con1veyance does not come from the equitable
: mortgager.
It is suflBcient that the debtor
\ has an interest in the property' conveyed,
Having such an
I either legal or equitable.
interest, if he procures a conveyance to one
who advances money upon it for him, taking
tlie property as security for the money advanced, he has a right to redeem.
Tlie
grantee in such case, acijuiring the title by
Jones on
j his act, holds it as his mortgagee.
Mort. 2d ed. § 331. Stoddard v. Whiting,
: 46 N. Y. 627; Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. 251.
It is denied that this court lias the power
I
I to declare
that an absolute deed shall be
I deemed to be a mortgage, allowing an equi-l
At law|
j table mortgager the right to redeem.
it has no such power. Nor, when the court
in equity, was the
I had a limited jurisdiction
It was always underj doctrine admitted.
stood, however, that, in a case like the presi ent, if, instead of a demurrer, an answer
was filed admitting the facts alleged, the
court had the power to apply the remedy.
Thomaston Bank v. Stimpson, 21 Maine,
195; Whitney v. Baohelder, 32 Maine, 313;
Howe v. Russell, 36 Maine, 115; Eiohardson
But since the
V. Woodbury, 43 Maine, 206.
act of 1874 conferred general chancery powers upon the court, it has full and comfdete
jurisiliction in such cases. Rowell v. Jewett,
69 Maine, 293-303; Jones, Mort. (2d ed.)

I

§282.
Courti of equity generally exercise

such

While the grounds upon which the
power.
doctrine is admitted vary with different
courts, there is a great concurrence of opinIn our
ion as far as the result is concerned.
judgment, it is a sound policy as well as
principle to declare that, to take an absolute
conveyance as a mortgage without any defeasance, is in equity a fraud.
Experience
shows that endless frauds and oppressions
would be perpetrated under such modes, if
It is taking
equity could not grant relief.
an agreement, in one sense, exceeding and
differing from the true agreement. Instead
of setting it wholly aside, equity is worked
out by adapting it to the purpose originally
intended. Eouity allows reoaralioa to be

:
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made by admitting
The cases
proved.
are too numerous
cases are collected
§ 241, et teq. See
109 Mass. 130; and
Mass. 256.
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to be

which support this view
to cite. The American
in Jones, Mort. 2d ed.
Campbell v. Dearborn,
Hassam v. Barrett, 115

The complainant seelts to separate the artioriginallj mortgaged as personal property, and, being allowed the value of them,
redeem the balance of the estate only.
That
would not be equitable.
The personal became a part of the real as originally designed
to be.
It was affixed and solidly bolted thereto.
The mortgage was evidently only to
serve a temporiiry purpose.
It was not just
to either party that there should be two mortIt is urged that the
gages instead of one.
defendants foreclosed the personal mortgage.
It could not be done. The personal mortgage was extinguished when attempted to be
done.
That was but a ruse to get the possession which the defendants were entitled
to.
Ko severance was ever made or attempted to be made.
It is intimated that the mill has burned
down, pendente lite, under an insurance obtained by the defendants, and a question
may arise, before the master, whether the
complainant should have a credit of the net
If the insurance was obtained on
proceeds.
the mortgagees' own account only, they
should not be allowed. CusJiing v. Thompson, 34 Maine, 496; Pierce v. Faunae, 58
Maine, 351. The head note in Larrabee v.
Lumbert, 32 Maine, 97, is erroneous in that
It was allowed in that case by conrespect.
sent.
Insurance Co, v. Woodbury, 45 Maine,
cles

447.

fleld agreed to pay all taxes and Insurance."
He also says, "We have had the house,
stable and mill insured, and have paid
the insurance, $108."
We think this is evidence of an insurance obtained by the mortgagees at the expense of the mortgager on
account of his failure to keep his verbal covenant to insure, and renders it proper that
the net proceeds of any insurance obtained
should be allowed in the settlement between
them.
But this cannot be, if the insurance was
collected under a policy in which it is agreed
between
the insured and insurer that the
company in case of loss should be subrogated
to the right of the mortgagee. For in such
case the insurance is not in fact on the mortgager's account, nor is it such an insurance
Jones,
as could be made available to him.
Mort. (2d ed.) § 420, and cases in note.
The complainant may redeem the whole
property upon payment of whatever may be
due upon the whole debt.
Inasmuch as the
complainant sets up a claim exceeding the
equitable right, neither party to recover costs
up to the entry of this order; and whether
future costs shall be recovered by either side,
to be reserved for decision when the proceedAnother
ings are to be finally terminated.
reason why complainant should not recover
costs is, that when bis bill was commenced
the mortgage debt was not due.
The mortThe
gage could not be redeemed until 1880.
bill was commenced long before that time.
But as the mortgage is now due, and no
point is taken that the proceeding was premature, it will probably be ior the interest
of all the parties that their matters may be
adjusted under this bill. For which purpose
a master must be appointed, unless the parties can best determine the accounts between
themselves.
Decree aeeordingly,

But where a mortgagee insures the property by the authority of the mortgager, and
charges him with the expense, then any inBifrance recovered should be accounted for.
And if a mortgager covenants to insure, and
APPLETON, C. J.,
fails to do 80, the mortgagee can himself in, sure at the mortgager's expense.
FOBTH, VIRGIN, and
One of the defendants testifies that " Stinch- curred.
\<,

WALTON, DAN-

LIBBEY, JJ.,

con-

(5)

BREWER,

A.

Hay-

s

,

Bradbury, for complainant
for defendants.
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few weeks after the sale.
March. 1858,
Brewer died, and the respondent has been
appointed as aaministratrix on his estate.
an said notes and mortgage to Brewer hav
coime into her hands as such administratrS^
One of ttip nntpg )^a,p ho en paid to her, and
ghe still holds the flthpr nntea and mf)rt;sflf;e.
Brewer[s _estate Is reDresented-.as JnsQlxent
andn:ommissioners have been appointed, and
have repnrtpfl tliaJJJTg^claJirj of the cnpipjainthe,tiine-Jit_H3£_de:,
anFIs ^3^.85; and,
large part of the debt
cease of fi'rewer,
to
iateBSfirTtn hp. -«ef nEed..by...fl5i.jagEtgagfc.
him was due and unpai.d,_ and.Jia8.Jiat aiTlCft
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Ijien on the stocks, to secur e all sums of
money
then due, and such further sums as
"
the co inpTaJnant might furnish anST advance
to said Brewer," for "the purpose' of, flnishiiig
said ship a nd fittin gs har for_sea.
The vessel
was completed, and was ^regist^^]jn_the
name of said Brewer as owne r, of seven eigiiflis, an'g o F^yatlia nlei XyFr""'^^ "^ """^
The said Brewer, on th e back of
Sghth.
said mortgage, acEHgWTSgg Eirih'Wrinrigj
^e ship thttgTesig^gar' ws the vess'ffVame3" InTSe^ mprt
^^e. The mortgage was dulj
recorded, on the day of registry, in the cnRtom house, and afterwards
in the town
clerk's office . Soon after wajds_tte, s hip ^ror
eeeded -to sea, a nd has never since bg^.iii
this state, except in June. 1858. and -Aha
complainant has not exercised control over
her or received any possession
nndfr hiy
mortgage,
in February. 1858, the ship being
in New Orleans, the said Brewer sold to said
French tne seven-eigntns of tne ship, which
then stood in his name, for their full value!
making no reservatio n of. -the... rig hts f^f thi»
complainant under his mortgag e, but giving
an absolu te bill of. sai.e,^jEliJi warranty, of.
said seven-eighths . Upon the sale. Brewe r
receivea from ji'rench, as~part ot the consid eration, his three negotinhli ^ notes, arnnnntmg in all to $12.240, in nearly equal sums,
and payable at differen t dates , the lat^
being" the first day ot Marcn. i8t)t): t^e sa
mortgage , oL-Baill
notes being secure
by

It

KENT, J. The case, as stated in the bill,
to which a general demurrer has been filed,
is in substance this:
I. N. M. Brewer, the
intestate, on the 25th of October. 1851. gave
to the complainant a mort{;age of a

a

'

den,

1863.

Heard on demurrer.

f

IBi^i^egn^y.
B.

Court of Maine.

a a

(51 Me. 4D2.)
Supreme Judicial

relief as the nature of the case may require.
which arises is*
The principal question
whether .- a Tifinrf gfl|3^^e nf
vessel which has_
distant tate, by
been sold in another and
the mortgagor in possession, by an absolute
of sale
the entire ves sel'or igt'erest,
.bi
and. wJth.. warr anty^ without any priSF authority from the mortgagee, can follow the
proceeds of the sale, existing in ttie""p'6t68
^iven for"the purc haseTaDdTn" the possession
'
represeSStiver
of the itiortgag6r,""or~Sis
It is
well-settled doctrine, both in law
change ot rop^
and in equity that
mer
erty fro m one form to another can not. 4a.
jij:self. divest the owner, ffij&agg who have
distinct and mmediate rights in the thing.
ih.ita original shap
of their property hi it,
As
general rule, hat right attaches to the
new form so long as such new ro perty
capable of being lflenti%d and distinguished
..any
from all other property. &116, np rights
bona fide purchaser for
valuable -c onaideration, without notice. Intervenct It makes
no difference.
In law, into what other form
the change may have been made, whether
into promissory notes received as the consideration of the transfer, or into other merchandise.
The product is substituted for the
original thing, and so remains, as long as it
can be clearly shown to be such substitute.
ceases when the means of distinguishing
and identifying fail. Scott v. Surman, Willes,
400; Whitcomb v. Jacobs, Salk. 160; Taylor
leading case)
V. Plumer
Maule & S. 562;
Story, Eq. Jur.
1258, 1259.
Money itself may be followed if
can be
thus identified. The difficulty in relation to
money usually is that, as
has "no ear
mark,"
cannot be thus distinguished; but
this is simply a failure of proof, but does
not alter or disprove the principle. Taylor
V. Plumer, above cited.
This doctrine has been often applied to
agents, factors, and trustees, where the sale
has been rightfully made, and the proceeds
are existing in notes or other property, and
the agent dies or becomes insolvent. ThompMason, 232, Fed. Oas. No.
son V. Perkins,
13,972; Story's Equity, before cited.
This class of cases is where the sale was
made by
person intrusted with the property with a power to -sell, or where the sale
has
subsequently ratified and con- .
been
firmed.
But the same principle applies to cases
where the property of a party has been misapplied, or
trust fund has been wrongfully
"An abuse of trust can confer
converted.
no rights upon the party abusing it, or on
those who are in privity with him."
Story,
Bq. Jur.
1258.
The case of Taylor v.
Plumer, before cited, was one of fraudulent
transfer. Mr. Justice Story, In Conrad v.
Insurance Co.,
Pet. 448, says that this
general principle "has been extended to Cases
where there has been
fraudulent or tortious misapplication of property."
It may be admitted that the relation of
o

v.

ll
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mortgagor and mortgagee does not of itself,
and unconnected with other facts, create the
relation of principal and agent, or give any
right to the mortgagor to sell the whole
property by an absolute bill of sale, with
warranty of a perfect title. The mortgagor
in possession may sell his interest^ 1. e.. his
right to redeem, but h e.Ja^iaL-Wr ongdoe.r.if he
tiip pntire property to a
b61Is aiid deliver s .,
purchaser without thp knr;>-^leflg;ft nr {issen);:
Such sale, if the existence
of the mo rtgagee.
of the mo rtga' ^elS n nt ^^ispfnaprl ia nn-yg ffTSTJ^
a PT-iminfll ftfFpnse .
I t may
St. 1860, c. 150.
also be granted t hat, as to^tJie mortgagee and
In j" title and mter est, sucn saie ao^s not con vey, nor'impair his title, and that he may_^
aB'tf~eafQfc.O iig.. ri ght to the, thing.
l5ur'sii6
jKtieffiifiE Jia.majr.„find. it.
But w e thinlt that, unde r the circumstances
stateg~ m this bill, he
h^_an el ection to~5o
'
55r or to follow" the proce eds ^ex istin g' in t^
flEw" foi- m of negotiable notes in the ha nds
t flti,vp ^f ^iij^
^II^J"2ll£^.^^LS^ tho_copi:eRaii
estate.' iB emaydo this on the ground that
he"as^nts to and affirms me saie, and to tn e
change x)f the prpjei tS-Jaartgaged
to._^
from a vessel to the notps t,f>\pp. ST^subsequent ratification is equivalent to a prior
authority. We have seen that, if he had had
prior authority, he would have come under
the rule so often applied, to agents and factors.

He may do this, also, on the nthpr p;r^>mn1..
was a wrongful, If not a fraudulent^
conversion of his pro perty.by.the mortgage
lii possess i on, ana he max, so ^^- waive.. thg
tort as to pursue the proceeds in the JOSS''
form, whilstjjhfiy. n an bp identified
He. must
elect wbic iTcn,n,l'sg tn pirrgnf ■ He cannot hav e
Murray v. Libbern, 2 Johns.
both_£fiaieiiifia.
Ch. 441; Murray v. Ballon, 1 Johns. Ch. 566.
The bill suflaciently sets out an indebtedThe comness covered by the mortgage.
plainant must, of course, establish such indebtedness, i. e., for money advanced for the
purpose of finishing the ship and fitting her
for sea. No other debt or claim is covered
by the mortgage.
But as to this debt, under the circumstances of this case, the law ^imputes a trust in
the mortgagor during his life, anS that trust'

"^

thatit

t he notes in the hands of his per ot the
sonal representative . The proceeds
s ale of the sh i p, in her ^ "i^s , stand in place^
_
^"''^- ^P^ sho^Tld be anal ifid as'
"O^.^^'""^
we ha ve a ri^ht to presume Mr., BESffiec-Jf
h'eT] a^'U^d. would haYfi-applied them, so far
as_needed,„^„i]iS. discharge nf the ripht.qg-^
the mo rt;p;^p^ .
cured,^by
*
In this case there is not a plain and adeq uate remedy at law . xne estate is insolvent, and, to say the least, it would require
a peculiar action and judgment in law to
take these proceeds out of the general" mass
of the estate, which by law should be distributed pro rata among all the creditors,
and appropriate it specifically to the complainant's debt. Such appropriation is peculiarly the proper province of a court of equity.
According to the statement in the bill, the
claim of the complainant is not equal to any
one of the notes, and it would be difficult to
find any principle of law by which an action
of trover could be maintained for them. The
estate is entitled to the notes and the proceeds after the mortgage debt is paid, and
the claim set up is based on an Imputed t rust
'"'^
^
ana not on a legai tme to the notw.j
it is worthy ot oDservation that tne words
limiting the equity powers of this court to
cases, "where the parties have not a plain
and adequate
remedy at law," wMch are
found in Rev. St. 1841. c. 96, are omitted in
the present Revised Statutes. We are not
called upon, in this case, to determine whether the omission of these words does in fact
enlarge or alter the equity powers of this
court.
It seems to leave them under the general rules of equity in all cases where the
subject-matter Is made by statute cognizable
follows

in equity.
It was declared by this court,' In Tappan
V. Deblois, 45 Me. 131, that "by the Revised
Statutes of this state (1857) ye have jurisdiction of all cases of trust, whether arising py
implication of law or created by deea or-—

—

Vlll."'

■

Demurrer overruled.

APPLETON,
DIOKERSON,
red.

O.
and

J., CUTTING, DAVIS,
BARROWS, JJ., concur-
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embodied by the last sent ence, and says the
gecreerto I;?!? ptF
court erred in rendering
(5 S. E. 194, 79 Ga. 451.)
forced by__a iracnmeni: tor contematf-rV'E'isatfa.,
becau se J;he verdict was a 'money verdicti
Supreme Court of Georgia . February 13, 1888.
and t£e^same7:ould oniy be enfof ceff by eX'
Error from superior court, Muscogee coun- ecution; jsecong'f' fT^P OTl^S'tBe" verdict of the
ty; Smith, Judge.
Jury was a money verdict, ana couig''g5r^
Su it by Hattie E. Tillman and William
enforced by . a.n~gCtgchmeht for contempt.
Tillman, plaintiffs and defendants in error and could only be enforced by execution;
against Jonn W. Clements, dernndant an
^tiirdJ ecause hgTerStcTof 'fcejury was' a
debt, and to enerror,
money v erdictrjTna was
in
for
an
account
and
settleplaintiff
ment of~a legacy due"saia" Hattie hi. mi - force" the de cree^by 'ag''imgB TOP ri'or conman under the will of one Jacob A. Clem - tempt w ould be to Tmpr'is'on"*ffie' defendant
!,.•_,;
'!^"-i?frn""!s"-i5«i««iii«««iijiii«!J!!iTa':.
i^i' jt-ilji.
for
ents. John W. Cle niCTts__Deing^ an executor
debt. whichirBroEmtea'ti g:tTO^;ijsj^^^^^
tion of the stajEef
of the same.
our&.Tecaus"e the decree
souglit and moved for provides botn for the
The following is the official report:
by execution, and an atHattie E. Tillman, n legatf-e nnrlpr th(> will entorc inent of
of Jacob A. Cleme nts, deceaspfl- with ht^r tachment for contempt; and the complainhusband and trustee. Willifl.m„L. Tillmnn ant should be required to. elect whether she
filed their bill fo r .qcconnt anri s ettlemen
would proceed to enf orceit bv execution or
against John W. Clements, executor, and Sa- attachment foi:_£aBtamBtJf the court determined that
ftm -BT-CIgments. .executri
it could be enforced by attach"
ment for contempt."/
The_b ill contamed charges, of mismana^ement 6r"the estate, viQ^ations pf the provi C. J. Thorn ton,._f or. plaintiff in_ error.
L.
sron§"6r saig bill, a na nQn:rn8'yr"»nt by t^° F. Garrard, for defendants in error.
"f
SecutSr of the intei'est
(if>Tnp]|fiii^,r^j; q,|3
iegafefe.
i.'he defendants answered the bill;
KIBBEE, J.i 'Originally, in the absence
but as "their answers are not material or nec- of statutes providing otherwise, decre es of
essary to an understanding of the errors com- courts of ec uitv. of vyhatever kind or natureT"
plained of, they are not set forth. The jury
" We. the operatq.^ stf;^ptlv and exclu«iv|ly
iff^returned the following verdict:
Jgg^-. The only remedy for their enforce jury, find that Sarah B. Clements has no ment was by
what is termed "process of
property or eiTects of the estate of Jacob A. conteiililit," Uhfler wnich
he party falling
Clements,
de ceased, in he hands, as execu - to
arrestea and^mpirlsoned
obgy^ jhem wa
/.Mg or otnerwise. wej the Jury, fju-therfind until he yielded
"o6^^ia£fiL."orr^Sid--tihe
that John W. Clements, as executor of the pontempt by showinig 'that-disfl.bfiidienca
yt^s
Clements,
deceased, has now not wilful, but the result^_of jnabillty, just
will of Jacob A.
_
in his hands tIie,sum _of^eight hundred andjjpia produced by his .wn,_fa3;lt,Qr^oatMmafi£,.
'dolla rs princi pal and^ve hundrea'^'nars^- The writ.df .assistance to deliver possession,
leresl, Ijelohgillg' KrHnt ng'Er Tiirma h. as lega - and even the sequestration to compel the
A. Clements. " performance of a decree, are comparatively
tee under the will of Jaco
Upon this verdict tEe following decree was of recent origin. Our statutes expressly pro"Whereupon, the vide that "all orders and
IhH court:
Uy
i-eudertid
decrees of.,flja^£ftm;t
OTtJlulHUa
(ioiusiaered. it is ordered, adjudged
enforCe dTy atta ch|ngnt against the
S^he'
a na decreed by the cou rt that the complainan
person decrees for money, may be enfoceed
do t-ecover the same sum or eignt hundred and by execution against
Code,
jthe^aESBSEty."
ten doii ars^riricipal an3"'the' furth er sum of §"3099. ' "JTdecree in favor of any party, for
five -nunafga" dollars Interest to this date, a spe cific su m of money,
for regu lar in ""'" ""
doll ars, coits "st'anmenig"^° 1Eone^^ shall be enforcigi^
and "the fu rthe stm
" flnrlo
"of suit in this behalf laid ^uF ana_ ^^ended,
againsT'prop^r^'v as at law
4;il5. " Every decree or order of a court of
ToT W hlCli" saig~ge veraTsums let execuHorns- ^MWfl
sue, to TBie^levied in~the" first "2^6 of the equity may be enforced by attaghme pt
agajng
goodg-g HCT"chattelg, lands and tenem'ents, "of " the person for contempt: and Jf^jafissftaJafi
saidTacoF Al. Clements, -agcgaBeO" in'^Si partly for money and partly for the,.perJo hn W. Clements. execu'toV of th rormance^f^a duty, the fo nper. may Jifiuen{lands
gilL-fifL- gaid Jaco b_A ^'qni?"tSr '"<*^" ^"^ rorced'byexecution, a,nd
the^Iatter by^ atj:^.^^foun d; an If notto be found, then to be inent orjoth^process." 7!fode','§' 4216.
The
levie^of the'pbrsonal goods and chattels. clear Tegislative intent is manifest to en<''g"''
lands and tenements^^of said John Yft
large and render more efficacious equitable
and decreed by remedies, while preserving the remedies the
ents.. it is turther ordere
said court thgrj-lltt iiaiU J^n W. Clements courts had previously employed in the abdo satisfy and pay the aforesaid amounts, sence of statutes providing others. Tjndpiprincipal, interest, arid cSS ST to We^safa our statutes, when a party is decreed to percomplainant, onOT_before^'tEe , arst""^y jaf "lorm a autv. or fo rin any i^ct other tha.n thp
Taniiary 'Seftl a'n'ct,'iir "def.ault Jjaeieof, that
Ee he heidTand deemedjto be in con tempt
Blandford, J., being disqualified, Judge Kib" Plainlj g,
and dec ree of this^court
bee, of the Oconee circuit,
was designated to
"^the^order
ia^rrni; p^epta" to the' portion of the decree preside in his stead.
et a l.
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mere pa yment of money, which the cotirt Th mome nt
appears that there
has Ju risdiction to adjudge He shall do. jFEe* it^itwo^3[cle^^|TeTBe'3iH^of^
disolbgya'.J£e anJtJi6ri'£y' oj tTEie"~court Is defied;. "to (Jisc"iiarge
___ the "part'y,*'*etc.
.^^^_
JSe^is g uiltg-itf contempt, an d the arrest and. TKer^'Kerr that, "o'Mili'arily, it would
'

be imla

imprisonment . of .hi§_i Lej:gaiUOiaLimBasfla: proper to include in the order the alternative
ment for_ debt
in any a,pprogriate sense je£ order for imprisonment on failure, since it
"
contempt will en"ferm."
cour rnf"errii'itv shmild not to be presumed that
^uTiTF
'the
"there
rBnder"«:'^ Himpl^ dpprpo fny iTi^f^<»v pn a
orovisiony
simple , money ,_yerdict, — a d^^iy^e which. . It hall be no lmpBijl()ftlB^nt for debf'^as not
~
Int ended to intCTfere with the traditional
fa,ilnre.ia "power ot cnancei7^urtsJo"punish for con
Taw^pc6^3ji.g.ainst.^i:aBfiCt£j=ttig.
pay the decree HfiJJ^J^ot, be JSOjEtemakhftj. tempf'aIl,refuBaI g''t5~ oBey their a wiui He, could compulsory process.. .again^t.,,th.e.,
per- creeB ^na^sscSBXK" Tfiis proposition may be
8on of t he p arty in 5e|3iilt be r^sR ^ to-ta conceded to be sound without affecting the
In Coughlin v. Bhlert, 39 case at bar In any respect "The power in
enforce a;^B|£^n
Mo. 28Si, ithe court uses the following lan- question was never exercised by chancery
guage:
"We do not mean to say that a courts except in those cases where a trust in
party may not be put in contempt for dis- the property or fund arose between the parobeying a decree for the performance of acts ties litigant, or some specific interest in
which are within his power, and which the was claimed, or the chattel had some pecourt may properly order to be done. If it culiar value and Importance that a recovery
were shown, for instance, that the party of damages at law for its detention or con£ad in his possession
certain speciflc sum version was Inadequate. Such interference
of money or other thin
which he refused was in the nature of a bill quia timet, and
to deliver up, under, the! order of the court was asserted only on a proper showing that
fo any .purpose^ it may very well be that the fund or property waS in danger of loss
Story, Eq. Jur.
or destruction."
his disobedience would be a contem
fo
708jurisdiction
which he m ight lawfu lly be,
710.
"No
to compel the pay]fed^"
TnTSanEoTyTtlJarTtonril
Ga. 220, JudgeMc- ment of an ordinary money demand unconCay, delivering the opinion, says: "We do nected with such peculiar equities ever exnot intend to say that simply because a debt isted in chancery courts, nor had they the
is adjudged by a decree In chancery, in- power to compel such payment by punishing
stead of by a judgment at law, It may there- the refusal to pay under the guise of confore be enforced by imprisonment. Tfte.igr^;,
n must be cleaxLv ^'"Hiiifflf (^^ntpmnt
IgJ^lJ^, nffy aFEar tne cteCTge was.jight In
awarding an^gSe cuiion agalnat-thfi-fiseciitQi
or the process of the court, ■""li tiniiii"Ti
"".2
'
Unwilling to obey
W!iio
the order as set forth in said decree, but ffie facta did
able and unwilling
» » It ought never to be
lot au'^faorize a!n 'alternative order iniprigpn^oTlTBfe courL_
■resorted to except as a penal process,
round- ing H'e'''fle!fenda nt on'Siflure 'to pa.j ._J)i^-\
ed on th nnwil lingness o? tEe"pari£yTo obey.
lenFreversecC
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canceled_andL2lks5SEi®i^? ""^"I^i-SSiji^l
the title of the plalB tiffa in an?lo"said pr emis^^nff'evefy part thereof, ma De^ onSrm^
ana establi^ed -aff" agalBsT said" ■^efioaahts
and each and every of them, and all per-

1

a

p

a

a

t
t

SiSSd-HB^ISL. ^'^'^""^"^^^ plsiiniHffg^^crMted
oeremoved",
by^the- severaX*9Beds~aforesaia,
and that the said aecds, ana~' ^:eB35a~ail
oOSeii7 ^""gecIgf^d_null and Toid7"ana~T?g

^

a

and^tt^j^^^^tEat-ilie

it

1879,

defendant Sansom held ossesi on of t^e land
i3iider"a"Iease
from the other de fendants nd
as" their tenant'" TEe""aeferiaants
offered in
judgment rendered
eviSence tEe record of
by the district court of Johnson county, on
August 24, 1875, upon
petition filed June
11, 1873, by the heirs at law of League, (who
against
died intestate November
1865,)
Virgil Wilkerson, Orlando Dorsey, and several other persons, and Hart, alleging that
Wilkerson ejected the plaintifCs from this
land, and BnlawfuUy
withheld possession
thereof from them; that on October 29, 1870,
the defendant Dorsey, by deed diuly recorded,
conveyed
to some of the other defendants
than Wilkerson and Hart three-fourths of
the land, reserving in that deed the remaining fourth to himself, and that other deeds
(particularly set forth) of parts of the land
were afterwards made to the rest of such
other defendants and recorded; jiat the defendant Har "sets up some pretende d., clajffl
and that "the de^4g.'Ja tIetosai d-ttffla-;"
fendant Wilkerson'Ts~S. naked trespasser upon the land of the plaintiffs, and that the
several other defendants' several deeds,
which appear upon the record of deeds of
Johnson county as aforesaid, are fraudulent
and void, and that the said pretended claims
and deeds, and each and all of them, cast a
cloud upon the title of the plaintiffs;" ^nd
praying "tha they have judg ment, that the

is

DecemBer

9,

1
9,

f

s

a

i
e

'
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GBAY, J. This is a writ of error sued out
by Edmo nd J. Hart, a citizen of Louisiana ,
to'reyerse a j udg ment r endered against him
in tiie circuit court of Jhe^ United^tates
ffie''Northern drsfflct of Texas, In an action
brought by him against,^aHfin_ Japspgi, aiid
the heirs at law of Jphomas^M, Xieagu^cit-'
izens of Texas, to recover a tract of land in
Johnson county, 'lu llmi tiiat of whicn tney
had tHspuftSt ii^ ea- 'EiSu
St~the trial. Hart
jBat gnt from me fe ^^^STTSis title iffld^
pubfic of Texa to League, £d_a_deed with
fom~League,
^^erarbovenants^of warranty ~
August
_184g^^ nd"boffi recorded "on
c[a"ted_

a

t

fendants in error.

s

Error to the CircTiit Court of the United
for the Northern District of Texas.
Henry J. Leovy and W. Hallett Phillips,
for plaintifE in error. A. S. Lathrop, for de-

States

e

January

l^

for

S. 151.)

Supreme Co urt, qf thg TTnited States.

claiming through or under them," aiiii
writ of possession, damages, and. costs
That record also showed the issue and due
service of citations to all the defendants ex-'
cept Dorsey and Hart; the issue..gl..a_i!itation directing
heriff _^'s erve Hart,_being
a citizen of Louisiana, by publication^^" and
"the sKerffi's return^ showing 3ffie"\xec"ifltion of
tire"HEa1:ioii,Jdry .aj^h^Bublication in a^ijewspaper of the county four successive weeks
like servTce' by
Before he return day, and
citizen of New
TniBIication on" Dorsey,
York. That record further showed
default
of all the defendants; and that upon a wfit
of inquiry the jury assessed damages against .
Dorsey and Hart; fmrnij_asi fai^« t>ie issufi
"<* the
_r^,';^'^ Pn^"""*" tn.J.pafnio nT^r^ftiR t^"g
aintiffs
Jus hgirs; jthftLjaact "glaimed
teiid lanffy""""and that a deed' was made by
borsey and "recorded, as alleged in the petition, but that Hart and Dorsey respectively
had no title of record or otherwise; ^d returned
verdict " for the laintiffs: and tfia?
tliey rec""ovef~SSe and desCTiEearin.'-tB.e.„ petion."
That record finally showed a judgment '''that the plaintiffs recover of the defendants the premises described," and "that
the several deeds in the plaintiff's petition
mentioned be and the same are hereby annulled and canceled, and for naught held, >and the cloud thereby removed," and for
costs, and that execution issue for the costs.
The circuit court, against the plaintiff's objection, admitted the judgment in evidence,
instructed the jiury that
divested the plaintiff of his title to the land, and directed a
verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiff, deriving his title under
deed with covenants
of general warranty
from League, is entitled to maintain this
action against League's heirs, who are estopped by those covenants, unless the former
judgment in the action brought by them in
the state court has adjudicated the title as
between them and the present plaintiff.
It
is therefore necessary to consider the nature
and effect of that judgment.
The petition
combined,
in accordance with the practice
prevailing in that state, an action in the nature of ejectment to recover possession of the
land, and a suit in equity to remove a cloud
upon the plaintiffs' title; and the service by
publication was in the form authorized by
the lodal statutes against non-residents.
Pasch. Dig. Laws Tex. (4th Ed.) art. 25.
The petition alleges that Wilkerson was in
and that the other defendants,
possession;
Hart, held recorded
except
deeds, which
were fraudulent and void, and cast
cloud
upon the plaintifts' title.
But as to Hart,
did not allege that he was in possession,
or was In privity with the other defendants,
or that he held any deed, but only that he
set up some pretended claim and title. And
the verdict finds that he claimed the land,
but had no title of record or otherwise thereThe judgment
in.
that the plaintiffs recover the land of the defendants,
and that
sons

et al.

a
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the deeds mentioned in the petition be and
are annulled and canceled,
and the cloud
thereby removed, and for costs; and execution Is awarded for costs only, and not for
any writ or process in the nature of a writ
of possession or habere facias.
It is difficult to see how any part of that
judgment (except for costs) is applicable to
Hart; for that part which is for recovery
of possession certainly cannot apply to Hart,
and that part
who was not in possession;
which removes the cloud upon the plaintiff's
title appears to be limited to the cloud created by the deeds mentioned in the petition;
and the petition does not allege, and the verdict negatives, that Hart held any deed. But
if there is any judgment (except for costs)
against Hart, it is, upon the most liberal
construction, only a decree removing the
cloud created by his pretended claim of title,
Genand is no bar to the present action.
erally, jfnot unive rsal ly, equity juri|d|£tij>n
.'TS~exer"cisey''iiriperson'am,'"and' ^Wt i^ rem,
and depends up0ll'"tE5^6nff61 "oT the court
over the parties, by reason of their presence
or residence, and not upon the place where
is
^the land lies in regard to which relief
sought
Upon a bill for the removal of a
cloud upon title, as upon a bill for the specific performance of an agreement to convey,
the decree, imless otherwise expressly provided by statute, is clearly not a judgment in
rem, establishing a title in land, but oper\ates in personam only, by restraining the de'fendant from asserting his claim, and directI Ing him to deliver up his deed to be canceled, or to execute a relief to the plaintiff.
Langd. Eq. PI. (2d Ed.) §§ 43, 184; Masaie
Orton v. Smith,
V. Watts, 6 Cranoh, 148;
18 How. 263; Vandever v. Freeman, 20 Tex.
It would doubtless be within the power
334.
of the state in which the land lies to provide
by statute that if the defendant is not found
within the jurisdiction, or refuses to make
or to cancel a deed, this should be done in
his behalf by a trustee appointed by the
Felch v. Hooper,
court for that purpose.

Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S.
in such a case, as in the orof its jurisdiction, a court of
by compelling a
personam,
deed to be executed or canceled by or hi behalf of the party. It has no inherent power,
by the mere force of its decree, to annul a
deed or to establish a title.
In the judgment in question, no trustee to
act in behalf of the defendant was appointed
by the court, nor have we been referred to
any statute authorizing such an aPDOui1;ment
to be made. { The utmost ettect which can be
attributed to the judgment, as against Hart,
is that of an ordinary decree for the removal
by him, as well as by the other defendants,
of a cloud upon the plaintiff's title. tTSuch
a decree, being in personam merely, can only
be supported against a person who is not a
citizen or resident of the state in which it is
rendered, by actual service upon him within
its jurisdictioS and constructive service by^
publication ina newspaper is not sufficient.
The courts of the state might perhaps feel
bound to give effect to the sgrvice inada as ^
directed by its statutes. jBut no court deriving its authority from another government [
will recognize a merely constructive service !
as bringing the person within the jtu-isdic- |
tion of the court.
The judgment would be^
allowed no force in the courts of any other
state;
and it is of no greater force, as
against a citizen of another state, in a court
of the United States, though held within the
state in which the judgment was rendered.
Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466, 475;
Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336; Bischoff V. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812; Knowles v.
Gaslight Co., 19 Wall. 58; Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U. S. 714.
See, also, Schibsby v. Westenholz, L. K. 6 Q. B. 155; The City of
Mecca, 6 Prob. Div. 106.
The circuit court having ruled and instructed the jury otherwise,
its judgment
must be reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to set aside the verdict, and
to order a new trial.
Mass. 52;
132.
But
dinary exercise
equity acts in
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and indlyidua l in thek character, or h ayS-fln

MESSENGER.

especla:! value^on^accpuM &i&'S..8;SSM
connected IwlthJthCTQ, as pictures, 'cmq^Jties,

N. E. 491, 147 Mass. 185.)

Court of Massacliusettb.
Middlesex.
June 19, 1888.

fofmanceof

Appeal from supreme judicial court, Middlesex county.
Bill In equity, b y Oeorge B. A{\nmn affai"st
Wil liam T .. Messens^r, to compel fflft performance of an agre e ment to furn ish t he
plamtiH wlffi''""cerEam'"peiTecr~working ^injectors for steataqgcrtiei'^'--aga'To "apply 'for
and -asslgn tcr pKlHtlg cer t^aZIgt^g paienF
urtEi d ominion ot Oanaaa! Hearing in the
supreme juQiciarcburTupon defendant's demurrer, which was sustained, and the plaintiff appealed.
The facts are stated in the
opinion.

DBVENS,

J. It

Charles S.

ness.
is the co ntention of

defendant that the plaintiff bas^Ji^fullj^cMj:.
plete, and adequate remedy-at-jcomiopn
By a suit for dam ages , a nd that the court ,,
We
gtcnag' 'Iff'equityT iSnnot ^ant ~
sought by the prayers of the" ^IT Thef con B'overs y arises from the iailure "Eo perform
an exe cutorywritten~ ^ontractr "So'Tar as
"THis relates to personaTpPeptP^, the objections arising from the statute of frauds,
which haye sometimes been found to exist
when oral contracts were sought to be enforced, haye, of course, no application. The
general rule that contracts as to the purchase of personal property are not specifically enforced, as are those which relate to real
property, does not rest on the ground of any
distinction between the two classes of property other than that which arises from their
Contracts which relate to real
character.
property can necessarily only be satisfied by
a conyeyance of the particular estate or parcel contracted for, while those which relate
to personal property are often fully satisfied
by damages which enable the party injured
to obtain elsewhere in the market precisely
similar property to that which he had agreed
The distinction between real
to purchase.
and personal property is entu-ely subordinate
to the question whether an adequate remedy
can thus be afforded.
If^fro m the nature
of the p eisflCaL _property,_ it cannot, a court
iS'equity wi ll entertam jurisdiction to en Istory, Jilq. Jur. § 717;
Tcitvw^tSeToSSact .

J|^

6lark

y.

Flint,

i

22

furntturer^iTi heirlooms, specjfit-pera cpntractjn relation to^them
wiU be decreed.' Lloyd y. Loaring, 6 Ves.
773; "Fells y. Read, 3 Ves. 70; Lowther v.
Lowther, 13 Ves. 95; Williams v. Howard, 3
Murph. 74. An agreement to assign a patent will be specifically enforced. Blnney y.
Annan, 107 Mass. 94. Nor do we p e rceiye
any reason why an agre ement t ofurnish arti cles which the yendor"'aloh"e'^ii'' supply,
whetKTbecause their'manufaetufe is guarded by a patent or for any j)ther_reason,
Hapgood
"should not also be thus enforced.
yrTE£osenstockr23
Fed. 86. "As the yalue of
a pateut-right cannot be ascertained by computation, so it is impossible, with any approach to accuracy, to ascertain how much
a yendee would suffer from not bein^ able
to obtain such articles for use in his busifamily

Judicial

Wm. B. Durant, for plaintiff.
Knowles, for defendant.
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Pick.

231.

A

conti-act

for

bank, railway, or other corporation stock,
freely sold in the market, might not be thus
enforced, but it would be otherwise where
the stock was limited in amount, held in a
few hands, and not ordinarily to be obtained. White y. Schuyler, 1 Abb. Prac. (N. S.)
300; Treasurer v. Mining Co., 23 Cal. 390;
Poole y. Middleton, 29 Beay. 646; Doloret
■^hfij:&-Mti1 Sim. & S. 590.
V. Eothschild,
cles of person al prop prtr, "^""1 frp r°"!jJiar

The contract of the defendant . was twofold: to fumisli and delly^E certain describwithm a specied "worEIng'steam-injectors,
fied time, to the^plamtiff| ariS'also tha.t_if
the JHefendant "shall make im^i^'SBai^ts
in^
injectors for steamBoilers, and shall take
wiTpatgnt s therefOTjn_Jhe ynited..§tates, he
and,
will_a^^^for letters patent Jn£8flada,
and,
cony
ey
EtSning
.
them,_wni7?ssisii
onTo
the same" to^ the plaintiff, andjjia,t,he will
iiot do 'any""act*'prejndi cial to these^ lg£tfiSS
patent or Can ada, or the monpEflE^thus segure 5r"'ii:' 'TF^said' "tEaF" the_court will not
egfaccsua. contract ffi):.pei:sflnal. services when
such services require the exercise of peculiar
s5ill, IhtellecEuaTabiutyr^Hd judgment, and
that, therefore, the defendant cannot be ordered to make and deliver the injectors contracted for. But the principle on which it
Is held that a court of equity cannot decree
one to perform a personal service involving
peculiar talent or skill, because it cannot
so mould its order and so supervise the individual executing it that it can determine
whether he has honestly obeyed it or not,
has no application here. The defendant has
agreed to furnish and deliver certain injectors, which the contract shows to be patented
articles. Ther e is nothing in th e JnlL-from
whlchjtjs'to tie inferred that t hey were jret
to be made~wESrthe conti*act"was executed;
Birt,~if'"tt be assumed- that they-were, there
is nothing from which it can be inferred
that any skill peculiar to the defendant was
required to construct them.
For aught that'
appears, they could be made by any intelligent artificer In the metals of which they
were composed.
The details of their manufacture are given by reference to the patents, which are referred to In the agreement;
so that no difficulty, such as has sometimes
been experienced,
could have been found In
describing accurately and even minutely the
articles to be furnished.
Nor are there
found in the case at bar any continuous du-
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plaintifE could obtain for the breach of that
to be done, or work to be performed,
portion of the agreement which relates to
requiring any permanent supervision, wMch,
the application for a patent in Canada for
as it could not be concluded within a definite
the improvements which defendant had
been
and reasonable time, has sometimes
We have not
made, would be in damages.
held an obstacle to the enforcement of a conThat equity, by
Intended thus to decide.
tract by the court. Agreements to make an
virtue of its control over the persons before
archway under a railway, or to erect a sidthe court, takes cognizance of many things
ing at a particular point for the convenience
which they may do or be able to do abroad,
of the land-owner, have been ordered to be
while they are themselves personally here,
specifically enforced. Although the party agwill not be controverted^ One may be enjoin->
grieved might have obtained damages which
ed from prosecuting a suit abroad. He may
would have been sufficient to have enabled
him to pay for constructing them, and al- be compelled to convey land situated abroad,
although the conveyance must be according
though the work to be done necessarily Into the laws of the foragn country, and must
volved engineering skill as well as labor, he
be sent there for record. Pingree v. Coffin,"^
was not bound to assume the responsibility
12 Gray, 288; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545;
or the labor of doing that which the defendCunningham v. Butler, 142 Mass. 47, 6 N.
ant had agreed to do. Storer v. Railway Oo.,
Greene v. Railway
E. 782; Bailey T. Ryder, 10 N. Y. 363; New2 Youuge & C. Ch. 48;
ton V. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587. There is nothCo., L. R. 13 Eq. 44.
The case at bar Is
ing to show that the plaintiff, in making his
readily, distinguishable from that of WoUenapplication in Canada for the patent, is comsak V. Briggs, 20 Bradw. 50, on which the
In that case the de- pelled to leave the state, any more than he
defendant much relies.
would be compelled to do so if he was an
fendant was to construct for the plaintiff
applicant at Washington. The grant of such
certain improved machinery for a particular
purpose, but no details were given as to the jj^ patent is an act of administration only,
form, structure, principle, or mode of op- ■"'If it were to be granted here, the party
erating the proposed machine.
It was ob- jOBTOuld be ordered to make application. It
viously a contract too indefinite to enable the
was held in Runstetler v. Atkinson, 4 MacArthur, 382, that where a formal assignment
court to order its specific enforcement.
■^ It is urged that specific performance of a
of an invention had not been made, but a
part only of a contract will not be ordered valid agreement had been made so to assign,
equity would order the party to make the
when it is not in the power of the court to
\order the enforcement of the whole, and that formal assignment, and also to make appliit would not be possible to enforce that porcation for the patent, which, in such case,
tion of the contract which relates to the apThe laws of
would issue to the assignee.
Canada, which we can know only as facts,
plication for letters patent in Canada, and the
subsequent assignment of them.^But where
are not before us by any allegations as to
If all that is required by them is a
iTtwo parts of a contract are distinctly separathem.
/ ble, as in the case at bar, there is no reason
formal application in writing by the inventor, there would seem to be, from the alleand the
j why one should not be enforced,
in damages for the
gations of the bill, sufficient reason why the
I plaintiff compensated
defendant should be required to make and
V^breach of the other. When a contract relates
• to but a single subject, and it Is Impossible forward it, or place it in the hands of the
for the defendant to perform it except par- plaintiff to be forwarded, to the Canadian
tially, the plaintiff is entitled to tlie benefit of authorities. In any event, as the application
such partial performance, and to compensais preliminary only to obtaining letters patent for the purpose of assigning them to the
tion, if it be possible to compute what is just,
plaintiff, the averments of the bill, taken in
far as it is unperformed. It was therefore
s^so
held in Davis v. Parker, 14 Allen, 94, that
connection with the terms of the agreement,
set forth a good reason why the plaintiff may
where one had agreed to convey land, vdth
release of dower, and was unable to procure
ask an assignment of his title to the improvements in question from the defendant,
a release of dower, the purchaser was entitled to a conveyance without such release,
so far as the dominion of Canada is concerned, and also why the defendant should
with an abatement from the purchase money
of the value of the wife's Interest at the be restrained from alienating or in any way
See, also, Milkman
Incumbering any right he may have to lettime of the conveyance.
V. Ordway, 106 Mass. 253; Curran v. Waterters patent from Ganada if plaintiff should
Power Co., 116 Mass. 90.
decide to seek his remedy in this form, rather
We have assumed, in favor of the defendthan in damages for breach of this part of
ant's contention, that the only relief that the
the contract. Demurrer overruled.
ties
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PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES,
EWING

V.

LITCHFIELD

et aL

(22 S. E. 362, 91 Va. 575.)
Supreme

Court of Appeals of Virginia.
27,

June

1805.

Appeal
from circuit court, Washington
county; Sheffey, Judge.
Bill by one Litchfield and others against
Thomas Ewing.
Decree for complainants,
and defendant appeals.
Reversed.
White & Fenn, for appellant.

for appellees.

Daniel Trigg,

KEITH, P. This bUl was filed in the circuit
court of Washington county by Litchfield
and others, and sets forth the following facts:
In January, 1890, the plaintiffs entered into
a conti-act with J. D. Imboden, by which the
plaintiffs and the said Imboden agreed to procure $100,000 of the stock of the Virginia &
Tennessee Coal & Iron Company at the price
of $10 or less per share of $loo each. These
shares, together with 15,000 shares owned by
the plaintiffs, were to be TOted in a stockholders' meeting, to be held within a period
named, and upon a notice prescribed in the
contract, so as to acquire the control of $1,950,000 of the stock which remained in the
treasury of the Virginia & Tennessee Coal &
Iron Company. This block of 19,500 shares
of stock was to be sold to Imboden at $10 per
share, and in consideration of his purchase
of the said treasury stock at this reduced rate
he undertook to secure and cause to be submitted to the said meeting of stockholders,
for their ratification, a contract, by and on
behalf of the Danville & East Tennessee
Railroad Company and the Atlantic & DanvUle Railroad Company with the Virginia &
Teimessee Coal & Iron Company, binding the
railroad companies to extend their roads into
the lands and coal fields of the coal and iron
company, or to make connections therewith
satisfactory to the said parties by means of
other railroads, by the 1st of January, 1893,
and to complete and have in operation the
line of said railroad companies from Abingdon to Damascus on or before the 1st day of
January, 1891, and to complete and have in
operation all that part of the line of said
railroads and their connections, so as to connect Abingdon and the coal fields, by the 1st
of January, 1893, and then binding the said
under certain terms
railroad companies,
therein named, for the transportation of the
product of the coal fields, owned by the Virginia & Tennessee Coal & Iron Company. It
is further provided that, unless the party of
the first part, J. D. Imboden, or his assignees,
shall, at the meeting of the stockholders provided in the contract, purchase the treasury
stock and delivesr or cause to be delivered the
contract of the railroad companies, as hereinbefore provided, or in the event of the failure of the first party to notify the parties of
the second part of his readiness to conform
to and to comply with the provisions of this
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agreement, then the contract entered into was
to be nuU and void, except that the parties of
the second part "shall be entitled to demand
and receive from the party of the first part
the amount of $50,000 of the stock of the Virginia & Tennessee Coal & Iron Company, or

$5,000 in lieu thereof by way of ascertained
and liquidated damages on account of the

breach of this contract." There are details of
the contract entered into between the parties
which I have thought it unnecessary to set
out, but have contented myself with reciting
what I conceived to be the features of the
contract upon wtilch this controversy depends. The $50,000 of stock was to be deposited with the Exchange National Bank of
Lynchburg by the party of the first part, to
be held in accordance with the provisions of
the contract, and it was also provided that
the party of the first part should have the
right to elect to pay either the stock or the
money in cash as damages, in the event of
Subhis failure to comply with his contract.
sequently an amended bill was filed, and
Thomas Ewing was made a party defendant,
it appearing that J. D. Imboden, in executing the contract set out in the original bill,
was acting as the agent of Ewing, and that
Imboden had no personal interest In It To
this bill there was a demurrer, which the
circuit court overruled, and such proceedings
were had that a final decree was entered in
the cause, from which Thomas Ewing has
and his appeal presents for our
appealed,
consideration at the outset the propriety of
the decree of the circuit court upon the demurrer to the bill.
It wiU be observed that this suit Is not
brought to enforce the specific performance
of that which the defendant contracted to do,
—that is, to procure contracts from certain
railroad corporations to build a line of railway into the coal fields controlled by the
plaintiffs within a stipulated period; in other
words, it is not a suit for the specific performance of the principal contract entered into between the parties. Stated broadly, that
was a contract upon the part of Ewing to conBtruct, or for him to procure others to construct, certain lines of road to certain points
named In the contract, the object being to derelop the coal fields owned by the Virginia &
Tennessee Coal & Iron Company, in which
company the plaintiffs were large stockholders. Vpon the part of the plaintiffs, in consideration of Ewing procuring this road to be
Duilt, or procuring a satisfactory contract upon the part of others to build It, they were
to unite with him, who, In the meantime,
with their aid, was to secure $100,000 of the
stock of the Virginia & Tennessee
Coal &
Iron Company, thus constituting a controlling
Interest in the company, and thereby give to
the appellant the control of 19,500 shares of
stock, at $10 per share. In a proper case a
court of equity delights specifically to enforce contracts where the parties have no
other remedy, or the remedy afforded elsewhere is less complete or satisfactory; but

PENALTIES AND PORFEITTTRBS.

\
1

a

if

a

/ j

it

'j|

ll^

It will go even further than this. It will not
permit a party, by the voluntary payment of
the agreed penalty, to defeat the enforcement
It will not enof the alternative contract
tertain a suit for the recovery of damages
merely, nor will it undertake to give damages
ssLve, as before observed, as ancillary or auxiliary to some one of Its recognized subjects
of jurisdiction; and so far from liquidated
damages constituting an exception to the rule
that courts of equity wUl not entertain suits
for damages for breach of contract, it seems
that, if the damages for the breach of a contract have been liquidated by the parties to
and agreed j
the contract (that is, ascertained
upon), that fact, so far from inviting thej
assistance of a court of equity, is sufficient to
Indeed, this must of necessity be
repel it.
so, for, as the jurisdiction of the court to enforce contracts specifically rests upon the insufficiency of damages as a redress or remedy
for failure to comply with a contract, the
very foundation of jurisdiction seems wanting
in those cases where the parties themselves
have otherwise determined, and have fixed a
money value in the form of liquidated damages upon the injury sustained by its breach.
In this view is found an explanation of the
leaning shown by courts of equity, in doubtful cases, to construe such agreements as we
are here considering as creating a penalty or(
forfeiture rather than liquidated damages.!
For, if It be determined that It Is but liquidated damages, the jurisdiction of a court of
equity is at an end, but If It be construed as
a forfeiture or penalty, then it afCords no obstruction to the interpretation of the court
of equity, because it will prohibit either the
enforcement or the voluntary payment of the
penalty or forfeiture, and will compel the
performance of the alternative contract If a
proper case be made. Courts of equity, therefore, always strongly Incline to that construetion which declares
to be a forfeiture or
penalty rather than liquidated damages.
In
this case, however, a court of equity is without motive to prefer the one to the other construction.
The alternative for which the penalty is given. If It be penalty, is the securing
of a contract for the building of a railroad.
It is obviously impossible to compel the defendant either to build it himself or to procure others to build it. It will leave the parties, in the forum appropriate for that relief,
to recover damages for its breach,— liquidated
damages,
court of law shall be of opinion
that the parties so intended the stipulation in
the contract, or damages in ordinary cases,
court of law shall be of opinion that the
stock or money stipulated to be paid was a
penalty. We have not referred to cases.
Cases upon the subject of the specific performance of contracts and other subjects discussed are too numerous
even for citation.
The whole subject has been treated with
great fullness and ability In Pomeroy's Equity, and we shall content ourselves with referring to the appropriate chapters In that

if

here the undertaking of the defendant Is to
build a railroad, or to procure others to build
it, and courts of equity will not enforce contracts for that . purpose. This seems to be
well settled.
The object, and the only object, of this bill
is to recover what the parties have agreed upon, either as a penalty or forfeiture, or as
The breach of the conliquidated damages.
tract Is recognized as the foundation of thp
relief sought, and the plaintiffs have resorted
to this court, and Invoked its aid to enable
them to gather in the form of damages the
There
fruits of a mere breach of contract.
are cases in which courts of equity will
award damages, but they are cases where,
having obtained jurisdiction over the subject
and of the parties, under some of the wellrecognized sources of equity jurisdiction, it
is found necessary to award damages in order to do full and complete justice by way
as when. In the enforceof compensation,
ment of a contract for the sale of land, the
court finds Itself unable to give the party
seeking and entitled to its aid all that, under
In such a
his contract, he should recover.
case the court will, as far as possible, specifically execute the contract, and then ascertain the damages accruing by reason of Its
inability in the particular case thus to afford
The giving of the damages
complete relief.
Is ancillary or auxiliary to the jurisdiction
specifically to enforce the performance of the
contract.
See Nagle v. Newton, 22 Grat. 814.
The case before ns being in Its essence for the
recovery of damages for a breach of contract,
a court of equity Is not to be beguiled into
granting the relief sought because It is Ingeniously and artfully concealed under cover
of a prayer to compel the assignment of certain shares of stock. The great weight of authority in this countESr Is that a court of equity wIU not entertain a bill for such a purpose,
though In England It seems to be otherwise.
Had the subject and object of the principal
contract between the parties in this case been
the sale and purchase of the $50,000 of the
stock in question, a court of equity would
have left them to their remedy at law, and
will certainly not barken to their prayer when
It appears that the stock, the assignment of
which is sought, Is Itself but one form of the
penalty or liquidated damages agreed upon
as the measure of the injury sustained by the
Much of
breach of the contract entered into.
the argument addressed to us had for its object to enable us to determine whether or not
the stock, or In lieu thereof the $5,000 in
money, a^eed to be transferred or paid by
the appellant in ease of a failure to perform
the contract, was to be considered as a penalty or as liquidated damages.
This Is a
feature of the controversy
which it Is not
necessary
for us to determine, because in
neither aspect of it are the plaintiffs entitled
to the relief sought, £^A court of equity will
neither enforce a penalty or- forfeltnre, nor
permit it to be enforced in a court of lawi

a
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PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
work,

and especially to sections 446, 447,
1401-1403, and to Lawson, Rights, Rem. &
Prac. pp. 2588, 2590, 2591, as sustaining the
views here presented.
We are of opinion that the demurrer to the
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bill

have been sustained, and the bill
enter a decree reand therefore
versing the decree of the circuit court.
should
dismissed,

BUCHANAN, J.,

absent.
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CRAIG

V.

HUKILD

et al.

(16 S. B. 363, 37 W. Va, 520.)
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Dec. 22, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Monongalia county.
Bill by Joseph W. Craig against B. M.
Hukill & Co. and others for partition of
land.
There was a decree for partition. DeReversed.
fendant B. M. Hukill appeals.
Okey Johnson, W. P. Hubbard, and Keck,
& Fast, for appellant. Cox & Baker,
for appellee.
Son

BRANNON, J. W. M. Davis executed to
David Kennedy a lease of a tract of land for
a term of years, for the purpose of drilling
for petroleum oil, which lease has come by
assignment to B. M. Hukill. The deed of
lease contains a covenant on the part of the
lessee to commence operations for oil development within nine months, or for payment of a
certain sum of money per month until commencement of work, with a provision that
a failure to do one or the other should work
an absolute forfeiture of the lease. Afterwards Davis executed an instrument by
which he agreed to sell to H. P. Griffith all
the oil and gas under the said tract, and
Griffith transferred all his right in said tract
to Joseph W. Craig.
Davis had a life estate
in said tract, with remainder in fee to his
children; and, by the death of one of them, he
inherited an undivided one-fifth share therein.
Hukill, claiming under the first-mentioned
lease, as also under a lease from the guardian of the surviving children, bored for and
produced oil on the premises.
Craig brought
a suit in equity in the circuit com't of Monongalia county against Hukill, Davis, and others, praying that the tract be partitioned,
and one-fifth assigned as the share of Davis
in fee, and that all the oil and gas under
it be assigned to the plaintiff, Craig. The
theory of Ci'aig for relief is that by reason
of failure to commence operations, or to pay
money in lieu thereof, as provided in the lease
to Kennedy, it had become forfeited, and he
had, by the said agreement between Davis
and Griffith, become entitled, in exclusion of
all rights under the Kennedy lease, to all
Obviously,
oil which Davis could convey.
Craig can get relief only through an enforcement of the forfeiture of the Kennedy lease.
Thus, at the threshold of the case, we are

met with the question whether a court of
equity will enforce this alleged forfeiture.
Affirmative relief against penalties and forfeitures was one of the springs or fountains
of equity jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction
was very early exercised;
and it would be
going in the very opposite direction, and acting contrary to its essential principles, to affirmatively enforce a forfeiture. The elementary books on equity Jurisprudence state
the rule as almost an axiom, that equity never enforces a penalty o f_forfeiture.
2 Story,
TSqrjur. § 1319; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 459; Bisp.
Eq. § 181; Beach, Mod. Eq. Jur. § 1013.
Mr. Pomeroy, in 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 460, says
that rule is without exception;
and I confess my search has led me to the same conclusion. This doctrine is supported in America by decisions of the highest authority, coming from jurists of the most eminent name,
—among them, Kent and Marshall; and there
seems to be no change or qualification in
Livingston v. Tompkins, 4
later decisions.
Johns. Ch. 415; Horsburg v. Baker, 1 Pet
232; Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146.
The estate under the Kennedy lease certainly
vested; and the plaintiff seeks, by a suit in
equity, to divest it, which he can only do by
declaring and enforcing the forfeiture of that
lease, for the plaintiflE's right must depend
for its birth and existence on that forfeiture. In Livingston v. Tompkins, supra, it
was held that "equity wiU not assist the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture, or anything
in the nature of a forfeiture," and "will not!
lend its aid to divest an estate for the
breach of a condition subsequent." McKlm
V. Mason, 2 Md. Oh. 510; Warner v. Bennett,
31 Conn. 468;
Smith v. Jewett, 40 N. H.
530.
In Oil Creek R. Co. v. Atlantic & G.
W. R. Co., 57 Pa. 65, a bill was filed to enforce a forfeiture of a lease because of failure
to build a road according to the express provisions of the lease; and the court refused,
on the ground that equity never lends its
aid in enforcement of a forfeiture, but will
leave the parties to their legal remedies.
Many cases cited in the text-books above cited sustain this principle.
Though equity has
jurisdiction in partition, yet it will not exercise it when it can be done only by enforcing
a forfeiture, when the plaintiffs right grows
only out of a forfeiture. As equity has no
Jurisdiction, we cannot decide the merits of
the case, and therefore reverse the decree
without prejudice to the
and_dismiMiJheJ)ill,
plaintiff to seek to assert his rights by any
appropriate legal remedy.
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WHERRY.

(42 AU. 112, 189 Pa. 198.)
Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan.

2, 1899.

Appeal from court of common pleas, AUegheny county.
Action by H. H. Kunkle and Conrad Jordan, partners doing business as Kunkle &
Jordan, against James Wherry, to recover a
balance alleged to be due on a contract for
granite construction. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Reversed.
R. A. & Jas. Balph, for appellant
E. G. Ferguson, for appellees.

J.

S. &

FELL, J. The defendant was the contractor
for the construction of a large, 10-story building, which he was required to complete in 11
By the terms of his contract with
months.
the owner, he was to receive $100 for each
day less than the time limit, and to pay
$1,000 for each day that he should exceed
it, in the completion
of the work.
He entered into a contract with the plaintiffs for
the stone and granite work. They agreed to
furnish the materials, and to finish the work
to the top of the second story, ready for the
bricldayers, in six weeks' time after three
stories of ironwork had been erected, and
bound themselves "to pay the sum of $150
per day as a penalty for each and every day
thereafter that the said work remains unfinThe
ished, as and for liquidated damages."
learned judge held that this stipulation should
be regarded as a penalty, and not as liquidated damages, and that the defendant could,
set off against the plaintifEs' claim such damages only as he proved to have been actually
sustained by him because of the delay of the
plaintiffs in completing the work.
The rule that in actions ex contractu, where
the breach of an agreement admits of compensation, the recovery may be limited to
the loss actually sustained, notwithstanding
a stipulation for a penalty. Is founded upon
the principle that one party should not be
allowed to profit by the default of the other,
and that compensation, and not forfeiture, is
Equity will regard a penthe equitable rule.
alty or forfeiture as Intended to secure the
fulfillment of a contract, and It may preclude
the injured party from recovering more than
a just compensation, or from obtaining a collateral advantage. Notes to Peachy v. Duke
of Somerset, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas. Bq.
Whether a sum named
2044; BIsp. Eq. 178.
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as compensation for the breach of a contract
Is to be considered as a penalty to secure its
fulfillment, from which equity will relieve,
or as damages liquidated by the parties themselves, is a question which cannot be answered by the application of any general rule.
The question is always one of construction,
and any rule upon the subject is a mere guide
to the tutention of the parties. The grounds
on which each case is to be considered and
determined are clearly stated by our Brother
MitcheU in Keck v. Bieber, 148 Pa. St. 645,
24 Atl. 170:
"The general principle upon
which the law awards damages is compensation for the loss suffered.
The amount may
be fixed by the parties in advance, but, where
a lump sum Is named by them, the court will
always look into the question whether this
is really liquidated damages, or only a penalty; the presumption being that it is the latter. The name by which it is called is of but
slight weight; the controlling elements being
the intent of the parties, and the special circumstances
of the case."
And he quotes
with approval March v. AUabough, 103 Pa.
St. 335: "The question • • • Is to be deby the intention of the parties,
termined
drawn from the words of the whole contract,
examined in the light of its subject-matter
and its surroundings; and in this examination we must consider the relation which the
sum stipulated bears to the Injury which
may be caused by the several breaches provided against, the ease or difficulty of measuring a breach In damages, and such other
matters as are legally or necessarily Inherent
in the transaction." From the nature of this
case, the actual damages which would result
from a breach of the contract would not readily be susceptible of ascertainment, and it
seems to us that It was the manifest Intention
of the parties not to leave them to the uncertain estimate of a jury, but to fix them by
"Uncertainty as to the
express agreement
extent of the injuries which may ensue" was
said in Powell v. Burroughs, 54 Pa. St 329,
and Coal Co. v. Schultz, 71 Pa. St 180, "to
be a criterion by which to determine whether
It is a case of liquidated damages or a penalty."
The damages named were for the
breach of a single stipulation, and were not
disproportionate to the loss which would
probably result to the defendant from the
failure of the plaintifCs to complete their
work In time. The fifth and seventh assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment is reversed, with a venire facias de
novo.
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JAQUITH
(5

Supreme

V.

Mich.

HUDSON.
123.)

Court of Michigaa.

May Term,

1858.

EiTor to circuit court, Wayne county.
The action was by Jaquith against Hudson, upon a promissory note for one thousand dollars, given by the latter to the former, April 15th, 1855, and payable twelve
Defendant pleaded the
months after date.
general issue, and gave notice that on the
trial he would prove that, previous to said
15th day of April, 1855, plaintiff and defendant had been and were partners in trade, at
Trenton, in said county of Wayne, under
the name of Hudson & Jaquith; that, on
that day the copartnership was dissolved,
and the parties then entered into an agreement, of which the following is a copy:

"This article of

agreement,

made

and en-

into between Austin B. Jaquith, of
Trenton, Wayne county, and state of Michigan, of the first part, and Jonathan Hudson,
of Trenton, county of Wayne, and state of
Michigan, of the second part, wltnesseth,
that the said Austin B. Jaquith agrees to
sell, and by these presents does sell and convey unto the said Jonathan Hudson, his
heirs and assigns, all his right, title, and interest in the stock of goods now owned by
the firm of Hudson and Jaquith, together
with all the notes, books, book accounts,
tered

I

/

)
(
/
^

moneys, deposits, debts, dues, and demands,
as well as all assets that in anywise belong
to the said firm of Hudson & Jaquith; and
that the copartnership that has existed between the said firm of Hudson & Jaquith is
hereby dissolved; and that the said Austin
E. Jaquith, by these presents, agrees that he
will not engage in the mercantile business. In
Trenton, for himself, or in connection with
any other one, for the space of three years
from this date, upon the forfeiture of the
sum of one thousand dollars, to be collected
by the said Hudson as his damages.
In eonsideration whereof, the said Jonathan Hudson, of the second part, agrees for himself,

his heirs and administrators, to pay unto the
said Austin E. Jaquith the sum of nine hundred dollars, for his services in the firm of
Hudson & Jaquith, together with all the
money that he (the said Austin B. Jaquith)
paid into said firm, deducting therefrom the
amount which he (the said Austin E. Jaquith) has drawn from said firm; the remainder the said Hudson agrees to pay to the
said Jaquith, his heirs or assigns, at a time
and in a manner as shall be specified in a
note beaiing even date with these presents.
And the said Hudson, for himself, his heirs
and assigns, agrees to pay all th« debts,
notes and liabilities of the firm of Hudson &
Jaquith, and to execute unto the said Jaquith a good and sufficient bond of indemnifi-

cation against all claims, debts, or liabilities
of the firm of Hudson & Jaquith.
"Trenton, April, 1855.
"Austin B. Jaquith. [L. S.]
"Jonathan Hudson.
[L. S.]
"Witness:
Arthur Edwards. Arthur Edwards, Jr."
And defendant further gave notice, among
other things, that he would show, on the
Ixial, that, after the execution of said agreement in writing, and the giving of said note
in pursuance thereof, and on or about the
15th day of July, 1855, plaintiff, in violation
of said agreement, entered into the mercantile business at Trenton, and had continued
to carry on the same ever since; by means
whereof the consideration of said note had
failed. And he further gave notice, that he
(the defendant) continued to carry on the
mercantile business at Trenton, after the dissolution of said copartnersMp; and by means
of the breach of said articles by plaintiff,
defendant had sustained damages to the sum
of one thousand dollars, liquidated by said
articles for a breach thereof, which sum he
from the
would claim to have deducted
amount of said note, on the trial.
On the trial, the plaintiff, having introduced the note in evidence, rested his case.
Defendant then proved by Arthur Edwards
the due execution of said agreement.
The
defendant also proved by the said witness
that the plaintiff resumed mercantile business in July, 1855, in the village of Trenton,
within eighty rods of the old stand of Hudson & Jaquith, and had ever since continued
in such business.
On cross-examination, Capt Edwards testified that the above agreement was made in
duplicate, and signed by the parties about
the middle of April, 1855, which duplicates
were placed in his hands, to be kept till the
bond of indemnity and note mentioned in the
agreement
were executed;
that the duplicates were not to be delivered till both parties came and demanded them.
Hudson at
once took exclusive possession of the store,
goods, books, and papers of the old firm of
Hudson & Jaquith, where the duplicate
agreements were signed, and they were left
in witness' hands until the other papers mentioned in them were executed.
Witness did
not recollect whether it was said by the parties that the agreement was not to take effect till both parties came for the duplicates.
Witness never delivered to the defendant the
agreement now produced by him, and cannot
tell how it eame into his possession.
The
plaintiff and defendant never came and jointly demanded the duplicates of him. He has
no recollection that either of the parties ever
notified him not to deliver over the papers.
On re-examination, witness said he lived
at Trenton in 1855, and his papers were for
the most part kept there.
Witness cannot
remember delivering this duplicate to de-
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It might have been delivered by
him to defendant, but witness has no recollection of it.
The defendant then, by another witness,
gave evidence tending to show that, not long
after the date of said agreement, the bond
of indemnity mentioned in the agreement
was executed by defendant and delivered to
the plaintlfE.
No evidence was given to show any damage sustained by the defendant by reason of
plaintiff's again engaging in business in Tren-

fendant

ton.

The plaintifC then called as a witness Arthur Edwards, .Jr., who testified that he was
one of the subscribing witnesses to said
agreement.
The duplicate agreements were
to go into Capt Bdwai-ds' hands, and to be
delivered only when plaintiff and defendant
came together for aid demanded
them.
When they were ready for signing, plaintiff
hesitated about signing the duplicates, but
; witness thinks that Capt Edwards then said
that plaintiff could sign them safely, as he
(the said Capt. Edwards) would hold them
until they were jointly demanded; cannot
remember whether Hudson or Edwards
made the remark, but one of them made
some remark which gave witness the impression that these duplicate papers were to
be null until they should be both simultaneously delivered to the parties. Witness was
in and out of the room, and did not hear
the whole conversation, and cannot say positively whether Hudson was there when this
remark was made.
There was something
said about some other papers, but witness
could not recollect it distinctly.
The court was then asked by plaintiff's
counsel to charge the jury as follows:
"(1) That a delivery to both parties, at the
same time, of the agreement
in duplicate,
by Capt. Arthur Edwards, was essential to
give it effect, and render it operative between the said plaintiff and defendant; and,
before the defendant can claim the full benefit of it, he must show either such a delivery as was agreed upon, or a willful refusal, on the part of the plaintiff, that such
delivery should be made.
set up
"(2) That, even if the agreement
was, in the opinion of the jury, properly delivered, as between the parties, the defendant
against the
can not recoup any damages
plaintiff, except upon evidence showing that
damage
was actually sustained by
some
him; that the clause in the agreement as to
damages cannot, of itself, and in the absence of evidence, operate to the reduction
of the claim of the plaintiff, as the sum fixed
In the agreement is in the nature of a penalty, and not liquidated damages;
and no
under it except
can be recovered
damages
such as are proven."
The court refused so to charge; and plaintiff excepted.
The court then charged the jury in substance as follows:
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That, if the jury were satisfied that the
duplicate agreements were placed in Capt.
beEdwards' hands under the agreement
tween the parties that the same were not to
become operative until both parties called on
him to deliver them, that then they must be
satisfied that such a delivery had taken
place, or the agreement
had never taken
effect; but if, on the other hand, they should
be satisfied that the real nature of the transaction was that the said duplicate agreements were to be placed in Capt. Edwards'
hands solely to await the future execution
and delivery of the bond, note, etc., mentioned in the agreement, and were thereupon to
become operative,
that then no formal delivery of said duplicates was necessary.
The agreement in such case would take effect as soon as the bond, note, etc., mentioned, were made and delivered to plaintiff.
The court further charged the jury, that it
was not necessary for the defendant to prove
any actual damage
under the plaintiff's
breach of the said agreement, as the damages therein fixed were liquidated damages,
and not a penalty.
The issue was then submitted to the jurV^
on the evidence, who found a verdict for the
plaintiff, in the sum of eighteen dollars and
eight cents, allowing the defendant the sum
of one thousand dollars mentioned
in the
agreement.

Plaintiff brought the case to this court, by
writ of error, accompanied by bill of exceptions.
G.

D. Bethune Duflield, for plaintiff in error.
v. N. Lothrop, for defendant in error.

J. The first point upbn
court below was requested
to
charge, and for the refusal of which the first
exception is taken, assumed that, by the arrangement between the parties, the contract
was not to become operative, or to have any
force or effect, until the duplicates should be
delivered by Capt. Edwards to both parties
at the same time.
Whether such was the effect of the arrangement,
or whether the agreements were
placed in the hands of Capt. Edwards solely
to await the execution and delivery of the
bond and note mentioned in the contract,
and thereupon to become operative, was a
question which depended upon the intention
of the parties, to be gathered from the whole
transaction, their acts and declarations,
and,
in some measure, upon the nature and provisions of the contract itself. It was a question of fact involved in the issue.
The court
had no right to assume the truth or falsehood of either side of the question.
The evidence bearing upon the point was conflicting.
It was as clearly a question of fact for
the jury as any other fact in issue in thi
cause.
To have
charged
the jury as re
quested would have been an encroachment
by the court upon the province of the jury.
CHRISTIANCY,

which
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j

j
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The question was, therefore, properly submitted to the jury. The charge of the court
In this particular was in all respects fair and
correct, and the verdict of the jury is conclusive upon this point. The first exception,
therefore, is not well taken.
The second exception raises the single
question, whether the sum of $1,000, mentioned in the covenant of Jaquith not to go
into business in Trenton, is to be construed
as a penalty, or as stipulated damages— the
plaintifC in error insisting it should be construed as the former, the defendant as the
latter.
We shall not attempt here to analyze all
the decided cases upon the subject, which
were read and cited upon the argument, and
It
which, with others, have been examined.
is not to be denied that there is some conflict, and more confusion, in the cases; judges
have been long and constantly complaining
of the confusion and want of harmony in
the decisions upon this subject. But, while
no one can fall to discover a very great
amount of apparent conflict, stUl it will be
found, on examination, that most of the eases,
however conflicting in appearance, have yet
been decided according to the justice and
equity of the particular case.
And while
there are some isolated cases (and they are
but few), which seem to rest upon no very
intelligible principle, it will be found, we
think, that the following general principles
may be confidently said to result from, and
to reconcile, the great majority of the cases,
both in England and in this country:
First. The law, following the dictates of
equity and natural justice, in cases of this
kind, adopts the principle of just compensation for the loss or injury actually sustained;
considering it no greater violation of this
principle to confine the injured party to the
recovery of less, than to enable him by the
aid of the court to extort more. It is the
application, in a court of law, of that principle long recognized in courts of equity,
which, disregarding the penalty of the bond,
gives only the damages actually sustained.
This principle may be stated, in other words,
to be, that courts of justice will not recognize or enforce a contract, or any stipulation
of a contract, clearly unjust and unconscionable; a principle of common sense and common honesty so obviously in accordance with
the dictates of justice and sound policy as
to make it rather matter of surprise that
courts of law had not always, and in all
cases, adopted It to the same extent as courts
of equity. And, happily for the purposes of
justice, the tendency of courts of law seems
now to be towards the full recognition of the
principle, in all cases.
This principle of natural justice, the courts
of law, following courts of equity, have, in
this class of cases, adopted as the law of
the contract; and they will not permit the
parties by express stipulation, or any form
of language, however clear the Intent, to set

it aside;

on the familiar ground, "conventus
privatorum non potest publico juri derogare."
But the court will apply this principle,
and disregard the express stipulation of parties, only in those cases where it is obvious
from the contract before them, and the whole
subject-matter, that the principle of compensation has been disregarded, and that to
carry out the express stipulation of the parties, would violate this principle, which alone
the court recognizes as the law of the contract.
The violation, or disregard, of this principle of compensation,
may appear to the
court In various ways,— from the contract,
the sum mentioned,
and the subject-matter.
Thus, where a large sum (say one thousand
dollars) Is made payable solely In consequence of the non-payment of a much smaller sum (say one hundred dollars), at a certain day; or where the contract Is for the
performance of several stipulations of very
different degrees of importance, and one
large sum is made payable on the breach
of any one of them, even the most trivial,
the damages for which can. In no reasonable probability, amount to that sum; in
the first case, the court must see that the
real damage is readily computed, and that
the principle of compensation has been overlooked,
or purposely disregarded; In the
second case, though there may be more difficulty In ascertaining the precise amount of
damage, yet, as the contract exacts the same
large sum for the breach of a trivial or comparatively unimpoi;tant stipulation, as for
that of the most important, or of all of them
together. It is equally clear that the parties
have wholly departed from the idea of just
compensation, and attempted to fix a rule
of damages which the law will not recognize
or enforce.
We do not mean to say that the principle
above stated as deduclble from the cases, is
to be found generally aimounced In express

terms. In the language of the courts; but It
will be found, we think, to be necessarily

implied in, and to form the only rational
foundation for, all that large class of cases
which have held the sum to be in the nature
of a penalty, notwithstanding the strongest
and most explicit declarations of the parties
that it was intended as stipulated and ascertained damages.
It is true, the courts In nearly aU these
cases profess to be construing the contract
with reference to the intention of the parties, as if for the purpose of ascertaining and
giving effect to that Intention; yet It is obvious, from these cases, that wherever It has
appeared to the court, from the face of the
contract and the subject-matter, that the sum
was dearly too large for just compensation,
here, while they will aUow any form of
words, even those expressing the direct contrary, to Indicate the Intent to make it a
penalty, yet no form of words, no force of
language, Is competent to the expression ot
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the opposite intent. Here, then, is an intention incapable of expression in words;
and as all written contracts must be expressed in words, it would seem to be a
mere waste of time and effort to look for
such an intention in such a contract. And
as the question is between two opposite intents only, and the negation of the one
necessarily implies the existence of the other,
there would seem to be no room' left for
construction with reference to the intent. It
must, then, be manifest that the intention
of the parties in such cases is not the governing consideration.
But some of the cases attempt to justify
this mode of construing the contract with
reference to the intent, by declaring, In substance,
that though the language is the
strongest which could be used to evince the
intention in favor of stipulated damages,
still, if it appear clearly, by reference to the
subject-matter, that the parties have made
the stipulation without reference to the principle of just compensation,
and so excessive
as to be out of all proportion to the actual
damage, the court must hold that they could
not have intended it as stipulated damages,
though they have so expressly declared.
See, as an example of this class of cases,
Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141.
Now this, it is true, may lead to the same
result in the particular case, as to have
placed the decision upon the true ground,
viz., that though the parties actually intended the sum to be paid, as the damages agreed
upon between them, yet it being clearly unconscionable, the court would disregard the
intention, and refuse to enforce the stipulation. But, as a rule of construction, or interpretation of contracts, it is radically vicious, and tends to a confusion of ideas in
the construction of contracts generally. It
is this, more than anything else, which has
produced so much apparent conflict in the
decisions upon this whole subject of penalty
It sets at defiance
and stipulated damages.
all rules of interpretation, by denying the
intention of the parties to be what they, in
the most unambiguous terms, have declared
it to be, and finds an intention directly opposite to that which is clearly expressed—
"divinatio, non interpretatio est, quae omnino
recedit a Utera."
Again, the attempt to place this question
upon the intention of the parties, and to
make this the governing consideration, necessarily implies that, if the intention to make
the sum stipulated damages should clearly
appear, the court would enforce the contract
according to that intention. To test this, let
it be asked, whether, in such a case, if it
were admitted that the parties actually intended the sum to be considered as stipulated damages, and not as a penalty, would a
court of law enforce it for the amount stipulated? Clearly, they could not, without going back to the technical and long exploded
doctrine whicli gave the whole penalty of
H.&B.EQ.(2dEd.)—

5

65

the bond, without reference to the damages
actually sustained. They would thus be simply changing the names of things, and enforcing, under the name of stipulated damages, what in its own nahire is but a penalty.
The real question in this class of cases
wUl be found to be, not what the parties
intended, but whether the sum is. In fact,
in the nature of a penalty; and this is to be
determined by the magnitude of the sum; in
connection with the subject-matter, and not
at all by the words or the understanding of
the parties. The intention of the parties can
not alter it. While courts of law gave the
penalty of the bond, the parties intended the
payment of the penalty as much as they
now intend the payment of stipulated damages; it must, therefore, we think, be very
obvious that the actual intention of the parties, in this class of cases, and relating to
this point, is wholly immaterial; and though
the courts have very generally professed to
base their decisions upon the intention of the
parties, that Intention is not, and can not
be made, the real basis of these decisions.
In endeavoring to reconcile their decisions
with the actual intention of the parties, the
been compelled
to
courts have sometimes
use language wholly at war with any Idea
of Interpretation, and to say "that the parties must be considered as not meaning exactly what they say."
Homer v. FllntofC,
9 Mees. & W., per Park, B. May it not be
said, with at least equal propriety, that the
courts have sometimes said what they did
not exactly mean?
The foregoing remarks are all to be confined to that class of cases where it was
clear, from the sum mentioned and the subject-matter, that the principle of compensation had been disregarded.
But, secondly, there are great numbers of
cases, where, from the natm-e of the contract and the subject-matter of the stipulation, for the breach of yphich the sum is
provided, it is apparent to the court that
the actual damages for a breach are uncertain in their nature, difficult to be ascertained, or impossible to be estimated with
certainty, by reference to any pecuniary
standard, and where the parties themselves
are more Intimately acquainted with all the
peculiar circumstances, and therefore better
able to compute the actual or probable damages, than courts or juries, from any evidence which can be brought before them.
In all such cases, the law permits the parties to ascertain for themselves, and to provide in the contract itself, the amount of
the damages which shall be paid for the
In permitting this, the law does
breach.
not lose sight of the principle of compensation, which is the law of the contract, but
merely adopts the computation or estimate
of the damages made by the parties, as being the best and most certain mode of ascertaining the actual damage, or what sum
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The
to a just compensation.
therefore, for allowing the parties to
ascertain for themselves the damages in this
class of cases, is the same which denies the
right in the former class of cases; viz., the
courts adopt the best and most practicable
mode of ascertaining the sum which will

will amount

reason,

just compensation.
In this class of cases where the law

produce

per-

mits the parties to ascertain and fix the
amount of damages In the contract, the first
inquiry obviously is, whether they have done
And here, the intention of the
so in fact?
parties is the governing consideration; and
In ascertaining this intention, no merely
technical effect will be given to the particular words relating to the sum, but the entire contract, the subject-matter, and often
the situation of the parties with respect to
each other and to the subject-matter, will be
Thus though the word "penalconsidered.
ty" be used (Sainter v. Fergason, 7 Man., G.
& S. 716; Jones v. Green, 3 Younge & J.
299; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223), or "forfeit" (Noble V. Noble, 7 Cow. 307), or "forfeit and pay" (Fletcher v. Dycke, 2 Term R.
32), it will still be held to be stipulated damages. If, from the whole contract, the subject-matter, and situation of the parties, it
can be gathered that such was their intention. And In proportion as the difficulty of
ascertaining the actual damage by proof Is
greater or less, where this difficulty grows
out of the nature of such damages, in the
like proportion is the presumption more or
less strong that the parties intended to fix
the amount.
It remains only to apply these principles
to the case before us.
It is contended by
the plalntifE in error, that the payment of
the one thousand dollars mentioned in the ,
covenant of Jaquith is not made dependent
solely upon the breach of the stipulation not
to go into business in Trenton, but that it
applies equally-^First, to the agreement to
sell to Hudson his interest in the goods;
second, to sell his interest in the books,
notes, accounts, etc.; and, third, to the agreement to dissolve the partnership. But we
can perceive no ground for such a construction. The language in reference to the sale
of the interest In the goods, books, notes,
accounts, etc., and that in reference to the
dissolution, is not that of a sale in futuro,
nor for the dissolution of the partnership at
a future period, but it is that of a present
sale and a present dissolution— "does hereby
sell," and "the copartnership is hereby dissolved," is the language of the instrument.
It is plain, from this language, from the
subject-matter, and from all the acts of the
parties, that these provisions were to take,
and did take, immediate effect. There could
be no possible occasion to provide any penalty or stipulated damages for the non-performance of these stipulations, because this
sale and dissolution would already have been
accomplished the moment the contract took

and, until It took
purpose;
the stipulation for the one thousand
dollars could not take effect or afford any
security, nor would Hudson be bound or
need the security.
But it remained to provide for the future. If Jaquith were to be
at liberty to set up a rival store in the same
village, it might seriously affect the success
of Hudson's business; and we are bound to
infer, from the whole scope of this contract,
that Hudson would never have agreed to
pay the consideration mentioned in it, nor
to have entered into the contract at all, but
for the stipulation of Jaquith "that he will
not engage in the mercantile business in
Trenton, for himself or m connection with
any other one, for the space of three years
fromi this date, upon the forfeiture of the
sum of one thousand dollars, to be collected
by said Hudson as his damages."
This
stipulation of Jaquith not to go into business, is the only one on his part which lookb
to the future; and it is to this, alone, that
the language in reference to the one thouAny other construction
sand dollars applies.
would do violence to the language, and be
at war with the whole subject matter.
The damages to arise from the breach of
this covenant, from the nature of the case,
must be not only uncertain in their nature,
but impossible to be exhibited in proof, with
any reasonable degree of accuracy, by any
evidence which could possibly be adduced.
It is easy to see that while the damages
might be very heavy, it would be very difficult clearly to prove any. Their nature and
amount could be better estimated by tBe
parties themselves, than by witnesses, courts,
or juries. It is, then, precisely one of thai
class of cases in which it has always been
recognized as peculiarly appropriate for the
parties to fix and agree upon the damages
for themselves. In such a case, the language must be very clear to the contrary, to
overcome the inference of intent (so to fix
them), to be drawn from the subject-matter
and the situation of the parties; because, it
is difficult to suppose, in such a case, that
the party taking the stipulation intended it
only to cover the amount of damages actually to be proved, as he would be entitied to
the latter without the mention of any sum
in the contract, and he must also be supposed to know that his actual damages, from
the nature of the case, are not susceptible
of legal proof to anything approaching their
actual extent.
That the parties actually intended, in this case, to fix the amount to be
recovered, is clear from the language itself,
without the aid of a reference to the subject-matter, "upon the forfeiture of the sum
of one thousand dollars, to be collected by
the said Hudson as his damages."
It is
manifest from this language that it was intended Hudson should "collect," or, in other
words, receive this amount, and that it
should be for his damages for the breach
of the stipulation. This language Is stronger
effect
effect,

for any
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than "forfeit and pay," or "under the penalty of," as these might be supposed to have
reference to the form of the penal part of a
bond, or to the form of action upon it, and
not to the actual "collection" of the money.
It is, therefore, very clear, from every
view "we have been able to take of this case,
that it was competent and proper for the
parties to ascertain and fix for themselves
the amount of damages for the breach complained of, and equally clear that they have
From the imcertain nature
done so in fact.
of the damages, we cannot say that the sum
In this case exceeds the actual damages, or
that the principle of compensation has been
violated. Indeed, It would have been perhaps difficult to discover a violation of this

P>
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principle had the sum in this case been
more than it now Is, though, doubtless, even
in such cases as the present, if the sum
stated were so excessive as clearly to exceed
all reasonable apprehension of actual loss or
Injury for the breach, we should be compelled to disregard the intention of the parties, and treat the sum; only as a penalty to
cover the actual damages to be exhibited in
proof. In this case the party must be held
to the amount stipulated in his contract.
The second exception, therefore. Is not well
taken; the court properly refused to charge
as requested, and no error appearing in the
record, the judgment of the circuit court for
the county of Wayne must be affirmed.
The other justices concurred.
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V.

KEEBLE.

(5 South. 149, 85 Ala. 552.)

V Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 8, 1888.

Appeal from city court, Dallas county; John
Haralson, Judge.
This was an action brought by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble, against the appellee,
Julia P. Keeble, as the executrix of R. C.
Keeble, deceased, for the recovery of money
alleged to be due the plaintiff by the deThe defendant pleaded
fendant's testator.
the general issue, payment, accord and satisfaction, and set-off.
The only question in the
case arose on the instruction given the jury
by the court, founded on the facts set out
in the seventh plea. The demurrer to this
It was, in
plea was overruled by the court.
tessubstance, that plaintiff and defendant's
tator had been in partnership in the mercantile business.
Plaintiff sold out to defendant's testator, but was employed by the latter as business manager.
The terms of the
ii employment imposed on plaintiff the obligation to wholly abstain from the use of in^>toxicating liquors, and, in the event he should
become intoxicated, that he should pay, "as
liquidated damages," the sum of $1,000. The
plea alleged that plaintifE violated his promise
to keep sober, and thereby became bound to
pay to defendant's testator said sum of $1,000,
which sum was offered as a set-off to plaintiff's demand.

/

Mr. Roy and White & White, for appellant
Pettus & Pettus, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE, J. The only question in
this case is whether the sum of $1,000, agreed
to be paid by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble,
to Richard C. Keeble, the testator of the appellee, as mentioned in the written contract
of employment between the parties, is to be
regarded by the court as a penalty or as
liquidated damages.
The city court held it,
in effect, to be liquidated damages, by charging the jury to find for the defendant, if
the facts set out in the seventh plea were
satisfactorily proved.
The solution of this
question is one which the courts have often
confessed embarrassment in determining. No
one rule can be announced which will furnish a single test or criterion for all cases,
but, in most cases, a multitude of considerations are to be regarded in seeking to reach
the real intention of the parties.
The following general rules may be deduced from the
authorities, each having more or less weight,
according to the peculiar circumstances
of
each case, and the nature of the contract
sought to be construed:
(1) The court will
always seek to ascertain the true and real intention of the contracting parties, giving due
weight to the language or words used in the
contract, but not always being absolutely controlled by them, when the enforcement
of
such contract operates with unconscionable
hardship, or otherwise works an injustice.

if the sum to be J/
(2) The mere denomination of
paid as "liquidated damages,' ," or as "a pen- j
alty," is not conclusive on the court as to I
desismated as
aa '
its real character.
Althoughh designated
"liquidated damages" it may be construed as
a penalty, and often when called a "penalty"
it may be held to be liquidated damages,
where the intention to the contrary is plain.
to lean against
(3) The courts are disposed
any interpretation of a contract which will
make it liquidated damages; and, in all cases
of doubtful intention, will pronounce the stipulated sum a penalty.
(4) Where the payment of a smaller sum is secured by an obligation to pay a larger sum, it will be held
a penalty, and not liquidated damages.
(5)
Where the agreement is for the performance
or non-performance of a single act, or of several acts, or of several things which are but
minor parts of a single complex act, and the
precise damage resulting from the violation
of each covenant is wholly uncertain or incapable of being ascertained save by conjecture, the parties may agree on a fixed sum
as liquidated damages, and the courts will
so construe It, unless it is clear on other
grounds that a penalty was really Intended.
(6) When the contract provides for the performance of several acts of different degrees
of importance,
resulting
and the damages
from the violation of some, although not all,
of the provisions are of easy ascertainment,
and one large gross sum is stipulated to be
paid for the breach of any, it will be construed a penalty, and not as liquidated damages.
provides for
(7) When the agreement
the performance of one or more acts, and the
stipulation is to pay the same gross sum for
a partial as for a total or complete breach of
performance, the sum will be construed to
be a penalty.
(8) Whether the sum agreed
to be paid is out of proportion to the actual
damages, which will probably be sustained
by a breach, is a fact into which the court
wiU not enter on inquiry, if the intent is otherwise made clear that liquidated damages; and
not a penalty, are in contemplation.
(9) Where
the agreement is in the alternative, to do one
of two acts, but is to pay a larger sum of
money in the one event than in the other,
the obligor having his election to do either,
the amount thus agreed to be paid will be
held liquidated damages, and not a penalty.
(10) In applying these rules, the controlling
purpose of which is to ascertain the real intention of the parties, the court will consider
the nature of the contract, the terms of the
whole instrument, the consequences naturally
resulting from a breach of its stipulations,
and the peculiar circumstances surrounding
the transaction; thus permitting each case to
stand, as far as possible, on its own merits
and peculiarities.
These rules are believed
to be sustained by the preponderance
of judicial decisions.
Graham v. Bickham, 1 Am.
Dec. 328, and note, pp. 331-340;
WiUiams v.
Vance, 30 Am. Rep. 26, and note, pp. 28-36;
1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 440-446;
MePherson v.

Robeiipon, 82 Ala. 459, 2 South. 333; Hooper
V. Railroad Co., 69 Ala. 529; Watts v. Sheppard, 2 Ala. 425; Bish. Cont. § 1452; Curry
V. Larer, 7 Pa. St. 470; Foley v. McICeegan,
4 Iowa, 1; Nash v. HermoslUa, 9 Cal. 584;
Muse V. Swayne, 2 Lea, 251; 2 Greenl. Ev.
! 258.
The appellant was In the employment of the
appellee's testator as a business manager, at
very liberal wages, having been a partner
with him in the mercantile business, under
the firm name of R. C. Keeble & Co. Although he was but an employfi, having sold
to R. C. Keeble his entire interest in the partnership business, he remained ostensibly a
partner. The terms of the employment,
reduced to writing. Imposed on the appellant,
Henry Keeble, the obligation, among other
duties, "to wholly abstain from the use of
intoxicating liquors," and "to continue and remain sober," giving his diligent attention to
the business of his employer, and promising,
in the event he should become intoxicated,
that he would pay, "as liquidated damages,"
the sum of $1,000, which the testator, Richard Keeble, was authorized to retain out of
The
a certain debt he owed the appellant.
appellant violated his promise by becoming
intoxicated, andiremained so for a long time,
and acted rudely and insultingly towards the
customers and employes of the testator, and
otherwise deported himself, by reason of Intoxication, in such manner as to do Injury to
the business.
It Is not denied by appellant's
counsel that this is a total breach of the promise to keep sober; nor is it argued that the
damage resulting from the violation of such a
promise can be ascertained with any degree of
certainty; nor even that the amount agreed
to be paid as liquidated damages, in the event
of a breach, is disproportionate to the damages which may have been actually sustained
in this case. But the contention seems to be
that, inasmuch as it was possible for a breach
to occur with no actual damages other than
nominal, the amount agreed to be paid should
Unless this
be construed to be a penfilty.
view is correct, the application of the foregoing rules to the construction of the agreement manifestly stamps It as a stipulation
for liquidated damages, and not a penalty.
It is argued. In other words, that becoming
intoxicated in private, while off duty, would
be a violation of the contract, but would be
attended with no actual damage to the business of R. C. Keeble & Co.
This fact would,
In our opinion, except the case from the operation of the rules above enunciated.
There
are but few agreements of this kind where
the stipulation is to do or not do a particular
act. In which the damages may not, according to circumstances, vary, on a sliding scale,
from nominal damages to a considerable sum.
One may sell out the good-will of his business in a given locality, and agree to abstain
from Its further prosecution, or, in the event
of his breach of his agreement, to pay a cer-

69

tain sum as liquidated damages; as, for example, not to practice one's profession as a
physician or lawyer, not to run a steam-boat
on a certain river or to carry on the hotel
business in a particular town, not to re-establish a newspaper for a given period, or to
carry on a particular branch of business within a certain distance from a named city. In
all such cases, as often decided, it is competent for the parties to stipulate for the payment of a gross sum by way of liquidated
damages for the violation of the agreement,
and for the very reason that such damages
are uncertain, fluctuating, and incapable of
easy ascertainment
Williams v. Vance, 30
Am. Rep. 29-31, note; Graham v. Bickham, 1
Am. Dec. 336-338, note; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.
It is clear that each of these
§ 442, note 1.
various agreements may be violated by a substantial breach, and yet no damages might
accrue
The
except such as are nominal.
obligor may practice medicine, and possibly
never interfere with the practice of the other
contracting party; or law, without having a
paying client; or he may run a steam-boat
without a passenger;
or an hotel without a
guest; or carry on a newspaper without the
least Injury to any competitor.
But the law(
will not enter upon an investigation as to the \
quantum of damages in such cases. This is '
the very matter settled by the agreement of
the parties. If the act agreed not to be done
is one fi:om which, in the ordinary course of
events, damages, incapable of ascertainment
save by conjecture, are liable naturally to fol\
low, sometimes more and sometimes less, ac-\
cording to the aggravation of the act, the I
court wiU not stop to Investigate the extent of
]
the grievance complained of as a total breach",
but will accept the sum agreed on as a proper \
and just measurement,
by way of liquidated
damages, unless the real intention of the parties, under the rules above announced,
designed it as a penalty.
We may add, moreover, that no one can accurately estimate the
physiological relation between private and
public drunkenness,
nor the causal connection between intoxication one time and a score
of times.
The latter, in each instance, may
follow from the former, and the one may
naturally lead to the other.
There would
seem to be nothing harsh or unreasonable
in
stipulating against the very source and beginning of the more aggravated evil sought to
be avoided.
The duty resting on the court,
in all these cases, is to so apply the settled
rules of construction as to ascertain the legally expressed and real intention of the parties.
Courts are under no obligations, nor have they
the power, to make a wiser or better contract
for either of the parties than he may be supposed to have made for himself.
The court
below, in our judgment, did not err in holding, as it did, by its rulings, that the sum
agreed to be paid the appellee's testator was
liquidated damages, and not a penalty. Affirmed.
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HEYDER

et a!, v.

EXCELSIOR BUILDING

LOAN ASS'N NO. 2 OF CITY
OF NEWARK.
(8

Atl. 310, 42 N.

J.

Eq. 408.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
March 5, 1887.
C. T. Glen, for appellants.
for respondents.

Guild & Lum,

KNAPP, J. The learned master who decided this cause reached the conclusion on
,_the evidence that the purchaser of the premises, and not the mortgagee, should bear the
loss incident to the fraudulent cancellation of
the mortgage made upon the record prior to
the purchase, on the faith of which cancella/tion the buyer parted with the whole puiv
chg.se money believing the property to be un-

A.

After a careful review of the
incumbered.
am
case,
am led to an opposite result.
fully impressed with the importance of securing due protection to the holders of mortgage securities, where, in pursuit of the provisions of the registry laws, the lien has been
The security
made apparent on the record.
afEorded by registry should remain undisturbed by a cancellation effected through mistake, accident, or fraud of third persons, even
if by such cancellation subsequent mortgagees or purchasers are made to suffer loss.
Such after-acquired rights ought not to prevail against the just claims of an innocent
incumbrancer, because the recnon-negligent
Ceincellation
ord has been wrongly effaced.
of a mortgage on the record is only prima
facie evidence of its discharge, and it is left
to the owner making the allegation to prove
the canceling to have been done by fraud,
accident, or mistake. Such proof being made,
will be established,
even
the mortgage
against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees
Banking CO. v. Woodruff,
without notice.
2 N. J. Eq. 117; Harrison v. Railroad Co.,
19 N. J. Eq. 488.
Between a mortgagee whose mortgage has
been discharged of record solely through the
unauthorized act of another party, and a
purchaser who buys the title in tiie belief,
induced by such cancellation, that the mortgage is satisfied and discharged, the equities
are balanced, and the rights in the order of
time must prevail. The lien of the mortgage
must remain despite the apparent discharge.

h
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But this i3 apart from any default attributable to the holder of the lien. If through his
negligence
the record Is permitted to give
notice to the world that his claim is satisfied,
he cannot, in the face of his own. carelessness, have his mortgage enforced against a
bona flde purchaser taking his title on the
faith that the registry is discharged.
Where
one gives to another the power to practice a
fraud upon Innocent parties, the court will
not interfere in his protection at the expense
of those who have been deceived and misled
by such fraud. What circumstance shall be

sufficient to establish negligence,
euch as
shall preclude a mortgagee from a decree
establishing his canceled paper, must be determined as a question of fact in each particular ease, tested by those rules of conduct
which men of common prudence usually observe in the care and management of such
securities. That it is negligence In the owner of a mortgage to permit It to be in the
custody and control of the mortgagor or owner of the mortgaged premises, in view of the
provisions of our statute of registry, will not
admit of denial. Such an occurrence is so
unusual, so imperils the owner, and therefore so unlikely to happen in business dealings, that it was regarded in Harrison v. Railroad Co. as ground for the gravest suspicion
of the truthfulness of a witness who had testified to such custody by the assent of the
owner of the security.
The minute of discharge of this mortgage
made upon the record by the register expressed, in general form, thie fact of cancellation. The entry was made upon evidence
presented to the register such as the statute
has declared to be suflScient authority for so
doing. The mortgage was produced by the
mortgagor, canceled, and there is no doubt
that upon the faith of this cancellation the
purchaser took title to the property, and paid
the consideration. But it clearly appears
that the mortgage was unpaid, and that the
act of the mortgagor in procuring the entry
of the discharge was fraudulent, and without
the knowledge or assent of the mortgagee.
If this were all of the case, and no default
appeared on the part of the mortgagee, nol)withstanding the forcible language of the
act which declares such minute to be a full
and absolute bar to and discharge of the said
pntry, registry, and mortgage, the right of
the respondent
to the lien of its security
should be maintained; and it is solely upon
the ground that the respondent is chargeable
with negligence which tended to and actually did produce the injury that I think the
decree should be reversed.
The mortgage
was in the possession and imder the control
of the mortgagor at the time when it was
produced for cancellation on the record. How
long he had such custody does not positively appear, but the strong Inference from the
testimony is that it was during the whole
time between the registry of the mortgage
and its cancellation. Neither the president
of the association, nor Its treasurer, who had
charge of its securities, were able to say that
they ever had the actual custody of this mortgage;
and they further declare that the
mortgagor, although an officer of the company, had no access whatever to the securities in the possession of the treasurer. It is
therefore impossible that he should have obtained its possession by means resembling
think, be attheft. His possession must,
tributed either to the assent or to the negligence of the officers of the association respouf
sible for its securities. If we regard the the-

I
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ory that the mortgagor, at the conclusion of
his transaction of the loan, fraudulently substituted a copy of the mortgage for the original paper, and delivered that to the association, I am still forced to the conclusion that
the officers were culpably negligent in permitting themselves to be thus'imposed upon.
The fact that he was the law officer of this
body would not justify so Implicit a trust
in him in the matter of a loan to himself.
We must assume that these officers were men
of business capacity and skill. The transaction was in the line of their ordinary duIndeed, they did not trust to him, but
ties.
employed
other counsel to make searches
against his property. In their ordinary transactions their habit was to submit to counsel
the securities received for loans for inspection and approval. The slightest examinatiori of the paper received by them would
have shown it to be but a copy. They submitted it to no legal adviser; they gave it
no examination. If it were not intended to
be, as was its purport, a mere copy, leaving
the original in other hands, any degree of
care, exceeding the blindest confidence, must
have revealed the deception.
The theory fails
to lead us out of the difficulty.
do not

I
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think that any circumstance presented In this
case made it the appellant's duty, in order to
avail himself of the rights of a bona fide
purchaser, to institute personal inquiry of
Any rule placing him under
the mortgagee.
this exaction would embrace every case of
a purchase of lands that had ever been subject to mortgage which the record showed to
be canceled.
Such a rule, it is needless to
say, would render this provision of the registry act entirely nugatory. A purchaser could
then only buy with safety when the registry
had been discharged,
and an admission of
payment obtained from the mortgagee.
Doubtless circumstances may, and frequently
do, arise to put the purchaser upon Inquiry,
and charge him with notice.
It seems to me
in this transaction
that nothing appears
which should have put this purchaser upon
further inquiry. He was permitted to rely
upon the record.
He did so, purchasing
upon the belief that it spoke the fact truly.
It was false, but the deception was directly
traceable to the culpable negligence of the
mortgage owner, and the loss should fall upon the party chargeable with the fault.
The decree below should be reversed, and
the bill of complainants be dismissed.
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PHILLIPS
(4 De Gex,

Court of Appeal

V.

PHILLIPS.

F. &

J.

in Chancery.

208.)

Jan.

F. O. Haynes, for plaintiff. Mr.
and John Pearson, for defendants.

11,

1862.

Malins

The LORD CHANCELLOR.
When I reserved my judgment at the conclusion of the argument in this case, it was
rather out of respect to that argument than
from a feeling of any difficulty with regard
^ to the question that had been so strenuously contested before me.
The case is a very simple one. The plaintiff claims as the grantee of an annuity
granted by a deed dated in the month of
February, 1820, to issue out of certain lands
in the county of Monmouth, secured by
Y> powers of distress and entry. The annuity
or rent charge was not to arise until the
death of one Rebecca Phillips, who died in
1839, and the first
the month of December,
payment of the annuity became due on the
8th March, 1840.
The case was argued on both sides on the
admitted basis that the legal estate was outstanding in certain incumbrancers, and is
Subject to the annuity
stlU outstanding.
the grantor was entitled in fee simple in
In February, 1821, the grantor inequity.
On the
termarried with one Mary Phillips.
occasion of that marriage a settlement, dated
in February, 1821, was executed, and under this deed the defendants claim, and
claim, therefore, as purchasers for a valuNo payment has ever
able consideration.
been made in respect of the annuity.
The bill was filed within twenty years,
and seeks the ordinary relief applicable to
the case. The defendants by their answer
Insist thai the deed was voluntary, and
rtherefore void, under the statute of Elizabeth, as against them in their character of
purchasers for valuable consideration, and
they also insist upon the statute of limitations.
But in the answer the defense of
purchase for valuable consideration without notice is not attempted to be raised.
At the hearing an affidavit of Mary Phillips and another person was produced, denying the fact of notice of the annuity at
the time of the grant and at the time of the
creation of the marriage settlement, and the
y contention at the bar was that the defense
of purchase for valuable consideration without notice was available for the defendants
under these circumstances, and ought to be
allowed as a bar to the claim by the court
The vice chancellor in his judgment refused
to admit the defense of purchase for valuable consideration without notice, and I entirely agree with him in the conclusion that
such a defense requir«s to be pleaded by
the answer, more especially where an answer has been put in.

1
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But I do not mean to rest my decision
upon that particular ground because I have
permitted the argument to proceed with reference to the general proposition, which was
maintained before me with great energy
and learning, viz., that the doctrine of a
court of equHjif was this, that It would give
no relief whatever to any claimant against
a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice.
It was urged upon me that authority to this effect was to be found in
some recent decisions of this court, and
particularly in the case decided at the rolls
of Attorney General v. Wilkins, 17 Beav.
285.

I undoubtedly was struck with the novelty and extent of the doctrine that was
thus advanced, and in order to deal with
the argument it becomes necessary
to revert to elementary principles. I take it to
be a clear proposition that every conveyance of an equitable interest is an innocent
conveyance,
that Is to say, the grant of a.
person entitled merely in equity passes only
that which he is justly entitled to and no
more.' If, therefore, a person seised of an
equitable estate (the legal estate being outmakes an assurance by way of
standing)
mortgage
or grants an annuity, and afterwards conveys the whole estate to a purchaser, he can grant to the purchaser that
which he has, viz., the estate subject to the
mortgage or aimuity, and no more. The
subsequent grantee takes only that which
is left in the grantor. Hence grantees and
incumbrancers claiming in equity take and
are ranked according to the dates of theh:
securities; and the maxim applies,
"Qui
prior est tempore potior est jure."
The first
grantee is potior, that is potentior. He has
a better and superior, because a prior, equity. The first grantee has a right to be
paid first, and it is quite immaterial whether the subsequent incumbrancers,
at the
time when they took their securities and
paid their money, had notice of the first incumbrance or not. These elementary rules
are recognized in the case of Brace v.
Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Wms. 491,
and tbey are further illustrated by the familiar doctrine of the court as to tacking
securities. It Is well known that if there
are three incumbrancers, and the third incumbrancer, at the time of his incumbrance
and payment of his money, had no notice
of the second incumbrance, then, if the first
mortgagee
or incumbrancer has the legal
estate, and the third pays him off, and
takes an assignment of his securities and a
conveyance
of the legal estate, he is entitled to tack his third mortgage to the first
mortgage which he has acquired, and to exclude the intermediate Incumbrancer; but
this doctiioe is limited to the case where the
first mortgagee has the legal title, for. If
the first mortgagee
has not the legal title,
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the third does not, by the transfer, obtain
the legal title, and the third mortgagee, by
payment off of the first, acquires no priority over the second.
Now the defense of
a purchaser for valuable consideration is the
creature of a court of equity, and it can
never be used in a manner at variance with
the elementary rules which have already
been stated.
It seems at first to have been
used as a shield against the claim in equity
of persons having a legal title. Bassett v.
Nosworthy, Finch, 102, 2 White & T. Lead.
Cas. Bq. 1, is, If not the earliest, the best
early reported case on the subject. There
the plaintiff claimed under a legal title, and
this circumstance, together with the maxim
which
have referred to, probably gave rise
to the notion that this defense was good
only against the legal title; but there appear to be three cases in which the use of
this defense is most familiar:
'^ First, where an application is made to an
auxiUary jurisdiction of the court by the
possessor of a legal title, as by an heir at
ij^\i law (which was the case in Bassett v. Nos^ worthy, Finch, 102, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas.
^ ; Eq. 1), or by a tenant for life for the deliv4 ery of title deeds (which was the case of
Wallwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. 24), and the defendant pleads that he is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without
In such a case the defense Is good,
notice.
i I and the reason given Is that, as against a
K purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, th^ court gives no assistance,
that is, no assistance to the legal title. But
"y I this rule does not apply where the court exercises a legal jurisdiction concurrently with
'I
,
courts of law. Thus it was decided by Lord
^'
Thurlow in Williams v. Lambe, 3 Brown
Ch. 264, that the defense could not be pleadY'
ed to a bill for dower, and by Sir J. Leach
\
in Collins v. Archer, 1 Russ. & M. 284, that
\
it was no answer to a bill for fines. In
"\ those cases the court of equity was not
\
asked to give the plaintiff any equitable, as
distinguished from legal, relief.
J'
The second class of cases Is the ordinary
one of several purchasers or incumbrancers,
each claiming in equity, and one who is later
'^
and last in time succeeds in obtaining an
outstanding legal estate not held upon existing trusts or a judgment, or any other legal
advantage the possession of which may be
a protection to himself or an embarrassment
He will not be deprived
to other claimants.
of this advantage by a court of equity. To
by
a bill filed against him for this purpose,
a prior purchaser or incumbrancer, the defendant may maintain the plea of purchase
for valuable consideration without notice, for
the principle is that a court of equity will
not disarm a purchaser, that is, will not take
from him the shield of any legal advantage.
This is the common doctrine of the tabula In
naufragio.
Thirdly, where there are circumstances
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that give rise to an equity as distinguished
from an equitable estate,— as, for example,
an equity to set aside a deed for fraud, or
to correct It for mistake,— and the purchaser
under the instrument maintains the plea of
purchase for valuable consideration without
notice, the court will not Interfere.
Now these are the three cases In which the
defense in question Is most commonly foimd.
None of them involve the case that Is now
~^
before ^fi,
_^
~|^^^--Trwas Indeed said at the bar that the defendants, being In possession, had a legal
advantage in respect, of the possession, of
which they ought not to be deprived;
but
that Is to confound the subject of adjudication with the means of determining it.
The possession is the thing which is the subject of controversy, and is to be awarded by
the court to one or to the other;
but the
subject of controversy and the means of determining the right to that subject are perfectly different.
The argument, In fact,
amounts to this, "I ought not to be deprived
of possession, because I have possession."
The purchaser will not be deprived of anything that gives him a legal right to the possession, but the possession itself must not be
confounded
with the right to it.
, The case therefore that
have to decide Is
the ordinary case of a person claiming, under an innocent equitable
conveyance,
that
interest which existed in the grantor at the
time when that conveyance was made; but,
as I have already said, that interest was diminished by the estate that had been previously granted to the annuitant, and, as
there was no ground for pretending that the
deed creating the annuity was a voluntary
deed, so there is no ground whatever for contending that the estate of the person taking
under the subsequent marriage settlement is
not to be treated by this court, being an
equitable estate, as subject to the antecedent
annuity, just as effectually as if the annuity
itself had been noticed and excepted out of
the operation of the subsequent instrument
I have no difflculty, therefore, in holding
that the plea of purchase for valuable consideration is upon principle not at all applicable to the case before me, even If I
could take notice of It as having been rightly
and regularly raised.
We next come to examine the authorities
upon which the defense relies.
Now, undoubtedly, I cannot assent to some observations which I find attributed to the master of
the rolls in the report of the case of Attorney
General v. Wllkins, 17 Beav. 285, but to the
decision of that case, as explained by his
honor in the subsequent case of Oolyer t.
Finch, 19 Beav. 500, I see no reasonable objection, and the principles that I have here
been referring to are fully explained and
acted on by the master of the rolls In the
case of Oolyer v. Finch, 19 Beav. 500.
It is
Impossible, therefore, to suppose that he in-
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to lay down anything In the case of
Attorney General v. Wilkins, 17 Beav. 285,
which is at variance with the ordinary rules
of the court as I have already explained
them, or which could give countenance to the
argument that has been raised before me at
the bar.
have consequently no difficulty In holding
that the decree of his honor the vice chancellor is right upon the grounds on which he
placed it in the court below, and that also it
would have been right if he had considered
the grounds which have been urged before
me in support of this petition of rehearing.
I therefore affirm the decree and dismiss the
petition of rehearing; but, inasmuch as the
tended

I

sues In forma pauperis, of course
It must be dismissed without costs.

plaintlfiC

Mr. Pearson, for appellant,
turn of the deposit.

asked

for a re-

The LORD OHANCJEILIiOR.
I think that the respondent should have the
benefit of the deposit.
You purchase the liberty of coming here by the deposit.
I do not
think that I can give the appellant any further costs against you, but I can give him the
benefit of the deposit which, according to the
rules of the court, you have made. Therefore the deposit will be given to him, unless
it exceeds the costs of the appeal.
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KNAPP

V.

BAILEY.

(9 AU. 122, 79 Me. 195.)
Supreme

Judicial

Court of Maine.

March

1,

1887.

On appeal from decision of single justice
at nisi prius, Penobscot county.
Bill in equity brought to remove a cloud
from the complainant's title, and to redeem
the land from an equitable mortgage.
The
judge at nisi prius rendered a decision in favor of the complainant, and the respondent
appealed to the law court

A. W. Paine

plainant.

and

C.

P.

Stetson,

for

com-

Davis & Bailey, for respondent

PETERS, C. J. This bill seeks to remove
a cloud overhanging the complainant's title
to an imdivlded parcel of land,—in efEect, to
redeem the land from an equitable mortgage,
the allegation being that the debt has been
paid. We can have no reasonable doubt of
the facts thus far alleged.
The defendant's
grantor was caUed as a witness by the complainant The defendant contends that his
testimony was inadmissible, and cites cases
which sustain the ordinary principle that a
grantor cannot dispute with his grantee the
title which he has assumed to convey.
The
objection goes to the testimony, and not to
the witness personally. The principle of estoppel, which is invoked, Is aimed,
not
against the witness because he is a grantor,
but against any oral testimony to contradict
the terms of a deed. As said by Judge Curtis in answer to the same objection: "The
facts to be proved were dehors the record,
and one witness was as competent, in point
of law, [to prove them,] as another." Where
a grantor is allowed to prove a fact by another, he may do so by himself. Holbrook v.
Bank, 2 Curt 246.
It is true, as a general rule, that the effect
of a deed cannot be controlled by oral eviBut among the exceptions to the rule
dence.
is that in equity, where the proof is clear
and convincing, a deed absolute on its face
may be construed to be an equitable mortIn Rowell V. Jewett, 69 Me. 293, this
gage.
exceptional doctrine was first allowed to
It was fully
have operation in this state.
accepted in Stinchfleld v. Mllllken, 71 Me.
567, where the opinion says: "But ttie transaction was in equity a mortgage,—an equitaable mortgage. The criterion is the Intention
of the parties. In equity this Intention may
be ascertained from all pertinent facts, either within or without the written parts of
the transaction. Where the intention is clear
that an absolute conveyance Is taken as a
security for a debt, it Is in equity a mortThe real intention governs." In Lewgage.
is V. Small, 71 Me. 552, the same doctrine
It has since been aflBrmed in
is admitted.
other cases, receiving an able discussion in
the late case of Reed v. Reed, 75 Me. 264.
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The effect of many of the older cases in this
state has been swept away by this new principle in our legal system,—a product of the
growth of the law, very greatly promoted by
The present case
legislative stimulation.
must be governed by the equitable rule declared in the later decisions.
Another question presented by the case is
whether the statutory provision (Rev. St. c.
73, § 12) which declares that a title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration cannot
be defeated by a trust, unless the purchaser
had notice thereof, means actual or constructive notice.
Section 8 of the same chapter requires "actual notice" of an unrecorded
deed to defeat a subsequent purchaser's, title
from the same grantor. The two sections
were incorporated in our statutory system at
the same time,—in the Revision of 1841.
One requires "notice," the other "actual notice." We think the difference In phraseology may be accounted for partly on the
idea that section 8 would be applicable more
to law cases, and section 12 more to questions in equity. We can have no doubt that
there may be cases of constructive trusts
where section 12 would apply. At the same
time, where the facts present questions
analogous to those ordinarily arising under
the other section, we think actual notice
would be required; that under either section, in cases generally, actual notice, as we
understand the meaning of the term, would
be the rule; and that actual notice applies in
the present casa
There is a conflict In the cases and among
writers as to what is actual notice.
Much
of the difference Is said to be verbal only,—
more apparent than real. Certain propositions, however, are quite well agreed upon by
a majority of the authorities. Notice does not
mean knowledge; actual knowledge is not
required. Mr. Wade describes the modes of
proving actual notice as of two kinds. One
he denominates express notice, and the other
implied.
"Implied, which imputes knowledge to the party because he is shown to be
anxious of having the means of knowledge,
though he does not use them; in other
words, where, he chooses to remain voluntarily ignorant of the fact, or is grossly negligent in not following up the inquiry which
the known facts suggest." Wade, Notice (2d
Ed.) § 5. Some writers use the word "implied" as meaning constructive, and would
regard what Is here described to be implied
actual notice as constructive notice merely.
As applicable to actual notice, such as is required by the sections of the statute under
consideration, we think the classification of
the author whom we quote is satisfactory.
The author further explains the distinction
by adding that "notice by implication differs
from constructive notice, vrith which it is
frequently confounded, and which it greaUy
resembles,
with respect to the character of
the inference upon which it rests; constructive notice being the creature of positive
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law, or resting upon strletly legal inference,
while implied notice arises from inference
of fact."
It amounts substantially to this:
that actual notice may be proved by direct
evidence, or it may be inferred or implied
(that is, proved) as a fact from indirect eviA man
dence,— by circumstantial evidence.
m^j have notice or its legal equivalent. He
may be so situated as to be estopped to deny
that he had actual notice. We are speaking
of the statutory notice required under the
conveyances act A higher grade of evidence
may be necessary to prove actual notice appertaining to commercial paper. Kellogg v.
Curtis, 69 Me. 212.
The same facts may
sometimes be such as to prove both constructive and actual notice; that is, a court might
Infer constructive notice, and a jury infer
actual notice, from the facts. There may
be cases where the facts show actual, when
they do not warrant th€ inference of constructive, notice; as where a deed is not
regularly recorded, and not giving constructive notice, but a second purchaser sees it on
the records, thereby receiving actual notice.
Hastings v. Cutler, 24 N. H. 481.
Mr. Pomeroy (2 Eq. Jur. 596, note) summarizes the effect of the American cases on
the point under discussion in the following
words: "In a few of the states the courts
have interpreted the intention of the legislature as demanding that the personal information of the unrecorded Instrument should
be proved by the direct evidence, and as excluding all instances of actual notice established by circumstantial evidence.
In most
of the states, however, where this statutory
clause is found, the courts have defined the
'actual notice' required by the legislature as
embracing all Instances of that species in
contradistinction from constructive notice;
that is, all kinds of actual notice, whether
proved by direct evidence or inferred as a
legitimate conclusion from circumstances."
The doctrine of actual notice Implied by
circumstances (actual notice in the second
degree) necessarily involves the rule that a
purchaser, before buying, should clear up the
doubts which apparently hang upon the title,
by making due Inquiry and investigation.
If a party has knowledge of such facts as
would lead a fair and prudent man, using
ordinary caution, to make further inquiries,
and he avoids the inquiry, he Is chargeable
with notice of the facts which by ordinary
diligence he would have ascertained. He
has no right to shut his eyes against the
light before him. He does a wrong not to
heed the "signs and signals" seen by him.
It may be well concluded that he Is avoiding notice of that which he in reality believes or knows.
Actual notice of facts
which to the mind of a prudent man indicate notice is proof of notice.
3 Washb.
Real Prop. (3d Ed.) 335.
It must be admitted that our present views
are not fully supported by the case of Spofford V. Weston, 29 Me. 140, a decision made

cv
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years ago. But the doctrine has growu
liberally since that day, and the correctness
of some things pronounced in that opinion is
virtually denied In subsequent cases. Porter V. Sevey, 43 Me. 519; Hull v. Noble, 40
68 Me. 334.
Me. 459; Jones v. McNarrin,
Many cases which affirm the doctrine contended for by the complainant, as well as
many opposing cases, are cited by the text
writers. Wade, Notice, §§ 10, 11, et seq., and
cases in notes; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 603, and
notes. The decided preponderance of authority supports the position that the statutory
"actual notice" is a conclusion of fact capable of being established by all grades of
legitimate evidence.
As to what would be a sufficiency of facts
to excite inquiry no rule can very well establish. Each case depends upon its own facts.
There is a great Inconsistency in the case*
upon this point.
But we are satisfied that
In the case before us the defendant must be
charged with notice that his grantor held
title by what equity must declare to be an
invalid deed. He saw the grantor was out of
possession.
He could have easily ascertained,
that he never had possession.
He knew that
others had controlled the property in many
ways for many years.
He examined the
registry when he discovered the deed In
question, and there must have seen evidence
of other conveyances
Inconsistent with Its
full validity. He purchased the property for
$40, while worth, had the title been perfect,
nearer $1,000. He took a quitclaim deed;
and it Is held by some courts that such an
Instrument of conveyance does not make
him a bona fide purchaser without notice
(Baker v. Humphrey, 101 tJ. S. 404), although in our system it is a circumstance
only bearing on the question (Mansfield v.
Dyer, 131 Mass. 200). More than all else,
perhaps, the defendant made no inquiry of
the grantor whether he had any real title or
not, asking no explanations, but Insisting to
him that he had no valuable title. It Is Impossible for us to say, in the light of theseImpressive illuminating proofs, that the defendant purchased without notice.
He purchased on the basis of a merely nominal title.
We would not say that he did not believehe could legally purchase, encouraged,
as he
was, by the doctrine of the earlier cases, now
abrogated; nor do we Impute more than a
want of caution and of diligence. Men's interests spur their judgments to one-sided
conclusions oftentimes. The great dramatist
makes a character reluctant to acknowledge
the situation say, "I cannot dare to know
that which
know;"
while another, morequick-sighted, because anxious to believe, exclaims, "Seems, Madam! Nay, it Is. I knownot seems."
One rejects proof on the clearest facts; the other accepts it on the slightest. Judgment affirmed.
40
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WALTON, DANFORTH, EMERY,
TER, and HASKELL, JJ., concurred.
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KIRSCH

et al. v.

TOZIER

(38 N. B. 375, 143 N.
<3ourt

T.

of Appeals of New York.

et al.

380.)
Oct. 23, 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
fifth department
Action brought by Theodore Kirsch and
another against Orange Li. Tozier, the Buffalo Savings Bank, and others, to reinstate
a mortgage executed by defendant Lester H.'
Tozier and wife to defendant Orange L.
Tozier, in trust for plaintiffs, to set aside its
discharge, and for its foreclosure. The bank
held a subsequent mortgage.
From a judgment of the general term (18 N. Y. Supp.
334) aflELrming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.
AflSrmed.
This action was brought to reinstate a
mortgage executed by the defendant Lester
H. Tozier and his wife to the defendant Orange L. Tozier, which was made in trust for
the plaintiffs, Michael Kirsch and Theodore
Kirsch, and for Peter Kirsch, now deceased,
minor children of John Kirsch, to set aside
a discharge of such mortgage executed by
Orange L. Tozier, and for foreclosure of the
mortgage and sale of the mortgaged premises
for the benefit of the persons named, ,as cestuis que trustent. Th6 lands in question consist of 102 acres, situate in the town of Shel•don, Wyoming county, N. Y., of which John
Kirsch died seised in the year 1872. On the
8th day of January, 1873, the defendant Orange L. Tozier was appointed general guardian of the infant children, Michael J., Theodore and Peter Kirsch. At the time of his
death John Kirsch owed debts which, with
the incumbrances upon his real estate, exceeded the value of both his personal and
real property. Orange L. Tozier and Elizabeth Kirsch, the latter the widow of the deceased,
were appointed administrators of
the estate of John Kirsch. Subsequently to
this it was agreed between them and Lester H. Tozier, a son of Orange L. Tozier, that
they should purchase the mortgages then existing on the farm, foreclose them, and procure a title to the land, and convey the same
to Elizabeth Kirsch, who should. In turn, by
mortgage thereon, secure to Lester H. Tozier
the amount paid by him, and give a mortgage upon the farm of $1,000 to these three
This arrangement was carried
children.
out, except that upon a sale of the lands,
either by direct purchase at the sale or by
deed coming immediately from the purchaser, Lester H. Tozier became the owner for
the consideration, in all, of $1,131.56. Thereupon it was further arranged between Orange L. Tozier and the widow, Elizabeth
Kirsch, that the widow should convey to the
then holder of the title, Lester H. Tozier,
all her interest in the lands to which she was
entitled as widow, and that a mortgage
should be executed by Lester H. Tozier to
Orange L. Tozier, in trust for the three children, in the sum of $1,000, one-third thereof
payable to each of the three children when

77

he should arrive at age, with interest In the
Having received the deed from
meantime.
Mrs. Elizabeth Kirsch, Lester H. Tozier and
his wife executed to Orange L. Tozier, in
trust for Michael Kirsch, Peter Kirsch, and

Theodore Kirsch, "minor children of John M,
Kirsch, deceased," the mortgage in question,
dated the 15th day of October, 1875, expressing a consideration of $1,000 payable
The sum of $333.33 November
as follows:
13, 1887; the sum of $333.33 March 18, 1891,
and the sum of $333.33 October 6, 1892,— with
interest, payable annually, from the 1st day
of April, 1876.
This instrument was delivered to Orange L. Tozier, who caused the
same to be recorded in the proper clerk's
ofBce on the 23d day of October, 1875.
Tha
mortgagee and trustee paid the interest upon this mortgage
to Elizabeth Kirsch, tha
mother of the children, in pursuance of a
previous arrangement, until the spring of
1886, since which time no part of the principal or interest has been paid thereon by the
trustee for the benefit of either of the children. On the 3d day of September,
1883,
Lester H. Tozier and his wife executed and
delivered a deed of the farm to Orange L.
Tozier, at a consideration, as expressed in
the deed, of $4,000, and the record title of
such farm has since been in Orange L. Tozier. After acquiring this title, and on the
19th day of February, 1886, Orange L. Tozier executed and acknowledged a discharge
of the mortgage, and caused the same to be
recorded in the proper clerk's office on the
9th day of March, 1886.
On the 27th day of
January, 1886, before the execution of such
Orange L. Tozier applied to the
discharge,
defendant the Buffalo Savings Bank for a
loan of $2,000 upon his farm, which application was granted on the 1st day of February, 1886; and on an examination of the
titie of such farm, submitted to the officers
of the bank, tha-e was an abstract certified
by the proper clerk of Wyoming county to
the effect that Orange L. Tozier appeared
to be the owner of the farm.
On such abstract a memorandum of the mortgage sought
by this action to be reinstated described the
mortgage simply as being given for $1,000
and interest, "in trust for Michael Kirsch,
Theodore Kirsch, and Peter Kirsch, minor
children of John M. Kirsch, deceased," having written across the face of the memoran"Discharged March 9,
dum
as follows:
E. M. Jennings, Clerk."
1886.
The defendant the Buffalo Savings Bank, at the time of
taking its mortgage and advancing the
money thereon, had not, either through any
of its officers or attorneys, any knowledge or
notice of the existence of this mortgage now
sought to be reinstated in this action, except
the memorandum on the abstract of title of
its discharge, and the constructive notice
given by the record of such mortgage.
Adolph Rebadow, for appellants.
Peck, for respondents.
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O. J. (aftar stating the facts).
The ouly serious question presented on the
record arises on the claim of the Buffalo Sav-

ANDREWS,

ings Bank that It was not chargeable with
notice nor put upon inquiry to ascertain that
the defendant Tozier had no authority to disThe savcharge the mortgage in question.
ings banli, when it took its mortgage, had constructive notice of every fact which could
bave been ascertained by an inspection of the
deeds or mortgages or record in the chain of
title. An inspection of the records of the
title to the land upon which Its mortgage was
taken would have disclosed the mortgage given by Lester H. Tozier in October, 1875, and
that it was given "in trust" for the three minor children of John M. Kirsch, deceased;
that the lands covered by the mortgage were
subsequently,
in 1883, conveyed by Lester H.
Tozier to Orange L. Tozier, the mortgagee
named in the mortgage given In trust for the
minor children of John M. Kirsch; that after
such conveyance, and In March, 1886, Orange
L. Tozier, then being the owner of the lands,
and also the mortgagee "In trust" In that
mortgage, himself executed and caused to be
recorded a satisfaction of the mortgage, and
that this occurred before any part of the sum
secured by the mortgage had become due.
There can be no doubt that the satisfaction of
the mortgage was, as to the defendant Orange
L. Tozier, a breach of trust The satisfacThe question was without consideration.
tion whether Tozier held the mortgage as trustee impressed with a trust in favor of the
three children of John M. Kirsch admits of
no doubt.
The implication from the nature
of the instrument, the character of the beneficiaries, and the division of the payments into three equal parts, payable at specified, but
different, dates in the future, is that the instrument was Intended to secure to the several beneficiaries as they became of age an
equal share of the sum for which the mortgage was given.
The acceptance by Orange
L. Tozier of the mortgage containing the declaration of the trust was an acknowledgment
of the trust on his part, and boimd him to
perform it The trust was expressed in the
instrument, although not fully set out In
words, and any act thereafter done by him
in contravention of the trust was by the comStatute of
mon law and by the statute void.
The
Uses and Trusts (1 Rev. St 730, § 65).
discharge of the mortgage was not inlouded
for the benefit of the infants, but to deprive
them of the benefit of the security, and, as
we have said, was a plain breach of trust
The bank knew, or must be presumed to have
known, when it took its mortgage, because
an examination of the records would have
disclosed the facts, (1) that the mortgage was
taken by Tozier In trust for Infants; (2) that
he satisfied It before It became due; (3) that
his relation to the property had changed, so
that when he executed the satisfaction he
was himself the owner of the land, having
an adverse interest to those beneficially inter-

ested in the security; and (4) that in satisfying the mortgage he was dealing with himself. Persons dealing with a trustee must
take notice of the scope of his authority. An

act within his authority will bind the trust
estate or the beneficiaries as to third persons
acting In good faith and without notice, although the trustee intended to defraud the estate, and actually did accomplish his purpose
It has freby means of the act In question.
quently been held that a peison dealing with
administrator, or trustee, who,
a,n executor,
from the nature of his office, or by the terms
of the trust has power to satisfy or transfer
the securities of the estate, or to vary the instrument from time to time, Is not bound to go
further, and ascertain whether In fact the act
of the executor or trustee is justified, and that
It is sufBno breach of trust was intended.
cient for his protection that he acts in good
faith, and. If the act of the executor or trustee is justified by the terms of the power, the
Field
party dealing with him is protected.
But circumV. SchiefCelin, 7 Johns. Oh. 153.
stances were disclosed by the record when
the bank took its mortgage which precluded
the bank from relying upon the recorded satThere was "^
isfaction of the prior mortgage.
no indication in the mortgage that any power
was vested In the trustee, Tozier, to accept
payment of the mortgaig© before It became
due, or to vary the trust security.
There was
no such affirmative power conferred upon him
in fact, and the case of McPherson v. Rollins,
107 N. Y. 316, 14 N. B. 411, seems to be a decisive authority that there Is no implication of
such a power In case of a trustee of a specified security for the benefit of minors, and no
other evidence of his actual authority exists
than may be implied from the fact that he is
trustee of the security.
The rule declared in
that case opwated with great severity upon
one who, without any actual notice, bought
the property upon an official certificate that
no lien existed on the premises, paying full
value therefor. There the mortgage was given to secure the payment of an annuity to the
mortgagee, and also annuities to two minors
until they should become of age. The mortgagee afterwards, and before the expiration
of the minority of the two children, without
consideration, assumed to discharge the mortgage, and the satisfaction was duly recorded.
It was held that the trustee had no power to
satisfy the mortgage before the termination
of the trust, and that the pm-chaser was not
protected.
It is difficult to perceive any solid
distinction between that case and the present
In McPherson v. Rollins there was no express direction that the mortgage security
should remain unchanged during the term of
the trust
It was given to secure annuities,
presumably for maintenance.
Here the mortgage was given to secure a gross sum, for the
benefit of infants, the shares being payable,
as was to be Infared, on their severally attaining full aso.
There is a very pregnant
circumstance in the present case bearing up-

PRIORITIES AND NOTICB.

a

A. purchaser is not required to use the utmost
circumspection. He is bound to act as an

ordinarily prudent and careful man would
He cannot act
do under the circumstances.
In contravention to the dictates of reasonable
prudence, or refuse to inquire when the propriety of inquiry is naturally suggested by
circumstances known to him. The circumstances of this case made it, we think, the
duty of the bank to inquire in respect to the
authority of Tozier to discharge the prior
mortgage, and, having failed to do so, It is not
entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser.
Baker v. Bliss, 39 N. Y. 70, and cases
cited; Story, Eq. Jur. 400 et seq. The other
questions are satisfactorily disposed of in the
opinions of the referee and at general term,
and do not require furthra: ela;boration.
The
Judgment should be athrmed, wltb costs. AU
concur. Judgment affirmed.
§

fN/

iA

on the point of constructive notice. The bank
relied upon a discharge by Tozier of a lien
iield by him as trustee on his own land. The
transaction as disclosed by the record showed
that In executing the satisfaction Tozier was
dealing with himself, and that the act was in
his own Interest; and not only so, but that
the mortgage was not due. Tozier was acting in the double capacity of owner of the
land and trustee of a lien thereon for other
persons.
The transaction was unusual and
special, and the sayings bank, with knowledge of Toziar's relation to the land as owner
and trustee, was, we think,rbound to inquire
by what authority he acteo; and, If Inqtulry
had been made, the invalidity of the transaction would or might have been disclosed?
What circumstances will amount to constructive notice, or wiU put a party upon inquiry.
Is in many cases
question of much difficulty.
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KNOBIiOCH
(17 N.
Supreme

a

696,

V.

MUELER.

123 111. 554.)

Court of Illinois.

Jan.

20,

1888.

Appeal from circuit court, St Clair county;
A. Watts, Judge.
George Christian Mueler died March 27,
By his wUl, dated March 14, 1870,
1870.
his real estate was devised to his sons,
The ■will was
George and Solomon Mueler.
admitted to probate, but afterwards, at the
January term, 1871, in the circuit court of
St Clair county, this instrument was, on
bill filed for that purpose, set aside, and declared not to be the will of said deceased.
by this court
This decree was affirmed
Mueller v. Rebhan, 94 111. 142. On the 27th
day of March, 1879, Catharine Rebhau, one
of the heirs at law of said George C. Mueler,
deceased, filed in the circuit court of St.
Clair county her bill for partition of the W.
% N. W., and the N. B. N. W. %, of section
28, town 1 N., range 7 W.,— alleging the
death of said George C. Mueler intestate;
that at his death he left him surviving
Mueler, MarGeorge Mueler and Solomon
garite Rhinehardt and complainant Catharine Rebhau, his children and only heirs at
law, to whom descended in equal parts the
said lands; that on the death of said ancestor, George and Solomon had taken possession of the land jointly, and received the
rents thereof until February 29, 1875, when
George died, leaving all his property to Soloetc., since
mon by his will duly probated,
when said Solomon has received the rents
and profits of said land.
The bill alleged
that Solomon was the owner In fee of the
undivided one-half of said lands, and the
complainant and Mrs. Rhinehardt were each
the owner in fee of the undivided one-fourth
part thereof, as tenants In common, and
prayed for partition of the land, and that
Solomon be required to account for the rents
and profits, etc. At the February term, 1880,
of said court, said bill was taken as confessed as to Mrs. Rhinehardt, and Solomon
Mueler and his wife, who was also made a
party, filed their answer, admitting the material allegations of the bill, and consenting
to partition of said premises according to the
prayer thereof.
an amended
Subsequently
answer and cross-bill was filed, setting up
that said Solomon had made lasting and
valuable improvements on the land, etc. On
hearing, said defendant Solomon admitted in
open court the allegations of the bill in respect of the Interest of the parties as tenants
in common,, the death and Intestacy of the
ancestor, and consented to a decree of partition; and a decree declaring the several interests of the parties as set up in the bill
as heirs at law of said George O. Mueler,
deceased, In and to said land, was entered
by the court by consent, and commissioners were appointed to make partition accordingly. At the May term, 1880, of said court,
on proof that defendant Solomon had pur-

chased the interest of hla co-defendant Margarite Rhinehardt the decree was, on his motion, so changed as to require the commissioners theretofore appointed to set off to
the said Solomon three-fourths, and to the
complainant one-fourth, of said land. The
Issue as to rents and profits and improvements was referred to the master for proofs.
At the same term the commissioners filed
their report, setting off to the complainant
Mrs. Rebhau, as and for her one-fourth interest in said land, lot 10, as shown In their
report, containing 48 acres of the land; and
set off the residue of said tracts of land to
Exceptions to the report
the said Solomon.
were filed, which were, at the May term,
1881, overruled by the court, and the report
No writ
approved by decree duly entered.
of error was prosecuted or appeal taken from
At the February
the decree of partition.
term, 1883, of said court on hearing of the
Issues as to rents and profits, a decree was
In favor of complainant Rebhau
rendered
for $1,638.97, from which an appeal was
On the
prosecuted to the appellate court.
of
8th day of March, 1881, in consideration
$5,050, Mrs. Rebhau, and Emil, her husband,
by their warranty deed, conveyed the undivided one-fourth part of the premises of
which her father died seized, and all their
right, title, and Interest in the whole of said
land, to appellant Thomas Knobloch; rehowever, her rights to rents and
serving,
This deed was
profits theretofore accrued.
filed for record March 10, 1881. At the February term, 1882, appellant brought an action
of trespass against said Solomon for alleged
trespasses upon said 48 acres of land set off
to Mrs. Rebhau, and afterwards brought
In March
ejectment to recover the same.
or April, 1883, appellee found a paper dated
March 9, 1855, purporting to be the last will
and testament of George Christian Mueler,
deceased, in and by which the testator devised all his land to his two sons, George
and Solomon, subject to the payment of
$1,500 to Catharine Rebhau. This will was
duly admitted to probate.
On July 6, 1883,
Solomon Mueler, appellee here, filed in the
St. Clair circuit court the present bill against
appellant,
Catharine Rebhau, Emil Rebhau,
Margarlte Rhinehardt and Edward Abend,
who, prior to the probate of the last will,
had been appointed administrator of the estate of said George C. Mueler, deceased,
substantially setting up the foregoing facts,
and praying that said will (1855) stand as the
last will and testament of the said George
Christian Mueler; that the deed from Catharine and EmU Rebhau to said Knobloch be
set aside as being a cloud upon complainant's
title; that all proceedings
in partition regarding said land, and the stating of an account of rents and profits now pending In the
appellate court, and all actions commenced
by said Edward Abend as aforesaid, and by
said Knobloch, be no further prosecuted;
and that the defendants, their attorneys,
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agents,
etc., be perpetually enjoined from
taking any further steps in regard to said
action. An injunction was granted as prayed in the bUl of August 25, 1883.
Appellant
answered, setting up that he had purchased
in good faith and paid $5,050 for the interest
of Mrs. Rebhau in said land, without any
notice of any adverse claim or title, and also
setting up that complainant, Solomon, is estopped, by the decree of partition rendered
by his consent in open court, from disputing
complainant's title. At the September term,
1885, of said circuit court, a decree was entered perpetually enjoining the prosecution
of said suits, and setting aside the deed from
Mrs. Rebhau and her husband to appellant
as a cloud on complainant's tiUe. From this
decree appellant, Knobloch, alone appealed.

W. C. Kueffner and James M. Dill, for
appellant. A. R. Halbert, for appellee.

SHOPB, J., (after stating the facts as
The bUl in this case seelis to reabove.)
move, as a cloud upon the title of appellee,
Solomon Mueler, derived under the will of
1855, the deed of Catharine and Emil Reb-

hau to appellant; and restrain by injunction
the prosecution of an action of ejectment
brought by appellant to recover the land partitioned to Catharine Rebhau in the proceedings instituted by her for partition of the
lands of which her father died seized, and to
enjoin a certain trespass suit brought for alleged trespasses upon said land by appellee,
and to restrain Mrs. Rebhau from collecting
$1,638.97, decreed as rents and profits in said
partition proceeding.
Mrs. Rebhau not having appealed from the decree against her,
the latter branch of the case made by the bill
is not before us. When the instrument dated March 14, 1870, purporting to be the last
vrill and testament of George C. Mueler, who
died March 20, 1870, was set aside upon bill
filed for that purpose. It was supposed by all
the parties in interest that his estate had descended to his heirs at law as intestate estate,
were
and letters of administration
All the parties acgranted accordingly.
quiesced in this condition of affairs, and rested in the belief that the property had so
descended until the discovery, in March or
April, 1888, 13 years after the death of the
ancestor,
of the will of the 9th of March,
1855, by which the estate in question was
devised to George and Solomon Mueler. The
good faith of the parties is not questioned,
no fraud or misconduct is alleged, or laches
imputed or imputable to any one, on accoimt
of the delay in the production of this will,
or in any of the proceedings had in respect
to the real or personal estate prior to its discovery.
When Catharine Rebhau, daughter
and one of the heirs at law of said George
on the 22d day of
C. Mueler, deceased,
March, 1879, filed her bill for partition of the
real estate of which said George 0. had
died seized; and when Solomon Mueler filed
his answer, admitting the intestacy of his
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 6

SJ

to the partition to
father and consenting
Mrs. Rebhau and Mrs. Rhlnehardt, his sisters, each a one-fourth part or Interest in the
land of which their common ancestor died
seized, and consented to the decree therefor,
the several parties in good faith believed the
facts alleged in her bill to be true, and that
the land had descended to the four children
of George C. Mueler, deceased, in equal
parts in fee.
It Is also equally clear that
when appellant, Thomas Knobloch, purchased the interest of Catharine Rebhau in said
land, and paid her therefor $5,050, that he
did so in good faith, relying upon the tiUe
of said Catharine as found and declared by
the circuit court of St. Clair county In said
partition proceeding by the consent of appellee. Upon the production and probate of the
will of 1855, in April, 1883, it became manifest that the titie to said land had not In
fact so descended to the heirs at law of said
George Christian Mueler; but by virtue of
that will the legal title thereto, at the death
of the testator, vested in the devisees, George
and Solomon Mueler, and that by the last
will of said George Mueler, who died February 29, 1875, the legal title to the whole
of said land became vested in appellee, Solomon Mueler. It is apparent that all parties,
while acting in good faith, were mistaken,
and that the decree of the circuit court, finding one-fourth interest of said land in fee in
Catharine Rebhau, would not have been entered had the court or parties been aware of
the true condition of the titie to the land.
It is said by counsel for appellee that this
bill may be maintained, if upon no other
ground than as a bill in the nature of a bill
of review. This is manifestiy a misapprehension.
In neither the frame of the bill, or
in the prayer, has the pleader attempted a
review of the decree rendered in the partition
proceeding of Rebhau against Mueler et al.
The bill sets out the filing of that bill, the
decree of partition, and for rents and profits;
but it nowhere seeks to reopen that decree,
or reverse. Impeach, or alter it, or to procure a rehearing of that cause upon the alleged newly-discovered matter. The prayer
is to remove appellant's title, derived thereunder, as a cloud upon appellee's titie, and to
restrain proceedings under that decree vpithout reopening it or setting it aside. The
whole scope of the bill is to procure the relief
sought upon the equitable ground of mist.8Jrp
of fact, as to the title at the time of the
entry of that decree, without in any way interfering with it by seeking to enjoin proceedings under it. The two grounds upon
which a bill of review, or bill in the nature
of a bill of review, will lie, are: Elrrors of
law, appearing on the face of the decree,
without further examination of facts; and
new fact or facts, discovered since the decree, which are material, and which it was
impossible for the party to produce at the
time the decree passed.
2 Daniell, Ch. Prac.
1576; 2 Smith, Ch. Prac. 50.
Bills contain-
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ing newly-discovered matter are in the nature of original bills, in so far as such newmatter presents an issuable fact, and therefore admits an answer and the formation of
an issue; but only so far as it relates to the
truth and sufficiency of the alleged new matter, and its admissibility for the purpose of
affecting and opening the original decree.
Authorities supra; Bufflngton v. Harvey, 95
TJ. S. 99. The purpose of a bill of the character named is to procure a reversal, alteration, or explanation of the former decree,
ihe bill should state the former bill, the proceedings thereon, and the decree rendered by
the court, the grievance under the decree of
the party presenting the bill, and the error
of law or new matter discovered upon which
it is sought to reverse, reopen, or impeach it.
In bills of review, if the former decree has
not been carried into execution, the prayer
may simply be that the same may be reversed
and set aside; If the former decree has been
executed, that the decree be reversed, and
the complainant be restored to his former condition or status, as if it had not been renIn bills in the nature of bills of re"dered.
vlew, instead of praying the reversal of the
former decree, the prayer should be that the
cause be reheard in respect to and considering the new matter at the same time It is
reheard upon the original bill, etc. 2 Daniell,
Ch. Prac. 1581, 1582.
The decree of partition rendered at the
February term, 1880, and the subsequent decree approving the report of the commissioners rendered at the May term, 1881, of said
court, remain unreversed
and in full force
and effect.
The court had jurisdiction of the
subject-matter and of the parties, and rendered Its decree determining the several interests of the complainant Catharine Rebhau
and appellee, by the consent of appellee, as
appears by his answer filed in said cause, and
by the recitals in said decree of partition.
Decrees of courts of chancery, in respect of
matters within their jurisdiction, are as binding and conclusive upon the parties and their
privies as are judgments at law; and a decree by consent in an amicable suit has been
held to have an additional claim to be considered final. Allason v. Stark, 9 Adol. &
E. 255.
Decree so entered by consent cannot
be reversed, set aside, or impeached by bill
of review or bill in the nature of a bill of review, except for fraud, unless it be shown
that the consent was not in fact given, or
something was Inserted, as by consent, that
was not consented to. 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac.
1576; Webb v. Webb, 3 Swanst. 658; Thompson V. Maxwell, 95 U. S. 391; Armstrong y.\
Cooper, 11 111. 540; Cronlj v. Trumble, 66 111.
432; Haas v. Society, 80 111. 248; Atkinson
V. Manks, 1 Cow. 693; Winchester v. Winchester, 121 Mass. 127; Allason v. Stark,
9 Adol. & B. 255; Earl of Hopetoun v. Ramsay, 5 Bell, App. Cas. 69.
See, also, note to
Duchess of Kington's Case, 2 Smith, Lead.
Cas. '826 et seq. It Is the general doctrine

that such a decree is not reversible upon appeal or writ of error, or by bill of review for
Armstrong v. Cooper, 11 111. 540. No
error.
exceptions were taken to the decree of partition, or attempt made in the cause in which
it is rendered to vacate or modify it. It is
undoubtedly true that, as between the parties
and those chargeable with notice, courts of
equity will entertain jurisdiction and grant
relief, on proper bill filed, from the injurious
effects of admissions and confessions of material facts, made in course of judicial proceedings, in ignorance of the rights of the
party making them, where he has been guilty
of no negligence, either in the discovery of
the fact, or in applying to the proper forum
for relief; but such relief can only be granted
upon such grounds and for such reasons as
would authorize the court to set aside agreements or contracts entered into by the parAttorney General v. Tomline, 7 Ch.
ties.
Div. 388; Millspaugh v. McBride, 7 Paige,
509; Purnival v. Bogle, 4 Russ. 142; The
Hiram, 1 Wheat. 440. But it is apparent
that the decree in the partition proceedings
can only be attacked, reversed, annulled, or
in that case,
set aside by direct proceedings
or upon bill of review, or bill in the nature of
a bill of review.
If this were not so, however, there is another ground upon which the decree must be
It is the well-settled doctrine of
reversed.
this court that no relief will be granted In
equity, in cases of this sort, injuriously affecting intervening rights acquired in good
faith, after the rendition of a Judgment or
So it has
decree, and in reliance thereon.
may be made in
'been held that amendments
judicial proceedings, but not so as to affect
I the intervening rights of third persons accruShirley v.
/ ing prior to such amendment.
Phillips, 17 111. 473; Coughran v. Gutcheus,
18 111. 390; Sickmon v. Wood, 69 111. 329;
1 Story, Eq. Jur. 165.
Relief will not be
granted to the prejudice of appellant, if he
has an equal equity with appellee, and is
equally entitled to the protection of the court.
1 Story, Eq. Jur, 165.
As already seen, all
the parties to the partition proceedings supposed in good faith that Mrs. Rebhau was
the owner in fee of the undivided one-fourth
of the lands of which her father died seized,
and that on the 8th day of March, 1881, appellant purchased her interest in such lands
for a full and adequate consideration,
without notice, actual or constructive, of any defect in her titie, and in good faith. All the
elements to constitute him a bona fide pur^
chaser are present;
that is, a valuable consideration paid, absence of notice, and presence of good faith.
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 745.
His grantor had, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, in a proceeding Instituted to
find and declare her interests in these lands,
been adjudged, by the consent and admission
of appellee, to be the owner in fee of the undivided one-foiu:th part thereof, and there
was nothing in the record or elsewhere ap-
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a

the party found and declared by that decree
to be the owner, and we can perceive no
principle upon which
court of conscience
can hold that appellant shall lose in consequence of the mutual mistake, rather than
appellee.
It cannot be said that the equities of appellee are superior to those of appellant in respect of the title thus acquired,
and, the equities being equal, the court will
Pom.
give no assistance to the legal title,
Eq. Jur.
742, and cases cited,) but will remit the complainant to his remedy at law.
said, however, that, at the time apIt
pellant purchased,
the report of the commissioners had not been confirmed by the
court, and that he purchased subject to having ttie interest of his grantor, as found by
set aside.
It is true that
the commissioners,
exceptions to the report of the commissioners
were then pending, but none of the exceptions questioned the right or title of Catharine Eebhau to the undivided one-fourth part
of the real estate of which her father died
Such exception related simply to the
seized.
manner of partition, and the conduct of the
in making the same. There
commissioners
was nothing therein to put appellant upon
notice or inquiry as to the title of Mrs. Rebhau. He bought subject, as a matter of
course, to having the amount set off to Mrs.
Rebhau changed or diminished by subsequent action of the commissioners, or to have
their report set aside by the court; but his
purchase was of her interest in the land,
which was conceded by appellant and declared by the court to be a one-fourth interis

§

(2

^

est therein.
It Is also said by counsel for appellee that
appellant may rely upon the covenants of
warranty in his deed from the Rebhaus, and
It
therefore the equities are with appellee.
is not shown whether Mrs. Rebhau, and her
husband, who joined in the execution of said
deed, are solvent or insolvent, and we perceive no principle, nor is any suggested by
counsel,
upon
which appellant should be
driven to resort to his legal remedy against
his grantor for indemnity from loss, especial-

a

it

is not shown
ly in view of the fact that
that such remedy would be availing. It will
not be proper for us to here discuss or determine the right of appellee to the money paid
by appellant for the land in question, or as
to whether he has any remedy In respect of
the same.
We are of opinion that the defense of
bona fide purchaser has been maintained,
and, upon both of the grounds indicated, the
right of appellee to the relief sought should
as against appellant,
have been denied,
Knobloch, and the bill dismissed as to him.
For the error of the court in this regard,
the decree, in so far as
affects the appellant, Knobloch, will be reversed, and the
cause remanded to the circuit court of St.
Clair county, with instructions to enter decree in conformity with this opinion, dismissing the bill as to said appellant
a

it

a

a

it

it

§

(2

a

4

a

§

a

a

it

parent to disclose that she, who was thus
clothed with apparent legal title, was not the
owner in fact of that interest in the land.
Nor is
shown or claimed that further inquiry would then have disclosed anything to
cast suspicion upon her title. The defense
of
bona fide purchaser had its rise in equity, upon the doctrine that a court of equity acts upon the conscience of him against
whom relief is sought; and if he has done no
wrong, or it would be unconscientious or inequitable to grant the relief, the court will
If, in
refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.
equity and good conscience, the complainant
should not obtain what he seeks, or the defendant ought not to suffer what is demanded, then the court will withhold its power.
In theory, it is said, the defense of
bona
some defect in
fide purchaser presupposes
purchaser's title; but the court refuses to
investigate the validity of the title of either
party, upon the ground that good conscience
does not dictate that he who* has dealt honestly, in good faith, and without notice,
should be deprived of the legal right he has
There was forthereby gained.
Id.
739.
merly much apparent conflict In the adjudgbona fide
ed cases as to when the defense of
In Phillips v.
purchaser would be availing.
Phillips,
De Gex, P. & J. 208, Lord Westbona fide
bury grouped the cases in which
purchaser will be protected into three general
classes, and reduced the doctrine to a forEq.
mula, which it is said by Pomeroy
Jut. 742) has been accepted, by subsequent
The docjudges almost without exception.
trine thus formulated, so far as applicable
here, is: "Thirdly, when there are circumstances which give rise to an equity, as distinguished from an equitable estate,— as, for
example, an equity to set aside a deed for
for mistake,— and the
fraud, or to correct
purchaser under the instrument maintains
the plea of purchase for valuable consideration without notice, the coifft will not interfere."
is apparent
Without extended discussion,
that the bUl here filed seeks relief ancillary
The purpose
to the legal estate of appellee.
of the bill is to remove the deed to appellant
as
cloud upon appellee's legal title, and to
enjoin the assertion of rights by appellant
thereunder. The right to the relief sought
exists, if at all, upon the equity arising out
of the alleged mistake as to the title to said
This brings
land in the grantor of appellant
the case directly within the rule above given, which is sustained by the weight of modern authority; and, if appellant has made out
his defense as bona fide purchaser, he should
have prevailed in the court below. The decree of partition, as seen, was rendered by
court of competent jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matAppellant
consent.
ter, and by appellee's
without notice, for full value, and In perfect
good faith, acquired the title, sought to be
cloud upon appellee's title, from
removed as
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MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF BALTIMORE
et al. Y. WHITTINGTON.
(27

Atl.

984,

78 Md. 231.)

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov.

16,

1893.

court of Baltimore

Appeal from circuit
city.
Suit by Jacob Craft Whittlngton against
the mayor and city council of Baltimore and
Clarence M. Ellinger for injunction. Prom a
decree for complainant, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Argued before ROBINSON, O. J., and
BRISCOE, BRYAN, FOWLER, and Mo-

SHERRY,

JJ.

G. Hayes, Jas. P. Gorter, Wm. 8.
Bryan, Jr., and F. W. Story, for appellants.
F. O. Slingluff and T. WaUis Blakiston, for
TboB.

appellee.

McSHERRY, J. By section 47, art. 49, of
the Municipal Code of Baltimore City, it is
enacted, in substance,
that when any lots
of ground are chargeable with the payment
of taxes, and are subject to ground rents
or leases for terms of years, renewable forever, the collector shall, in the sale of such
lots for nonpayment of taxes, first sell only
the leasehold interest, if it should sell for
an amount sufficient to pay the taxes, but,
if it should not, then that he shall sell the
whole fee-simple estate, provided these provisions "shall not apply to cases where the
books of the city do not disclose the fact
that the lot or lots are on lease as aforesaid,
or unless the collector shall have actual notice of such lease prior to the sale thereof."
The dty tax collector of Baltimore sold in

Y

March, 1891, for the nonpayment of state
and city taxes, the fee-simple estate in a
lot of ground on Druid Hill avenue, and the
mayor and city council became the purThe sale was reported to the circuit
chaser.
court of Baltimore city, and was ratified in
May. 1892. In October following, the city,
through and by its comptroller, sold the lot
to Clarence M. Ellinger, to whom it was
thereafter conveyed. When the sale was
made by the collector, the lot was subject
to a lease for 99 years, renewable forever,
which was owned by J. Hem-y Weber, and
the reversion or fee was owned by the apThe unpaid taxes were
pellee, Whittington,
due by the owner of the leasehold estate, but
the collector sold the whole fee, without having first offered, or having attempted to sell,
the leasehold, as required by the section of
the City Code to which reference has been
made. There was no entry on the books of
the collector showing that the lot was subject to a lease, and the single question involved in the case is whether, when the collector made the sale, he had "actual notice"
of the existence of the lease. If he had, the
sale was irregular. If it was irregular, the
decree of the circuit court of Baltimore city,
restraining by injunction the mayor and cily

council, and its grantee, Ellinger, from disturbing the possession of the owner of the
reversion, must be affirmed.
It appears by the record that in 1883 proceedings were instituted In the circuit court
of Baltimore city by Rebecca and Maiy McKoen against J. Henry Weber for a sale of
this same leasehold estate imder a mortgage
by Weber in 1881. Mr.
executed
thereon
T. WaUis Blackiston was appointed trustee
to make the sale. He took possession of the
property, and collected the rents and profits,
but, owing to a depreciation in its value,
made no sale of it. In the meantime the
ground rent was regularly paid to the appellee, up to July, 1892, but the state and
city taxes for the eight years beginning with
On the 1st day of
1882 remained unpaid.
December, 1890, Lewis N. Hopkins, city c(Alector, filed a petition in the foreclosure prorepresenting that taxes for the
ceedings
years just mentioned were In arrear upon
the property "decreed to be sold." The petition further stated that the collector was unar
ble to enforce the collection of those taxes
by reason of the pendency of the foreclosure
and it prayed that the trustee
proceedings,
might be required to pay the taxes out of
the rents theretofore collected from the property, or that the collector might "be allowed
to proceed to collect said taxes by sale of
the property in the ordinary way." This petition was signed by the late Mr. W. A. Hammond, "city solicitor, attorney for petitioner,"
and was sworn to by the deputy city colan order was passed,
Subsequently,
lector.
requiring the trustee to pay the taxes within
five days out of the fimds previously collected
by him "as rents from the property decreed
to be sold," and directing, upon his failure to
do so, that the property be sold in the ordinary way by the collector.
The trustee did
fail to pay the taxes, and the collector made,
under authority of this order, the sale of
March, 1891, already mentioned.
It is upon
these facts that the appellee relies to sho-n
that the collector had "actual notice" of the
existence of the leasehold estate.
Notice is of two kinds,— actual and constructive. Actual notice may be either express or implied.
If the one, it is established by direct evidence; If the other, by
the proof of circumstances from which it is
inferable as a fact Consitructive notice is,
on the other hand, always a presumption of
Express notice embraces,
law.
not only
knowledge, but also that which is communicated by direct information, either writtei*
or oral, from those who are cognizant of the
fact communicated.
Wade, Notice, i 6. Implied notice, which Is equally actual notice,
arises where the party to be charged is
shown to have had knowledge of such facts
and circumstances as would lead him, by the
exercise of due diligence, to a knowledge of
the principal fact 16 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 790. Or, as defined by the supremfe
court of Missouri in Rhodes t. Outcalt, 48
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Mo. 370, "a notice Is regarded In law as actual when the party sought to be affected
by it knows of the particular fact, or Is conscious of having the means of knowing it,
although he may not employ the means in
his possession for the purpose of gaining further information."
It is simply circumstantial evidence from which notice may be la
ferred. It differs from constructive notice>
with which it is frequently confounded, and
which it greatly resembles, in respect to the
character of tie inference upon which it
rests; constructive notice being the creature
of positive law, resting upon strictly legal
presumptions, which are not allowed to be
controverted, (1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 399; Townsend V. Little, 109 U. S. 504, 3 Sup. Ct. 357,1
while implied notice arises from inference of
fact, (Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354;
Wade, Notice, § 3.) With constructive notice we are not now concerned, and it is not
pretended that the city collector had express
notice, or knowledge personally, of the existence of the leasehold
estate.
But he became a party to the equity proceeding, wherein a decree had been passed directing a sale
of the leasehold interest
He did more. He
asked, notwithstanding the decree bad been
long before signed and enrolled, that be be
permitted to sell for the nonpayment of
taxes, tmder the summary process of distraint, the identical property previously docreed to be sold, and no other or different
Interest; and the property which had been
thus previously decreed to be sold was not
J~, the fee simple, but only the leasehold interest
in the lot In question.
He obviously knew
there was a proceeding pending in the circuit court of Baltimore city, having for its
object the sale of some interest in the property.
He knew, further, the equity proceeding interfered with the execution of his distraints, and he applied to the court for leave
to proceed, in spite of the decree, to sell the
same prcq)erty which had been decreed to
be sold.
We say he knew these things, and
we say so, not because the record shows that
he was personally aware of them, as matters of actual knowledge, but because the
deputy dty collector and the collector's attorney, botii of whom were his agents in this
transaction, did have such knowledge; the
one having sworn to the facts stated in the
petition, and the other having signed the peSo both the attorney and the
tition itself.
deputy collector knew, or at least were in
possession of facts which would necessarily
y
N lead, upon the exercise of the slightest diligence, to a knowledge or notice, of the exist/
They must therefore be
ence of the lease.
regarded as knowing that which, with ordi-
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nary diligence, they might have known, or
that which they were conscious of having the
This result is not a
means of knowing.
legal presumption, but an inference of fact,
and it seems to us an irresistible inference.
It
would be idle to say that the collector was
Ignorant of facts relating to the title to property which he was about to sell for the nonpayment of taxes, when his deputy, acting
for him and in his name, was in full possession of them, or that he did not know the
things which his attorney was aware of in
that particular proceeding respecting the
state of the title; and it would be equally idle
to say that the deputy, when he swore to the
petition, and the attorney, when he signed it,
filed It, and procured a court's order upon It,
were not-apprised of the character of the estate previously decreed to be sold, or were
not in a iwsition where they were conscious
of having the means of knowing precisely
what property the decree affected.
At all
events,
the exercise of ordinary diligence
would most assuredly have informed both of
these agents of the collector of every fact
which the records in the equity case disclosed, and among those facts was the material and important one that the lot was subject to a lease for 99 years, renewable forever.
It is consequently a legitimate inference of fact that both of these representatives of the collector knew what the record in
the foreclosure case disclosed as to there being a leasehold estate In Weber, and not a
fee, and this was implied actual notice.
Notice to the attorney, as well as notice to the
depvity, was notice to the collector, and was
actual, and not merely constructive, notice
to him, for the principal Is bound by and
affected with notice to his agent, and he Is
equally bound by notice received by his attorney in the same transaction.
Astor v. WeUs,
4 Wheat 466; Reed's Appeal, 34 Pa. St 209;
Houseman t. Association, 81 Pa. St 256;
Smith T. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320.
If this were
not so, then, in every case where notice is
necessary, it might be avoided by simply employing an agent.
We are, for the reasons
we have given, of opinion that the collector
had, through the means we have indicated,
such actual notice of the existence of the
lease as to bring him within the proviso
quoted from the City Code, and that he was
therefore not authorized to sell the fee-simple
estate until he had first offered the leasehold for sale. It results, then, that the sale
made by him was Irregular, and the decree
granting the injimction applied for by the appellee must be affirmed.
Decree affirmed,
with costs In this court and In the court below.

•/

•
'

i

j
-

PRIORITIES AND NOTICE.

86

WILLIAMSON

V.

BROWN.

Court of Appeals

of New York.

1857.

The plaintiff was the grantee of fifty acres
of land on which there was no recorded incumbrance.
His grantor purchased the land
of the defendant, giving ba^ck a mortgage for
a part of the purchase price.
The defendant commenced to foreclose his
whereupon this
mortgage by advertisement,
action was brought to restrain the foreclosure.
The other material facts appear in the
opinion.

D. H. Marsh, for appellant.

rence,

for

recording acts was that of 7 Anne, chapter
That act differed from our general registry act in one important respect. It did not,
in terms, require that the party to be protected by the act should be a bona fide purchaser.
Its language was: "And that
every such deed or conveyance, that shall at
any time after, etc., be made and executed,
shall be adjudged fraudulent and void,
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, unless,"
20.

(15 N. T. 354.)

J.

R. Law-

respondent.

SBLDEN, J. The referee's report is conclusive as to the facts. It states, in substance, that the plaintiff had sufficient
information to put him upon inquiry as to the
defendant's mortgage;
but that, after making all the inquiry which upon such information it became his duty to make, he failed to
discover that any such mortgage existed.
This being, as I think, what the referee intended to state, is to be assumed as the true
interpretation of his report.
The question in the case, therefore, is, as
to the nature and effect of that kind of notice so frequently mentioned as notice suffiinquiry.
cient to put a party upon
The
counsel for the plaintiff contends that while
such a notice may be all that is required in
some cases of equitable cognizance, It is not
sufficient, in cases arising under the registry
acts, to charge the party claiming under a
recorded title with knowledge of a prior unregistered conveyance.
He cites several authorities in support of' this position.
In the case of Dey v. Dunham, 2 Johns.
Ch. 182, Chancellor Kent says, in regard to
notice under the registry act: "If notice
that is to put a party upon inquiry be sufficient to break in upon the policy and the
express provisions of the act, then indeed the
conclusion would be different; but I do not
apprehend that the decisions go that length."
Again, In his Commentaries, speaking on the
"Implied notice may
same subject, he says:
be equally effectual with direct and positive
notice;
but then it must not be that notice
which is barely sufficient to put a party upon inquiry."
So in -Jackson v. Van Valkenburgh, 8 Cow.
280,
Woodworth, J., says:
"H these rules
be applied to the present case, the notice
was defective.
It may have answered to
put a person on Inquiry, in a case where that
species of notice is sufficient; but we have
seen that to supply the place of registry, the
law proceeds a step further."
A reference to some of the earlier decisions
under the registry acts of England will tend,
I think, to explain these remarks, which were
probably suggested by those decisions.
One
of the earliest, if not the first of the English

etc.

The English judges found some difficulty
at first in allowing any equity, however
strong, to control the explicit terms of the
statute.
It was soon seen, however, that adhering to the strict letter of the act would
open the door to the grossest frauds. Courts
of equity, therefore, began, but with great
caution, to give relief when the fraud wag
palpable.
Hlne v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 275, was a
case in which the complainant sought relief
against a mortgage having a preference under the registry act, on the grovmd that the
mortgagee
had notice.
Lord Hardwicke
dismissed
the bill, but admitted that "apparent fraud, or clear and undoubted notice
would be a proper ground of relief." Again,
he said: "There may possibly have been
cases of relief upon notice, divested of fraud,
but then the proof must be extremely clear."
Jolland V. Stainbrldge, 3 Ves. 478, is another case in which relief was denied; The
master
of the rolls, however, there says:
"I must admit now that the registry is not
conclusive evidence, but it is equally clear
that it must be satisfactorily proved, that
the person who registers the subsequent deed
must have known exactly the situation of
the persons having the prior deed, and knowing that, registered in order to defraud them
of that title."
Chancellor Kent refers to these cases tn
Dey V. Dunham (supra) and his remarks in
that case, as to the effect, under the registry
acts, of notice sufficient to put a party upon
Inquiry, were evidently made under the influence of the language of Lord Hardwicke
and the master of the rolls, above quoted.
But the English courts have since seen,
that If they recognized any equity founded
upon notice to the subsequent purchaser of
the prior unregistered conveyance,
it became necessarily a mere question of good
faith on the part of such purchaser. They
now apply, therefore, the same rules in regard to notice, to cases arising under the
registry acts, as to all other cases.
It will be sufficient to refer to one only
among the modem English cases on this subject, viz.: Whitbread v. Jordan, 1 Younge
& C. 303. The plaintiff was a London brewer, and supplied Jordan, who was a publican,
with beer. It was the common practice with
brewers In London to lend money to publicans whom they supplied with beer, upon a
deposit of their title deeds. Jordan had- deposited certain deeds with the plaintiff, pur-
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euant to this custom.
He afterward gave to
one Boulnois, a wine merchant, a mortgage
upon the property covered by the deeds deBoulnois
posited, which was duly recorded.
had notice of Jordan's debt to the plaintiff,
and of the existing customs between brewers
and publicans, but he made no inquiry of the
brewers. The suit was brought to enforce
the equitable mortgage arising from the deposit.
Baron Alderson held that the notice
to Boulnois was sufficient to make it his duty
to inquire as to the existence of the deposit;
that his not doing so was evidence of bad
faith; and the plaintifC's right, under his
equitable mortgage, was sustained. No case
could show more strongly that notice which
puts the party upon inquiry is sufficient even
under the registry act.
The cases in our own courts, since Dey v.
Dunham and Jackson v. Van Valkenburgh
(supra), hold substantially the same doctrine.
<Tuttle v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 213; Jackson v.
Post, 15 Wend. 588; Grimst(3ne v. Carter, 3
Paige, 421.)
can see no foundation in reason for a distinction between the evidence requisite to establish a want of good faith, in a case arising under the recording act, and in any other
case, and the authorities here referred to are
sufficient to show that no such distinction is
recognized, at the present day, by the courts.
The question, however, remains, whether this
species of notice Is absolutely conclusive upon the rights of the parties. The plaintifC's
counsel contends, that knowledge sufficient
to put the purchaser upon inquiry is only
presumptive evidence of actual notice, and
may be repelled by showing that the party
■did inquire
with reasonable diligence, but
failed to ascertain the existence of the unregistered conveyance; while, on the other
hand. It is insisted that notice which makes
It the duty of the party to inquire, amounts
to constructive notice of the prior conveyance,
the law presuming that due inquiry will necessarily lead to its discovery.
The coimsel for the defendant cites several
authorities in support of his position, and
-among others the cases of Tuttle v. Jackson
In the
and Grimstone v. Carter (supra).
first of these cases, Walworth, chancellor,
says: "If the subsequent purchaser knows
at the time
■of the unregistered conveyance
of his purchase, he cannot protect himself
against that conveyance; and whatever is
sufficient to make it his duty to inquire as
legal
to the rights of others is considered
notice to him of those rights;" and in Grimstone V. Carter, the same Judge says; "And
if the person claiming the prior equity is in
the actual possession of the estate, and the
purchaser has notice of that fact, it is sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the actual
rights of such possessor, and is good constructive notice of those rights."
It must be conceded that the language
•used by the learned chancellor in these cases,
if strictly accurate, would go to sustain the

I

87

doctrine contended for by the defendant's
counsel.
Notice is of two kinds: actual and
constructive. Actual notice embraces all degrees and grades of evidence, from the most
direct and positive proof to the slightest ciiv
cumstance from which a jury would be warranted in inferring notice. It is a mere
question of fact, and is open to every species of legitimate evidence which may tend
Conto strengthen or impair the conclusion.
structive notice, on the other hand, is a legal
facts; and like
Inference from established
other legal presumptions, does not admit of
dispute. "Constructive notice," says Judge
Story, "is in its nature no more than evidence of notice, the presumption of which is
so violent that the court will not even allow
of its being controverted." (Story, Eq. Jur.
§399.)
A recorded deed is an instance of constructive notice. It is of no consequence whether
the second purchaser has actual notice of
the prior deed or not.
He is bound to take,
and is presumed to have, the requisite notice. So, too, notice to an agent Is constructive notice to the principal; and it would not
in the least avail the latter to show that the
agent had neglected to communicate the fact
In such cases, the law imputes notice to the
party whether he has it or not. Legal or implied notice, therefore, is the same as constructive notice, and cannot be controverted
by proof.
But it will be found, on looking into the
cases, that there is much want of precision
They have been
in the use of these terms.
not unfrequently applied to degrees of evidence barely sufficient to warrant a jury in
Inferring actual notice and which the slightest opposing proof would repel, instead of beof
ing confined to those legal presumptions
The
notice which no proof can overthrow.
use of these terms by the chancellor, therefore, in Tuttle V. Jackson, and Grimstone v.
Carter, is by no means conclusive.
The phraseology uniformly used, as descriptive of the kind of notice in question,
"sufficient to put the party upon inquiry,"
would seem to imply that if the party is
faithful in making inquiries, but fails to
discover the conveyance, he will be protect-.,
ed. The import of the terms is, that it beIf,
comes the duty of the party to inquire.
then, he performs that duty is he still to be
bound, without any actual notice? The presumption of notice which arises from proof
of that degree of knowledge which will put
a party upon Inquiry is, I apprehend, not a
presumption of law, but of fact, and may,
therefore, be controverted by evidence.
In Whitbread v. Jordan (supra),- Baron
Alderson laid down the rule as follows:
"When a party having knowledge of such
facts' as would lead any honest man, using
ordinary caution, to make further inquiries,
does not make, but oii the contrary studiously avoids making, such obvious inquiries, he
must be taken to have notice of those facts.
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which, If he had used such ordinary diligence,
would readily have ascertained." This
very plainly implies that proof that the party
has used due diligence, but without effect,
In this case it
would repel the presumption.
is true the decision was against the party
having the notice.
But in Jones v. Smith,
1 Hare, 43, we have a ease in which a party,
who had knowledge sufficient to put him on
inquiry, was nevertheless held not bound by
he

the notice.

The defendant had loaned money upon the
security of the estate of David Jones, the
father of the plaintifE.
At the time of the
loan he was informed by David Jones and
his wife, that a settlement was made previous to the marriage, but was at the same
time assured that it only affected the property of the wife. He insisted upon seeing
the settlement, but was told that it was in
the hands of a relative, and that it could not
be seen without giving offense to an aged
aunt of the wife, from whom they had exDavid Jones, however,
after
pectations.
promised that he
some further conversation,
would try to procure it for exhibition to the
defendant. This promise he failed to perform. It turned out that the settlement included the lands upon which the money was
knowledge
loaned.
Here was certainly
enough to put the party upon inquiry; for he
was apprised of the existence of the very
document which was the foundation of the
complainant's claim.
He did inquire, however, and made every reasonable effort to see
the settlement itself, but was baffled by the
The
plausible pretenses
of David Smith.
vice-chancellor held the notice insufficient.
He said: "The affairs of mankind cannot be
carried on with ordinary security, if a do(>trine like that of constructive notice is to be
refined upon until it is extended to cases like

This doctrine Is confirmed by the language
of Judge Story in Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn.
554, Fed. Gas. No. 4,847.
He says: "I admit
that the rule in equity seems to be, that
where a tenant or other person is In possession of the estate at the time of the puiv
chase, the purchaser is put upon inquiry as
to the title; and if he does not inquure, he
is bound in the same manner as if he had
inquired and had positive notice of the title
of the party in possession."
It Is still further confirmed by the case of
Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264. The language
of Parker, J., in that case is very emphatic.
He says: "To say that he (the purchaser)
was put upon inquiry, and that having made
all due investigation without obtaining any
knowledge of title, he was still chargeable
with notice of a deed, if one did really exist
would be absurd."
J£ these authorities are to be relied upon,
and I see no reason to doubt their correctness, the true doctrine on this subject Is,
that where a purchaser has knowledge of any
fact sufficient to put him on inquiry as to
the existence of some right or title in conflict with that he is about to purchase, he is
presumed either to have made the inquh^
and ascertained the extent of such prior
right, or to have been guilty of a degree of
negligence
equall.v fatal to his claim to be
considered
as a bona fide purchaser. This
presumption, however. Is a mere inference of
fact, and may be repelled by proof that the
purchaser failed to discover the prior right,
notwithstanding the exercise of proper diligence on his part.
The judgment should be reversed, and
there should be a new trial, with costs to
abide the event.

PAIGE, J. The question to be decided Is,
whether, under the finding of the referee,
Possession by a third person, under some
the plaintiff is to be deemed to have had at
previous title, has frequently but inaccu- /the time of his purchase legal notice of the
rately been said to amount to constructive jfprior unrecorded mortgage of the defendant
notice to a purchaser, of the nature and ex- J f The referee finds that the plaintiff had suffitent of such prior right. Such a possession
cient information or belief of the existence
puts the purchaser upon inquiry, and makes j of such mortgage to put him upon inquiry,
it his duty to pursue his inquiries with dili-| but that upon pursuing such inquiry to the
gence, but is not absolutely conclusive upon i extent of such information and belief, he did
him.
In Hanbury v. Litchfield, 2 Mylne &1 not find that such mortgage existed or had
K. 629, when the question arose, the master ', been given. It seems to me that the two
of the rolls said: "It is true that when a ten- i\findings are Inconsistent vnth each other.
ant is in possession of the premises, a pur- 'T.f the plaintiff, on pursuing an Inquiry to y
chaser has implied notice of the nature of his
the full extent of his information and belief/
title; but, if, at the time of his purchase,
as to the existence of the defendant's mortthe tenant in possession is not the original
gage, was unable to find that It either then
lessee, but merely holds under a derivative
existed or had been given, the highest evilease, and has no knowledge of the covdence Is furnished that the Information reenants' contained in the original lease, it has
ceived or belief entertained by the plaintiff
never been considered that it was want of
was not sufficient to put him on inquiry as
due diligence in the purchaser,
which is to
to the existence of such mortgage.
The last
fix him with implied notice, if he does not part of this finding effectually disproves the
pursue his inquiries through every derivative
fact previously found of the sufficiency of
lessee until he arrives at the person entitled
notice to put the plaintiff on Inquiry. The
to the original lease, which can alone convey
two facts are utterly Inconsistent with each
to him information of the covenants."
other, and cannot possibly co-exist.
the present."
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The remarks of Parker, J., In Rogers v.
Jones, 8 N. H. 264, 269, are directiy apposite
to the facts found by the referee.
Judge
Parker says: "To say that he (demandant)
was put upon Inquiry, and that having made
all due investigation without obtaining any
knowledge of title, he was still chargeable
with notice of a deed, if one did really eicist,
would be absurd." The sound sense of these
observations is clearly shown by the principle of the rule that information sufficient to
put a party upon inquiry is equivalent to evidence of actual notice or to direct and positive notice.
That principle is that such information will, if followed by an inquiry prosecuted with due diligence, lead to a knowledge ot the fact with notice of which the
party is sought to be charged.
Hence, in all
cases where the question of implied notice
of a prior unrecorded mortgage or conveyance arises as a question of fact to be determined, the court must decide whether the information possessed by the party would, If
it had been followed up by proper examination, have led to a discovery of such mortIf the determination is
gage or conveyance.
that such an examination would have resulted in a discovery of the mortgage or conveyance, the conclusion of law necessarily results that the information possessed by the
party amounted to implied notice of such instrument. But if the determination is the
converse of the one stated, the information of
the party cannot be held to be an implied
These propnotice of the deed or mortgage.
ositions will be found to be fully sustained
(Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myhie
by authority.
& K. 699; 2 Sugd. Vend. 552 [Am. Ed. 1851]
marg. p. 1052; 4 Kent, Comm. 172; Insurance Co. V. Halsey, 4 Sandf. 577, 578; Id., 8
N. T. 274, 275; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 398-400,
400a;
Jackson v. Burgott, 10 Johns. 461;
Dunham v. Dey, 15 Johns. 568, 569, in error;
Jackson v. Given, 8 Johns. 137; Jolland v.
Stainbridge, 3 Ves. 478; Pendleton v. Fay,
2 Paige, 205.)
Where the information is sufficient to lead a party to a knowledge of a
a neglect to
prior unrecorded conveyance,
make the necessary inquiry to acquir« such
knowledge will not excuse him, but he will be
chargeable with a linowledge of its existence;
the rule being that a party in possession of
certain information will be chargeable with
a knowledge of all facts which an inquiry.
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by such Information, prosecuted
suggested
with due diligence, would have disclosed to
him. (4 Sandf. 578; 3 Myhie & K. 699.) In
this case the fact being found by the referee
that the plaintiff, after pursuing an inquiry
to the extent of his information, failed to discover the existence of the defendant's mortgage, it seems to me that neitlier law nor
justice will justify us in holding the plaintiff
chargeable with implied notice of such mortgage.
The doctrine of notice and its operation in favor of a prior unrecorded deed or
mortgage rests upon a question of fraud, and
on the evidence necessary to infer it. (4
Kent, Comm. 172.) Actual notice affects the
conscience, and convicts the junior purchaser
of a fraudulent intent to defeat the prior conveyance.
His knowledge of facts and circumstances
at the time of the second purchase sufficient to enable him, on due inquiry,
to discover the existence of the prior conveyance, is evidence from which a fraudulent intent may be inferred. (15 Johns. 5^; 2
Johns. Ch. 190; Jackson v. Burgott, 10 Johns.
462.) Now, if it is ascertained and found as
a fact, that the facts and circumstances
within the knowledge of the second purchaser, at the time of his purchase, were Insufficient to lead him, on a diligent examination,
to a discovery of the prior conveyance,
how
upon this finding can a fraudulent intent be
inferred, and if not, how can he be charged
with notice which implies a fraudulent in-

tent? It is not in the nature of things, that
a knowledge of the same facts and circumstances shall, at one and the same time, be
I
held evidence of both innocence and guilt.
think the rule well established, that an inference of a fraudulent intent on the part
of a junior purchaser or mortgagee must,
in the absence of actual notice, be founded on
clear and strong circumstances, and that
such inference must be necessary and unquestionable. (McMechan v. Grifflng, 3 Pick. 149,
154, 155; Hine v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 275; Jackson V. Given, 8 Johns. 137; 2 Mass. 500;
2 Johns. Ch. 189; 15 Johns. 569; 8 Oow. 264,
266.)

For the

above reasons, both the judgment
on the report of the referee and the
Judgment of the general term affirming the
same, should be reversed, and a new trial
should be granted.
Judgment reversed.
rendered

,
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THOMAS
(21

et al.

N. E.

352,

v.

BURNETT.

128 111. 37.)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April

5, 1889.

Error to circuit court, Randolph county;
George "W. Wall, Judge.
Charles W. Thomas, pro se, James A.
Watts, for defendant in error.

cate of purchase, which is the certificate now
sought to be set aside.
Section 31 of the conveyance act declares
that all deeds, etc., authorized by law to be
recorded, "shall take effect and be in force
from and after the time of filing the same for
record, and not before, as to all creditors and
subsequent purchasers without notice; and
all such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged void as to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice, until the
same shall be filed for record."
An attach-

Shope, J. This was a bill filed by Martha
Burnett against Charles W. Thomas and
the sheriff of Kandolph county, to set aside
ing creditor, who levies his attachment witha certificate of purchase held by Thomas upout notice of a prior unrecorded deed of his
on a 40-aere tract of land owned by the comdebtor, either actual or constructive, acquires
plainant, as a cloud on her title, and to enjoin the sheriff from making a deed under a lien, which, if perfected by judgment, execution, sale, and deed, will bold the legal
such certificate. Both parties claimed title
estate as against the grantee in a prior unreunder James Burnett, a son of the complaincorded deed.
Having acquired a lien as an
ant.- It is conceded that on the 29th day of
March, 1882, Jamec Burnett was the owner
innocent creditor without notice, he will have
a right to enforce the same, notwithstanding
of the tract of land in controversy, which
he may have, subsequently to the levying of
was inclosed and in cultivation, but upon
his attachment, received notice of the deed.
On that day the
which there was no house.
Martin v. Dryden, 1 Gilman, 187; Stribling
complainant, as it is shown, bought the land
V. Ross, 16 111. 122; Jones v. Jones, Id. 117;
in good faith from her son for the sum of
Henderson v. Downing, 24 Miss. 106. Un$1,600.
No deed was made until in the
less, therefore, the plaintiff in attachment
month of April following, when James Burnett conveyed the land to complainant.
No had notice, either actual or constructive, of
the unrecorded deed from James Burnett to
question arises in respect to the payment of
the purchase money at the date of the purMrs. Burnett, the lien thereby acquired must
chase. The land had been fenced, and under
prevail over the rights of the complainant
David C.
cultivation for over 20 years.
under that deed.
The statute makes her
Thompson had for some years acted as the
deed void as against the attacliing creditor if
agent of James Burnett, while he was owner,
a lien on the property was thereby secured in
and had rented the land from year to year.
good faith, and without notice of her rights.
The deed to complainant was not recorded
Complainant's right to the relief sought deuntil October 22, 1884, and the land stood on pends, therefore, upon the fact whether the
the assessment books in the name of James
plaintiff in attachment, at the time of the levy
Burnett, until 1885. The complainant, after
of the writ, had notice of her rights.
There
her purchase, retained Thompson as her
is no pretense that she had actual notice of
agent in respect of this land, who, in August,
the unrecorded deed, but it is claimed that
1882, rented the land as the complainant's to
she had constructive notice, arising from the
one Jordan for one year, who raised a crop
possession of the land by complainant. Comthereon, and retained possession of the same
plainant took possession after her purchase
until in August, 1883, when he surrendered
by her agent and tenants, as we have seen,
In March, 1884,
possession to Thompson.
long prior to the levy of the attachment, and
At which possession she has ever since retained.
the agent rented the lands to Tagle.
each renting the agent informed the tenants
It is well settled that actual possession of
that complainant was the owner of the
land by a party under an unrecorded deed is
premises, and that he was renting it for her.
constructive notice of the legal and equitable
A crop was raised on the land each year aft- Jight of the party in possession. The posseser 1882 by the tenants of complainant, and
^sion by tenant is the same in all respects as
the fences were kept in repair by her agent,
if by the party himself. Franz v. Orton, 75
who collected the rent, and paid the same to
111. 100; Whitaker
v. Miller, 83 111. 381;
her. On the 10th day of October, 1883,
Coari v. Olsen, 91 111. 273. It is claimed by
Margaret Gilfillen sued out an attachment
plaintiff in error that possession, to have the
against James Burnett in the Randolph cireffect of notice, must be of that character
cuit court returnable to the March term
which will arrest attention, and the case ol
thereof, then following, and this land was
Loughridge v. Bowland, 52 Miss. 546, is relevied upon on that day as the property of
ferredtoassustainingthat positio n . In that
James Burnett, and a certificate of levy duly
case the grantor of the land at the time of the
filed. At the September term, 1884, of said
conveyance was in possession of the same by
court, said plaintiff in attachment recovered
his tenant. After the sale the same tenant
judgment for $2,500 against said Burnett.
continued to hold possession under an agreeSpecial execution was issued thereon, under
ment to pay rent to the grantees. There was
which, on October 22, 1884, the tract in conthen nothing more than a technical attorntroversy was sold to defendant Thomas, atment by the tenant to the purchaser.
And
torney of the plaintiff in question, for $1,900,
the court held that the mere attornment of
and the sheriff delivered to Thomas a certifithe tenant, without any visible change in the
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character of the holding, was not sufficient to
put a creditor or subsequent purchaser on inIt is not necessary to the decision of
quiry.
this case to express any opinion in respect of
the doctrine there announced, for the reason
that after the complainant's purchase she,
through her agent made a lease of the property to Jordan. This was in August, 1882,
and for one year, and under it a crop was
raised. The tenant was informed tliat his
landlord was Mrs. Burnett, the compiainant.
The agent, as before stated, Itept the place in
repair as her agent, collected the rents, and
paid them to her. Here were open, notorious
acts of ownership asserted in an unequivocal
manner by the complainant.
Thompson, the
agent, was not himself in possession of the
property, but the tenants of complainant were,
and it was their possession which constituted
notice. It is, however, said that there was
no tenant in actual possession at the time of
the levy of the attachment, and therefore the
plaintiff in error was not chargeable with
The tenant's
p( notice of the unrecorded deefl.
I possession of land is that of his landlord.
Jordans occupied the land up to August,
|3?he
f:1883, and this was notice to the world of Mrs.
jjfBurnett's title, to all intents as if she had occupied it. Actual residence is not essential
to continuous possession.
the party is in
actual possession of the land, and there are
continuous acts of ownership, it is sufficient.
Coleman v. Billings, 89 111. 183; Ford v.
Marcall, 107 111. 136. The land here in con-
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troversy was improved, and under fence. In
such case, the owner will not lose his possession by failing to be continuously in the
actual occupancy or use of the land by himself or tenant. The fact that a short time
may have elapsed between the actual occupancy by one tenant, before another tenant
takes possession, will not be a loss of possession by the owner.
The improvements, the
fact that a crop had been raised the previous
season, will clearly indicate the possession,
and will be sufficient to put others dealing
The attachwith the property upon inquiry.
ment here was levied October 10, 1883, a short
time after the tenants had surrendered possession, to Thompson, complainant's agent,
who still continued to act as such agent in
taking care of the property, and the plaintiff
should have made inquiry before levying her
writ of attachment. It is apparent this could
have been done, either of the outgoing tenants
or of the agent.
Any reasonable, prudent
man, contemplating a purchase of the property, would have made such inquiry; and it
is clear that an inquiry of the Jordans or of
Thompson would have led to notice of the
claim of complainant, and of the existence ■
of the unrecorded deed. We think the cir-M
cumstanees are such as to charge the attach- \\
ing creditor with notice of the deed from j\
This be- / /
James Burnett to the complainant.
ing so, the circuit court committed no error
in granting the relief prayed, and its decree
will be affirmed.
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strong and positive that the mortgage had
no subscribing witnesses when it was re(37 "Wis. 449.)
corded.
But this testimony is contradicted;
Jan. Term, 1875. and, considering the circumstances attendSupreme Court of Wisconsin.
delivery of the mortAppeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun- ing the execution and
gage, we think the probabilities favor the
ty.
inference that the instrument was witnessed '^
Action by one Pringle against Andrew
when it was left for record. According to
a
to
foreclose
Dunn and wife and others
view, there was a mistake in transcribthis
given to the La Crosse & Milmortgage
ing the mortgage upon the record by omita
bond
secure
Company
to
wauliee Railroad
the witnesses. The weight
of said company for $5,000, payable Jan- ting the names of
evidence, to our minds, supports this
uary 1, 1864, said mortgage bearing date of the
April 11, 1854, and alleged to have been re- inference or conclusion. It is to be observed
that the mortgage is perfect and fair on its
corded on such date, and afterwards assigned
face, showing two witnesses. A strong prepurchaser
for
fide
to plaintiff, as a bona
sumption fairly arises from the instrument
value. There was no record of the assign-

PRINGLE

V.

DUNN

et aL

ment. The court found that the witnesses
to the mortgage did not subscribe it at the
time of its execution, but after It had been
recorded;
that, after such subscription, it
was not again recorded; that the plaintiff
was the bona fide holder of the bond and
mortgage;
that the defendants
other than
Andrew Dunn and wife had no actual knowledge of the mortgage, and the recording of
the mortgage before it was subscribed was
not constructive notice; and dismissed the
complaint. Plaintiff appeals. Modified.

Mariner, Smith & Ordway, for appellant.
Guy C. Prentiss, J. P. C. Cottrill, and John
W. Gary, for respondents.

COLE, J. Before approaching the legal
questions involved in this case. It is necessary to determine a question of fact; and
that Is, does the evidence show that the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed was properly attested when first left at the oflace of
the register, so as to entitle it to record?
There is considerable testimony in the case
which tends strongly to prove that the mortgage had no witnesses when it was recorded. And the court found as a fact that the
mortgage
was not subscribed by the witnesses Baker and McFarlane at the time
of Its execution, and before It was transcribed upon the records and entered in the
general index, but was subscribed by these
witnesses after It was recorded, and that
it was not again recorded. This finding affirms one important fact, which Is much
contested by the defendants,
which is the
genuineness of the signature of the witness
A. J. McFarlane to the Instrument. An attempt is made to prove, and it is argued
that the evidence shows, that McFarlane
never signed the mortgage as a witness,
and that his signature thereto is a forgery.
On this point we wUl only make the remark that we are satisfied from the evidence, and especially by an inspection of
the writings themselves, of the authenticity
of the signature. Whether the mortgage was
subscribed by the witnesses at the time of
its execution and before it was left at the
ofiBce for registry Is a question of more doubt
upon the evidence. The testimony is quite

itself that it was witnessed at the time of
This presumption is not overits execution.
come nor repelled by the testimony offered
to show that it was not witnessed at that
In respect to the degree or quantity
time.
of evidence necessary to justify a finding
that the subscribing witnesses signed the
instrument after it was executed and recorded, the case would seem to come within
the rule laid down in Kercheval v. Doty,
"The prop31 Wis. 478, where it is said:
osition being to set aside or invalidate a
written contract by evidence of a far less
certain and reliable character than the writing itself, the greatest clearness and certainty
of proof should be required. It is like the
cases where the object is to correct or reform a deed or other instrument on the
ground of mistake, or to set aside or rescind
it on the same ground; where the rule is
that the fact must be established by clear
and satisfactory evidence."
The testimony
offered to show that the mortgage was not
witnessed when executed and before it was
recorded falls short of this rule. The fact
is not established by clear and conclusive
proof that it was not witnessed when executed. It would serve no useful purpose
to go Into a detailed discussion of the evidence upon this point, and we shall not do
so. It is sufiicient to say that, giving to
the testimony offered to show that the mortgage was not witnessed before it was re- /
ceived for record all the weight to which /
it is entitled. It falls to establish that fact/
In a clear, satisfactory manner.
Assuming, then, that the mortgage was
witnessed when it was left at the oflBce of
the register to be recorded, the further important inquiry arises as to what effect must
be given to the record as constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers for
value. This record was in this state. The
entry of the mortgage was made in the gen.
eral index book, but the full record of the -7
Instrument had no subscribing witnesses;
and therefore the question Is, would such
a record operate as constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers for value, independent
of any actual notice? It Is claimed by the
counsel for the plaintiff that the record does
and should so operate, notwithstanding the
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mistake In the registration or recording of
the instrument in extenso. This presents a
question of no little difllculty, which must
be solved by the application of general principles of law to the provisions of our statute.
It is a familiar mle that an instrument
must be properly executed and acknowledged
so as to entitle it to record, in order to
make the registry thereof operate as constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser.
Says Mr. Justice Story: "The doctrine as
to the registration of deeds being constructive notice to aU subsequent purchasers is
not to be understood of all deeds and con"veyances which may be de facto registered,
1)ut of such only as are authorized or re^luired by law to be registered, and are duly
registered in compliance with law. If they
are not authorized or required to be registered, or the registry itself is not in compliance with the law, the act of registration
is treated as a mere nuUityj and then the
■subsequent purchaser is afCected only by
such actual notice as would amount to a
fraud." 1 Eq. Jur. § 404. See, also Ely v.
"Wilcox, 20 Wis. 528; Fallass v. Pierce, 30
Wis. 444; Lessee of Heister v. Fortner, 2
Bin. 40; Shove v. Larsen, 22 Wis. 142, and
•cases cited on page 146.
Under our statute,
among other requisites, two witnesses are
essential to a conveyance, to entitle it to
record. The statute requires every register
to keep a general index, each page of which
shall be divided into eight columns,
with
heads to the respective columns as pre-scribed;
and the duty is imposed upon the
register to make correct entries in said index of every instrument received by him
for record, imder the respective and appropriate heads, and immediately to enter in
the appropriate column, and in the order of
time in which it was received, the day and
hour of reception; and it is declared that
the instrument "shall be considered as re«orded at the time so noted." Rev. St. 1858,
In Shove v. Larsen, supra,
■c. 13, §§ 142, 143.
the effect of this index containing correct
■entries of matters required to be made therein was considered, and it was held that by
^,force of the statute it operated as constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser. In
that case the index contained an accurate
of the land mortgaged, but in
•description
transcribing the mortgage at large upon the
records a mistake was made in the descrip•Uon;
and it was claimed In behalf of the
subsequent purchaser that it was the registration of the instrument at large which alone
But this
amounted to constructive notice.
construction of the statute was not adopted,
the court holding that a subsequent purchaser
was bomid to take notice of the entries in
the index, which the law required the register to make. This result seemed to foUow
necessarily from the language of the statute,
■which
declared that the instrument should
■/U-ft

Oil

-/,•-/-('

,,

,
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as recorded at the time noted.
Time might elapse before the instrument
was transcribed at large on the record, or
It might be lost, and not transcribed at all,
leaving the Index the only record of its contents.
And the manifest intention of the
srtatute seemed to be to make the index notice of all proper entries from its date, and
also of the instrument itself until it was
registered In full. The further consequence
would seem necessarily to result from this
view of the statute that the registration of
the conveyance in extenso relates back to
the registration in the index, and from thence
there is constructive notice of the contents
of the instrument. The doctrine of Shove
V. Larsen was approved in Hay v. Hill, 24
Wis. 235i but the court refused to make the
entry In the index In that case operate as
constructive notice, because upon its very
face it bore conclusive evidence that it was
not made at its date; in other words, the
rectitude and Integrity of the index were
successfully impeached by the index itself.
See, also. Insurance Co. v. Scales, 27 Wis.
640.
Where there Is nothing upon the face
of tlie Index to impeach or throw suspicion
upon Its accuracy, there it would afCect a
purchaser with notice of those
subsequent
facts which the law required to appear therein. Doubtless, a still further consequence follows from this construction of the statute,
namely, that where, by some mistake, there
is a discrepancy between the proper index
entries
and the instrument as registered, , ,
there each supplies the defects of the other J/
in the constructive notice thereby given; that
is, It appears to be the Intention of the statute to charge the subsequent purchaser constructively with such knowledge as the proper Index entries afford, as well as with
notice of those facts derived from the registration itself. He is presumed to have examined the whole record, and Is affected with ~
notice of what It contains.
But when the
instrument, as registered In full, appears
defective in some material and essential
parts, which are not supplied by the index
entries, what effect, then, must be given the
record as constructive notice? This is really the difficult question In this case. Prom
the entries in the index It would not appear
whether the mortgage was witnessed or not.
The presumption from the mere entries them- \
selves would be that it was witnessed and I
acknowledged, so as to entitle it to record;
but when the mortgage, as registered In full,
was examined,
it would be found that it
had no witnesses, and had no business on
the records. As the record itself is only
constructive notice of its contents. It is difficult to perceive how it can go beyond the
facts appearing upon it, and charge a purchaser constructively with knowledge of a
fact not In the record.
One of the counsel for the defendants states
the argument on this point as follows:
He
be considered

/
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Insists and claims that the entries in the
index hool^s, so far as they indicated that
the mortgage had been filed for recordy inwas so exdicated also that the mortgage
ecuted as to entitle these entries of it to
be made;
but that, when the full record
was looked at for all the particulars of the
mortgage, and perhaps for the express purpose of verifying the entries in the index,
it is found that the apparent assertion by
was
the index entries that the mortgage
properly executed was wholly untrue, and
that the mortgage in fact was no incumbrance.
The fact, as truly shown to exist
by the full record, overcomes and destroys
the false assertion as to the fact in the
And, it appearing by the instrument
index.
registered that it was not entitled to record,
both the registration and index itself cease
to affect the purchaser with constructive notice.

It is not readily perceived wherein this argument as to the effect of our various provisions upon the subject of registration is
unsound.
The question mainly depends upon the construction of our own statutes. So
far as we are aware, this is the first time the
point has been presented in this court for
adjudication. We have derived but little
aid from the decisions in other states, for
the reason that few of them have similar
statutory provisions. We have been referred
by the counsel for the plaintiff to two cases
in Michigan,— Brown v. McCormick, 28 Mich.
215, and Starkweather
v. Martin, Id. 472.
In Brown v. McOormick the effect of the registry, as notice to subsequent purchasers,
was made to turn upon the curative act of
1861,
mentioned in the opinion. In Starkweather V. Martin the question was, how far
the absence, on the registry of a deed, of
any mark or device indicating a seal, or of
any statement of the register that the original was sealed, affected the validity of the
record entry as evidence of title. The record entry of the deed was made more than
forty years before the cause was decided,
by the proper officer, and in the appropriate place for the registry of deeds, under
the law permitting the registry of only sealed instruments; and the instrament was in
the form of a warranty deed, purporting to
be acknowledged and dated at a time when
it was the common and lawful course to
seal conveyances,
and contrary to official
duty to take the acknowledgment unless the
conveyance was sealed, and where the conclusion, attestation clause, and certificate of
acknowledgment of the instrument all spoke
of it as under seal. The court said that
these facts and incidents, taken together,
afforded a very strong presumption that the
original was sealed.
The doctrine of this case does not seem
to have a very strong bearing upon the question under consideration. It may be said
that it was contrary to the duty of the reg-

ister to record the mortgage unless It was
properly acknowledged and witnessed, and
that a presumption arises that he would not
have done so. But in answer to this it may
also be said that the law made it the duty
of the register to record the mortgage unless
it was properly acknowledged and witnessed, and that a presumption arises that he
would not have done so. But in answer to
this it may also be said that the law made
it the duty of the register to record, or cause
to be recorded correctly, all instruments authorized by law to be recorded.
Section 140,
c. 13, Rev. St. 1858.
And the presumption
that he performed his duty in recording the
mortgage correctly is as strong as the presumption that he would not have recorded it
unless it was entitled to registry.
la Shove v.-Larsen, a number of cases are
referred to which hold that a mistake in recording a deed, or recording it out of Its
order, renders the registration ineffectual as
notice to subsequent incumbrancers and purchasers.
The doctrine of those cases would
seem to be applicable to the case before us.
The registration and index entries being Incomplete,
showing that the mortbecause
gage had no subscribing witnesses, constructive notice could not be presumed of such
a record; for the principle ."that the registry
is notice of the tenor and effect of the Instrument recorded only as It appears upon that
record" fully applies. Shepherd v. Burkhalter, 13 Ga. 443.
See, In addition to the cases
cited in Shove v. Larsen, Brown v. Kirkman,
1 Ohio St. 116; Stevens v. Hampton, 46 Mo.
404; Bishop v. Schneider, Id. 472; Terrell v.
Andrew Co., 44 Mo. 309; Frost v. Beekman,
1 Johns. Ch. 288.
The question, then, arises whether the evidence shows that any of the defendants were
affected with actual notice of the mortgage.
This question, we think, must be answered
in the affirmative, so far as the defendants
Thomas Maloy and Stanislaus Bartosz are

J\

concerned.

In the deposition taken on his own behalf,
but read as a part of the plaintiff's case,
Thomas Maloy distinctly admits that he had
heard, when he purchased his lots, that there
was a defective railroad mortgage upon
them, but that he did not look for It, because
his abstract did not show it It is claimed
by one of the counsel for the defendants that
this related to the Aiken mortgage, and not
to the one upon which this action is brought
It seems to us, however, that this is a totally inadmissible construction of the testimony.
He most certainly refers to, the mortgage in suit. And what he had heard about
there being a defective railroad mortgage
upon the property was sufficient to put him
upon inquiry.
Parker v. Kane, 4 Wis. 1.
"What Is sufficient to put a purchaser upon
an inquiry is good notice; that is, where a
man has sufficient information to lead him
to a fact, he shall be deemed conusant of it."
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Sugd. Vend. (9th London Ed.) p. 335. "In regard to the inquiry required of a party, it
should be such as a prudent and careful man
would exercise in his own business of equal
importance. Accordingly, where the mortgagee is informed that there are charges afEecting the estate, and is cognizant of two only,
he cannot claim to be a purchaser without
notice of other charges, because he believes
that the two, which satisfy the word "charges," are all the charges upon it. He is
bound to inquire whether there are any others. The rule with respect to the consequences of a purchaser abstaining from making
inquiries does not depend exclusively upon a
fraudulent motive. A man may abstain from
mere heedlessness or stupidity, and be none
the less responsible for the consequences;
but, if he make reasonable inquiry, and is
deterred by a false answer, he is excusable,
if it be of a character to delude a prudent
man." 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 400b; Jackson v.
Van Valkenburgh, 8 Cow. 260. Independently of the record, Maloy had notice of the existence of the mortgage, or had a knowledge
of such facts as to call for further inquiry.
He cannot, therefore, be protected as an innocent purchaser for value.
The defendant Bartosz must be charged
with notice of the mortgage by the recitals
in the deed from Tenney and wife to his immediate grantor. He was present when that
deed was executed and delivered to his uncle,
He testifies that he did not know whether
anything was said about the railroad mortgage at that time or not; that he did not understand English very well. The purchase
was really made by his uncle for him. And,
whether he fully understood the conversation at the time about Incumbrances, he
must be chargeable with notice of what aj)pears in his chain of title. This clause was
in the deed to his uncle; "Said premises are
free and clear from all incumbrances except
a mortgage to the La Crosse Railroad Co.,
which
am to save said Bartosz harmless
from." The general rule upon this subject
is "that, where a purchaser cannot make out
a title but by a deed which leads him to another fact, he will be presumed to have
knowledge of that fact." The following authorities are very clear and decisive upon
that point: Pitzhugh v. Barnard, 12 Mich.
105; Case v. Erwin, 18 Mich. 434; Baker v.
Mather, 25 Mich. 51; Insurance Co. v. Halsey, 8 N. Y. 271; Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns.
Ch. 298; Gibert v. Peteler, 38 N. Y. 165; Acer
V. Westcott, 46 N. Y. 384; Coles v. Sims, 5
De Gex, M. & G. 1. The clause in the deed
referred to the mortgage as an existing incumbrance, and he cannot now, in good faith,
claim that it is not a lien upon his property.
The counsel for the plaintiff claims that
the defendant McLindon had actual knowlIt
edge of the existence of the mortgage.
Is true, he testified that when he purchased
he knew by report that there was a railroad
mortgage upon the property, but he says
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that the report stated that the mortgage was
void. Were he not protected by another principal, he could not certainly be regarded as a
bona fide purchaser. But he purchased from
S. S. Johnson, or claims through Johnson, in
whom the title stood free from any taint.
For the rule is well settled that a purchaser
■*
affected with notice may protect himself by
purchasing of another who is a bona flde
purchaser for a valuable consideration. For
a similar reason, if a person who has notice .
sells to another who has no notice, and is a
bona flde purchaser for a valuable consideration, the latter may protect his title, although it was affected with the equity arising from notice in the hands of the person
from whom he derived it. Mr. Justice Story
says this doctrine, in both of its branches,
has been settled for nearly a century and a
half in England. 1 Eq. Jur. § 410. He states
an exception to the rule, which was recognized and enforced in Ely v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.
91, where the estate became revested in the
original fraudulent grantee, when the original equity was held to reattach to it. There
is no pretense that McLindon comes within
the exception; and, as a bona flde purchase
of an estate for a valuable consideration
purges away the equity from the estate lA
the hands of all persons who derive title"^
under it, he is protected.
It is said that it
does not appear that Johnson's title was derived from the common source. As we understand the bill of exceptions, an abstract
was offered in evidence to show title from
Bunn, by various intermediate conveyances,
to the defendant, which was ruled out on
the plaintiff's objection. But perhaps it is a
better answer to the objection to say that
the plaintiff has made the defendants parties
under the general allegation that they claim
some interest in or title to the mortgaged
premises, which was subject to the mortgage. This allegation implies that this interest was not adverse, but was derived
from Dunn, though subsequent in date, and
inferior in right, to the plaintiff's mortgage.
It was further insisted that the evidence
showed that the defendant Mary Maloy had
actual notice of the mortgage. We do not
think this position is sustained by the testimony. It is attempted to charge her with
the same actual knowledge her husband had,
because he aided her when she made her purchase of Martin Maloy. It does not appear that
anything was said at this time about the railroad mortgage, or that she ever had any notice
of it. It does not appear, even, that he was
acting as her agent in any legal sense; and,
besides, if he were, his knowledge, acquired
at another time, when not engaged in her
business, ought not to be imputed to her.
Notice, to bind the principal, should be
brought home to the agent while engaged
in the business or negotiation of the principal, and when it would be a breach of trust
in the former not to communicate the knowledge to the latter. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 408,

^
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and cases cited in note 1. The evidence falls
to bring her within that rule.
A number of other questions were discussed upon the argument; but we believe these
observations dispose of all the more important ones.

The judgment of the circuit court as to the
defendants Thomas Maloy and Stanislaus
Bartosz must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
It is so ordered.
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TAYLOR.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct., 1876.
Appeal from chancery court, Lincoln county; Thomas Y. Berry, Chancellor.
Bill in equity by Bentonville Taylor
against J. B. Deason, M. W. Hoskins, and
G. W. Hoskins, her husband, Ellen McClendon and A. D. McClendon, her husband, to
recover the balance of the purchase money
of certain land, and to subject land to the
payment of th,e same.
The bill showed that on February 16, 1872,
the complainant sold and conveyed the land
in question to J. B. Deason; the deed, which
,, was duly recorded on February 19, 1872, reciting a consideration of "the sum of $700,
to be paid to the party of the first part on
or before the first day of July, 1872, by the
,^j)arty of the second part." For the purchase
money Deason gave his note, of even date
with the deed, as follows: "On or before
the first day of July next,
promise to pay
Bentonville Taylor, or bearer, the sum of
$700, for town lots conveyed by him to me
^ttis day.Xl^his sum is to be paid in Mississippi state certificates of indebtedness at
par." After maturity of the note, Deason
sold and conveyed the lots to the defendant
M. W. Hoskins, and the latter and her husband sold and conveyed the same to the
defendant Ellen McClendon.
When Deason
sold and conveyed the lots to the defendant
Hoskins, he informed her agent that be had
paid Taylor aU the purchase money.
The defendants demurred to the bill, on
the ground that the complainant had no
vendor's lien. It appearing on the face of
the bill that the consideration for the sale of
the lands was not money or United States
currency; and because the recital in the
deed was not notice to the defendants Hoskins and McClendon of the complainant's
equity.
The demurrer was overruled, and an answer filed, and upon final hearing a decree
was rendered for the complainant for the
balance of the purchase money due him, and
foreclosing his vendor's lien on the land.
The defendants appeal.

I
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Ses^onB & Cassedy, for appellants.
Chrisman & Thompson, for appellee.
Bentonville
Taylor, pro se.

CHALMERS, J. We are content with the
finding of the chancellor on the facts. If
any injustice was done In fixing the amount
"^^
due, it was to the appellee, and not to the
appellants.
The fact that the note was dischargeable in Mississippi certificates of Indebtedness (known as Alcorn money) did not
deprive it of the protection of the vendor's
"^
equitable lien. Harvey v. Kelly, 41 Miss.
In the face of the

deed which

H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 7

Taylor

cuted to Deason was this recital: "The par(the vendor), for and in
consideration of the sum of $700, to be paid
on or before the first day of July, 1872, by
the party of the second part" (the vendee),
&c. For this sum of $700, Deason, the vendee, executed his note to Taylor, due 1st of
July, 1872. The deed was recorded at once,
and Deason took possession of the premises.
Without having completed payment In full
of the note, Deason sold the premises in
1874 to Hoskins, who subsequently sold to
Mrs. McClendon.
Both Hoskins and Mrs.
McClendon deny actual knowledge, at and
before their purchases, that any thing remained due to Taylor.
Did the law give them constructive notice
of Taylor's rights? Nothing is better settled than that the purchaser of real estate
is bound to take notice of all recitals In the
chain of title through which his own title
is derived. Not only is he bound by everything stated In the several conveyances constituting that chain, but he Is bound fully
to investigate and explore everything to
which his attention is thereby directed.
Where, therefore, he is Informed by any of
the preceding conveyances,
upon which his
ovm deed rests, that the land has been sold
on a credit, he is bound to inform himself
as to whether the purchase money has been
paid since the execution of the deed. Wiseman V. Hutchinson, 20 Ind. 40; Croskey v.
Chapman, 26 Ind. 333; Johnston v. Gwathmey, 4 LItt. (Ky.) 317.
It is argued, however, that this principle
only applies before the maturity of the notes,
as shown by the recitals of the deed, and
that it will not apply where, as in the case
at bar, subsequent purchasers have bought
after the notes were past due. It Is said
that, in such case, the subsequent purchasers may rely upon a presumption that the
original debt has been paid. We know of
no principle which would justify a reliance
upon such a presumption, and it Is expressly
negatived by the cases of Honore v. Bakewell, 6 B. Mon. 67, and Thornton v. Knox,
Id. 74. They may rely upon such presumption after sufficient time has elapsed to bar
the notes, although, in fact, they may have
been renewed.
Avent v. McCorkle, 45 Miss.

ty of the first part

Miss. 697.)

490.
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It appears in the case at bar that the subsequent purchasers knew that Deason had
bought the realty on a credit, because they
asked him at the time of their purchase if
he had paid all the money due Taylor.
It
was their own folly if they relied upon his
assurances, instead of applying for information to Taylor, who lived In an adjoining
county, and is shown by the bill to be a
practising lawyer, well known in Brookhaven, where the lots were situated and all
the defendants resided.
Decree affirmed.
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HOUSTON
(21

Pac.
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TIMMERMAN.i

Supreme Court of Oregon.

May

3, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Linn county.
Hewitt & Bryant and Tilman Ford, for
appellant. /. K. Weatherford and D. S, jBT.
Blackburn, for respondent.
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LORD, J. This was a suit to partition certain lands described herein. The defendant
denied that the respondent had any interest
in said lands, and alleged that she was Wie
owner in tee-siinple, and entitled to the possession of the whole of said premises.
The
plaintiff, in reply, denied this, and alleged
affirmatively that some time in July, 1884,
she commenced a suit against A. J. Houston
for a divorce and alimony, and for an equal
undivided one-third of the real property then
owned by said Houston, and that he was the
owner in fee of said real property, which
was duly described therein.
That the summons in said divorce suit was served on
, 1884, and that prior to that time and
prior to the 26th day of September, 1884, the
defendant Timmerman had notice that the
complaint for divorce and one-third of said
real property had been filed by the plaintiff
against her husband. That on the 5th day
of February, 1886, a decree was entered,
granting a divorce in favor of the plaintiff,
and adjudging her to be the owner of the undivided one-third of said real property, etc.
The court below, after a trial of said cause,
rendered
a decree therein, granting
the
prayer of plaintiff for partition, except as to
the 160 acres of land mentioned therein, and
partition was ordered and made on June 26,
1888, and confirmed by the court.
The defendant Timmerman derived her title to the
premises in dispute in this wise: On the
15th day of March, 1880, the plaintiff's husband, A. J. Houston, for value, made and
delivered his promissory note to the defendant Timmerman for the sura of $3,400, with
interest at the rate of 10 per eent. per annum from date; that, the said A. J. Houston failing to pay said note, the defendant
Timmerman commenced suit on the 26th
day of September, 1884, and caused service
of summons to be made upon him on that
day, and that on October 27, 1884, the defendant Timmerman recovered judgment
against the said A. J. Houston for the sum
of $5,463.87, which, on the same day, was
duly docketed in the judgment lien docket,
and thereupon became a lien upon all the
real propeity mentioned in tlie complaint in
this suit. It further appears that on March
19, 1883, said A. J. Houston made and delivered his promissory note to J. T. Williams
for $1,000, with interest from date at the
rate of 10 per cent, per annum, payable six
months after date, and to secure the payment of the same executed a mortgage, which
was duly recorded, upon the 160 acres of land
set out in tlie complaint.
The said Houston
' Upon the subject oJ lis pendens generally, e

note to Newman

v. Chapman,

note, the mortgage was
against the said Houston and the
plaintiff herein. The defendant Timmerman, however, answered, setting up her
judgment, and asked, if the property be sold
to foreclose said mortgage, that the overplus, if any, should be applied in payment of
her judgment, and a decree was accordingly
so entered, etc.; that execution was issued
upon said decree, and said 160 acres was sold
to the defendant Timmerman for $2,500;
that thereafter, on May 13, 1885, execution
was issued upon said judgment, and the remainder of the premises described herein
was sold to the defendant Timmerman, and
said sale confirmed, and deeds were duly executed by the sheriff to said defendant.
It will be noticed that the suit of the defendant Timmerman to recover the amount
due on the note against A. J. Houston,
who was then the husband of the plaintiff
herein, was commenced after the suit of the
plaintitf for divorce against her husband, and
that a judgment was recovered and docketed
before a decree in the divorce suit was rendered, and in which one-third of the real estate then owned by the husband was decreed
It is true, there was no direct
the plaintiff.
proof of the date of the service of the summons in the divorce suit; but, as this will
not affect the result reached, it is immaterial.
The contention is that the defendant Tim- 1
merman was a purchaser pendente lite. *
There is, however, a preliminary question to
be first disposed of, namely, that the appeal
was not taken within six months as allowed
The answer to this is that the obby law.
jection relates to the interlocutory or first decree, and not to the final decree, and that, as
our own Code does not authorize an appeal
from interlocutory judgments or decrees, but
only from such as are final, and, the appeal
from the final decree being within six
months, there was a right of appeal, and the
objection, therefore, is unavailing.
An examination of the statutes of the two
states from which the authorities were read,
to tlie effect that an appeal might be taken
before a final judgment or decree was entered
shows that appeals in those states may be
taken from interlocutory judgments or decrees, which, not being the case under our
Code, they fail on application.
See Freem.
Co-tenancy, §^ 519, 527. But to return.
Among the ordinances or rules adopted by
Lord Chancellor Bacon "for the better and
more regular administration of justice" was
one which provided that, where a person
"comes in pendente lite, and while the suit
is in full prosecution, and without any color
of allowance, or privity of the court there
regularly, the decree bindeth."
Chancellor
Kent said that a "lis pendens duly prosecuted and not conclusive is notice to a purchaser so as to affect and bind his interest by
the decree. "
Strictly speaking, however, the
doctrine of lis pendens is not founded upon
notice, but upon reasons of public policy,
founded upon necessity. "It affects him,"
said Lord Chancellor Ceanworth, "not be-

failing to pay said

foreclosed

1037, 1/f Or. 499.)

14 Am. Deo. 774-779.

LIS PEMDENS.
cause it amounts to notice, but because the
law does not allow litigant parties to give to

others, pending the litigation, rights to the
property in dispute, so as to prejudice the
opposite party." * * * The necessities of
mankind require that the decision of the
court shall be binding, not only on the liti
gant parties, but also on those who derive
title under them by alienation made pending
tlie suit, whether such alienees had or had
not notice pending proceedings. If this
were not so, there could be no certainty that
litigation would ever come to an end." Bellamy V. Sabine, 1 De Gex & J. 566. The
main purpose of the rule is to keep the subject-matter of the litigation within the power
of the court until the judgment or decree
shall be entered; otherwise, by successive
alienations, its judgment or decree could be
rendered abortive, and thus make it impossible for the court to execute its judgments or
Hence the general proposition that
decree.
one who purchases of either party to the suit
the subject-matter of the litiga.tion, after tlie
court has acquired jurisdiction, is bound by
the judgment or decree, whether hepuf chased
for a valuable consideration or not, aud without any express or implied notice in point of
fact, is sustained by many authorities, and
disputed by none. Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S.
521; Grant v. Bennett, 96 111. 513; Randall
v. Lower, 98 Ind. 261; Daniels v. Henderson,
49 Gal. 242; Blanehard v.Ware, 43 Iowa, 530;
Oarr v. Lewis, 15 Mo. App. 551; Gurrie v.
Powler, 5
J. Marsh. 145; Hiern v. Mill,
The
13 Ves. 120; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 405.
doctrine of lis pendens was introduced in
analogy to the rule at common law in a real
action "where if the defendant aliens after
pendency of the writ, the judgment in the
Soraction will overreach such alienation."
rell V. Carpenter, 2 P. Wms. 482. And this
may account for the leaning in some of the
courts to restrict the application of the rule
of lis pendens to actions or suits affecting
McLaurine v. Montitle to real property.
roe, 30 Mo. 469; Winston v. Westfeldt, 22
Marsh.
Ala. 760; Baldwin v. Love, 2
489; Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441.
But it is hardly considered well settled that
it may not with equal propriety be applied to
Two things, however,
the sales of chattels.
seem indispensable to give it effect: (1) That
the litigation must be about some specific
thing, which must necessarily be affected by
the termination of the suit; and (2) that the
>, particular
property involved in the suit
t "must be so pointed out by the proceeding as
to warn the whole world that they intermedPreem. Judgm. §§ 196,
die at their peril."
Now, the divorce suit of the plain? 197.
'
tiff was not brought specifically to recover
the one-third of the real estate of her husband,, as was decreed in the divorce proceedi ing. Theland was not the subject-matter of
the suit was
\ the litigation, and the subject of
that belonged to the
title
recover
not
to
I
; plaintiff.
It was incidental and collateral to
■
The court has no
the divorce proceeding.

J.

J. J.

,
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to affect the title of the husband
to his lands, or decree that one-third of them
shall be set apart for her in her own right
and title, independent of a decree for divorce.
Nor has the plaintiff any title on which to
base a suit to recover any portion of the same,
except as it comes by force of the statute
upon a decree for divorce. A proceeding in
divorce is partly in personam and partly in
rem, and, in so far as it is to affect the marriage Hiatus, it is to change a thing
independent of the parties, and is a proceeding not against the parties in personam, but
against their status in rem. 5 Amer. & Eng.
Cyclop. Law, "Divorce," 751. The matter
upon which the jurisdiction acts is the siatiis. The marriage is the thing which the
It is the subject
suit is brought to dissolve.
of the litigation; but, as incidental to it, the
court may grant temporary dWraony pendente
lite, or permanent alimony, when a decree
And the general
for divorce is rendered.
rule is that bills for alimony do not bind the
property of tho defendant with Us pendens.
iStDry, Eq. Jur. §196; Brightman v. Brightman, 1 R. I. 112; Isler v. Brown, 66 N. 0.
556; Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662.
But the court cannot affect the title of the
real property of the defendant in a divorce
proceeding until the point is reached that a
Tempodecree of divorce is to be rendered.
rary alimony may be granted pendente lite,
but the title of the real estate of the defendant remains intact, and cannot be affected
during the pendency of the proceeding, but
only when the proceeding for a divorce has
terminated, and a decree rendered that the
marriage is dissolved, and then only by force
of the statute.
Our statute provides: "Whenever a marriage shall be declared void or dissolved the
party at whose prayer such decree shall be
made shall in all cases be entitled to the undivided one-third part in his or her undivided
right in fee of the whole of the real estate
owned by the other at the time of such
*
*
*
decree; and it
shall be the
duty of the court to enter a decree in
Code
with this provision."
accordance
Or. § 499. It is " whenever a marriage shall i)
be declared dissolved" that the statute oper]
ates, not before, or pendente lite; and they
court then becomes authorized, and it is its
"duty, " "to enter a decree" for the undivided
one-third part in fee of the whole of the real
estate "owned by the defendant at the time
of such decree" for a divorce. It must be
manifest, then, that the primary object of the
suit is to affect the marriage relation, — its
status; that it is the specific matter in controversy to be affected; and that it is only
when the status is changed by a decree of divorce that the statute operates to divest title
"owned" by the defendants, and that it then
becomes the duty of the court to enter a decree in accordance with its provisions.
Nor
do the cases cited by counsel sustain his conIn Tolerton v. Williard, 30 Ohio St.
tention.
586, the suit was of "double aspect," as said

jurisdiction
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by the court, and was brought to protect her
equitable right in property which was the
subject of dispute. This property was bought
with the wife's money, and she sought a resThe court says: "It
toration of her riglits.
is evident that the court in coming to its conclusion did take tliese equities into consideration, so that the decree may fairly be considered an equitable one in her favor." And
again: "In a proceeding like the one under
consideration where the wife claims rights in
her husband's property other than those arising from the maritnl relation, and insists upon them in connection with her claim for alimony, the court is fully authorized to pass
In Daniel v. Hodges, 87 N.
upon them."
C. 97, the proceeding was for alimony, and
the only property which the husband owned
was a lot that the wife sought to have subjected to her claim, and was in actual possession of it by order of the court when her
husband, pending the litigation, conveyed it
to another, and the court held, under the exceptional circumstances of the case, that the
doctrine of lis pendens applied.
There the
proceeding was to subject the specific thing
to her claim, which the husband attempted
to defeat by conveying away the property,
and the court, while admitting the general
doctrine that a Us pendens was not applicable
in such cases, said: "We are of the opinion
the petition for alimony under the particular
circumstances of the case constituted such a
Us pendens as affected the purchaser with
notice, independent of the actual notice had,
and rendered the deeds void."
But this has
no relevancy to the case at bar.
There she
sought to subject the property to her claim
for alimony, and the suit was directed specifically against it, and she was put in actual
possession by order of the court, and then it
was only "under the peculiar circumstances
of the case" that the court thought the
purchaser from the husband pending the litigation was affected with the rule of Us pendens.
Here there was no alienation of the
property, which was only incidentally involved, or any cliarge of any act on the part
of the defendant Houston to defeat any right
whatever which might accrue to the plaintiff,
if the marriage should be dissolved. If the
defendant Houston had conveyed away the
property to another with the object of defeating her right, upon a decree for divorce, to
any interest in his lands, such purchaser may
be affected with the rule of lis pendens in
such case ; but that is not the question here,
and which it wiU be time enough to decide
when properly presented for our consideration. The debt which the defendant Houston owed the defendant Timmerman was
contracted long before the suit for divorce
was commenced, or the cause or ground of
the divorce existed, and doubtless the credit

was given on the faith of the property, a part
of which included the property in dispute,
There is no prethen owned by Houston.
tense of any fraud or collusion, or that the
debt is not an honest obligation which Houston ought to have paid long before the divorce proceeding was instituted.
Although
the commencement of the divorce suit
might result in a decree which would affect
the property of the defendant, the property
was not the subject specifically of the litigation, and by reason thereof was not withdrawn from such burdens as might be legally
imposed upon it for just claims upon judgand docketed against its
ments recovered
owner, prior to divesting him of his title by
The
force of the statute under the decree.
defendant Timmerman had the legal right to
commence her action to recover the money
due on the note of Houston, and the fact that
the wife of Houston had instituted proceedings for a divorce did not aSect that right,
but when judgment was recovered thereon,
and docketed, by force of law, the lands then
owned by him in that county, including tlie
land in dispute, became subject to the lien of
such judgment; and, as the facts show that
this was before any decree was rendered in
the divorce whereby title to such lands could
be divested, it follows that whoever took title
from him subsequently, either by contract or
by operation of law, took said title cmto onei-e,
or subject to the lien of such judgment. It
results, as a purchaser of said lands at an execution sale upon such judgment, the defendant Timmerman was not affected by or subject to the rule of Us pendens, and her deed
It is true, in the
thereby rendered invalid.
divorce suit the property was described in
the complaint and decree, which, since the
decision in Bamford v. Bamtord, 4 Or. 30,
has been deemed essential to reach the property of the guilty party, but it is apprehended
that neither allegation or proof concerning
the lands is necessary, but that it is enough
and a suflBcient compliance with the latter
clause of section 499, Code Or., to say in effect that the party obtaining the divorce is
hereby entitled to one-third of the real property owned by the other, whatever it may be.
In this view, if any question arises as to
what property was so owned by him, it can
be determined by appropriate proceedings for
that purpose between the parties interested,
much better than in a divorce suit, in which
it is neither proper nor convenient that third
parties, in order to protect their rights, should
be compelled to intervene and become parties
to a controversy between husband and wife
in a divorce proceeding. Barrett v. Failing,
6 Sawy. 475, 3 Fed. Rep. 471.
So that, however we look at the facts of this record, our
conclusion is that the decree of the lower
court must be reversed, and it is so ordered.
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HORN
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Supreme

Judicial

V.

COLE

et al.

Court of New Hampshire.

July Term, 1868.
Trover by one Horn against

one Cole and
another. There was verdict for defendants.
JudgOn motion to set aside the verdict
ment on the verdict.

It appeared on trial that the plaintiff was
contemplating to remove West; that his son,
Charles B. Horn, had removed before, and
was residing at Jefferson, Illinois.
The plaintiff packed a box of goods and delivered
them to the freight agent at East Milan,
directed to Charles E. Horn, Jefferson, Illinois, and ordered them to be forwarded by
freight on the railroad. The box started
from Milan In the freight cars on the 29th of
August, 1864.
The defendant Cole, having a note against
Charles E. Horn, instituted a^suit on It, and
had the box and contents attached on the
writ at Northumberland on the same 29th
of August; and the defendant Green is the
officer who made the attachment.
The plaintiff brought this suit on the 31st of the same
August. On the 3d of September he procured a receipter for the goods, and had
them forwarded according to the original
direction. The suit of Cole against Charles
E. Horn was settled by payment of debt and
The plaintiff, on his arrival at Jefcosts.
ferson, found the box and contents there In
The plaintiff claimed damgood condition.
ages for the detention of the goods, and for
consequential damages.
The plaintiff testified that the goods all belonged to him when
they were delivered to the railroad, and when
they were attached. The defendant Cole testified that the plaintiff, when carrying the
box to the depot, passed by Cole's shop, and
that he said to the plaintiff, "Are you going
to leave us, Horn?" that Horn replied, "No;
but Charles had some things at my house,
and I took them, and put a few of my things
with them into the box, and am sending them
to Charles;" that the plaintiff then procured
The
Cole to mark the box, as before stated.
evidence tended to show that the plaintiff
made similar statements to others, before
and after, as to the ownership of Charles B.
There was no evidence that the plainHorn.
tiff knew Cole had any demand against
The defendant Cole also
Charles B. Horn.
testifies that, relying on this representation
to him that the goods belonged to Charles
E. Horn, he had procured his writ and caus.
ed the property to be attached as belonging to Charles E. Horn. The plaintiff was
not Indebted to Cole, but there was evidence
that he was Indebted to others.
Mr. Fletcher,
defendants.

for plaintiff.

Mr.

Ray, for

PERLEY, C. J. There Is no complaint
that the rulings and instructions of the court

\i01

trial were err\)nebiiis or' improper, provided the evidence wayraiit«Ltlief J?try In rethe'
turning a verdict for ttife4efenjdldiifii''and
verdict must stand, if the efWetiee was competent to prove such representations by the
plaintiff as would estop him to set up his
title to the goods attached to the property of
Charles E. Horn.
The evidence reported in the case was competent to prove that the plaintiff made the
representations on the occasion and in the
circumstances testified to by Cole; that the
plaintiff, though not Indebted to Cole, was
in debt to others; that Cole, believing the
representations to be true, and relying on
them as true, caused the goods to be attached as the property of Charles B. Horn;
and, also, that the plaintiff made these representations knowing them to be false, with
the intention that all persons who were interested in the subject should take them to
be true, and act on them as such, and with
the intention to mislead and deceive all to
whom the representations were communicated, and induce them to act on them as
true; that his intention was to deceive his
own creditors, and prevent them from taking
the goods as his for the debts which he owed
to them.
These facts must be taken to have
been established by the verdict.
But, as there was no evidence that the
plaintiff knew Cole had any demand against
Charles E. Horn, we cannot infer that the
plaintiff had Cole in his mind as an individual whom he meant to deceive by his false
representations, or that he had an intent to
prevent Cole from taking the goods for a
debt which he owed to Cole, as he owed no
such debt; and, on the evidence reported,
the jury were not at liberty to find that the
plaintiff had Cole In his mind as an individual whom he meant to deceive and defraud
by inducing him to take the goods for his
demand against Charles B. Horn.
This raises the point, which the counsel for the plaintiff takes, whether, to estop a party from
showing that his representations were false,
it is necessary that the false representations
should have been intended to deceive and defraud the individual party who trusted to
them and acted on them, provided there was
a general intention to deceive and defraud all
persons who were interested in the subjectmatter of the false representations.
The ground on which a party is precluded
from proving- that his representations on
which another has acted were false is, that
to permit it would be contrary to equity and
good conscience.
This has been sometimes
called an "equitable estoppel," because the
jurisdiction of enforcing this equity belonged originally and peculiarly to courts of equity, and does not appear to have been familiarly exercised at law until within a comparatively recent date; and, so far as relates
to suits at law affecting the title to land,
I understand that in England and in some
of the United States the jurisdiction is still
on the

N. H. 287.)
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Storrs v. Barconfined to courts of equity.
ker, 6 Johns. Oh. 166, 168; Evans v. Bicknell,
6 Ves. 174, 178; Plckard v. Sears, 6 Adol. &
E. 469.
The doctrine, however, is a very
old head of equity, and is recognized and
applied in a great number of the early cases.
Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Ch. Gas. 108; Teasdale v.
Teasdale, 13 Vin. Abr. 539; Hobbs v. Norton,
1 Vern. 136; Gale v. Lindo, Id. 475; Huns2 Vern. 150; Lainlee v.
den V. Gheyney,
Hanman, Id. 499; Raw v. Pote, Id. 239;
Blanchet v. Foster, 2 Ves. Sr. 264; East India Co. V. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83; Stiles v. Gowper, 3 Atk. 693; Webber v. Farmer, 13 Vin.
Abr. 525; 2 Brown, Pari. Gas. 88; 2 Eq.
481; Neville
1
v. Wilkinson,
Gas. Abr.
Brown, Ch. 543; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns.
Ch. 166; Strong v. Ellsworth, 2G Vt 366.
Many of these cases related to underhand
agreements in fraud of marriage settlements;
but the principle is of general application.
Relief was given
1 E'onbl. Eq. 267, note x.
according to the circumstances of the case,
— sometimes
by enjoining suits at law. In
which the legal title was set up, and sometimes by decreeing conveyances and the cancelling of deeds and other instruments; but
in all these cases relief was given in equity
contrary to the strict legal rights of the defendants.
Thus, in the case of an equitable estoppel,
a party Is not allowed to assert his strict legal right because, in the circumstances of
the individual case, it would be contrary to
equity and good conscience.
Take the presIn trover, folent case for an illustration.
lowing the legal definition of the action, if
the plaintiff proves property in himself and
a conversion by the defendant, he has maintained his action, and is entitled to a verIt is conceded that the
dict and judgment.
plaintiff owned the goods, and that the deThe defense here
fendants converted them.
set up appeals from the strict rule at law
to the equitable doctrine that a party shall
not be allowed to exercise his legal right of
proving the facts, if, on account of his previous declarations or conduct, it would be
contrary to equity and good conscience.
So
in a writ of entry; by the technical rules
at law, if the demandant proves seisin in
himself and a disseisin by the tenant within
the time of limitation, he is entitled to judgment; but if the demandant,
having a dormant title to the land demanded, concealed
his title, and encouraged the tenant to purchase from another, he is not allowed, in our
practice, to set up his legal title, because it
would be contrary to equity and good conscience.

It thus appears that what has been called
an "equitable estoppel," and sometimes, with
less propriety, an "estoppel in pais," is properly and peculiarly a doctrine of equity, originally introduced there to prevent a party
from taking a dishonest and unconscientious
advantage of his strict legal rights,— though
now with us, like many other doctrines of

equity, habitually administered at law. But
formerly the practice was different, and suits
at law, the courts being incapable of giving
effect to this equity, were often enjoined
where the party insisted on his rights at law
contrary to the equitable doctrine, as in
Raw V. Pote, Stiles v. Cowper, and Webber
V. Parmer, qua supra.
It would have a tendency to mislead us In
the present inquiry, as there is reason to suspect that it has sometimes misled others, if
we should confound this doctrine of equity with the legal estoppel by matter in pais.
The equitable estoppel and legal estoppel
agree Indeed in this, that they both preclude
from showing the truth in the individual
case.
The grounds, however, on which they
do it are not only different, but directly opposite.
The legal estoppel shuts out the
truth, and also thQ equity and justice of the
individual case on account of the supposed paramount importance of rigorously enforcing a certain and unvarying maxim
of the law. For reasons of general policy,
a record is held to import incontrovertible
verity, and for the same reason a party is
not permitted to contradict his solemn admission by deed. And the same is equally
true of legal estoppels by matter in pais.
Certain acts done out of court and without
deed were, by a technical and unyielding rule
of law, upheld on like grounds of public policy, and followed always by certain legal
consequences.
The legal effect of such acts
was not permitted to be controverted by
proof.
Thus, if one accepts a lease and enters
under it, he is estopped to claim any other
estate in the land during the term; he cannot show that he owned the land when the
Estoppels by matter m
lease was made.
pais were few in number, and all of this
general and well defined character; and
they all enforced some technical rule of the
law against the truth, and also against the
justice and equity of the individual case.
Coke, in his examination of the different
kinds of estoppel by matter in pais, enumer"By livery, by entry, by
ates the following:
acceptance
of rent, by partition, and by acceptance of an estate."
Go. Litt. 352a. In
Lyon V. Reed, 13 Mees. & W. 309, Parke, B.,
speaking of legal estoppels by matter in
pals, says:
"They are but few, and are pointed out by Lord Coke, Go. Litt. 352a.
They
are all cases which anciently really were,
and in contemplation of law have always
continued to be, acts of notoriety no less solemn than the execution of a deed, such as
livery, acceptance of an estate, and the like.
Whether a party had or had not concurred
in an act of this sort was deemed a matter
which there could be no difficulty in ascertaining, and then the legal consequences follow."
In the authorities which contain the most
complete enumeration of the different kinds of
legal estoppels and the fullest discussion of
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tbe law on the subject,
find no allusion to
the equitable estoppel which we are now considering. All legal estoppels, whether by record, by deed, or by matter in pais, depended
on, strict legal rules, and shut out proof of the
truth and justice of the individual case. Viner, Abr., "Estoppel," passim; Lyon v. Reed,
13 Mees. & W. S09; Freeman v. Cooke,
2

Exch.

658.

For this

reason, because legal estoppels,
whether by record, deed, or matter in pais,
shut out proof of the truth and justice of individual cases, they have been called odious, and
have been construed with much strictness
against parties that set them up. They were
formerly required, like other defences regarded as inequitable, to be pleaded with certainty
to a certain intent in every particular.
If
they were relied on by way of averment, and
tried by the jury, the jury might find, and
according to some authorities were bound by
their oath veritatem dicere to find, according
to the truth of the case, regardless of the estoppel.
Trials Per Pals, 284; Co. Litt 22Ta;
Com. Dig. "Estoppel," B, 10. The practice is
now different, and legal estoppels may be relied on, when given in evidence, without being
specially pleaded.
Legal estoppels exclude
evidence of the truth and the equity of the
particular case to support a strict rule of law,
on grounds of public policy.
Equitable estoppels are admitted on the exactly opposite ground of promoting the equity
and justice of the Individual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights imder a
general technical rule of law, when he has so
conducted himself that It would be contrary
to equity and good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth.
The facts upon
which equitable estoppels depend are usually
proved by oral evidence; smd the evidence
should doubtless be carefully scrutinized, and
be full and satisfactory, before it should be
admitted to estop the party from showing the
truth, especially In cases affecting the title to
land. But where the facts are clearly proved,
the maxim that estoppels are odious— which
was used in reference to legal estoppels, because they shut out the truth and justice of
the case —ought not to be applied to these
equitable estoppels, as it has sometimes been.
Inadvertently, as I think, from a supposed analogy with the legal estoppel by matter in pais,
to which they have, in this respect, no resemblance whatever. Lord Campbell, in Howard
V. Hudson, 2 El. & Bl. 10; Andrews v. Lyons,
In other cases, where
11 Allen, 349, 351.
more attention has been paid to the real nature
of this equitable doctrine, it has been held
that such estoppels are not odious, and to be
construed strictly, but are entitled to a fair
and liberal application, like other equitable
doctrines which are admitted to suppress
fraud and promote honesty and fair dealing.
Mellor and Compton, JJ., in Ashpitel v. Bryan,
3 Best & S. 474; Gowen, J., in Dezell v. Odell,
3 Hill, 220; Com. v. Moltz, 10 Pa. St. 530, 531;
Buckingham v. Hanna, 2 Ohio St 557; Van-
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Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 32G; Preston
V. Mann, 25 Conn. 118, 128.
In this equitable estoppel, the party is forbidden to set up his legal title because he has
so conducted
himself that to do it would be
As
contrai'y to equity and good conscience.
in other cases of fraud and dishonesty, the
circumstances
out of which the question may
arise are of infinite variety; and, unless courts
at law are willing to abdicate the duty of administering the equitable doctrine effectually
in suppression of fraud and dishonesty, the applicatlMi of it cannot be confined within the
limit of any narrow technical definition, such
as will relieve courts from looking, as in other
cases depending on fraud and dishonesty, to
the circumstances
of each individual case.
Certain general rules will doubtless apply, as
in other cases where relief is sought on such
groomds. But I find myself unable to agree
with the authorities where the old maxim that
legal estoppels are odious has been applied to
this equitable estoppel, and where attempts
have been made to lay down strict definitions,
such as would defeat the remedy in a large
proportion of the cases that fall within the
principle on which the doctrine is founded.
The doctrine having been borrowed from
equity, courts at law that have adopted it
should obviously look to the practice in equity
for their guide in the application of it; and in
equity, the doctrine has been liberally applied
to suppress fraud and enforce honesty and
fair dealing, without any attempt to confine
the doctrine within the limits of a strict definition. For instance, the doctrine has not In
equity been limited to cases where there was
an actual Intention to deceive.
The cases are
numerous where the party who was estopped
by his declarations or his conduct to set up
his legal title, was ignorant of it at the time,
and of course could have had no actual intention to deceive by concealing his title. Yet,
if the circumstances were such that he ought
to have informed himself, it has been held to
be contrary to equity and good conscience to
set up bis title, though he was in fact Ignorant
of it when he made the representations.
Hobbs V. Norton, Hunsden v. Cheyney, Teas-'
dale V. Teasdale, qua supra; and Burrowes v.
Lock, 10 Ves. 470.
So, if the party knew the
facts, but mistook the law.
Storrs v. Barker,
6 Johns. Ch. 166.
Nor is it necessary In
equity that the intention should be to deceive
any particular individual or individuals.
If
the representations are such, and made in such
circumstances,
that all persons interested in
the subject have the right to rely on them as
true, their truth cannot be denied by the party .
that has made them against any one who has
trusted to them and acted on them.
Gale v.
Lindo, Webber v. Farmer, qua supra.
In the much and well considered case of
Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118, 128, Storrs, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court, says:
"The doctrine of estoppel in pais, notwithstanding the great number of cases which
have turned upon it and are reported in the
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which belonged, originally and appropriately,
books, cannot be said even yet to rest upon
to the jurisdiction in equity.
any determinate legal test which wUl reconcile
It can hardly be supposed mat Lord Denthe decisions, or will embrace all transactions
man, in the statement which he made of this
to which the general principles of equitable
necessity wherein it originated demand that it equitable doctrine In reference to the facts of
In fact, it is because it Is that case, understood that he was laying down
should be applied.
a technical definition fixing the limits of the
so peculiarly a doctrine of practical equity,
that its technical application is so difficult, and doctrine, and excluding all cases that did not
its reduction to the form of abstract formulas come clearly within the terms which he used
Nevertheless,
This was said in on that occasion.
the remarks
is still unaccomplished."
of Lord Denman have often been treated as
1850, and little has since been done towards
a sort of authoritative text covering the whole
extricating the doctrine from the confusion
and conflict of authority with which it was ground, which it was the business of courts
This, as I think, has been in later cases to expound and explain. And it
then embarrassed.
is curious to observe what different and concaused by the fact that courts have continued
tradictory interpretations have been put on his
to exercise their ingenuity in the vain attempt
to compress a broad doctrine of equity within statement of the equitable doctrine;. It has
been cited in Massachusetts
as authority for
the narrow limits of a technical definition.
The case of Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & B decisions tn which it has been held that the
representations,
to estop the party from show469, decided as late as 1837, appears to have
ing they were not true, must have been made
been regarded, both in England and in this
country, as the leading case at law on this with the intent to deceive, and the intent to
subject. It was trover by the mortgagee of deceive the party who sets up the defence.
personal goods against the defendants,
who Plumer v. Lord, 9 Allen, 455; Andrews v. Lyons, 11 Allen, 349. And in California the same
were purchasers at a sheriff's sale on execuThe facts set up case has been relied on for the rule that where
tion against the. mortgagor.
in defence were, that the plaintiff was pres- a representation comes in any way to the ears
ent at the sale, did not disclose his title as of a party, who acts on it, the party making
Is estopped to deny its
mortgagee, and encouraged the defendants to the representation
purchase.
The question on trial was as to truth, unless it had the character of a confidential communication.
Mitchell v. Reed, 9
the property of the plaintiff in the goods, and
In England it has been treated as a
Lord Denman directed a verdict for the plain- Gal. 204.
tiff. A rule to show cause why the verdict statement of the equitable doctrine made in
reference to the circumstances of that case,
should not be set aside was made absolute.
In delivering the judgment of the court. and not Intended as a formal and complete
Lord Denman said:
"His [the plaintiff's] ti- definition. Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654;
Gregg v. Wells, 10 Adol. & E. 90; Jorden v.
tle having been established, the property could
only be devested by gift or bale, of which no Money, 5 H. L. Oas. 212.
It would be a laborious and not a profitable
But the rule
,.- Bpeciflc act was even surmise^.
/of law, is clear that where one, by his words task to attempt an analysis of all the recent
I will briefly advert
/ or conduct, willfully causes another to believe decisions on this subject.
the existence of a certain state of things, and to some of those which appear to be the most
induces him to act on that belief so as to alter Important.
In Plumer v. Lord, 9 Allen, 455, it was
his own previous position, the former Is concluded
from averring a different state of held that to create an estoppel in pais, the
things as existing at the same time; and the declarations or acts must have been accomplaintiff might have parted with his Interest panied with a design to mislead; and LangIn the property by a verbal gift or sale, with- don V. Doud, 10 Allen, 433, is to the same
In Andrews v. Lyons, 11 Allen, 349,
out any other formalities that threw technical point.
difficulties In the way of legal evidence. And the court went one step further, and decided
we think his conduct in standing by and giv- that the declarations or acts must have been
ing a kind of sanction to the proceedings un- accompanied
with a design to deceive the
party who sets up the estoppel, and induce
der the execution was a fact of such a nature
that the opinion of the jury ought to have iiim to act on them; and in this last case
been taken whether he had not, in point of it is said that such an estoppel shuts out the
truth, and is odious, and must be strictly
^fact, ceased to be the owner."
It is worthy of note that in this suit at law oroved. In Hawes v. Marchant, 1 Curt 144,
the court, so late as 1837, after stating the Fed. Gas. No. 6,240, the rule Is laid down
general equitable doctrine, did not venture to that to be estopped the party must have deput the defence directly on the ground that signedly made £ldmIssions inconsistent with
the plaintiff was estopped by his conduct to the defense or claim which he proposes to
prove the truth of the case, but allowed the set up, and another, with his knowledge and
facts to go to the jury as evidence that the consent, so acted on this admission, that he
plaintiff, in some undefined and mysterious will be Injured by allowing the admission
way, had parted with his property in the to be disputed; and this rule
is dted and
goods.
So late and so reluctant were the apparently approved in
Audenrled v. Bettecourts to admit in suits at law this defence,
ley, 5 Allen, 382.
which depended on fraud and dishonesty, and
In these cases, it is to be observed, the
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court have not been content with saying, in have been intended at the time; but, if the
reference to the facts before them, that, if party unwittingly misled another, you must
certain things concurred in the case, it would add that he has misled him under such cirfall within the equitable doctrine, and the cumstances that he had reasonable ground
party would be estopped, but they have un- for supposing that the pei-son whom he was
dertaken to lay down a strict legal defini- misleading would act upon what he was saytion of general application, excluding from ing.
the operation of the doctrine all cases that
In Gregg v. Wells, 10 Adol. & E. 90, Lord
do not fall within the terms of the definition.
Denman says: "Pickard v. Sears was in my
Applying the rule as laid down in Hawes v. mind at the time of the trial, and the prinMarchant to the present case, if Horn had ciple of that case may be stated even more ,
known that Oole had a demand against broadly than It is there laid down. A party ,
Charles E. Horn, had falsely represented to who negligently or culpably stands by and \
Cole that the goods belonged to Charles, allows another to contract on the faith and
)
with the design to deceive him and induce understanding of a fact which he can conhim to attach the goods as the property of tradict, cannot afterwards dispute that fact ;
Charles, and Cole, relying on the representain the action against the person whom he /
tion, had taken the goods as the property of has himself assisted in deceiving." This '
Charles, and as Horn intended, yet if, after shows that Lord Denman did not himself
he had made the false representation, he did understand that his remarks in Pickard v.
not know that the goods were taken as the Sears were to be taken as a definition and
property of Charles, and assent that they limitation of the equitable doctrine, for he
should be so taken, he would not be estop- says the principle of the case might be statped to set up his own title In the goods.
The ed more broadly than it is laid down there,
statement that another party must have act- and may Include the case of a culpable negligence.
ed on the false statement with his knowlSo Hobbs V. Norton, 1 Vern. 136;
edge and assent must mean this, or it can
Hunsden v. Cheyney, 2 Vern. 150; Teasdale"
mean nothing; for he could not know that V. Teasdale, 13 Vin. Abr. 539; Burrowes v.
he had acted on it at all until the act was Lock, 10 Ves. 475,— before cited, show that the
practice In equity does not require that there
done and accomplished.
The remark of Lord Campbell in Howard
should in all cases be an intention to deV. Hudson, qua supra, though not called for ceive, or even a knowledge that the repreby the case, is to the effect that the repre- sentation was false.
sentation must have been intended to deWe come now to the decisions in this country, which give a broader application to this
ceive.
These authorities would seem to sustain doctrine than those before cited.
the plaintiff's coimsel fully In his position
In Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 221, the general
that the false representation must not only doctrine is said to be that when a party, eibe Intended to deceive but also to deceive
ther by his declarations or his conduct, has
the identical party that acted on them.
Influenced a third person to act In a particuThere are, however, authorities of equal lar manner, he will not be afterwards perrespectability, and In greater numbers, which mitted to deny the truth of the admission if
maintain a different doctrine.
the consequence would be to work an injury
In England, the case of Pickard v. Sears to such third person, and that in such case
does not appear to have been understood as it must appear— First, that he made an ad- '
Intended to lay down a complete definition mission which is clearly inconsistent with ;
of the equitable doctrine excluding all cases the evidence he proposes to give, or the
that could not be brought within the terms claim which he proposes to set up; second,
of the remarks made by Lord Denman. In that the party has acted on the admission; i
Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Excb. 654, it was held third, that he will be injured -by allowing i
that the term "willfully," used in Pickard v. the truth of the admission to be disputed. \
Sears, was not to be understood In the sense According to this interpretation of the equi- j
of "maliciously";
and that, whatever a table doctrine, it would seem not to be nee- !
man's real meaning may be, if he so con- essary that the representation should be Inducts himself that a reasonable man would tended to deceive, or that the party making j
/^ take the representation to be true, and be- it should know it to be false, or ihat it i
/ lieve it was meant he should act on It, and should be intended the imrty should act on i
he did act on It as true, the party making It, who does so In fact, and is deceived by it. ,
j
1
the representation would be equally preclud- The rule of this case has been adopted and
j
ed from contesting its truth.
This is wholly followed in Newman v. Hook, 37 Mo. 207; '
j
\
inconsistent with the notion that an inten- Carpenter v. Stillwell, 12 Barb. 135; and
tion to deceive is an essential ingredient of Eldred v. Hazlett, 33 Pa. St. 316.
In Eoe V. Jerome, 18 Conn. 138, the genHbe representation, which precludes the party making it from showing that it was false. eral doctrine is stated to be that where one
So in Jorden v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 212, it person, by his words or conduct causes anwas held not to be necessary that the party other to believe in a certain state of things,
making the representations should know and thus induces him to act on that belief,
that they were false; that no fraud need BO as injuriously to affect his previous posl-
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seek ever to promote and encourage."
In Frost v. Saratoga Ins. Co.,
Denlo, 154,
it Is said by Beardsley, C. J., that such an
estoppel Is
question of ethics, and is allowed to prevent fraud and injustice, and
exists wherever a party cannot In good conscience gainsay his own acts or assertions.
The case of Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118,
Is strong to the point that this estoppel, depending on
broad doctrine of equity, cannot
be governed In application by narrow and
strict rules of construction, such as have prevailed in legal estoppels
In some. If not in most, of the cases. In
which
Is said that if a party makes representations Intending to deceive the party that
5

In a suit at law to recover damages for a
false affirmation that the signer of a note
was of age. it was decided, in Lobdell v.
Baker, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 193, that It was not
necessary to allege or prove th-at the defendant knew the slgn-r wa^ an Infaot. Wilde,
J., in dellveiing the opinI"n of the coiu^, ?aid:
"A party may render himself liable In an action for damages to a party prejudiced by
a false affirmation, thougli not made with
any fraudulent Inteution." This, It may be
sa'Kl. is not directly In point, but the only difft-rencu Is in the form of the remedy.
The
principle involved is the same, whether the
question is raised In a suit to recover d.amages for the false representation,
or redress
is sought by estopping the party to prove the
falsehood of the representation. Both cases
go on the same general ground that the party
is responsible
for the consequences of his
false representation.
There are numerous authorities that It la
not necessary to the estoppel that the declarations or conduct should be Intended to deceive any particular person or persons; that.

a

,

';

^^

'^i

person.

if they were intended to deceive generally, or
were of such a character, and made In sucb
circumstances, that It must have been under
stood they were likely to deceive, and any
person using due diligence was In fact deGregg v. Wells,
ceived by them, it Is enough.
10 Add. & E. 90; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer,
1 Johns. Oh. 353; Adams v. Brown, 16 Ohio
St. 78; Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 221; Quirk
V. Thomas, 6 Mich. 76; Mitchell v. Eeed, 9
Cal. 204.
It has been declared in many cases that
this equitable estoppel Involves a question of
legal ethics, and applies wherever a party
by. words or conhas made a representation,
duct, which he cannot In equity and good
conscience prove to be false; and that this
kind of estoppel, being a broad doctrine of
equity, cannot be limited In application by
the terms of any narrow legal definition. In
Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 483, it
is said by Sutherland, J., that the party
is estopped when in good conscience and
equity he ought not to be permitted to gainsay his admission; and In the same case, by
Nelson, J.: "From the means In which the
party must avail himself of these estoppels,
it Is obvious there can be no fixed and settled
rules of universal application."
And in Dezell V. Odell, 3 Hill, 225, Bronson, J., adopting
the language of Nelson, J., in Canal Co.
V. Hathaway, adds, "It is a question of ethics." In Strong v. EUsworth, 26 Vt. 366,
J., says the doctrine lies at the
Redfield,
foundation of morals. In Lucas v. Hart, 5
Iowa, 415, the court holds that: "In these
estoppels there can be no fixed and settled
rules of universal application to regulate
them as in technical legal estoppels;
that in
many,
and probably In most. Instances,
whether the act or admission shall operate as
an estoppel or not must depend on the circumstances
of the case, though there are
some general rules which may materially assist in the examination of such cases."
In
the application of these general rules to that
case the court decided that the acts and admissions of the respondent estopped him from
asserting his title to the property in question;
that to permit him to do
would be "unconscionable,
and contrary to that faimeas
and honest dealing which courts of equity

a

tlon, he Is concluded from averring a different state of things as existing at the time;
and this rule was followed in the later cases
of C!owles V. Bacon, 21 Conn. 451, and Dyer
V. Cady, 20 Conn. 563; and In Preston -v.
Mann, 25 Conn. 118, before cited, it is said
that the doctrine did not then rest on any
determinate, legal test which will embrace
all transactions to which the general principles of equity. In which it originated, demand that It should be applied.
Buchanan v. Moore, 13 Serg. & R. 304, 306,
is to the point that, though the party behis representation to be true, and
lieved
made it under a mistake, he Is estopped to
show that he made the representation innocently believing it to be true, provided the
other party acted on it, and had reason to
So in Strong v. Ellsact on it, as true.
worth, 26 Vt. 366, It is said by Redfield, C.
/j., that he who by his words or actions, or
his silence even, intentionally or carelessly
Induces another to do an act which he
/
would not otherwise have done, and which
(
will prove injurious to him If he Is not al\
\ lowed to insist on the fulfillment, may insist
and that the doctrine
^N.on such fulfillment;
of equitable estoppels lies at the foundation
of morals. In MitcheU v. Reed, 9 Cal. 204,
It was held that where a statement made to
a third person is not confidential, but general, and is acted on by others, the party
making the declaration Is estopped to deny
Its truth; that the intention with which the
declaration is made is not material, except,
This case
perhaps, where It Is confidential.
and Quirk v. Thomas, 6 Mich. 76, are authorities that to work the estoppel it is not
necessary the declaration should be made to
the party who acts on It, nor In his presence,
nor that the declaration should be Intended
Vtp come to the knowledge of any particular
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acts on them, the equitable estoppel applies,
It was not intended, as I think, to lay down
a rule excluding all cases that did not fall
within the statement made in reference to
the facts of the case then under consideration; that what is said is not to be taken as
a rule to limit and define the doctrine and
exclude all other cases.
They say, if such
and such things concur, "this case will fall
within the doctrine"; but they do not intend
to say no other cases are within it For example, in Kinney v. Pamsworth,
17 Conn.
361, Storrs, J., says that "admissions which
have been the means, designedly, of leading
others to a particular com-se of conduct, cannot afterwards be conscientiously retracted
by one who has made them."
He could not
have intended to lay down the rule that one
would in no case be estopped by a representation not designed to deceive, because
the same judge, in Preston v. Mann, says:
"The doctrine Is not reduced to the limits of
any formula," and, "whatever the motive
may be, if one so acts or speaks that the
natui-al consequence of his words or conduct
will be to influence another to change his condition, he is legally charged with the intent
to induce the other to believe and to act on
that belief, if such proves to be the result."
So Lord Denman, speaking,
in Gregg v.
Wells, 10 Adol. & B. 90, of his judgment In
Pickard v. Sears, says:
"The principle of
that case may be stated even more broadly
than it is there laid down."
In this state we have several cases where
the general question has been more or less
considered. In Wells v. Pierce, 27 N. H. 503,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel was traced
to its origin in equity, and it was held that
If the owner actively encourages the purchase of his property from another, he will
be precluded from claiming it, though he
was not aware of his interest at the time;
which is clearly in conflict with the notion
that the representation must be accompanied
In Davis v.
with an intention to deceive.
Handy, 37 N. H. 65, the doctrine of Wells v.
Pierce was approved and applied. In the
recent case of Drew v. Kimball, 43 N. H.
285, one point directly involved was whether
it was necessary that the party to be estopped should intend to deceive and defraud the
individual to whom the representation was
and it
made, and who set. up the defence;
Indeed
was held that it was not necessary.
it seems to me that it would be trifling with
a doctrine depending on equity and good conSo, if a represcience to hold otherwise.
sentation was intended to deceive one man,
and it in fact deceived and defrauded anThen, again, if the representation
other.
were intended to have one operation, and, as
it turned out, deceived and defrauded by
another method not contemplated by the
party at the time, but still the natural consequence of the representation. It would be
quibbling with a doctrine depending for its
application on the morality of the act to hold
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that the party would not be answerable for
the consequences of his false and fraudulent
representation as much as if it had taken
effect on the party and in the manner intended.
In a case depending on a question of
"legal ethics," it would bring down the morality of the law to a very low standard to
hold that a party was not liable for the
wrong caused by his fraud to one man, because the fraud was contrived against another man.
In Drew v. Kimball the case did not raise
But, on
the precise point taken in this case.
a full discussion of the general doctrine, and
a review of the authorities, the court, adopting the hypothetical case put by Parke, B.,
in Freeman v. Oooke, say: "If, whatever a
man's intentions may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the
representation to be ti'ue, and believe it was
meant he should act upon it, and he Aid act
upon it, as true, the party making the representation would be equally precluded from
contesting its truth.
In short, the representations are to be regarded as willful when
the person making them means them to be
acted on, or if, without regard to intention,
he so conducts himself that a reasonable man
would take the representation to be true,
and believe it was meant he should act
on it."
There have been several other cases in this
state where thijs equitable doctrine has been
Thompson v. Sanconsidered
and applied.
born, 11 N. H. 201; Simons v. Steele, 36 N.
H. 73; McMahon v. Portsmouth Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 22 N. H. 15; Odlin v. Gove, 41 N.
H. 473; Corbett v. Norcross, 35 N. H. 99,
115; Richardson v. Chickering, 41 N. H. 380,
Though I do not find that the precise
385.
point taken here for the plaintiff has been
directly decided in any of our cases, yet the\
general current of our decisions on the subject tends to a liberal application of the doctrine for the suppression of fraud and dishonesty,
and the promotion of justice and
fair dealing. No disposition has been shown
in the courts of this state to treat this equitable estoppel as odious, and embarrass its application by attempts to confine it within the
limits of a narrow technical definition. We
are content to follow where the spirit and
general tone of these decisions lead; and they 1
lead plainly to the conclusion that, where a \
man makes a statement disclaiming his title
to property, in a manner and under circumstances such as he must understand those
who heard the statement would believe to be
true, and, if they had an interest in the subject, would act on as true, and one, using
his own means of knowledge with due diligence, acts on the statement as true, the
[party who makes the statement cannot show
that his representation was false, to the inI
jury of the party who believed it to be true,
and acted on it as such; that he will be liable for the natural consequences of his representation, and cannot be heard to say that
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the party actually injured was not the one
he meant to deceive, or that his fraud did
not take effect In the manner he intended.
Our conclusion is that, on the facts which
the verdict has established, the plaintiff was
estopped to show his representation
that the

belonged to Charles E. Horn to be
false, though he did not know that the defendant Cole had any- demand against
Charles E. Horn, and though he had not Cole
in his mind as the party whom he meant to
goods

deceive.

Judgment on the verdict.
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Mr. Justice SWATNE delivered the opinion
of the court.
This Is an action of ejectment brought by
Diclierson and Wheeler.
The latter died
during the progress of the suit The parties
agreed in writing to submit the case to the
court without the intervention of a jury.
The court found the facts. So far as it is
necessary
to state them, they may be thus
summarized: Mlcajah Chauneey owned the
He died on the
land In controversy.
day of February, 1853, leaving two children,
They
Edmund Chauneey and Sarah Kline.
were his only heirs at law. He is the common source of title of all the parties in this
litigation. On the 3d of March, 1853, John
Kline and Sarah, his wife, conveyed by warranty deed the entire premises to Lowell
Morton. The deed was duly recorded on the
6th of March, 1854, and on the 1st of April,
1854, Lowell Morton entered into possession
of the preinlses.
He and the defendants have
ever since been in actual possession, claiming
to own and hold the property as tenants in
common.
The latter were In possession at
the commencement of this suit, claiming title
from Lowell Morton.
through conveyances
Prior to the 1st of April, 1856, Lowell Morton learned that- Edmund Chauneey was one
of the children of Mlcajah Chauneey, and
Whereupon Lowthat he lived In OaUfomla.
ell Morton procured Eleazer Morton to write
to Edmund Chauneey to learn whether he
On the 1st
made any claim to the premises.
of April, 1856, Edmund Chauneey, still living
In California, addressed a letter to his sister,
Sarah Kline, then living In Michigan, wherein
he disavowed, in strong terms, the intention
ever to assert s^ich a claim.
The contents of this letter subsequently
came to the knowledge of Lowell Morton,
to the defendants
^who thereafter conveyed
"by warranty deeds. Under these deeds they
have since held and claimed title, and have
On the
I occupied and Improved the property.
9th of July, 1865, Edmund Chauneey conveyby
ed the undivided half of the premises,
quitclaim deed, to Orlando B. Dicljerson and
On the 1st of May, 1868,
James WItherell.
WItherell conveyed all his right, title, and interest to William W. Wheeler, one of the
original plaintiffs. The suit was Instituted
Lowell Morton
on the 6th of March, 1873.
and the defendants had then been in possesThe
sion eighteen years and eleven months.
court below held as conclusions of law that
the action was barred by the statute of lim-

writ
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of error.

Both the conclusions of law are relied upon
as errors for the reversal of the judgment.
Our remarljs will be confined to the point of
estoppel.
This defence is founded upon the letter of
Edmund Chauneey.
The contents of the letter of Morton, to which it refers, are not
given in the finding of facts, but the subject of that letter and the inquiry which it
made appear clearly in the letter of Chauneey. He said: "Mr. Morton wrote me a let-!
Intended to
ter.
He wanted to know if
claim any of the Conger farm" (meaning the
premises In controversy).
"You can tell Mr,
Morton for me, he need not fear any thing
from me. Thank God, I am well off here,
and you can claim all there. This letter will
be enough for him.
intended to give you
and yours all my property there, and more
if you need it." The phrase, "I intended to
give," etc., Implies that he knew his half of
the farm had already been sold to Morton, and
that he could not, therefore, give his sister,
to whom the letter was addressed, any part
of that property.
It does not appear that
there was any other property held by them as
coparceners.
He says furthar, that he Intended to give her more If she needed It.
All this was communicated to Lowell Morton.
What was the effect upon him? He was
lulled Into security.
He took no measures to
perfect his title, nor to procure any redress
from the Klines, who had conveyed and been
paid for the whole of the property while they
ovmed but the half. On the contrary, he
gave thereafter deeds of warranty to all the
defendants,— who are sixty-two in number,—
and he and they occupied and improved the
premises down to the commencement of this
suit.
Between that time and the date of the
letter was a period of nearly seventeen years.
What Improvements were made and how far
the property had risen in value are not disclosed, nor does it appear what stimulated
Chauneey
and comto violate his promise
mence this attack on the defendants.
The estoppel here relied upon is known as
an equitable estoppel, or estoppel In pals.
The law upon the subject is well settled.
The vital principle is that he who by his lan-^
guage or conduct leads another to do what
he would not otherwise have done, shall not
subject such person to loss or Injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he
acted.
Such a change of position is sternly
forbidden. It Involves fraud and falsehood,
and the law abhors both.
This remedy Is always so applied as to promote the ends of
justice. It is available only for protection,
and cannot be used as a weapon of assault.
It accomplishes that which ought to be done
between man and man, and is not permitted
to go beyond this limit
It Is akin to the
principle Involved in the limitation of ac-
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tlons, and does its work of justice and repose where the statute cannot be invoked.
Here, according to the finding of the court,
the time of adverse possession lacked but a
year and a month of being twenty years,—
when- it is conceded the statutory bar would
have been complete.
In Faxton v. Faxon, 28 Mich. 159, a mortgagee holding several mortgages prevailed on
then intenda son of the deceased mortgagor,
ing to remove to a distance, to remain on the
premises and support the family, by assuring
him that the mortgages should never be enThe son supported the family, and
forced.
the property grew in value under his tUlage.
After the lapse of several years the mortHe was held
gagee proceeded to foreclose.
to be estopped by his assurances upon which
"The
The court said:
the son had acted.
Bomplainant may have estopped himself without any positive agreement, if he intentionally led the defendants to do or abstain from
doing any thing involving labor or expendiamount, by giving
ture to any considerable
they should be relieved
them to understand
In Harkfrom tbe burden of the mortgages.
ness V. Toulmin, 25 Mich. 80, and Truesdale
V. Ward, 24 Mich. 117, tliis principle was applied, in the former case, to the extent of destroying a -chattel mortgage, and in the latter, of forfeiting rights under a land contract, where parties were led to believe they
were abandoned.
There is no rule more necessary to enforce good faith than that which
compels a person to abstain from asserting
claims which he has induced others to suppose he would not rely on. The rule dores
not rest on the assumption that he has obtained any personal gain or advantage, but
on the fact that he has induced others to act
in such a manner that they will be seriously prejudiced if he is allowed to fail in carrying out what he has encouraged them to expect."
Cooley, J., was inclined to doubt the
sufficiency
of the proof, but said, finally:
"His" (the mortgagee's) "assurances have undoubtedly been relied upon and acted upon by
and, considering
the defendantfl,
the great
lapse of time without any claim under the
mortgages on the part of the complainant,
am not disposed to dissent from the conclusion of my Brethren."
The case before us
arose also in Michigan.
In Evans v. Snyder,
64 Mo. 516, the heirs assailed
an administrator's sale. No order of sale could be
found.
This was held to be a fatal defect
But the supreme court of the state held that
where they stood silently by for years, while
the occupant was making valuable and lasting improvements
on the property,
and redeeming it from the lien of the ancestor's
, debts, they would be estopped from afterHere, as by
wards asserting their claim.
Judge Cooley, stress is laid upon the lapse of
This is also a feature of the case in
time.
hand.
Other authorities to the same effect are
They may be readily found.
very numerous.

I

It

is unnecessary to extend this opinion by referring to them.
We think the facts disclosed In the record
make a complete case of estoppel in pals.
But it is said this objection to the plaintifC's claim is not available at law, and must
be set up in equity.
"This is certainly not the common law.
'And so a man can see one
Ldttleton says:
thing in this case, that a man shall be estopped by matter of fact, though there be no
writing, by deed or otherwise.' Lord Coke,
commenting hereon, gives an instance of estoppel by matter in fact,—this very case of
partition. Co. Litt. 356, § 667. And such an
award has been held sufficient to estop a
party against whom ejectment was brought.
Morris v. Eosser, 3 East, 15." Brown v.
Wheeler,

17 Conn.

345,

353.

In City of Cincinnati

v. White's Lessee, 6
the proprietors of the city plat, in
dedicated
the ground between B^ont
1789,
street and the Ohio river to the public for
The legal
and other purposes.
commercial
title had not then emanated from the governIn this state of
ment of the United States.
things the statute of limitations does not run.
acquired the legal
White long subsequently
title and brought ejectment for the premises.
This court said (page 441): "This is a possessory action, and the plaintiff, to entitle
himself to recover, must have tiie right of
possession;
and whatever takes away this
right of possession will deprive him of the
Adams, Bj. 32;
by ejectment.
remedy
Starkie, part 4, 505-507."
This is the rule

Pet.

431,

laid down by Lord Mansfield, in Atkyns v.
Hoarde, 1 Burr. 119. "Ejjectment," says he, -,
"is a possessory remedy, and only competent 1
where the lessor of the plaintiff may enter,
and every plaintiff in ejectment must show a
right of possession as well as of property." ,
If the plaintiff in the present c%se was not
entitled to possession, how, according to this
authority, could he recover? If he had recovered, and a court of equity would have enjoined him from executing the judgment by a
writ of possession, we ask, again, how could
he recover in this action? Is not the concession that relief could be had in equity fatal to
the proposition we are considering? In Stoddard V. Chambers, 2 How. 284, it was said by
this court: "On a title by estoppel, an action
of ejectment can be maintained." We do not
overlook the fact that a land claim had been
conveyed before it was confirmed by an act
of congress to the assignor and his legal representatives.
It was held that on such confirmation the legal title became vested in the
former, "and inured, by way of estoppel, to
his grantee and those who claimed by deed
under him." In that case, as in this, there
was no formal transfer of the title. The
transfer was made, as under a statute of limitations, when the bar is complete, by operation of law. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black,
Why may not a like transfer be held to
599.
have been made in this case?
The reason

EJQUIXABLE
given for the rule of Inurement and estoppel
by virtue of conveyances is, that it avoids
circuity of action.
Does not the same consideration apply, with equal force, In cases
of estoppel in pais? Why is it necessary to
go into equity in one case and not in the
other?
It has never been held that the statute of
frauds applies to cases of inurement, and it
has been conceded that it does not affect
cases of dedication.
Where is the difference
in principle in this respect between those
cases and the one before us? But here this
point cannot arise, because the promise relied
upon was in writing.
In City of Cincinnati v.
White's Lessee, supra, this court, speaking of
the dedication there in question, said, "The
law considers it in the nature of an estoppel
in pais, which precludes the original owner
from revoking such dedication," and that a
grant might have been presumed, "if that
had been necessary, and the fee might be
considered in abeyance until a cojnpetent grantee appeared to receive it; which was as early as the year 1802, when the city was incorporated." Here there was a grantee capable
of taking the fee aU the time from the date
of the letter. The common law is reason
dealing by the light of experience With hu-
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man affairs.
One of its merits is that it has
the capacity to reach the ends of justice by
the shortest paths.
The passage of a title by inurement and estoppel is its work without the help of legislation. We think no sound reason can be
given why the same thing should not follow
in cases of estoppel in pais where land is concerned.
This subject has been carefully examined
in Elgelow, Estop, pp. 533, 537. The learned author comes to no final conclusion whether in cases like this the defence may be made
at law, or whether a resort to equity is necessary.
The former is om- view. Whether the
title passed or not, the fact that the plaintiff
was not entitled to possession of the premises was fatal to the action.
Chauncey conveyed to the plaintiff in error
by deed of quitclaim. He is not, therefore,
a bona fide purchaser.
Piatt v. Oliver, 3
How. 333; May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217.
Morton and the defendants were in possession.
For both these reasons, he took whatever title he acquired subject to all the rights,
legal and equitable, of Morton and of the defendants, who deraigned their titles from the

latter.
Judgment aflJrmed.
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NAT. BANK v. NATIONAL BANK OF COM-

OONTINBNTAIi

MONWEALTH.
(50 N. T. 575.)

Court of Appeals

of New York. 1872.

Action by the Continental National Bank
against the National Bank of the Commonwealth.
From a judgment of the General
Term affirming a judgment for plaintiff, deAffirmed.
fendant appeals.
This controversy arises over a sum of $63,062.50 paid by the Continental Bank on a
check drawn on that bank by one Ross, who
kept an account thereat, to the order of J. S.
Cronise & Co. A certification purporting to
be by the teller of that bank was forged on
the check, but the check was received by
Cronise & Co. as a certified check and was
so deposited
in the Commonwealth Bank.

j not

made on the faith of the statements

plaintiff's

teller.

<>f

(7) That the jury could not speculate upon
what might have been done or attempted by
Cronise & Co. after the delivery by them of
the gold certificates or checks to Ross, had
they been apprised that the certification was
a forgery after such delivery.
(8) That defendant's rights were not superior to those of Cronise & Co.
(9) That plaintiff was bound by the acts
and declarations of its teller only so far as
the same were within the scope of his anithority; and that his verbal admission was
not binding on plaintiff, unless authority to
make such was proved or the statement rati-

fied.

Luther R. Marsi, for appellant
Bmott, for respondent.

James

J. The jury have found to be
forgery, the writing on the check, which
purports to be a certification thereof by the
plaintiff's teller. They have also found that
the teller, when resorted to, In effect pronounced 'K genuine.
That the plaintiff would be bound by the
act of its teller, had he in fact certified the
check,
is settled.
Farmers' & Mechanics'
Bank v. Butchers' & Drftvers' Bank, 16 N.
Y. 125, 69 Am. Dec. 6781 14 N. Y. 623. Not
do we doubt that an admission by liim that
it was genuine, made on the presentation to
him of the counterfeited certification and Inquiry put, also binds the plaintiff. We can
see no difference in result, and effect upon
others dealing with the check on the strength
of that admission, between writing "Timpson, teller," signifying good, upon a worthless check, and declaring that the words
"Timpson, teller," already there, were written there by him. In the one case they are
his own, and Signify good. In the other he
adopts them as his own, and so makes them
his own, and they signify good. This was the
effect of his admission. And see 53 Me. 103,
and Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447.
There seems to be no dispute but that the
defendant takes the place of Cronise & Oo.,
•charge given.
and may avail itself of any defense to tie
action of the plaintiff which that firm of
(2) That, to estop plaintiff, the check must
have been taken for value on the faith of the brokers could have made.
acts or declarations of the plaintiff's teller.
The question then arises, is the plaintiff,
(3) That it was not enough to show acts or by the other facts presented,
estopped from
declarations of plaintiff's teller inducing the maintaining that in truth the certification
belief that the certification was genuine, but was a forgery, and the admission of its telit must be shown that the check was taken ler an Innocent mistake?
for value on the faith of such acts or decThere is no disagreement as to the genlarations.
eral definition of an estoppel in pais.
It Is
(5) That if the cheek was not shown to
agreed that there must have been some act
plaintiff's teller until after Cronise & Co. or declaration of the plaintiff
or of its agent
had actually delivered the gold checks and to the
defendant's assignors, which so afcertificates to Ross, then the only question
fected the conduct of the latter to their
was the question of forgery.
Injury, as that it would be unjust now to
(6) That if nothing further remained to be permit the plaintiff to set up
the truth of
done by Cronise & Co. to complete
their the case to the contrary of its
mistaken act
Ross,
with
contract
then the delivery was or declaration.
The day before the drawing of the check
Cronise & Co. sold $50,000 of gold to brokers,
who gave the name of Ross as their principal, which was accepted by Cronise & Oo.'s
clerks. The next day Ross went to Cronise's
office, asked for the gold, and stated to whom
he intended to deliver it.
Cronise's clerk
took the check, presented it to the teller at
the Continental Bank, who said that it was
"all right," whereupon the clerk returned to
Cronise. In the meantime Ross had been
given gold checks and certificates to the
amount of $50,000, payable to bearer, and
He went with them to
had left the office.
the Bank of New York, was there Identified,
received the gold, and left for parts unknown.
Cronise & Co. had relied entirely on the information obtained from the Continental
Bank, and had taken no steps to pursue
They indorsed the check and depositRoss.
ed it in the Commonwealth Bank the same
afternoon. It was sent in through the clearing house and charged to the Continental
Bank in the usual way on the following day,
on the afternoon of which notice was given
to the Commonwealth Bank that the certification was a forgery.
The following requests to charge were refused except as otherwise contained in the
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But the plaintiff insists that there are certain limitations to be put upon this generality.
1st The plaintiff claims that it is necessary that its act or declaration must have
been made to mislead.
To this proposition the plaintiff cites Pickard V. Sears, 6 Adol. & E. 469; 33 Eng. Com.
Law, 115, where the court say: "Where one
by his words or conduct willfully causes another," etc. But this word "willfully," used
In the decision in that case, has subsequently received judicial comment and limitation.
Thus in Freeman v. "Cooke, 2 Exch. 654, the
court say: "By the term 'wUlfully,' however, in that rule, we must understand, if,
whatever a man's real intentions may be,
he so conducts himself that a reasonable
man would take the representation to be
true, and believe that it was meant that he
should act upon it, and he did act upon it
as true, the party making the representation would be equally precluded from contesting its truth; and conduct by negligence
or omission, where there is a duty cast upon
any person by usage of trade^ or* otherwise
to disclose the truth, may often have the
same effect"
So in Cornish v. Abington, 4 Hurl. & N.
549, Pollock, C. B., says:
"The jury having
found that the defendant, whether intentionally or not, led the plaintiff to form an
opinion that he was dealing with the defendant and induced him to furnish goods to the
defendant, the defendant must pay him for
them." And referring to Freeman v. Cooke,
and Pickard v. Sears, supra, the learned
chief baron remarks to the effect that the
word "willfully" means nothing more than
"voluntarily," and he holds that if the representation was made voluntarily, though
the effect upon the hearer was produced unintentionally, the same result would foUow;
and that if a party uses language which, in
the ordinary course of business and the general sense in which words are understood,
conveys a certain meaning, he cannot afterward say that he is not bound, if another
so understanding it has acted upon it Of
course, this general language here extracted
should be read in connection with the facts
of that case to prevent carrying the force o*
these words too far.
But it is shown that
"willfully" and "voluntarily," as used in the
definition of an estoppel, are convertible.
In Manufacturers' & Traders' Bank v.
Hazard, 30 N. Y. 226, it is said that it is not
necessary to an equitable estoppel that the
party should design to mislead. Be this dictum or rule, we do not find that it has been
in this state disputed or questioned.
In In re Bahia & S. P. Ry. Co., L. R., 3
Q. B. 584, it is held that if a representation
is made with the Intention that it shall be
acted upon by another, and he does so, there
is an estoppel from denying the truth of
what was represented to be the fact, and
that the case is within the principle of PickH.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)-8

f^

ESTOPPEL.

113

ard V. Sears, as explained by Freeman v.
Cooke, both supra.
The word "wiUful" does not mean malo
anlmo, but so far willfully that the party,
making the representation acted upon, means
that it shall be acted upon in that way. Per
Compton, J., in Howard v. Hudson, 2 Ell.
& Bl. 1.
And we hold that there need not be, upon
the part of the person making a declaration
or doing an act an intention to mislead the
one who is induced to rely upon it There'
are cases in which parties have been estopped where their acts or declarations have
been done or made in ignorance of their own
rights, not knowing that the law of the land
gave them such rights. Here, certainly, there
could be no purpose to mislead others, for
there was not the knowledge to inform the
purpose, and both parties were equally and
6
innocently misled.
Storrs v. Barker,
Johns. Ch. 166, 10 Am. Dec. 316. Indeed,
it would limit the rule much within the reason of it if it were restricted to cases where
there was an element of fraudulent purpose.
In- very many of the cases in which the rule
has been applied, there was no more than
negligence on the part of him who was ea
topped.
And it has long been held, that
where it is a breach of good faith to allow
the truth to be shown, there an admission
will estop. Gaylor v. Van Loan, 15 Wend.
308.
There are decisions where the rule has
been stated as the plaintiff claims it We
have looked at those cited by it.
It was not
necessary to the conclusions of the court in
those, that such restriction should be put
upon the rule, and we do not think that the
language employed was used with the intention of making such a limitation, for the
facts of the case did not require it.
2d. The plaintiff further claims that Cronise & Oo. parted with the gold and took the
check before the declaration of the teller
was made known to them, and that before
an estoppel can be insisted upon, it must appear that they acted in reliance thereupon,
or altered
their position in consequence
thereof, or parted with some value on the
faith therein.
The fair result of the testimony is, that
Ross left the office of Cronlse & Go. before
the return of their messenger to it from the
bank, and Cronlse & Co. had then delivered
They did not act after his
the gold checks.
return, relying upon the declaration of the
teller which the messenger brought to them.
Assuming, for the present, that they did
in reliance upon that declaration refrain
from action and left untaken any measures
for the arrest of Boss or the stoppage of
payment on the checks he had received; assuming that It is reasonably probable, that
If they had been told by the plaintiff the
reverse of what they were told, they would
have acted and would have taken those
measures;
assuming that it is reasonably
probable that action and such measures
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in pais. And see 15 Wend. 308, and
Brown v. Sprague, 5 Denio, 545.
These cases appear to us to lay down a
sound rule. It must be that the conduct of
by the decmen. which may be influenced
larations of those with whom they deal, Is
aot confined
to that which is shown by
affirmative and positive acts following upon
find induced by those declarations. Conduct
iS not alone that which is active, positive
Conduct, as limited to this
and aflirmatlve.
inquiry, is the reserve of one's own powers
of person and property, and of those means
of help which can be summoned from friendly or accommodating
sources and from the
tribunals and officers of justice, and is as
often forbearance of their use and quiescence and contentment with affairs as they
are, as action designed
to change affairs.
And such quiescence and content, induced
estoppel.
In Howard v. Hudson, supra. Lord Camp- by false or erroneous statement, may be
bell, Ch. J., recognizes the existence of the quite as damaging as any result from acprinciple, that doing an act and omission to tion. It is as bad to fail to recover property
act are the same. And see Helme v. Insur- gone, when with the knowledge of an existIn ing fact it might have been retrieved, as it
ance Co., 61 Pa. 107, 100 Am. Dec. 621.
Knights V. Wiffin, L. R., 5 Q. B. 660, the per- is to lose It. And so it is as damaging to
son who relied upon the declaration had be- rely in quiet upon an untrue statement, to
fore it was made and not in reliance upon it, the neglect of using the means of recovery,
as It Is to rely upon an untrue statement,
paid his money for property not delivered,
but after it was made, relying upon it, took and by action thereon meet with loss irrepno active course of conduct, remaining con- arable.
To hold otherwise, would be to astent and passive.
Had the declaration been sert that the law makes a difference between
the reverse of what it was, which would damage received by action and omission to
then have been true, he might have taken act, in circumstances precisely similar, save
active measures tending to retrieve his posi- in these elements.
When an act produces
tion.
He rested satisfied in the belief, as conduct from which flows injury. It cannot
man, that the property had
a reasonable
matter whether that conduct be affirmative
And he was or negative, active or quiescent.
been passed to him as agreed.
damaged.
The right of estoppel was there
We assumed, for the purpose of the preand it was maintained upon the vious consideration of one branch of the subupheld,
ground of the plaintiff relying upon the ject, that Cronise & Co. did. In rriianee upon
statement and taking no steps further, and the declaration of the plaintiff, refrain from
of his abstaining from active measures of re- action and leave untaken any measures.
covery in consequence of the statement.
It The jury have so found the fact, and the
was there held, that acquiescent reliance finding Is sustained by the testimony.
We
upon the defendant's statement was an alter- also assumed that It was reasonably probation of the plaintiff's position.
able that if they had been told the truth by
In Bank v. Keene, 53 Me. 103, the ques- the plaintiff they would have acted, and have
The plaintiff there held taken measures which would have prevented
tion was presented.
a note purporting to have been signed by the whole or some of the injury which beHearing that the same was fell. The jury have found that this assumpthe defendant.
forged,
the plaintiff asked the defendant, tion Is well founded.
who, looking at the note, admitted the signaThough, as Is conceded herein, Ross left
The plaintiff, in reli- the office of the brokers before their messenture to be genuine.
ance on that admission, refrained from tak- ger returned, he had left but a very short
ing any proceedings against him who passed time; a time so short that had the plaintiff
the note to it, so as to secure payment from declared the certification a forgery and the
him. The instructions to the jury were: check worthless, there was ground for the
That if the plaintiff, relying upon the de- jury to find that there was time for the
fendant's admission, was induced to refrain broker's clerk, with his speed of foot, to have
from obtaining security by arrest of the one gone from the bank of plaintiff to the office
passing the note upon it, or by attachment of Speyers, there have learned the falsity of
of his property, and thereby sustained an Ross' assertion of a delivery of gold to SpeyInjury, the defendant would be estopped from er, and thence to the office of Cronise & Co.,
denying his signature. This Instruction was and have delivered his message soon enough
declared by the court on review to be Im for measures to have been decided upon and
harmony with the principles applicable to es- taken for the stoppage of the payment of
would have prevented tlie whole or some
part ot the damage which befell, can it be
held that the conduct of Cronise & Co. was
so affected
to their injury by the declaration of the plaintiff as that the defendant
may set up the declaration in estoppel of the
plaintiff?
The proposition contained in thi.»
query we understand the plaintiff to resist.
And this, because the act, the affirmative
act, had been done which changed the position of Cronise & Oo. toward Koss and the
transaction before the declaration was made
known to them, and had not been done in
reliance upon it. And this is a denial, that
after a declaration is made and is relied
upon, an omission thereby induced to act
and to take such measures as will arrest an
impending evil, and an injury resulting from
such omission, can be made available as an
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the checks at the Bank of New York. We
leave out of view for the present the checks
upon the sub-treasury.
Nor was it a strained, unnatural nor unjustified inference for the jury to make that the
clerk would so have done, and that Cronlse
& Co. would have taken such measures and
made stoppage of payment. It was but applying to the facts of the case and to the
position of the parties in this transaction, the
common Itnowledge of human nature and its
workings under powerful Incentives, and at
a particular spot in the state and a particular hour of the day when those incentives
are pressed in their greatest strength.
And from these findings thus authorized,
it was a legitimate conclusion that Cronise
& Co. suffered injury by the declaration to
them of the plaintiff.
And if there is nothing else in the case
the verdict and judgment are to be sustained.
The plaintiff Insists however that the
learned judge at circuit made several errors
in his refusals to charge as requested, and
in the charge which he delivered to the jury.
We wiU notice all of these instances which
are indicated upon the points handed up,
alluding to the requests by the numbers
given to them in the points.
The second, third and fifth requests are
already covered by what we have said.
The seventh request is: "That the jury
cannot speculate upon what might have been
done or attempted by Cronise & Co. after the
delivery by them of the gold certificates or
gold checks to the person calling himself
John Ross, had they been apprised that the
certificate was a forgery after such delivery."
If by the word "speculate," which Is the
word of controlling meaning in the request,
was meant to guess, or to reason to practical
results from unproven premises, doubtless
the jury had no right so to do. And there
would have been no error in the learned
judge if he had so told the jury. But It
would have been in the nature of an abstract
proposition not necessarily involved in not
growing out of the particular case. Hence
It was not error for him to decline to charge,
He did
except as he did thereafter charge.
charge them that Cronise & Co. to set up an
estoppel must have had time to stop payment of the gold; that the circumstances
must have been such as that they could have
done it; that they must have occupied such
a relation to the transaction as that they
could with reasonable diligence have arrested the crime in its consummation and have
secured the gold; that they must have still
stood in a position where they could have
corrected any act and could have saved the
gold.
This put the jury upon the proper inquiry. Nor can we concede that at the close
of the trial the question of estoppel had be^
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come one of law only and for the court, as
is claimed by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff.
He admits that there were two
questions yet for the jury; whether the certification was forged or not, and whether its
genuineness
was admitted. And surely it

was still a question of fact how much relative time had been spent by the respective
actors from the moment Ross left the office
of Cronise & Co." until the payment of the
checks at the Bank of New Xork, and considering the relative positions of the different business places, whether in that lapse of
time Cronise & Co. under all the circumstances could have made effectual interposition to stop payment of the checks delivered to him, or have made any successful
effort at recaption of the gold if he had received it.
It is claimed that the learned judge erred
in charging the jury that the delivery of the
gold checks was not in law a delivery of the
gold.

The points call our attention to that part
of the charge in which the language of the
judge is: "The delivery of these gold checks
on the part of Mr. Cronise, it is insisted
upon, is in law a delivery of the gold.
think that it was not."
It is proper to see in what connection this
was said. For standing alone or applied to
any and every case of a delivery of checks,
it might be in some of them erroneous.
What was the practical application of it for
the minds of the jury? The topic then under the learned judge's and the jury's attention was whether Cronise & Co. could, under the facts of the case, in any proper view
as injured by the
of them, be considered
plaintiff's declaration; and the judge pre"If
cedes the remark excepted to by saying:
Cronise, in point of fact, had done all that
could be done on his part at that time, and
had put himself in such a position that this
admission could not affect his action to his
prejudice, then the principle of estoppel
would have no ajpplication to the case so
Then he tells them,
far as he is concerned."
It Is
in the remark excepted to, in effect:
insisted that the delivery of these checks
was a delivery of the gold, In law, so that
he could not reclaim it; and if he could not
reclaim it then he was not injured by the
declaration, for there was nothing he could
do after such delivery. We may infer, properly, from the words "it is insisted," that all
this had passed before the jury In the argument of counsel, either to the jury or to the
If It
court, and was a reference thereto.
should be admitted to be technically iHaccurate as a statement of law, applicable to all
cases, it did not tend to mislead on this ocfor which it
casion;
and for the purpose
Doubtless the
was uttered, it was correct.
banding over of the checks was a delivery
of the gold to fulfill the contract for the sale
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accordance
with the rules of the
broilers' board under which the original parties to the transaction acted.
But it was
not such a delivery as prevented Cronise &
Co. from Intercepting the checks at the
counter of the Bank of New York, and there
forbidding and stopping payment of them.
And this is true, whether the gold be dollars, in which to make payment of a debt
payable, or a commodity to be transferred
in satisfaction of a contract for the sale and
delivery of a chattel. The scope of the remarks of the court to the jury was that notwithstanding Cronise & Oo. had put these
checks into the hands of Ross, stOl they
could stop payment of them at the place of
payment.
And, so considered, it did not mislead the jury from the question at issue, or
give them an erroneous rule of law by which
to dispose of it.
The plaintiff claims that even if it should
be held that it is estopped to show the truth,
as to so much of the gold as was paid to
Ross over the counter of the Bank of New
York, it should not be as to so much of it
as was represented by the checks on the subtreasury. And if these checks were alone
concerned
in the transaction, it might be
said with force that Ross could have as soon
got payment on them and clear escaped, as
Harmon, the clerk, could have made his errand and returned. But these checks are
connected with those on the Bank of New
York; and Ross did not depart with the
avails of the one until he had got the avails
of the other.
If Ross first went to the sub-

treasury and obtained payment, then he afterward went to the Bank of New York;
and he was there, or to and from there,
from ten to fifteen minutes; and this opportunity for stopping payment of the checks
at the Bank of New York was also opportunity for arrest of his person, and obtaining
from him the gold got at the sub-treasury.
And If it be said that he may have passed
away the checks on the sub-treasury in the
still he was at the
street to a confederate,
Bank of New York to be seized, and the
coercion of arrest to be used upon him.
In
53 Me. 103, arrest Is named as one of the
means of obtaining security which the plaintifC had let slip; and in L. R., 5 Q. B. 660,
Blackburn, J., goes so far as to say that it
needs not that it should appear that any
benefit would result from the attempt to secure payment,
but that the injured party
had the right to make that attempt; and
losing the exercise of the right by his reliance on the declaration, the declarant was
estopped.
We need not go so far here. Arrest and detention of the swindler Is a powerful means in coercing restoration; and arrest and detention were as probably in the
power of Cronise & Co. as the stoppage of
the payment of the checks at the Bank of
New York.
The judgment appealed from should be
affirmed, with costs to the respondent

All concur except RAPALLO, J., who concurs as to all but the sub-treasury gold.
Judgment affirmed.
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GAIiBRAITH

et

al.

v.

LUNSFORD.i

W. 365, 87 Tenn. 89.)
Court of Tennessee.
Oct 18,

(9 S.

Supreme

1888.

Appeal from chancery court, Knox county;
Henry R. Gibson, Chancellor.
Ejectment by .T. P. Galbralth and others
against B. P. Limsford; the controversy being as to the location of a division line. In
the plot referred to by the arbitrator the line
from P to E represents the original botmdary, and the one ■which complainant now
seeks to have established as the true one.
The line from O to P represents the boundary as recognized for many years, and alleged by defendants to have become the
boundary by estoppel.
Defendant had judgment and complainant appealed.
Luckey & Yoe and Pickle & Turner, for
complainants. Jesse L. Rogers, for respondent.

POLKES, J. This is an ejectment bill,
the disposition of which was dependent upon
a question of boundary. After answer and
proof, the cause was submitted to Mr. Jerome Templeton, a solicitor of this court, as
an arbitrator, who was "to hear and decide
the same according to the law and the evidence."
The award was to be in writing,
and was to be made tte decree of the court
The arbitrator presented his award, wherein
was stated his findings of fact and of law,
adjudging that the bill should be dismissed.
Complainants excepted to the award, upon
the groimd that the arbitrator manifestly
undertook, as he was required by the submission, to decide the case according to law;
but that he had misconceived the law, and
determined the case contrary thereto, upon
the facts as found by him. The chancellor
overruled the exceptions, and entered a final
decree, making the award the judgment of
the court Complainants have appealed, assigning as error the action of the court in
refusing to set aside the award, and in entering decree thereon.
Under the submission
the arbitrator was judge of the facts and
the law, and was not required to give the
grounds of his decision; in which event it
would have been presumed that he had decided according to law. But, having stated
his findings of fact, it was proper for the
court to determine, on the exceptions presented, whether the conclusions of law announced by the arbitrator were warranted by
the facts as found in a case where, by the
terms of the submission, the award was to
be in accord with the law. PoweU v. Riley,
The proof is not in the record,
15 Lea, 153.
having properly been omitted, inasmuch as
no question was made —^if, indeed, any could
have been made— as to the correctness of the
conclusions of fact reached by the arbitrator.
1 Upon the subject of equitable
erally, see note to this case in 1
524.

estoppel gen-

L. R. A. 522-
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We are therefore to consider only the quesin the exception to the
tion propounded
of law
award, to wit, that the deductions
upon the facts as found are contrary to law.
The complainants, in support of their exceptions
in the court below, now advance
the following propositions In their assignments of error in this court:
(1) "A line
which could be easily ascertained by survey,
and which had been known, and was lost or
overlooked by mutual mistake, was and is
not a doubtful line, that could be agreed
upon or fixed, or become the true line, and
binding by recognition, because void under
the statute of frauds."
(2) "Recognition of
a line under a mistake of fact, where it was
mutual, and either could have discovered the
mistake by survey or otherwise, is not binding on either party, and neither party can
set up the mistake against the other, by way
of estoppel or otherwise; as mistake is as
much that of one as the other, and fault, if
any, is equal; and, besides, one's admission,
made under mistake, will be relieved against
in equity, more especially when mistake is
mutual." (3) "Recognition of a line, not the
true one, will not divest title to land out of
a married woman nor minor, by estoppel or
otherwise, as a married woman cannot be
divested or part with title to land in that
way; but more especially when it was by
mistake of fact, as well upon the part of her
adversary as that of her own, and when
either could have easily discovered the mistake; nor is such married woman or descendant estopped to set up the truth, and
recover accordingly; and more especially in
a court of equity."
Robbed of their verbiage, the assignments
of error are to the effect (1) that the line or
boundary, under the facts as found by the
arbitrator,— there being, as assumed by the
assignments,

no bona

fide

doubt,

as to the

true line, entertained by both parties,— was
not such a doubtful boundary as could be
established by parol or acquiescence.
.(2)
That the doctrine of equitable estoppel does
not apply at all to the facts as found. (3)
And, if applicable, it cannot be effectual, as
against married women.
Before disposing of these propositions, let
us see what are the findings of the arbitrator, as shown by the award itself.
We
quote:

"Without going Into the details of the
proof,
find as follows:
"(1) The south boundary line of grant No.
18,417, to Wm. Cox, issued October 3, 1833,
is the line from P to E in plot (Exhibit A)
to the deposition of P. W. Galbraith.
I further find that, as an original proposition, the
north boundary line of the 250-acre tractWm. Cox to Jacob Pate, September 22, 1814
—was the line from I to T, on same plot;
and in 1833, when said grant was issued, the
two tracts adjoined the lines here above described,—being the same as far as the latter
extended, and being the dividing line of the
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fendants claim it, was not by B. F. McFarland only, but also by his wife.
This
recognition extends as far back as 40 years
ago, or to 1848.
In 1870 the heirs at law of
Sarah M. L. McFarland, deceased, recognized the same line,
to P, when they partitioned among themselves the lands inherited
from their mother.
When John Neal bought
the 82-acre tract from B. F. McFarland, No1863, and when Hopkins bought
vember
the same from Neal, in 1866, said line,
to
P, was the dividing line, being lived up to
and recognized by McFarland and wife; and
we may assume that both Hopkins and Neal
bought with that understanding, well Justifled by the conduct of McFarland and wife.

a

is

(land

O

I

a

/

it

I

In 1870 the commissioners making partition
did the locating of lines; but that only shows
the mistake about the division line had become the understanding of the neighborhood.
By accepting the partition, the heirs showed/-'
themselves ignorant of any mistake, so long
had
In 1873,
(the line) been recognized.
John E. Hopkins, desiring to build
new
dwelling-house, procured the division line to
be run by J. P. Galbraith, the husbajpd of
heirs, who showed
one of the McFarland
him where to build.
Several other of the
McFarland heirs were then at home in the
neighborhood,
and must have known of the
building of the house, which was on their
land, as they claim it now; but was on Hopkins' land, and. just south of the division
line, as they must have known Hopkins
claimed it. To say the least of it, they were
silent when they should have spoken.
In
1877,
R. M. Barton, Jr., and wife, Jennie
M. Barton, the latter being one of the McFarland heirs, by deed called for the Hopkins division line from O to P.
In July,
1877,
Barton and wife sold the residue of
the land partitioned to the latter to Wm.
Galbraith; and some time afterwards, and
prior to June, 1882, when Wm. Galbraith
filed his bill against John E. Hopkins, the
discovery was made that the line, so long
recognized and lived up to on both sides as
the true division line,- that is, the line from
mistake, and that the true
to P,— was
line was from
to E or from
on said
to
plot The line from
to P never was consistent with the 2d call, 'thence north 10
poles to
stake,' or with the fourth call,
stake,' in the deed
'thence north 44 poles to
from McFarland to John Neal, made hi 1863.
Nor was the same consistent with the calls
of the deed from Wm. Cox to Jacob Pate,
made September 22, 1814; nor was the same
consistent with the oldest marked line on
the ground.
An accurate survey, at any
time, ought to have discovered the true line.
was, the parties on both sides the
But so
line made
mutual mistake, without taking
the trouble of
survey, on which they acted
from some time prior to 1848 to some time
after 1877.
After so long a public acquiescence, and so many public acts, some by
solemn deeds of record on the part of Sarah
M. Ia McFarland,
her husband, and her
heirs,
under the influence and with the
knowledge of which strangers have bought
the adjoining land, and built
valuable
house thereon worth many more times the
value of land involved, can the McFarland
heirs now be heard to complain of said mistake, and be allowed to correct the same? '"'
"Where the true locality of the line is doubtful, such acts are regarded as furnishing
evidence that the line so recognized
is the
true line; nor are either of the parties at
liberty afterwards to abandon such line, although the line should afterwards be ascertained at
difCercnt place.
Gilchrist v. MeGeo,
Yerg. 458, 459, Green, J. See, also.
9

tracts. I add that, If I am mistaken as to
the true south boundary of said grant, the
result would be the same, because the deed—
Geo. M. Combs to Wm. Cox, February 10,
1814— covered both tracts, and both parties
to this suit derive title from Wm. Cox; and
am convinced
the north boundary line of
the 250-acre tract is the line I to T; that is,
it not under said grant, certainly under the
Combs deed, so far as these parties are concerned, Wm. Cox owned the land in controversy.
between Au"{2) I find that somewhere
gust 11, 1846, and March 28, 1857,— that is,
while Presley S. Chesher owned the 250acre tract, or prior to August 11, 1846,—
\ said dividing line was lost, or at least its
y^Mocation became doubtful. As a consequence,
Chesher, between the point, I, and the New
Market road, on said plot, cleared and inclosed the land up to and along the line from
O to P on said plot, being the disputed line,
as defendants
claim it.
Chesher did this
under a claim of right, which,
infer from
the circumstances, he thought that was his
line. There is a marked line there, not as old
as the line from F to E, but still an old line.
Further, B. F. McFarland and wife, Sarah
M. L. McFarland, a daughter, and the vendee of Wm. Cox, made the same mistake.
They either forgot or never knew where the
true dividing line was, and they clearly recognized the line from O to P as the dividing
I find no
line between them and Chesher.
ever recogevidence that Mrs. McFarland
nized said last-named line before her marriage.
The deed to her from her father, containing the boundaries of said grant, is dated April 16, 1841, and conveys to her by her
maiden name.
Her marriage was subseOn one
quent, but the date does not appear.
occasion, while John E. Hopkins owned the
82-acre tract, being the northern portion of
the 250 acres,— that is, after November 3,
1866, and prior to 1869, when Mrs. McFardied,- she and John E. Hopkins went
along the Chesher fence, along the line from
to P, talking about a trade as to Mrs.
McFarland's land north of said line.
She
then recognized said line as the dividing line
This
between her and Hopkins.
cited as
showing the recognition of said line, as de-
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ilerrl wether

v.

Larmon,

3 Sneed,

446,

448.

In tlie application of the principle of equi-

table estoppel, there is no exception in the
case of married women.
2 Herm. Estop.
See, also, Howell v. Hale, 5 Lea, 405;
1232.
2 Pom. Eq. Jm:. §§ 814-818;
Crittenden v.
Posey, 1 Head, 320; Stephenson v. Walker,
8 Baxt. 289.
And the doctrine applies to
Infants having such intelligence as to enable
them to comprehend the Import of their conduct. Barham v. Turbeville, 1 Swan, 438.
If this authority is doubted, still the only
infant affected is Mrs. Barton; who with her
husband, after her majority, ratified her former recognition of the line so long lived up
I do not think the case of Wm. Galto.
braith v. John E. Hopkins, is res adjudicata,
because (1) complainants in this cause (except Barton's wife) were not parties to that
suit; (2) the land involved here was not involved in that suit. The subject-matter was
not the same. Being clear In my convictions
above expressed, without discu^ing the question of the statute of limitations, I decide,
having considered the case as arbitrator, according to the submission made hi the case,
that complainants' bill be dismissed, with
ISigned]
costs.
Jerome Templeton."
We have given the entire award, so that
it may be seen what were the findings of
fact and of law. The award must be taken
as a whole, and not in detached sentences.
It will not do to cull out words here and
there, and from them argue that the parties
knew where the true line was. The mutuality of the mistake, and the ease with which
the parties might have discovered the same,
had they taken the old deeds and procured
the services of a competent surveyor, does
not render it any the less a mistake. The
fact still remains that there was an honest
ignorance of the whereabouts of the true
line, and a bona fide recognition of the line
indicated on the plot as O to P. If, with
full knowledge of the true line, another be
fixed by verbal agreement, such agreement
is within the statute of frauds, and conse
quently void; but, where there is doubt or
ignorance as to the true locality of the line,
a parol agreement, fixing the line between
adjoining owners, is not within the statute;
and, where satisfactorily established, will be
enforced by the courts, notwithstanding it
may afterwards be demonstrated that the
agreed line was erroneously fixed. And such
adjustment may be shown, as well by circumstances and recognition, as by direct evidence of a formal agreement, when parties
have acted thereon. Houston v. Matthews,
Gilchrist v. McGee, 9 Yerg.
1 Terg. 116;
458: Merriwether v. Larmon, 3 Sneed, 451;
Lewallen v. Overton, 9 Humph. 76; Rogers
69; Riggs v. Parker,
1 Sneed,
V. White,
Meigs, 49; Yarborough v. Abernathy, Id. 420.
The cases on this subject are numerous
in this state, and citations might be multiplied; but they clearly make the distinction,
and establish the principles as stated above.
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This being so, It is not difficult to apply
them to the findings of fact made by the
arbitrator in the case at bar. We have admissions and declarations, we have conveyances made, and partitions had, calling for
the line O to P. We have long acquiescence
on the part of complainants, and those under whom they daimi, coupled with the expenditure of money by defendant in building
Improvements upon the property In dispute,
largely in excess of the value of the land
itself. Induced not only by what had long
been the understanding of the parties as to
the location of the line, but by positive pointing out of the line, with knowledge that the
improvements were then about to be made.
And during all this time we have absolute
Ignorance on the part of the adjoining owner
as to the true line; ignorance none the less
absolute by reason of the fact that. In the
opinion of the arbitrator, it might have easily
been removed by a survey. There was no
survey, and the honest ignorance remained,
until shortly before the filing of the bill In
This Is not a case of silence,
this cause.
but of numerous afiirmatlve acts and admissions that were calculated to and did Influence the conduct of defendants, and which
acts and admissions are inconsistent with
the claim of title now sought to be set up.
The facts as found would seem to make out
a case of estoppel, unless the disability of
coverture prevents the application of this
doctrine, as Is strenuously insisted upon by
the learned counsel for complainants. Let
The contention Is that,
us see how this is.
as a married woman cannot, m reference to
her lands, bind herself by title-bond, power
of attorney, contract of sale, or even a deed,
without privy examination, and certificate of
aclinowledgment In a prescribed form showing that it was done freely, voluntarily, and
understandingly, it would be an anomaly In
the law to hold that she might part with
her title indirectly, when she had no purpose to do so, and when, instead of doing
so freely, voluntarily, and understandingly,
she was actually In ignorance, or laboring
under a mistake of fact. And cases are cited which seem to sustain the contention.
It
must be admitted that the cases on this
subject are to a certain extent conflicting.
But much of the difficulty and confusion is
due to a failure to observe the distinction
between the cases which seek, by the doctrine of estoppel, to validate those contracts
of a married woman which by law are declared void, and the cases where, in the
absence of any contract, and independent of
any contract or agreement, her conduct has
been held to prevent her from asserting what
would otherwise be a right. To the former
class belongs the case of Dodd v. Benthal,
And the language of the judge
4 Heisk. 601.
delivering the opinion in that case, at page
607, where he says:
"The complainant being both an Infant and feme covert at tEe
time of the execution of the deed tn ques-
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tfon, no act of afiarmance or disaffirmance in
pais on her part during coverture could be
binding upon her," etc.,— is correct when confined to a contract of a person under disability, which by law. is void in consequence
of such disability. To the latter class, above
referred to, belongs the case of Howell v.
Hale, 5 Lea, 405. Here the conduct of the
married woman, independent of any contract, operates to estop her in the same manner and to the same extent as if she were a
feme sole. So in the case at bar, while
there are facts and circumstances upon which
a contract might be implied that would be
binding upon a person sul juris, yet there
are also such admissions, statements,
and
conduct on the part of the complainants and
their ancestor as are amply sufficient to
create an estoppel entirely independent of,
and altogether outside of, any idea or claim
of a contract.
Mr. Pomeroy says "that
[\ while, upon the question how far the docequitable estoppel by conduct applies
I trine of
I to married women, there is some conflict
1 among the decisions,
the tendency of modern
\
\

V

authority, however, is strongly towards the
enforcement of the estoppel against married
women, as against persons sul juris, with
little or no limitation on account of their
disability;"
and that the decisions to the
contrary seem' to be in opposition to the
general current of authority.
Modern English cases, as well as American, are cited to
sustain the text.
Section 814, and notes.
The case of Morrison v. Wilson, 13 Cal. 495,
relied on so confidently by counsel for complainants, seems to not only deny the application of an estoppel in pais to a married
woman, but goes so far as .to hold that affirmative fraud on her part will not effect
that result. It is sufficient to say of this
case that it not only loses sight of the distinction referred to as to the defective execution of a contract, but is directly opposed
to our own adjudged cases, so far as the
The doctrine
element of fraud is concerned.
of estoppel has, by courts of this state, been
^applied to married women and infants. Thus
in Howell v. Hale, 5 Lea, 405, she was held
She had by her
estopped by matter in pais.
conduct Induced Thomhill to purchase the
mortgage debt on her land, leading him to
believe that the land should stand liable
therefor. This court held her estopped by
her conduct to make defense to said mortgage, whether she might have done so or
In
not, as against the original mortgagee.
Cooley V. Steele, 2 Head, 606, we have a
clear case of estoppel in pais applied to a
married woman. She had, in a deposition,
made a statement,
as to title to certain
shares, contrary to what she there asserted
in the case before the court.
This court
said: "Complainant would be clearly entitled, upon well-established principles, to the
relief sought, but for the estoppel created by
her oath in the before-mentioned deposition.*'
To the same effect is Pilcher v. Smith, Id.

where it Is said: "The legal disability^
of coverture carries with it no license or
)
privilege to practice fraud or deception on
/
other persons." Estoppel in pais has also^
been applied to infants by this court.
Barham V. Turbeville, 1 Swan, 437; Adams v.
Fite, 3 Baxt 69.
In the latter case the
court, after finding the weight of the proof
in favor of the complainant having been of
age at time of the execution of the deed,
continuing, said:
"Both on the ground of
long acquiescence, and of the concealment of
the fact that he was not of age, when complainant had good reason to know that
Ewlng was trading with him as sui juris,
complainant is repelled, even if he was In
fact only twenty years of age when he made
It is true that in the case of
the deed."
Barham v. Turbeville the infant was not
merely silent, but actively proclaimed his
father's title to the property he subsequently sued for; and the court puts the estoppel
of actual and purposM
upon the ground
fraud, which was right and proper, under
the facts of that case. But, so far as the
opinion in this case undertakes to hold that
actual and positive fraud, at the time of the
act set up as constituting the estoppel, U
essential to the application of the doctrine of
estoppel, it is obiter and unsound, as we
shall presently undertake to show.
It is also urged that actual fraud must
exist before an estoppel can be maintained
against one sui juris; and a forUori before
it can be applied to a married woman, if
against the latter it can be invoked at all.
It is true that there is a theory which makes
the essence of equitable estoppel to consist
of fraud; but this theory is not sustained
by principle nor authority. There are many
familiar to
well-settled cases of estoppel
courts of equity, which do not rest upon
fraud; and Instances are admitted, even by
the courts, which maintain this theory, which
cannot be said to involve any element of
fraud, unless by a complete perversion of
language and misuse of terms.
The confusion to be found in some of the books on
this subject is due doubtless to the fact that
the fraud referred to has its origin In the
effort afterwards to set up rights contrary
to the conduct of the party, although at the
time of the act constituting the estoppel there
was the most perfect good faith. The term,
as used in such cases, is, as Mr. Pomeroy expresses it, virtually synonymous with "unconscientious" or "inequitable."
It Is in this
sense that it may be said that It Is a fraud
or fraudulent to attempt to repudiate the
conduct which has induced the other party
to act, and upon which the estoppel is predicated; but it is entirely another thing to say
that the conduct Itself— the acts, words, or
silence of the party— constituting the estoppel must be an actual fraud, done with the
Intention of deceiving. It may therefore be
safely said that although fraud may be, and
often is, an ingredient in the conduct of the
208,
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party estopped, It Is not an essential element.
If the word is used in its commonly accepted
sense; and the use of the term is unnecessary, and often improper, unless applied to
the effort of the party estopped to jrepudiate
his conduct, and to assert a right or claim
in contravention thereof. The best-considered cases are In accord with the views above
expressed.
Bank v. Bank, 50 N. Y. 5T5; Waring V. Sombom, 82 N. Y. 604. And although
the earlier Pennsylvania decisions generally
leaned strongly in favor of the theory that
an actual fraud is of the essence of every
such estoppel by conduct. It is worthy of
note that in the late case in that state of
Bidwell V. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 412, it Is said:
"It is not necessary that the party against
whom an estoppel is alleged should have intended to deceive.
It is suflBcient if he intended that his conduct should induce another to act upon it, and the other, relying
on it, did so act." 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 804,
805, et seq.
The ease of Brant*v. Coal Co.,
93 U. S. 326, pressed upon us by counsel for
complainant as establishing the contention
that fraud is an essential element in the application of the doctrine of estoppel, and that
it is essential that the party invoking the estoppel was himself not only destitute of the
knowledge of the true state of the title, but
also of any convenient or available means of
acquiring such knowledge, merits special
mention. In addition to what we have already said as to the first proposition, we will
be content to adopt Mr. Pomeroy's note upon
this case, where, after quoting freely of the
opinion, he says: "With great deference to
the opinion of so able a judge, I think his
error in this passage is evident
It consists
In taking a special rule, established from
motives of policy for a particular condition
of fact, and raising It to the position of a
universal rule. Where an estoppel by conduct is alleged to prevent a legal owner of
land from asserting his legal title, courts
of equity, in order to avoid the literal requirements of the statute of frauds, were
driven to the element of fraud in the conduct as essential. See the text, sections 805807. The passage quoted from Judge Story
Is dealing with this long-settled rule of equity, and not with the subject of equitable
estoppel in general. When this special rule
is made universal, its inconsistency with
many familiar Instances of equitable estoppel becomes apparent, and Judge Field is
forced to escape from the antagonism by
denying that these instances do in fact belong to the doctrine. If this conclusion be
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then some of the most important and
well-settled species of the estoppel, uniformly
regarded as such by text writers and courts,
must be abandoned, and the beneficent doctrine itself must be curtailed In its operation
to one particular class of cases. This result
is in direct opposition to the tendency of judicial decisions, and of the discussion of
text writers."
See note 1 to section 806,
Pom. Eq. Jut., and cases there dted. It is
worthy of notice, also, that, in the opinion
referred to, Judge Field quotes approvingly
from the Pennsylvania case of Hill v. Epley,
31 Pa. 334, language which is practically, to
all intents, an abandonment of the extreme
position supposed to be maintained in the
Brant Case.
The language referred to is:
"The primary ground of the doctrine is that
it would be a fraud in a party to assert
what his previous conduct had denied, when
on the faith of that denial others have acted." The element of fraud is essential either
in the intention of the party estopped, or in
the effect of the evidence which he attempts
to set up; so that at last the difficulty seems
to be in the use of terms, rather than in the
true principles controlling the doctrine under
consideration. As to the second proposition
for which the Brant Case is cited, it Is sufficient to say that it does not sustain the position that the mutuality of the mistake, or
the possibility of having discovered it, prevents the application of the doctrine of estoppel.
It merely asserts the familiar rule
that where the party setting up the estoppel
knew the true condition of the titie, either
in fact or in contemplation of law, the doctrine will not avail him; the fact being in
that case, as shown in the opinion, that "he
knew he was obtaining only a life-estate by
his purchase."
This opinion is already too long to allow
further elaboration on the question of estoppel under the facts of this case.
It will,
however, not be out of place to add that I
find nothing in the numerous reported cases
in this state, from Patton v. McClure, Mart.
& Y. 339, down to Allen v. Westbrook, 16
Lea, 251, that makes vrillful fraud on the
part of the party sought to be estopped, in
the act constituting the grounds of the estoppel, essential to the application of the
doctrine. We hold, therefore, that there is,
in the case at bar, on the facts as found by
the arbitrator, every element of an equitable
estoppel, and complainants must be repelled.
The disability of coverture Is not sufficient
to defeat this result. Let the decree of the
chancellor be affirmed, with costs.
correct,
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STARRY r. KORAB.
(21

N. W.

eOO.

65 Iowa, 267.)

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 8, 1884.

Appeal from superior court of Cedar

Rap-

Ids.

This is an appeal from an order in a gardischarging the garnishment proceeding
Plaintiff obtained judgment against
nishee.
one Joseph Lustick, on which execution issued, and appellee was garnished as a supposAt
ed debtor of the defendant in execution.
the proper time he appeared, and answered
that he was not indebted to said Lustick in
any sum, and that he did not have any propbelonging to him.
erty in his possession
Plaintiff filed a pleading controverting this
answer, in which It is alleged that in a conversation had between plaintiff and garnishee before the execution was issued, garnishee stated that he was indebted to Lustick
in a certain sum, and that he would not pay
the same to Lustick until plaintiff had an
opportunity to procure the Issuance of an
execution on said judgment and serve notice
of garnishment on him thereunder; and that,
and believing
relying on this representation,
it to be true, plaintiff, at great expense and
trouble to himself, procured said execution
to issue, and caused the garnishee to be served with notice of garnishment thereunder,
and that the garnishee is now estopped by his
and conduct from denying that
representation
he was indebted to Lustick at the time he
The garnishee
was served with the notice.
demurred to this pleading on the ground that
it did not show that he was in fact indebted
to Lustick when the notice of garnishment
was served, and the facts averred in the
pleading did not create an estoppel. The demurrer was sustained, and, plaintiff declining to plead further, judgment was entered
Plaintiff appeals.
discharging the garnishee.
Blake & Hormel, for appellant.

& Swislier, for

Bowman

appellee.

REED, J. The purpose of the pleader was
undoubtedly to set up in the pleading controverting the answer of the garnishee what
The
an equitable estoppel.
Is denominated
effect of such estoppel is to preclude the party
from asserting a strict legal right, on the
ground that his assertion of such right, under
the circumstances of the case, would be
The
against equity and good conscience.
pleading assumes that at the time the notice
of garnishment was served on the garnishee
he was not in fact indebted to Lustick, and
that on strict legal grounds he was entitled
But the claim is that, havto be discharged.
ing induced plaintiff, by the representation
that he was Indebted to Lustick, to Institute
the garnishment proceeding and incur the expense and trouble incident thereto, it would
be manifestly unjust and inequitable in him
to assert his exemption from liability thereon. And the question presented by the record is whether, under the facts stated in the

pleading, the garnishee Is estopped to deny
that he Is indebted to Lustick.
It will be observed that the representation
on which plaintiff claims to have acted in
Instituting the garnishment proceedings consisted (1) In the statement of a matter of fact,
viz., that the garnishee was at that time inand
debted to Lustick in a certain amount;
as to his con(2) in a promise or agreement
duct in the future, viz., that he would withhold the amount and not pay it over to Lustick until plaintiff would have an opportunity
to procure an execution to issue, and notice
of garnishment to be served upon him. But
it does not appear from the averments of the
pleading that the statement as to the matter
of fact was not true when It was made; that
is, It is not averred that the garnishee was
not indebted to Lustick at the time the repSome time elapsed
resentation was made.
between the making of the representation

and the service of the garnishment notice,
and for anything that appears In the pleading
may have been indebted to
the garnishee
Lustick at the time of the representation,
and have paid the amount to him before the
notice was served upon him. If those are
the facts, the injury and damages which
would result to plaintiff In case of the garnishee's discharge would be occasioned, not
by his denial of the truth of his statement
that he was indebted to Lustick, but by his
failure to perform the agreement to retain in
his hands the amount of the Indebtedness
until the notice of garnishment should he
But an estoppel does not
served upon him.
arise from the mere failure of a party to perform an executory agreement.
The doctrine of estoppel is applied to prevent the injustice which would result if one
who has once asserted the existence of a fact,
and thereby induced another to act In the belief of the truth of that statement so as to
change his previous position, were permitted
afterwards to deny its truth. Under such
circumstances, and as against the one wbo
made the statement, the law is that it shall
Plckbe conclusively presumed to be true.
ard V. Sears, 6 Adol. & E. 469. But it is
difficult to conceive a case in which one who
is sued for the mere failure to perform an
executory agreement would be precluded by
the law from making any defense against the
claims. It may be that plaintiff has a cause
of action against the garnishee on the agreement; but If so he clearly cannot enforce it
in this proceeding.
His remedy in that case
must be sought in an original action agauist
the party as defendant. In this proceeding,
if he can recover at all, he can do so only by
showing either that the garnishee was Indebted to the defendant In execution when the
notice of garnishment was served on him,
or that such a state of facts existed as that
he Is estopped to deny that he was so indebted. The pleading In question, in our opinion,
does not show either of these states of fact.
Affirmed.
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et al. v.

GTJGGBNHEIMBR
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et al.

Va. 839.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
1882.

Oct. 16,

Appeal from circuit court, Botetourt county.
Bill by Max Guggenhelmer and others
against William J. Penn, as administrator
of Stuart B. Penn and in his own right,
Ann S. Penn, and others, to ascertain the
interest of William J. Penn in the estate of
S. B. Penn, deceased, and to subject the
same to judgments of plaintiff against said
William J. Penn. Under the will of Charles
B. Penn certain lands were given to his
children. He owned a third interest in certain land on James river, known as the
"Home Place," the other two-thirds of which
belonged to his wife by descent from her
father. Under said will he expressed a wish
that his wife should retain the "home place,"
and at her death it should be the property
of her son Stuart B. Penn. Tl^p widow, in
1850, received the personal estate given to
her under the will of her husband, and gave
a receipt reciting that she received it "agreeably to the provisions of his said last will
At the same time the
and testament."
"home place" was put on the land book of
the county and assessed for taxes in her
name as tenant for life and devisee of her
husband. She never renounced the will, nor
had dower assigned, but she filed an answer
in 1867 to the plaintiffs bill. In which answer she denied that she had done anything
to divest herself of her two-thirds in the
"home place." The circuit court entered a
decree that the widow had elected to accept
the provision in the will of her husband, and
that the remainder of the "home place"
passed on the death of the said Stuart B.
Penn, childless, among others, to the said
William J. Penn, who was entitled to an
Interest of one-fourth, subject to his mother's life estate, which interest was liable to
be subjected by his creditors to the satisfaction of their judgment liens. Prom this
judgment Ann S. Penn appealed, and, pending the appeal, died. Affirmed.
Edmund Pendleton, for Mrs. Ann S. Penn.
and John J. Allen, for Max
Guggenheimer. G. W. & L. C. Hansbrough,
for George Skillen Penn and Mrs. Prances
ti. Mayo.

J. H. H. Figgatt

STAPLES,

J.

The main question in this

case turns upon the construction to be given to the will of Charles B. Penn which was

admitted to probate at the September term

of the county court of Botetourt, in the year
1849.
The testator, at the time of his death,
was possessed of a valuable real and person-

al estate, which he devised and bequeathed
to his wife, Mrs. Ann Penn, and to his four
children. To his two sons George S. Penn
and William Penn he gave severally a tract
of land. To Mrs. Mayo, his married daughter, he gave certain real estate and a sum of
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To his wife he bewith the full confidence that she would make such disposition
of them among his children as should be
just and equitable, after retaining such of
them as she might desire for her own use
during her lifetime. His other personal estate he directed to be sold, and the balance
remaining, after the payment of his debts,
together with the proceeds of any real estate not specifically devised, he bequeathed
to his wife, with the full confidence that she
would divide it among his children as she
might deem just and proper.
The third clause of the will, which gives
rise to this controversy, is as follows:
"It is my will and desire that my wife
shall retain the home place, and at her death
it shall be the property of my son Stuart B.
hereby give to him, his heirs,
Penn, which
and assigns forever."
The home place, thus mentioned by the
testator, is a tract of about 820 acres, onehalf of which, known as the "lower half,"
was the property of Mrs. Penn, devised to
her by her father. She was also the owner
of one-third of the upper half of the tract,
derived by descent from her sisters.
The testator was entitled to two undivided
thirds acquired by purchase In the upper
half of the tract. So that his Interest at the
time of his death did not exceed one-third
of the entire ti'act.
The first question arising under the clause
already quoted is whether the testator intended to dispose of the entire tract, or
whether the will is to be construed as disposing merely of his undivided third.
If the former interpretation be the true
one, it is conceded that it was incumbent
upon Mrs. Penn, the widow, to make her
election, and that she cannot claim both her
own estate and the provision made for her
by the will.
Before entering into a discussion of that
question it will be proper briefly to advert
to some of the principles of law governing
in such cases.
The doctrine of election is said to rest upon the equitable ground that no man can
be permitted to claim inconsistent rights
with regard to the same subject, and that
any one who asserts an interest under an
instrument is bound to. give full effect, as
far as he can, to that instrument. Or, as it
is sometimes expressed, he who accepts a
benefit under a deed or will must adopt the
contents of the whole instrument, conforming to all its provisions, and relinquishing
every right inconsistent with it.
In the terse language of Lord Rosslyn In
Wilson v. Lord Townsend, 2 Ves. Jr. 697:
"You cannot act. You cannot come forth to
a court of justice claiming In repugnant
rights. When you claim under a deed, you,
must claim under the whole deed together.
You cannot take one clause, and advise the
court to shut their eyes against the rest

$10,000 in bank stock.
queathed all his slaves,

I

'
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Suppose, in a will, a legacy Is given to you
by one clause; by another, an estate of
which you are in the possession is given to
another. AVhile you hold that, you shall not
claim the legacy." 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 465,
466; 1 White & T. Lead. Gas. Eq. pt. 1, pp.
541, 547, 548; Kinnaird v. Williams, 8 Leigh,
400; Craig v. Walthall, 14 Grat. 518; Dixon
In order, however, to
V. McCue, Id. 540.
raise a case of election, it is well settled the
intention on the part of- the testator to
give that which is not his own must be clear
and unmistakable. It must appear from language which is unequivocal, which leaves no
room for doubt as to the testator's design.
The necessity for an election can never arise
from an uncertain or dubious interpretation
of the clause of donation. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §
472; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 10.
It is not necessary, however, that this intention should be expressly declared.
The
dispositions of the instrument, fairly and
reasonably interpreted, may of themselves
show a clear design on the part of the testator to bestow upon the devisee property
which in fact belongs to another.
As in other cases, the intention may be
gathered from the whole and every part of
the instrument. The difllculty of ascertaining the testator's intent. It Is said, Is always much greater where he has a partial
interest in the estate devised than where he
undertakes to dispose of an estate in which
he has no interest.
In the former case, the presumption is that
he Intended to dispose of that which he might
properly dispose of, and nothing more; and
this presumption will always prevail, unless
the intention Is clearly manifested by demonstration plain, or necessary implication on the
part of the testator to dispose of the whole estate. Including the interest of third parties.
Generally, when the testator has an undivided
interest in certain property, and he employs
general words in disposing of It, as "all my
lands," or "all my estate," no case of election
arises from it; for it does not plainly appear
that he meant to dispose of anything but what
was strictly his own. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1087;
1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 489.
A case of election does arise, however, when
the testator, having an undivided or partial
interest in an estate, devises it specifically,
thus Indicating a purpose to bestow it as an
entirety. This rule on this subject is thus
laid down in 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 489.
Where
the testator proposes to give the whole thing
itself, using language which, by reasonable Intention, must necessarily describe and define
the whole corpus of the thing in which his

particular interest exists as a distinct and
identified piece of property, then an intention
to bestow the whole, and not merely the testator's individual share, must be inferred, and
a case for an election arises.
This rule is
mentioned and commented on by Judge Christian in delivering the opinion of this court in
Gregory v. Gates, 30 Grat. 83, to which I refer

as authority for other views here announced.
Now, let us apply these principles to the case
in hand.
In the first place, there can be no
doubt that the tract of land or estate in question was universally known and described as
the "Home Place."
It is so spoken of by all
the witnesses, by the parties, and it was so denominated
in all the pleadings.
Mrs. Penn,
in her answer, describes it as the "Home
Place."
She speaks of the "upper half of the
home place" and the "lower half of the home
place."
It is scarcely to be supposed that the
testator would term it differently from every
other person;
that he referred only to his
partial interest of one-third when by universal
consent, usage, and habit, the entire tract was
known and recognized as the home place. His
language is:
"That my wife shall retain the
home place, and at her death it [the home
place] shall be the property of my son Stuart
B. Penn, which
hereby give him, his heirs ■
and assigns, forever."
What gives some significance, at least, to this language is that the
mansion house, occupied by the testator and
his family for many years, was located, not
upon the half in which the testator had an
interest of two-thirds, but upon that portion
exclusively owned by Mrs. Penn. It was this
portion upon which the family resided that
might with some propriety be termed the
"Home Place," and not the two undivided
thirds of one-half, constltutiug merely a part

I

of the tract.
It was said In the argument before this
court that the language of the clause now under consideration is different from the other
clauses of the will.
For example, that the
testator, when disposing of his own property,
invariably uses the words, "I give and bequeath," whereas In the present instance he
merely expresses the wish that his wife shall
retain the home place.
This difference of
phraseology grows out of the fact that the testator was carefully defining and limiting an
estate to be enjoyed by his wife during her
life, and the language used by him was such
as he supposed would accomplish the object
He then proceeds to say that it Is his will and
desire at her death it (the home place) "shall
be the property of my son Stuart B. Penn,
which
hereby give him, his heirs and assigns, forever."
It is Impossible by argument
or illustration to add to the force and perspicuity of this language.
Nothing can be plainer,
more direct and comprehensive. The cases of
Padbury v. Clark, 2 Macn. & G. 298; HoweUs
V. Jenkins, 2 Johns. & H. 706; Grosvenor v.
Durston, 25 Beav. 97; Grissell v. Swinhoe, L.
R. 7 Eq. 291, 295,— in which It was held that
the devisee was bound to elect,— are directly
In point and conclusive of the question.
The other dispositions made by the testator
confirm thoroughly this view of his Intention.
He gave to his son George S. Penn an estate
worth about $11,000, to his son William Penn
an estate of the value of $14,000, and to Mrs.
Mayo property worth $12,000 or $15,000.
The provision made for his wife was more

I
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us apply these principles to the case beUpon the death of the testator, in
1849, Mrs. Penn continued in the possession of the home place until the present
time,
period of 30 years.. It does not appear

it

it

a

it

that she ever expressed any dissatisfaction
with the provisions of the will till the filing
of her answer in the cause In the year 1867.
In the year 1850 the entire tract was entered
books of the county
upon the commissioner's
and assessed with taxes in her name, as tenant for life. Whether this was done by her
It can
direction or not,
does not appear.
scarcely be supposed she was ignorant of
fact disclosed on every tax ticket paid by her.
It has been already stated that by the will
testator's slaves were given to Mrs. Penn, in
full confidence that she would make such disposition of them among his children as would
be just and equitable, after retaining such
proportion of them as she might desire for her
own use during her life.
The residue of the real and personal estate was also given to her In trust for the
benefit of the children. In the year 1850,—
not long after the testator's death,— the executors turned over to her the entire personal estate, including slaves, and took her receipt, stating that this was done in coni
formity with the provisions of the will. The
executors must therefore have understood
that Mrs. Penn had accepted the provision
Upon no other ground
made for her benefit.
would they have been warranted in thus
dealing with the assets.
The terms of the
receipt given by her show that she was perfectly apprised of the contents of the will,
that she knew the condition and value of the
property, and that she had united with the
in fulfilling the intentions and
executors
wishes of the testator. Had Mrs. Penn renounced the will, as she was bound to do,
in order to claim her own estate, she would
have been entitled only to one-third of the
slaves for life, and one-third of the personal
property absolutely. As
was, she received
from the executors under the will 49 slaves,
of the value of $18,370, and other property,
worth between $5,000 and $6,000.
The testimony shows that Mrs. Penn never made any
formal division of the property; that she,
however, distributed among her children
about 12 of the slaves, retaining the residue
in her own possession, for her own use and
benefit,
until their emancipation in 1865.
It is of no sort of consequence that during
his lifetime Stuart B. Penn resided at the
home place, and managed and controlled all
the operations of the estate.
This was, of
course, done by the authority of Mrs. Penn,
and doubtless for the reason that
was
more agreeable to her that one of her sons
should relieve her of the trouble and responsibility, to which, amid the infirmities
of declining years, she was unequal. She
certainly exercised
dominion and ownership of the property, to which she was en-

8
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Where the election Is once made by the
party bound to elect, either expressly or impliedly, and with full knowledge of all the
binds not only himself, but also all
facts.
those parties who claim under him, his repPom. Eq. Jur. 516.
resentatives and heirs.
It

/-(

1097-1098.

Let

fore us.
the year
a

than sufficient for her support and maintenance during tier life in tlie most comfortable
If, however, he deand abundant manner.
signed that his son Stuart B. Penn should take
the one-third of the home place, subject to the
incumbrance of the life estate, the provision
for him was wholly inadequate, and disproportionate to the benefits conferred upon his
other children. On the other hand, if the testator intended that the entire home place
should be the property of his son Stuart B.
Penn, the period of his enjoyment would be
postponed until the death of Mrs. Penn, and
the value of the devise would be about equal
to the provision for the other children.
> I am therefore of opinion that by the plain
terms of the will Mrs. Penn was put to her
election, and that she could not and cannot
choose both her own estate and the bequests
\ made in her favor.
'
The next Inquiry ia, whether Mrs. Penn did,
in fact, elect to claim under the will.
An election may be implied as well as expressed.
Whether there has been an election
must be determined upon the circumstances
of each particular case, rather than upon any
general principles. 1 White & T. Lead. Gas.
Bq. 539, 571, 572.
It may be inferred from
the conduct of the party, his acts, his omissions, and his mode of dealing with the property.
Unequivocal acts of ownership, with
knowledge of the right to elect, and not
through a mistake with respect to the condition and value of the estate, will generally be
1
deemed an election to take under the will.
Lapse of time, alPom. Eq. Jur. §§ 514, 515.
though not of itself conclusive, yet, when connected with circumstances of enjoyment, may
be decisive upon the question of election.
In Adsit V. Adsit, 2 Johns. Ch. 448, 451,
f
Chancellor Kent said: "Taking possession of
1 property under a will or other instrument, and
'> exercising unequivocal acts of ownership over
it for a long period of time, will amount to a
I
binding election."
"Positive acts of acceptance or renunciatlon," says Mr. Justice Story, "may arise from
[
' long acquiescence, or from other circimistances
of a stringent nature, and are not indispensable."
"Again," he says, "it may be necessary to
consider whether he [the devisee] can restore
other persons affected by his claim to the same
situation as if the acts had not been performhad not existed, and
ed, or the acquiescence
whether there has been such a lapse of time
as ought to preclude the court from entering
upon such inquiries upon its. general doctrine
of not entertaining suits upon stale demands
or after long delays." 2 Story, Bq. Jur. §§
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titled only under her husbflnd's will, and
which she could never have assumed unless
she intended to conform to its provisions.
After this long lapse of time, after this
long-continued enjoyment and possession of
the estate, and unequivocal recognition of
the provisions of the will by receiving the
property from the executors, it is too late
for Mrs. Penn, at this day, to disclaim the
testator's bounty, and assert title to her own

his just share or proportion of that estate,
and his creditors may not only subject it to
satisfaction of their debts, but they may resort to a court of equity for the purpose of
ascertaining that Interest and of removing
every obstacle In the way of the just enforcement of their liens.
William J. Penn
can no more defeat the claims of his creditors by a disclaimer of title than he could
do so by a voluntary deed, or gift or assign-

estate.

ment.

The slaves have long since been emanciand
pated, the personal property exhausted,
it is now impossible to place the children in
the condition they would have occupied had
Mrs. Penn in the outset declared her intention to hold her own property.
So far from it, it is very clear that she
made her election to claim under the will,
and that she did so with a deliberate and
intelligent choice, and with a full knowledge
of all the circumstances, and of her own
No possible injury can accrue to any
I rights.
one from the conclusion thus reached, for
Mrs. Penn lived and died in the enjoyment
of the estate.
She never attempted any
other disposition of it.
Stuart B. Penn, the devisee, is dead, without children, and the estate has passed in
due course of law to Mrs. Penn's children.
A contrary decision can result only in disturbing a condition of things settled and
acquiesced in for many years by all' parties.
I think, therefore, there is no error upon
this branch of the case in the decision of
the circuit court
The learned counsel for the appellant, In
his petition for an appeal, and in his argument before this court, has taken the ground
that the parties bringing this suit are neither
heirs nor purchasers nor beneficiaries under
the will of Charles Penn, but judgment creditors of William J. Penn, and, as such, intruders and volunteers, seeking to set aside
a family settlement, and to vest In William
J. Penn an interest which he himself does
not claim, and to which he never asserted
any title. It will not he denied that complainants, by virtue of their judgments,
have a Hen upon all the real estate of their
debtor,
and that under our statute they
may enforce that lien in a court of equity.
This right of the complainants, and, Indeed, of all judgment creditors, cannot be
afEected by any omission of disclaimer on
According to repeatthe part of the debtor.
ed decisions of this court, when the freehold has once vested, the owner cannot divest himself of the title by any mere parol
disclaimer; but he can only do so by deed
or some other act sufficient to pass an estate.
Even had William J. Penn executed
such deed, voluntarily relinquishing his title,
his creditors would not be bound by it
When the court has once settled that Stuart
B. Penn is entitled to the home place under
the will of his father, William J. Penn, as
one of his heirs, has an absolute title to

In Dold V. Geiger's Adm'r, 2 Grat 98, it
was held that choses In action, to which the
wife becomes entitled during coverture, are
liable to the claims of the husband's creditors, and a voluntary relinquishment of the
same by the husband, and a settlement upon
the wife, before being reduced Into possession, will not protect such choses In action
from such creditors' claims.
Judge Stanard, in answer to an objection
similar to the one made here, said: '"I think
it may safely be laid down as a just deduction from the elementary principles of our
law that the general rule is that the rights
of property of a debtor, whether in possession or In action, present or reversionary,
in law or In equity, and of value adequate
to pay his debts, and without which he is
insolvent, and the payment of his dehts
must be frustrated, cannot by the mere volition of the debtor, In the form of assignment, surrender, or other modes of arrest,
pass to volunteers without valuable consideration, and be thereby placed in the hands
of such volunteers, beyond the reach and
secure from the claims of such creditors."
This opinion of Judge Stanard, and, indeed,
the decision Itself, constitutes a complete
answer to the points made by counsel, and
render unnecessary any further discussion
of the subject.
The next question Is whether the circuit
court erred in disallowing the account of
William J. Penn against the estate of Stuart
B. Penn, for money alleged to have been
paid by the former as administrator of
Stuart B. Penn. The latter died in the year
1857,
considerably Indebted.
William B.
Penn qualified as his administrator, and removed to the home place, thereafter residing with his mother, the life tenant. There
is no doubt that the net income derived
from the estate was appropriated by him to
the payment of his brother's debts. The
only question is whether this income was
sufficient for that purpose, or whether any
part of the indebtedness was discharged by
William J. Penn out of his private means.
William J. Penn, in one of his depositions,
states that from 1857 to 1860 he realized
from the home place an income of $6,196.15,
all of which, by the direction of his mother,
was applied to the payment of his brother's
debts.
He further states that Stuart B.
Penn had a note in bank of $4,600, for which
the witness, at the request of his mother,
substituted his own note. The larger por-
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tlon of this latter note was paid oft by him
in February, 18G4, and the balance in 1865,
In Confederate money. This, reduced to its
actual value In sound money, amounts to a
very insignificant sum.
In the concluding part of William J. Penn's
deposition he expresses the opinion that he
has been fully reimbursed for all moneys expended
by him in the payment of his
Unfortunately for the pat^
brother's debts.
ties setting up this claim, William J. Penn
is their witness, and their only witness.
They cannot ask the court to discard their
own testimony, and enter a decree in their
favor upon a case unsupported by proof. I
have no doubt, however, that William J.
Penn has given an accurate and truthful account of his transactions and dealings with
the estate.
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The home place was regarded as one of
the most valuable estates on James river,
yielding a large income annually to its ownA very small portion of its profits was
ers.
required for the support of Mrs. Penn; the
balance passed into the hands of William J.
Penn, and I am satisfied that he was fully
reimbursed for every dollar appropriated by
him for the payment of his brother's debts.
The complainants, after the fullest opportunity, have been unable to adduce any testimony to the contrary. They are clearly
not entitled to a reversal of the decree in the
present state of the case, and it is most apparent that nothing is to be gained by further inquiry.
Upon the whole, I think the decree of the
circuit court should be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
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Supreme Court of Arkansas.

J.

May Term,

1883.

Appeal from circuit court, Phillips county;
N. Oypert, Judge.

M. T. Sanders and Tappan & Homor, for
appsllant. Thweatt & Quarles, for appellee.

SMITH, J. William St John Hubbard
died in the year 1878. Just before his death
he made his will, which was afterwards duly
proved, and which Is in the words following:
"I bequeath and leave imto my brother,
Edward L. Hubbard, the full amount of his
indebtedness to me, and the remainder of
my property, both personal and real, to my
sister, Mrs. Sarah L. Fitzhugh, after paying
all of my debts, and my sister to administer
without bond."
In point of fact Edward L. Hubbard was
not then indebted to the testator. He had
formerly owed the testator a debt of $4,221.by note and secur61, which was evidenced
ed by deed of trust upon real estate;' but
this debt had been transferred, eight months
before the execution of the will, to Mrs.
The deed of trust conSarah L. Fitzhugh.
tained the usual power of foreclosure ty
advertisement and sale upon default in payment;
and, in case of the refusal of the
trustee to act, the sheriff of Phillips county
was empowered to execute it
Cage, the trustee, who was also the draftsman of the will, did refuse to sell the property, alleging as his reason that the debt had
been satisfied by the provisions of the 'fviU,
whereupon the services of the sheriff were
called into requisition. After due notice he
sold and conveyed the lands to Mrs. Fitzhugh, who brought ejectment.
The defendant set up as an equitable defense that the
deed of trust imder which the plaintiff claimed title had been canceled, and the debt
which it was intended to secure had been
released to him by virtue of said will. The
cause was transferred to equity. Testimony
was taken on both sides, and at the hearing
the court required Mrs. Fitzhugh to elect
whether she would afiSrm the vfill and accept the devise to her, or renounce the same
and assert a right to the debt due by Edward L. Hubbard.
She elected to take under the will. The court thereupon dismissed
her complaint set aside the trustee's sale
and conveyance,
and canceled Edward L.
Hubbard's note and deed of trust
Mrs.
Fitzhugh has appealed, and the main question is whether this is a proper case for the
application of the doctrine of election.
"An election in equity ia a choice which a
\
party Is compelled to make between the acceptance of a benefit under an instrument
and the retention of some property, already

his own, which is attempted to be disposed
of in favor of a third party by virtue of the
same instrument.
The doctrine rests upon
the principle that a person claiming under an
instrument shall not interfere by title paramount to prevent another part of the samer
instrument from having effect according to
its construction. He cannot accept and reIt is a doctrine
ject the same instrument.
which is principally exhibited in cases of

wills.

•

*

•

"The most common instance which is put
of a case of an election is where a testator
gives money or lands to A., and by the
same will gives something of A.'s to B.
Here A. must elect. He must either give
effect to the will by allowing B. to have the
property which the testator intended should
go to him', or, If he chooses to disregard the
will and retain his own property, he must
make good the value of the gift to the disappointed beneficiary." Bisp. Eq. § 295; see,
also. Story, Eq. Jur. § 1076 et seq.; 1 White
& T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 342.
Here the testator has undertaken to dispose of a debt which belonged to Mrs. Mtzhugh.
But he has given her the whole of
his own estate. Her conscience is therefore
affected by the implied condition annexed to
the testator's bounty that while availing herself of the will in one direction, she shall
not defeat its operation tn another.
The ultimate question in all such cases is
this: Did the testator Intend that the devisee, upon accepting the benefit conferred upon him, should acquiesce in the donation of
own property to another?
the devisee's
Hence it becomes Important to determine
how far parol evidence is receivable to maniCage and other witfest such Intention.
nesses were sworn to prove declarations of
the testator that in using the language, "indebtedness to me," he referred to the debt
which had been assigned to Mrs. Fitzhugh.
In Bobmson v. Bishop, 23 Ark. 378, this
court expressed its preference to construe
wills from their ovni terms, rather than to
take the deposition of the scrivener as to
what the testator meant by particular clauses.

Parol evidence Is admissible, in this class
of causes, to the same extent as tn other
cases, in aid of the construction of written
Instruments, and no further. You may show
the condition of the subject-matter and the
surrounding circumstances, so as to place
the court In the position of the testator;
but his purpose to put the devisee to his
election must appear from the will itself.
2 Redf. Wills, 745.
But as It was In proof that Edward L.
Hubbard owed the testator no other debt,
the vrtll can have no reasonable construction
without tnclnding Mrs. Fitzhugh's debt
The decree below is afiSrmed.
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WILBANKS

et al. v.

as
Supreme

WILBANKS.

ond wife and
cease.

lU. 17.)

Court of Illinois.

Nov.

Term,

1856.

Error to circuit court, Jefferson county.
Tbe defendant in error filed Ms blU
against the plaintiffs, to enjoin the plaintiffs
from prosecuting an action of ejectment
against Walter S. Akin and David Rotramel,
for the recovery of forty acres of land which
the defendant In error claims under the will
of his father, Robert A. D. Wllbanks, deceased.

The bill states that R. A. D. Wllbanks, the
father, entered the forty acres in the name
of his wife, Sarah U. Wllbanks;
that she
died leaving the plaintiffs in error her heirs
at law by her said husband; that the forty
acres In dispute were part of the homestead
or farm upon which said Wllbanks, the father, and wife resided.
That Wllbanks, the father, married a second time and afterward died, leaving a son,
the defendant in error, by his second wife,
and made a will bequeathing to his said
second wife, for Ufe, the homestead,
and at
her death willed it to the defendant in error,
and that the forty acres were Included in the
bequest
That the plaintiffs In error were also proTided for, one of them CT. J. Wllbanks) havI
ing a specific bequest left to Mm, of real
'
and personal estate, and that the others
were also as to the balance of the real esundisposed of, made
\' tate of the testator
residuary legatees.
The defendant in error asks that the plaintiffs be enjoined from prosecuting their action at law, for the reason that the intestate,
by devising the said tract of land to the defendant. Intended to put the plaintiffs off
with what be gave them under the will, and
that the plaintiffs ought to elect whether
they would refund the value of the land or,
enjoined from prosecuting
be perpetually
their action at law.
The plaintiffs demurred to the biU generally and specially, and contend that the facts
stated in the bill do not warrant the issuance of an injunction against the plaintiffs,
because the defendants to the suit at law
are not parties; that from the face of the
bill they are manifestly proper parties to the
proceedings,
and for that cause the demurrer ought to have been sustained to the bill;
they also contend that the facts stated in the
bill do not show a case of election In equity
1st, they were residuary
at all, because:
the Intestate, was
legatees;
2d, Wilbanlis,
tenant by the curtesy, and had an Interest
In the land in question; 3d, because the testator treated the land as Ms own property;
and, 4th, the forty acres of land in dispute
are not described in the wjll at all, and the
court will not supply the defect by implication, from the fact that it was witMn the
boundaries of the land bequeathed to Ms secH.& B.Eq.(2(1 Ed.)—9
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the defendant upon her de-

The demurrer was sustained. The plaintiffs stood by their demurrer; but the court
ruled them notwithstanding to answer over,
which they refused to do. A decree pro confesso was entered at September term, 1855,
of the Jefferson circuit court, and the plaintiffs were perpetually and unconditionally enJoined from prosecuting their suit at law.
The plaintiffs assign for error, the ruling
of the court below, on the demurrer, and
contend that the demurrer ought to have
been sustained to the bill, and that the overruling the demurrer and granting the Injunction was erroneous, and that the decree
of the court was rendered without any equity whatever to support it; and further,
that if the Injunction ought to have been
awarded at all, it ought to have been awarded on condition of the plaintiff falling to
elect.

R. S. Nelson, for plaintiffs in error.
Baugh, for defendant in error.

D.

SOATES, C. J. The testator in this case
disposed of all his estate, Iwth real and personal.
The objects of his bounty were exclusively those upon whom the law would
have cast the estate in case of Intestacy; but
whether in the same proportions under the
will as at law, does not appear.
Whether
the provisions of the will are as beneficial
as those of the law, or not, the devisees may
not therefore disturb or set aside its provisions,
under circumstances wMch
unless
raise a right of election.
The widow accepted the devise made to
her, wMch barred her dower; and the heirs
as such merely could not avoid the provisions of the will, wMch disposed
of the
whole estates, real and personal, so far as
they belonged to the testator. The legal title
to the tract in controversy was not in the
testator, but the plaintiffs, his children by a
former wife, as heirs to their mother, in
whose name the land had been purchased of
the United States.
The testator devised tMs tract to his second wife for life, as a part of his homestead,
with remainder to defendant in fee, his son
by the second wife.
The object of the bill by defendant is to
enjoin the plaintiffs from proceeding in ejectment, to recover the land as heirs at law of
their mother,
upon the ground that they
have devises and bequests made to them
by the same will, of wMch they have accepted, and they cannot, therefore. In equity
and conscience be permitted to claim under
the will the benefit of the devises and bequests to them, without giving fuU effect
to
it in every respect, so far as they are concerned.

We think the circumstances clearly present a case for election (waiving any question
of a resulting trust for the husband), and
assuming the fact to be as is alleged,

that
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the provisions of the will have been accepted, the plaintiffs are estopped in equity and
from all claim to this tract of
conscience
their own, which is given to the defendant.
In the general language of the authorities,
they may not, at the same time, take under
the will and contrary to it. This was the
doctrine of the civil law, from whence,
doubtless, we derived the rule. But it seems
to have been confined to cases of wills by
the civil law, while the rule with us has
been extended to deeds and other contracts;
and it has been held to be the rule at law
as well as* in equity.
The intention of the author of the deed
or will to dispose of property which is not
his, must be manifest; it is difficult to apply the doctrine of election when the testator
has some present interest in the estate disposed of, though not entirely his own; for it
might be that he intended to dispose only of
Yet it is a question of inhis own interest.
tention, which is to prevail, and will be
gathered from the terms of the instrument.
An absolute power in the testator to dispose of the subject, and an intention to exercise that power, seems in general sufficient
to make a case of election; a devise to the
heir, although inoperative, compels him to
elect between the estate devised, and claims
The estate descending
adverse to the will.
to the heir under his election to claim against
the will, descends subject to the implied condition.
These priijciples are extracted from Mr.
Swanston's note to Dillon v. Parker, 1
Swanst 394b. , The doctrine of election Is
very fully and comprehensively laid down
in that case and note, and in Gratton v.
Haward, 1 Swanst. 413, and note c. See
also, Noys v. Mordaunt, 2 Vern. 581; 2 Story,
Bq. Jur. §§ 1075-1096; 2 WilUams, Ex'rs 1236,
section 9 of Election (B) and notes; 1 Rop.
Hush. & Wife, 566, note 1; (7 Law Lib. 334.)
It has been suggested that the testator
here was tenant by the curtesy of this tract
of land, and it should therefore be intended
and understood that he devised that interest
which belonged to him, and not the fee,
which was in his children by his first wife.
This view of the devise cannot help or explain away the plain and obvious meaning
and intention upon the face of the instrument;
and that was to pass the fee in all
the lands disposed of in the will. Besides,
this would make the will inoperative as to
this tract; for the estate by curtesy terminated with the life of the testator, at which
time the devise took effect.
We cannot indulge in a construction that would defeat
the Intention, make the provision inoperative,
or render the will void. Nor can we indirectly do the same thing by supposing that the
testator believed this tract to belong to him;
and Intended only to dispose of so much as
belonged to him.
Where such appears to
have been the clear Intention of the testator

to dispose of so much, and no more than he
might own, and the particular property was
devised or bequeathed under the Impression
that it belonged to the testator, then, it may
be, that the question of repugnancy and election might not arise; but the devisee or
legatee might take the interest given, without surrendering his claim to his own property. Still the foundation of the doctrine of
election is the Intention of the testator.
So
that when be clearly intends to dispose of
the property of another, real or personal, although the will or deed alone and of itself
may be ineffectual. Inoperative, or void as a
or sale, yet" it affords authentic
conveyance
evidence of the intention of the testator or
grantor, and that intention shall be made
effectual and prevail to transfer the property
of one who accepts a benefit under such will
Indeed,
or deed. 2 Story, Bq. .Tur. § 1077.
in section 1076, Mr. Justice Story illustrates
this doctrine of election by putting a case
precisely like that before us. If the testator
should devise an estate belonging to his son,
or heir at law, to a third person, and should
in the same will bequeath to his son, or heir
at law, a legacy of one hundred thousand
dollars, etc., an Implied or constructive election is raised. The son or heir must rehnquish his own estate or the bequest under
the will.
The party is entiiled to a full knowledge
of the circumstances, and of the situation
and value of the estates or provisions made;
and an election made in actual ignorance of
material facts will not preclude the party
from exercising the right anew upon obtaining full information.
This record does not
show that the election here was without full
knowledge of all material facts.
But admitting that the plaintiffs may yet
make a new election. If they claim, by descent and against the will, all the lands and
personalty devised and bequeathed to them
In the win, they will be liable to make compensation to the disappointed devisee to the
extent of the value' of the devise intended
for him. So that equity will lay hold of the
devise or bequest renounced, and substitute
compensation for the devise or bequest defeated. See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. and 1 Swanst
above.

Whether by renunciation the party forfeits all Interest, as In case of estates upon
express conditions, or is entitied to any surplus after full compensation, as seems to be
warranted by the current of authorities, is
Immaterial here, it seems to us. For its loss
to defendant from the midst of his homestead tract, would cost plaintiffs more hi
compensation out of their devises than It
could be worth to them thus situated and
surrounded.
And they cannot now assert
their tiUe as heirs to their mother, without
making compensation to defendant, out of
the devises to them in the wilL Decree affirmed.

ELECTION.
ROGERS
(3 Cb.

v.

JONES.

DiT. 688.)

High Court of Justice.

Aug. 3, 1878.

By a marriage settlement dated the 11th
of November, 1833, certain messuages and
(including six cottages
In
hereditaments
Ehos street, Ruthin) were settled to the use
of William Williams for life, with remainder to the use of his wife, Jane Williams, for
life, with remainder to the use of the first
and other sons of W. Williams in tail, and
for default of such issue to the use of his first
and other daughters in tail, and for default
of such issue to the use of the heirs of the
survivor of them, the said W. Williams and
Jane Williams.
William Williams, by his will made in
1860, gave to his said wife, Jane Williams,
all his real estate during her life, and after
her decease he purported to devise "all those
six cottages situate In Rhos street" (being
part of the property included in the said settlement) to his nephew, Thomas Rogers, his
heirs and assigns.

The testator . died in

without

issue,
absolutely entitled under the settlement to the
property therein comprised.

and his widow,

In

1864

1S60

Jane Williams,

became

Thomas Rogers, not being aware

of the settlement, sold and conveyed to the
plaintiff his supposed reversionary interest
under the testator's will in the said cottages.
In 1875 Jane Williams died, having appointed the defendants, W. D. Jones and
E. P. Davies, her executors.

the
After the death of Jane Williams,
plaintiff first ascertained that shE^^had, in
in Rhos street
1872, sold the six cottages
to a purchaser for value without notice of
the devise hi the testator's will.
The plaintiff now brought his action
against the executors of Jane WUliams, and
submitted that he was entitled to be indemnified out of her estate in respect of the
loss sustained by him in consequence of the
sale of the cottages by the defendant, or that
such sale was an election by her to take the
cottages against the will of the testator, and
that, consequently,
the plaintiff, as the person Injured by such election, was entitled to
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receive compensation for such injury out of
the other benefits derived by Jane Williams
under the will of the testator, for the loss
occasioned to the plaintiff by such election,
and to have the amount of such benefits ascertained and paid out of her estate.
C. C. Ellis & Co.,
Adam's, for defendant.

Chitty, Q.
Cookson, Q.
fendant.

F.

W.

C, and Mr. Romer, for plaintiff.
C, and Mr. Bradford, for de-

JESSELi, M. R. The testator in this case
gave his real estate to his wife for her life,
with remainder as to six cottages, which did
not belong to him, to his nephew Thomas
Rogers. At the time of the devise the testator's only interest in these cottages was a
life estate under the settlement, with a contingent remainder If he survived his
is wife. , yif^
Under these circumstances a case of elec- Y
this I
tion arises.
The doctrine of election is this,
that if a person whose property a testator
affects to give away takes other benefits under the same will, and at the same time
elects to keep his own property, he must
make compensation to the person affected
by his election to an extent not exceeding
In this case the
the benefits he receives.
widow, having elected to take against the
will, was bound to make compensation to
the plaintiff to the extent of the benefits she
received under the wiU. Therefore, in her
lifetime, she might to this extent have been
thus made liable.
But it is said that the plaintiff's right to
be indemnified is lost by the death of the
Why? I see no principle upon
widow.
which her death should exonerate her es.The liability of her estate must now
tate.
be ascertained, and there must be an inquiry as to the amount of the benefits which
the widow received in her lifetime under the
will, and as to the compensation to which
the plaintiff is entitled in respect of the loss
he has sustained by not getting possession
of the six cottages at the death of the
widow, so far as such loss does not exceed
her benefits under the wlU.
The pleadings to be amended by making
T. Rogers coplalntlff.

■t-.J-v

'X.^
C>aX^..

for plaintiff.
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SCHLEGEL

ing the general principle, and the wide range
of application. Adsit v. Adslt, 2 Johns. Oh.
(9 N. E. 868, 104 N. X. 125.)
452;
Sanford v. Jackson, 10 Paige, 266;
Church v. Bull, 2 Denlo, 430; Lewis v.
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 18, 1887.
Smith, 9 N. Y. 502; Fuller v. Yates, 8 Paige,
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
325; Havens v. Havens, 1 Sandf. Ch. 331;
second department
Wood V. Wood, 5 Paige, 599.
In view of these settled rules, we think i\
John W. Konvallnka, Henry McGlpskay,
widow in this case was not put to her \1
the
Konvallnka,
and W. E. Glover, for appellant,
The devise to the executors was 'J
election.
George Bliss, for respondents,
Bx'r, etc.
trust, but valid as a power in
void
as
a
another.
Maria Schlegel and
trust, for the sale of the lands and a division of the proceeds, and the lands descendANDREWS, J. The question Is whether ed to the heirs of the testator subject to the
1 Rev. St. p. 729,
the widow of the testator is put to her elecexecution of the power.
tion between dower and the provision in the
§ 56; Cooke v. Piatt, 98 N. Y. 35.
will. The estate of the testator consisted of
It is strenuously urged that, the power of
both real and personal property. The will,
It worked an equitasale being peremptory.
after directing the payment of the testator's ble conversion of the land into personalty,
debts and funeral expenses, and after giving
as of the time of the testator's death, and
furniture in his created a trust in the executors in the proto his wife the bedroom
dwelling-house, and to his children the rest ceeds for the purpose of distribution, which
of the furniture therein, proceeds as follows:
trust it Is alleged is inconsistent with a
"All the rest, residue, and remainder of my claim of dower. The doctrine of equitable
estate, property, and effects of every nature,
conversion, as the phrase implies. Is a fiction
kind, and description I give, devise, and beof equity, which Is frequently applied to
queath to my executors and executrix heresolve questions as to the validity of trusts;
authorize and direct to determine the legal character of the interinafter named, and
them to sell and dispose of the same at such
ests of beneficiaries;
the devolution of proptime, and on such terms, as to them shall
erty, as between real and personal representatives; and for other purposes.
seem best, and to divide the proceeds thereIt seems to
of equally among my wife and children,
be supposed that there Is a necessary repugThere can be no nancy between the existence of a trust In
share and share alike."
controversy as to the general principles govreal property created .by a vrill and an outstanding dower Interest of a widow In the
erning the question of election between dower and a provision for the widow in the will.
trust property. We perceive no foundation
DovyOTisfavore^, It is never excluded by a for this contention. If the purposes of a
provisionTor a wife except by express words, trust, as declared, require that the entire
title, free from the dower Interest of the
or by necessary implication. Where there are
widow, should be vested in the trustees, In
no express words, there must be, upon the
of the intenorder to effectuate the purposes of the testaface of the will, a demonstration
tion of the testator that the widow shall not tor In creating it, a clear case for an election Is presented.
take both dower and the provision. The will
Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N.
only when It Y. 851.
But the mere creation of a trust
furnishes this demonstration
clearly app^rs, without ambiguity or doubt,
for the sale of real property, and its distrithat to permit the widow to claim both dow- bution. Is not Inconsistent with the exister and the provision wouid interfere with
ence of a dower interest in the same property.
There is no legal difficulty In the trusother dispositions, and disturb the
the
tee executing the power of sale, but the sale
scheme of the testator as manifested by his
will. The intention of the testator to put will necessarily be subject to the widow's
right of dower, as it would be subject to any
the widow to an election cannot be inferred
outstanding interest In a third person parafrom the extent of the provision, or because
mount to that of the trustee.
she is devisee under the will for life or in
fee, or because it may seem to the court
In the cases of Savage v. Burnham, 17 N.
that to permit the widow to claim both the
Y. 577, and Tobias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y.
provision and dower would be unjust as a 327, the widow was put to her election, not
family arrangement;
or even because it may
because the vesting of the title in trustees
be inferred or believed, In view of all the
was per se inconsistent with a claim for
of the
circumstances,
that, if the attention
dower, but for the reason that the vnll made
had been drawn to the subject,
a disposition of the Income, and contained
testator
excluded
dower.
he would have expressly
other provisions which would be In part deWe repeat, the only sufficient and adequate
feated If dower was Insisted upon.
There
demonstration which, in the absence of exis language in the latter case which, disconpress words, vrill put the widow to her elecnected from the context, may give color to
tion, Is a clear Incompatibility arising on the
the contention of the appellant
But It is
face of the will between a claim of dower
the principle upon which adjudged cases proand a claim to the benefit given by the will.
ceed which Is mainly to be looked to, be'
We cite a few of the cases in this state showcause a correct principle is sometimes ml»-

KONVALINKA

et al.

ELECTION.
There Is, however, no ground for
applied.
of the meaning of the
misapprehension
learned judge In that case, interpreting his
language with reference to facts then under
consideration.
It has frequently been declared that powers of or in trust for sale are not inconsistent

with the widow's right of dower. Gibson
V. Gibson, 17 Eng. Law & Eq. 349; Bending
V. Bending, 3 Kay & J. 257; Adsit v. Adsit,
supra; In re Frazer, 92 N. Y. 239. And It
was held in Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596,
that the widow was not put to her election,
where the testator devised all his property
to trustees, with a peremptory power of
sale, and directed the payment to the widow
fund.
of an annuity out of the converted
under
The same conclusion was reached,
very similar circumstances, in Fuller v.
Yates, 8 Paige, 325; and in Re Frazer, supra, the widow's dower was held not to be
excluded by a provision hi the will, although
as to a portion of the realty the power of
sale given to the executors was peremptory.
The general doctrine is very clearly stated
by the vice-chancellor
in Ellis v. Lewis, 3
Hare, 310: "I take the law to be clearly settled at this day that a devise of lands
eo
nomine upon trusts for sale, or a devise of
lands eo nomine to a devisee beneficially,
does not, per se, express an Intention to de-
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vise the lands otherwise than subject to Its
This relegal incidents, dower included."
mark of the vice-chancellor also answers the
claim that the testator, when he described
as the subject of the dower, "all the rest,
residue, and remainder of my estate," meant
the entire title, or the estate as enjoyed by
him. A similar argument was answered by
Lord Thurlow in Foster v. Cook, 3 Brown,
Ch. 347. "Because," he said, "the testator
am
gives all his property to the trustees,
to gather, from his having given all he has,
that he has given that which he has not."
The argument that the testator intended
equality of division between his wife and
children is also answered by the same conThe proceeds of the testator's essideration.
tate were by the will to be equally distributed.
It left untouched the dower of the widow,
which he could not sell or authorize to be
sold, and which was a legal right not derived
from him, and paramount to all others.
It
may be conjectured, perhaps reasonably Inferred, that the testator really Intended the
provision for his wife to be exclusive of any
other interest, but so It is not written in the
will, and we are not permitted to yield any
force to the suggestion.
It Is a question of
legal Interpretation, which has been settled.
The judgment should therefore be affirmed. All concur.

I

-a
.

/

'T-i-'v/-'

ELECTION.

134

EEED

V.

(29

Supreme

Judicial
October

Writ of dower.

DICKEEMAN.
Pick.

146.)

Court of Massachusetts.
Term, 1831.
The following facts were

agreed to by the parties.
EUjali Reed, the late husband of the demandant, died seised in fee of the land described la the writ On August 8, 1816, he made
his last will, containing the following provisions:
"I give and bequeath to my beloved
wife, Lucy Reed, and Alice Reed, my daughter, one-half of my dwelling house where
now live, the southerly part of said house,
and the north buttery in said house, during
my wife's natural Ufe. Also to my beloved
wife I give and bequeath one-half of my indoor movables.
also give and bequeath to
my beloved wife one cow, which
order my
sons, Solomon and Elijah, to keep for her, or
some other in the room of it, free from any
expense to her during her natural Ufe. Also
I give and bequeath to my wife and my
daughter, Alice Reed, one heifer, a year old
last spring, and hereby order my two sons,
Solomon and EUjah, to be at one-half the expense of keeping said heifer for their mother." The will was proved in September,
1816.
Soon after the death of the testator,
the demandant selected a cow from the stock
on the farm, and that cow, or another instead of it, has ever since been kept on the
farm for her by her sons, Solomon and
Elijah, and she has had the use of it ever
since, until within a year past, when she sold
it. A heifer was provided for her and Alice
by Solomon and Elijah, and was kept by
them for their mother until it died, which
happened soon after the probate of the will.
The demandant has always, since the death
of her husband, been in the possession of the
indoor movables.
She has always lived in
that part of the house which was devised to
her, and Alice has lived with her.
It appeared by the records of the probate court
that in March, 1829, the judge of probate appointed a committee to set ofC by metes and
bounds and define that part of the dwelling
house of the testator unto his widow and
Alice, which was devised to them for their
use during their natural life, together with
the cellar, privileges, and appurtenances;
and
In April, 1829, the committee made a return,
showing their performance of the duty required of them. The real estate of the testator was appraised, soon after his death, at
$10,529, and the personal at $647, his debts
amounted to a sum between $3,000 and $3,600, the real estate given to Alice was worth
$900,
one-half of the indoor movables
was
worth $95, and the fee simple of the whole
dwelling house was worth between $1,300
and $1,400. A demand was made upon-^the
defendant, on July 5, 1830, to assign doyer to
the demandant.
On the foregoing facts, or such of them as
would be admissible In evidence on a trial
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before a jury, and on such Inferences as may
be legally made from them, the case was
submitted to the court, and if, in the opinion
of the court, the demandant was entitled to
recover, the defendant was to be defaulted;
but otherwise, the demandant was to become

nonsuit
Mr. Eddy, for demandant
Mr. Miller, for tenant

W. Baylies

and

MORTON, J. The demandant Is clearly
entitled to recover her dower, unless she is
barred by the provision made for her in the
wiU of Elijah Reed. In that Is given to her
a freehold estate in a part of the dwelling
house of the deceased, and also certain personal property.
The will contains no declaration of the testator's intention, whether this
was to be in lieu of, or in addition to, the
dower of his widow.
By St 1783, c. 24, § 8, "the widow, In all
eases, may waive the provision made for her
in the will of her deceased husband, and
claim her dower, and have the same assigned
her in the same maimer as though her husband had died Intestate, in which case she
shall receive no benefit from such provision,
unless it appears by the will plainly the testator's intention to be in addition to her
dower." This Is a material alteration of a
rule of the common law applicable to this
case. By that rule a devise or bequest to
a widow is presumed to be in addition to her
dower, imless it clearly appears that it was
the intention of the testator that it should be
in lieu of dower.
The wife has a legal interest in her husband's estate, of which she cannot be devested without her own consent After his
death she is legally entitled to dower, unless by some act of her own during his lifetime she has barred her right or after his
decease voluntarily relinquished that right
A bequest or devise Is deemed a bounty, and
not the payment or satisfaction of a pre-existing debt or obligation. A gratuity cannot
extinguish a legal right; hence the commonlaw rule that a donation in a will does not
operate as an extinguishment of the right of
dower, but is presumed to be a gratuity hi
addition to the existing legal right; but a
donation may be made on a condition, and
that condition may as well be the relinquishment of the right of dower as the performance of any other act, and If a donation in a
win be made on the express condition that
dower shall not be claimed, or. If it clearly
appear from the will that it was the intention of the testator that the widow should not
have both the donation and the dower, then
the donation shall be taken to be in lieu of
dower, and the widow cannot hold both. She^
may have her election.
She cannot claim under the will and adversely to it; but she Is
not thereby devested of her right of dower,
but may have her election between her dower
and the provision made for her in the will.
By the clause of our statute Just quoted.
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this presumption
i proylslon.In the
I of dower, unless

of law Is reversed,

and the

will Is deemed to be in lieu
it plainly appears that the

testator intended it to be in addition to it.
In this case there is no express declaraprovision was intion that the testamentary
tended to be in addition to dower, nor can
any such intention be inferred from all the
The inadequacy of the
will taken together.
provision alone will not justify such an in-

ference.
The plaintiff must therefore take the devise and bequests In the will, vmless she seaThe statute
sonably elected to waive them.
There is
seems to presume an acceptance.
some positive act to be done by the widow,
indicating her election, before she can be enThe demand required to be
titled to dower.
made thirty days before an action can be
commenced might be considered an election,
where no election had previously been made.
Withm what time shaU a widow be holden
to waive the provision made for her in the
will, or to be bound by it? In New York,
the widow shall be deemed to have elected
to take the testamentary provision, unless
she enters upon or commences a suit for her
-dower within one year after ber husband's
In Virginia, she is allowed nine
i death.
'
months, and ill Vermont only sixty days, in
which to make her election; and, on failure
to do it, she is confined to her dower at common law. Our statute has not fixed any precise time for the election; but doubtless the
widow would be holden to have accepted the
provision, unless she waived
testamentary
it in a reasonable time, that the settlement
of the estate might be closed and distribution
What shall be deemmade among the heirs.
ed a reasonable time, not being fixed by statute, cannot be accurately defined by any gen-

<k^t^^^-4^

eral rule, and
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not now

be discussed.
that, under the circumstances of this case, the demandant is precluded from waiving the provisions of the
will and claiming dower.
Fourteen years elapsed after the probate
of the will before any demand of dower was
During the whole of this time she ocmade.
cupied the real estate which was devised to
her.
The personal property bequeathed to her
was received by her, and some of it has been
disposed of by her.
The benefit of the other
provision in the will in her favor had been
enjoyed by her. A decree of the probate
court has been made, assigning to her by
definite bounds that part of the real estate
which was devised to her; and the whole estate has passed out of the hands of the original devisees.
We think, after all this, it is-,
too late for the widow to waive the provision I
made for her in the wiU and claim her K
dower.
It is true that in equity the widow may
sometimes be relieved from an improvident
election; but this can only be done where
some deception or fraud was practiced upon
her, or at least where she acted under an
ignorance of the facts or a misappr^ension
of her legal rights. But here is no evidence
of any deception, or misapprehension,
or even
ignorance of the circumstances of the case.
The plaintiff chose to regard and carry into
effect the provisions and directions contained
in her husband's vtIII. No desire to avoid it
on her part was known to exist till many
years after the death of her husband,
and
not until the estate had passed from her family into the hands of strangers.
We are entirely clear that she cannot now change her
determination, waive the provisions of the
will, and claim her dower.
need

For we are all of opinion
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VAN DYKE'S APPEAIi.
(60 Pa. 481.)
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May

11,

1869.)

Appeal from the decree of the court at
Nisi Prius:
In Equity: In proceedings In
which James 0. Van Dyke and others, in
their own right, were defendants.
The case was heard at Nisi Prius on bill
and answer, which with the exhibits, present
substantially the following facts: —
Dr. Frederick A. Van Dyke, a citizen of
Pennsylvania, residing and having his home
in Philadelphia, died November ISth 1867,
leaving a will, bearing date November 5th
1861, and codicils dated July 4th 1863 and
May 20th 1866— which were proved in Philadelphia on the 25th of November 1867.
Letters testamentary were granted to those of
the executors named in the will who survived
him.
Dr. Van Dyke left to survive him his widow,' Mrs. Elizabeth Van Dyke, and eight children, or issue.
The decedent was owner of personal

estate amounting,

accord-

ing to inventory filed, to
Of real 'estate in Philadelphia val-

$11,100 70

ued at

38,000 00

(since sold for)

70,000 00

And of real estate in New Jersey

By his will he gave to his living
daughters each $10,000, making
And to the Pease children (the issue of a daughter)

$119,100 70
$20,000 00
12,000 00
$32,000 00

The residue of the Philadelphia estate and
the New Jersey estates he devised to the five
sons (and the issue of such as were deceased)

in

equal shares.

The will having no subscribing witnesses,
could not pass real estate in New Jersey;
and, as to the testator's real estate there, he
died intestate, and his children take in equal
shares.
The interests of the testator's children, derived from the will and the intestacy, are
as follows:—
The personal estate is valued at.
The real estate in Philadelphia
The gifts to hia daughters
to

Leaving to

he distributed
five sons
Or $3,700 each.

. . $11,100 70

amount

among his

38,000 00

$49,100 70
32,000 00
$17,100 70

The daughters take under the will about

$10,000 each.

The latter take equally with the sons the
estate in New Jersey.
In addition to the dispositions above stated, the testator ordered as follows: —
"13th.
direct that no public inventory or
sale of my household furniture shall be made;
that it shall be taken charge of by my executors, and kept by them until disposed of
according to devises made. That so much

I

as she may require shall remain in possession of my wife, Elizabeth Van Dyke, for her
use, the remainder to be divided among my
children, the articles only excepted especially
devised in this instrument, or designated in
my accompanying letter, to which
refer
my executors, as well as for directions for
the disposal of my body.
"14th. I direct and enjoin on my heirs that
no exception be taken to this my will or any
part thereof on any legal or technical account, and that any property or possession
which may have been overlooked or omitted
to be mentioned,
shall be disposed of by an
equal, distribution among my children.
"15th. In case either of my married daughters should die without issue, or surviving
children, then as to the share or shares of
her or them, I direct that such share or
shares devised by me in trust for her or
them, shall be equally divided among my
other children, and the surviving children of
any one of them who may be deceased."
The bill alleges that the testator meant
to exclude all but his sons from his New Jersey property; and that he intended that his
daughters should take no more than the legacies he had bequeathed to them.
The prayer is that the daughters may be^
put to their election, either to give effect to
the whole will, by relinquishing their claim
upon, the New Jersey property, or from their
legacies to compensate
the sons for their
loss in consequence of the daughters sharing
with them the New Jersey property.
Mr. Justice READ, at Nisi Prius, dismissed
the bill.
The plaintiffs appealed, and assigned the

I

dismissal of the bill for error.
Argued before THOMPSON,
READ, AGNEW, SHARSWOOD,

LIAMS,
E.

C. Mitchell and
C. E. Morgan,
appellees.

lants.

for

JJ.

0. J., and
and WIL-

E. Olmsted, for appelJr., and W. A. Porter,

SHARSWOOD, J. No question has been
made by the parties as to the jurisdiction of
a court of equity in this state to give the re-

lief prayed for in this bill. It having been
suggested that it would be an encroachment
upon that, which, by the Acts of Assembly,
is exclusively conferred upon the Orphans'
Courts, the attention of the counsel was directed to this point when the cause was ordered for reargument.
The learned and able gentlemen retained
for the defendant, have, however, frankly
conceded it. Consent,
cannot give
indeed,
jurisdiction, and it is therefore, deemed proper to say, that we entertain no doubt upon
the subject. The Orphans' Court, by the
Act of June 10th, 1836, § 19, Pamph. L. 792,
has jurisdiction of proceedings for the recovery of legacies, of the settlement of the accounts of executors, the distribution of the
estates of decedents, and in all cases wherein
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disposition absolutely void, is no disposition
executors may be possessed of, or in any way
at all, and being incapable of effect as such,,
accountable for any real or personal estate
it cannot be read to ascertain the intent of
of a decedent. It Is also the settled docthe testator. But an express condition antrine that the jurisdiction of that court withWhitenexed to the bequest of the personalty does
in its appointed orbit is exclusive:
not render the disposition of the realty valid;
side V. Whiteside, 20 Pa. 473; Shollenberger's
it would be a repeal of the Statute of Frauds
Appeal, 21 Pa. 337; Black v. Black, 34 Pa.
so to hold.
How then can it operate any
354; and no doubt a court of equity cannot
more than an implied condition to open the
interfere with a matter of which the Oreyes of the court so as to enable them to
has
exclusive jurisdiction:
Court
phans'
read tliose parts of the will which relate to ,
Loomis V. Loomis, 27 Pa. 233; Bickley v.
Biddle, 33 Pa. 276.
the realty, and without a knowledge of what
they are, how can the condition be enforced?
But it is not in every case, which may incidentally bear upon the settlement of the
"As to the question of the election," said
Lord Kenyon, while Master of the Rolls,
estate of a decedent, that its jurisdiction is
exclusive; otherwise, all remedies for the re"the cases which have been cited are certainly great authorities, but I must confess I
covery of claims against such estates would
necessarily be drawn within its vortex. This
should have great difficulty in making the
McLean's Execsame distinctions, if they had come before
has never been pretended:
They have said you shall not look into
me.
utors v. Wade, 53 Pa. 146; Sergeant's ExThis is not a a will unattested so as to raise the condiecutors V. Ewing, 30 Pa. 75.
tion which would be implied from the devise
proceeding to recover a legacy charged on
land, nor to compel a settlenlent or distriif it had appeared; but if you give a legacy
bution, but falls within jthe a dmitted s copfi- on condition that the legatee shall give the
however, I am
of the authority of a~court of eq, uitv inj^ases- lands, then he must elect;
/of-trttStnDle legaf 'title being in the de- bound by the force of authorities to take no
fendants, as heirs at law, that court, if it is
notice whatever of the unattested will, as
a case of election, holds them bound as trusfar as relates to the freehold estate:" Carey
tees to compensate the devisees disappointed
v. Askew, 1 Cox, 241. "I do not understand," said Sir William Grant, "why a will,,
of the bounty intended for them by the testhough not executed so as to pass real estator.
tate, should not be read for the purpose of
The jurisdiction in such case is expressly
recognized as concurrent in Lewis v. Lewis,
discovering in it an implied condition, conThe decree of
cerning real estate, annexed to a gift of per18 Pa. 79, 53 Am. Dec. 443.
this court will doubtless be conclusive as to
sonal property, as it is admitted it must be
upon the final settlement
the subject-matter
read, when such condition is expressly anof the account of the executors, but so would
nexed to such gift. For if by a sound cona judgment against them in a court of law,
struction such condition is rightly inferred
if no fraud or collusion were shown. We
from the whole instrument, the effect seems
pass, therefore, to the main question.
to be the same as if it was expressed in
It may certainly be considered as settled words:" Brodie v. Barry, 2 Ves. & Beames^
in England, that if a will, purporting to
127.
So Lord Eldon declared, that "the disdevise real estate, but ineffectually, because
tinctions upon this head of the law appear
according to the Statute of
not attested
to be rather unsubstantial," and that "there
Frauds, gives a legacy to the heir at law,
are, undoubtedly, these distinctions, and a
Hearle v.
judge, having to deal with them, finds a diffihe cannot be put to his election:
Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695; Thellusson v. Woodculty in stating to his own mind satisfacford, 13 Ves. 209; Breckinbridge v. Ingram,
tory principles on which they may be ground2 Ves. Jr. 652; Sheddon
v. Goodrich, 8 Id.
ed:" Rex V. Wauchop, 1 Bligh, 1. And in
482.
These cases have been recognized and
another place: "The reason of that distinction, if it was res Integra, is questionable."
followed in this country:
Melchor v. Burger, 21 N. C. 634; McElfresh
v. Schley, 2
"With Lord Kenyon, I think the distinction
GUI, 181, 41 Am. Dec. 415; Jones v. Jones, 8
such as the mind cannot well fasten upon:"
GiU, 197; Kearney v. Macomb, 16 N. J. Bq.
v. Goodrich, 8 Ves. Jr. 482.
Sheddon
Mr.
189.
Tet it is equally well established, that
Justice Kennedy has expressed the same opinif the testator annexes an express condition
ion: "When a condition is necessarily imto the bequest of the personalty, the duty of
plied by a construction in regard to which
election
will be enforced: Boughton v.. there can be but one opinion, there can be no
Houghton, 2 Ves. Sr. 12; Whistle v. Webster,
good reason why the result or decision of
2 Ves. Jr. 367; Kex v. Wauchop, 1 Bligh, 1;
the court should not be the same as in the
McElfresh v. Schley, 2 Gill, 181, 41 Am. Dec.
case of an express condition, and the donee
415.
That this distinction rests upon no
bound to make an election in the one case
City of Philadelphia
sufficient reason
has been admitted by alas well as the other:"
most every judge before whom the question
510.
There is another
V. Davis, 1 Whart.
has arisen.
Why an express condition should class of cases in England wholly irreconcilprevail, and one, however clearly implied,
able with this shadowy distinction; for the
should not, has never been and cannot be,
heir at law of a copyhold was formerly put
satisfactorily explained. It is said, that a
though there had been no
to his election,
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surrender to the use of the will. This was
previous to 55 Geo. Ill, c. 192, 1 White &
T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 239, note; yet, as Sir
William Grant has remarked, "a will, however executed, was as inoperative for the
conveyance of copyhold as a will defectively
of freehold
executed is for the conveyance
estates:" Brodie v. Barry, 2 Ves. & Beames,
130.

The mind instinctively shrinks from the
task of frustrating the clear intention of a
aiming too to make all his chiltestator,
dren equal, upon authorities establishing a
The predistinction without any difference.
cise point can never arise in this state, for
happily our Statute of Wills of April 8th
Pamph. L. 249, wisely provides that
1833,
the forms and solemnities of execution and
proof shall be the same in all wills, whether
of realty or personalty. The case before us
is of a will duly executed according to the
laws of Pennsylvania, devising lands in New
Jersey, where, however, it is invalid as to
the realty by not having two subscribing witnesses.
A court of New Jersey might hold
on these authorities bound to
themselves
shut their eyes on the devise of the realty,
and consider it as though it were not written, and so they have held Kearney v. MaThey might feel
comb, 16 N. J. Eq. 189.
compelled
themselves
to say, with Ld. Alvanley, however absurdly it sounds:
"I cannot read the wUl without the word 'real' in
it, but I can say, for the statute enables
me, and I am bound to say, that if a man,
by a will unattested,
gives both real and
personal estate, he never meant to give the
real estate:" Buckerldge v. Ingram, 2 Ves.
Jr. 652. But a statute of New Jersey has no
such moral power over the conscience of a
court of Pennsylvania to prevent it from
reading the whole will upon the construction of a bequest of personalty within its
rightful jurisdiction.
If a question could
arise directly upon the title of the heirs at
law to the New Jersey land, doubtless the
court of any other state, upon the well settled principles of the comity of nations, must
decide it according to" the lex rei sitae.
We
are dealing only with the bequests of personalty, and the simple question is, whether the
testator intended to annex to them a condition. If, without making any disposition
whatever of the New Jersey estates, dying
intestate as to them, he had annexed an express proviso to the legacies to his daughters
that they should release to their brothers all
their right and title as heirs at law to these
lands, it is of course indubitable that such a
condition would have been effectual.
We
are precluded by no statute, to which we owe
obedience, from reading the whole will, and,
if we see plainly that such was the intention of the testator, from carrying it into effect.
Some

cases have arisen in England upon
disposing of English and Scotch estates, in which the judgments have not been

wills

harmonious, nor can any general principle
them bearing upon this
question. In Brodie v. Barry, 2 Ves. &
Beames, 127, an heir at law of heritable property in Scotland, being also a legatee under
a will not conforming to the law in Scotland
as to heritable property, was put to his election. By that law a previous conveyance by
deed was necessary, accordhag to the proper
feudal forms, upon which the uses declared
by the will might operate.
As by the law
of Scotland the heir at law m such a case
was put to his approbate or reprobate (the
apd it was
Scotch law term for election),
very similar to a will of copyhold. Sir William Grant considering the law of both countries to be the same, felt himself relieved
from the necessity of determining by which
law the decision should be made. Dundas
V. Dundas, 2 Dow & Clark, 349, was a. case
in the House of Lords from Scotland.
The
will was formal according to the Scotch laws,
but was invalid as to real estate in England
imder the Statute of Frauds. Yet the decision of the Court of Session putting the English heir at law to his approbate or reprobate
This case Is certainly in point,
was affirmed.
In favor of the position taken in this opinion.
It is true, that in the judgment pronounced
by Lord Chancellor Brougham, then but recently raised to the wool-sack, it is not put
on that ground. He assumes, that in England, while a court of law would be precluded by the statute from looking at the disposition made of the realty, it was competent for a court of equity to do so, and that
the Court of Session in Scotland had only
done what a chancellor in England had a
right to do; a distinction, it must be allowed, not adverted to in any of the previous
cases, which were all in courts of equity.
In McCall v. McCall, Drury, 283, Lord Chancellor Sugden, held that an heir at law of
heritable property in Scotland, who was also
the devisee of real estate m Ireland, under a
will duly executed as to the Irish, but ineffectual as to the Scotch estate, was bound
to make his election. In the later case of
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 13 Bug. L. & Eq. 443,
which arose in England, the heir at law In
Scotland was not put to his election but distinctly on the ground, that the will in the
alleged disposition of the Scotch estate, had
used only general words.
"If the will had
mentioned Scotland In terms," said Sir
Knight Bruce, Lord Justice, "or the testator
had not any real estate except real estate in
Scotland, that might have been a ground for
putting the heir to his election.
The matter, however, standing as it does, we are
bound to hold that the will does not exhibit
an Intention to give or affect any property
which it is not adapted to pass," and Lord
Cranworth concurred in this view.
In this state of the authorities, we are
clear in holding that we are not precluded by
force of the New Jersey Statute of Frauds,
from reading the whole will of the testator
be extracted from
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in order to ascertain Ills intention in reference to tlie bequest of personalty now in
We are equally clear that it is a
question.
The intention of the tescase of election.
merely upon the implicatat6r"Hbes'notT^^t
tion arising from his careful division of his
property, among his children, In different
classes, but he has Indicated it in words by
"I direct and enjoin on my heirs,
/•the clause:
f that no exception be taken to this will, or
on any legal or technical
1 any part thereof,
true,
It
is
that for want of a
account."
V
bequest over this provision would be regarded as in terrorem only, and would not induce
Chew's Appeal, 45 Pa. 228.
a forfeiture:
But as has been often said, the equitable
doctrine of election Is grounded upon the
ascertained intention of the testator, and we
can resort to every part of the wUl to arf' rive at It.
"The intention of the donor or
i testator ought doubtless to be the polar star
Kennedy,
:^ in such cases," says Mr. Justice
"and wherever it appears from the instrument Itself conferring the benefit, with a certaiaty that will admit of no doubt, either by
express declaration,
or words that are susceptible of no other meaning, that it was the
intention of the donor or testator that the
object of his bounty shcvild not participate in
It without giving his assent to everything
contained in the instrument, the donees ought

139

not to be permitted to claim the gift unless
they will abide by the intention and wishes
of its author:"
City of Philadelphia v. Davis, 1 Whart. 510.
This, however, is not the only mode in
which the equity of the case can be reached.
The doctrine of equitable election rests upon the principle of compensation, and not of
forfeiture, which applies only to the nonperformance of an express
condition: 2
Madd. Ch. 49. Besides, no decree of this
court could authorize the guardians of the
minors to execute releases of their right and
title to the New Jersey lands, which would
The alternative
be effectual In that state.
decree prayed for In the bill is that which Is
most appropriate to the case.
Decree reversed, and now It is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the executors of
the last will and testament of Frederick Augustus Van Dyke, deceased, shall pay to the
defendants, Mary A. Van Dyke, Margaret P.
Fernald, and Frederick A. Pease, Elizabeth
Pease and Augusta Pease, such sum less
than the amount of their respective legacies,
as will compensate the said plaintiffs and the
surviving sons of the testator for the value
of the shares of the said legatees In the said
real estate In New Jersey, and that it be
referred to James Parsons, Esq., as master
to settle and report such respective amounts.

SATISFACTION.
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STRONG

T.

WILLIAMS.

(12 Mass.

Sapreme Jndicial

Court

391.)

of Massachusetti.

1815.

Debt on a bond by Mary Strong against
DeJohn C. Williams, executor.
On report.
fendant defaulted.
The plaintiff declared in debt upon a bond
made to her by Woodbridge Little, Esq., the
defendant's testator, dated the 18th of August, 1800, conditioned to pay her $200 within one month after her marriage, if such
event should take place in the lifetime of the
or adobligor, or that his heirs, executors,
ministrators should pay her $333.33 within
six months after his decease.
The adtion
was referred to the decision of the court upon an agreed statement of facts to the following effect:
On the day of making the
bond declared on the testator made a written promise to the plaintiff, then resident in
his family, to pay her $20 annually, so long
as she could continue in his family, and to
provide for her, during the same time, all
kinds of clothing, and all articles which she
might need, both in health and sickness;
the plaintiff at that time living in the testator's family as a maid and housekeeper.
Payment of the said annuity was regularly
indorsed on said promise until the year 1806,
and the plaintiff duly received the other articles therein stipulated, and continued to
live in the testator's family until his decease.
On the 20th of March, 1813, the said
testator made his last will, which was approved after his decease, and of which the
defendant is executor; and on the 21st of
June following the testator died, leaving
neither wife nor issue.
In the said will the
said testator, in consideration of the long,
faithful, friendly, and meritorious services of
the plaintiff, both to himself and his then
late beloved wife, bequeathed
to her his
household furniture, with sundry other valuable chattels, $300 in cash, and also the use
of his homestead- for six months, or half the
rents thereof for the first twelve months after his decease, at her election.
The specific
articles so bequeathed were of the value of
$745.84,
and the rent of the said homestead
for six months was equal to $50; all of
which the plaintiff had received, together
with the said cash legacy.
The amount of
the testator's
estate and credits was $3,346.66,
and of the legacies, payable in money, $2,200. All the residue of his estate, after payment of debts (which were of trifling
amount) and legacies, he devised to the coi>
poration of Williams College, under whose direction the defendant contended that the
bond had been satisfied by the payment of
the said legacies to the plaintiff.
If, in the
opinion of the court, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum due by the bond in
addition to the said legacies, judgment was

to be rendered In her favor upon the default
of the defendant; otherwise the plaintiff
was to become nonsuit.

PUTNAM, J. delivered the opinion of thecourt.
The general rule anciently established inchancery was, that when a testator being in.
debted gave to his creditor a legacy equal to,
or exceeding the amount of his debt, the legacy should be considered as a satisfaction f(ir
the debt.
The rule has been acknowledged
in Inter cases, but with marks of disapproba>
tion, and a disposition to restrain its operation in all cases where, from circumstances'
to be collected from the will, it might be inferred that the testator had a different intention.
Haynes v. Mico, 1 Bro. Cha. Ca. 131.
Thus where the testator left a sufficient estate, it was determined that he was to be presumed to have been kind as well as just.
So
if the legacy was of a less sum than the debt;
or of a different nature; or upon conditions;,
or not equally beneficial in some one particular, although more so in another.
All the cases agree that the intention of the/
testator ought to prevail; and that, primal
facie at least, whatever is given in a will is
But by later
to be intended as a bounty.
cases the courts have not been disposed to
understand the testator as meaning to pay a
debt, when he declares that he makes a gift;
unless the circumstances of the case should
lead to a different conclusion.
Thus in the case cited for the plaintiff,
Brown v. Dawson, 2 Vern. 498, where the
wife joined in the sale of her jointure, and
the husband gave her a note of 71. 10s. per
annum for her life; and afterwards upon another such sale he gave her a bond for 62.
10s. per annum for her life; and he afterwards made his will, and gave her lAl. per
annum for life: the legacy was adjudged to
be a satisfaction for the note and bond. Here
it will be perceived that the annuity given in
the will amounted exactly to the sums secured by the bond and note: and the presumption of satisfaction proceeded upon the
similitude of the legacy to the debt. 2 Fonbl.
330, in notis.
So in the case of Fowler v.
Fowler,^ V.W\\\. 353, the general rule wa»
applied. There the husband, being indebted
to the wife for arrears due by the marriage
settlement, gave her a larger legacy by the
will: and it was held a satisfaction of tho
debt.
But it is to be observed that lord chancellor Talhot expressed great dissatisfaction
with the rule: and it does npt-appear that
any circumstances could be found, to take
the case out of its general application. In
that case the court refused parole evidence,
to prove that the testator intended both
should be paid.
But cases of this nature must depend upon
the circumstances: an4 there must be a
strong presumption, to induce a beli^that
the testator intended the legacj^as a payment,
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2 Fonbl. 332.
Thui>
as a bounty.
where the testatrix had given her servant a
bond for 202. free of taxes for her life, and
afterwards made her will and gave the serv-

«nd not

ant

201.

per annum payable half yearly, but

said nothing about the taxes, the court held
that both should be paid. Atkinson v. Webb,
2 Vern. 478. — Here the legacy, being not
quite so beneficial as the debt, did not raise
a presumption that it was intended as a payment.
So where the testator having sufficient assets, and having manifested great kindness
for the legatee, gave a legacy of a greater
amount than he owed, it was holden by lord

Cowper, that the testator might
chancellor
be presumed to be kind as well as just: and
he decreed the payment of the legacy as well
Cuthbert v. Peacock, X Salk. 155.
as the debt.
It has been holden that a legacy for a less
sum than the debt shall never be taken as
satisfaction; 2 Salk. 508; and that specifla
things devised are never to be considered as
2
satisfaction of a debt, unless so expressed.
£q. Ca. Abr. title Devises pi. 21, cited Bac.

Abr. Legacies D.

So the circumstance, that the testator had
devised "that all his debts and legacies should
be paid," was holden sufficient to take the
case out of the general rule: as where the testator, indebted to his maid servant 1002., by
bond for wages, afterwards gave her 6002.
lord chancellor King decreed that both should
be paid, as the
testator had made proviuon for the payment of his debts.
1 F.
Will. 408, 409, vide note.
So where it appeared that the legatee had
lived with the testatrix as a servant for twenty or thirty years, and she had given her a
bond for 2602. and in one month afterwards
she made her will and gave her 5002. : and
in another clause she gave the rest of her
servants 52. apiece, but not to Jane Greese,
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the legatee; "because," said the testatrix, "I
have done well for her before;" and she also
made provision for her debts and legacies.
Lord Hardwioke thought the circumstances
above stated took the case out of the general
rule, and decreed the legacy to be no satisfaotion for the debt.
Richardson v. Greese, 3
Atk. 65; Nicholls v. Jvdson, 8. P.. 2 Atk.
301; Clark v. -SeMe22, S. P., 3 Atk. 97.
So where the testator was indebted for
goods on an open account, a legacy for a larger
sum was not held a satisfaction: because he
might not know whether he was indebted or
not; and therefore no presumption was to
arise, that he intended merely to pay a debt.
Powel's Case, 1 P. Will. 299; 10 Mod. Case
No. 201, p. 398.
In the case at bar, the consideration for the
legacy appears from the will to have been for
the services of the legatee.
A presumption
that the legacy was intended to be a satisfaction of the bond also, must rest on the fact
that the bond was giveu for the same services: of which fact there is no evidence before ns. It may have been for a different
cause.
We can only presume that it was for
a

lawful

one.
appears also from the will, that the testator intended his debts and legacies should
be paid, before his residuary legatees should
The pecuniary legacy to the
take any thing.
plaintiff also is not so much as the debt; and
therefore cannot be considered as a payment

It

of it. Neither is there any declaration of the
testator, that the specific articles given should
be considered as a satisfaction of the debt.
It
appears also that there are sufficient assets.
From a consideration of the principles and
decisions applicable to this case, we are therefore all of opinion that the plaintiff ought to
recover.
Defendant defaulted.

(r
1
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DEICHMAN
(22

Atl.

799, 49

V.

N.

AENDT.

J.

Bq. 106.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey. Oct.

26, 1891.

Action by Deichman against Arndt for
the construction of a will.
Wm.
Charles jl. ITztcA.forcomplainant.
M. Davis, for defendant.
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BIRD, "V. C. By the bill in this case the
complainant asks the aid of the court in
determining the true construction of the
last will of Ann Arndt, deceased, and consequently the rights of the legatees and
devisees under said will. At the time or
her death and of the making of her will
she was the owner of a lot of land with
a dwelling thereon, in which she resided.
Before the making of her will she gave a
bond to William M. Davis, the guardian
of Harry King Arndt, one of her infant
children, conditioned tor the payment of
To secure this bond
$500, with Interest.
she gave a mortgage upon said bouse and
lot. By her willshedevises this house and
lot to her "son Harry in the following
I give to my son Harry King
language :
Arndt, absolutely, to be held in trust,
by ray executor hereinafter
however,
and lot wherenamed, the dwelling-house
in I now reside, situate on Main street, in
Phillipsburg, N. J., until he arrives at the
age of twenty-one (21) years; my executor
to rent the same, collect the rent, pay all

taxes, insurance, services, and repairs, and
the balance remaining to be used for the
support and maintenance of my son Har\ ry King Arndt,' hereinbefore named."
*r
jTwo questions are presented in the bill
vl for consideration, viz.: Is thedevisetobe
*' 'regarded as a payment
and discharge of
Harry an
I the bond, and is the gift to
' absolute fee?
In this case the testatrix in
* clear
language directs that all of her
debts be paid as soon as conveniently can
She makes disposibe after her decease.
tion of herpersonal estate, including bankstock, giving a portion thereof to her
daughter, a portion to another son, and
The diviaa portion to the said Harry.
, ion of this personal property is not equal,
but the extent of inequality Is not made
iapparent. She first gives to her daugh;ter certain household furniture; and, in
the second place, to her son Frank cer•V tain household furniture; and, in the third
place, makes the devise of the house and
lot to Harry. She then provides for the
protection of her cemetery lot, and gives
the three children all of her silver-ware.
^Immediately after this she directs her executor to sell "the balance of my household effects," and to divide the proceeds
thereof between her three children, directing him, however, to hold the share of
Harry until he arrives at the age of 21
years. Then she directs her executors to
collect the dividends of her 19 shares of
bank-stock, and to pay the same towards
the support and maintenance of Harry
until he arrives at the age of 21 years, at
which last-mentioned date he is authorized to sell the said stock and divide the
Notproceeds between her three children.
withstanding this last provision, she authorizes her executor to sell all the said

\

shares of bank-stock at such time or
times as be shall think fit, and to invest
the proceeds, and pay the interest thereof
for the support and maintenance of her
son Harry until he arrives at the age of
21 years. She then directs that the residue
of her estate, "consisting principally of
bonds and mortgages and notes, money
and stock, should be divided equally between my three children, share and share
alike, my executor, however, retaining
that portion falling to my son Harry
King Arndt until he arrives at the age of
twenty-one years. " From this It appears
that the testatrix was indebted to the
guardian of her son in the sum of $500:
that she made her said sorf both devisee
and legatee, imposing a condition upon
the devise that the executor should receive the rents and profits until the son
arrives at the age of 21 years, for his support and maintenance, and a like condition upon the gilt of the legacy ; and that,
as the matter stands, both the devise and
the legacy are of uncertain value. Where
there is nothing to show a contrary intention upon the part of the testator, and
he directs the payment of his debts, the
gift of a legacy is never presumed to have
been given for the purpose of discharging
a debt due from the testator to the legaVan Riper v. Van Riper, 2 N. J. Eq.
tee.
1 , Heisler v. Sharp, 44 N. J. Eq. 167, 14
Atl. Rep. 624; Rusling v. Rusling, 42 N. .1.
Eq.594,8Atl.Rep. 534; Chancey'sCase,l P.
Wms. 408, 410, 2 White & T. Lead. Gas.
820; Reynolds v. Robinson,
7.'>2, notes,
82N. Y. 103; Boughton v. Flint, 74 N. T.
The
477; In re Huish, 43 Ch. Div. 260.
courts so little favor the discharge of debts
by legacies that they have uniformly laid
hold of slight circumstances to overcome
that payment was inthe presumption
of the direction to
tended independently
pay debts. Hence, when the gift has been
of land or of goods and chattels, or upon
conditions unfavorable to the donee when
compared with the present discharge of
the debt, the payment of. both has been
required.
2 White & T. Lead. Gas. S21.
"Money and land being things of a different kind, the one, though of greater value,
shall never be taken in satisfaction of the
other, unless so expressed."
""Whateverr
is given by will is prima facie to be In-I
Eastwood v.|
tended a benevolence."
Vinke, 2 P. Wms. 613, 616. In this casethe
court remarked : "But, though the court
has gone so far, it never yet construed a
devise of land to be a satisfaction for a
debt of money." In Bryant v. Hunter,
3
Wash. C. 0. 48, Fed. Gas. No. 2,068,,
Washington, J., says:
"The generalf
rule ia that a devise of land is not a|
satisfaction or part performance of an|
See, also,'
agreement to pay money."
The
Eaton V. Benton, 2 Hill, 676, 580.
bond in this case being for the payment
of money, and the gift being land, the
construction must necessnrily be controlled by the cases cited. It can make
no difference that the payment of the bond
was secured by mortgage on the land devised. It cannot be doubted but that the
gifts of goods and chattels and proceeds
of bank-stock and residue by the testatrix to her son Harry ai-e alike subject to
the same conditions that govern with
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respect to the devise of land. According eration Is whether or not the Interest deto all of the cases there Is no similitude vised to Harry be less than the fee-simple
whatever between those gifts and the ob. absolute. When the sentence making the
ligation which the testatrix had directed devise to Harry Is read, if there be any
doubt as to the extent of the interest deher executor to pay.
I have not thought It necessary to put vised, such doubt will be dissipated upon
The testatrix first deany stress upon the fact that both the careful reflection.
bond and the mortgage were given to the clares that she gives him the premises abguardian of the devisee and legatee. It solutely, but afterwards gives such direchas been suggested that if this bond he tions as at first view would seem to have
paid to the guardian of Harry, Harry's been intended as a qualification to the exproportion of the estate of the testatrix tent of limiting his interest to the rents
will be much larger than the portion re- and profits until he arrives at the age of
This 21 years. But when this sentence and this
ceived by his brother and sister.
would be an important consideration if apparent qualification are read in connecit were the duty of courts to construe tion with the succeeding clauses in the
wills so as to make an equal disposition will, by which gifts are made to Harry, the
doubt is removed. She ordered the silver
of the estate disposed of thereby among

and devisees, irrespective of the
directions of the will. There is nothing
in this will to give any certain assurance
'
to the court that the testatrix intended
make an equal disposition of her es'I to
If there beany
tate among her children.
inequality in the value of the gifts, the
testatrix may have had very good reason
therefor; but, whether she nad or not,
she had a lawful right to make any distinction she chose. This bond must be
first _gaid out^of the personal estate, as
'?t¥er de5ts,T)efore_the payment ofany of.
'I&e legacies.
TThe next question presented for considlegatees

.

L

■(

L

to be divided

between her three children

;

but Harry's interest in other personal
property and in the bank -stock and iu
the residue of the personal property is to
be retained by the executor, and the
he in- »
terest and dividends paid to Harry, until \
he arrives at the age of 21 years, when
1
len he
I
is entitled to the possession of the principal.
From the control given to the executor over the interest of Harry until
he arrive at the age of 21 years the testatrix in all probability intended to provide
against the necessity of appointing a
guardian for him. In my judgment the
fee-simple absolute vested in Hariy.

SATISFACTION.

144

DBWITT

T.

YATES.

(10 Johns. 156.)
Supreme

\

■

Court of New York.

May,

1813.

This was an action of debt for a legacy.
The cause was tried at the Saratoga circuit
in September, 1812.
Peter Yates, by his last
will, dated the 15th of August, 1807, be"Item, I give to my
queathed as follows:
I daughter Maria's children, of her body, two
\ hundred and fifty pounds; if any of the five
children should decease before my decease,
I
shall
t or after, the parts of the deceased
\ come to the then living; each of them is to
(have fifty poimds when they come of age,
or when they or either of themi should mar-

"

;ry."
In

t

>

P

a subsequent part of the will, the testator having devised the half of a farm, etc.,
to his son-in-law, Philip Vanderbergh, and
his wife, and the other half to his wife, etc.,
, directs as follows:
"In consideration of
! which, it is my will, and I do hereby order,
J that the said Philip Vanderbergh, his heirs,
! etc., shall pay to the children of my said
daughter Maria, to wit, Sarah (the wife of
i
the plaintiff), John, Maria, Catalma, and
Catharine, the sum of two hundred and fifty
pounds, equal to 625 dollars, to be paid unto
them and each of them. In simis of fifty
pounds, as they respectively shall arrive at
the age of 21 years, or on the day that they
or either of them shall marry," and appointed the defendant and three others his executors.

It was proved that Philip Vanderbergh,
the devisee, in October, 1807, paid to the
plaintiffs the 50 pounds given to Sarah, the
wife of the plaintiff, and named In the second clause of the will.
It was admitted that a year had elapsed
since the death of the testator; that the
plaintiffs had duly demanded payment of the
legacy, mentioned in the first clause, of the
defendant, previous to the commencement of
the suit, and had tendered and filed a bond
according to the directions of the statute;
and that the defendant had ass.ets in his
hands, after payment of all debts and otlier
legacies, sufficient to pay the legacy in question.
The defendant offered a witness to prove
that, before and at the time the testator
made his will, he expressed his intention to
give one legacy to the children of his daughter Maria, and that was the legacy directed
to be paid by Philip Vanderbergh; but the
evidence was objected to, and overruled by
the Judge.
A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the coturt, on a case
made.

Mr. Huntington, for plaintiffs,
for defendant.

Mr. Skin-

ner,

KENT,
court.

C.

J.,

delivered the opinion of the
case of a simi of money

This Is the

given twice In the same instrument to the
same legatee.
The general rule on this sub- 1
ject, from a review of the numerous cases,/:
appears evidently to be that where the smn'l
i]
is repeated In the same writing the legatee[l''''/-\/
can take only one of the sums bequeathedj
The latter sum is held to be a substitution,
and they are not taken cumulatively, unless
there be some evident intention that they
should be so considered, and it lays with
the legatee to show that intention and rebut
the contrary presumption;
but where the
two bequests are in different instruments, as
by will in the one case and by a codicil in
the other, the presumption is in favor of the
legatee, and the burden of contesting that
presumption is cast upon the executor.
The
presumption either way, whether against tht
cumulation because the legacy is repeated in
the same instrument, or whether in favor
of it because the legacy is by different Instruments, is liable to be controlled and repelled by internal evidence, and the circum
Godol. Leg. p. 3, c. 26,
stances of the case.
1 46; Swinb. pt. 7, c. 21, § 13; Duke of St.
Albans v. Beauclerk, 2 Atk. 636; Garth v.
Meyrick, 1 Brown, Ch. 30; Ridges v. Morrison, td. 389; Hooley v. Hatton, Id. 390,
note; "Wallop v. Hewett, 2 Oh. R. 37; Newport v. Klnaston, Id. 58; James v. Semmens,
2 H. Bl. 214; Allen v. OaUen, 3 Ves. Jun.
289; Barclay v. Walnwrlght,
Id. 462; Osborne V. Duke of Leeds, 5 Ves. 369. This
question, which appears to have arisen so
often and to have been so learnedly and ably
discussed In the English courts, was equally
familiar to the civil law. The same rule existed there, and subject to the same control.
Dig. 30, 1, 34; Dig. 22, 3, 12; and the notes
of Gothofrede, Id.; Voet, Con. ad Pand. torn.
2,408, s. 34.
And Chancellor D'Aguesseau, in
his pleadings in the Case of the Heirs of
Vaugermain (Oeuvres, tom. 2, 21), adopts
and applies the same rule to a case arising
under the French law. The civil law puts
the case altogether upon the point of the
testator's intention; but then, if the legacy
was repeated in the same instrument, it required the highest and strongest proof to
accumulate it. Evidentissimis probatlonibus
ostendatur testatorem multlplicasse legatuni
volulsse.
In the present case, what are the intrinsic
circumstances to show a manifest intent of
the testator to multiply the legacy? The
only material variation in the two bequests
is that, in the latter instance, the legacy
was charged upon Philip Vanderbergh in
respect of the real estate to him devised;
but this affords no evidence of an intention
to accumulate. The inference is the other
way. It was only strengthening the security
of the legacy by means of the charge. There
was no specified object. There was no assigned reason or cause, as respected the legatees, for repeating the bequest
Courts have
required some new or additional cause for
enlarging the boimty before they have held

SATISFACTION.
unless the words of the will
In a will, the
showed the Intent
testator gave double legacies to his daughters, but he added, in those cases, that they
were "in addition" to what he had before
given; and the master of the roUs, In Barclay V. Walnwright, said that he laid considerable stress upon this, that where the
testator meant addition he expressed it. The
whole will denotes throughout a careful and
studied apportionment of the testator's estate among his children, according to his
opinion of their wants and ctrcumstances;
and he imposed , several trusts and charges,
probably with a view to greater accuracy in
He appoints four
the partition of his estate.
sons executors, but he charges his funeral
expenses upon three, and his debts upon two,

It accumulative,
clearly

of them.

A

small variation in the direction

H.&B.EQ.(2dEd.)—

10
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as to payment wljl not alter the construction. In Halford v. Wood, 4 Ves. 76, the
legacy was an annuity of £30 for life, and
in the one instance it was declared to be
payable quarterly, and In the other instance
the will was silent as to the payment, and
yet it was not held accumulative. So, also,
in Greenwood v. Greenwood, 1 Brown, Ch.
31, note, the one legacy was simply to Mary
Cook, but the other was to Mary CJoqk "for
her own use and disposing, notwithstanding
her coverture"; and yet Lord Bathurst decreed that she was entitled to one legacy
only.
As, then, the substituted legacy In this
ease has been paid by the devisee, on whom
it was charged, the defendant is entitled to
judgment.
Judgment for the defendant.
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EDWARDS

et al.
(17

Supreme

Error
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RAINIEK'S EX'RS.
St. 597.)

of Ohio.

Dec. Term, 1867.

to court of common

pleas,

Pickaway

Reserved in the district court.
The original petition was filed by the executors of Isaac Rainier, deceased, against
J, his devisees and legatees, on the 3d day of
June, 1864, In the court of common pleas
of Pickaway county, to obtain a construction
' of the vnU of said deceased.
The will Is dated September 8, 1860, to
which a codicil is added, dated December 4,
1861.
The testator died March 25, 1863, and
his will was admitted to probate April 29,
1863, and is as follows:
"(1) I will that all my just debts and funeral charges be paid.
"(2) I give and bequeath to Mary Rainier,
my much-esteemed wife, in lieu of her right
of dower, thirty acres of land during her nat*
*
•
ural life, and bounded as follows:
Out of the farm on which I now reside, situated in Madison township, Pickaway county. And I also give to my wife all the
household
and kitchen furniture of every
description,
except what Is hereafter vrilled.
And I also give to my wife five hundred dollars in cash; and I also give her my sorrel
mare Fly, and my top buggy, with the harAnd my said wife
ness belonging thereto.
is to have sufficient timber of any part of
said quarter section, for the use and support
of her said dower, together with fuel suffiAnd the widow may select
cient for fire.
what books she may think proper for her
own use, except those hereafter willed.
/ "(3) I give and bequeath to my daughter
I Sarah A. Edwards, wife of Stephen S. EdI wards, aU notes I hold against Stephen
S.
: Edwards, of every description whatever, up
, to the first day of November,
1852; and I
also give to my daughter, Sarah A. Edwards,
fifteen hundred dollars in cash.
"(4) I give and bequeath to my son Isaac
Rainier the use, occupation, and enjoyment
of the northwest quarter of section eleven.
In Violet township, Fairfield county, Ohio,
to have and to hold during his natural life,
and then to his heirs.
"(5) I give and bequeath to my daughter
Hester Ann Adell the use, occupation, and
enjoyment of the northeast quarter of section number foiui;een, situate in Violet township, Fairfield county, and state of Ohio, to
have and to hold during her natural life, and
then to her heirs, subject to the dower of
■- my wife, Mary
Rainier. And the said Hester Ann Adell, wife of George Adell, is to
pay to my daughter Sarah A, Edwards, wife
of Stephen S. Edwards, one thousand dollars in money, in the following payments, to
wit, one hundred dollars per year. The first
payment to be made one year after my
death, and if the said Hester Ann Adell
should fail to make the above payments as
>
required, and should it become necessary to
county.

'^

Court

v.

Ohio

sell any portion of the land. It is my will It
shall be taken off the west side, not to exceed thirty acres."
(6) In this item the testatoj gives to his
son John F. Rainier the northwest quarter
of section number fourteen, in Madison township, "subject to the widow's dower above
written"; and he also gives him "the horse
power wood saw, and all the reaping and
mowing machines, and all wagons and farming utensils of every description whatever,
and aU the stock of every kind (except two
cows, which
leave to the widow, she having choice);
also Clerk's Commentaries
on
the Old and New Testament, six volumes,
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, and all
the books belonging to me not taken by the
widow; and I also give to my son John F.
Rainier aU mechanic tools of every kind
whatever, and one bedstead, bed, and bedding."
(7) In this item he gives to his daughter
Mary E. Pontius, wife of Franklin G. Pontius, the northwest half of the northeast
quarter of section eleven, in Violet township, and "five hundred dollars in money, including a dueblU" of $82 against said Franklin G. Pontius.
"(8) I give and bequeath to my niece Almina Ebright one bedstead, bed, and bedding; and I also give to Almina Ebright one
hundred dollars In money, provided she continues to Uve with the family imtil she arrives at the age of eighteen years, if there
should be that amount remaining after paying ofE the other legatees as above given.
"If the widow should see proper to marry
again, she then shall forfeit her Interest in
my real estate, and my daughter Hester Ann
Adell and my son John F. Rainier shall pay,
each of them, two hundred and fifty dollars
in lieu thereof.
"AU the above legacies to be paid in two
years after my decease, or as soon after as
can be collected."
The testator appointed John P. Rainier
and George Adell executors of his will.
By the codicil, the testator gave the northwest quarter of section eleven, in Violet
township, to John F. Rainier and George
Adell in trust for Isaac Rainier for life, and
then to his heirs, and revoked all right that
Isaac had in the foregoing will except as
expressed in the codlcU.
He gives to John all the household furniture after the death of his wife, and adds
the following clause:
"And it is my will
that each my several children shall have all
the growing and matured crops that may he
(on) the different tracts of land that I hf^ve
willed to them ag above written."
It was claimed by the executors that the
sum of $1,000, mentioned
In the fifth item
of the will, was intended to be a part payment of the sum of $1,500 bequeathed in the
third item to Sarah A. Edwards; while the
latter claimed that said sum of $1,000 was
a legacy to her in addition to the sum »*

I
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aver that the person"Che executors
alty Is .Qsrifficlent to pay said legacy unless
said suiu of $1,000 be applied for that purbut Mrs. Edwards answers that the
pose;
personalty was sufficient when the will was
executed, ?nd that if there is not now
enough It fs because It was expended in imThis is not
provemenvs on the real estate.
denied by /eply.
The exexjutors claim the com in cribs, on
the lands devised as aforesaid, at the time
but the same is
of the testator's decease;
devisees of the
claimed by the respective
land on which the corn was grown and matured, and wi which the cribs were several51,500.

ly located.

The court «f common pleas decreed that
will be construed to give to Sarah A.
Edwards a legacy of $1,500 only; that the
sum of ?1,000 mentioned in the fifth clause
Is a fund foi the part payment thereof, and
not an additional legacy; that the corn in
and not
the cribs passed to the execdtors,
and that the sum of $500
to the devisees;
given to the widow is a debt In lieu of dower, and not h legacy.
To reverse this decree a petition in error
was filed in the district court, which was
there reservwl for decision in this court
The following are the assignments of erthe

ror:

was error In finding that the
(1) There
legacy to Saaiah A. Edwards was a legacy
of $1,500 only, and not a legacy or legacies
of $2,500.
(2)

There was error in finding that the

com named in the petition as being in the
cribs on the land of Isaac is not embraced
in the provisions of the will, but belongs to
the executors.
(3) TTiere was error In finding that the
sum of $500 to the widow is a debt in lieu
of dower, and not a legacy.
assignment of errors.
(4) General
C. N. Olds,

for defendants.

for

plamtifEs.

Henry F. Page,

DAY, 0. J. We are called upon, under
this proceeding In error, to determine whether the court of common pleas correctly construed the will of Isaac Rainier, deceased.
No bill of exceptions was taken In that court
embodying the evidence there given, and. so
far as evidence was admissible to aid in the
construction of the will, it may be presumed
to have been before the court. At most,
however, the evidence could only Inform the
court of all the circumstances that surrounded the testator, to aid it in determining the meaning the testator intended should
be given to the words he used in the will.
With

this presumption

In favor

of the

Judgment below, we are left to construe the
will by the language used therein, aided
only, on the principal question, by a fact
conceded by the pleadings, that the testator,
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when he executed the will, had personal
property sufficient to fill all the legacies
upon the largest construction of the bequests.
It is claimed by the executors that the
sum of $1,000, to be paid by Mrs. Adell to
Mrs. Edwards, is to be applied on the legacy
to her of $1,500, and Is not to be regarded
as a legacy in addition to that sum.
Mrs. Edwards claims that it was the intention of the testator to give her both sums.
Here arises the principal question presented for our consideration:
Was the $1,000
Intended by the testator to be an additional
benefit or legacy to Mrs. Edwards?
The books afford us but little aid in the
solution of this question; for, in the language of Chief Justice Hornblower In Jones
V. Creveling's Ex'rs,
19 N. J. Law, 127:
"After a careful examination of the cases
cited on the argument and of many others,
I am satisfied, notwithstanding all the nice
distinctions that have been taken by courts
of law and courts of equity upon the subject of single or cumulative legacies, we
must come down to the plain oommon-sense
question of what was the intention of the
testator."
Chief Justice Kent, after much research,
arrived at substantially the same result in
De Witt v. Tates, 10 Johns. 156. Although
he recognizes the general rule that, where
the sum is repeated in the same writing, the
presumption is against the legatee, and that
where the two bequests are in different instruments the presumption Is In his favor,
"The presumption either way,
he adds:
whether against the cumulation, because the
legacy is repeated in the same Instrument,
or whether in favor of it, because the legacy
is by different instruments, is liable to be
controlled and repelled by internal evidence,
and the circumstances of the case."
The general rule is stated in an English
treatise to be that, where two legacies are]
given by the same testamentary instrument
of equal amount, courts infer an intention in
the testator to give but one legacy; and that,
"where the legacies given by the same testamentary instrument to the same person are
of different amounts, the legacy shall be conRop. Leg. *996, *998.
sidered accumulative."
If the $1,000 was in the form of a direct
bequest, these authorities might aid us in
arriving at a conclusion; but the real question is whether that sum was intended to be
In part payment of a legacy already expressly given In the will; if not, the question is settled, for it is clear that the testator intended Mrs. Edwards should have
If he did not intend that it
the money.
should apply in part payment of the $1,500,
It is equally clear that he intended it should
be an additional legacy.
The only question then is whether the testator intended that Mrs. Edwards should receive the sum of $1,000, to be paid to her
as directed in the fifth Item of the will. In
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and at particular times, and is in a
clause naming the person to pay it, and providing the means of securing payment.
It
would have been more certain, doubtless, if
the testator had added, in the fifth item, for
what purpose he directed the sum of $1,000
to be paid to Mrs. Edwards, whether as payment on the legacy already given to her, or
He did, however, take
in addition thereto.
care to express a purpose that the money
should be paid by Mrs. Adell to Mrs. Edwards; and there he leaves it in her hands,
without any intimation but that he intended
it should be fully and unconditionally her
property; certainly there is no intimation
that he intended it to diminish the amount
of the legacy before given to her.
Nor can the failure to express any purpose to have the $1,000 applied on the legacy of $1,500 be the result of haste, for the
testator lived two years and a half after he
made the will; neither was it the result of
accident or oversight, for he carefully revised his will, more than a year after Its
execution,
as is shown by the codicil then
person,

added

thereto.

While, then, we fail to find in the will
anything from which It can fairly be inferred that the testator intended the $1,000
should be applied in reduction of the legacy
of $1,500, is it not clearly inferable from
the will that he Intended it should be iu
addition thereto?
In Crevellng's Bx'rs v. Jones, 21 N. J.
Law, 576, it is said: "Upon a question
whether two legacies shall be construed to
be cumulative or not, a fair and forcible
argument In support of the increase may he
drawn from the fact that they are for different sums; or the sums are stated in different sections of the will; or one in the will
and another in a codicil; or the sums are
made payable at different times, or out of
different funds."
We find in this vrHl nearly all these indices of cumulative legacies.
But if we
seek to find the intent of the testator, I
think it may be clearly discovered if we
give to the language he has used in the will
its natural and ordinary meaning, and give
to every part of the Instrument its just operation and effect.
1 Bedf . WUls, 431.
The testator concludes his will by directing "aU the above legacies to be paid in two
years" after his decease.
This embraces the
whole $1,500, as much as any part of it. It
is
direction to his executors not to pay
part of any legacy, but "all." This direction applies only to the legacies to be paid
by the executors, and not to the amount to
be paid by one legatee to another. In such
cases the testator not only specifies
the
amount to be paid, but the person to pay
and in every instance it is to be paid in
consideration of real estate devised.
The
executors have no more to do, for aught that
appears in the will, with the amount to be
paid by Mrs. AdeU to Mrs. Edwards, than

it,

part payment of the legacy he had given
her In the third.
The Intention of the testator in relation to
this "is to be gathered from the phraseology
of the will itself, and, to arrive at this intention, it is necessary to look into the entire instrument."
Williams v. Veach, ,17
Ohio, 180; Beckwith v. Moore, 14 Ohio St
129; Brasher v. Marsh, 15 Ohio St. 103.
Let us then look at the will. We search
in vain for any expression of a purpose that
the $1,000 should be applied in part satisfaction of the legacy bequeathed in the third
There is no language used
item of the will.
in the instrument from which such an intention can fairly be implied. It would have
been most natural, in b. matter of so much
importance, to have indicated that the $1,000
was to be paid to Mrs. Edwards, to apply on
the legacy before given to her, if such was
the intention of the testator. If he intendted
to make the mode of paying this legacy of
$1,500 to differ so widely from that of paying all the other legacies in his will, it is
singular that he did not add to the gift of
"fifteen hundred dollars in cash" some words
indicating such a purpose, or else haye done
so in connection with the direction that a
$1,000 should be paid to the legatee of the
$1,500.
This strikes us with the more surprise, if such was his intention, since in
other parts of his will. In matters of less imhe is sufficiently explicit.
Where
portance,
he directs two of his legatees to pay money
to his widow in the contingency of her marriage, he specifies that it shall be "in lieu"
of her Interest In his real estate. In the second item he gives his wife all the household and kitchen furniture, except what is
"hereafter willed"; she is also to have such
books as she may select, "except those hereafter willed"; and in the sixth clause he devises land subject to the widow's dower
"above
written."
While thus explicit in
minor matters, if such was his purpose he
would naturally have added to the legacy of
$1,500, or to the requirement to pay the legatee of that amount the sum of $1,000, some
words indicating a purpose to have the latter sum applied on the former.
Nor was it at all singular, as contended In
argument, that the testator did not embrace
in the third item all he Intended to give his
daughter Mrs. Edwards, but left a part to be
Inserted in the fifth.
After providing for his wife in the second
clause, it would seem that he makes a further provision for her in the fifth, in relation to the real estate; clearly, in the sixth,
he gives her some property in addition to
that bequeathed to her in the second. Moreover, there are obvious reasons, if he did
Intend to give the $1,000 in addition to the
$1,500, why he should insert that gift in the
clause we find it, and no particular reason
why both gifts should be Inserted in one
item' of the will. One was a general legacy;
the other was to be paid by a particular

"^a
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they have with the several amounts to be
paid by other devisees to the widow In case
of her marriage.
The sum directed to be paid by Mrs. Adell
to Mrs. Edwards is a matter that the testa-

tor has left entirely between them, and not
as a legacy that the executors are called upon to settle out of the personalty; therefore
they are directed to pay "all" the legacies
in two years, and the sum to be paid by
one daughter to the other is left upon a
different security, and to be divided into
payments that are to run for longer periods.
Moreover, upon the other construction, the
executors might not know for years, beyond
the time limited for the payment of legacies,
what amount to pay on the $1,500, for they
could not know how much Mrs. Adell would
pay, or, if she failed to pay, how much the
land charge would sell for.
If the clear and plain directions of the
testator in his will be executed, there will
be no difficulty; the executors will pay "all"
the legacies in two years, and the annual
payments due from Mrs. AdeU will be paid
every year for ten years; then the intent of
the testator, as expressed by the language
he has used, will be fulfilled.
The will cannot be construed to apply the
to the reduction of the legacy of
$1,000
$1,500, without adding to the instrument material words not written there by the testa-

f,

\ tor.

We cannot think, in the absence of any
intimation of the kind, that the testator intended to diminish his legacy of $1,500 "in
cash," which he positively directs to be paid
In two years, by directing that part of it be
paid in ten years without interest.
The plain reading of the will affords the
only consistent construction that can be given to it, and points out the only practical
If we give to all
method of its execution.
the language the testator has used bearing
upon the question its natural and ordinary
import, and there stop to inquire for the
meaning of the testator, his intention is clear
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and obvious. It is only when we begin to
sti-ain or distort what the testator has said
by constructions or presumptions that doubts
of his intention arise. To adopt the construction claimed by one party, "we must
expunge, transpose, or interpolate material
words; to sustain that of the other, we
leave the will as it is." Keading the will,
then, as it is written, we think the testator
clearly intended to give Mrs. Edwards a le'gacy of $1,500 in cash, to be paid In two
years by his executors, out of the estate that
would come to their hands; and, in addition
thereto, to give her $1,000, to be paid by a
different person, out of a different fund, and
at widely different times. In so holding we
but leave the money where the testator
willed to leave it, and so left it after a deliberate revision of his will.
The court of common pleas, therefore, erred in their construction of the vrill upon this
point.
As to the amount bequeathed to the widow in lieu of dower, although error is assigned upon this ruling of the common pleas,
it is not now urged. "We do not feel called
upon, therefore, to express an opinion on
Indeed, it is doubtful If the
that point.
question can be made on this record. The
reasons, however, for sustaining the holding
of that court on this point are so strong,
that we are content to aflflrm that part of the
decree without further consideration.
As to the corn in the cribs, we think the
codicil may be fairly construed to mearl as
held by the common pleas.
We see no reason, therefore, why the decree of that court should not be affirmed in
all respects, except as to the construction of
the will relating to the bequests to Mrs. Edwards; as to that, it must be reversed; and,
unless cause be shown to the contrary, a
final decree will be entered here in favor of
the plaintiffs in error.
■WHITE,

WELCH, BRINKERHOFF,

SCOTT. J.I.,

concur.

and
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ROQUET
(118

Ind.

T.

ELDRIDGE

147, 20

et al.

N. E. Rep. 733.)

Supreme Court of Indiajia.

April

2, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Vigo county;
Joshua Jump, Special Judge.
Action by Hugh D. Roquet, administrator
dec. t. a., etc., of William B. Eldridge,
and
ceased, against William G. Eldridge
others, heirs, devisees, and legatees of said
From a judgdecedent, to settle the estate.
ment declaring certain legacies adeemed,
the legatees, William G, Eldridge and others,
appeal.
O. F. McNutt and Stimson & Stimson, for
appellants.
S. C. Davis and S. B. Davis, for

appellee.

MITCHELL, 3. After the issues were
Joined in the court below, the judgment appealed from was rendered upon an agreed
statement of facts. The questions for decision arise out of the facts agreed upon,
which, so far as they are material, are as
In November, 1863, William B.
follows:
Eldridge executed his last will and testament, by the second clause of which he deEldridge and
vised to his sons Hamilton
Abram A. Eldridge his homestead farm, to
To his daughters,
be held by them jointly.
Amanda and Cynthia, and to his sons William G. and Robert B., he bequeathed $500
each, to be paid in cash, which sums were
to be talien and considered as in full of each
of their respective interests in the homeThe will contained a recital,
stead farm.
the effect of which was that the devises and
bequests thus made were to be considered as
farm
the disposition of the homestead
among the testator's children, and were not
Afterto affect any other interest or estate.
wards, and during the life-time of the testator, his sons Hamilton and Abram A. Eldridge, devisees of the homestead farm, furnished their father $2,000 in money, out of
which he paid to each of the four legatees
above named the sum of $500, and received
from each a receipt of the following tenor,
viz.:
"Received of William B. Eldridge,
$500, in consideration of my interest in his
homestead farm, corresponding with his last
will."
One of the daughters was a married
woman at the time she received the money
and executed the receipt therefor, as above.
The testator died In February, 1881, having
had but the six children named above.
He
had only about $500 in value of personal
property, which, with the farm above mentioned, valued at about $6,400, comprised his
whole estate.
On behalf of the administrator with the
will annexed, it is Insisted that the sums
paid to the several legatees by the testator
In his life-time constituted a satisfaction or
of the legiacies provided by the
ademption
will, while the legatees insist that the legar

are specific or demonstrative In their
character, and that since It does not appear
that the money paid them was raised out
of, or derived from, the land comprised in
the homestead farm, the payment did not
work an ademption of the sums bequeathed
by the will.
The legacies were, however,
neither specific nor demonstrative. Spealiing upon the subject of specific legacies, the
lord chancellor in Fielding v. Preston, 1 De
Gex & J. 438, said: "There have been attempts in various cases to determine the
meaning of a specific legacy, and what is
the test whereby such legacies may be distinguished from general bequests.
There
are objections to most of the definitions, but
1 think we are quite safe In treating that as
a specific bequest which the testator directs
A legacy is specif-\
to be enjoyed in specie."
ic when it can be satisfied only by the trans- \
fer or delivery of some particular portion of
or article belonging to the estate, which the
testator intended should be transferred to
2 Redf. Wills, 122;
the legatee in specie.
Lord
2 Bap. & L. Law Diet, tit "Legacy."
Hardwicke said, in Ellis v. Walker, Amb.
309:
"The court leans against considering
legacies as specific." Unless, therefore, it
appears that the money or thing to be transferred is so clearly identified and Inherently
described as that the legatee can say to the
executor that all or a portion of the very
fund or property In question was transferred by the will, the bequest will not be regarded as specific,
Sidebotham v. Watson,
11 Hare, 170.
While it is true the doctrine of ademption
does not apply to specific devises or legacies,
as a general rule, (S wails v. S wails, 98 Ind.
511,) yet, even in case of a specific devise
or bequest, if the very thing devised or bequeathed had been transferred to the devisee or legatee in the life-time of the testator,
so that there would be nothing left for the
will to operate upon, an effectual ademption
would have taken place.
Accepting the foregoing as the true criterion of a specific legacy. It becomes clear
that the bequest of $500 In cash to each of
the sons and daughters named, and the further direction that this was to be considered
In full of their respective interests In the
homestead" farm, and that the devises and
bequests previously . made were not to affect any other Interest or estate, did not constitute a specific bequest of any portion of
the testator's estate to be transferred in
specie.
Neither did the legacies belong to
that intermediate class which are sometimes
denominated "demonstrative,"
and
which
are peculiar, in that they are not ordinarily
liable to be adeemed or abated by an advancement made In a general way. "A
demonstrative legacy Is a bequest of a sum
of money payable out of a particular fund or
thing. It Is a pecuniary legacy, 'given generally, but with a demonstration of a particular fund as the source of its payment'
cies
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Is therefore eqnlvalent to, or In the nature
of, a devise or bequest of so much or such
Glass
a part of the fund or thing specified."
V. Dunn, 17 Ohio St. 413; 5 Amer. & Eng.
Ene. Law, 541; 2 Redf. Wills, 140, 141.

It

While it Is quite true the will plainly in-

dicates that the sums bequeathed to the
sons and daughters named were to be tak-

en in full of their respective interests in the
homestead farm, which was specifically devised to the two other sons named in the
I will, there is no direction that the bequests
are to be paid out of any particular fund,
or that the fund out of which payment is
to be made is to be derived from the rents,
Issues, or profits of the land, or that the
legatees are to have any interest, as such,
The Implication is that
in the land itself.
the bequests were chargeable against the
devisees of the land, or, at most, that they
Moreshould be chargeable upon the farm.
over, since it appears by the agreed statement of facts that the sons to whom the
homestead farm was devised furnished the
money with which the legacies were paid,
it is not apparent why this should not be
held to satisfy the bequests, even though it
should be conceded that they were payable
thus payable, it must
out of the land.
have been contemplated that the amount
should constitute a charge upon the farm,
to be removed by the devisees at some time,
by paying the several amounts to the lega-

If

'

tees.

We

know

of no authority

which

would justify a holding that a general 1^acy which is payable out of a particular
\ fund, or in a specified manner, may not be
satisfied, in case the legatee
receives the
amount thereof from the testator in his lifetime, out of the very fund devoted to the
payment of the bequest, provided it clearly
appears that the amount was given and received with the intention that it should work
Ian ademption of the legacy.
we assume

j

If
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farm was to be the
that the homestead
source from which the fund was to be derived, out of which the legacies were payable, the conclusion follows that the devisees of the farm were to take it subject to
the burden of paying the legacies after the
Having furnished the
testator's
death.
money to the testator during his life-time
with which to pay off the bequests, and the
money having been paid to the legatees and
received by them for that purpose, the legacies are effectually satisfied from the very
source contemplated by the will. An ademption results where a parent or other person
standing in loco parentis, after having made
a bequest, gives a portion to the child to
whom the bequest is made, equal to or in
excess of the amount bequeathed,
the portion given and the legacy being ejusdem
generis.
Weston v. Johnson, 48 Ind. 1.
Within the rule thus stated the l^acies
were adeemed.
Whether a legacy be specific or demonstrative, if it clearly appears that the particular
thing or fund bequeathed has been irrevocably delivered over to the legatee in the lifetime of the testator, the legacy is adeemed
because the testator's title to the thing or
fund has been divested by the gift, and has
become vested in the legatee during the lifetime of the testator. Clayton v. Akin, 38
Ga. 320.
The fact that one of the legatees was a
married woman at the time she received the
money from her father and signed the receipt is of no consequence.
The receipt of
the money from the source contemplated by
the wiU satisfied the legacy by operation of
law, and not by force of any contract. Money paid to a married woman in ademption of
a legacy produces the same legal result as if
she were unmarried.
There was no error. The judgment Is affirmed, with costs.

n
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EOGEKS

et al. v.

(19

Supreme

FRENCH.

Ga. 316.)

Court of Georgia.

Jan. Term,

1856.

Error from superior court, Marion county;
Worrill, Judge.
In equity.
Jolin French and Elizabetli, his wife, filed
a bill against the executors of John Rushin,
deceased, for the recovery of th« legacies
left them under the will. The biU and answer are voluminous, as is also the evidence
in the case. The following is sufficient to
understand the questions made in this court:
The defendants gave in evidence the following receipt:
"July 30, 1830. Received of John Rushin
Five Hundred Dollars, which is considered
and to be considered by all whom It may
concern as that amount advanced by him,
the said John Rushin, to me as legacy, that
would ever be coming to me from him in
his lifetime, or from his estate after his decease.

John French."
"[Signed]
John Rushin's will was dated 26th June,
and by that will he gave to Mrs.
1855,

French a little negro worth not exceeding
$200, and one equal share of all his property. Subsequent to the making of his will,
he distributed some of his negroes to his
to Mrs. French.
children, among others,
There was some evidence to show that the
question of the ademption of this legacy of
the little negro had been submitted to Judge
Taylor. Defendants' solicitors requested the
court to charge: "(1) That If they believed
that after the making of the will, bequeathing to complainant a little negro worth $200,
over and above her equal proportion of the
property to be distributed under the wiU of
John Rushin, the testator, in his lifetime,
gave complainant a negro of equal or greater
value than the one mentioned In the will,
this Is prima facie an ademption of the legacy; and, to rebut this presumption of an
ademption, the testimony must be clear and
relevant, not presumptive merely, but a
demonstration from the language and conduct of the testator that he considered the
gift by the will as a subsisting benefit."
The court declined to charge the latter
portion of this request, but charged "that, to
rebut the presumption of an ademption, the
jury might resort to presumptive evidence,
but the presumption must be clear and satisfactory; that if they believed the testator
gave complainant, after the making of the
will, and at or about the same time he gave
other property to each of his other children
of equal value, they might infer from these
facts that the legacy was not adeemed."
Defendants' counsel farther requested the
court to charge: (2) That in a court of equity the presumption is against a double
portion, and the receipt given by French in
1830, although it bears date prior to the vfill,

Is, nevertheless,
a charge against him, for
which he is bound to account.
This the court declined to charge: (3) As
to effect of a responsive answer as evidence,

and that an answer Is responsive where it
has necessary connection with and grows out
of the allegation, and is explanatory thereof.
This the court gave, and added: He supposed the latter clause referred to that portion of defendants' answer which stated that
Judge Taylor had determined that the legacy
The court
of the little negro was adeemed.
charged that this was not responsive, there
being no allegation In the bill on the subject
To these charges as given, and refusals to
charge, defendants excepted, and have assigned error thereon.

Miller & Hall, for plalntifiCs in
Stubbs & Hill, for defendant in error.

error.

LUMPKIN, J. (1) Was the court right in
refusing to give the first charge as requested, without the modification and explanation
which accompanied it in the charge as given?

In Ex parte Pye,

18 Ves. 152, Loi;d Eldon
"that where a father gives a legacy
to a child the legacy, coming from the father to his child, must be understood as a
portion, though it is not so described in the
will, and afterwards advancing a portion to
that child, though there may be slight circumstances of difference between the advance and the portion, and a difference in
amount, yet the father will be intended to
have the same purpose in each Instance; and
the advance is, therefore, an ademption ot
the legacy.
But a stranger giving a legacy
is understood as giving a bounty, not paying
a debt.
He must, therefore, be proved to
mean it as a portion or provision, either on
the face of the will, or if it may be, as it
seems it may, by evidence applying directly
to the gift proposed by the will." (See, also,
Elkenhead's Case cited in 2 Vern. 257; Precedents in Chancery, 182, and Ambler, 325.)
Thus, then, we have the rule clearly stated and carrying this doctrine of ademption
to its utmost limits. The English courts regret, as well they may, that it has been
pushed so far. We see and feel the reasonableness of the rule which requires the courts
to lean against double portions, as it is called;
and we can readily understand why a legacy
in a will should be adeemed by a subsequent advance having the same object In
view as the legacy, notwithstanding any
slight difference in value or amount between
the legacy and the advance. A father, for
Instance, directs by his will his executors to
pay to a daughter $1,000 to purchase, upon
her marriage, household furniture.
The
child, however, marries in the lifetime of
the father, and he advances to her $1,000, or
some sum approximating to that, for the
same purpose specified in the will.
This la,
and manifestly should be, a case of adempobserves
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tion, and so should all others standing upon
But suppose the legacy
the same footing.
a nurse, and th© subsefor
negro
little
a
be
quent advance be of money to buy a carriage, is there any propriety in construing
this advance to be an ademption of the legacy?

Listen to the reasoning of the chancellor

in the case of Pye, just cited, in support of
what he deduces from the books as the
doctrine" of the courts up"unquestionable
on the subject: "By a sort of artificial rule,

in the application of which legitimate children have been very harshly treated, upon
an artificial notion that the father is paying
a debt of nature, if the father afterwards
advances a portion on the marriage of that
child, though of less amount, it is a satisfaction of the whole or in part; and in some
cases it has gone the length, consistent with
the principle, but showing the fallacy of
much of the reasoning, that IJie portion,
though much less than the legacy, has been
held a satisfaction, in some instances, upon
L this ground, that the father, owing what is
called a debt of nature, is the judge of that
provision by which he means to satisfy it;
and though, at the time of making the will,
he thought he could not discharge that debt
with less than £10,000, yet, by a change of
circumstances and of his sentiments upJ his
on that moral obligation, it may be satisfied
by the advance of a portion of £5,000."
— ^Is not such reasoning from the mouth of
such a judge well calculated to inspire the
■
- f" hope that tlie day is not distant when all
precedents win be abolished, and every case
be tried by an enlightened tribunal upon its
own merits? To such a consummation the
world must, from the necessity of the case,
to say nothing of its policy, sooner or later
come; for the world wiU not contain the
law books that will be written, much less

J

^1

wUMaw2^S__ani4udg^j_mth,.their^syg^^

vHo

i

Jtacome, ,to-ahleto bBJ_th^^ Necessity will
become the mother of justice in this case,
as she is said to be generaUy
of Invention.
Would that some Caliph Omar would arise
to apply the torch to all the repositories of
legal learning throughout the globe!
Precedent! Precedent! This Is the vampire that
is forever draining the very life blood of justice. Give the books of reports as fuel for
They will contribute much more to
baths.
the health, happiness, and convenience of
the people than as at present employed.
and
But to return from this digression,
without elaborating the rule further, we remark that the presumed ademption may be
destroyed or confirmed by the application of
parol evidence of a different intention by the
testator.
2 Atk. 48; 3 Atk. 77; 7 Ves. 708;
Select Bq. Cas. 141.
And this was the substance of the charge as given.
The judge
instructed the jury that they might, in order
to rebut the presumption that the advance
made by the testator to French and w^fe, in
bis lifetime, and subsequent
to the making
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of the will, was an ademption, look to the
fact of whether or not similar advancements
were made to the other children; and this
the court was authorized to do by the testimony of Mrs. Wilkes, the widow of John
Rushin, who states that she lived with the
testator from 1834, the year before he made
his will, down to 1843, when he died, and
made to all the chilthat the advancements
dren during that period were equal, and that
the testator tried to make them so.
(2) Was the advance of $500 mad« in land
by the testator to John French, the husband of his daughter, in 1830, five years before he made his will, a charge against his
share of the estate?
The case of Upton v.
Prince, Cases Tern. Talb. 71, is cited in support of the proposition that an advance made
prior to the making of a will may adeem a
legacy.
The testator, William Prince, had
two sons,— William and Peter, Elizabeth,
Sarah, Mary, and Anne.
In his lifetime,
and soon after the sons became of age, they
desired their father to advance to each of
them a sum of money toward setting them
up in the world, and agreed that whatever
he should advance should be part of what
he should give them by vrill, whereupon the
father, on the 11th of June, 1734, advanced
£1500 to William Prince, who gave the following Instrument for the same:
"Received
of my father the sum of £1500, which I do
hereby acknowledge to be on account and in
part of what he hath given or shall, in and
by his last will, give unto me his son." And
on the 31st March, 1727,
the father advanced £1500 to Peter Prince, who gave a
similar instrument to that of his brother.
On the 17th of August, 1730, William Prince,
the father, executed hia will, which contains
the following recital: "And whereas, I have
paid to, given, or advanced with
heretofore
my children, William, Elizabeth and Sarah,
do hereby,
the sum of £1500 apiece, now,
in like manner, give and bequeath unto my
three other children, Peter, Mary and Anne,
the several sums of £1500 apiece."
He then
willed that the residue of his estate should
be divided in sis equal parts, and gives the
He deone-sixth to each of his children.
posited the two receipts given by William
and Peter in a drawer vrith his will, and intimated that the said drawer should not be
opened after his death by either of his said
sons unless bis other children, or one of his
sons-in-law, were present.
The question was whether Peter should
have a new sum of £1500 upon the words of
the will, or whether he should not be In the
they both being
same case with WUUam;
equally advanced by the father, and this
seeming only a mistake in the testator. The
lord chancellor decreed the £1500 received
by Peter in his father's lifetime to be a satisfaction for what the father gave him by
his will, and that he should not have another £1500 upon the words of the vrtll.
While we controvert the general doctrine
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that a previous advance made to a child
shall adeem an express gift by a subsequent
Trill, wherein and whereby the testator undertakes to dispose of the property which he
then has, still we are not prepared to deny
the justice of this case. Here it was a question of Intention, as it should be in every
case, and aU the facts go to show that Peter's name was, by mistake, inserted with
those of the unportioned part of the children.
The whole will establishes
that it
was the intention of the testator that the
two sums of £1500 paid to William and
Peter should be deducted out of the legacies
given to them; else why deposit their receipts in a drawer with his will with directions that the drawer should not be opened
after his death by either of. his said sons
unless his other children, or one of his sonsin-law, were present?
Before dismissing this case, I would remark that the able counsel, Mr. Hall, who
adduces it, concedes that it is the only direct
authority he can find upon the point; and,
if he has found none others, we may safely
assume that none other exists.
I will add
that Upton v. Prince is only recognized by
Mr. Williams on Executors, and other law
writers in this way. They say, in referring
to It, that if an advance previously made
will adeem a legacy a fortiori will an advance made subsequent to the execution of
In our judgment it is always a
the will.
question of intention, in all cases, whether
the advance be before or after the execution
of the will, and that no arbitrary rule should
control the matter.
How, then, stands the present case? The
testimony shows that in 1830, the date of
the receipt given for $500 given by French
to his father-in-law,
old man Rushin advanced $500 to each of his children.
This
fact is not disputed, but it is insisted that
French got $500 extra of the rest; else it is
asked, why should a receipt be required of
Perhaps
him when the rest gave none?
they have been lost or destroyed.
The defendants, and not French, have had the custody of the testator's papers.
Perhaps
French lived at a distance and forwarded
this receipt, not knowing but such an acknowledgment would be exacted of all. Be
this as it may, there is one fact which, to
our minds, is conclusive,
that this $500 was
not Intended by the testator to be a charge
on the legacy of French and wife.
In his

will

he mentions, In every other case, what
are to be charged against his other
children, or a portion of them; and there is
not a word as to this extra advance, as it is
pretended,
to French.
It was made five
years only before the will was executed, and
his attention was called to the subject by
referring to the respective advances made to
some of the other children.
It is not likely
that this would have been overlooked or forgotten.
He is silent as to the $500 advance
made to each of the children in 1830, and
from this we infer that the testator himself
considered
that all, at that time, were advanced pari passu.
But it is suggested that the defendants
have sworn to the fact, and that their answer is not overcome by counteracting testimony. They only testify as to their information and belief, and the rule does not apply to such answers.
(3) Was pie court wrong In making the
addition which it did to the third charge, as
requested?
It is not complained that the
charge, as asked, was not given.
The error
assigned is that the judge selected that portion of the defendant's answer which set
forth the award made by Judge Taylor, and
stated that the same was not responsive to
the bill, whereas, it is urged that the same
was responsive, and that admitting it was
Still, it was wrong to single out this
not.
particular portion of the answer and omit
sums

any reference to the rest
In the first place, we concur with the eh:cult court in holding that the reference to
the award made by Judge Taylor was not
responsive to any allegation, but matter
purely in evidence; and, secondly, that the
omission of the court to refer to the rest of
the answer was favorable to the defendants.
It left the jury to infer that the balance of
the answer was responsive.
It is finally contended that the advancements made to the different legatees, and
to French and wife amongst the rest, should
be brought into hotchpot; but no such necessity exists, provided the advancements were
equal, for In that event each is entitled to an
equal share under the will of what rematas.
We see no error in this record, to make It
proper to send back a case, like this, which
has been pending so long, and occupied so
much time of the country. There should be
an end of litigation unless manifest injustice
has been done.
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time these deeds were made.
Such is the
opinion of the witnesses to the deeds, although one of them, who was draftsman,
Supreme Court of Tennessee. December
was led to doubt upon that subject by some
Term, 1857.
Interviews a month or more afterwards, yet
This bill was filed in the chancery court
at the time of the transaction he has no
at Murfreesboro, for the purposes fully statdoubt. The proof falls short entirely of
ed in the opinion. At the October Term,
showing that degree of mental unsoundness
1857, Chancellor Ridley gave a decree for the
or imbecility that would invalidate the gifts;
from which the defendants
complainants,
but it is insisted that. If he were not of unappealed.
sound mind, yet his intellect was so enW. L. Martin, for complainants. Ruclser feebled by long-continued inebriety that hfr
was easily infiuenced by his wife, and that
and B. A. Keeble, for defendants.
she, against his will, caused him to make
CARUTHERS, J. On the 29th April, 1851,
these donations, by the exercise of an absolute dominion over his will. As an evidence \
John L. Jetton made his will, disposing of
of this, it is said that she procured, by her 1
all his property to his wife, children, and
He gave to his wife one- dictation and .power over him, a remainder |
grandchildren.
third of his land for life, and one-tenth of interest to be vested in an illegitimate child I
of hers, born before his marriage with her, I
^'all his slaves and other' personal property,"
jointly with her children by him, in the two
after the payment of debts and expenses.
slaves given to her for life. He had taken
Item 3. "After the payment of debts and exthis child with her, and raised it in his house
and the talcing out onepenses aforesaid,
with his other children; and it is not untenth for my widow, the residue of said
natural that he should freely yield to her"
slaves, and other personal property, monies,
wishes in giving to it a small pittance of his
etc.," "I direct to be divided into nine equal
estate.
parts, one part of "which I give to my son
Whether this child will get anything
under the deed is a question not now to be
TiCwis, one part to the children of Mary
decided, and does not affect the argument.
•Graham, one part to Jane Barr, one part to
There is evidence that for several of the last
Charlotte Bryant;" and so on to each of his
nine in number. He limits the years of his life, embracing the time of these
daughters,
gifts, she managed most of his business, and
estates of his daughters to their natural
that he deferred to her in many things; but
lives, to their separate use, and then to their
this was rendered necessary by his intemin remainder. He died in 1854.
<;hildren,
perate habits, and was a prudent delegation
His will was proven and recorded without
of authority, rather than an evidence of
<-ontest
After the execution of this will,
either a want of sense or submission to unthe testator made several deeds of gift to a
part of his children and his widow, the dedue influence.
He sometimes said he was
in torment, etc., when he was drunk. It
fendant.
On the 19th August, 1853, he made
was very natural he should feel that way
a deed of gift to his vrife for life, and then
when under the dominion of liquor; and that
to all her children one negro woman and
child; and, on the same day, he gave by
she should "torment" him about his self-destroying habits was to be expected, in view
deed to a trustee, for the benefit and sepaof the destruction of health and happiness,
rate use of his daughter Francis L. Burke,
a negro man;
which was the inevitable consequence of his
and at the same time, and in
the same way, a negro man was given to
ruinous course; but it iDy no means follows,
as a necessary consequence,
his daughter Jane Barr.
On the 25th Authat the fact
gust, 1853, he gave a negro boy to his son
that she vexed or tormented him would augLewis; and, on the 29th, he gave to a trusment her influence. His remarks about not
tee, for the use and benefit of his daughter
being able to do as he pleased, or at liberty
Martha A. Sawer, a lot in Pulaski and a
to invite his friends to dinner, etc., are all
negro man, with the same limitations and
attributable to the same cause, and have
restrictions.
very llttie weight in establishing this point,
These deeds of gift were all regularly
for which they are adduced in evidence. In
proven and recorded.
This bill was filed all this, we find nothing to authorize the conSeptember, 1856, by the children and legaclusion, or at least not sufficient for that
tees, not thus advanced,
for the purpose of
purpose, that he was unduly Influenced by
setting aside all said deeds of gift, upon the
her to make the deeds of gift in question, or
ground
of the mental incapacity of the
that there was any fraud practiced upon him
donor, and undue Influence on the part of
by his wife, or anybody else. He deliberhis wife; and, if this cannot be done, they
ately made the arrangement with his attorpray that the several gifts may be held to
ney to write them, and gave every evidence
satisfy the legacies of defendants by way
of a free and settled purpose In doing what
of ademption.
Upon the first question we
he did. The deeds of gift were, therefore,
have no difficulty.
The old man was very
valid and binding, and vested good tities In
intemperate and aged, but had sufficient cathe donees.
l)acity to make a binding contract at the
2. The second ground assumed by the com(5

V.

Sneed, 229.)
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plainants Is that the gifts, if good, operated
as an ademption of the legacies in the will to
the extent, at least, of the value of the property, and that, in the division of the property
under the will, the respective donees must be
made to account for it. This is a more difflcult question, and must be decided by refer[ ence to the authorities. The general rule on
this subject is that where a parent, or one
standing in loco parentis, gives a legacy to a
child, and afterwards advances a portion to
that child, it will be an ademption or satisfaction of the legacy to the extent of the value of the portion, unless a contrary intent
2 WlUiams, Ex'rs, 1143, and subappears.
But
sequent pages; 2 Story, Bq. Jur. § 1111.
the rule has several qualifications and exceptions.
It is founded on the presumption that
a bequest by the father is intended as a portion to the child, and so of the after gift;
and the presumption
will be that a double
portion was not intended, where nothing else
appears, and therefore It will be taken that
the gift was intended as a satisfaction of the
legacy when it is of equal or greater value,
Rop. Leg. 370, 374;
and, if less, pro tanto.
The word "ademp2 Williams, Ex'rs, 1148.
tion," is synonymous with "satisfaction"
In that
when applied to specific legacies.
case, the disposition of the thing given before
the death of the testator is a complete extinction of the legacy, and the intention of
the testator in such cases is immaterial, because there is nothing at the time the will
tates effect for it to operate upon. Eop. leg.
829.
But in respect to general legacies, the
question is one of intention, and this intention will be presumed, as we have said, in
all cases of legacies and subsequent gifts by
a parent, or one standing In, or occupying the
place of, parent, unless that presumption is
rebutted.
Such is the general rule. But
this presumption of ademption will not prevail, (1) where the testamentary portion and
subsequent advancement are not of the same
nature; (2) where the latter depends on a
contingency,
and the former is certain; (3)
when either is in lieu of, or a compensation
for, an interest to which the child is entitled:
or (4) where the bequest is of a residue or
Williams, Ex'rs, 1144,
part of a residue.
Rop. Leg. 877, states that another ex1145.
ception to the general rule is where the bequest is of an "uncertain amount." "It has,
tiierefore, been determined more than once,"
he says, "that a devise of a residue, or of part
of a residue, to a child, is not adeemed oy a
subsequent gift upon the legatee's marriage."
Though, Sir W. Grant intimated a doubt as

to the correctness of this opinion, in 15 Ves.
as the author states, yet it is considered
well setUed as the law, when not controlled

518,

by special circumstances. In Famham v.
Philips, 2 Atk. 216, Lord Hardwlcke said,
"There was no case where the devise had
been of a residue that was uncertain,
and
that at the testator's death might be more or
less, in which the gift of a subsequent portion had been held an ademption."
Where
a testator directed a debt of 100 pounds to be
paid out of an estate, and the residue divided between his wife and children, and afterwards gave one of his daughters a thousand
pounds, it was held that this did not operate
of her testamentary share
as an ademption
This was the case of Parnof the residue.
The application
ham V. Philips, above cited.
of this doctrine to the case before us produces a result that we would rather avoid,
if we could do so upon any principle settied
by authority. It must result in giving the
defendants the benefit of the will, as well as
The provision for them unthe deeds of gift.
der the will is that they are each to have oneninth of the residue of his slaves and other
personal property and money, after the payment of debts, expenses, and the one-tenth
to the widow. The testamentary portions or
legacies must be fluctuating and uncertain,
or, in the language of the books, they may
"be more or less, something, or nothing" at
the death of the testator and settlement of
the estate. In answer to the seeming injustice of this doctrine, it may be said that it is
the right of every man to give as a bounty
to his children, or others, in such proportions
as he chooses, to some more and others less.
Where he intends or desires equality, or to
make gifts in his lifetime operate in the
ademption or satisfaction of general legacies,
it is easy to express such purpose. Where
he falls to do so, the rules of law must prevail vrithout regard to the consequences.
This doctrine of ademption does not apply to
real estate, nor to legacies and gifts to others than children, or those who stand in that
This
relation, in cases of general legacies.
distinction rests upon artificial reasons, the
justice and propriety of which are not very
clear, nor the reasons on which it is founded
approved; but that branch of the doctrine,
having no application to the case before us,
need not be discussed, but left for a case to
which it applies.
The decree will be reversed, and the bill dismissed as to this branch
of the case, but remanded for further proas to other matters
the settlement of the estate.
ceedings

connected
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Faulks.
RUNYON, Ch. The bill states that John
B. Miller, deceased, late of Madison, in the
county of Morris, made and entered into a
in writing with Jehiel K.
valid contract
Hoyt upon the twenty-fifth of April, 1872,
for the sale and conveyance by him to the
latter, or to such company of individuals as
might be named by him, (Hoyt,) certain land
therein mentioned for the price of $800 an
acre; and that on or about the tenth of
June following he made another like agreement in writing with Hoyt for the conveyance to him, his heirs and assigns, or to
such person or persons as he might designate, of the same property, on or before the
then next, for the
first day of September
price of $39,392, to be paid, and which- Hoyt
thereby stipulated to pay, as follows:
$100
and
upon the execution
of the agreement,
$4,900 on the delivery of the deed,— the balance, $34,392, to be secured by the bond of
the grantee or grantees,
and his or their
mortgage of the property; that the time for
the delivery of the deed was, by another
agreement in writing, made on the twentieth
of August, 1872, between
Miller and Hoyt,
extended to the first day of October then
next; that Miller died September
3, 1872,
intestate, leaving a widow and a son, the
defendant David L. MiUer, who was his only
heir at law; that letters of administration
of his estate were granted to Theodore little, October 1, 1872; that after the death of
John B. Miller, and on or about the twentyeighth of September, 1872, Hoyt notified David L. Miller that he would be ready to take
the deed, and carry out the agreement
on
his part on the first of October then next,
and requested Miller, as heir at law, to aeliver at that date a deed for the property, in
conformity
with the contract, to Henry B.
Reddish and Henry 0. Ohlen, whom he designated as grantees;
that David L. Miller
did not and never would convey the property, except upon condition that he should
1 receive the purchase money for his own use;
that the complainants are informed that
Reddish and Ohlen, on or about the first of
October, 1872, demanded of David L. Miller
that he convey the property to them by warranty deed, free from any dower of his wife,
and from the dower of the widow of his
father, and from the lien of certain judgments which were of record against him,
David L. Miller, and tendered the money and
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bond and mortgage, but he would not comply witty the request; that neither David L.
Miller, nor Hoyt, Reddish, or Ohlen, ever
requested the widow to release her dower to
Reddish and Ohlen; that she never refused
to release it to them, but was at all times
ready to release it upon condition that the
purchase money should be paid, and secured
to be paid, to the administrator of John B.
Miller, and that David L. Miller was aware
of her readiness to release upon that condition; that on or about the thirteenth of December, 1872, the- widow wrote a letter to
her late husband's administrator in which
she said that she had expected to join with
her husband In the conveyance to the purchaser, but he died before any conveyance
was made; that she was still ready to do
all that she could to perform the agreement,
and was ready to release her dower on condition that the purchase money should be paid,
or secured to be paid, to the administrator,
and she offered to release her dower upon
those terms in case the administrator should
take judicial proceedings to compel specific
performance
of the agreement; that he did
bring suit to that end in this court in December, 1872; that in January
following the
widow died, and the complainants in this
suit were appointed administrators of her
estate; that in the suit brought by the administrator of John B. Miller specific performance was decreed, but the decree was, upon
appeal, reversed, so far as Hoyt and Reddish
and Ohlen, and the performance of the agreement by them, were conca:ned.
By the decree of the court of errors and
appeals the bill was dismissed as to those
defendants, but was retained as to the others,
in order that the legal representatives
of the
VTidow might have an opportunity of raising,
by cross-bill, the question whether they have
any remedy against David L. Miller.
This
suit is brought accordingly by the administrators of Mrs. Miller against David L. Miller
and his wife, and his assignee in bankruptcy,
(he filed his petition in bankruptcy after the
decree for specific performance was entered,)
the administrator of John B. Miller, (he refused to bring the suit, or to join in it, or
to permit the complainants
to bring it in his
name,) and the administrators of a Judgment
creditor of David L. Miller.
The prayer of
the bill is that the land may be decreed to
be personal property, and may be sold under
the order of this court; that the proceeds of
the sale may go into the hands of the administrator of John B. Miller as personal property, to be administered and distributed by
him accordingly; that it may be decreed that
the complainants, as the legal representatives
of the widow, shall have her share thereof
according to law; and that. If necessary, it
may be decreed that David L. Miller's wife
has no dower in the property, and that the
judgment above mentioned is no lien upon the
None of the defendants
premises.
have answered except the assignee in bankruptcy.
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rule.
Upon a full and careful consideration of
the matter
reached the conclusion in the
suit for specific performance that the contract worked
conversion.
See Miller's
Adm'r v. Miller, supra.
The only new feature now presented is the fact that the appellate court has decided that specific performance ought not to have been decreed.
The reason for that conclusion has already
been stated.
It was not the invalidity of the
contract, nor any consideration which rendered the contract unenforceable in equity
at the death of John B. Miller, or at the time
fixed by the contract for completing the purchase.
The contract was one which, at the
time fixed by
for completing the purchase,
could have been enforced against the purchaser in equity, and
would have been enforced at that time on the application of the
heir, with the consent of the vridow, and she
was willing to johi him In enforcing
he
had been willing to secure to her her right
in the purchase money.
In equity he ought
a

it
if

it

it

(vendee

and mortgage decreed to be given, on account
of purchase money, were and should be personal assets in the hands of the administrator
of John B. Miller, and should be by him administered as personal property in due and
legal course of administration, and that he
should pay to the administrators of the widow
her distributive share thereof.
That decree
(it was made over 10 years ago) was not appealed from by David L. Miller.
The only question presented for decision is
whether, under the circumstances of the case,
the contract of sale worked an equitable conversion of the land into money at the death
of John B. Miller. That it would have done
so had the contract been enforced against the
is indisputable,
and is not denied.
But the answering defendant insists that the
failure to compel specific performance
prevents such result.
That failure, however,
was due, not to the invalidity of the contract, but to the fact that, because of the
length of time which had elapsed between
the time fixed by the contract (as extended)
for the completion of the purchase and the
making of the decree for specific performance,
was inequitable to require the vendee to complete the purchase, seeing that he
had tendered himself ready to comply with
the requirements of the contract on his part
at the time fixed, and that in the meantime
the property had fallen in value.
It may be
upon the
remarked that the noncompliance
part of the heir was not due to the widow.
She was never
She did not refuse to release.
asked to release.
On the thirteenth of December, 1872, she stated to her late husband's
administrator, by letter, that she was willing
to release in case he should take judicial proceedings to compel specific performance of
the contract.
It is proved that on the very
day on which, under the contract as extended, the deed was to be delivered, her attorney
stated to the attorney of Reddish and Ohlen
that she was willing to release upon such a
payment
as would secure her rights, by
W^hich was meant payment to her husband's
administrator, and not to David L. Miller.
A valid and binding contract of sale such
as
court of equity wlU specifically enforce

against an unwilling purchaser operates a^
a conversion.
The cases in which the court
has refused to decree that
contract for
sale works equitable conversion are those
In which the contract was such as equity
would not enforce.
The counsel for the answering defendant
insists that the decision in the case of Teneick v. Flagg, 29 N. J. Law, 25, is decisive
of the question under consideration,
and
adverse to the claim of the complainants.
But it is to be observed that that was anaction at law.
Mrs. Attie Teneick had
agreed to convey land to James Buckalew,
and had received part of the purchase money. He refused to accept the deed because of
the pendency
of an action of ejectment
brought against Mrs. Teneick by other parties to obtain possession «f the land. She
delivered a deed for the property to her
agent, to be delivered by him to Buckalew
upon the favorable termination of the actioB
of ejectment.
She died before the termination was reached.
By her death the action
of ejectment abated, and
was not renewed.
After her death her heirs conveyed the property to Buckalew In pursuance of her agreement, and the purchase money was paid ta
her administrators. The husband of one of
the heirs brought suit against the administrators to recover
share of the money.
The court held that he was entitled to recover, on the ground that on the death of
Mrs. Teneick the title descended to her
heirs; the deed held in escrow passing no
title, since the event on which
was to be
delivered to Buckalew did not happen in
the life-time of the grantor, and at her death
the deed ceased to have any validity. In
the decision of the case the difference between the equitable rule and the legal rule
was distinctly recognized by Justice Haines
in his opinion.
The cause was, of course, decided in the court of law upon the legal

I

By the decree In the above-mentioned suit,
brought by John B. Miller's administrator,
(Miller's Adm'r v. Miller, 25 N. J. Eq. 355;
S. C. on appeal, Reddish t. Miller's Adm'r,
27 N. J. Eq. 514,) in addition to decreeing
specific
performance.
It was decreed that
David L. Miller, at and ever since the death
of his father, had been, and at the date of
the decree was, seized of the property as a
trustee to and for the use of Reddish and
Ohlen, and not otherwise, and that David L.
Miller's wife was not, and had not been, entitled to any dower or right of dower in or
to the land, and that the judgment creditors
of David L. Miller were not entitled to any
lien to or claim upon or against the property
by virtue of their judgments, and also that
the moneys decreed to be paid, and the bond

it
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Equity regards that as
to hare enforced
The
done -which ought to have been done.
doctrine of conversion is a reasonable one.
In this case, John B. Miller had made a sale
of the property, -which, had he lived, he
■would have been able to enforce in equity,
he -would
and which it is to be presumed
He had sold the property
have enforced.
It should not be, and it is
at a high price.
not, in the po-wer of the heir to defeat the
right of the next of kin by his o-wn unwillBy force
/mgness to carry out the contract
j of the contract the vendor became in equity
/ trustee of the property for the vendee, and
I the latter became trustee of the purchase
V money for the former.
It has been held that
the equitable rights of the next of kin of the
vendor are not defeated, -where the vendee,
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by his laches, after the death of the vendor,
loses his right to specific performance, provided the contract -was enforceable in equity
at the death of the vendor. , Curre v. Bo-wyer, reported in a note to Farrar v. Earl of
Winterton, 5 Beav. 1. Where there is a con-'
tract for the sale of an estate, the estate is
in equity considered as converted into personalty from the time of the contract, although the purchaser has an election to purLa-wes v.
chase or not as he shall see fit.
Bennet 1 N. J. La-w, 167; Sugd. Vend. (8th
Am. Ed.) 187, and cases cited.
The sale in this case -worked an equitable
conversion of the land Into money, and the
-wldo-w -was entitled, accordingly, to a distributive share of the purchase money as part
of the personal property of her husband.
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WHELESS
(21 S.

Supreme

W.

V.

WHELESS

595,

et al.

92 Tenn. 293.)

Court of Tennessee.

March

2,

1893.

Appeal from chancery court, Davidson
county ;
A. Cartwright, Special Cbancellor.
Bill for partition by Joseph Wheless and
others against H. H. Wheless. Judgment
forcomplainants. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Dickenson & Frazer, Stokes & Stokes,
Joand Frizzell & Zarecor, for appellant.
seph Wheless, Jr., and N. D. Malone, for
respondent G. A. Tillman, guardian ad
litem. J. S. Pileher, for widow of J. F.
Wheless.
W. Byrnes, for petitioner Mc-

J.

Crosky.

J.

J.

CA-LDWELL,
Gen. John F. Wheless
died intestate and without issue, leaving
a widow, and numerouscollateralkindrtd.
The bill in this cause was filed for a partition of his lands, where that could be done,
and for nale and division of proceeds,
where partition in kind might not be pracher answer,
ticable. The widow, in
, claimed that the undivided interest
of her
husband in what is known as tbe"Baxter
Smith Tract" was not realty, but personal
I property, under the doctrine
of equitable
i conversion, and that it therefore belonged
to her, as distributee, and not to the heirs.
: The
chancellor
decided this question
against her, and she appealed.
No doctrine is more firmly fized in English and American jurisprudence than that
of equitable conversion, by which, under
circumstances,
real
estate
is
certain
treated, in equity, as personal property,
and personal estate as real property.
/Througli this doctrine, courts of equity
treat as land money directed to be emI
ployed in the purchase of land, and, as
I
; money, l,and directed to be sold and conVverted into money; and the direction upon
which the conversion arises may be made
by will, or by deed, settlement, or other
contract inter vivos. Adams, Eq. *185,
186; 1 PoraTEqmif: § 371; 2 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 790; 4 Araer. & Bng. Enc. Law, 127;

Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 664, 665. It was
early recognized in this state, (Stephenson
V. Yandle, 3 Hay w. [Tenn.] 109,) and has
since been applied in several cases upon
the construction of wills. McCormick v
Cantrell, 7 Yerg. 615; Williams v. Bradley,
7 Heisk. 58; Green v. Davidson, 4 Baxt.
448.
The difficulty which sometimes arises
in the application of the principle to a particular instrument lies, not in the subtlety
of the principle itself, but rather in ascertaining the intention of the maker from
the words employed. To operate as a conversion, <he direction that the form of the
property be changed must be imperative,
in the sense of being positive and unmistakable. If the intention, as gathered from
the whole instrument, be left in doubt, or
the direction allows the trustee to sell or
not, as he deems best, the courts are not
at liberty to say that a conversion has
taken place, but must deal with the property according to its actual form and character. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1214.
Mr.
6

Pomeroy says: "No express declaration in
the instrument is needed that land shall
be treated as money, although not sold,
or that money shall be deemed laud, although not actually laid out in the purchase of land. The only essential requisite

is an absolute expression of an inteution f
that the land shall be sold, and turned into money, or that the money shall be ez-J
pended in the purchase of land. • • •
The true test, in all such cases, is a simple
one: Has the will or deed creating the
trust absolutely directed, or has the«ontract stipulated, that the real estate be
turned into personal, or the personal estate be turned into real?" 3 Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 1159. Again: "The whole scope
and meaning of the fundamental principle
underlying the doctrineare involved in the
existence of a duty resting upon the trustees or other parties to do the specified
act; for, unless the equitable right exIsts, tbere is no room for the operation of
the maxim, 'Equity regards that as done
whiuh ought to be done.' The rule is therefore firmly settled that, in order to work
a conversion while the property is yet actually unchanged in form, there must be a
clear and imperative direction in the will,
deed, or settlement, or a clear, imperative
agreement in the contract, to convert the
property; that is, to sell the land for
money, or to lay out the money in the purchase of land. If the act of converting—
that is, the act, itself, of selling the land,
or of laying out the money in land — is left
to the option, discretion, or choice of the
trustees, or other parties, then no equitable conversion will take place, been use
no duty to make the change rests upon
them. It is not essential, however, that
the direction should be express, in order
to be imperative.
It may. be necessarily
•
* • If by express language,
implied.
or by a reasonable construction of all its
terms, the instrument shows an intention
that the original form of the property
shall be changed, then a conversion necessarily takes place." Id. § 1160. To the
same effect are Wurt's Exr's v. Page, 19
Eq. 375; Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 33
N.
N. W. Rep. 188; Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y.
588.
Numerous
other authorities, textbooks, and judicial decisions are at hand;
but they are, in the main, so harmonious,
and so entirely in accord with the fall
quotations just made from Mr Pomeroy,
that we forbear to make further citations
with respect to the character of direction
necessary to work the notional change,
and call the doctrine of equitable conversion into play. As a matter of some moment on the question of construction, it is
well to observe that unless the sale or
purchase contemplated
is expressly directed to be made at a specified timeinthe
future, or upon the happening of some
particular event, which may or may not
happen, the conversion
takes place, in
wills, as from the death of the testator;
and in deeds, and other Instruments inter vivos, as from the date of their execu-

J.

tion. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1162.
The instrument upon which the controversy arises in this cause is a deed, in the
following language: " We, Baxter Smith
and wife, Bettie G. Smith, • • • in
cousideratiou of the sum of $34,395.60, paid

/
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to be paid as hereinafter mentioned, have bargaint-d and sold, and do
J hereby transfer and convey, onto James
i H. Yarbri>ugh,in trust, as hereinafter mentioned, the following tract of land • • •
to haveand to hold, for himself and other
beneflciaries hereinafter named, in trust for
'. the following uses and purposes :
That is
to say, said tract of land has been j(>intly
purchased by James C. Warner, Percy
^ arner, John P. White, John F. Wheless,
B. F. Wilson, W. M. Grantland, Charles L.
H. YarRidley, Baxter Smith, and
brough, Li. H. Davis, and G. A. Maddux,—
the last three purchasing as a firm, under
thefirm name and style of I'arbro ugh, Maddux and Davis,— each paying and to pay
one tenth of the purchase money for said
land, as hereafter set out, except John P.
• • • Said
White, whopaystwotenths.
tract of land is conveyed to said J. H.
Yarbrongh, as trustee for said named purchasers, with power and authority to hold,
possess, and manage thesamein theirinterMt and behalf, and to sell and convey the
same, by deed in fee simple, upon the written direction of a majority in value of the
adult beneficial owners then living, upon
Buch terms and conditions as they may
direct, and to collect and divide the prosaid beneficiaries,
ceeds of sale among
their heirs, administrators, executors, and
assit^ns, as their several interests may appear. • • The aforesaid sura of $34,395.60
has been paid, and secured to be paid, as
follows: • * To secure the payment of
the promissory notes herein described, a
lien is expressly retained upon the share
or interest of the maker alone, and not
against the tract as a vrhole. In case
any of the beneficiaries herein named, in
order to preserve his or their ow^n title,
should have to pay and discharge for another any accruing taxes or other incumbrance or lien upon the whole property,
then, in that event, he or they shall have
a lieu upon the share or interest of the person who has failed to make such payment.
Should said J. H. Yarbrough desire to resign the trust herein given him,
'
he may do so, by and with the consent
and approval, in writing, of a majority
in value of the adult beneficiaries, owners,
named above, and appoint in liis room
and stead a new trustee, and clothe him
with like power and duties as those now
conferred on him, by a suitable deed of
conveyance in writing, to be recorded in
the register's office of Davidson county,
Tennessee."
Such are the material portions of the
instrument the court is called upon to construe in this case; and the inquiryis whetherthe land conveyed thereby is to be treated, in equity, as realty, or as personalty.
If as realty, the share of Gen. Wheless
passed to his heirs, under the statute of
descent; if as personalty, it went to his
widow, as sole distributee, sut)ject in either case, of course, to his debts.
A general view of the deed readily discloses a proposed speculation, entered into
by several persons jointly, — a syndicate
buying land to sell again. In furtherance
of the scheme a trustee was appointed,
and the land conveyed to him for the benefit of all the purchasers,— for each ofthpm
according to his interest.
The idea of a
. and eecurea
■

'
(

J.

'
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resale, as the ultimate object of the enterprise, runs through the whole instrument.
It appears, from the nature of the transaction ; from the words conferring upon the
trustee power and authority "to sell,
* • • and collect and divide the proceeds;" and from the provision for appointment of a successor in case the trustee should resign.
That a partition in
kind should ever occur, or that the trust
should cease before a sale of the land and
division of its proceeds were fully accomThe
plished, was never contemplated.
land was bought to sell again, and a trustee was appointed as a part of the plan.
All this is clear; but it is entirely consistent with the proposition that the trust
w^as created merely as a cheaper and more
convenient method of preserving and conveying theland. More is required to make [
The fact ^
a case of equitable conversion.
of a contemplated resale is present in ev- /
ery purchase of land upon speculation ; /
and land purchased with such view is not^
converted into personalty by the mere appointment of a trustee to receive the title,
and as the agency through which the re-j
sale is to be accomplished for the owners.'
It is manifest that the paramount object
of the enterprise was a resale of the land
through the trustee, as representative of.
the beneficial owners, yet the deed does

not contain any imperative direction that
he shall sell; no absolute, unconditional
duty to sell is placed upon him. "The
equitable 'ought' " is not to be found in
the deed, either as a matter expressed or
to be necessarily implied. Not only does
it contain no positive direction that he
shall sell, but it, in reality, does not even
permit him to sell, upon his own motion.
His only power of sale is made to depend,

expressl.y, upon the direction of others.
He has no independent authority in that
respect. The words of the deed on this
point are; " With power and autliorit.y to
bold, possess, and manage the same in
their interest and behalf, and to sell and
convey the same, by deed in fee sin. pie, upon the written direction of a majority in
value of the adult beneficial owners then
living, upon such terms and conditions as
they may direct." This language imposes
upon the trustee no positive, unqualified
obligation to sell the land at all events.
At most, It but gives him authority to
sell at such time, and upon such terms and
conditions, as others may direct. In effect,
it but makes hira the instrumentalit.y
through which a majority of the beneficial
owners living at any given time may
make a sale. He has no right to sell without their written direction, and no authorit.v to demand or require such direc
tion at one time or another. It cannott be
be\
that a conversion was wrought by
creation ofa trust so passive as this on eis.
To meet the fact that the trustee has no
power to sell unless directed by a majority
of the adult beneficiaries to do so, it is
suggested that the beneficiaries themselves
are clothed with a trust, to the extent of
being empowered to direct when and how
the sale shall be made, and that they are
bound to give such direction.
Therecan
be no doubt that it was contemplated
beiipficiaries
that the
should at some time
give the trustee the required direction to

the\/

/
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sell the land, and that a duty was, to that
extent, indirectly devolved upon them ;
but that can hardly be said to have made
trustees of them, or to have magnified the
limited power of the real trustee into an
imperative obligation to convert the land
into money. The purchasers, though intending an ultimate sale, clearly had no
thought that the terms of the deed
changed the character of the property,
and converted the real estate into personlalty. That they intended the land to be
jheld as realty until actually sold and
(turned into money is manifest from the
jgeneral frame and terms of the deed, and
those parts of it retaining
j especially from
'separate liens in favor of the grantor, and
providing for a special lien in favor of
such beneficiaries as might be compelled
to pay taxes or discharge liens for others.
In the portion of the deed last referred to,
the interest of each of the several beneficiaries ia referred to as an interest in land,
as such, and provisions are made with reference thereto which would be inappropriate as applied to personalty. We are
of opinion that the deed shows upon its
face when considered as a whole, that the

land was conveyed to a trustee merely for
convenience, and to save expense and
trouble in the ultimate sale and conveyance, and that no conversion took place.
Gup attentfon has been called to the
very instructive and soundly reasoned

case of Orane v. Bolles, (N. J. Ch.) 24
Atl. Rep. 237, In which a conversion of
land into money was held to have occurred under direction contained in a will.
There are several points of similarity between that case and this one, and perhaps
as many important differences. The principles of law laid down in that case are
the same recognized and applied by us in
this one, the difference in result reached
being due to differencein purport of instruments construed.
Without stating the
aspects in which the two instruments
agree, or those in which they differ, we
are content with simply saying that the
court in that case said that the direction
for sale was "imperative," and did not
depend on the "request or consent" of the
testator's children, while in this case there
is no imperative direction to selU and the
power to sell does depend on the direction
of the beneficiaries.
Affirm the decree.
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MILLER, J.

Josh-

The complaint in this action

demands an equitable partition or sale of
several pieces of land therein described, upon a portion of which was erected a hotel,
called the Pavilion Hotel, together with the
personal property, consisting of furniture in
said hotel, and that an account be taken of
and expenditures made by
the disbursements
the plaintiff, Augustus Prentice, for the benefit of and as additions to said property, and
that the share of the defendant, Mary Ann
Janssen, be charged upon the same and deducted from her portion of the proceeds of
the sale of the property. The land belonged
to Francis Blancard at the time of his decease in 1868, and the title is derived under
the provisions of his last will and testament.

The plaintiff, Augustus Prentice, holds threefourths, by conveyances
from' the residuary
legatees or their representatives, and the defendant, Mary Ann Janssen, the remaining
one-fourth.
The defendant last named has
Joined with the plaintiff in making leases of
the property since 1873; large sums have
been expended in making improvements by
the owners, and the rents have been received and applied in part, if not entirely, for
that purposa
The residuary clause in the will of Francis Blancard devised and bequeathed his
property to five of his children, among whom
were Francis H. Blancard and the defendant, Mary Ann Janssen.
It also authorized
Francis H. Blancard to carry on the hotel
business in the Pavilion Hotel, for the term
I
of five years, if he so desired, and the exj
: ecutors were empowered and directed, after
', the testator's death, to sell and convert into
; money all the real and personal property of
which he should be seized or possessed, including the hotel property, after the right
! of occupancy of his son had ceased, as they
should deem advisable, and divide the pro' ceeds
equally among the residuary legatees.
The son, Francis H., died before the testator, and no action was ever taken by the
executors to sell the property, and it remained undisposed
of, and was used and
regarded by the ovniers as real estate to
which they had titie. Only one of the executors,
the defendant,
Gerhard Janssen,
was living at the time of the commencement of this action, and he is made a party,
as the husband of the defendant, Mary Ann
Janssen, and does not by his answer claim
any rights as executor or that he is a proper
party as such.
The answers admitted that
plaintiff and the defendant, Mrs. Janssen,
owned the property as tenants in common.
We think that under the provisions cited

1G3

from the testator's will, the executors who
were donees of a power took no estate in
the lands as trustees, but merely a power la
trust to be executed for the purposes of distribution, according to the will, which was
liable to be defeated by a reconversion of
the property, which was made personal by
the will, into real estate.
The testator by the authority and direction to his executors to sell the real estate,
constructively converted the same into personal estate, and being thus converted, the
residuary legatees were entitied to take the
same as such and had a right at their election to reconvert into real estate. No distinct and positive act is required for such a
purpose, and the rule applicable to such a
case is that "in the reconversion of real estate a slight expression
of intention will
likewise be considered sufficient to demonstrate an election on the part of those absolutely entitled."
Lieigh & D. Conv. (5
Law Library), m. p. 168; Mutlow v. Bigg,
L. R., 1 Ch. Div. 385; 1 Jarm. Wills, 523 et
seq. The real estate was not disposed of
by the executors under the provisions contained in the wiU, and as there was no
lawful purpose for which a sale was absolutely required there was no obstacle to prevent a reconversion of the same by the parties in interest from personal into real esThis they elected to do by positive
tate.
and unequivocal acts. Three of the four
residuary interests were conveyed to thej
plaintiff, Augustus Prentice, and the defendant, Mary Ann Janssen, retained the other I
one-fourth. The whole has since been en- '
joyed, possessed and treated the same as real
estate.
This was done by the acquiescence
of the executors and all tie parties in interest, not only by possession, but by acts showing their Intention beyond any question.
In
Story, Eq. Jur. § 793, it is said that if land
is directed to be converted into money merely, the party entitied to the beneficial interest may if he elects so to do, prevent any
conversion of the property and hold it as it
This has been done by the residuary
is.
legatees here;
and as the lands were not 1
sold and disposed of by the executors, audi
no diversion made, the rule applies that the
person entitled to the money, being of law- 1
ful age, can elect to take the land, if thai
rights of others will not be affected by such 1
Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N. Y. 1, 11.
election.
No rights of other parties were Injured by
the election to reconvert;
and as threefourths of the residuary interests had been
sold and conveyed to the plaintiff by those
who were entitied to the proceeds of a sale,
if one had been made under the power, and
the owner of the remaining one-fourth had
assented to the reconversion,
by exercising
acts of ownership, and the purpose of the
power had become unattainable, the power
to sell became extinguished, and the plaintiff and defendant already named became
owners as tenants In common.
Hetzel t.
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Barber, supra; Garvey v. McDevitt, 72 N.
563.
Neither the will itself nor the surrounding circumstances evince in any way
that the testator intended not only to confer
a power of sale, but that the exercise of such
power would 'become absolutely necessary to
enable the executors to make lie distribution
required to the residuary legatees, within the
principle laid down in Crittenden v. Fairchild, 41 N. Y. 289, 292, which is relied upon
by the defendant's counsel.
The facts here
The
are far different from the case cited.
distribution was actually made and the purby the
pose of the will fully accomplished
of the personal estate into real
reconversion
estate by "the parties in interest, as is quite
obvious, and each of the legatees had received their full share as directed; thus rendering the exercise of the power of no avail.
It follows that the executors having only a
power to sell for the purpose of distribution
and
—which power never was exercised,
which became of no use by reason of the
reconversion of the land into realty— Gerhard Janssen, the surviving executor, had no
right, title, interest, or lien upon the property, which rendered him a necessary party
The provito the action as such executor.
sion of 1 Rev. St. p. 735, § 107, which makes
a power of sale a lien or charge upon the
land, has no application when it had ceased
to operate, and was of no practical use. As
by the reconversion no interest remained in
be no lien or
there could
the executors,
Equity would not incharge upon the land.
terfere to compel the execution of the power
under 1 Rev. St. p. 734, § 96, because the
vrithout its
purpose had been accomplished

T.

■

exercise.

Nor was it necessary that Gerhard Janssen, the surviving executor, should be a parIn regard to the
ty for any other reason.
payment of debts and legacies there was no
evidence that any debt or legacy remained
unpaid when this action was brought. Seven years had then elapsed, and as debts and
legacies are primarily to be paid out of the
personal estate, unless express directions or
a clear intent to the contrary is found, or to
be gathered from the will (Bevan v. Cooper,
72 N. Y. 317; Kinnier v. Rogers, 42 N. Y.
531j, the presumption is that they have been
The burden of proof was on the depaid.
fendants to establish that they were not, if
such was the fact. No such defense was set
upon the
up in the answer or interposed
trial, and as the case stood the plaintiff was
not required to show that the debts and legThe same remarks
acies had been paid.
will apply to the point made, that there was
no payment or accounting for the testamentary expenses.
i
Charles Blancard, a son of the testator,
was not, we think, a necessary party deBy the will he is
fendant in this action.
bequeathed the sum of $5,000, and he is not
named therein as a residuary legatee.
It is

claimed that he became entitled to an Interest in the residuary portion of the estate
which was given by the testator to his brother Francis, who died before the testator,
without leaving any child or descendant,
and that the share bequeathed and devised
to Francis lapsed and his share descended to
the testator's heii'S at law;
that Charles
Blancard was one of them, and therefore a
necessary party to th,e action.
Without considering the question whether the devise to
Francis H. Blancard having lapsed it passed, under the residuary clause, to the four
children named who survived him, or whether the papers produced

upon the argument

of

this appeal, showing that Charles Blancard
had sold and conveyed away all the interest
which he may have had in the property, and
therefore was not a proper and necessary
party to the action, it is sufficient to say that
the point does not arise upon the record before us, and it is a complete answer to the
objection that the admission made by the
pleadings, that the plaintiff and the defendant are the sole owners of the real estate,
dispensed
with the production of evidence
upon the trial to establish such fact and preclude the objection that Charles Blancard
had an outstanding interest as an heir at
law under the residuary clause in the will of
Francis Blancard.
No title was acquired by the deed from
Wemple,
as executor of Caroline Blancard,
deceased, of the interest of the decedent in
one of the lots of the Pavilion Hotel, to the
defendant, Mary Ann Janssen. Nor Is there
any valid reason why Mrs. Janssen should
be subrogated in this action to his rights because the real estate had been converted into
personalty. By the will of Caroline Blancard the executor was authorized and empowered, during the minority of the nephews
and nieces of the testatrix, to whom she had
given one-half of the property, to sell or
lease jointly with the ,other owners of the
undivided shares therein.
After one of the
devisees became of age the executor conveyed to Mrs. Janssen all the interest and
estate vested in him as such.
He had no
estate in the premises and only a power in
trust, which was to be executed while the
devisees were in a minority in connection
with the other owners. He had therefore
no authority to execute the conveyance to
Mrs. Janssen, and the deed was InvaUd and
conferred upon her no title. Subsequently
Mr. Wemple, as special guardian of one of
the devisees, who was an infant, by order
of the court conveyed all of her interest under the will of Caroline Blancard, including
that which had been previously attempted to
be conveyed to Mrs. Janssen, to the plaintiff,
Augustus Prentice, and by other conveyances the interest of the other devisees was
acquired by him. As the executor had no
authority to convey the premises, the right
acquired by the deed of the special guard-
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ian could not be affected by the knowledge
of tlie purchaser of the conveyance to Mrs.
Janssen.
We think that the share of Mrs. Janssen
was properly chargeable with Its proportion
of expenditures made by Augustus Prentice,
the plaintiff, for repairs and improvements
By the lease $5,000 was to
of the property.

I
j be applied for
' was supposed

1

^..^

.^ct

../,

!
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improvements and repairs. It
that they would not exceed
that amount; but the covenant to make repairs was properly construed by the referee
to mean that the lessors were to make all
repairs, whether they exceeded the sum namIt also appears from the referee's
ed or not.
findings that Mrs. Janssen after she had
knowledge
that the repairs exceeded the
sum specified, assented to the appropriation
of additional sums due for, rents, to be used
In making improvements; that she stood by
and did not object to the erection of a new
building, and she thus acquiesced in all the
expenditures actually made.
Under such circumstances there certainly was an implied
obligation that she should pay her share of
the moneys expended for the benefit of the
property in which she had a common interest, and they are a proper charge against the
defendant's portion of the real estate sought
In making the reto be partitioned
or sold.
pairs the plaintiff, Augustus Prentice, did
not occupy the position of a volunteer, without any authority of his co-tenant, but acted
under the lease, which, as we have seen,
covered the amount actually expended, and
that this was done with the assent and approval of the defendant. The case of Taylor
V. Baldwin, 10 Barb. 582, 626, which is reUed upon by the defendant's counsel, is not
adverse to the views expressed.
f There is no valid objection to charging the
defendant's share of the proceeds of the sale
Vith the amounts expended, as found by the
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referee.
These expenses were incurred In
reference to the property under special di^
render it
which, we think,
cumstances
chargeable therewith, and the judgment
properly provided for the payment of defendant's proportion out of her share of the
avails realized upon a sale. Nor is any reason shown why she should not be charged
with her share of the costs, as found by the
referee.

There was no error in the allowance of the
architect's fees. Although there is some confusion in the referee's report in regard thereto, it nevertheless
appears from the receipts
introduced in evidence that the amounts
charged in the account were actually paid to
him.
We think the court properly ordered that
the sale of the real estate and the personal
property should be made as one parcel.
The
real estate as the referee found was sd situated that a sale of one portion would interfere materially with the value of the remainder, and the personal property, being
purchased for the benefit of the hotel, was
of such a character that it could be disposed
of more advantageously by a sale with the
real estate than by a separate sale. No reason therefore exists why the sale of the
whole real and personal estate should not be
made together in a single lot. We have examined the authorities cited by the defendant's counsel upon the question last considered, and none of them sustain the position
that the court has not the power, in an
equitable action, where the parties are tenants in common of real and personal property, to direct a sale of both in one parcel
when their interest will be promoted by such
a sale.

There was no error, and the judgment
All concur.
should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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KOPPBR V. DYER.
i)YER V. KOPPER et al.
(9 Att 4, 59 Vt. 477.)
Supreme Court of Vermont

April 30,

1887.

and forever barred from all equity of redemption in said premises." Kopper did not
pay the $500 as required by the decree, but
sent his personal check under circumstances
January 2, 18^, Dyer
stated in the opinion.
obtained of the clerk of the court a certified
copy of the decree for record, and a writ of
possession thereunder, and immediately took
possession of the property, and has paid taxKopper at once brought
es thereon since.
the original bill In this cause, praying for
such relief as shall give the orator the benefit of the payment already made, as much as
he would have had if the currency had been
paid into court, as ordered by the decree;
that the decree be opened, and further order

Appeal from chancery, Addison county,
December term, 1886; Taft, Chancellor.
Bill in chancery seeking relief from a decree of foreclosure, which had become absoHeard on
lute, on the ground of accident
pleadings and master's report. Decree that
the orator is entitled to relief according to
the prayer of his bill, and that the cross-bill
of defendant. Dyer, be dismissed, with costs,
from which defendant appealed.
In August, 1880, defendant John M. Dyer, made on terms, meet to the court, to relieve
the orator from the loss that must result to
sold and conveyed to Frederick Kopper the
him should no relief be granted; and for an
premises in controversy, known as the "Lake
Dunmore Hotel Property," together with a injunction restraining the defendant from
under the writ of
large amount of personal property used in any further proceedings
therewith, for $13,500. Of said possession, and from exercising any use or
connection
The bill and inpurchase money, $10,500 was secured by control of the premises.
of said real estate and personal junction were served, and Dyer withdrew
mortgages
June 1, 1885, Kopper
property, both executed by Kopper to Dyer, 'from the premises.
$8,600 to be tendered Dyer
August 23, 1880, conditioned that Kopper pay caused the sum of
in payment of the installment Of Said decree
Mary G. Goddard, according to their tenor,
Dyer refused to
falling due on that day.
certain notes, amounting to $10,500, which
receive it, claiming that Kopper did not owe
Dyer had executed, and which were secured
him, and that the property was his. Kopby mortgage on his other real estate; that
bill in
per afterwards filed his supplemental
Kopper pay all imassessed taxes on the Lake
cause, setting up the tender, and claimthis
1880;
of
grand
list
Dunmore property on the
ing the benefit thereof, with said payment of
and that he keep the premises insured in the
$500 to the clerk as a compliance with the
premThe
Dyer's
benefit
sum of $5,000 for
terms of the foreclosure decree. Dyer filed
ises have been continually occupied by Kophis answer to said bill, September 22, 1885,
below,
he
and
stated
exception
with
the
per,
February 20,
thereto,
and an amendment
paid
The taxes were
is now In possession.
May 29, 1885, Kopper conveyed the
1886.
The conby Kopper to and including 1884.
premises, together with the personal property
Insurance has not been
dition respecting
thereon, which had been mortgaged to Dyer,
In 1884, Dyer paid insurcomplied with.
to Wyman H. Merritt and Frank B. Briggs by
For
of
amount
the
premiums
to
$75.
ance
warranty deed, which deed was given Merritt
default in payment, Mary C. Goddard foreand Briggs as security to them for the loan of
closed her mortgage against Dyer, and obthe money which was tendered to Dyer, June
Septemtained a decree of foreclosure at the
April 14, 1886, Dyer filed his cross1, 1885.
ber term, 1882, of the Franklin county court
bill against Kopper, Merritt, and Briggs, for
Dyer,
fear19,
1883,
January
of chancery.
a disclosure of the mortgaged personal proping that Kopper might not satisfy the Goderty, for surrender of the premises, and an
being
purpose
of
the
for
decree,
and
dard
accounting for their use; or. If the decree is
sure that his own property would not be
to be opened and further time given to resacrificed, procured the National Life Insurdeem, for a correction of the decree, and an
for
him
ance Company to hold in readiness
accounting and foreclosure.
to
Demurrers
the amount required to pay that decree; and
the cross-bill having been overruled, the same
from
the
same
the
on May 23, 1883, obtained
was taken as confessed against Merritt and
company, and paid it in satisfaction of that
Briggs; and Kopper filed his answer thereto
Dyer was also compelled to pay the
decree.
June 19, 1886. The other facts appear in the
company the further sum of $193.85, in conopinion.
sideration of its having held said amount in
May.
Dyer
January
also
to
Stewart & Wilds, for Dyer. Ormsbee &
readiness from
Briggs, J. M. Slade, and Noble & Smith, for
paid $32.86 costs of the Goddard foreclosure.
Kopper.
Dyer made several attempts to foreclose his
mortgage against Kopper, and finally it was
ROWELL, J. Kopper seeks relief on the
decreed "that, unless the said Frederick Kopground of accident.
per pay to the clerk of this court, for the
That chancery may
grant relief on that ground, in cases of this
benefit of the orator, the sum of $500 on or
kind, cannot be doubted; and the first quesbefore January 1, 1885, and the STun.of $8,062.09 on or before the first day of June, 1885,
tion that arises is, has the orator made a case
he, (the said Frederick Kopper,) and all perthat calls for the interposition of the court
sons claiming under him, shall be foreclosed
in his behalf?

AOCIDHNT^
The term "accident," in its legal significaJudge Story detion, is difficult to define.
fines it as embracing, "not merely inevitable
casualty, or the act of Providence, or what
Is technically called vis major, or irresistible
force, but such imforeseen events, misfortunes, losses, acts or omissions, as are not
the result of any negligence or misconduct
1 Story, BJq.
in the party" afCected thereby.

Jut.

§ 78.

Jut.

S 823.

Mr. Pomeroy justly criticises this

definition as including what are not accidents
at all, but mistakes, and as omitting the very
central element of the equitable conception,
" 'Accident' is an unand defines it thus:
event, occurring exunexpected
and
foreseen
ternal to the party afCected by It, and of
which his own agency is not tie proximate
cause, whereby, contrary to his own intention and wish, he loses some legal right, or
becomes subjected to some legal liability, and
another person acquires a corresponding legal right, which it would be a violation of
good conscience for the latter person, under
2 Pom. Bq.
to retain."
the circumstances,

And the chief point of the thing

Is that, because of the unforeseen and unexpected character of the occurrence by which
the legal relation of the parties has been
unintentionally
changed, the party injuriously affected thereby is, in good conscience, entitled to relief that will restore those relations to their original character, and place
him In his former position.
Id. § 824. But,
as a general rule, relief will not be granted
unless it can be done with justice to the other party; for, if he cannot be put in as good
a situation
as he would have been In had
the other i>arty performed, the court will not
interpose. Rose v. Rose, Amb. 331.
Equity, in many instances, relieves against
forfeitiu-es occasioned by the non-payment of
money at a day certain; and this, although
there is no accident, but negligence instead,
on the ground that the condition and the forfeiture are regarded as merely security for
the payment
of the money.
This is the
ground on which tenants are relieved from
forfeitures
for the non-payment of rent as
stipulated, and mortgagors are allowed to
redeem after the law-day has passed.
And
although the agreement
Is not wholly pecuniary, nor measured by pecuniary compensation, still, if the party bound by it has
been prevented by accident, without his fault,
from an exact fulfillment, so that a forfeiture
is thereby incurred, equity will Interpose,
and relieve him from the forfeiture, upon
his making compensation,
if necessary, or doing anything else In his power to satisfy the
equitable rights of the other party.
2 Pom.
Eq. Jur. i 833.

In Cage v. Russel, 2 Vent. 352, It is laid
down as a standing rule of equity that a forfeiture shall not bind when the thing can
be done afterwards, or any compensation can
be made for
Forfeitures are odious, and
courts struggle against them, and relief is
granted for the non-performance of diverse

it
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collateral acts whereby they af^e Incurred; as
for not laying out a specific sum in repairs
in a given time, (Sanders v. Pope, 12 Ves.
282,) for cutting down timber when covenanted against, (Northcote v. Duke, Amb.
511,) for not renewing a lease in time, (Rawstorne v. Bentley, 4 Brown Ch. *415,) and the
like. Relief is also granted against forfeitures incurred by unintentional breaches of
the condition of mortgages for support, on
terms that the party in fault fully compensate and indemnify the other party for all
Henry
he has lost by reason of the breach.
T. Tupper, 29 Vt. 358.
In Adams v. Haskell, 10 Wis. 123, the defendants were prevented by accident from
reaching the place of a foreclosure sale until
after it was completed, and the court for
that reason ordered a resale, but on terms.
In Pierson v. Clayes, 15 Vt 93, the orator,
by reason of pending negotiations of settlement, without negligence on his part, let the
time of redemption expire; and he was relieved by opening the decree, and giving further time to redeem.
The case of Bostwick v. Stiles, 35 Conn.
195, is confessedly much in point. That was
a bill to open a decree of foreclosure, and obtain further time.
The mortgage debt was
about $4,000, and the value of the premises
twice that sum.
The time limited for payment was August 5th. The petitioner intendbut, not having sufficient
ed to redeem,
means of his own, he applied to his uncle—a
man of property— to help him, and he agreed
to, and to furnish the money on August 3d,
on which the petitioner relied; but, for some
reason not explained, he did not furnish the
money as agreed, and the petitioner delayed
making other arrangements until the evening
of August 5th, when he applied to Russell for
assistance.
Russell had no money, but plenty of government bonds, and agreed to make
payment in them if defendant would take
them; and accordingly went to defendant's
house that evening, after defendant had gone
to bed, and told his wife that he had come
prepared to redeem the mortgage for the petitioner, but defendant did not get up, but
sent word by his wife that he was sick, and
Russell went away. On this state of facts,
the court held that the petitioner's failure to
pay on August 5th was occasioned by accident, without fault or neglect on his part
and that the accident lay in the fact of hia
uncle's failure to furnish the money as
agreed, and as the petitioner had reason to
believe he would. The court says that there
Is a degree of uncertainty in regard to all
business expectations,
and that no more
ought to be required in respect of future obligations imposed by law than that such means
shall be taken to fulfill them as will render
it reasonably certain, as far as human sagacity can foresee, that they will be i)erfonned.
It Is common in England to enlarge the
time of redemption on application before the
day of payment; and, though the indulgence
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Is not granted of course, It is said not to require a very strong case to obtain It. And
the time may be enlarged more than once.
Thus, in Jones v. Creswlcke, 9 Sim. 304, aftand after
er the time had been enlarged,
the order absolute had been made, though
not drawn up, the time was again enlarged,
on the ground that the man who had agreed
to lend the defendant the money was prevented by illness from going up to London on
the day it was due, and his wife, whom he
had deputed to carry it up, was prevented
from doing so because the Ivondon coach was
And see Edwards v.
full the day before.
CunlifEe, 1 Madd. 287.
And the decree may be opened after the
order absolute has been made and enrolled.
Thus, in Ford v. Wastell, 6 Hare, 229, notwithstanding the order absolute had been
drawn up and enrolled, the decree was opened because all the plaintiff's property was
involved in an administration suit that she
was justified in believing would terminate
in season to enable her to avail herself of
her property with which to meet the payment, but which had not yet terminated.
See, also, Thornhill v. Manning, 1 Sim. (N.
S.) 451, in whlfth the promptness of the
mortgagor in applying was regarded as the
great and important feature in the case to
guide the court in deciding what it ought
to do.

Applying these principles, as shown and
illustrated by the cases, it is quite out of
the question to say that the defendant is
entitled to keep this property, and that the
orator has not made a case that calls for the
interposition of the court in his behalf.
The orator gave $13,500 for the property,
and had paid $2,724 towards it, and expended about $10,000 upon it in improvements
and repairs; and on January 1, 1885, the
time limited by the decree for paying the
installment of $500, he believed the real estate fairly worth $5,000 or $6,000 more than
he gave for it. He was exceedingly anxious
to redeem the property, but had no available
means of his own, and relied for means
wherewith to pay his debts partly on Income
assured to members of his family, and partly on the equity of redemption in the property, his ability to make which available at
the value he put upon it being his only
means of escape from absolute bankruptcy.
It appears that his vrife and her sister. Miss
Jenkins, owned property in New York City,
as to which he was agent, and that before
and on December 29, 1884, he }iad been in
negotiation with one Martin of that city in
respect to leasing it to him; and It was
agreed that, on delivery of proper leases
thereof, Martin should advance to him $650
towards performance on his part, and Hopper relied on the use of that money to pay
the $500 installment. Accordingly he went
to New York on December 30th, with the
lease executed, found Martin, and made an
appointment with him for 11 o'clock the next

day; and, on going to the place at the time
appointed,
found a message postponing the
appointment to. the office of an attorney
down town at 2 that afternoon; whereupon,
being unable to commnmicate with Martin,
he went to the office down town at 2, and
found that Martin had been there, but had
gone.
He afterwards met Martin on the
street,
and, being exceedingly anxious to
obtain the money, persuaded him to go
back to the attorney's office; but, he being
out, they went to another attorney's office,
and he was out; and finally he persuaded
Martin to give him his check for $650 before the leases were approved by an attor
ney.
But this was after 3 o'clock, when
all the banks in the city were closed. Said
check was good, but, being drawn on a
bank in the upper part of the city, and it
being after banking horn's, It was impossible for Kopper to draw the money on it
that day. He had for several years kept a
deposit account with the Second National
Bank of that city, and had at this time a
small balance standing to his credit there,
and that bank was accustomed to place to his
credit the amoimt of such checks as he deposited there properly indorsed.
He had
previously carried checks to that bank after
business hours for deposit, handing them in
over the railing to be credited to him at the
opening of the bank the next day. On this
occasion he properly indorsed said check
"for deposit," and sent it to said bank by a
district messenger boy, but whether it reached the bank or not that day does not appear.
At the sarnie time he drew two checks on
said bank to the order of the person who
was then the clerk of the court in which
the decree was obtained,— one for $575,
(which he supposed to be the amount required to pay said installment, but which
was in fact more than was required;) and
one for $25, for a sum otherwise payable to
the clerk,— inclosed them in an envelope,
with a letter to the clerk, went to the Grand
Central Depot, and sent the package to Middlebury by the porter of the sleeping-car,
inclosing it in another envelope to the station-agent there, requesting him to deliver
the package to the clerk Immediately, which
he did on the morning of January 1st, which
day was a legal holiday in New York; and
the $650 check was passed to Kopper's credit
by the Second National Bank on the next
day, the first business day after it was reDyer refused to take Kopper's check
ceived.
of the clerk, and the clerk did not treat it
as payment of the installment, nor regard
it as available funds in his hands, until it
was paid, and the avails credited to him by

the collecting bank, which was on January
5th, on which day he was trusteed by some
of Kopper's other creditors, and on the 6th
this bill was brought.
On these facts, and the others disclosed
by the record, Kopper cannot justly be charged with negligence.
The means he had tak-
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en to obtain the money rendered It reasonably certain that he ■would succeed, and that
he was anxious to obtain It abundantly appears. That he did not meet Martin at 11
nor at 2 was an unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, external to himself, of which
his agency was not the proximate, nor even
the remote, cause, and thereby he was prevented ffom sending his money seasonably,
in a form that would have been treated and
regarded as payment, whereby, contrary to
his own intention and wish, he lost his legal
right to pay, and Dyer acquired a legal right
not to have him pay; and in these circumstances Kopper is entitled to relief that will
reinstate him in his former position, on terms
that he satisfy the equitable rights of the
other party.
But he cannot have relief imder his bill
as drawn, for It is not adapted to his case.
The original bill goes upon the ground that
he is entitled to have his attempted payment
of the first installment treated as an actual,
seasonable payment; while the supplemental
bill sets up a tender of the other installment, and asks that it be adjudged a payment thereof, and that the defendant be
decreed to accept and receive the same in
full satisfaction and discharge of the decree.
But his attempted payment was not payment, and he is not entitled to have it treated as such, because neither the money, nor
seasonably came into the
its equivalent,
hands of the clerk, and Dyer was not bound
to accept and receive his check as pajnnent,
though he might have safely taken the money after the time expired. If he could have
got it; for taking an installment after the
time for paying it is expired does not open
the decree as to installments for the payment
of which the time has not expired. Smalley
V. Hickok, 12 Vt. 153;
Gilson v. Whitney,
an unreported case in Windsor county a few
years ago, ut audivi.
Nor was the tender
of the second installment effective; for, not
having paid the first, he had no legal standing for tendering the second.
Redemption
is the appropriate relief in
this case. Indeed, it is said that whenever
a mortgagor is driven to the necessity of filing a bill against the mortgagee, it must be
one to redeem, and that the court can relieve
him only by allowing a redemption. Goldsmith V. Osborne, 1 Edw. Oh. 560; Cholmley
v. Coimtess of Oxford, 2 Atk. 267;
Lord
Langdale in Dalton v. Hayter, 7 Beav. 313.
But the bill lacks some of the essential elements of a bill to redeem.
It neither offers
nor avers a willingness to pay, which is necessary by all the authorities.
But, inasmuch as the orator is entitled to relief, he
should not be turned out of court, but allowed to amend his bill into a bill to reHarrigan
deem. If he shall be so advised.
V. Bacon, 57 Vt. 644.

There was no necessity for bringing the

cross-bill.
The chattel mortgage was not embraced in the original bUl, and so could not
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of a decree; and discovery of
property subject to it could not aid in defending the original bill. As to the execution of the decree by giving possession, that
K. L. §§
can be done by summary process.
766, 767;
Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns.
Oh. 609; Ludlow v. Lansing, Hopk. Oh. 231;
Valentine v. Teller, Id. 422; Yates v. Hambly, 2 Atk. 237.
As to the use of the premises pending suit,
the defendant would be entitled in respect
thereof, if at all, only on failure of the
original bill, in which event he could avail
himself of his rights by way ot claim for
injunction damages.
And, as to the alternative prayer for foreclosing any remaining
equity, that would be the result of any decree on the original biU.
Nor was there
any necessity for bringing in Briggs and
Merritt, for they purchased pendente lite,
and so will be bound by any decree made.
Besides, treating them as entitled to the
benefit of their demurrer, as they were treated at the bar, they are not proper parties to
the cross-bill;
for new parties cannot be
made in that way.
A cross-bill, by force of
the term, is a bill by a defendant against
the plaintiff or other defendants in the same
suit, or both.
If an orator desires to make
new parties, he amends his bill, and makes
them, although it be in respect of matters
that have transpired since the filing of his
bill; though until very recently, in respect
of such matters, he would have brought a
supplemental bill. If the Interest of the
defendant requires the presence of new parhe takes his objection for want of
. ties,
them, and the orator is forced to bring them
in, or have his bUl dismissed; and if, at the
hearing, the court finds new parties Indispensable, it refuses to proceed.
These remedies cover the whole subject, and a crossbill to make new parties is not only irregular and improper, but wholly unnecessary.
Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130.
But if they are not entitled to the benefit
of their demurrer because the bill has been
taken as confessed as to them, yet Kopper's
defense avails for them; for, when the defendants are jointly interested, a decree pro
coufesso as to some merely takes away their
standing in court, and disentitles them' to
appear or be heard on many questions certainly without an order of court; but the
success of the others avails for them, and
1 Hoff.
the. bill will be dismissed as to all.
Oh. Pr. 554; Clason v. Morris, 10 Johns. 524>,
Frow V. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 552.
As to the terms that will satisfy the equitable rights of Dyer. As between the two,
it belonged to Kopper to pay the Goddard
and Dyer stood as his surety in
mortgage,
respect thereof. Field v. Hamilton, 45 Vt.
35; Wells v. Tucker, 57 Vt. 223; Comstock
V. Drohan, 71 N. T. 9.
Hence Dyer is entitled to be reimbursed, not only the principal
sum that he paid to redeem said mortgage,
but his reasonable costs and expenses in that
be the subject
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behalf In good faith Incurred. Hayden v.
Cabot, 17 Mass. 168; Downer v. Baxter, 30
Vt. 467; Hulett v. SoiUlard, 26 Vt 295; Cornstock V. Drohan, 71 N. T. 9.
As to the costs of that foreclosure, It sufficiently appears that they were properly Incurred, and Dyer is Justly entitled to reimbursement. But, as to the amount paid by
him to the insurance company for holding
tn readiness
the monejf wherewith to redeem, it does not sufficiently appear that that
was such a prudent and necessary thing to
do In the circumstances as to entitle him to
The mortgage of the premreimbursement
ises in question being conditioned to keep
the property insured for Dyer's benefit,
which Kopper neglected to do, he is chargeable with the insurance premium of $75 that
Dyer was compelled to pay in 1884, and this
was included in the decree.
He is also

chargeable with the $60.30 paid by Dyer
for taxes, as shown by the nmster's report,
as well as with all the other taxes that Dyer
has since paid, or that he shall hereafter
pay, or become liable to pay, on the pi'operty,
As Kopper put his bill upon false ground,
namely, that he had performed the decree
when he had not, Dyer was Justified in defending it, and should recover his costs; and
as Dyer had a right, after the decree became
absolute, to deal with the property as his
own, he is entitled to the costs of his writ of
possession, and of the execution of it Cree
V. Lord. 25 Vt 498. In Thomhill v. Manning, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 451, the costs of an
ejectment were allowed In a similar case.
The decree dismissing the cross-bill is affirmed; but the decree for the orator in the
original bUl is reversed, And the case remanded, with mandate.
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PATTON et bL v. CAMPBBLIi.
(70 111.73.)

Bnpreme Court of Illinois.
Benfley,
«(V^aite &

Sept. Term, 1878.

& Quigg, for appellants.

Swett
Clarke, for appelleew

CRAIG, J. This was a bill In chancery,
filed in the superior court of Cook county,
by George W. Campbdl, as assignee In bankruptcy of the late firm of Durham & Wood,
against William Patton and others, to recover the value of certain goods which had
been replevied by Patton & Co. from Dur^
ham & Wood.
It appears from the record that on or about
the 20th of October, 1870, Patton & Co., of
New York, sold Duilham & Wood, of Chicago, a biU of goods, amounting to $1,600, on
a credit of four months. About the first of
November, after the sale, Durham & Wood
failed, and Patton & Co. commenced an action of replevin to recover the goods they
bad sold. A replevin bond in the penal sum
of $1,000, in the usual form, was filed with
the papers in the action, and $800 or $900
worth of the goods were replevied.
In the fire of October 8th and 9th, 1871, the
papers in the case, including the bond, were
Subsequently the action was dis
destroyed.
missed.
The defendants answered the biU, to which
replication was filed, the cause was heard on
the proofs taken, and decree rendered in

favor of complainants for $850.
bring the cause to this
The defendants
court, and seek to reverse the decree on two
grounds:

First. For the reason a cotu^ of chancery
has no jurisdiction, the remedy of complainants being complete at law.
Second. The purchase of goods from Patton & Co., by Durham & Wood, was fraudulent, and Patton & Co., upon discovery of
the fraud, had the right to rescind the sale
and replevy the property.
The questions
will be considered In the
order in which they are raised.
The bill in this case is filed to recover upon
an instrument under seal, which bad been
destroyed.
The jurisdiction of a court of equity arising from accident is a very old head,
in
equity, and probably coeval with its existence.
But It is not every case of accident
Which wUl justlftr the interposilion
of a
Court of equity.
The Jurisdiction
wUl be
taaintained only when a court of law can not
grant suitable relief; and where the party
has a conscientious
title to relief. 1 Story,
Eq. Jur., § 79.
In case, however, of lost instruments imder
seal, equity takes jurisdiction, on the ground
that, until a recent period, it was the settled
doctrine that there was no remedy on a lost
bond in a court of common law, because there
could be no profert of the instrument, withput which the declai-ation would be defect-
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The jurisdiction having been assumed
and exercised on this ground, it is stIU retained and upheld. 1 Story, Eq. Jur., § 81;
Walmsley v. ChUd, 1 Vesey, Sen., 341; Fisher
V. Sievres, 65 lU. 99.
Under the allegations In the bill In this
cause, we think it is well settled that a court
of equity had jurisdiction.
The remaining question In the case Is, were
the goods purchased under such circumstances as gave the app^lants the right of
rescission on the ground of fraud, or was
there such a fraud practised that the title
to the property did not pass to Durham &
Wood?
The evidence shows that Hart, who was a
traveling agent for appellants, called on Durham & Wood, in Chicago, to sell them goods.
They examined his samples and told him
they wanted to make a large order, and
wanted to buy on four months' time. Hart
told them, Patton & Co. hardly ever vary
from three months' time. Diu-ham remarked,
he had bought and could buy of A. T.
Stewart & Co., of New York, on four months'
timoL On this statement. Hart sold the
goods on four months' time.
It turned out, on investigation, that Durham & Wood had only bought two biUs of
goods of Stewart & Co., and they were sold
on thirty days' credit
While it Is true the statement made by
Diu-ham, that he had bought and could buy
goods of Stewart & Co. on four months'
time, was false, yet, it does not appear that
this statement induced Hart to seU the goods;
It only had the effect to cause him to
give one month longer credit on the goods
than he otherwise would, which did not, in
this case, in anywise affect the rights of appellants, for the reason that the failure occurred and the goods were replevied within
less than two months after the sale.
It appears, from the evidence, that Hart
made no objection to sell the goods on three
months' time; he neither asked nor required
any representations from Durham, as to the
standing or responsibility of the firm, to induce him to sell the goods on a credit of
three months. At the time the goods were
purchased.
It does not appear that Durham
& Wood were in failing circumstances, insolvent, or In any manner pressed by their
creditors; for aught that appears they were
at that time solvent, and responsible for all
their contracts.
Neither does it appear that they made any
false representations in regard to what they
were worth, what property they owned, or
the amount of debts they had contracted.
It is riot shown that the goods were bought
with the intent not to pay for them, or with
a view to make an assignment.
We understand the rule to be, that if a
party, knovring himself to be insolvent, or
In failing circumstances, by means of fraudulent pretenses or representations, purchases
goods with the intention not to pay for them,
ive.
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that the goods were bought with any impure
or wrong motives.
It is true that, some two months after the
purchase of the goods, the parties went Into
bankruptcy, but this was involuntary, and
does not, of itself, sihow the condition of the
firm at the time the goods were bought
Upon a careful examination of the whole
4 Scam. 97.
But the case under consideration does not record, we are satisfied the decree of the
come within this rule.
court below was correct, and it will be afThere is no evidence in this record to show firmed.

but wJth the design to cbeat the vendor out
goods, such facts would warrant the
vendor in rescinding the contract for fraud,
and would justify him in recovering possession of the property by replevin, where the
goods had not in good faith passed into the
hands of third parties. Henshaw v. Bryant,
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BREWER
(30

Court

V.

HERBERT.

Md. 301.)

of Appeals of Maryland.
1869.

March

11,

Appeal

Washington
from circuit court,
as a court of equity.
The bill in this case was filed by the appellee for an Injunction to restrain proceedings at law and for the specific performance
The appellee was the owner
of a contract
of a dwelling house and half lot of ground
situate in Hagerstown, and sold the same to
the appellant on the 9th of October, 1865, by
their agreement in writing, as follows, to wit:
"Articles of agreement made and concluded
this 9th day of October, 1865, between F.

county,

Dorsey Herbert and John A. K. Brewer, both
of Washington county and state of Maryland,
That in consideration of the sum
wltnesseth:
of four thousand dollars, to be paid as hereinafter mentioned, the said Herbert has this
day sold to the said Brewer his house and
half lot of ground, situated on the corner of
West Washington and Prospect streets, in
Hagerstown; and the said John A. K. Brewer on his part agrees to pay the said sum of
four thousand dollars, as follows: Two thousand dollars on the 1st day of April, 1866;
and one thousand dollars on the 1st day of
April, 1867; and one thousand dollars on the
1st day of April, 18^,— with Interest from the
1st day of April, 1866; and the said Herbert
doth further agree to give the said Brewer
possession of the same on the 1st day of
April, 1866, and on payment of the whole
purchase money to make a good and sufficient
deed for the same, clear of all incumbrances,
In witness whereof the
to the said Brewer.
parties hereto have set their hands and seals
on the day and year first above written.
"[Signed]
F. Dorsey Herbert. [Seal.]
"J. A. K. Brewer.
[Seal.]"
Of the ?2,000 to be paid by the agreement
on the 1st day of April, 1866, the appellant,
at the request of the appellee, paid $1,000 on
the 10th day of October, 1865. At the time
of sale the said premises were tmder lease by
Herbert to Dr. Berry, whose term expired, on
the 1st day of April, 1866. The appellee held
a policy of Insurance for $1,000 on the house
at the time of sale, which was allowed by
him to expire about the last of January, 1866.
On the 5th day of February, 1866, the house
was totally destroyed by fire, but without any
fault on the part of the appellee or his tenant,
Berry. On Monday, the 2d day of April, 1866,
the 1st being Sunday, the appellee made a
tender of the premises, then a vacant lot, to
the appellant, which he refused to receive in
The appellant havits destroyed condition.
ing refused to receive the ground, and holding
that the appellee was unable to perform his
part of the contract, by reason of the destruction of the house, brought suit on the law
side of the courts to recover from the appellee the said $1,000, so as aforesaid paid to
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him. Whereupon the appellee filed the bill
in this cause to enjoin said proceedings at
law and for a specific execution of the agreement.
The court below by its decree enjoined said proceedings
at law, and decreed a
specific execution.
From this decree the
present appeal was taken.
Before BARTOL, 0. J., and GRASON,

MILIiEiR,
Wm.
Syester,

and

ROBINSON,

T. Hamilton,
for

JJ.

for appellant

A. K.

appellee.

MILLER, J. After the execution of the
written contract for the sale of the house and
lot, and before the day fixed for delivery of
possession and. payment of the first Installment of purchase money, the house was accidentally destroyed by fire, without fault of either party or of the tenant then in possession of the same. The vendor had a fee
simple title to the property, and at the proper
time, under the contract, offered to deliver
possession of the premises In the condition in
which they then were.
This the vendee refused to receive because of the destruction of
the house by fire, and the main question in
the case is, can he on this ground successfully
resist this application in equity by the vendor
for a specific performance of the contract?
In contracts of this kind between private
parties, the vendee Is In equity the owner of
the estate from the time of the contract of
sale, and must sustain the loss If the estate
be destroyed between the agreement and the
conveyance, and will be entitled to any benefit which may accrue to it in the Interim.
This doctrine, notwithstanding the dictum In
Stent V. Bailey, 2 P. Wms. 290, to the contrary, was plainly announced and settled by
the decision of Lord Bldon, In Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, a case very similar In Its circumstances to the present, where it was held
that If there was no objection to the title of
the vendor, or it had been accepted In fact
by the vendee before the houses were burned,
no solid objection to the bill for specific performance could be founded on the mere effect
"for If
of the accident before conveyance,
the party," says the lord chancellor, "by the
contract has become In equity the owner of
the premises, they are his to all tatents and
They are vendible as his, chargepurposes.
able as his, capable of being Incumbered as
his; they may be devised as his; they may
and they would descend to his
be assets;
heir." This decision has always been regarded as fixing the true equitable rule in such
cases.
It was recognized by Sir Thomas
Plumer In Harford v. Purrler, 1 Madd. Ch.
287, and In Rawlins v. Burgis, 2 Ves. & B.
387, and by Lord Chancellor Manners in Revell V. Hussey, 2 Ball & B. 287. From these
and other authorities of equal weight announcing the maxim that equity regards as
done that which was agreed to be done is
deduced as the established doctrine In equity
that from the time the owner of an estate
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enters into a binding agreement for Its sale
he holds the same in trust for the purchaser,
and the latter becomes a trustee of the purchase money for the vendor, and being thus
in equity the owner the vendee must bear any
loss -which may happen, and is entitled to any
benefit which may accrue to the estate in the
interim between the agreement and the conveyance.
1 Sugd. Vend. 228, 388-391; 2 Pow2 Story,
eU, Cont eS; Dart, Vend. 114-118;
Eq. § 1212.
The contract here is not for a
sale at a future day; it does not use in this
Its
respect prospective or contingent terms.
lang4iage is: The vendor "has this day sold
to" the vendee his house and lot, which clearly imports a binding contract then executed
By such terms the title
and consummated.
in equity passes from the date of the contract,
and If there were nothing else In it there
w«uld be no room for argument, for It would
be Impossible to withdraw the case from the
operation of the rule above stated.
But It has been earnestly and strenuously
urged by the appellant's counsel that as the
contract contains an agreement by the vsidor ta deliver possession of the house and
lot to the vendee on the 1st of April, 1866,
the destruction of the house by fire before
that period rendered performance by the
vendor of this part of the contract impossible, and he cannot, therefore,
either in law
or equity, ask the vendee to perform his
part of it; and this circumstance, it Is mslsted, distinguishes the case from those cited, and prevents it from falling within the
principle established by them.
Let us test
the soundness of this argument. The vendee knew before and at the time of the contract there was a tenant In possession whose
term would not expire imtil the 1st of April,
and the first installment of the pm-chase money is made payable on, and Interest on the
deferred payments runs from, that day. The
subject-matter of sale Is realty,— a lot of
ground with a house upon it, described as a
house and lot.
The agreement as to delivery is not like the usual covenant by a tenant In a lease, to deliver in as good condition and repair as when the contract was
made.
There Is also no difficulty about delivery, except that the premises were not,
as to the buildings upon them. In the same
condition as at the date of the contract
The question then resolves Itself into this,
does the fact of the insertion into a contract
like the present for the sale of real estate,
of an agreement to deliver possession at a
future day, make any difference In the application of the rule? It is true it does not
appear in the cases cited there were In the
contracts any stipulations as to delivery of
possession at a future day, nor Is this circumstance
alluded to, but they explicitly
say It is the passing of the title in equity
which throws the risk of loss upon the ven- .
dee, and entitles him to accruing benefits.
To this, as we have seen, a conveyance Is
not necessary, nor is payment of the pur-

chase money or any part of it; for in Hampson V. Bdelen, 2 Har. & J. 66, this court
has decided that "a contract for land bona
fide made for a valuable consideration vests
the equitable interest in the vendee from the
time of the execution of the contract, although the money Is not paid at that time."
See, also, SIter's Appeal, 26 Pa. 180.
Neither can possession nor delivery of possesfor, if the contract had
sion be necessary,
been silent on this subject, the vendor would
have had the right to retain possession at
least until the 1st of April, when the first installment of the purchase money was payable, and if the vendee had obtained possession before he would have been restrained
in equity from exercising any acts of ownership prejudicial to the Inheritance (Crockford V. Alexander, 15 Ves. 138; Reed v.
Lukens, 44 Pa. 202); and yet the equitable
title would all the while have been in him,
subject to his dlsiwsitlon by deed or wIU,
If, then, in the aband liable for his debts.
sence of. a stipulation to deliver at a future
day, there Is an Implied right in the vendor to retain possession until that period,
and this would make no difference as to the
liability of the vendee for an intermediate
loss, how can the insertion of such a stipulation have In equity any different effect? The
whole foundation of this doctrine of equity
is that the equitable title ^nd Interest passes
by the contract of sale, and from the time
of its execution, and it contemplates delivery of possession as well as payment of purchase money, and a conveyance
at a future
period.
Hence Sir Edward Sugden and Sir
Thomas Plumer both cite, as in exact accord
with the decision of Lord Eldon, the rule of

the civil law, where the very case is put In
the Institutes: "Cum autem emptio et venditio contracta sit, periculum rei venditae
statim ad emptorem pertinet, tametsl adhue
ea res emptorl tradita non sit:- Itaque, si
cedes totae vel allqua ex parte incendlo
consumptae fuerint — emptoris danmuni est, cul
necesse est, licet rem non fuerit nactus, pretium solvere."
In sales of personal property
delivery of the goods sold Is not necessary
to pass the titie as between the parties,
where the statute of frauds has been gratified by giving something In earnest, or payment of the whole or part of the piu-chase
money, or a sufficient note or memorandum
in writing of the bargain, and in such case
the property is at the buyer's risk before delivery. Franklin v. Long, 7 Gill & J. 418.
And even where the seller remaining in actual possession agrees to deliver the property at a particular place, and it Is destroyed
by fire before such delivery, the loss will
fall on the purchaser. Terry v. Wheeler,
25 N. Y. 520.
Where sales are made under
authority of a court, the contract is not regarded as consummated until it has recelvedi
the court's sanction or ratification, and therefore any loss happening before confirmation
falls upon the vendor.
Ex parte Minor, 11.
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Ves. 559; Wagner v. Cohen, 6 Gill, 102.
But where a loss occurs after confirmation,
it
by which the contract is consummated,
falls upon the vendee, even though no purchase money has been paid, and the vendor
This was expressly
remains in possession.
decided in Robertson v. Skelton, 12 Beav.
also said: "In
260, where Lord Langdale
equity the estate belongs to the purchaser
from the date of the order to confirm the report, and the right of possession belongs to
the vendor till the purchase money, for which
it is security, has been paid." Again, If we
look to the contract itself, and gather therefrom the intent of the parties, it is clear
from the language used their intention was
that the equitable title and interest should
Upon
pass from the day of its execution.
this point its terms are too positive and exDelivery of posplicit to admit of doubt.
session and payment of purchase money were
postponed to a future day for the convenience
of each party respectively, and we cannot
construe the agreement to deliver into a condition that the contract shall be void if
there is any change in the state or value of
the property on the day of delivery, nor interpolate any such words into the instrument.
We are therefore constrained to hold
the argument founded on this delivery clause
to be unavailing to the appellant
But it is said specific execution of contracts is in all cases not a matter of absolute
right, but of sound discretion in the court,
and as the vendor cannot now deliver the
house which was the main inducement to the
vendee to buy, and constituted the chief
value of the property, it would be inequitable to enforce the contract as against him.If this objection were sound, this doctrine of
losses and benefits could never have been
But, whilst it is conceded an
established.
application for specific performance is always addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, yet where a contract respecting
real estate is in writing, and is in its nature
and circumstances unobjectionable, it is as
much a matter of course for a court of equity to decree a specific performance of it as it
is for a court of law to give damages for a
breach of it. Smoot v. Rea, 19 Md. 405; 2
Story, Eq. Jur. § 751.
"The fairness or
hardship of a contract, like all its other
qualities,
must be judged of at the time it
was entered into, not by subsequent events."
If It was then certain, mutual, fair in all its
parts, and for an adequate consideration, it la
immaterial that by force of subsequent circumstances
it has become less beneficial to
one party, unless such change is In some
way the fault of the party seeking Its specific execution.
Revell v. Hussey, 2 Ball &
B. 288; Lawder v. Blachford,
Beat 526;
Webb V. Railway Co., 9 Hare, 129; Low v.
Treadwell, 3 Fairf. 541; Fry, Spec. Perf. 93,
compels the
88.
Adherence to principle
courts to overlook the hardship of particular
cases. But the doctrine upon which this de-
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cision rests is founded In strict justice and
equity, for whilst the vendee may think it
hard to be compelled to pay for that which
he cannot have in the condition It was when
he purchased, the vendor, with equal justice, might think it hard to lose his money
after a bona fide sale of his property, because of an accident accruing to it without
fault on his part It is to be remembered
too that whilst the rule burthens the vendee
with a loss it also entitles him to all benefits.
Thus where a reversionary Interest is agreed
to be purchased, and lives drop, or one
agrees to purchase an estate in consideration of a life annuity to the vendor, and the
cestui que vie dies, or where there is a sudden rise in the value of the land from its being required for a public purpose, before conveyance, in all such cases the vendee reaps
the benefit
So in the case before us, if a
valuable mine had been discovered on the
premises the day after the contract or by
any unforeseen or unexpected circumstances
their value had been increased a hundred
fold, the benefit would have resulted to the
vendee, and the vendor could not have been
released
from his contract. We cannot,
therefore, sustain this objection to the bill.
It appears that at the. date of the contract
the vendor held a policy of insurance upon
the house, which by accident he allowed to
expire without renewal before the fire, and
of this the vendee received from him no notice.
A similar state of facts existed in
Paine v. Meller, and was held to constitute
no objection to the vendor's bill.
It is admitted there was no understanding between
the parties that the vendor should keep the
policy alive. They did not contract on any
such basis. After the contract the vendee
had an insurable interest in the house, and,
in the absence of all agreement on the subject, the presumption is he intended to protect himself by Insuring in his own name, or
to take the risk of a failure to Insure. The
vendor was not bound to keep up the insurance or give notice to the vendee of its having expired. If the policy had existed at
the time of the loss, the vendor could have
recovered from the insurance company, but,
being trustee of the premises for the vendee,
he would be bound in equity to account to
the latter for the money so received (Reed v.
Lukens, 44 Pa. 200); but his failure to renew or to give notice cannot deprive him of
his right to enforce the contract of sale.
It also appears there was at the date of
the contract a judgment against the vendor
for $2,363.38, but he had at that time entered an appeal from the judgment to the court
of appeals, and given an appeal bond with
security amply sufficient for that purpose to
pay the amount of the judgment with costs,
in case he should fail to prosecute his appeal
with efCect The authorities are clear that
equity will not compel a vendee to take an
Imperfect or defective title, yet cases of high
authority are to be found in which a pe-
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cunlaiy charge against which adequate security has been given has been held not to
constitute a defect in title, and also where
equity has enforced the agreement where a
perfect title can be made at the time of the
decree.
But this judgment thus appealed
from, with appeal bond given, does not, in
the sense in which courts of equity use the
terms, make this such an imperfect or defective or incumbered title as will prevent
specific execution, and especially not where
the decree itself, as that appealed from In
fact does, can protect the vendee by pro-

viding that the Judgment debt may be paid
by him out of the purchase money due on
the contract and in discharge thereof.
We have bestowed upon the case our best
oare and consideration. We find nothing in
the authorities cited by the appellant's counsel sufficient to overthrow the doctrine upon
which we have based our decision, and can
discover no ground upon which, in justice
and equity, the appellee can be denied the
relief he seeks.
The decree must be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
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as full and perfect security as would be
The bill praygiven by a deed of mortgage.
ed, that the defendants might be decreed to
join in a sale of the interest of their intestate
in the Nereus and Industry, or to sell the
and pay out of the prosame themselves,
To this
ceeds the debt due to the plaintiff.
amended bill, also, the defendants demurred,
and on argument, the demurrer was sustainFrom this deed, and the bill dismissed.
to this court.
appealed
cree, the plaintiff
The cause was argued at the last term.

Appeal from circuit court of Rhode Island.
The original bill, filed by the appellant.
Hunt, stated, that Lewis Rousmanler, the inof the defendants, applied to the
testate
plaintiff, in January, 1820, for the loan of
offering to give, in addition to his
$1,450,
notes, a bill of sale, or a mortgage of his interest in the brig Nereus, then at sea, as
Mr. Hunter,
Mr. Wheaton, for appellant
collateral security for the repayment of the for respondents.
money.
The sum requested was lent; and
MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion
on the 11th of January the said Rousmanier
executed two notes for the amount; and on
of the court. The counsel for the appellant
objects to the decree of the circuit court on
the 15th of the same month, he executed a
pover of attorney, authorizing the plaintiff
He contends, 1. That this
two grounds.
power of attorney does, by its own operato make and execute a bill of sale of threefourths of the said vessel to himself, or to tion, entitle the plaintiff, for the satisfaction
any other person; and in the event of the
of his debt, to the interest of Rousmanier in
said vessel, or her freight, being lost, to col2. Or, if this
the Nereus and the Industry.
lect the money which should become due on
be not so, that a court of chancery will, the
conveyance being defective, lend its aid to
a policy by which the vessel and freight
This instrument contained carry the contract into execution, according
were insured.
also, a proviso, reciting, that the power was
to the intention of the parties.
given for collateral security for the payment
1. We will consider the effect of the power
of the notes already mentioned, and was to of attorney.
This instrument contains no
be void on their payment; on the failure to
words of conveyance or of assignment, but
As
do which, the plaintiff was to pay the amount
is a simple power to sell and convey.
thereof, and all expenses, out of the proceeds
the power of one man to act for another,
of the said property, and to return the resi- depends on the wiU and license of that other,
The bill furdue to the said Rousmanier.
the power ceases, when the will, or this perThe general rule,
mission, is withdrawn.
ther stated, that on the 21st of March, 1820,
the plaintiff lent to the said Rousmanier the
therefore. Is, that a letter of attorney may,
additional sum of $700, taJiing his note for at any time, be revoked by the party who
makes it; and is revoked by his death. But
payment, and a similar power to dispose of
his interest in the schooner Industry, then
this general rule, which results from the naThe bill then charged, that on
also at sea.
ture of the act, has sustained some modification. Where a letter of attorney forms a
the 6th of May, 1820, the said Rousmanier
part of a contract, and is a security for
died insolvent, having paid only $200 on the
The plaintiff gave notice of his
money, or for the performance of any act
said notes.
claim; and on the return of the Nereus and
which is deemed valuable, it is generally
Industry, tools possession of them, and offer- made irrevocable, in terms, or if not so, is
2 Esp. 565. Aldeemed irrevocable In law.
ed the intestate's interest in them, for sale.
though a letter of attorney depends, from its
The defendants forbade the sale; and this
nature, on the will of the person making it,
bill was brought to compel them to join in it.
The defendants demurred generally, and the and may, m general, be recalled at his will;
court sustained the demurrer; but gave the yet, if he binds himself, for a consideration.
Hunt v. In terms, or by the nature of his contract,
plaintiff leave to amend his bUL
Ennis, 2 Mason, 244, Fed. Cas, No. 6,889.
not to change his will, the law will not perThe amended bUl stated, that it was exmit him to change it Rousmanier, therepressly agreed between the parties, that
fore, could not, during his life, by any act
Rousmanier was to give specific security on of his own, have revoked this letter of attorney. But does it retain its efficacy after
the Nereus and Industry; and that he offerThat his death? We think, it does not. We think
ed to execute
a mortgage on them.
counsel was consulted on the subject, who
it well settled, that a power of attorney,
though irrevocable during the life of the paradvised, that a power of attorney, such as
I
1
was actually executed, should be taken in fty, becomes extinct by his death.
/
preference to a mortgage, because it was
This principle is asserted in Littleton (secequally valid and effectual as a security,
tion 66), by Lord Coke, in his commentary
and would prevent the necessity of changing
on that section (52b), and in Willes' Rethe papers of the vessels, or of taking posports (105, note, and 565). The legal reason
session of them on their arrival in port. The
of the rule is a plain one. It seems founded
powers were, accordingly, executed,
with on the presumption, that the substitute acta
the full belief that they would, and with the
by virtue of the authority of his principal,
existing at the time the act Is performed;
Intention that they should, give the plaintiff
12
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)—
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and on the manner in which he must execute
his authority, as stated in Combes' Case, 9
Coke, 766.
In that case, it was resolved, that
"when any has authority, as attorney, to do
any act, he ought to do it in his name who
The reason of this
gave the authority."
The title can, regularresolution is obvious.
ly, pass out of the person in whom it is
vested, only by a conveyance In his own
name; and this cannot be executed by another for him, when it could not. In law, be
A conveyance in the
executed by himself.
name of a person, who was dead at the time,
y would be a manifest absurdity.
'
This general doctrine, that a power must
be executed in the name of a person who
gives it, a doctrine founded on the nature'
of the transaction, is most usually engrafted in the power Itself. Its usual language Is,
that the substitute shall do that which he is
empowered
to do. In the name of his principal. He is put in the place and stead of
his principal, and is to act In his name.
This accustomed
form is observed in the
instrument under consideration. Hunt is constituted the attorney, and is authorized to
make, and execute, a regular bill of sale,
Now, as an
in the name of Bousmanier.
authority must be pursued, in order to make
the act of the substitute the act of the principal, it is necessary, that this bUl of sale
should be In the name of Rousmanier; and
it would be a gross absurdity, that a deed
should purport to be executed by him, even
by attorney, after his death; for, the attorney is in ttie place of the principal, capable
of doing that alone which the principal might
do.
This general rule, that a power ceases with
the life of the person giving it, admits of
If a power be coupled with
one exception.

(

an "Interest," It survives the person giving
it, and may be executed after his death. As
this proposition is laid down too positively
in the books to be controverted, it becomes
necessary to inquire, what is meant by the
expression, "a power coupled with an Interest?" Is It an interest in the subject on which
the power is to be exercised? or is it an interest in that which Is produced by the exercise of the power? We hold it to be clear,
that the interest which can protect a power,
after the death of a person who creates it,
must be an interest in the thing Itself. In
other words, the power must be engrafted on
an estate in the thing. The words themselves would seem to import this meaning.
"A power coupled with an Interest," Is a
power which accompanies,
or is connected
with, an interest The power and the interest are united in the same person.
But if we
are to understand by the word "interest,"
an interest in that which is to be produced
by the exercise of the power, then they are
never united. The power, to produce the
Interest, must be exercised, and by its exercise, is extinguished.
The power ceases,
when the Interest commences, and therefore,

cannot, In accurate law language, be said
to be "coupled" with It.
But the substantial basis of the opinion of
the court on this point, is found in the legal
reason of the principle. The interest or title
in the thing being vested in the person who
gives the power, remains in him, unless it
be conveyed with the power, and can pass
out of him only by regular act In his own
name.
The act of the substitute, therefore,
which, in such a case, is the act of the
principal, to be legally effectual, must be In
his name, must be such an act as the principal himself would be capable of performing,
and which would be valid, if performed by
him.
Such a power necessarily ceases with
the life of the person maldng it But if the
interest, or estate, passes with the power,
and vests In the person by whom the power
Is to be exercised, such person acts in his
own name. The estate, being in him, passes
from him, by a conveyance in his own name.
He is no longer a substitute, acting in the
place and name of another, but is a principal, acting in his own name, in pursuance
The legal
of powers which limit his estate.
reason which limits a power to the life of the
person giving it, exists no longer, and the
rule ceases with the reason on which it is
founded. The intention of the instrument
may be effected, without violating any legal
principle.
This idea may be In some degree Illustrated
by examples of cases In which the law is
clear, and which are incompatible with any
other exposition of the term "power coupled
with an Interest"
If the word "Interest,"
thus used, indicated a title to the proceeds
of the sale, and not a title to the thing to he
sold, then a power to A., to sell for his own
benefit would be a power coupled with an
Interest; but a power to A., to sell for the
benefit of B., would be a naked power, which
could be executed only in the life of the person who gave it.
Yet, for this distinction,
no legal reason can be assigned. Nor is
for, a
there any reason for it in justice;
power to A., to sell for the benefit of B., may
be as much a part of the contract on which
B. advances his money, as if the power had
been made to himself. If this were the true
exposition of the term, then a power to A.,
to sell for the use of B., inserted in a conveyance to A., of the thing to be sold, would
not be a power coupled with an Interest,
and, consequently, could not be exercised,
after the death of the person making it;
while a power to A., to sell and pay a debt
to himself, though not accompanied with any
conveyance which might vest the title in
him, would enable him to make the conveyance, and to pass a title, not in him, even
after the vivifying principle of the power
had become extinct.
But every day's experience teaches us, that the law is not, as
the first case put would suppose.
We know,
that a power to A., to sell for the benefit
of B., engrafted on an estate conveyed to
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A., may be exercised at any time, and Is
not affected by the death of the person who
created it It is, then, a power coupled with
an interest, although the person to whom It
Is given had no interest in its exercise. His
power is coupled with an interest in the
thing, which enables him to execute it in
his own name, and is, therefore, not dependent on the life of the person who created it
The general rule, that a power of attorney,
though irrevocable by the party, during his
life, is extinguished by his death, Is not affected by the circumstance, that testamentary powers are executed after the death of
the testator.
The law. In allowing a testamentary disposition of property, not only
permits a will to be considered as a conveyance, but gives it an operation which Is
not allowed to deeds which have their effect
during the life of the person who executes
An estate given by will may take efthem.
fect at a future time, or on a future contingency, and in the meantime descends to the
heir. The power Is, necessarily, to be executed after the death of the person who
makes it, and cannot exist during his life.
It is the intention, that it shall be executed
after his death.
The conveyance made by
the person to whom It is given, takes effect
by virtue of the will, and the purchaser holds
his title under It Every case of a power
given in a will, is considered In a court of
chancery as a trust for the benefit of the
person for whose use the power Is made,
and as a devise or bequest to that person. .•
It is, then, deemed perfectly clear, that thi
power given m this case, is a naked power!
not coupled with an interest which, though
Irrevocable by Rousmanler himself, expired
on his death.
It remains to inquire, whether
the appellant is entitled to the aid of this
court, to give effect to the intention of the
parties, to subject the interest of Rousmanler
in the Nereus and Industry to the payment
of the money advanced by the plaintiff, on
the credit of those vessels, the Instrument
taken for that purpose having totally failed
to effect its object
This is the point on which the plaintiff most
relies, and is that on which the court has
felt most doubt
That the parties intended,
the one to give, and the other to receive, an
effective security on the two vessels mentioned in the biU, is admitted; and the question is, whether the law of this court ■vvUl
enable It to carry this intent into execution,
when the instrument relied on by both parties has failed to accomplish Its object The
respondents
insist, that there is no defect
in the instrument Itself; that It contains
precisely what it was intended to contain,
and is the instrument which was chosen by
the parties, deliberately, on the advice of
counsel, and intended to be the consummation of their agreement That in sucn a case
the written agreement
cannot be varied by
parol testimony. The counsel for the appellant contends, with great force, that the cases

179

in which parol testimony has been rejected,
are cases in which the agreement Itself has
been committed to writing; and one of the
parties has sought to contradict, explain or
vary it by parol evidence. That in this case,
the agreement is not reduced to writing. The
power of attorney does not profess to be the
agreement but is a collateral Instrument, to
enable the party to have the benefit of It,
leaving the agreement still In full force, In its
original form. That this parol agreement, not
being within the statute of frauds, would be
enforced by this court, if the power of attorney
had not been executed; and not being merged
In the power, ought now to be executed. That
the power being Incompetent to its object, the
court will enforce the agreement against general creditors. This argument is entitled to,
and has received, very deliberate consideration.

The first Inquiry respects the fact Does
this power of attorney purport to be the
agreement?
Is it an instrument collateral to
the agreement?
Or Is It an execution of the
agreement itself. In the form Intended by
both the parties? The bfil states an offer on
the part of Rousmanler to give a mortgage
on the vessels, either In the usual form, or
in the form of an absolute bUl of sale, the
vendor taking a defeasance;
but does not
state any agreement for that particular security. The agreement stated in the bill Is,
generally, that the plaintiff, in addition to
the notes of Rousmanler, should have specific
security on the vessel; and It alleges that the
parties applied to counsel for advice respecting the most desirable mode of taking
this security. On a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of a mortgage,
and an irrevocable power of attorney, counsel
advised the latter instrument, and assigned
reasons for his advice, the validity of which
being admitted by the parties, the power of
attorney was prepared and executed, and
was received by the plaintiff as full security
for his loans.
This is the case made by the
amended bUl; and it appears to the court, to
be a case In which the notes and power of
attorney are admitted to be a complete consummation of the agreement. The thing
stipulated was a collateral security, on the
Nereus and Industry.
On advice of counsel,
this power of attorney was selected, and given as that secxirity.
We think It a complete
execution of that part of the agreement; as
complete, though not as safe an execution
of It, as a mortgage would have been.
It is contended, that the letter of attorney
does not contain all the terms of the agreement
Neither would a bill of sale, nor a
deed of mortgage, contain them.
Neither Instrument constitutes the agreement Itself,
but is that for which the agi-eement stipulated.
The agreement consisted of a loan of
money on the part of Hunt and of notes for
its repayment, and of a collateral security
on the Nereus and Industry, on the part of
Rousmanler.
The money was advanced, the
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notes were given, and this letter of attorn^
was, on advice of counsel, executed and received as the collateral security which Hunt
required.
The letter of attorney Is as much
an execution of that part of the agreement
which stipulated a collateral security, as the
notes are an execution of that part which
stipulated that notes should be given.
But this power, although a complete security, during the life of Rousmanier, has been
The lerendered inoperative by his death.

gal character of the security was misunderThey did not suppose,
that the power would, in law, expire with
Bousmanier. The question for the considIf money be
eration of the court is this:
advanced on a general stipulation to give securily for its repayment on a specific article;
on advice of
and the parties deUberately,
counsel, agree on a particular instrument,
which is executed, but, from a legal quality
inherent in its nature, that was unknown to
the parties, becomes extinct by the death of
one of them; can a court of equity direct a
new security of a different character to be
given? or direct that to be done which the
parties supposed would have been effected
by the instrument agreed on between them?
This question has been very elaborately
argued, and every case has been cited which
could be supposed to bear upon it No one
of these cases decides the very question now
before the court It must depend on the
principles to be collected from them.
It is a general rule, that an agreement in
writing, or an instrument carrying an agreement into execution, shall not be varied by
parol testimony, stating conversations or ciranterior to the written instrucumstances
This rule is recognized in courts of
ment.
equity as well as in courts of law; but
courts of equity grant relief in cases of
fraud and mistake, which cannot be obtained
in courts of law. In such cases, a court of
equity may carry the intention of the parties
into execution, where the written agreement
In this case,
fails to express that intention.
Mistake is
there is no ingredient of fraud.
the sole ground on which the plaintiff comes
into court; and that mistake is in the law.
The fact is, in aU respects, what it was supposed to be.
The instrument taken, is the
instrument intended to be taken.
But it is,
conti-ai-y to the expectation of the parties, extinguished by an event not foreseen nor adverted to, and is, therefore, incapable of effecting the object for which it was given.
Does a court of equity, in such a case, substitute a different instrument for that which
has failed to effect its object?
In general, the mistakes against which a
court of equity relieves, are mistakes in fact
The decisions on this subject, though not always very distinctly stated, appear to be
founded on some misconception of fact. Yet
some of them bear a considerable analogy to
that under consideration.
Among these, is
stood by the parties.

that class of cases In which a Joint obligation has been set up in equitj- against the
representatives of a deceased obligor, who
were discharged at law. If the principle of
these decisions be, that the bond was joint,
from a mere mistake of the law, and that
the court will relieve against this mistake, on
the ground of the pre-existing equity, arising
from the advance of the money, it must be
admitted, that they have a strong bearing
on the case at bar. But the judges in the
courts of equity seem to have placed them
on mistake in fact, arising from the IgIn Simpson v.
norance of the draftsman.
Vaughan, 2 Atk. 33, the bond was drawn by
the obligor himself, and under circumstances
which induced the court to be of opinion,
that it was intended to be joint and several.
In Underbill v. Horwood, 10 Ves. 209, 22T,
Lord Bldon, speaking of cases in which a
joint bond has been set up against the representatives of a deceased obligor, says, "the
court has inferred, from the nature of the
condition, and the transaction, that it was
That Is, the instrumade joint, by mistake.
ment is not what the parties intended in
fact They Intended a joint and several obligation; the scrivener has, by mistake, prepared a joint obligation."
All the cases in which the court has sustained a joint bond against the representatives of the deceased obligor, have turned upon a supposed mistake in drawing the bond.
It was not until the case of Sumner v. Powell, 2 Mer. 36, that anything was said by
the judge who determined the cause, from
which it might be inferred, that reUef in
these cases would be afforded on any other
principle than mistaJ^e in fact In that case,
the court refused its aid, because there was
no equity antecedent to the obligation.
In
delivering his judgment, the master of the
roUs (Sir W. Grant) indicated very clearly
'an opinion, that a prior equitable consideration, received by the deceased, was indispensable to the setting up of a joint obligation against his representatives; and added,
"so, where a joint bond has, ia equity, been
considered as several, there has been a credit
previously given to the different persons who
have entered into the obligation."
Had this
case gone so far as to decide, that "the credit
previously given" was the sole ground on
which a com-t of equity would consider a
joint bond as several, it would have gone far
to show, that the equitable obligation remained, and might be enforced, after the
legal obligation of the instrument had expired. But the case does not go so far;
it does not change the principle on which the
court had uniformly proceeded, nor discard
the idea, that relief is to be granted, because
the obligation was made joint, by a mistake
in point of fact. The case only decides, that
this mistake, in point of fact, will not be
presumed by the court, in a case where nc
equity existed antecedent to the obligation,

MISTAKE OF LAW.
where no advantage was received by, and
no credit given to, the person against whose
Yet,
estate the instrument is to be set up.
the course of the court seems to be uniform,
to presume a mistake, in point of fact, in every case where a joint obligation has been
given, and a benefit has been received by the
No proof of actual misdeceased obligor.
take is required; the existence of an anteIn cases attendcedent equity is suflcient.
ed by precisely the same circumstances, so
far as respects mistake, relief will be given
against the representatives of a deceased
obligor, who had received the benefit of the
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true, they excluded the clause, from a mistaken opinion that it would make the contract usurious, but they did not believe that
the legal effect of the contract was precisely
the same as if the clause had been inserted.
They weighed the consequences of inserting
and omitting the clause, and preferred the
latter. That, too, was a case to which the
statute applied. Most of the cases which
have been cited were within the statute of
frauds, and it is not easy to say, how much
lias been the influence of that statute on
them.

The case cited by the respondent's counsel
from Precedents in Chancery, is not of this
obligation, and refused aguinst the repredescription; but it does not appear from that
sentatives of him who had not received it.
case that the power of attorney was intendYet the legal obligation is as completely exed, or believed, to be a lien. In this case,
tinguished in the one case as in the other;
the fact of mistake is placed beyond any
and the facts stated, in some of the cases in
controversy. It is averred in the bill, and
which these decisions have been made,
admitted by the demurrer, that "the powers
would rather conduce to the opinion, that the
of attorney were given by the said Rousbond was made joint, from ignorance of thi
manier, and received by the said Hunt, unlegal consequences of a joint obligation,
der the belief that tjjey were, and with the
fi'om any mistake in fact
Intention that they should create, a specifio^
The case of Lansdown v. Lansdown, Mos.
lien and security on the said vessels."
We
364, if it be law, has no inconsiderable bearing on this cause.
The right of the heir- ^.find no case which we think precisely in
point; and are unwilling, where the effect of
at-law was contested by a younger member
the instrument is acknowledged to have been
of the family, and the arbitrator to whom
entirely misunderstood by both parties, to
the subject was referred decided
against
say, that a court of equity is incapable of
him. He executed a deed in compliance with
affording relief. The decree of the circuit
this award, and was afterwards
relieved
against it, on the principle that he was igno- couii: is reversed; but as this is a case in
which creditors are concerned, the court, Inrant of his title. The case does not supstead of giving a final decree on the demurpose this fact, that he was the eldest son,
rer, in favor of the plaintiff, directs the cause
to have been unknown to him; and if he was
to be remanded, that the circuit court may
Ignorant of anything, it was of the law,
permit the defendants to withdraw their dewhich gave him, as eldest son, the estate he
murrer, and to answer the bill.
had conveyed to a younger brother. Yet he
was relieved in chancery against this conveyance.
Decree: This cause came on to be heard,
There are certainly strong objecon the transcript of the record of the cirtions to this decision In other respects; but,
cuit court of the United States for the disas a case in which relief has been granted
trict of Rhode Island, and was argued by
on a mistake in law, it cannot be entirely
disregarded.
counsel: on consideration whereof, this court
Although we do not find the naked prinis of opinion, that the said circuit court erred,
in sustaining the demurrer of the defendciple, that relief may be granted on account
ants, and dismissing the bill of the complainof ignorance of law, asserted in the books,
ant It is, therefore, decreed and ordered,
we find uo case ih which it has been decided,
that a plain and acknowledged mistake in
that the decree of the said circuit court in
law Is beyond the reach of equity. In the
this case be, and the same is hereby, recase of I/ord Imham v. Child, 1 Brown, Oh.
versed and annulled. And it Is further or91, application was made to the chancellor
dered, that the said cause be remanded to
to establish a clause, which had been, it was
the said circuit court with directions to persaid, agreed upon, but which had been conmit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer, and to answer the bill of the comsidered by the parties, and excluded from
the written Instrument, by consent
It is plainants.
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it was alleged, executed, with a full
belief that they would, and with intention
that they should, give to the plaintiff, as full
Suprene Court of the United States. January
and perfect a security, as would be given
Term, 1828.
by a mortgage.
(See ante, 170.)
The defendants having also demurred to
Appeal from the circuit court of Rhode Isthe amended bill, the circuit court decided
in favor of the demurrer, and dismissed the
land. The appellant filed a bill on the chanbill; and an appeal was entered to this
cery side of the circuit court of the United
court. At the February session, 1823, this
States for the district of Rhode Island, set1820,
Louis
ting forth that, in January,
court considered that the appellant might be
entitled to the relief prayed for in equity,
Rousmaniere obtained from him two loans
but the respondents were permitted to withof money, amounting, together, to $2,150;
draw their demurrer, and to file an answer
and at the time the first loan was made,
in the court below. 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Bd.
Rousmaniere offered to give, in addition to
589.
The answer of the defendants admithis notes, a bill of sale, or mortgage, of his
ted the loans of money, and the delivery of
interest in the brig Nereus, then at sea, as
a collateral security for the repayment of
the promissory notes, and that but $200 were
A few days after the delivery of paid, before the death of the Intestate. <rhe
the money.
the first note, dated 11th of January, 1820,
execution of the powers of attorney was also
admitted, but it was denied that possession
he executed a power of attorney, authorizing the plaintiff to mal^e and execute«a bill
of the vessels was taken by the appellant;
of sale, of three-fourths of the Nereus, to
and they alleged their resistance of the athimself, or to any other person; and in the tempt to take possession of them.
The anevent of the loss of the vessel, to collect the
swer also asserted ignorance of any agreemoney which should become due on a polment for a specific lien on the vessels, exicy, by which the vessel and freight were
cept that imported by the language of the
powers of attorney; that they had heard
insured. In the power of attorney, it was
recited that It was given as collateral secuand believed, that the appellant meant to
rity for the payment of the notes, and was
as a partner, in a voyage of
be concerned,
to be void on their payment; on the failone of the vessels, which was relinquished,
ure of which, the plaintiff was to pay the and that afterwards he offered to loan the
amount and all expenses, and to return the money on security; upon which, the intesresidue to Rousmaniere. On the 21st of tate offered to give a mortgage, but the apMarch, 1821, an additional sum of $700 was
pellant preferred taking the powers of atloaned, for which a note was taken, and
torney, to avoid inconvenience, and took the
similar power of attorney given, to sell his
powers of attorney, by advice of counsel.
interest in the schooner Industry; this vesThe answer also stated, that a bill of sale
sel being also still at sea.
of the vessels, dated the day before the
On the 6th of May, 1820, Rousmaniere
death of the intestate, by which the vessels
died intestate and insolvent, having paid
were intended to be conveyed to one Bateman, and which the respondents stated, they
$200 on account of the notes; and the plaintiff gave notice of his claim' to the commis- had heard and believed; was Intended to be
sioners of insolvency, appointed under the
executed on the evening of that day.
The
authority of the insolvent law of Rhode Isanswer also alleged the insolvency of Rousmaniere, and that It existed a long time beland. The plaintiff, in his bill, alleged, that,
on the return of the Nereus and Industry,
fore his death; which they asserted must
he tools possession of them, and offered the
have been known to the appellant, and that
interest of the intestate in them, for sale; the Intestate resorted to Improper modes to
and the defendants having forbidden the
feeep up his credit
sale, this bill was brought to compel them
The evidence taken in the case, consisted
j
,' of the deposition of Mr. Hazard, the counsel
to join in it.
To this bill, the defendants demurred; and; who drew the papers, and In which he stattheir demurrer was sustained in the circuit j ed, that they were intended by both parties
court; but leave was given to the plaintiff^
to have the effect of a specific lien or mortto amend.
An amended bill was then filed, \ gage, and he advised them, they would have
'
in which it was stated, that it was expressthat effect; and also the deposition of Mr.
ly. agreed between the parties, that Rous- . Merchant, to show that the appellant admitmaniere was to give specific security on the ^:ed, that the motive by which he was inNereus and Industry, and that he offered to
duced to make the loan, was to compensate
execute a mortgage on them.
Counsel was
Rousmaniere for the disappointment susconsulted on the subject, who advised that
tained by his not uniting with him in a voythe power of attorney, which was actually
age of one of his vessels; and, accordingly,
executed, should be taken in preference to
an agreement was made, by which the apa mortgage, because It was equally valid
pellant was to let Rousmaniere have a sum
and effectual as a security, and would pre- of money, and that he was to give a bill of
vent the necessity of changing the papers of
sale of a certain vessel; but that afterwards
the vessels, or of taking possession of them
he refused to take the same, on account of
on their return to port. These securities
the inconvenience and difficulties
which
HUNT
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might attend the same; and that he had
consulted with Mr. Hazard, upon the subject, who told him, that he could or would
draw an irrevocable power of attorney to
sell, which would do as well, or words to that
effect; and which wns accordingly done.
The circuit court pronounce a decree, declaring, that the appellant hkd no specific
lien or security upon either of the vessels,
and no equity to be relieved respecting
them, and dismissing the bill, with costs;
from which decree, an appeal was entered to
this court.
On the part of the appellant, it was contended, that the decree ought to be reversed,
and a decree entered for the appellant. That
the answers to the bill did not respond to
it bethe only material facts in the cause;
ing fully proved, that the powers of attorney were intended to have the effect of a
specific lien, the appellant was entitled to
the relief he sought, upon the principles laid
down in the former decisions of this court.
Mr.
Kimball & Webster, for appellant
Wirt, Atty. Gen., and Mr. Robbing, for appellees.

WASHINGTON, J. This case was before
this court in the year 1823, and is reported
in 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589, and was then
argued at great length, by the counsel concerned in it. After full consideration. It was
decided, that the power of attorney given by
Rousmaniere, the intestate, to the appellant.
Hunt, authorizing him to mal^e and execute
a bill of sale of three-fourths of the Nereus
and of the Industry, to himself, or any other
person, and in the event of their being lost,
to collect the money which should become
due under a policy upon them and their
freight, was a naked power, not coupled
with an interest, which, though irrevocable
by Rousmaniere, in his lifetime, expired on
bis death.
That this species of security was agreed
upon, and given under a misunderstanding
by the parties, of its legal character, was
conceded in the argument of the cause by
the bar and bench; and the second question
for the consideration of the court, was,
whether a court of equity could afford relief in such a case, by directing a new security of a different character to be given?
or by decreeing ihat to be done, which the
parties supposed would have been effected
by the instrument agreed upon? After an
examination of the cases, applicable to the
general question, it was stated by the chief
justice, who delivered the opinion of the
court, that none of them asserted the naied
principle, that relief could be granted, on the
ground of ignorance of law, or decided, that ,
a, plain and aclmowledged mistalie in law,'
was beyond the reach of a court of equity.
The conclusion, to which he came, is expressed in the following terms:
"We find no
case which we think precisely In point; and
are unwilling, where the effect of the instru-
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ment is acknowledged to have been entirelj
misunderstood, by both parties, to say, that
a court of equity is incapable of affording
relief."
The decree was, accordingly, rer versed; but the case being one in which l
creditors were concerned, the court, instead
giving a final decree on the demurrer.
\^ot
In favor of the plaintiff, directed the cause
to be remanded, that the circuit court might
permit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer, and to answer the biU.
After the cause was returned to that court,
the demurrer was withdrawn, and an answer was filed. In which the defendants,
after admitting the loans mentioned in the
bills, by the plaintiff to their intestate, and
the notes given for the same, by the latter,
and their non-payment; assert their ignorance of any agreement between the plaintiff
and their intestate, that the former should
have a specific security, other than the powers of attorney, to sell vessels and to collect
the proceeds, or, the amount of the policies,
in case they should be lost; but express their
belief, that the powers of attorney were selected by the plaintiff, in preference to the
other securities, which were offered by the
intestate. The answer further states, that
the estate of Rousmaniere Is greatly Insolvent, and had been so before his death; that
the plaintiff had exhibited and proved his
demand, as stated in his bill, before the
commissioners of insolvency, duly appointed
upon the estate of Rousmaniere; and that
his dividend thereon declared, or to pe declared, the defendants were, and would be
ready to pay according to law.
The principal deposition, taken in the
cause, is that of Benjamin Hazard, counsellor at law, who deposes, that he drew the
powers of attorney, annexed to the original
bill; that on the day the first power was
Hunt and Rousmaniere came to
executed.
his office, when the latter stated, that the
former had loaned, or agreed to loan, to him,
a sum of money, upon security to be given
by him, on his interest in the brig Nereus,
and that he was desirous the security should
be as ample and available to Hunt, as It
could be made; that he wished and was
ready, to give a bill of sale of the property,
or a mortgage on it, or any other security,
which Mr. Hunt might prefer. Both the
parties declared, that they had called upon
the witness, to request him to draw th«
writings, and to obtain his opinion, as tn
the kind of instrument which would give tbn
most perfect security to the lender. Th8il
the deponent then told the parties, that u
bill of sale, or mortgage, would be goofl
security, but that an Irrevocable power of
attorney, such as was afterwards executed,
would be as effectual and good security, as
either of the others; and would prevent the
necessity of changing the vessel's papers,
and of Hunt's taking possession of the vessel, upon her arrival from sea.
That the
parties then requested him to draw such
an instrument, as, in his opinion, would
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merly had to consider; except in relation to
most effectually and fully secure Mr. Hunt;
the rights of the general creditors, against
and that the plaintiff frequently asked him,
the insolvent estate of a deceased debtor, in
whilst he was drawing the power, and after
opposition to the equity which a particular
he had finished, and read it to the parties,
if he was quite certain, that the power creditor seeks, by this bill, to set up. The
allegations of the bills, filed in this cause,
would be as safe and available to him, as a
bill of sale or mortgage, and that upon his which were, on the former occasion admitted by the demurrer to be'true, are now fully
assurances that It was, it was then executed.
proved, by the testimony taken in the cause.
The witness then proceeds to express his
Before proceeding to ■state the general
opinion, from his knowledge of the parties,
time,
that
question,
to which the facts in this case give
at
the
declaration
from
their
and
rise, or the principles of equity which apply
Rousmaniere would readily have given an
to it, it will be necessary, distinctly, to asabsolute bill of sale of the property or any
certain, what was the real agreement conother security which could have been asked;
cluded upon between the plaintiff and the
and that Hunt would not have accepted the
Intestate, the performance of which, on the
one which was afterwards executed, if he
part of the latter, was Intended to be secured
had not considered it to be as extensive and
perfect a security, in all respects, as an ab- by the powers of attorney?
Was It, that
Rousmaniere should, in addition to his notes
solute bill of sale; and he adds, more posifor the money agreed to be loaned to him by
tively, that such was the understanding and
give a specific and available
t-he plaintiff,
It appears,
agreement of both the parties.
by the testimony of this witness, that he security on the Nereu's and the Industry, or
was the particular kind of security selected
drew the power of attorney concerning the
by the parties, and did It constitute a part
Industry, for securlrg the second loan made
by the plaintiff to Rousmaniere, and that the
of the agreement? It is most obvious, from
the plaintiff's own statement, in his amended
circumstances attending that transaction,
bill, as well as from the depositions appearwere essentially the same as those which
ing in the record, that the agreement was
have been stated, in respect to the first loan.
We find another deposition in the record,
not closed, until the Interview between the
parties to it, with Mr. Hazard, had talien
which deserves to be noticed, as it consists
place.
of declarations, made by the plaintiff, after
The amended bill states, that the spethe powers of attorney were executed, and
cific security which Rousmaniere offered to
may serve, in some measure, to explain the ^give, was a mortgage of the two vessels, for
more positive testimony given by Mr. Haz- ■-which irrevocable powers of attorney were
ard.
This witness, William Merchant, de- substituted, by the advice of Mr.. Hazard,
poses, that after the decease of Rousmanand for reasons, which it would seem, were
iere, the plaintiff stated to him, and to a Mr.
approved of and acted upon by the plainRhodes, that in consequence of his declining
tiff. From the testimony of Mr. Merchant,
to engage in an enterprise in one of the vesIt would appear, that the security proposed
by Rousmaniere was a bill of sale of the
sels of Rousmaniere, to which he had at one
vessels, which the plaintiff declined accepttime consented, and of the complaints of
Rousmaniere, on that account, he was ining, for reasons of his own, uninfluenced by
any suggestions of Mr. Hazard, who merely
duced to offer to Rousmaniere a loan of
money.
That an agreement was accordingly
proposed the powers of attorney as a submade, by which he. Hunt, was to let Rousstitute for the other forms of security which
maniere have a certain sum on loan, and
had been offered by Rousmaniere.
The difRousmaniere was to give him a bill of sale
ference between these statements is not
of a certain vessel; but that, afterwards,
very material, since It is apparent, from both
Hunt, reflecting, that If he took that secuof them, that the proposed security, by irrevrity, he would have to take out papers at
ocable powers of attomeiy, was selected by
the custom-house,
in his own name, be subthe plaintiff, and incorporated Into the agreeject to give bonds for the vessel, and perment, by the assent of both the parties.
haps, be made liable for breaches of law
The powers of attorney do not contain, nor
committed by others, he consulted with Mr.
do they profess to contain, the agreement of
Hazard upon the subject; who told him,
the parties; but was a mere execution of
that he could, or would, draw an irrevocathat agreement,
so far as It stipulated to
ble power of attorney to sell, which would
give to the plaintiff, a specific security on
do as well, and which was accordingly done.
the two vessels. In the mode selected and
The cause coming on to be heard in the
approved of by the parties; to which excourt below, and that court being of opin- tent. It was a complete consummation of
ion, that the plaintiff had no lien or specific
the agreement.
Such was the opinion of
security upon these vessels, and no equity
this court, upon a former discussion of this
to have such lien or security created, against
cause, in the year 1823, and such is Its presthe general creditors of Rousmaniere, disent opinion. Upon this state of the case, the
missed
the bill; from which decree, the
general question to be decided, is the same
cause has been brought, by appeal, to this
now that It formerly was, and Is that which
court.
It must be admitted, that the case, has already been stated.
AS it is now presented
to the court, is not
There are certain principles of equify, apmaterially variant from that which we forplicable to this question, which, as general
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principles, we hold to be incontrovertible.
The first is, that where an instrument is
drawn and executed, which professes, or Is
/intended, to carry Into execution an agreement, whether In writing or by parol, pre-\
viously entered into, but which, by mistake]
of the draftsman, either as to fact or law,^
does not fulfil, or which violates, the manifest intention of the parties to the agreement, equity will correct the mistake, so as
to produce a conformity of the instrument
The reason is obvious:
to the agreement.
the execution of agreements, fairly and legally entered into, is one of the peculiar
and If the
branches of equity jurisdiction;
instmment which is intended to execute the
agreement, be, from any cause, insufficient
for that purpose, the agreement remains as
as if one of the parties
much unexecuted,
had refused, altogether, to comply with his
and a court of equity will, in
engagement;
the exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction,
afford relief in the one case, as well as in
the other, by compelling the delinquent party
fully to perform his agreement, according to
the terms of it, and to the manifest intention
of the parties. So, if the mistake exist, not
In the instrument, which is intended to give
effect to the agreement, but in the agreement itself, and is clearly proved to have
been the result of ignorance of some material fact, a court of equity will, in general,
grant relief, according to the nature of the
particular case in which it is sought. Whether these principles, or either of them, apply
to the present case, must, of course, depend upon the real character of the agreeIt it has been
ment under consideration.
correctly stated, it follows, that the instrument, by means of which the specific security was to be given, was selected by the
parties to the agreement, or rather by the
plaintiff; Rousmanlere having proposed to
give a mortgage or bill of sale of the vessels,
which the plaintiff, after consideration, and
advice of counsel, thought proper to reject,
for reasons which were entirely satisfactory
to himself.
That the form of the instrument, so chosen by the plaintiff, and prepared by the person who drew It, conforms
not, in every respect, to the one agreed upon,
is not even asserted In the bill, or in the
argument of counsel.
The avowed object of
the plaintiff was, to obtain a valid security,
but in such a manner, as that the legal interest in the property should remain with Eousmaniere, so that the plaintiff might be under
no necessity to take out papers at the custom-house, in his own name, and might not
be subject to give bonds, for the vessels, or
to liabilities for breaches of law, committed
by those who were Intirusted with the management of them.
That the general intention of the parties was, to provide a security,
as effectual as a mortgage of the vessels
would be, can admit of no doubt; and if
such had been their agreement,
the insufficiency of the instruments to effect that object, which were afterwards prepared, would
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have furnished a ground for the interposition of a court" of equity, which the representatives of Rousmanlere could not easily
have resisted. But the plaintiff was not satisfied to leave the kind of security which 'he
was willing to receive, undetermined; having finally made up his mind, by the advice
of his counsel, not to accept of a mortgage,
or bill of sale, in nature of a mortgage. He
thought it safest, therefore, to designate the
instrument; and having deliberately done so,
it met the view of both parties, and was
as completely incorporated into their agreement, as were the notes of band for the sum
intended to be secured.
In coming to this
determination, it is not pretended, that the
plaintiff was misled by ignorance of any
fact, connected with the agreement which
If, then, the
he was about to conclude.
agreement was not founded in a rpistake of
any material fact, and if it was executed in
strict conformity with itself; we think it
would be unprecedented,
for a court of
equity to decree another security to be given,
not only different from that which had been
agreed upon, but one which had been deliberately considered and rejected by the party
now asking for relief; or to treat the case,
as if such other security had in fact been
agreed upon and executed.
Had Rousmanlere after receiving the money agreed to be
loaned to him, refused to give an irrevocable
power of attorney, but offered to execute
a mortgage of the vessels, no court of equity
could have compelled the plaintiff to accept
Or, if he had totally
the -security so offered.
refused to execute the agreement, and the
plaintiff had filed his bill, praying that the
defendant might be compelled to execute a
mortgage, instead of an irrevocable power of
attorney; could that court have granted the
relief specifically asked for? We think not.
Equity may compel parties to perform their
agreements,
when fairly entered Into, according to their terms; but it has no power
to make agreements for parties, and then
compel them to execute the same.
The former is a legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and in its exercise, is highly beneficial
to society; the latter is without its authority, and the exercise of it would be not only
an usurpation of power, but would be highly mischievous in its consequences.
If the court could not have compelled the
plaintiff to accept, or Rousmaniere to execute, any other instrument than the one
which had been agreed upon between them,
the case is in no respect altered, by the
death of the latter, and the consequent
Inefficiency of the particular security which
had been selected; the objection to the relief asked for, being in both cases the same,
namely, that the court can only enforce the
performance of an agreement, according to
its terms, and to the intention of the parties; and cannot force upon them a different agreement.
That the intention of the
parties to this agreement,
was frustrated,
by the happening of an event, not thought
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»t, probably, by them, or by the counsel who
is manitvas consulted upon the occasion,
fest.
The kind of security which was
chosen, would have been equally effectual, for
the purpose intended, with a mortgage, had
RousiQaniere lived until the power had been
executed; and it may, therefore, admit of
some doubt, at least, whether the loss of the
intended security is to be attributed to a
want of foresight, in the parties, or to a
mistake of the counsel. In respect to a matter of law- The case will, however, be con-

(

sidered in the latter point of view.
The question, then, is, ought the court to
grant the relief which is asked for, upon the
ground of mistaJie arising from any ignoranee of law?
We hold the general rule to
be, that a mistake of this character is not a
ground for reforming a deed founded on such
mistake; and whatever exceptions there may
be to this rule, they are not only few in
number, but they will be found to have
something peculiar in their characters.
/
The strongest case which was cited ana
relied upon by the appellant's counsel, was
that of Lansdown v. Lansdown, reported in
Mos. 364. Admitting, for the present, the authority of this case, it is most apparent,
from the face of it, that the decision of the
court might well be supported, upon a principle not involved in the question we are
examining. The subject which the court
had to decide, arose out of a dispute between an heir-at-law, and a younger member
of the family, who was entitled to an estate
descended;
and this question the parties
agreed to submit to arbitration.
The award
being against the heir-at-law, he executed a
deed in compliance with It, but was relieved
against it, on the principle, that he was
ignorant of his title. If the decision of the
court proceeded upon the ground, that the
plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that he
was the eldest son, it was clearly a case
proper for relief, upon a principle which has
already been considered.
If the mistake
was. of his legal rights, as heir-at-law, it is
not going too far, to presume, that the opinion of the court may have been founded
upon the belief, that the heir-at-law was imposed upon by some unfair representations
of his better informed opponent; or that his
ignorance of a legal principle, so universally
understood by all, where the right of primogeniture forms a part of the law of descents,
demonstrated
a degree of mental imbecility,
which might well entitle him to relief. He
acted, besides,
under the pressure of an
award, which was manifestly repugnant to
law, and for aught that is stated in this case,
this may have appeared upon the face of it.
But if this case must be considered as an
exception from the general rule which hasi
been mentioned; the circumstances attending it, do not entitle it, were it otherwise ob
jectionable, to be respected as an authority,
but in cases which it closely resembles,
There is a class of cases which, it has
been supposed, forms an exception from this

\

general rule, but which vrlll be found, upon
examination, to come within the one which
was first stated.
The cases alluded to, are
those in which equity has afforded relief
against the representatives of a deceased
obligor, in a joint bond, given for money
lent to both the obligors, although such lepresentatives were discharged at law. The
principle upon which these cases manifestly
proceed, is, that the money being lent to
both, tlie law raises a- promise in both to
pay, and equity considers the security of the
bond as being intended, by the parties, to
be co-extensive with this implied contract
by both to pay the debt.
To effect this intention, the bond should have been made
joint and several; and the mistake in the
form, by which it is made joint, is not in the
agreement of the parties, but in the execution of it by the draftsman.
The cases m
which the general rule has been adhered to,
are, many of them, of a character which
strongly test the principle upon which the
rule itself Is founded. Two or three only
need be referred to.
If the obligee. In a
joint bond, by two or more, agree with one
of the obligors, to relieve him from his obligation, and does accordingly execute a release, by which all the obligors are discharged at law, equity will not afford relief
against this legal consequence, although the
release was given under a manifest misapprehension of the legal effect of it, in relation to the other obligors. So, in the case
of Worrall v. Jacob, 3 Merv. 271, where a
person having a power of appointment and
revocation, and, under a mistaken supposition, that a deed might be altered or revoked, although no power of revocation had
been reserved, executed
the power of appointment, without reserving a power of revocation; the court refused to relieve against
the mistake. The case of Lord Irnham v.
Child, 1 Brown, Ch. 92, is a very strong one
In support of- a general rule, and closely resembles the present, in most of the material
circumstances attending it. The object of
the suit was to set up a clarse containing a
power of redemption, in a deed granting an
annuity, which. It was said, had been agreed
upon by the parties, but which, after deliberation, was excluded by consent, from a
mistaken opinion, that It would render the
contract usurious. The court, notwithstanding the omission manifestly proceeded upon
a misapprehension of the parties as to the
law, refused to relieve, by establishing the
rejected clause.
It is not the intention of the court, in the
case now under consideration,
to lay it
down, that there may not be case In which
a court of equity will relieve against a plain
mistate, arising from Ignorance of law.
But we mean to say, that where me parties,
upon deliberation and advice, reject one species of security, and agree to select another,
under a misapprehension of the law as to
the nature of the security so selected, a
court of equity will not, on the ground' of "^
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fiucli misapprehension, and the Insufficiency
security, In consequence of a subsenot foreseen, perhaps, or
quent event,
thought of, direct a new security, of a different character, to be given, or decree that
to be done, which the parties supposed would
iave been effected by the Instrument which
was finally agreed upon.
If the court would not Interfere in such a
>case, generally, much less would it do so In
favor of one creditor, against the general
creditors of an insolvent estate, whose equity
Is, at least, equal to that of the party seeking to obtain a preference, and who, in
point of law, stand upon the same ground
with himself. This is not a biU asking for
a specific performance of an agreement to
execute a valid deed for securing a debt; in
•of such

1
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which case, the party asking relief would be
entitled to a specific lien; and the court
would consider the debtor as a trustee for
the creditor, of the property on which the
security was agreed to be given.
The agreement has been fully executed, and the only
complaint is, that the agreement itself was
founded upon a misapprehension of the law,
and the prayer Is to be relieved against the
consequences
of such mistake. If all other
difficulties were out of the way, the equity
of the general creditors to be paid their
debts equally with the plalntifC, would, we
think, be sufficient to induce the court to
leave the parties where the law has placed
them.
The decree is to be affirmed, with
costs.
Decree affirmed.
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tain relief in equity?
It is claimed that she has no remedy,

be-

it

a

Me. 139.
But some of the defendants thought the
lease to the plaintiff was Invalid, and so informed her. Taking their testimony as true,
which we do not question, they did not Intentionally deceive her on this point.
They actually thought there was a defect of which
they could take advantage.
She was unlearned In every respect, not being able to
write her own name. It Is evident that she
put confidence in them, believing them to be
better informed than herself; and supposing,
from their representations,
that her title to
the homestead, by the lease, had failed, she
was induced by them to relinquish all her
interest in the whole estate of her father, in
consideration of a new life lease from them of
the same property embraced In her first lease.
One-eighth
of the estate, subject to her
life Interest In the homestead, must have
been worth nearly or quite eight hundred
doUars.
This she conveyed to them. Their
new lease to her was of no value whatever;
for the title was already in her. Can she ob-

407.

This question is discussed at length by
Judge Story, and nearly all the English and
American authorities are referred to, and
many of them examined.
Story, Eq. Jur.
c.
(Eedf. Ed.). But while the weight of
authority is clearly against granting relief
merely on account of
mistake of the law,
it seems to be conceded in nearly all the
cases, and expressly decided In many of them,
that there are exceptions to this rule. Hunt
V. Rousmanler,
Pet 15; Bank v. Daniel, 12
1

other not living.
The property leased to the plaintiff was described as situated "on Chestnut street."
After the death of her father, the-plaintiff had
the lease altered so as to read "Wilmot
street."
This was done at the suggestion of
some of the defendants;
and besides, as the
property was otherwise sufBciently described,
the mistake of the street did not affect the
lease, and the alteration was immaterial.
It is contended that the lease was void because it was not to take effect until a future
day; but, whatever may have been supposed
to be the law in regard to the validity of
deeds to take effect In futnro. It Is now well
settled In this state that such deeds are not
for that reason void. Wyman v. Brown, 50

a

OAVIS, J. Jonathan Stevens, the father
of the parties to this suit, died in NoTember,
leaving personal property valued at
1857,
about ?3,000, and real estate worth nearly
$5,000. The plaintiff, being a widow, had
worked In his family for many years, receivA short time
ing therefor one dollar a week.
before his death he gave her a life lease of
his homestead in Portland, worth about $2,Wheth000, to take effect upon his decease.
er he did this for the reason that he thought
that he had not paid her enough for her services, or because she needed a larger share
of the property than the other heirs, does not
appear, and is immaterial. He died intestate,
leaving seven children, and the issue of an-

§
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1

and proofs.

it,

Me. 78.)

Court of Maine. 1863.
Suit in equity submitted on bill, answers
Supreme Judicial

Howard & Strout, for complainant.
Fox, for respondents.

there was no fraud; and the mistake
was not one of fact, but of law.
In this state jurisdiction In equity In cases
of "mistake" is expressly conferred by statute; nor is
in terms, limited to mistakes
of fact The legislature may be presumed
to have used the word as generally understood in equity proceedings; and therefore we
shall have to inquire whether courts of equity
have been accustomed to grant relief ia cases
like the one before us.
This question has frequently arisen In this
country and in England, and authorities are
not wanting in both countries in support of
the doctrine that no distinction should be
made between mistakes of law and mistakes
of fact.
It is quite true, as Judge Redfield observes
Story, Eq. Jur.
130, note), "that the distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact, so far as equitable relief is concerned. Is one of policy rather than of principle"; and yet it may not be the less necessary to maintain and observe It. No government could be administered at all, under
which Ignorance of the criminal law should
be held
sufficient excuse for violating It;
and the same principle is applicable to the
civil law. This is not on the ground that
every one Is presumed to know the law; for,
though this is often repeated as an axiom,
a presumption so variant from the truth cannot be recognized by the law. The ground
on which the doctrine rests Is this, that
is
Impossible to uphold the government, and so
to maintain Its administration as to protect
public and private rights, except on the principle that the rights and liabilities of every
one shall be the same as It he knew the law.
If aU contracts made In Ignorance of the
law were to be held invalid, there would be
no certainty in business and no security In
titles. All rights of property would be endangered, and the most Important encouragements for industry and enterprise would be
taken away. It is Indispensable,
therefore,
that the obligation of contracts should be
maintained, unless there Is some stronger reason for annulling them than
mere mistake
of the law. Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend.
cause

a
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Instead of saying that there are "exceptions" to the rule, it would probably be more
correct to say that while relief will never
be granted merely on account of the mistake
of the law, there are cases where there are
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other elements, not In themselves sufficient to
authorize the comt to interpose, but which,
combined with such a mistalse, will entitle
It is important therefore
the party to relief.
to inquire what it is that, with a mistake of
the law, will justify the interposition of the
coiurt, where there is no fraud, or accident, or
mistake of fact.
If a party, who himself knows the law,
should deceive another, by misrepresenting
the law to him, or, knowing him to be ignorant of it, should therein take advantage
of him, relief would be granted on the ground
of fraud. So that such a case is within neither the rule nor the exception.
It has sometimes been said that when mon•ey or other property has been obtained under a mistake of the law, which the defendant ought not in good conscience to retain, he
should be compelled to restore it. Northrup
V. Graves, 19 Conn. 548; Stedwell v. Anderson, 21 Conn. 139.
This is just as a principle, but entirely indefinite "as a rule. It proposes nothing but the opinion of the court in
«ach case, on a matter in regard to which
of opinion.
there may be great differences
It overlooks the public interests involved in
maintaining the obligation of contracts. Gen■erally, as between the parties, a mistake of
law has as equitable a claim to relief as a
mistake of fact.
It is believed that In nearly all such cases,
where relief has been granted, In addition
to the intrinsic equity in favor of the plaintiff, ^two facts have been found, (1) that
ire has been a marked disparity in the position and intelligence of the parties, so that
they have not been on equal terms; and (2)
that the party obtaining the property persuaded or induced the other to part with it,
so that there has been "undue influence" on
on the
the one side and "undue confidence"
other. 1 Story's Eq. 120.
When property
has been obtained under such circumstances,
and by such means, courts of equity have
never hesitated to compel
its restoration,
though both the parties acted under a mistake of the law; and there would be still
stronger reasons for granting relief In such
a ease, if the party from whom the property
had been obtained had been led into his misSparks
take of the law by the other partry.
V. White, 7 Humph. 86; Fitzgerald v. Peck, 4
Litt (Ky.) 127.
Thus, in Pickering v. Pickering, 2 Beav.
31, Lord Langdale set aside certain agreements entered into under a mistake of the
law, on the ground that "the parties were
not on equal terms," and that the plaintiff
acted under the influence of the defendant;
and the same thing was done in Wheeler v.
Smith, 9 How. 55, because the parties "did
not stand on equal ground," and the plaintiff
"did not act freely, and with a proper understanding of his rights."
This question has arisen more frequently
In cases where parties have been mistaken In
Thus,
regard to their titles to real estate.
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in Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. 126, the defendant sold to the plaintiff property which
he already owned, and the court compelled a
It may
restoration of the purchase money.
in
been, as Bronson, J., suggests,
have
Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 407, on the
ground that the defendant "misled" the plaintiff in regard to his title; but the correctness
of the decision is not questioned by Lord Cottenham, in Stewart v. Stewart, 6 Clark &

F.

964.

Judge

Story suggests that such a case .
to involve, In some measure, a mistake of fact,— that is, of the fact of owner1
ship,— arising from a mistake of the law."
Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 122, 130. And, in King v.
Doolittle, 1 Head, 77, the decision is put on
that ground. But, if all the other facts are
agreed and known to the parties, the question of "ownership" can be nothing but one
of law; and in such cases, as in others,
"seems

courts of equity should not Interfere, unless
appears that there was a difference in the
condition of the parties, so that, instead of
both acting voluntarily, one was misled or
unduly Influenced by the other. Nor will the
court then interpose. In the absence of fraud,
unless the defendant,
as well as the plaintiff, can be restored substantially to the same
situation as befbre. Crocier v. Acer, 7 Paige,

it

137.

Nor where there is a real controversy beparties, and the case is one of any
will the court set aside a compromise
fah-ly made by them, though it should afterwards appear that one has thereby received
property to which he was not legally entitled.
Steele v. White, 2 Paige, 478; Trigg v. Reed,
5 Humph. 529.
On the contrary, comrts of
equity encourage
such compromises; but
here, too, as in other cases, if the parties are
not on equal terms, and one misleads the
other, and obtains property thereby against
right and equity, as well as against law, he
will be compelled to restore It. "If a party, \
acting in ignorance of a plain and settled l
principle of law," says the vice chancellor.
Sir John Leach, "is induced to give up a portion of his indisputable property under the /
name of a compromise, a court of equity will /
relieve him from the consequences
of his/
mistake." Naylor v. Winch, 1 Sim. & S. 564.
And though this was a dictum, the principle was fully applied by the supreme court
of the United States In Wheeler v. Smith,
previously cited. And the same doctrine has
been recognized by this court in the case of
Freeman v. Curtis, 51 Me. 140.
And, in
both of these cases, relief was granted, not
on the ground that a mistake of the law
alone entitles one to relief, but that, though
there be no actual fraud, if one is unduly Influenced and misled by the other to do that
which he would not have done but for such
influence, and he has In consequence conveyed to the other property without any consideration therefor, or purchased what was
already legally his own, the court will, if It
tween
doubt,
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can be done, restore both of the parties to the
same condition as before.
The case at bar Is one of this kind. The
The plainparties were not on equal terms.
tiff was ignorant, in business affairs, as well
Having confidence in
as in other respects.
the defendants,
she relied upon what they
told her. It does not appear that she doubted the ralldity of her father's lease to her,
until such doubts were communicated to her
The proposition for her to refrom them.
lease her interest in all the other property
did not originate with her, but with them;
and she was induced to accept it by the fear
which they had impressed upon her that she
otherwise would have to give up the homeThey
stead. She acted under their influence.
believed that there was a defect in the first
lease, and they meant to take advantage of

it. As was said by the master of the rolls,
afterwards Lord Kenyon, in Evans v. Llewellyn, 1 Coxe, 333, "though there was no fraud,
there was something like fraud, for an undue
advantage was taken of her situation. The
party was not competent to protect herself,
and therefore this court Is bound to afford
her such protection."
The bill Is sustained, with costs; and the
defendants must be decreed to pay her a distributive share of the personal estate, with
Interest from the time of distribution, making her equal with them, and to release to
her one-eighth of all the real estate, and account to her for her share of the rents aud
profits of the portion not occupied by her,

APPLETON,

O.

and DICKERSON,

J., and KE3NT, WALTON,
JJ., concurred.
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The
constitutes their contract
written Instrument is made the evidence of
If It fails to present their
that contract
agreement the contract it expresses is not
the agreement of the parties, and the true
In such a case
contract remains unexecuted.
equity will reform the wiiting, causing
it to express the intentions of the parties.
This relief will be granted without regard to
the cause of the failure of the instrument
to express the true contract whether it be
from fraud, mistake in the use of language,
or any other thing which prevented the expression
of the intentions of the parties.
rule of
4. But there is another familiar
equity upon which plaintiff relies to defeat
the application of these doctrines to this
case, namely, relief will not be granted to
correct mistakes at law.
'
The rule has no application to mistakes in
contract,
or in the choice
the language of a
of the form of an instrument, whereby it
has an effect different from the Intention of
the parties. If parties, intending to sell and
lands, should, in ignorance of Its
purchase
legal ett'ect, execute a lease, equity would i
reform the instrument, though It was a mistake of law which led them to adopt it.
This mistake, it will be noticed, affects the
very contract the parties intended.
They InBut
tended a deed, but a lease was made.
where two are bound by a bond, and theobligee releases one, mlstakingly believing
that the other will remain bound, equity will
not grant him relief, for the reason that the
release Is just what he intended it to be;
his mistake related to the effect of the contract in matters not contemplated therein.
The mistakes of law against which equity
will not relieve are those which pertain to
the subject of the contract, and were Inthereto,
ducements
or considerations therefor. In such cases the parties intended to
make the very contracts which they executed,
but were induced to make them by a mistake of law.
Further Illustrations taken from the books
make our expression
of the rules plainer.
A tenant for life purchased a reversion under the mistake of law that such purchase
would cut off the remainder in tail and vest
the fee in him. It was held that he could
not have relief. A power of attorney was
taken from a debtor as a security; but the
debtor died before the power was executed.
Equity would not grant relief. In each of
these cases the very contracts entered into
by the parties were embodied in the instruments.
The mistakes were as to the results
to be reached which were inducements to the
contracts. In the first case the purchaser
supposed that the acquisition of the reversion
would vest in him the fee-simple title. This
was the Inducement for the purchase.
It
was a mistake of law. In the second case
it was the purpose of the parties to secure
the payment of the debt
They mistakenly
chose a power of attorney to effect their
ed by them,

322, 55 Iowa, 484.)

H. Mc-

being the

payee of a negotiable promissory note, transferred it to plaintiff by the following indorsement:
"For value received,
assign
the within note to James Stafford.
[Signed]

I

H. J. Fettei-s." The action was brought at
law upon this indorsement. The defendant
pleaded an equitable defense, wherein be substantially alleged that, by the agreement
under which the note was transferred, the
plaintiff was to take the note without recourse upon defendant, and that the parties
adopted the form of transfer as expressing
such agreement, and neither of them at the
time intended that it should have any other
effect than to express the agreement between
them, and neither knew that it did have the
effect which the law gives to such InstruDefendant, upon this answer, as in
ments.
a cross-blU,
prays that the indorsement be
reformed so as to express the true agreement made and Intended to be set out by the
parties, and that other proper relief be granted. A demurrer to this count of the answer
was overruled, and the issues raised by this
pleading were tried as an action in chancery.
It is triable here de novo.
very satisfactorily estab2. The evidence
lishes the facts set up In the equitable defense.
The defendant positively and explicitiy testifies that the agreement required him to transfer the note without liability; that he had no Intention to express any
different contract by the Indorsement,
and
was Ignorant of the legal effect of the Instrument; and that plaintiff expressly disclaimed that he expected or desired defendant to become boimd for the payment of the
note.
Six witnesses positively and strongly
corroborated defendant's testimony. They
heard the conversation between the parties
when defendant signed the indorsement
The plaintiff. In his testimony, denies the
statement
of defendant. We must accept
the facts of the case presented by the testiWe
mony of defendant and his witnesses.
are required to determine whether, upon these
facts, equity will grant relief to defendant
by reforming the indorsement upon the note
80 that it will express the real contract of
the parties.
3. The agreement
of the parties, the meeting of their minds upon the conditions and
obligations touching the subject contemplat-
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585.

In the

case

that plaintiff

us the parties agreed
should take the note without
before

They mistakenly
on defendant.
recourse
supposed that the form of assignment of the
note would have that effect, being Ignorant

it

of the provisions of the law of commercial
paper which makes the indorser liable In
case of default of the maker of the note.
perThis was
mistake of the law, but
tained to the instrument itself, and, by reason of it, the writing does not express the
true agreement of the parties. Equity wUI
reform it.
Glenn v. Statlee, 42 Iowa, 107, and Moorman V. Collier, 32 Iowa, 138, are not in conflict with our conclusions just expressed.
In
each case the mistake was not in expressing
the contract, but as to its legal effect. The
parties executed an instrument expressing
the very contract Intended, but the instruments had a legal effect unknown to, and not
Intended

by,

the

parties.

a

These decisions are also distinguishable
from the case at bar by the fact that in each
of them the rights of persons other than
the parties to the contracts are Involved.
They were actions upon delivery bonds.
Creditors not parties thereto were beneficiaries.
The law will, in such cases, rather impose hardship upon the parties who made
mistake than upon one chargeable with no

fault

We reach the conclusion that the circuit
court correctly rendered
decree reforming
the assignment indorsed upon the note, and
dismissing plaintiff's petition.
Affirmed.
a

1

1

V

8

(But,

]

object. But their purpose was defeated by
the law which provides that the death of the
grantor revokes a power of attorney. In
these cases, it will be observed, the instruments were of the character intended by the
parties. The mistakes pertained to the effect
of the instruments upon the rights of the
parties not contemplated by the contracts or
provided for therein.
on the 6ther hand, when parties enter into an agreement, which, through mistake of law or fact, they reduce to writing,/
and the instrument fails to express their true
agreement, or omits stipulations agreed up-j
on, or contains terms contrary to the Inten-/
tion of the parties, equity will reform the!
writing, making it conform to the agreement!
entered into by the parties.
The doctrines we have stated are familiar
to the profession. They have ample support
In the authorities. See Noulin v. Pyne, 47
Iowa, 293; Hunt v. Rosemanlers,
Wheat.
Story, Bq. Jur. §§ 113, 116,
174,
Pet 1;
et seq., and cases cited; Kerr, Fraud & M.
(Am. Ed.) 396 et seq., and page 418 and
cases cited; Reynolds v. Meellck, 17 Iowa,

a
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E W. Whelpley, for demurrer. Ii. A.
Obandler and F. T. Frellnghuysen, oontra.
The following are
THE CHANCELLOR.
the material facts stated In the bill: The
complainant is the owner of a farm in the
The defendants, in the
county of Morris.
construction of their railroad, made an excavation through the complainant's farm of
about five himdred feet in length, and varying from five to twelve feet deep. Commissioners were called under the charter of the
company,
who assessed the complainant's
damages at six hundred and eighty dollars.
From this award the complainant appealed
to the inferior court of common pleas of the
county of Morris, in which court he was entitled to review the award and to a trial by
Jury. Before the time for hearing arrived,
Samuel B. Halsey and Freeman Wood represented to the complainant that they were
acting for and on behalf of the railroad company, and proposed to submit the matters in
dlfEerence to three arbitrators, to be selected
by the parties, to which the complainant assented.
The arbitrators were selected, and
The
the submission was reduced to writing.
same matters were submitted to the arbitrators as were before, and acted upon by the
commissioners appointed under and by virBy the ninth section of
tue of the charter.
the charter of the company, they are obliged
to construct and keep in repair good and sufficient bridges or passages over or under the
said railroad or roads, where any public or
other road shall cross the same; and also,
where the railroad shall intersect any farm
or lands of any individual, to provide and
keep in repair suitable wagonways over or
under said road, so that he may pass the
same;
and if the company neglect to perform the said duty, after giving twenty days*
notice to the company, the owner of the land
may do it himself, and recover the valuation
by common process of law.
The arbitrators, thus selected, proceeded
to discharge the duties imposed upon them
in the presence of the complainant, and of
Halsey and Wood, who appeared and acted
on behalf of the company. During their deliberations, the complainant stated that he
should require a suitable wagonway over the
railroad, where It crossed his farm.
This
was assented to, but Halsey and Wood stated that this was a matter with which the
arbitrators had nothing to do, and was no
part of the submission, but was an independent duty, imposed upon the company by
their charter. This view was acquiesced in
by the arbitrators and by all parties, and
it is admitted to have been a correct view.
The arbitrators awarded that the company
should pay to the complainant eight hundred
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 13
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In awarding this
dollars for his damages.
amount, they did not take into consideration
Soon aftthe matter of bridges or crossings.
Halsey and
er the award was completed,
Wood went to the complainant with eight
hundred dollars, and with a deed, prepared
and ready for execution, from the complainant and his wife to the company. The complainant objected to signing the deed on the
ground that it did not, in express words, reserve all his rights as to a crossing or
bridges over the railroad. Halsey and Wood
assured him that such rights were not at aU
afPected by the deed. The deed was a special one in its character. Mr. Halsey was a
lawyer by profession. The complainant knew
this, and he relied upon his integrity, as
well as his professional learning. Upon Mr.
Halsey's reassurances that the deed was a
proper one, and did not compromise the
complainant's rights to proper crossings over
the road, he received the money, and executed and delivered the deed to Halsey and
Wood. They delivered it to the company,
giving the officers full knowledge of all that
had occm:red.
The complainant gave notice
to the company to construct a bridge over
their railroad where it crosses his land, and
upon the company's neglecting to do so the
complainant himself constructed the bridge
at an expense exceeding seven hundred dollars. He then instituted a suit in the supreme court against the company, under the
ninth section of their charter, to recover lie
value of the work done. The company set
up, as a plea in bar to the recovery, the deed
given by the complainant to the company.
This bill is brought to relieve the complainant from legal effect of that deed. The bill
prays that the deed may be reformed, and
that the defendants may be enjoined from
setting up the deed in bar to the complainant's action at law. To this biU the defendants have filed a general demurrer.
The principal ground urged in support of
the demurrer is that the object of the bill is
to correct a mistake of law, and that the
maxim is that ignorance of law furnishes no
excuse to a person either for a breach or for
an omission of a duty, ignorantia legis nemlnem excusat,
and that the same principle
applies to agreements entered into in good
faith, but under a mistake of the law.
Such undoubtedly is the general rule. It
has been adhered to with great strictness by
some authorities, while by others exceptions
have been made to the rule altogether irreconcilable with the principles and reasons upon which it has been established.
Some of
these conflicting authorities are referred to
and commented upon in 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §
113, etc.
But that the rule has its proper
exceptions is beyond all dispute.
In 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 113, 116, the rule is
laid down that agreements made and acts
done under a mistake of law are, if not otherwise objectionable, generally held valid
and obligatory.
The author says that he
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is that the deed may be made to conform
to the award.
In the case of ChampUn v. Layton, Edw.
Oh. 467, It was decided that
contract enmutual misconception of
tered into under
legal rights, amounting to
mistake of law
in the contracting parties, is as liable to be
contract founded
set aside or rescinded as
in mistake of matters of fact. In his opinion
in that case the vice, chancellor says: So,
both parties should be ignorant of
matter ol
law, and should enter into a contract for
particular object, the result whereof would,
by law, be different from what they mutualintended,— here, on account of the surprise
or immediate result of the mistake of both,—
there can be no good reason why the court
should not interfere In order to prevent the
enforcement of the contract, and relieve from
the unexpected consequences of it. To refuse
would be to permit one party to take an un-

I

It

a

a

advantage of the other, and to
conscientious
derive benefit from
contract which neither
of them intended
should produce. In
Stapylton v. Scott 13 Ves. 424, the lord chanadmit, where the contract
cellor says:
has proceeded upon the mistake of both parties, that avoids the contract at law as well
as here.
In Willan v. Wlllan, 16 Ves. 72,
an agreement
was decreed to be given up
upon the ground of surprise, neither party
understanding the effect of
This exception to the rule Is recognized
in the case

it

L

is

a

a

a

it

a

it

5

8

of Hunt V. Rousmanier,
Wheat 174,
Ed. 589.
The case before the court is entitled to
much more favorable consideration than these
cases, from the fact, before referred to, that
the mutual mistake is to be attributed to the
agent of the defendants.
He prepared the
deed, and he assured the complainant that
was correct.
There was no want of ordinary
prudence in the complainant's relying upon
his judgment
lawyer by profesHe was
sion, and
was natural and becoming that
the complainant should have confided in him.
There Is another consideration which very
properly enters into the ease. It Is
deed
procured from the complainant, by the solicitation of the defendants or their agent, which
conveys to them valuable rights and privileges without any consideration. The award
gives to the complainant eight hundred dollars as
remuneration for his damages; but
the legal effect of the deed is not only
release of the damages, for which the defendant
was compensated, but a release of rights and
privileges more valuable to the complainant
than the pecuniary compensation awarded to
him. The relative situation of the parties
matter of some consideration In
court of
equity.
plain man, the other
One was
professional man, professing skill and experience as to the matter in which he volunteered to advise.
have no doubt, if this
deed does not comport with the award, as to
the propriety of the court's reforming it.
But
am embarrassed
with another view

a

a

a

I

I

it

a

it,

lays down the doctrine in this guarded and
qualified manner because there are authorities which are sxipposed to contradict it, or
at least to form exceptions to it; and in the
case of Hunt v. Rousmanier, 1 Pet. 17, 7 L.
Ed. 27, a case much relied upon by the defendant's counsel, Mr. Justice Washington,
in delivering the opinion of the court, says,
"It is not the intention of the court, in the
case now under consideration, to lay it down
that there may not be cases in which a court
of equity will relieve against a plain mistake
arising from ignorance of law."
There are several considerations which induce me to consider this case as very properly embraced within the exceptions to the
The decision of the case does not rest
rule.
exclusively upon the mere fact of a mistake
in law upon the part of the complainant.
This deed does not carry out the intention of
the parties; and it is not necessary to resort
to parol testimony to establish this fact It
was executed for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the award of the arbitrators.
By that award, the complainant's rights and
privileges under the ninth section of the defendant's charter were not impaired, nor were
they in any manner whatever affected by it
The object of the deed was to give to the
company the same rights and privileges in
and upon the complainant's lands as the
award gave them, and no more. All that is
necessary to enable the court to reform this
deed, and to make it comply with the intention of the parties, is to have before It the
award which It was the design of all parties,
by this deed, to carry into execution.
The
mistake is a mistake of the draftsman, and
he acting as the agent of the party who now
seeks to take advantage of the mistake.
Mr.
Halsey prepared the deed, and took it to the
complainant to be executed.
It was his misapprehension of the law that led to the mistake.
It was not the carelessness or ignorance of the complainant,
but of the defendants' agent.
Mr. Justice Story, In commenting upon the case already referred to in 1
Pet. 1, 13, 7 L. Ed. 27, 14 Story, Eq. Jur.
If there had been any mis§ 115, remarks:
take in the instrvmient itself, so that it did
not contain what the parties had agreed on,
that would have formed a very different case,
for where an instrument is drawn and executed which professes,
or Is Intended,
to
carry Into execution an agreement previously
entered into, but which, by mistake of the
draftsman,
either as to fact or to law, does
not fulfill that intention, or violates
equity
will correct the mistake, so as to produce
conformity to the Instrument.
Now we have
before us an agreement in writing, the award
of the arbitrators, to carry which Into execution the deed was executed.
By a misapprehension of the law on the part of all parties,
and more particularly of the defendants'
agent, who drerw the deed,
releases valuable legal rights of the complainant which are
not affected by that award. All the bill asks

a
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In my Judgment, the deed in
question does not operate as a release of any
rights the complainant may have under the
ninth section of the defendants' charter.
In
other words, it is no legal bar to the comof the case.

plainant's recovery In his suit at law. The
bill assumes that it is a bar. The counsel
for the defendants raised an objection that
the fact of its being a bar to the complainant's
recovery was not, with sufficient directness
and distinctness, averred in the bill; but it is
assumed throughout the bill to be, in connection with the use the defendant is making of
the deed, the foundation for the complainant's
A distinct averment as to the legal
suit.
effect of the deed is not necessary.
The construction of the deed by the court could not
at all depend upon the complainant's opinion of it, nor would the complainant be bound
here or elsewhere by such an averment.
The deed recites that the company, by virhad surveyed
tue of their act of incorporaQon,
their route from Morristown to Dover over
and upon the lands of the complainant, giving
a description of the land Dy metes
and
bounds, and then proceeds as follows:
"Now
be it known that the said Thomas Green and
his wife, in consideration of the sum of eight
hundred dollars, to them in hand well and
truly paid by the said the Morris and Essex
Railroad Company,
the receipt whereof is
hereby acknowledged, have and by these presand
ents to grant, bargain, sell, convey,
confirm to the said the Morris and Essex
Railroad Company, and to their successors
and assigns, forever, the right, liberty, and
privilege of erecting upon the tract of land
above described, by its officers, agents, engiworkmen,
contractors,
neers, superintendents,
and other persons in their employ, and to
take possession of, hold, have, use, occupy,
and excavate the same, and to erect embankments, bridges, and all other works necessary to lay rails, and do all other things
which shall be suitable or necessary for the
completion or repair of said road or roads;
to have and to hold the said tract of land
and premises unto the said the Morris and
Essex Railroad Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, for the purposes
above mentioned, and for all the other purposes mentioned in the said act of incorporaIn
tion and the several supplements thereto.
witness whereof," etc.
The seventh section of the act provides
the mode in which the company shall proceed, If they cannot agree with the owner
of the land, to acquire the same by assessment.
Three commissioners are to be appointed, who are to a.ssess the value of the
land and the damages, upon payment of
which the company have the right to enter
upon and occupy the land for the purposes

of the railroad.

The provisions of the ninth

section are wholly independent of those of
the seventh section, and make It obligatory
upon the company to construct and keep in
repair bridges or passages
over or under
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the railroad, where It crosses public or private roads, and where it intersects lands of
individuals.
It is very manifest that the
assessment to be made by the commissioners
does not include any compensation for such
bridges or passages, and that, notwithstanding such assessment, the duty still remains
upon the company to construct such bridges
and passages over the road. If this is not
so, then the ninth section is superfluous.
The company cannot take possession of the
land except under the provisions of the sev"enth section; and, if the assessment
provided for in that section includes a remuneration to the land owner for bridging,
etc., there could be no propriety in imposing
that duty by the ninth section.
The deed
in question conveys to the defendants nothing more than the liberty of erecting upon
the land described the necessary superstructure for their railroad, and the necessary
embankments, bridges, etc. This is the same
right, and neither more nor less than they
would have acquired by an assessment under the seventh section of the act. I do ilot
see how, with any propriety, a construction
can be put upon this deed that will release
the company from the duties imposed by the
ninth section.
An assessment by commissioners would not have released them, and,
in my judgment, this . deed confers upon
them no additional rights, and releases them
from no other duties or obligations. The
language used in the deed is the same language used in the sixth section of the act,
which defines what rights the comR3ny acquire by assessment.
The deed confines the
company to the same use of the land as the
act confines them under the assessment.
The language in the deed is an exact copy
of the language of the act.
If, then, this construction of the deed is
the correct one, there is no necessity of reforming it; but the defendants contend for
a different construction, and, upon their construction, insist that it is a bar to the complainant's recovery in his suit at law. If
their construction is the correct one, then
the complainant is entitled to the protection of the court. Under such circumstances he had a right, when the defendants,
by a formal plea at law, contended for such
a construction of his deed, to claim the pro~
tection of this court. It was not safe for
him to risk his case at law. If the court
at law should be against him, it would then
be too late for him to ask relief in this
court. Would it be right, notwithstandilig
the construction this court has put upon the
deed, to dismiss the complainant out of
court? The court at law is not bound by
the construction this court may put upon
the deed. If the complainant's bill should
be dismissed, and the court at law should
differ from this court, the complainant will
be without remedy.
It may be asked, how
can this court make a decree to reform the
deed when it is of opinion that it needs no
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reformation? But the court need not adopt
any such inconsistency. It can afford to
relief without
the complainant adequate
making a decree to reform the deed. A decree enjoining the defendants from setting
up the deed as a bar to the complainant's

recovery In the action at law will afford him
all the protection that is necessary.
have no doubt that, under the circumstances of this case as it is made by his bill,
the complainant is entitled to relief.
The demurrer is overruled, with costs.
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GRISWOIiD

v:

HAZARD
(Nos.

(11 Sup.

et al.
50-53.)

(four

cases).

Gt. 972, 141 V. S. 260.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

May 25,

1891.

In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Rhode Island.

Appeals from the circuit court of the Unitfor the district of Rhode Island.
The first of the above suits was brought
by Griswold, a citizen of New York, against
the appellees, citizens of Rhode Island, to obtain a decree canceling or (if relief of that
character could not be granted) reforming a
certain bond, for the sum of $53,735, executed
by Thomas 0.' Durant, as principal, and GrisIt
■wold and S. D. Bradford, as his sureties.
was heard upon bill, answer, and proofs, and
the bill was dismissed.
The action at law. No. 53, was brought by
against Griswold upon the
the appellees
above bond in one of the courts of Rhode
Island, and was removed, upon his petition,
to the circuit court of the United States for
the district of Rhode Island, where a judgment was rendered against him for the sum
of $66,470.
The other two cases, Nos. 51 and 52, were
suits in equity brought by Griswold, pending
the action at law in the circuit court, to obtain an injunction against its further proseThe relief asked, in each of those
cution.
suits, was denied, and the bills were dised States

missed.

All of the cases have their origin in a suit
In equity brought, August 22, 1868, in the supreme court of Rhode Island, by Isaac P.
Hazard, of that state, against Thomas C.
Durant, Oliver Ames, Benjamin B. Bates,

John Duff, Cornelius S. Bushnell, Sidney Dillon, Henry S. McComb, the Credit Mobilier
of America, a Pennsylvania corporation, and
the Union Pacific Railroad Company, a corHazporation created by acts of congress.
ard sued on behalf of himself and all other
in the first-named corporation
stockholders
who should become. parties to his bill. Durant, from an early date in 1864 until May 18,
1867, was president of the Credit Mobilier of
America; having, It was alleged, to a great
extent, the management of its affairs, and the
confidence of its directors and trustees, as
well as the control of its finances and disbursements, and of its treasurer, clerks, and
The theory of the bill was that he
servants.
had acquired a large amount of the stock of
the Credit Mobilier of America upon which
dividends had been paid in money and in the
stock and bonds of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the amount of such bonds ex$700,000, and the
ceeding. It was alleged,
amount of such stock of the last-named corand that
poration being nearly $2,000,000;
the shares of stock, bonds, and moneys, so
equitably to the
received by him, belonged
Credit Mobilier of America and its stockholders.
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The bill alleged that Durant's pecuniary
condition was precarious; that he was, and
for a long time had been, largely engaged in
hazardous speculations and financial operations, sustaining thereby heavy losses, and liable to sustain others; that any recovery
against him, it was feared, could not be enforced by execution or the ordinary process
of law; that he was "about to depart out of
the state, and out of the jurisdiction of this
court;" and that the defendants,
(the individual defendants being sued as trustees in
a certain contract with the Union Pacific
Railroad Company, the profits of which belonged to the Credit Mobilier of America and
its stockholders,) "though requested so to do,"
had wholly neglected and refused to take any
steps to compel him to account for said moneys, stocks, and bonds, so received and improperly appropriated.
The principal relief asked was that Durant
be required to pay over and deliver to the
Credit Mobilier of America and the plaintiff
Hazard such sums of money and shares of
stock as should appear upon an accounting
to be justly due or belonging to that corporation and to Hazard, and to make such transfer of the stock and bonds as would fully prothat
tect its and his rights in the premises;
the amounts ascertained to be due be adjudged a lien upon the shares In the stock of
each of said corporations, owned or held by
or standing in the name of Durant, as well as
upon the above contract assigned to the defendant trustees and the dividends, earnings,
stocks, and bonds received or to be received
by virtue of that contract, to the extent of
the shares to which Durant might be entitled
under it; and that, on default in the payment and delivery of the moneys, stocks, and
bonds so found due, all such stocks and
bonds be sold under the direction of the
court, or otherwise transferred and apportioned equitably among the rightful owners and
claimants thereof; and that such stock,
bonds, moneys, interest, and rights, so procured by Durant, be deemed and taken as
the rightful property of the Credit Mobilier
The bill
of America and its stockholders.
prayed that Durant be restrained from departing out of the state, and out lOf the jurisdiction of the court, by writ of ne exeat, issued under its seal and by its order.
A writ of ne exeat was ordered to be issued, August 22, 1868, for $53,735. It was
in these words:
"Whereas, it is represented to our supreme
court, sitting in equity, on the part of Isaac
P. Hazard and others, complainants, against
Thomas C. Durant and others, defendants,
that said Thomas C. Durant is greatly indebted to the said complainant, and designs
quickly to go into other parts beyond this
state, (as by oath made in that behalf appears,) which tends to the great prejudice and
of the said complainants: Theredamage
fore, in order to prevent this Injustice, we
hereby command you that you do, without

.
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the said Thomas 0. Durant to
you and give sufficient bail or
security, in the sum of fifty-three thousand
seven hundred and thirty-five dollars, that he,
said Thomas C. Durant, will not go, or attempt to go, into parts beyond this state without the leave of our said com't; and, in case
the said Thomas C. Durant shall refuse to
give such bail or security, then you are to
commit him, the said Durant, to our county
jail, in your precinct, there to be kept in safe
custody until he shall do it of his own accord;
and when you shall have taken such security
you are forthwith to make and return a certificate thereof to our said court, distinctly
and plainly, under your hand, together with
this writ."
Durant was arrested under this writ on the
night of August 22, 1868, and on the 24th he
executed, with Griswold and Bradford, as
his sureties, the following bond, drawn by
one of Hazard's attorneys:
"Know all men that we, Thomas C. Durant, as principal, and John N. A. Griswold
and S. Dexter Bradford, as sureties, are firmly bound to Isaac P. Hazard, Rowland Hazard, Rowland G. Hazard, Elizabeth Hazard,
Elizabeth Hazard, trustee, Anna Hazard,
Mary P. Hazard, Lydla Torrey, Sophia Vernon, and Anna Horner in the sum of fiftythree thousand seven hundred and thirty-five
dollars, to be paid said obligees, their exto which
ecutors, administrators, or assigns;
payment we bind ourselves, our several and
respective heirs, executors, and administradelay, cause
come before

tors,

jointly

and severally,

hereby.

"Sealed with our seals and dated this 24th
day of August, A. D. 1868.
"The condition of this obligation is that
said Thomas C. Durant shall on his part
abide and perform the orders and decrees of
court of the state of Rhode
the supreme
Island in the suit in equity of Isaac P. Hazard and others against said Thomas C. Durant and others, now pending in said court
within and for the county of Newport."
This is the bond above referred to.
Under the latter date, and presumably before the execution of that bond, the attorneys of Hazard and Durant signed the following agreement:
"In the above entitled case
it is agreed that said Thomas O. Durant shall
file a bond, with surety in the penalty marked in the writ of ne exeat therein,
to abide
and perform the orders and decrees of the
court in said cause, and that thereupon the
writ of ne exeat aforesaid shall be discharged, and that the court may enter decree accordingly." The court, under the same date,
entered the following order:
"Thomas O.
Durant, one of the defendants in this suit,
having executed and filed a bond, with sureties, to abide and perform the orders and
decrees of the court made in this suit, it is
now, by consent, ordered that the writ of ne
exeat heretofore issued be discharged." For
some reason not explained,
the writ of ne
exeat was not returned to the clerk's office

and filed until October 21, 1868. The sheriff
made this return on the writ: "Newport, August 24, 1868.
caused the vylthin-named
Thomas C. Durant personally to come before
on the 22d day of
me, as within commanded,
this month, and now the writ is discharged

I

by order of court"
On the 2d day ot December, 1882, more
of
than 14 years after the commencement
Hazard's suit, it was ordered, adjudged, and
decreed in that suit, among other things, as
follows:
"Second. That the defendant Thomas 0.
Durant is accountable for and do, within 90
days from the date hereof, pay the sum of
$16,071,659.&7, with interest from this date,
the said sum, with interest thereon, to be
deposited in the registry of this court, or be
paid, in the first instance, to Rowland Hazard, of South Kingston, in said state, and
Henry Martin, of Brooklyn, in the state of
New York, who are hereby appointed special
commissioners,
with authority, jointly and
severally, to collect and receive the same, and
with power to take such steps to collect the
same as may be necessary and according to
law, and said fund, or so much thereof as
may be collected by process or otherwise, is
hereby directed to be paid and deposited in
the registry of this court to the credit of this
cause.

"Third. Of the aforesaid total sum of $16,071,659.97, the defendant Thomas 0. Durant
is hereby allowed and is decreed to be entitled to pay and discharge $8,816,232.93, or

any part thereof pro tanto, by transferring
and delivering stock of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company and first mortgage and
sinking fund bonds of said company, as per
Statement G, now exhibited to the court, and
directed to be filed in this cause, with all
dividends which may have been collected or
received by said defendant or his assigns after the date of this decree, together with interest on the same to the date of payment
thereof by said defendant, the certificates of
said stoct, with transfers thereof, and the
said bonds to be delivered to the said Rowland Hazard and Henry Martin, who are
hereby appointed special commissioners to receive the same, and who are hereby authorized and directed to sell the same, or such
portions thereof as may be delivered to them
from time to time as they are secured, at
public auction, and receive the proceeds thereof, and, after deducting the costs and charges
of such sales, deposit the same in the registry
of this court to the credit of this cause: provided, however, that the said privilege herein
granted to the said defendant Thomas 0. Durant to transfer and deliver said stocks and
bonds in partial discharge and payment of
the sum hereinbefore decreed to be paid by
him be exercised by him within thirty days
from the date of the entering this decree; and
that, in default of such transfer and delivery,
or of the transfer and delivery of the entu-e
amount of said stock and bonds within the
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said thirty days, the obligation of the defendant Thomas C. Durant to pay the said
proportion of the said sum or of the residue
of the same, after deducting the amount of
such stocks and bonds as may be delivered,
as aforesaid,
at their face value, shall become, and is hereby declared to be, absolute:
and provided further, nevertheless,
that the
said option or privilege -of the said Thomas
C. Durant shall not interfere in any manner
with any order or decree in the cause touching the transfer, delivery, sale, or other disposition of said stock and bonds.
"Fourth. The defendant Thomas 0. Durant is likewise ordered and directed to transfer and deliver, within thirty days from the
date hereof, five thousand seven hundred and
seven 45-100 (5,707 45-100) shares of the stock
of the Credit Mobilier of America, (which
stock has been found by the master to have
been purchased with the funds of the Credit
Mobilier, and which stock, with any dividends or profits accrued or to accrue on the
same, is hereby declared to be the property
of said corporation, subject to the decrees and
orders in this cause,) with any interest, dividends, rights, benefits, and profits which may
have accrued 'to the said Thomas C. Durant
as the holder of the said 5,707 4o-l(X) shares
of stock, or any part thereof, and not hereinbefore charged against him, said transfer
and delivery to be made to the said Rowland
Hazard and Henry Martin, or either of them,
as special commissioners,
with power, which
is hereby granted to said commissioners,
forthwith to take such measures, by suit or
suits in their own names, or otherwise, as
they may be advised is lavyful and necessary
to enforce such transfer, collection, or delivery, and said stocks to be held by said
subject to the further order of
commissioners
the court In this cause.
"Fifth. All interlocutory injunctions heretofore made in this cause, so far as consistent with this decree, are declared to be
and are hereby made perpetual, and the further consideration of the cause, and particularly as to allowances to the complainants for
costs, expenses, and services, and as to the
distribution of the funds that may be deposited in the registry of the court to the credit
of the cause, and also the consideration of
any order or decree which may be necessary
in the premises against the defendant Thomas C. Durant, by reason of any default which
may be made by him touching any portion of
this decree, and also the consideration of any
other and further decree herein against or
concerning
the defendants other than the
said Thomas C. Durant, be, and they hereby
are, directed to stand over, with leave to any
party in Interest, save parties in contempt
or parties who may appear to be for any other cause disqualified, to apply at any time
for further orders and directions."
The bill In case No. 50 was filed September
13, 1881.
That suit proceeds upon these
grounds:
That the bond of August 24, 1868,
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whereby Griswold became bound, as one of
the sureties of Durant, that the latter should
"on his part abide and perform the orders
and decrees of the supreme court of the
state of Rhode Island in the suit in equity of
Isaac P. Hazard and others against said
Thomas C. Durant and others, now [then]
pending in said court," was obtained by
fraud, and by concealment from him of facts
he was entitled to have communicated to
lum before he assumed the obligations imposed by that instrument; that he intended to
sign, and beUeved, at the time, that he signed, a bond which simply bound him for the
appearance
of Durant, so that he should be
personally amenable to the process and orders of the court in the suit brought by Hazard; that the execution of the bond In question was the result of mistake; that the
agreement whereby, upon the execution by
Durant of a bond, the writ of ne exeat was
to be discharged, was made without his
knowledge or consent, as was also the order
of court in pursuance of such agreement, and
was in derogation of his rights; that his purpose to become surety only for Durant's appearance to answer the process of the court
was well known at the time to the plaintiff
and his attorneys, who prepared, and supervised the execution of, the bond; and that
the writ of ne exeat was sued out upon the
ground that Durant was about to depart
from the state, when, in fact, he only contemplated coming to the state.
Protesting that the legal effect of the bond
was that he should be responsible only for
the appearance of Durant, so as to be subject
to the process of the court in the Hazard
suit, and averring his willingness to execute
a proper ne exeat bond, he prayed that the
bond in question be set aside as having been
obtained by fraud, imposition, and mistake,
or reformed, as indicated, and that the defendants be restrained by injunction from
enforcing it in its present shape.
The answers of the defendants put in Issue
the material allegations of the bill.
The
plaintiff filed a replication, and proofs being
taken, and the cause heard, the bill, as already stated, was dismissed.
(C. O.) 26 Fed.
135.

The action at law, being ease No. 53, was
March 3, 1883, in one of the
courts of Rhode Island, and was removed,
upon Griswold's application, to the circuit
court of the United States.
The declaration
set out the bond of August 24, 1868, alleged
that Bradford, one of the sureties thereon,
was dead, and that Durant had not kept
its condition, in that he had not performed
the above decree of December 2, 1882, in the
equity suit brought by Hazard; whereby the
plaintiffs Rowland Hazard, Rowland G. Hazard, Anna Hazard, and Lydia Torrey were
entitled to have and demand of him the
amount of said bond, $53,735.
A copy of
that decree was made an exhibit In the declaration.
The defendant Griswold filed ten
commenced
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each of which was In bar of the acOne of the pleas made a copy of the
in Hazard's suit a part of it.
proceedings
Demurrers and replications were filed to the
pleas, those to the second, third, fourth, fifth,
and seventh pleas being special demurrers.
By an order entered July 1, 1884, the demurrers were sustained to the second, third,
fourth, fifth, and seventh pleas, the opinion
pleas,

tion.

of the court being delivered by Mr. Justice
Gray. (C. C.) 21 Fed. 178.
Pursuant to a stipulation of counsel, dated
November 26, 1883, that the plaintifE might
demur specially to the second, third, fourth,
fifth, and seventh pleas, and, in case the demurrers were overruled, reply to these pleas
as If no demurrers had been filed, and that
amended pleas, if desired, might be filed by
the defendant, and In obedience to the order
of court requiring the amended pleas to be
filed on or before October 15, 1884, the defendant, on the 14th of October, 1884, filed
third, fourth, fifth, and seventh
amended
pleas.
The case was subsequently heard on
by plaintiff, made November 19,
a motion
1884, that the amended pleas be stricken out,
and on the 30th of March, 1885, this order
was' made:
"Plaintiff's
motion to strike
amended pleas from the files is granted."
made
between
Certain stipulations were
counsel ; among others, one to the efEect "that
the plaintiffs were able to prove under the
decree of the supreme court of Rhode Island,
in the equity suit brought by Hazard, an
amount of damage in excess of the penal sum
of the bond declared on in this suit." A jury
having been waived In writing, the court
gave judgment, as of February
12,
1887,
against Griswold, for $66,470.
The suit in equity No. 51 was brought June
12, 1885.
The bill In that case, after referring to the suit in equity brought by Isaac
P. Hazard In 1868, showed that, on the 17th
of November, 1875, Rowland G. Hazard commenced a suit in equity in one of the courts
of Pennsylvania, against the Credit Mobilier
of America and others, which was subsequently removed to the circuit court of the
United States for the eastern district of
Pennsylvania, that being the domicile of the
corporation; that in such suit Oliver Ames
was appointed receiver of all the goods, chattels, rights, and effects of the corporation,
and was authorized by the court in Pennsylvania to deliver to Durant a deed of release
from all actions, causes of action, suits, bills,
bonds, writings obligatory, debts, dues, duties, reckonings,
accounts,
sums of money,
judgments, executions, extents, quarrels, controversies, trespasses, damages, and demands
whatever, both in law or equity, which the
Credit Mobilier of America then had, or
might at any time thereafter have, claim,
allege, or demand, against said Durant, for
or by reason or means of any matter, cause,
or thing whatever; that afterwards, on the
27th day of October, 1881, Ames, under the
said authority, and In consideration of the

execution by Durant of a deed conveying the
title to certain lands mentioned in the order
of court authorizing the release, delivered to
the latter a deed of release, of the kind above
indicated,
of all sums of money then due
or owing to, or thereafter to become due to,
said corporation; that the above equity suit
in the supreme court of Rhode Island was,
and had been, wholly controlled by Rowland
G. Hazard; that, notwithstanding the delivery of the above deed to Durant, the latter
suit was proceeded with, and the supreme
court of Rhode Island rendered a decree refusing to allow him to set It up as a bar to
the entering of such decree, on the ground
that he was in contempt of that court for
violation of one of Its decrees rendered therein; and that after the delivery of the deed
of release to Durant the plaintiff requested
the defendants to surrender the bond of August 24, 1868, and to abstain from suing him
thereon, but they refused to comply with that
request The relief asked was an injunction
restraining the defendants from further proceeding In the action at law. Upon a hearing
before Judges Colt and Carpenter a demurrer
to the biU was sustained, and the bill dismissed, October 28, 1886, Judge -Carpenter delivering the opinion of the court (0. 0.) 28
Fed. 597.
The bill in case No. 52 was filed June 12,
1885.
It assailed the jurisdiction of the supreme court of Rhode Island over the subject-matter of the suit In equity brought by
Hazard, upon the ground that before bringing it neither the plaintiff therein, Isaac P.
Hazard, nor any other stockholder of the
Credit Mobilier of America, requested the
managing committee of the board of directors or the stockholders of that corporation to
begin legal or equitable proceedings against
Durant. The cause was heard upon demurrer before Judges Colt and Carpenter. The
demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed, the opinion of the circuit court being delivered by Judge Carpenter. (O. 0.) 28 Fed.
578.

James O. Carter, for appellants and plaintiffs in error. Ellas Merwin and Sam'l Maddox, for appellees and demandants in error.
Mr. Justice HARI/AN, after stating the
facts in the foregoing language, delivered the
opinion of the court
These four cases are so closely connected
In their facts, as well as In the questions of
law presented for determination, that It is
convenient to dispose of them by one opinion.
Our attention will be directed first to case
No. 50, In which a decree is sought to cancel,
or, in the alternative, to reform, the bond
of August 24, 18G8, executed by Durant as
principal, and by Griswold and Bradford as
sureties, and to restrain the defendants from
suing upon It In Its present form. The granting or refusing of such a decree depends, of
course, upon the inquiry whether the plaintiff Griswold has, by evidence sufficiently
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clear and conTlnclng, manifested bis right to
the relief asked.
While In respect to some matters there is
a conflict among the witnesses, certain facts
and circumstances are clearly established,
and may be summarized as follows: Durant,

in August, 1868, was a citizen and resident of
New York. He went to Newport for a brief
stay, and was there on the morning of Saturday, August 22d.
About noon of that day
the suit in which the writ of ne exeat issued
was commenced against him. He was then
sailing, with several friends, in his yacht on
the high seas. The yacht landed at the Newport wharf shortly before 11 o'clock at night.
Upon his stepping ashore he was notified by
two officers, who had kept continuous watch
for him at the wharf during the afternoon,
that they had a writ for his arrest, —meaning
the above writ of ne exeat,— and that he
must go to jail.
He accompanied them to
that place, one of the counsel of Hazard, Mr.
Peckham, following on foot to the sheriff's
office. Information of the arrest having been
communicated
to Mr. H. W. Gray, also a citizen of New York, temporarily at Newport,
that gentleman went to Griswold, who was
his imcle, and begged the latter to go to the
jail and become bail for Durant's appearance.
Griswold had only a slight acquaintance with Durant, never having met him until the spring of 1868, and held no personal
or business relations of any kind with him.
To oblige his nephew, who was Durant's
friend, and merely as an act of kindness and
courtesy to a stranger, (Griswold then resided in Newport,) he acceded
to the request
to become baU for Duranf s appearance
In
court, and for that purpose only went to the
jaU.
11
Hazard learned,
a little before
o'clock, that Durant had been arrested as he
landed from his yacht, and that owing to the
lateness of the hour the sheriff had taken
him directly to jaU instead of his own office,
"as had been previously arranged." He went
immediately to. the lodgings of one of his
attorneys, Mr. isradley, and caused him "to
go and see what could be done to prevent
Durant from remaining in Jail over Sunday;"
authorizing his attorney to use his name "for
the purpose of releasing said Durant from
jail until Monday, It being regarded as very
doubtful whether Durant In the short time
then remaining before Sunday would be able
to provide the necessary bonds."
Shortly after Griswold, accompanied by
Gray, reached the jail, the two counsel of
Hazard, namely, Bradley and Peckham, arrived there, and a few moments later Gov.
Van Zandt came in obedience to a message
from Durant, conveyed by Bradford, to act
as his counsel.
Hazard, It seems, did not
accompany his counsel to the jail.
It was
now nearly 12 o'clock.
All who were at the
Jail agree that they were there only because
of the arrest of Durant under a writ commanding the sheriff to take bail from him, in
the sum of $53,735, that he would not go or
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attempt to go into parts beyond the state
without the leave of the court, and, if such
bail were not given, to commit him to and
keep him in jail imtil he gave bail of his own
accord; and, such security being taken, the
officer was required by the writ to return a
certificate thereof to tiie court. There is no
claim that any one present was ignorant of
the terms of the writ, or of the extent of the
authority of the officer charged with Its execution. It Is further agreed by all the witnesses that there was a conversation at the
jail between the lawyers and Durant as to
what could be done in order to effect the latter's release.
But In this discussion or conversation Griswold took no part whatever.
That much Is distinctly stated by Peckham,
one of Hazard's attorneys who drew the
bond, and supervised the execution
of the
writ of ne exeat, although he says that the
sureties could not "help hearing, If they paid
any attention." It is equally beyond dispute
that the object of Griswold's presence at the
jail was well known to Hazard's attorneys.
Just here arises the difference among the
witnesses
as to what took place at the
jail. Detailing what occurred according to
his recollection at that place, Peckham says:
"When I got to the jail I found there Judge
Bradley, who had only preceded me there by
a minute or two; Mr. Durant;
Charles C.
Van Zandt, his counsel; Mr. Griswold; Dexter Bradford; and a stranger, who was, I
presume,
Mr. Gray. Mr. Van Zandt and
Judge Bradley were already talking about
the release of Mr. Durant from custody.
Judge Bradley said: 'That is a simple matter.
Let him give the bond called for by
the writ' The nature of that bond was
briefly explained. Mr. Dwant said that it
was out of the question for him to give It;
that he couldn't remain any longer in Rhode
Island; that his presence was absolutely demanded outside of the state, and forthwith;
and that he must leave here Monday morning.
It was suggested that he might file his
answer, and apply for the discharge of the
writ Immediately; but he said, 'I know what
in court are, and
proceedings
can't remain here at all.' It was then proposed that
he should give a bond in the same amoimt
marked in the two writs in the two cases,
conditioned to abide and perform whatever
decrees the court might make against him In
those suits. The nature of these proposed
bonds was freely discussed by Judge Bradley, Mr. Van Zandt, and Mr. Durant, and
the fact that they were bonds which would
hold the principal and sureties liable to pay
money In case Durant should not perform
any decree made by the court was commented on by Mr. Van Zandt and Mr. Durant.
During all this Interview Judge Bradley did
all the talking for the complainants, and Mr.
Van Zandt and Mr. Durant spoke about
equally for their side." The same witness
states: "Mr. Van Zandt having conferred
with Mr. Durant, and those two having

I
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the meeting at the jail: "It was proposed
conferred with the sureties,— I mean Mr.
by Judge Bradley that Dr. Durant should
Grlswold and Mr. Bradford,— Mr. Van Zandt
then announced
that they would give the give bond, with two sureties, which should
be substituted for the writ and the writ
As It was then very late.
bonds proposed.
I then understood from the conwithdrawn.
It was further agreed that all should meet
versation that the bond was in the nature of
at my office on the following Monday morna bail-bond, and that when the sureties deing, soon after midnight, and execute the
livered Dr. Durant into the custody of the
papers.
Besides
these honds, it was also
court, to either perform its orders and decounsel
should
agreed that the respective
crees personally, or to suffer such penalties
sign an agreement that upon the bonds bepersonally as the court might impose, they
ing executed the vrrits of ne exeat should be
absolutely discharged.
Just at the close of would comply with the conditions of the
Nothing was said in my presence by
bond.
the interview Judge Bradley addressed himself to all present, saying that he wished to any person inconsistent with these views."
Again, referring to what took place at the
the arrangemake sure that all understood
time the bond was actually signed, the same
ment alike, and he stated that Mr. Durant
was to give bonds, with Mr. Griswold and witness says: "A bond, prepared by Messrs.
Mr. Bradford as sureties, in the sums mark-'* Peckham and Bradley, was handed to me
' as counsel for Mr. Durant; there was some
ed in the writs, to abide and perform all the
decrees of the court in the suit; that counsel
little discussion as to whether it should be
made to the sheriff of Newport county, or
should sign agreements for the discharge ofthe writs; that all should meet at my office
to the complainants in the then suit.
Judge
Bradley preferred the latter, and it was so
soon after midnight Monday morning , and
sign the papers;
that in the meantime Mr.
done.
I told Mr. Durant that, in my opinion,
it was a proper bond to secure his appearDurant would go free from custody upon his
word of honor, and he appealed to the sureance in the suit, and the bond was then ex*
»
* I heard nothing said by
ties, saying: 'We rely upon you, gentlemen,
ecuted.
Judge Bradley or Mr. Peckham, except what
to see that he attends.'
We then separated.
I prepared the papers, and had them I have already stated; I myself told Mr.
lying upon my table when we met, pursuburant that, in my opinion, the instrument
They were read.
/was,
ant to the arrangement
in effect,
a
bail-bond."
Further:
Mr. Griswold took an active part at this '"There was nothing said or intimated by
any person in my presence or hearing on
meeting, and, I think, read the papers for
himself. The papers were signed without
that occasion to indicate thatffhe bond was
any objection or discussion
at that time.
a security instead of a
The statesuret^^
Probably we were not together at my office
ments of Gov. Van Zandt are fully sustained
Eeferring to the
by the depositions of Gray, Griswold, and
more than ten minutes."
interview at the jail, Bradley testified that
Durant.
nothing was said, to the best of his recolIn view of this great preponderance of
lection and belief, by any one, conveying the
evidence upon the side of the plaintiff, as
idea that the complainants were to obtain
to what occurred at the jail before the sepfrom the defendant only a bail-bond for his
aration of the parties to meet Monday mornappearance;
ing for the consummation of the business,
and that "the terms of the boud
were expressed so as to exclude the idea
the court is not at liberty to accept the acthat it was merely a bail for appearance,
count given by the defendants' attorneys of
and to provide that it should be a bond to
the interview of Saturday night. And we
abide and perform the order of the court."
have a strong conviction that the recollection
He further said that the bond "was to be
of Griswold, Gray, Durant, and Van Zandt
In all as to that interview, is sustained by all th(
a security," and it was so announced.
material respects his evidence was in accord
inherent probabilities of the case. And iii
with the recollection of Peckham.
saying this we would not be understood as
But there was other evidence which prereflecting upon the integrity of Hazard's atcludes our accepting the version of the aftorneys.
The difference in the recollection of
fair given by those gentlemen.
Gray, Grisgentlemen,
in respect to transactions in
wold, Durant, and Van Zandt, with more or
which they took part, often happens, withless distinctness, but all emphatically, state
out any reason to suspect that any of them
that neither at the jail Saturday night, nor
would intentionally deviate from the line
at the meeting before daylight on Monday
of absolute truth. Such differences existing,
morning, was there a hint, suggestion, or the court can only be guided by the weight
proposition, in any form, that Durant should
of the evidence, where the witnesses are ingive bond, with sureties, coi^ditioned that he
telligent, of equal credibility, and had equal
would abide and perform the decrees that
opportunities to know what occurred.
In
might be rendered in the Hazard suit, or
the first place, it is not at all probable that
that any bond was talked of except one that
Griswold would have executed the bond to
would make' the sureties responsible simply
question, as surety, if he had been informed,
for his appearance in the state, so as to be
or believed, that it bound him absolutely,
subject to the orders and process of the
within the amount specffied In such bond,
court
Gov. Van Zandt testifies, touching
for the payment of any sum adjudged
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against Durant,— almost an entire stranger
to him. In the next place, we cannot suppose that the lounsel who went to the jail to
represent the interests of Hazard, had any
other purpose In going there except to see
that that was, substantially, accomplished
which the writ of ne exeat authorized, namely, the obtaining of bail that would prevent
Durants departure from the state without
the leave of the court, and thus have him,
at all times, pending Hazard's suit, subject
to its rightful power in respect to any decree
to be rendered.
That was evidently Bradley's pm-pose, for, according to Peckham's
evidence, he suggested
that Durant could
effect his release by executing the bond specified in the writ.
But when the nature of
such a bond was explained, and it appeared
that the necessity for Durant' s being out of
the state on Monday rendered that course
entirely Impracticable, the latter was then
informed — ^according to the evidence of Peckham— that he could file an answer and apply
for the discharge of the writ immediately.
What was meant by this suggestion? It
could have meant but one thing, namely,
that it was in the power of Durant to obtain, without objection. If not of right, a
discharge
of the writ, after answering, by
executing a bond of some kind. A party arrested upon ne exeat may obtain the discharge of the writ, upon motion or petition,
and after notice, and according to some authorities, "it is a matter of course to order
the ne exeat to be discharged, upon the defendant's giving security to answer the complainant's bill, and to render himself amenable to the process of the court pending the
litigation, and to such process as may be issued to compel a performance of the final
* » * Or, where the defendant
decree.
cannot procure such security as will satisfy
the sherifC, or if he wishes to leave the state
before the termination of the suit, he may
apply to the court to discharge the ne exeat
upon his giving proper security to answer and
be amenable to process;
and upon such application the court will take such security
as it may deem sufficient, and will discharge
the sheriff from liability."
2 Barb. Ch. Prac.
655, 656;
Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606,
821; Bray ton v. Smith, 6 Paige, 489, 491;
McNamara v. Dwyer, 7 Paige, 239, 244.
also, Jae. Law Diet, tit
See,
"Ne Exeat
Regno;" Johnson v. Clendenin, 5 Gill & J.
463,
481. In Ee Griswold, 13 R. I. 126,
September
1880, Griswold,
determined
20,
by petition, sought to be discharged from the
bond in question on his principal's placing
himself within the jurisdiction of the court,
and subject to Its orders and decrees.
He
seems to have proceeded. In that case, upon the ground that he was entitled, of right,
to the order of discharge asked.
But the
supreme court of Rhode Island did not accept that view, observing that it could not
regard "a bond to abide and perform the decree as equivalent merely to a bond to abide
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the event of the suit."
To do so, the court
said, would be to ignore wholly the word
"perform" contained in the bond, which,
upon its face, appeared to be given by agreement of the parties. While it was there
said, and properly, that the court may require as a condition of the discharge of a
writ of ne exeat that the respondent give
security to perform the decree,— citing Robertson V. Wilkle, Amb. 177, and Atkinson v.
Leonard, 3 Brown, Ch. 218,— it was conceded
that "courts will generally discharge a wi'it
of ne exeat upon the respondents giving seciirity to abide the decree on the hearing of

the suit." If Durant had remained in Newport, and, upon filing his answer, had applied
for the discharge of the writ of ne exeat upon his giving bond with security simply to
abide the decree, and place himself, when
required, within the jurisdiction of the court,
it is inconceivable that the state court would,
under the circumstances, have denied his
application. But It was further said in that
case —and this is quite significant In its bearing upon another question to be presently
adverted to— that, "even if the bond in question was to be considered as having no other
effect than a bond to abide the decree made
upon hearing the cause, the petition could
not be granted in the present stage of the
proceedings.
No final decree In the cause
has yet been reached."
As, therefore, Durant could have filed
his answer, and, conformably to the general rule, have obtained a discharge of the
writ upon giving bond, with surety, that
he would be amenable to the orders and
process of the court; as he could not, consistently with his engagements,
remain in
Rhode Island long enough to have an answer prepared,
and to move for the discharge of the writ, upon sufficient bond to
be by him given; and as Hazard and his
counsel expressed
a desire that Durant
should not be held in custody over Sunday,—what more natural and equitable than
that the parties should, by consent, bring
about that which Durant must have understood from Bradley that he could accomplish, through the orders of the court, namely, iave a bond executed with sm*ety compelling his presence in the state when required by the orders of the court, or subjecting his sureties to personal liability If he did
not render himself amenable to Its process.
If the suggestion that Durant could file his
answer and apply to the court for the discharge of the writ (of course, upon bond
securing his amenability to the process of
the court) had been adopted, the plaintiff
would not have obtained a bond njaking the
surety absolutely responsible, within the
penal sum named In the writ and bond, for a
money decree against Durant.
It is therefore unreasonable to suppose that the parties
separated Saturday night under an agreement that Hazard should have from Durant
a bond that would subject his sureties to a
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larger responsibility than was involved in laid down that "a mere mistake of law,
stripped of all other circumstances, constithe suggestion made that Durant could obtain an order of court for the discharge of tutes no ground for the reformation of writthe v^rit.
On the contrary, it is more rea- ten contracts," yet "the rule that an admitted or clearly established misapprehension
sonable to suppose that the bond which, on
of the law does create a basis for the interSaturday night, was agreed to be executed
on the next Monday morning, was one that
ference of courts of equity, resting on discretion and to be exercised only in the most
would accomplish, by agreement of parties,
unquestionable and flagrant cases, is cerprecisely what Hazard's attorney suggested
tainly more in consonance with the best-conthat Dm-ant might accomplish by an order
of the parties
The agreement
sidered and best-reasoned
of court.
cases upon this
was thus made to take the place of an order point both English and American."
Snell v.
Insurance Co., 98 U. S. 85, 90, 92, 25 L. Ed.
of court, because Durant assured Hazard's
52; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. (Kedf. Ed.) §§ 138e,
attorneys that he could not remain in New138f; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron
port long enough to make a formal application for the discharge of the writ upon a Co., 102 Mass. 45, 48; Underwood v. Brockproper bond.
man, 4 Dana, 309, 316; Jones v. Clifford, 3
Oh. Div. 779, 791, 792; Canedy v. Marcy, 13
We are of opinion that, although the conGray, 373, 377; Green v. Railroad Co., 12
dition of the bond in question was that DuN. J. Eq. 165, 170; Beardsley v. Knight, 10
rant should "abide and perform the orders
and decrees" of the court in suit in which
Vt. 185, 190; State v. Paup, 13 Ark. 129;
it was given, all the parties, according to the 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. pt 1, 979-984; 2 Pom. Eq.
decided preponderance of evidence, intended
Jur. §§ 843-847.
to, at the time, as an instrument binding the
The conclusion reached upon this branch
sureties for the appearance of the principal
of the case is the only one consistent with
so as to be amenable to the process and defair dealing towards those who were willcrees of the court, upon default in which,
ing to become sureties for the appearance
and not before, were they to be liable to
of Durant If it be not justified upon the
pay the penalty. If the bond means, in law,
ground of mistake as to the mutual agreemore than that,—and counsel in this court
ment, superinduced by the conduct of the
agree that it does,— the case is one of a
party seeking 'now to take advantage of it
mutual mistake, clearly established,
as to
there could be no escape from the conclusion
the legal efCect of the instrument. There
that the taking of a bond that made Griswas no mistake as to the mere words of the wold absolutely liable as surety, for any
bond; for it was drawn by one of Hazard's
amount adjudged to be due from Durant
attorneys, and was read by Griswold before
and not greater than the penal sum named,
signing it But, according to the great was, under all the circumstances disclosed,
weight of the evidence, there was a mistake,
a fraud in law upon him; If the attorneys
on both sides, as to the legal import of the
of Hazard intended to obtain, by means of a
terms employed to give effect to the mutual
bond, more than he was entitled to by such
agreement.
In short, the instrument does a bond as the writ of ne exeat called for,
not express the thought and intention which
and more than the <;ourt would ordinarily
the parties had at the time of its execution.
have given them, upon Durant's application
And this mistake was attended by circumto discharge the writ; if they intended to
stances that render it inequitable for the
secure a bond that would make Griswold
obligees In the bond to take advantage of it.
personally liable, within the penal sum, for
The instrument was drawn by one of Hazany money decree passed against Durant,
ard's attorneys, and was presented and acthen a fraud was perpetrated upon him,
cepted as embodying tie agreement previwhich entitles him to relief; for, according
ously reached.
Griswold was unskilled in
to the decided preponderance of the evithe law, and took the word "perform" as
dence it must be assumed that Hazard's atimplying performance in the sense of Dutorneys knew that he signed the bond in the
rant's becoming amenable to the process of
belief that, pursuant to the previous imderthe court.
He had no reason— unless the 'standing, it was one to secure Durant's aprecollection of Gray, Durant, Van Zandt, and
pearance, nothing more, and yet they failed
himiself as to what occurred is wholly at
to inform him, at the time, that it was
fault— to doubt that the bond expressed the
drawn so as to impose upon him a much
real agreement;
especially if he heard Van
larger responsibility.
Their silence upon
Zandt's statement to Durant, when the latter
that question was, under the circumstances,
was about to sign the bond, that it "was, in
equivalent to a direct affirmation that the
effect,
a bail-bond."
A court of equity bond meant what Griswold supposed it did.
ought not to allow that mistake, satisfactoriIn view of what passed at the jail on Satly established and thus caused, to stand
urday night their diity was, by sufficient
uncorrected,
and thereby subject a surety to
explanation, to correct the misapprehension
liability he did not intend to assume, and under which he evidently labored. Besides,
which, according to the decided preponderthere can be no doubt, under the evidence,
ance of the evidence, there was at the time
that the agreement to discharge the writ
no purpose to impose upon him. While it is
was reached without consultation with Gris-
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between him and Griswold In the fall of the
year after the execution of the bond.
Peckham testifies: "About the last of October or
the 1st of November, 1868, along that time,
I met Mr. Griswold on Thames street, in
Newport, near my office. He spoke of this
I said, 'No;
bond as if it were a ball-bond.
it is a bond upon which you may be liable to
If, for example, the com't
pay money.
should find a judgment against Durant for
any sum of money, and he did not pay it,
you could be held for the amoimt named In
these bonds.'
He said, 'Well, I guess you
are right, but I must see Durant about, it.
He must do something about it.' I asked
him, 'Why, he is rich enough, isn't he?" and
Mr. Griswold said, 'Yes; he is rich enough,
but he Is reckless, and there Is no telling
how long such a man may stay pch, and he
must give me security.' I would like to add
here that I mentioned this to Mr.- Honey last
winter. Mr. Honey said that he was confident, from conversations he had had vnth
his client, Mr. Griswold, that Mr. Griswold
had no recollection of any such conversation
The concealment of this agreement from
with me; and I replied that, if Mr. Griswold
Griswold was, under the circumstances, a
did not recollect it, I should hesitate abo'ut
wrong to him. "The contract of suretyswearing to it, and that I did not think I
ship," says Mr. Story, "imports entire good
would swear to it under those circumstanfaith and confidence between the parties in
ces, and that certainly I would not like to
Any conregard to the whole transaction.
do so. Still I have felt bound to state it
cealment of material facts, or any express
here, upon further refieqtion, with these
explanations."
or implied misrepresentation of such facts,
If this be a correct stateor any undue advantage taken of the surety
ment of what passed between Peckham and
by the creditor, either by surprise or by
Griswold, upon the occasion referred to, it
withholding proper information,
vrill unis significant as showing that months after
doubtedly furnish a sufQcient ground to inthe bond was executed Griswold spoke of It
"If a party as a bail-bond. His declaration, after Peckvalidate the contract." Again:
taking a guaranty from a surety conceals ham's explanation of Its terms, "I guess you
from him facts which go to increase his risk,
are right," naturally meant no more than a
and suffers him to enter into the contract
without discussion,
courteous acquiescence,
under false impressions as to the real state in the opinion expressed by one learned in
of the facts, such a concealment will amoimt
the law. Griswold, while recalling the fact
to a fraud, because the party is bound to
that he expressed to Peckham his belief
make the disclosure."
1 Story, Bq. Jur. §|
that It was a bail-bond, denies explicitly that
To the same effect are Bank v. he, on that or any other occasion, ever admit324, 215.
Cooper, 36 Me. ISO, 196; Smith v. Bank, 1
ted that it was other than a bail-bond.
Dow, 272, 292; Kailton v. Mathews, 10 Clark
Besides, there was no absolute necessity
& F. 934, 943; Small v. Currie, 2 Drew. 102,
for Griswold's moving in the matter until
Phillips V. Foxall, L. R. 7 Q. B. 666, after some decree was passed against Du114;
672;
rant, and until an attempt was made to hold
Pidcock v. Bishop, 3 Barn. & O. 605;
Adams' Eq. 179. But we do not rest our
him personally responsible for the amount
He made an effort in Ee Grisflecision upon any groimd of fraud in law
of the bond.
wold, 13 R. I. 125, to be discharged from
or fraud in fact. We acquit the attorneys
of Hazard of any desire or purpose to do
his bond upon the principal's placing himself
Injustice to Griswold, or to commit a fraud
within the jurisdiction of the court. But, as
upon him. But we are constrained, by the
we have seen, the court, after declining to
discharge the bond, said that, even if the
■settled rules of evidence, to hold, as already
^,
Indicated, that their recollection of the cirbond In question was to be considered as
having no other effect than a bond to abide
cumstances
under which the bond of August 24th was executed is materially at fault,
the decree made upon hearing the cause,
and that the alleged mistake is
the petition for Its discharge would not be
established^
^ considered by it until a final decree was
by convincing proof.
The judgment in that case was
passed.
But it is said that Griswold was guilty
of such laches in seeking the relief now askpassed September 30, 1880.
Notwithstanded that he is not entitled to the aid of a
ing this announcement, and doubtless becourt of equity. This position is based princause of the intimation that the bond meant
more, in law, than he supposed,
cipally upon what Peckham says occurred
Griswold

No one of the witnesses, states that
wold.
he was consulted about that matter, or that
he was informed as to the legal result of
or order to discharge the writ.
-SLu agreement
He testifies that he knew nothing of any
So that while Hazard's atsuch agreement.
torney, according to his evidence, was preparing a bond that would bind Griswold
absolutely to pay any decree, not in excess '
that might be rendered against ^
of $53,735,
one who was almost a stranger to him, and
who, Hazard stated in his bUl, was then
engaged in hazardous speculations, and was
in a precarious condition pecuniarily, he was,
as the representative of Hazard, under an
agreement with Durant, of which Griswold
had no knowledge, that the writ of ne exeat
thus compelling the
should be discharged;
surety to risk the insolvency of the principal,
and putting it out of his power, for his own
protection,
to surrender the principal, and
obtain the cancellation of the bond, as. In
that case, the surety might have done. If
the bond had been, as he supposed it was,
one simply for the appearance of Durant.

f
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the present suit more than a year
before the decree was rendered against" Durant, and before the action at law was
brought on the bond.
Under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, we think the
defense
of laches Is without substantial
merit. Whether laches is to be Imputed to
a party seeking the aid of a court of equity
depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. There are no circumstances
here that would justify a refusal to grant
the relief asked because of Griswold's delay
in instituting suit to have the bond canceled
commenced

or reformed.

In the view the court takes of this case,
the proper decree to make, if Durant were
living, would be one reforming the bond
of August 24, 1868, so as to make Griswold
liable for the penal sum' named only in the
event that the principal failed to appear
and become subject to the orders and decrees of the court in the suit in which the
writ of ne exeat was issued. But such a
decree would not now be appropriate.
Under the circvunstances,
the only decree that
will accomplish the ends of substantial justice is one perpetually enjoining the prosecution of any action, suit, or proceeding
to
make him liable in any sum on or by reason
of said bond.
We come now to the action at law No. 53,
in which there was a judgment against
Griswold on the bond of August 24, 1868,
for the sum of $66,470. It is assigned for
error that the court sustained the demurrers
to the original second, third, fourth,
and
fifth pleas,
third,
ordered
the amended
fourth, and fifth pleas to be stricken from
the files, and denied the defendant's motions, at the trial, for judgment on his
eighth and ninth pleas.
It has been assumed in argument that the record in this case
substantially presents, among other questions, the following:
(1) Whether the bond
of August 24, 1868, was not obtained by
such fraud and concealment as rendered it
void as against Griswold.
(2) Whether upon the face of the record of the equity suit
in which the order or decree of December
2, 1882, was rendered the court was not without jurisdiction of the subject-matter of that
suit, the essential object of which, it Is argued, was to administer the affairs, and distribute the assets, of a Pennsylvania corporation, by means of decrees and orders of
a court in Rhode Island.
(3) Whether simple duress operating only on the principal in
the bond could be taken advantage of by
the surety. (4) Whether the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the stipulation of Griswold's
counsel, at the trial, that they were able to
prove, under the decree of December 2, 1882,
"an amount of damage in excess of the penal
sum of the bond declared on," could maintain an action on the bond for that or any
other sum, until it was ascertained and adjudged in Hazard's equity suit, what distinct
part, if any, of the $16,071,659.97 for which

Durant was adjudged by the supreme court
of Rhode Island to be accountable to the
Credit Mobilier of America, actually belonged, or would be ultimately awarded, to
the obligees In the bond.
These questions have been argued by the
counsel of the respective parties with signal
ability, and their Importance is recognized.
But, in view of the present condition of the
record of this ease, it is not deemed best
now to discuss them.
The ground upon
which the court below ordered the amended
pleas to be stricken from the files does not
appear.
It may be that the motion was
treated as a formal demurrer (Slocomb v.
Powers, 10 R. I. 255), or was granted because, in the judgment of the court, the
amended pleas did not materially change the
defense as presented in the pleas to which
special demurrers were sustained, and were
not, therefore, fairly embraced by the stipulation made by counsel for their being filed.
But, in our judgment, the amended pleas
were much broader, as well as mor^ specific in their averments, than were the original pleas; and the questions arising upon
them! could have been more appropriately
raised by demurrer. Smith v. Carroll (R. I.
July 19, 1890) 20 Atl. 227. We are the more
willing to make this disposition of the case,
because of the decision in case No. 50 in respect to Griswold's liability upon the bond
sued on.
In view of what has been there
said, the discussion of the above questions
would seem to be unnecessary.
The demurrer to the bill in No. 51 was
properly sustained. The error, if any, committed by the supreme court of Rhode Island
in not allowing the release, executed to Durant by the receiver in the Pennsylvania
court of the Credit Mobilier of America, to
be interposed as a defense in the suit
brought by Hazard against Durant and others, could not be corrected by bill in equity,
filed by a surety on the bond of August 24th;
for the reason, if there were no other, that
the release was delivered prior to the judgment in the state court constituting the basis
of the action at law on the bond.
The demurrer to the bill in case No. 52
was also properly sustained. In that case
the validity of the proceedings la the supreme court of Rhode Island, by Hazard
against Durant and others, was assailed
upon the ground that the bill in that suit
did not sufficiently show that any effort had
been made by Hazard, the plaintifC therein,
and who sued as stockholder, to procure
corporate action against Durant by the Credit Mobilier of America. It is only necessary
to say that this ground presents only a question of mere error in the judgment of the
state court, and does not affect its jurisdiction.
The decree In suit No. 50 must be reversed, with directions to enter a new decree perpetually enjoining the defendants
therein, and each of them', from prosecut-
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tng any suit, action, or proceeding against
Griswold on the bond executed by him on
the 24tb of August, 1868, as one of the
the decrees
sureties of Thomas O. Durant;
in cases Nob. 51 and 52 must be affirmed;
and the judgment in the action at law No.
53 must be reversed with directions for furnot Inconsistent with this
ther proceedings
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opinion. Griswold Is entitled to his costs
in this court in cases 50 and 53, and the
appellees in the other cases are entitled to
their costs here as against Griswold.
It is
so ordered.

BRADLEY and BREWER, JJ., did not
participate in the decision of this case.
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, X Appeal from district court, Slielby county;
> A. B. Tliornell, Judge.
Suit in equity to reform a cootract of asof certain accounts made by designment
f endant to plaintiffs, and to recover on the
contract so reformed the sum of $270, being
the value of certain machinery delivered by
plaintiffs to defendant in consideration of the
The defendant admitted the reassignment.
ceipt of the machinery, the assignment of the
accounts, and a certain modification of the
contract of assignment, but denied each and
every other claim of plaintiffs.
He also
pleaded an election of remedies on the part
of plaintiffs, by which they confirmed and
elected to stand on the original contract aa
made.
There was a trial to the court, and
judgment and decree for plaintiffs.
Defendant appeals.
Reversed.

f

Smith & Cullison, for appellant.
Phelps & Mosier, for appellees.

Nasb,

»BBMER, J. In the year 1891, plaintiffs,
a cf^artnership, were engaged in selling farm

machinery at the town of Audubon. Defendant had for a number of years prior thereto
been managing and conducting a farm in
Audubon county for his father. On or about
March lat, he moved onto a farm of his own,
in Shelby county, intending to cultivate It for
his own use and benefit.
Desirous of purchasing s(Hne farm implements,
he visited
plaintiffs' plaice of business, with the avowed
intention at securing the same. It appears
that the defendant was the owner of a stallion, which was "stood" fmr the season oA
1890 In Montgomery or Cass counties, by an
agent of def«idant, under an arrangement by
which the parties who received the services
of the stallion were to pay a certain amount
therefor in the event the mares bred to him
were got with foal; otherwise, nothing should
be paid.
The defendant was the own^r of
certain claims for services resulting from
the use of the stallion, which he prc^osed to
transfer to plaintiffs for the farm machinery
he de^red to purchase.
No agreement was
reached at the first interview, but it was arranged that defendant should see if he could
purchase the machinery of some other person at a lower price, and, if not, It was supposed that the negotiations would be renewed.
About March 27th, the defendant wrote
plaintiffs a letter of which the following is a
copy: "Marshall & Sharp: I dan make the
trade in Harlan, but tiiey are not so low
In price as you are. Jones would not make
the price he stated and furnish the goods
he nasmed.
Inclosed find assignment for
same.
Please sign and date, and keep one,
and send me one, and let me know by return mail, because I will want to know at
once if the deal is closed.
would come

I

I

'
but my house '^fiSaed to tEe "grbuml
last Saturday night, and
cannot
leave.
Very truly, O. D. Westrope." In this letter
was inclosed a contract for the plaintiffs' signature, the material parts of which are as
follows: After stating that plaintiffs had sold
certain machinery to defendant. It recites:
"That, as payment therefor, the said O. D.
Westrope enters into and does hereby assign
and transfer to said Marshall & Sharp the
following accounts for services of the stallion named General Duke, in the year 1890,
to wit: [Here follows a list of the accounts,
with the amounts of each set out, aggregating the sum of $300.] The said Marshall &
Sharp taking and accepting said accounts in
full satisfaction of said claim; the said 0.
D. Westrope hereby agreeing that all Jggjp
not paid for by July 1st, 1891, that he will
pay to said Marshall & Sharp such account
remaining unpaid, and said account so paid
by him to be reassigned to him.
Marshall
Dated at Audu& Sharp.
O. D. Westrope.
bon, la., March 28, 1891."
These contracts
were signed by appellees as indicated, and
one of th»n (there being two) was returned
to appellant, and the other retained by appellees.
Afterwards one of the articles called for by the contract was substituted by another, and all the goods with the substitute
But
Bamed were shipped to the appellant.
three of the mares served to appellant's horse
proved to be with foal, and appellees received but $30 from the accounts so assigned.
The other accounts never matured, because
the mares did not prove to be with foaL Vaa
appelant, being called upon to make payment of the balance of the purchase price,
refused, claiming that he had fully performed his contract.
The appellees thereupon Instituted an action at law against the appelant, alleging (1) that appellant had ^x>ciired Its signature to the contract by fraud and
misrepresentation; (2) that there was an Implied warranty In the sale of 'Uie accounts,
to the effect that they were snbt^sting and
against the parties whose acemforceaUe
counts they purported to be; and (3) that appellant received the property without any
consideration therefor having been paid 1^
him. The appellant made an issue of fact
oa. the first claim, and demurred to the second and third. The demurrer was sustained
as to the third, and overruled as to the second.
Defendant theretrpon answered the second, pleading that, under the arrangements
had with those who secured the services of
his stallion, It was agreed
that nothing
should be paid unless the mares were got
with foal; that plaintiffs knew of this arrangement when they accepted
the assignment
of the accounts.
Thereupon plaintiffs amended their petttion by adding another count, in
which they claimed that, by mutual mistake,
or Ijy mistake on their part and fraud on defendant's, the words "foals" was inserted in
that i»art of the contract containing the guar- \
anty, instead of the word "aceoants"; SldsJ
over,
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they asked that the mistake be corrected, and
A moticm was then
the contract reformed.
filed by defendant attacking the petition on
This motion was
the ground of misjoinder.
sustained, but pUiintiS& were permitted to file
this btst count as an independent action in
Certain pleadings were filed attackequity.
ing this equitable pleading, which need not
be referred to, and finally the defendant answered, admitting the receipt of the goods as
alleged, but denying the fraud and mistake.
He also pleaded that plaintiffs, by the institution of the law action, had confirmed the contract, and elected to stand thereon, and that
they could not now be allowed to repudiate
it; and that the contract was merged in a
judgment by which the rights of the parties
were fuUy determined. Defendant also pleaded that plaintiffs, with full knowledge of the
contents of the written contract, and that the
word "foals" was used therein, confirmed the
^
same, and elected to stand by the conditions
thereof.
The plaintiffs filed a' reply, denying
this last claim of defendant, and also filed a
demurrer to that part of the answer pleading an election and confirmation. This demurrer was submitted with the case, and the
court, in rendering the decree, sustained the <
df
if demurrer, reformed the contract as prayed,! :
I' and rendered judgment for plaintiffs.
DeV
^\ fendant excepted to the rulings, and appeals.
1.

The first point relied upon by appellant

is that the court erred in -sustaining the demurrer to that part of his answer pleading
It is said that
election and confirmation.
plaintiffs, by reason of having commenced
their suit at law, elected to rely upon the
contract, and that they cannot now be allowed to change front, and seek to have it
reformed.
The question presented is not
open for our consideration.
The suit is an
equitable one, triable de novo in this court,
upon the issues of fact presented to the lower court; and, while the appellant might
also have the case considered on error, yet,
to do so, he must assign the errors of which
he complains.
Powers v. O'Brien Co., 54
Iowa, 501, 6 N. W. 720; Patterson v. Jack,
59 Iowa, 632, 13 N. W. 724; Hodgln v. Toler, 70 Iowa, 21, 30 N. W. 1.
There is no assignment of errors, and we cannot, therefore,
review the action of the trial court in sustaining appellees' detnurrer. It may not be
inappropriate to say, however, that we do
not think the facts as pleaded in defendant's answer constitute such an election of
remedies, or such a claim of right, as prevents the appellees from asking for a reformation of the e<ntract upon which the suit
is founded.
2. The appellees alleged in their petition
that the contract of sale "did not express the
real contract entered into between plaintiff
and defendant, • • • In that the word
foals' was, by fraud or mistake of the defendant, used in the place of the word 'ac• • • but that plaintiff, through
counts,'
mistake as to the contents of said instruH.& B.BQ.(2d Ed.)— 14
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ment, believed that the word 'accounts' waa
used in the said instrument where the word

foals' is found, and was thereby induced
to sign the said instrument."
In an amend-

ment to the petition, the appellees said "that'
either said instrument did not express the
Intention and real contract of the parties
signing the same by reason of the mistake of
both parties or of the scrivener drawing the
same, or that the defendant fraudulently presented the same to plaintiffs, intending that
plaintiffs should be misled thereby, and
knowing that plaintiffs were in error as to
the terms and to its sufficiency to express
the contract between them." It is now insisted that the evidence does not sustain either claim. It seems to us that this is true
In so far as it relates to the alleged mistake
of fact recited in the original petition. The
evidence conclusively shows that both members of plaintiffs' firm knew when they signed the contract just what it contained. They
knew that the word 'foals" was used. InThey talked
stead of the word "accounts."
about the contract with each other before
signing it The defendant says that there
was no mistake; that the language tiscd
was just as he intended. Manifestly, there \
was no such mistake of fact as to justify a i
reformation of the instrument, for the plain I
reason that neither party was mistaken in /
regard to what was in fact in the contract.
A mistake, to be such as the law will relieve
from, must be mutual and reciprocal. When
/the contract as executed is just as the par- I
ties intended to make it, the court has no |
power to reform it because of mistake of
fact. To do so would be making a new
contract for the parties, and would also Impose upon one burdens which he did not inNo court has the power to
tend to assume.
make a new c<mtract for the parties. It can
only do what the parties mutually and manifestly intended at the time they signed the
same.
The mistake made, if any, was with
reference to the eflScacy of the terms used to
carry out the intent of the parties, and this
is the real claim made by the app^ees. We
have, then, the question:
Will a court of
equity reform a contract tmder such circumstances? In the case of Lee v. Percival, 52
N. W. 543, we held, following the rule laid
down by Prof. Pomeroy in his work on E)quity Jurisprudence, that "if, on the other
hand, after making an agreement, in the process of reducing it to a written form, the Instrumait, by means of a mistake of law,
fails to express the contract which the parties actually entered into, equity wiU interfere with the appropriate relief, either by
way of defense to its enforcement or by
cancellation or reformation, to the same extent as If the failure of the writing to express the real contract was caused by a
In this Instance there is
mistake of fact
no mistake as to the legal import of the contract actually made; but the mistake of
law prevents the real contract from being

\
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In the written Instrument."
counterpart of this proposition announced by
Prof. Pomeroy is: "The doctrine Is settled
that, in general, a mistake of law, pure and
simple, is not adequate ground for relief."
"The rule is well settled that
Section 842.
a simple mistake by a party as to the legal
effect of an agreement which he executes, or
as to the legal result of an act which he
performs, is no ground for either defensive
or affirmative . relief. * • • The principle
underlying this rule is that equity will not
interfere for the purpose of carrying out an
Intention which the parties did not have
when they entered into a transaction, but
which they might or even would have had if
they had been more correctly informed as to
the law,— if they had not been mistaken as
to the legal scope and effect of their transaction."
"If an agreement is
Section 843.
what it was intended to be, equity will not
interfere with it because the parties have
mistaken its legal Import and effect." Section 845.
We now have the two rules stated
as concisely as general principles may be,
and it is next important to determine under
which of them this case falls.
We have
seen that if the parties, at the time they
made their agreement,— at the time their
minds met, —mutually understood that the
defendant was to guaranty all the accounts
which he transferred to plaintiffs, but that,
in the process of reducing their agreement
to writing, they used the word "foals" under
the mistaken idea that it was as broad as
the word "accounts," then equity will afford
relief. But if they made an agreement that
defendant should guaranty the foals, under
the mistaken idea that this would be a guaranty of the accounts, then no relief can be
granted. It Is also a well-settled and oftrepeated rule of law that, before mistakes
of either fact or law can be relieved from
either affirmatively or negatively, it is essential that the proofs be clear, strong, convincing, and free from reasonable doubt
Gelpcke v. Blake, 15 Iowa, 387; Clute v. Frazier (Iowa) 12 N. W. 327
There Is another
rule which It may be well to note, as it is
relied upon by the appellees in this case. It
is as folloVs: "A mistake which will warrant a court of equity in reforming a written contract must be a mistake made by
both parties to the agreement, or it must be
the mistake of one party by which his intentions have failed of correct expression,
and there must be fraud in the other party
in taking advantage of the mistake, and obtaining a contract with the knowledge that
the one dealing with him Is in error as to
what are its terms." Bryce v. Insurance
Co., 55 N. T. 243; Winans v. Huyck, 71 Iowa,
459, 32 N. W. 422.
Another principle which
is suggested by appellant may also be stated.
It is to the effect that a mistake caused
by the want of that care and diligence in the
transaction which should be used by every
person of reasonable prudence, and the abembodied
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sence of which would be a violation of legal
duty, will not be relieved from by a court
of equity.
TJurning now to the evidence, we find that
It establishes the following facts: The defendant, desirous of purchasing some farm
machinery, visited the plaintiffs, and received
from them their lowest and besj price therefor. He then offered to exchange some accounts in payment or as collateral security
for the purchase prica
The plaintiffs would
not accept these accounts without a guaranty
from the defendant, and they so told him.
Defendant then said he would be responsible
and pay all accounts that were not paid and
turned over to plaintiffs by July 1st The
plaintiffs then said they would accept the
proposition. AU parties understood at the
time the condition of the accounts,— that the
parties against whom they purported to be
were not to be responsible unless th% mares
proved to be with foaL The defendant
wished to do a little more figuring, and said
that he was going over to his farm, and
would look the matter up a little further,
and would write what he concluded to do
about the matter.
It was further agreed
that if the trade was consummated, the
goods should be shipped to defendant over
the Rock Island Railroad.
The next plaintiffs heard from defendant was by letter of
date March 27, 1891, a copy of which we have
already given.
When plaintiffs signed the
contract which was inclosed in defendant's
letter, they understood they were carrying
out the arrangements previously made.
Some time in September of the year 1891, the
plaintiffs ascertained they were not going
to receive more than $30 from the accounts
which were assigned them, and they called
on defendant for payment
Defendant put
them off from time to time, and finally announced that he intended to stand. upon his
contract
When plaintiffs signed the contract they knew the words it contained, and
their mistake, which we are abundantly satisfied they made, was as to the legal effect
thereof. We feel quite certain that the defendant when he first talked to the plaintiffs, intended to guaranty all the assigned
accounts, and not those only which fully matured.
It is not so clear, however, that he.
In drafting the contract, intended, by the
words used, to make himself responsible for
the accounts without reference to the foals.
Now, in applying the law to these facts,
the first inquiry is, what was the contract
as actually entered into by the parties? for
it must be remembered that this is not a suit
to cancel or set the writing aside, but to
make it conform to the real agreement of
the parties. If, then, the instrument itself
Is the contract the parties in fact made,
then there is nothing to reform. But if they
made a parol contract— if there was in fact
a meeting of the minds of the parties,— and
they made a mutual mistake in reducing it
to writing, and used terms which did not
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express tbe real contract
between them,
equity will reform the instniment to make it
with the contract as actually
correspond
It is apparent from what we have
made.
said, as well as from some other circmnstantake the
ces in the case which we cannot
space to state, that, while the parties were

making propositions and negotiations with
each other for a trade, their minds never in
fact met mitil the plaintiffs signed the written instrument which was sent for their signature.
This was the contract between the
parties; and although it did not, for lack of
apt words, express what they thought it did,
this was the only agreement they made.
It is well to inquire what other contract
did they in fact make which should be givThe answer is, none.
en force and vitality^
The whole matter as it stood at the end of
the personal interview between the parties
was i»the form of propositions by one to
The acceptance by the ,defendant
the other.
was not of the offer made hiih by the plainHe in truth sent another proposition
tiffs.
when he mailed the contracts signed by himself.
These contracts were not in accord
with the previous negotiations of the parties;
but the plaintiffs, when they signed them,
Imew full well what they contained, and, if
any agreement was made, it was the one exIt may be that, bepressed in the writing.
cause of a mistake of law, the minds of the
But, if this be conceded,
parties never met
it wUl not aid the plaintiffs; for they are
insisting upon the performance of a contract
They are
which they say they did make.
not suing to avoid an instrument because
Moreover, if they
they never agreed to It
were asking cancellation or rescission, their
own negligence in signing the contract would
seem to be a bar to relief of this kind.
There is no evidence of fraud of any kind
on the part of the defendant
He forwarded such an agreement as he proposed to make
with the plaintiffs, and they, without any
kind of Imposition, misrepresentation, con-
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cealment, or other inequitable conduct on defendant's part, signed the instrument with
fuU knowledge of what it contained.
Ttie
most that can be claimed from the evidence
Is that the defendant forwarded the instrument with intent to induce plaintiffs to believe that it was in accord with the previous
negotiations, but this is a mere inference,
which is squarely denied by the defendant.
The presumptions are with the defendant,
and the rule is well settled that fraud will
not be presumed, but must be proved by him
who alleges it
An insuperable objection to relief on the
ground of fraud is the negligence
of the
plaintiffs in signing the instrument
They
had the same means of knowledge as to the
legal effect of the words used as the defendant; and, if they were mistaken as to the
proper legal construction thereof. It was not
due, so far as we can learn from the record,
to any fault of the defendant
The case,
then, is one of mistake of law, pure and simple, and a court of equity cannot reform it
If we should attempt to do so, we would
make a new contract for the parties, and impose upon one of them burdens to which he
has never assented.
While it may seem like
a hardship to say that plaintiffs shall not
recover for the machinery delivered defendant, yet the case is one of mistake of law, in
which some person must suffer; "and the
law wisely, though sometimes with great apparent hardship, leaves it for him to suffer
who committed the mistake."
These conclusions are supported by the following, among other, authorities:
Reed v.
Root, 59 Iowa, 359, 13 N. W. 323; Moorman
V. Collier, 32 Iowa, 138; Stafford v. Fetters,
55 Iowa, 484, 8 N. W. 322; Baker v. Massey,
50 Iowa, 399; Nowlin v. Pyne, 47 Iowa, 293;
HaUam v. Corlett, 71 Iowa, 446, 32 N. W. 449.
See, also, the cases cited in the first part of
this opinion.
It follows from what we have said that the
judgment must be reversed.
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18,
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Appeal from circuit court, Charlevoix counG. Ramsdell,
Jonathan
ty, in chancery;
Judge.
Suit to foreclose a mortgage by Louisa
Renard against Alice A. Clink, Eliza S. Fogg,
John Nichols, and Walter L. French. Bill
Reversed.
Complainant appeals.
dismissed.
Norton & Keat, for appellant
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S.

H. Clink,

MONTGOMERY, J. The bill In this cause
was filed to foreclose a mortgage executed by
the defendant Alice A. Clink to one A. H.
Van Dusen, and by him assigned to complainant. The other defendants are subsequent purchasers with notice, after the mortgage became due. A foreclosure at law was
attempted, a sale made, and a deed executed
to complainant; but, owing to the fact that
the assignment of the mortgage to complainant was not of record at the time of said
attempted foreclosure, that proceeding proved
After the complainant had obineffectual.
tained her deed on the foreclosure at law, and
before the filing of the present bill, the defendant Clink tendered to complainant the
amount due upon the mortgage, exclusive of
the costs of such former foreclosure; and In
this proceeding it is daimed that such tender
operated to discharge the lien of the mortgage.
The court below sustained this defense, and dismissed the biU.
It is made clear by the testimony that the
complainant, at the time she refused the tender, supposed that she had acquired title by
her former foreclosure,
ahd that, notwithstanding this, she was ready to accept the
amount of the mortgage, interest, and costs.
It also appears that she offered to take the
money tendered so far as it would go, but
that defendant refused to permit this unless
she would accept it in full payment and discharge of the mortgage.
Under these circumstances, we think the court below erred in
dismissing the bill. Under the repeated rulings of this court, a tender of the full amount
due upon the mortgage will operate to discharge the lien of the mortgage if the tender
Moynabe refused without adequate excuse.
han V. Moore, 9 Mich. 9; Bslow v. Mitchell,
26 Mich. 500; Sager v . Tupper, 35 Mich. 134;
Stewart v. Brown, 48 Mich. 383, 12 N. W. 499.
But In the present case it appears beyond
question that the complainant had no purpose
of exacting from the defendant any sum be^
yond what she believed to be her legal due.

While it Is a general rule that equity will not
relieve against a mistake of law, this rule is
not universal.
Where parties, with knowledge of the facts, and without any inequita,ble incidents, have made an agreement or
other instrument as they intended it should
be, and the writing expresses the transaction
as it was understood and designed
to be
made, equity will not allow a defense, or
grant a reformation or rescission, although
one of the parties may have mistaken or misconceived its legal meaning, scope, or effect
Martin v. Hamlin, 18 Mich. 354; Lapp v.
Lapp, 43 Mich. 287, 5 N. W. 31T. But where
a person is ignorant or mistaken with respect
to his own antecedent and existing private
legal rights, interest, or estate, and enters into some transaction the legal scope and operation of which he correctly apprehends and
understands, for the purpose of affecting such
assumed rights, interests, or estates, equity
will grant Its relief, defensive or affirmative,
treating the mistake as analogous to, if not
Identical with, a mistake of fact 2 Pom.
Eq. § 849, p. 314; Reynell v. Sprye, 8 Hare,
222; Blakeman v. Blakeman, 39 Conn. 320;
Whelen's Appeal, 70 Pa, St 410; Hearst v.
Pujol, 44 Cal. 230; Morgan v. Dod, 3 Colo.
551; Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149;
Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 2 Jac. & W. 205.
In Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 517, the mortgagor filed his bill to set aside a mortgage
sale, and asked that the premises be relieved
from the mortgage lien. The court found
that the mortgagee was mistaken as to his
rights, but was acting in good faith, and ,
Jegal
efused to enforce the statutory penalty, and
^'decreed that the mortgagor pay the mortgage
debt as a condition to relief. In Canfleld v.
^Conkling, 41 Mich. 371, 2 N. W. 191, a bill
was filed to set aside a mortgage, and to recover the penalty for refusal to discharge it
on tender of the amount due.
The court
found that the tender was sufficient, and say:
"He [defendaat] was bound to accept the tender, and complainant had made out a sufficient
case for relief. But the question was one on
which he might be mistaken without any
serious fault, and we do not think it one
where the mortgage ought to be held canceled without payment; nor is It a case calling for the statutory penalty for a willful and
knowing wrongful refusal to discharge the
mortgage." The decree below should be reversed, and a decree entered in this court
providing for a sale of the mortgaged premises to satisfy the amount due and unpaid upon the mortgage.
The defendant will recover
the costs of the court below, and the complainant will be entitled to the costs incurred
In this court The other justiceB concurred.
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EASTIN,

J. This

equitable

action

was

brought by appellant to rescind a contract
made with appellee by which, as alleged, he
was Induced to accept, in satisfaction of a
loss under a policy of insurance issued to
him by appellee, an amount equal to one-half
of that loss and to one-half of the amount
in the policy.
As
of insurance named
grounds of rescission, the petition charges
that appellant was ignorant of his legal

rights under the policy, and that, through
fraud and imposition practiced upon him by
appellee's agents, and by wiUful misrepresentations made by them as to his rights under the contract of insurance, he was induced to accept a part of his claim in satisfaction of the whole. The chancellor sustained a general demurrer to the petition,
and, appellant declining to plead further, his
petition was dismissed, from which ruling
this appeal Is prosecuted; so that the only
question for consideration here is whether
or not the facts alleged In the petition, and
admitted by the demurrer, are sufficient in
equity to entitle appellant to the relief sought.
The petition charges, in the fullest and
strongest terms, appellant's ignorance of the
rights and obligations of the parties under
the policy of insurance, and full knowledge
on part of appeUee both as to the rights of
the parties and as to appellant's ignorance of
them, as well as false and fraudulent misrepresentations
agents
made by appellee's
for the purpose of deceiving, and which did
deceive, appellant, as to the validity of his
claim under the policy.
It charges, among
other things, that appellee fully understood
its liability to appellant for the full amount
of his loss; that he was ignorant of the law
governing
his rights and appellee's obligations, while appellee both knew his rights
and knew that he was ignorant of them,
and with this knowledge, and intending to
deceive and defraud him, fraudulently represented to him that, by reason of an incumbrance on a part of the insured property, hia
entire claim under the policy was forfeited;
that these false representations were made
to him by appellee for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding him; and that by
these false and fraudulent representations,
and through ignorance of his legal rights, he
was induced to accept the sum of $400 In
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satisfaction of a loss of $800, when, except
for these fraudulent representations and his
Ignorance, he would not have done so. These
charges being admitted, it seems to us that
the case presented involves something more
than an effort to obtain relief purely on the
ground of a mistake of law, or mere Ignorance on part of appellant as to his legal
rights under the contract of insurance.
It
becomes, in addition to this, a case of actual
fraud, where, by fraudulent misrepresentations, made for the purpose and with the
intent to deceive, the known Ignorance of one
of the parties to the contract has been willfully taken advantage of, and he has thereby been induced to surrender a valid, subsisting right without consideration.
It is
true that the ignorance relied upon Is an
Ignorance of law, rather than of facts, and
that this is not always or perhaps generally,
and when standing alone, available as a
ground of relief against an executed contract, no matter how inequitable it may be.
On this point the decisions of the courts of
this country, as well as the English courts,
are by no means uniform; but, in our opinion, the weight of authority and the decisions of this court would now forbid that a
party who, with fuU knowledge of the ignorance of the other contracting party, has not
only encouraged that ignorance, and made
it the more dense by his own false and fraudulent misrepresentations, but has willfully
deceived and led that other into a mistaken
conception of his legal rights, should shield
himself behind the general doctrine that a
mere mistake of law affords no ground for
relief.
This view seems to be upheld by
many, if not all, of the modem text writers
who are recognized as authority on the question. Mr. Kerr, in his well-known work, in
treating of this subject, says: "But if it appear that the mistake was induced or encouraged
by the misrepresentations of the
other party to the transaction, or was perceived by him, and taken advantage of, the
court will be more disposed to grant relief
than in cases where it does not appear that
Kerr, Fraud
he was aware of the mistake."
& M. pp. 399, 400. And, in his work on
Equity, Mr. Bispham lays down this doctrine
in even stronger and less uncertain terms.
He says: "Where Ignorance of the law exists on one side, and that ignorance is known
and taken advantage of by the other party,
the former will be relieved. More particularly wUl this be so if the mistake was encouraged
or induced by misrepresentations
Bisp. Eq. § 188.
of the other party,"
Under the admitted facts of this case and the
circumstances surrounding and leading up to
the mistake relied on here, it is clearly
brought within the text above quoted; and
many other authorities to the same effect,
including reported eases in many of the
states of this Union, might be cited, If It
were necessary.
We fully recognize the wisdom of that rule
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which always Inclines the courts to uphold
enforce the validity of voluntary compromises and adjustments between parties
of their legal differences, when fairly arrived at. Nor would any mere ignorance
of or mistake in the law governing any
doubtful and disputed legal proposition, on
part of either of the parties to the compromise, in the absence* of evidence tending
to show that he has been overreached or unfairly dealt with or taken advantage of, and
by a good consideration,
where supported
be sufficient, in our Judgment, to justify the
rescission of a compromise settlement deliberately made between parties, standing
upon an equal footing, and with full knowledge of all the'facts.
If every mistake of
law were sufficient to warrant the interference of the courts, then no compromise
of a disputed legal proposition would be
final, for in every such case one party or
the other to the controversy is mistaken as
Upon the record beto the law of the case.
fore us, there may be some question as to
how far there was a controversy between
these parties over any doubtful legal question that might have been litigated in court,
or exactly what was the nature and extent
of the same. It is alleged in the petition
that . appellee claimed that all rights of appellant under his policy of insurance were
forfeited by reason of the existence of an
incumbrance upon a part of the insured
property; but it is further alleged that appellee, at the time the contract of insurance
was mp 'te, "had full knowledge of the same,
and, having such knowledge, made the contract, and issued
the policy aforesaid."
This allegation is admitted to be true, and,
in the absence of anything further in the
pleading pertaining to this point, we are
unable to see in this the basis of a doubtful
disputed legal proposition which might have
been litigated in the courts, or to know ecactly what controversy was settled by the
parties. But waiving the question as to the
benature and extent of the controveirsy
tween appellant and appellee, and reverting
to the character of the compromises which
courts will uphold, we now quote from another text writer, who uses this language,
to wit: "Voluntary settlements are so favored that if a doubt or dispute. exists between parties with respect to their rights,
and all have the same knowledge or means
of obtaining knowledge concerning the circumstances involving these rights, and there
is no fraud, misrepresentation, concealment,
or other misleading incident, a compromise
into which they thus voluntarily enter must
stand and be enforced, although the final issue may be difCerent from that which was
anticipated, and although the disposition
made by the parties in their agreement may
not be that which the court would have decreed had the controversy been brought before it for decision.
Of course, there must
not only be no misrepresentation, imposition,
and

or concealment; there must also be a full disclosure of all material facts within the
knowledge of the parties, whether demanded or not by the others." Pom. Eq. Jur. §
850.
Under the authorities quoted, it is
manifest that the compromise contract
sought to be rescinded here is within the
control of a court of equity, and may be
And now, referring to the deset aside.
cisions of this court, and to the doctrine established in this state, it seems to us still
clearer that the contract complained of, and
which was made under the circumstances
set forth in the petition and admitted by appellee, cannot be sustained. In an exhaustive opinion. In which the authorities were
ably reviewed, by Judge Robertson, after referring to the difficulty of determining in
every case when a contract was, in fact,
made under a mistake of law, it is said:
"When it can be made perfectly evident that
the only consideration of a contract was a
mistake as to the legal rights or obligations
of the parties, and when there has been no
fair compromise of bona fide and doubtful
claims, we do not doubt that the agreement
might be avoided on the ground of a clear
mistake of law, and a total want, therefore,
Underwood
of consideration or mutuality."
In the case of
V. Brockman, 4 Dana, 309.
Bay V. Bank, 3 B. Mon. 510, this court referred to and approved the above case, and
said: "Upon the whole, we would remark
that whenever, by a clear and palpable mistake of law or fact, essentially bearing upon
and affecting the contract, money has been
paid without cause or consideration, which
in law, honor, or conscience was not due and
payable, and which in honor or good conscience ought not to be retained, it was and
ought to be recovered back." Both of these
cases are cited with approval in the case of
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hopkins Co., 87
Ky. 613, 9 S. W. 497, and the doctrine laid
down therein has not been departed from
by this court. It will be seen that the question of fraud did not enter into the decision
of either of those cases, but that they are
almost entirely based upon the fact that
there was no good consideration to uphold
the contracts; that it was not a fair compromise of bona fide and doubtful claims;
and that the money was not in law, honor,
or conscience payable, and ought not in
honor or good conscience to be retained.
If, for these reasons, a contract made under a clear mistake of law may be set aside,
then how much stronger reason is there for
annulling the contract under consideration?
Not only was this contract, according to this
record, as it comes before us, wholly without consideration, and not only was the
money surrendered by appellant on his claim
not due in law, honor, or conscience, and
surrendered only under a clear mistake of
law, but it is further admitted by the demurrer that this contract was obtained, and
that appellant was induced to surrender one-
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half of his claim, by the actual false and
fraudulent misrepresentations of appellee,
knowingly made for the purpose of deceiving and diefrauding appellant
We are clearly of the opinion that the chancellor erred
in sustaining the demurrer to the petition,
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and, for the reasons Indicated, his Judgment
dismissing appellant's petition is reversed,
and the action is remanded, with directions
to set aside that order, and to overrule the
demurrer, an4 give appellee leave to file an
answer.
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MITCHELL, J.

B.

South-

Action to recover back the
paid by plaintiff to defendant for a
quitclaim deed of a piece of land in the village
of Jordan.
The facts, as disclosed by the
evidence, are that defendant platted into lots
a tract of land, of which he was the owner,
lying between Water street and Sand creek.
As shown upon the plat, the north and south
lines of the lots extend from Water street
to the creek. The distance marked on the
plat gave the length of these lines as 80 feet,
but the actual distance from Water street to
tlie creek was 110 feet. One of these lots,
and the adjoining 35 feet of another, had
according to
been conveyed by defendant,
the plat, to plaintiff or plaintiff's grantor.
defendant claimed and stated
Subsequently
to plaintiff, in substance, that the lots only
extended back 80 feet, according to the distance Indicated on the plat, and hence that
he still owned the strip of 30 feet next to the
creek. Plaintiff Icnew that defendant's claim
was based whoUy upon the theory that the
given on the plat would control,
distance
and hence that his claim of title was in fact
but expressions of opinion as to the legal effect and construction to be given to the
plat. So far as the evidence shows, defendant made this claim in good faith, and honestly supposed that his deeds of the lots only
cohveyed 80 feet. Plaintiff took the matter
under consideration for nearly a month, and
went to the register's ofllce and examined
the plat for himself. He then obtained from
defendant and wife a quitclaim deed of all
the land down to the creek, and paid therefor the money which he now seeks to recover. When he paid the money he knew all
the facts, and had the same means of knowledge of them which defendant had. The
transaction was unaffected
by any fraud,
money

trust, confidence, or the like. The parties
dealt with each other at arm's length. Plaintiff was not laboring under any mistake of
facts. He took the deed and paid bis money
under a mistake of law as to his antecedent
existing legal rights tn the property, supposing that, according to the proper legal construction of the plat, the lots were only 80
feet deep. However, under the doctrine of
Nicolin v. Schneiderhan, 37 Minn. 63, 33 N.
W. Rep. 33, since decided by this court, it
is now settled that a deed of lots according to
this plat would cover all the land down to
the creek, under the rule that distances must
yield to natural boundaries called for In a
deed. We are unable to see that this case
differs in principle from Perkins v. Trinka,
30 Minn. 241, 15 N. W. Hep. 115, and HaU v.
Wheeler, 37 Minn. 522, 35 N. W. Rep. 377.
It Is unnecessary to enter into any discussion of the question (left in great confusion
in the books) when, if ever, relief will be
granted on the ground of mistake in law
alone, or whether there is any difference between mistake of law and ignorance of law,
or between ignorance or mistake as to a
general rule of law and ignorance or mistake
of law as to existing individual rights in the
property which is the subject-matter of the
contract. We hold that money paid under
mistake of law cannot be recovered back
where the transaction Is unaffected by any
fraud, trust, confidence, or the like, but both
parties acted in good faith, knew all the
facts, and had equal means of knowing them,
especially where, as was evidently the fact
in this case, the transaction was intended to
remove or settle a question of doubt as to
title. It would be impossible to foresee aU
the consequences which would result from allowing parties to avoid their contracts in
such cases on the mere plea of ignorance or mistake of law affecting their
rights.
It would be difficult to teU what
titles would stand, or what contracts would
be binding, if grantors and grantees were at
liberty to set up such a plea. This may seem
to work inequitably in the present case, but
more mischief will always result from attempting to mould the law to what seems
natural justice in a particular case than from
a steady adherence to general principles.
Order reversed.
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Mr. Justice SWATNE.

The appellant was

the defendant In the court below. The record discloses no ground for any imputation

against him. It was not claimed In the discussion at the bar, nor is It insisted in the
printed arguments submitted by the coimsel
for the appellees, that there was on his part
any misrepresentation, Intentional or otherNor
wise, or any Indirection whatsoever.
has it been alleged that there was any intentional misrepresentation or piu-pose to deceive on the part of others.
The case rests entirely upon the ground of
The question presented for our demistake.
termination is whether that mistake was of
such a charactar, and attended with such circumstances, as entitle the appellees to lie
relief sought by their bUl and decreed to
them by the court below.
Peyton Grymes, the appellant, owned two
tracts of land in Orange county, Va., lying
about twenty-five miles from Orange courthouse. The larger tract was regarded as valuable, on account of the gold supposed to
be upon It The two tracts were separated
by intervening gold-bearing lands, which the
appellant had sold to others. Catlett applied
to him for authority to sell the two tracts,
which the appellant still owned. It was
given by parol; and the appellant agreed to
give, as Catlett's compensation, all he could
get for the property above $20,000. Catlett
offered to sell to Lanagan. Lanagan was
unable to spare the time to visit the property, but proposed to send Howel Fisher to
examine it This was assented to; and Catlett thereupon wrote to Peyton Grymes, Jr.,
the son of the appellant, to have a conveyance ready for Fisher and himself at the
court-house upon their arrival. The conveyance was provided accordingly, and Peyton
Grymes, Jr., drove them to the lands. They
arrived after dark, and stayed all night at a
house on the gold-bearing tract. Fisher Insisted that he must be back at the courthouse in time to take a designated train east
the ensuing day. This Involved the necessity
of an early start the next morning. It was
arranged that Peyton Grymes, Jr., should
have iPeyton Hume,
who lived near at
hand, meet Fisher on the premises in the
morning and show them to him, while
Grymes got his team ready for their return
to the court-house.
Hume met Fisher accordingly, and showed him a place where there
had been washing for surface-gold, and then
took him to an abandoned shaft which he
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was on the premises.
There Fisher
examined the quartz and other debris lying
about But a very few minutes had elapsed
when Grymes announced that his team was
ready. The party Immediately started back
to the court-house.
Arriving too late for the
train, they drove to the house of the appellant: and Fisher remained there until one
o'clock that night. While Fisher was there,
considerable conversation occurred between
him and the appellant In relation to the property; but It does not appear that any thing
was said material to ^ther party in this
controversy. Fisher proceeded to Philadelphia, and reported favorably to Lanagan,
and subsequently, at his request, to Repplier,
who became a party to the negotiation. He
represented
to both of them that the abandoned shaft was upon the premises.
Catlett went to Philadelphia, and there he sold
the property to the appellees for $25,000.
Fisher was sent to the court-house to investigate the title. He employed Mr. WlUiams,
a legal gentleman living there, to assist him.
A deed was prepared by Mr. Williams, and
executed by the appellant on the 21st of
March, 1866. On the 7th Of April ensuing,
the appellees paid over $12,500 of the purchase-money, and gave their bond to the appellant for the same amount, payable six
months from date, with interest. The deed
was placed In the hands of a depositary, to
be held as an escrow imtil the bond should
Catlett, tmder a power of attorney,
be paid.
received the first Installment, paid over to the
appellant $10,000, and retained the residue
on account of the compensation to which
he was entitled imder the contract between
The vendees requested Hume to hold
them.
of the property for them until
possession
they should make some other arrangement.
He occupied the premises untU the following
July, when, with their consent, he transferIn that
to Gordon.
red the possession
month, Lanagan and Repplier came to see
the property. Hume was there washing for
gold. He began to do so with the permission
of the appellant before the sale, and had continued the work without intermission. The
appellees desired to be shown the boundarylines. Hume said he did not know where
they were, and referred them to Johnson.
Johnson came. The appellees desired to be
taken to the shaft which had been shown
to Fisher. Johnson said It was not on the
premises.
Hume thought It was. Johnson
was positive; and he was right The appellees seemed surprised, but said little on the
subject
They proceeded
to examine the
premises within the lines, and, before taking
their departure, employed Gordon to explore
the property for gold. Subsequently this arrangement was abandoned,
and they paid
him for the time and money he had expended In getting ready for the work. In September, they sent Bowman as their agent to
make the exploration. On his way, he stopped at the court-house,
and told the appelsupposed
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lant that the shaft shown to Fisher as on the
land was not on it The appellant replied
Instantly, "that there was no shaft on the
land he had sold to Repplier and Lanagan,
and that he had never represented to anyone that there was a shaft on the land, and
that he had never authorized any one to
make such a representation, nor did he know
or have reason to believe that any such representation had, in fact, been made by any
one." It does not appear that his attention
had before been called to the subject, or that
he was before advised that any mistake as to
the shaft had occiu:red.
Bowman spent
some days upon the land, and made a number of cuts, all of which were shallow. The
It
deepest was only fifteen feet in depth.
was made under the direction of Embry and
Johnson, two experienced
miners living in
It reached a vein of
the neighborhood.
quartz, but penetrated only a little way into
it. They thought the prospect very encouraging, and urged that the cut should be made
deeper.

Bowman declined to do anything more,
No further exploraand left the premises.
tion was ever made. Johnson says, "I know
the land well, and know there has been gold
found upon it, and a great deal of gold, too,—
that is to say, surface-gold,—but it has never
The gold that
been worked for vein-gold.
refer to was found by the defendant, Grymes,
and those that worked under him." He considered Bowman's examination "imperfect
and insufficient." He had had "twenty-three
years' experience in mining for gold."
Embry's testimony is to the same effect,
both as to the siurface-gold and the character of the examination made by Bowman.
The premises lie between the Melville and
the Greenwood Mines. Before the war, a
bucket of ore, of from three to four gallons,
taken from the latter mine, yielded $2,400 of
gold.
This, however, was exceptional.
In
the spring of 1869 a vein was struck, from
forty to fifty feet below the surface, yielding
$500 to the ton. Work was stopped by the
influx of water. It was to be resumed as
soon as an engine, which was ordered, should
arrive. Ore at that depth, yielding from
eight to ten dollars a ton, will pay a profit.
Embry says he is weU acquainted with the
courses of the veins in the Melville and the
Greenwood Mines, and that "the Greenwood
veins do pass through the land in controversy, and some of the Melville veins do
also." Speaking of Bowman and his last cut,
he says:—
"At the place
showed him where to cut
he struck a vein, but just cut into the top
of it; he did not go down through it, or
across it. Prom the appearance of the vein,
was very certain that he would find gold
ore, if he would cut across it and go deep
Into it, and
told him so at the time; but
he said that they had sent for him to return
home, and he couldn't stay longer to make

I

I

I
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the examination, and went off, leaving the
cut as it was; and the exploration to this
day has never been renewed.
am still satisfied, that, whenever a proper examination
is made, gold, and a great deal of it, wUl be
foimd in that vein; for it is the same vein
which passes through the Greenwood Mine,
which was struck last spring, and yielded
$500 to the ton; His examination in other
respects, as well as this, was imperfect and
insufficient.
don't think he did any thing
like making a proper exploration for gold.
don't think he had more than three or four
hands, and they were not engaged more than
eight or ten days at the utmost"
In September, 1866, Repplier instructed
Oatlett to advise the appellant, that, by reason of the mistake as to the shaft, the appelthe return of the purchaselees demanded
money which had been paid. In the spring
of 1867, Lanagan, upon the same ground,
The apmade the same demand in person.
pellant replied, that he had parted with the
He promised to reflect on the submoney.
ject, and address Lanagan by letter. He did
write accordingly, but the appellees have
not produced the letter. This biU was filed
on the 21st of March, 1868.
A A mistake as to a matter of fact, to warwant relief in equity, must be material, and
Ithe fact must be such that it animated and
the conduct of the party. It must
(icontroUed
^o to the essence of the object in view, and
not be merely incidental. The court must
that but for the mistake the
be satisfied,
complainant would not have assumed the
from which he seeks to be reobliga,tion
lieved. Kerr on Mistake and Fraud, 408;
Trigg V. Read, 5 Humph. 529] Jennings v.
Broughton, 17 Beav. 241; Thompson v. Jackson, 3 Rand. 507; Harrod's Heirs v. Cowan,
Hardin, 553; Hill v. Bush, 19 Barb. (Ark.)
522; Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662.
Does the case la hand come within this
category?
When Fisher made his examination at the
shaft, it had been abandoned.
This was prima facie proof that it was of no account
It does not appear that he thought of having
an analysis made of any of the debris about
it nor that the debris indicated in any wise
the presence of gold. He requested Hume
to send him specimens from the shafts on
the contiguous tracts, and it was done. No
such request was made touching the shaft
in question, and none were sent It is neither alleged nor proved that there was a
purpose at any time, on the part of the appellees, to work the shaft The quartz found
was certainly not more encouraging than
that taken from the last cut made by Bowman under the advice of Embry and Johnson.
This cut he refused to deepen, and
abandoned.
When Lanagan and Repplier
were told by Johnson that the shaft was not
on the premises,
they said notbing about
abandoning the contract, and nothing which

I

I

I
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manifested that they attached any particular
to the matter, and certainly
consequence

nothing which indicated that they regarded
the shaft as vital to the value of the propThey proceeded with their examinaerty.
tion of the premises as if the discovery had
not been made. On his way to Philadelphia,
after this visit, Lanagan saw and talked several times with WiUiams, who had prepared
the deed. Williams says, "I cannot recollect
all that was said in those conversations, but
I do know that nothing was said about the
shaft, and that he said nothing to produce
the impression that he was dissatisfied or
disappointed in any respect with the property after the examination that he had made of
it" Lanagan's conversation with Houseworth was to the same effect.
The subsequent
conduct of the appellees
shows that the mistake had no effect upon
their minds for a considerable period after
its discovery, and then it seems to have been
rather a pretext than a cause.'
/^ Mistake, to be available in equity, must not
1 have
arisen from negligence,
where the
I means of knowledge were easily accessible.
exercised,
\3?he party complaining must have
at least the degree of diligence "which may
be fairly expected from a reasonable person."
Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 407.
Fisher, the agent of the appellees, who had
'
the deed prepared, was within a few hours'
travel of the land when the deed was executed. He knew the grantor had sold contiguous lands upon which veins of gold had
been found, and that the course and direction
of those veins were important to the premises
He could easily have taken
in question.
measures to see and verify the boundarylines on the ground. He did nothing of the
kind. The appellees paid their money without even inquiring of any one professing to
know where the lines were. The courses
and distances specified in the deed show that
Why was he
a surveyor had been employed.
not called upon? The appellants sat quietly
In the dark, until the mistake was developed
by the light of subsequent
events.
Full
knowledge was within their reach all the
time, from the beginning of the negotiation
until the transaction was closed.
It was
their own fault that they did not avail themselves of It. In Shirley v. Davis, 6 Ves. 678,
the complainant, being desirous to become a
freeholder in Essex, bought a house which
he supposed to be in that county. It proved
to be in Kent. He was compelled In equity
to complete
the purchase. The mistake
there, as here, was the result of the waut of
proper diligence. See also Seton v. Slade, 7
Ves. 269; 2 Kent's Com. 483; 1 Story's Eq.,
sects. 146, 147; Attwood v. SmaU, 6 01. & Fin.
338; Jennings v. Broughton, 17 Beav. 234;
CampbeU v. Ingilby, 1 De G. & J. 405; Garrett T. Burleson, 25 Tex. 44; Warner v. Daniels et al., 1 Woodb. & M. 91; Ferson v. Sanger, Id. 139; Lamb v. Harris, 8 Ga. 546;
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Trigg V. Read, 5 Humph. 529; Haywood t.
Cope, 25 Beav. 143.
Where a party desires to rescind upon the
ground of mistake or fraud, he must, upon
the discovery of the facts, at once announce
his purpose, and adhere to it. If he be silent, and continue to treat the property as
his own,, he wiU be held to have waived the
objection, and will be conclusively bound by
the contract, as if the mistake or fraud had
not occurred. He is not permitted to play
Delay and vacillation are
fast and loose.
fatal to the right which had before subsisted. These remarks are peculiarly applicable
to speculative property like that here in
which is liable to large and conquestion,
stant fiuctuations in value. Thomas v. Bartow, 48 N. Y. 200; Flint v. Woodin, 9 Hare,
622; Jennings v. Broughton, 5 De G., M. &
G. 139; Uoyd v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 537;
Saratoga & S. R. R. Co. v. Row, 24 Wend.
74; Minturn v. Main, 3 Seld. 220; 7 Rob.
Prac, c. 25, sect. 2, p. 432; Campbell v.
Fleming, 1 Ad. & El. 41; Sugd. Vend. (14th
ed.) 335; Diman v. Providence, W. & B. R.
R. Co., 5 R. I. 130.
A court of equity Is always reluctant to rescind, miless the parties can be put back in
statu quo. If this cannot be done, it will
give such relief only where the clearest and
it
strongest equity imperatively demands
Here the appellant received the money paid
on the contract in entire good faith. He
parted with It before he was aware of the
claim of the appellees, and cannot conveniently restore it. The imperfect and abortive
exploration made by Bowman has injured
the credit of the property. Times have since
for such
.There is less demand
changed.
property, and it has fallen largely in market
Under the circumstances, the loss
value.
ought not to be borne by the appellant.
Hunt V. Silk, 5 East, 452; Minturn v. Main,
3 Seld. 227; Okill v. Whittaker, 2 Phill. 340;
Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 144; Andrew
V. Hancock, 1 Brod. & B. 37; Skyring v.
Greenwood, 4 Bam. & C. 289; Jennings v.
Broughton, 5 De G., M. & G. 139.
The parties, in dealing with the property
In question, stood upon a footing of equality.
They judged and acted respectively for themThe contract was deliberately enterselves.
ed into on both sides. The appellant guaranteed the title, and nothing more. The appellees assumed the payment of the purchaseThey assumed no other liability.
money.
There was neither obligation nor liability on
either side, beyond what was expressly stipulated. If the property had proved unexpectedly to be of inestimable value, the appellant could have no further or other claim.
If entirely worthless, the appellees assumed
the risk, and must take the consequences.
Segur V. Tingley, 11 Conn. 142; Haywood v.
Cope, 25 Beav. 140; Jennings v. Broughton,
17 id. 234; Attwood v. Small, 6 CI. & Fin.
497; Marvin v. Bennett, 8 Paige, 321; Thom-
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Considering this to be as claimed by the
v.
aa T. Bartow, 48 N. Y. 198; Hunter
Goudy, 1 Ham. 451; Hall v. Thompson, 1 appellees, oinr views are as we have expressed them.
We have not, therefore, found it
Sm. & M. 481.'
The bill, we have shown, cannot be main- necessary to consider the question of such
authority; and hence have said nothing upon
tained.
In our examination of the case, we have that subject, and nothing as to the aspect
assumed that those who are alleged to hare the case would present if that question were
spoken to the agent of the appellees upon resolved in the negative.
the subject of the shaft, before the sale, had
Decree reversed, and case remanded with
the requisite authority from the appellant
directions to dismiss the bill.
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edge of the tacts upon which plaintiff's
equity is grounded ; and of course it was
impossible for him, as president of the
receiver company, to answer otherwise
1893.
than upon information and belief. In the
Appeal from court of common pleas, jurat to his answer be swears the allegations thereof are true "so far as they are
Philadelphia county; Thayer, Judge.
Bill by E.Theresa Riegel, administratrix therein stated as of his own knowledge,"
of Jacob Biegel, deceased, against the etc. ; but the answer contains not a single
American Life Insurance Company, asking allegation that purports to be "as of his
own knowledge."
the reinstatement of a surrendered policy.
The special evidential efficacy of a reDecree sustaining a demurrer to the bill,
and dismissing it, from which plaintiff ap- sponsive answer in equity is due to the
fact that the plaintiff, by calling on the depeals. Reversed.
fendant to answer the allegations of the
William W. Porter and Frederick J. Gel- bill, appeals to his conscience, accredits
ger, for appellant. H. Hazeihurst, for ap- him, and pro ban makes him his own witpellee.
ness. The plaintiff in this case never
called upon Mr. Ritchie, or any other
S'l'EBRETT, J. When this cause was here stranger to the transactions alleged in
two years ago, on appeal from decree sus- the bill, to make answer thfereto. The
taining the general demurrer, and dis- officers of the Insurance company, who
missing the bUl, an amendment, for the werecognizantof those transactions, were
purpose of clearly expressing what at the proper persons to deny, if they could
most was only implied, «vas moved, and of their own knowledge, the averments of
allowed at bar, by adding to the fifth par- the bill, and thus make the answer responagraph of the bill these words: "Both of sive. The answer of Mr. Ritchie in this
the parties acting in respect to the trans- case is in no sense a responsive answer.
action on the basis that the said Leisen- It is merely pleading; and, as such, put in
ring was then alive." That defect in the issue the facts in dispute, without more.
bill, however, did not appear to be the Eaton's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 490; Burke's
ground on which the demurrer was sus- Appeal. 99 Pa. St. 361; Socher's Appeal, 104
The plaintiff's Pa. St. 609; Coleman v. Ross, 46 Pa. St.
tained in the court below.
of fact 185; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1528,1529; 3 Greenl.
equity, grounded on averments
contained in the bill, and admitted by the Ev.§§ 287-289; Daniell.Uh. Pr. 846. In note
pleading, was then fully considered, and to the latter it is said that an answer
emphatically sustained, in a clear and con- which alleges as facts what the defendvincing opinion by our Brother Williams, ant could not personally know, though rereported in 140 Pa. St. 201, and 21 Atl. Ren. sponsive to the bill, simply puts plaintiff
392.
The decree was accordingly reversed, upon proof of his own allegations. So,
and record remitted, with direction that too, in 3 Greenl. Ev. § 287, it is said that, if
the defendant plead or answer, etc. After the fact asserted by the defendant is such
full consideration of the facts and circum- that it is not and cannot be within his own
stances, the opinion referred to concluded knowledge, but is In truth only an expresthus: "Dpon these facts, if the attention sion of his strong conviction of its-existence, or is what he deems an infallible deof the learntid judge had not been diverted
from them, we feel sure he would have duction from facts which were known to
reached the same conclusion that we have him, bis answer is not responsive, in the
reached,— that it would be grossly inequi- sense of being evidence in his own favor.
table to hold the plaintiff to a bargain The nature of his testimony cannot be
made under the influence of a mistake of changed by the positiveness of his asserfact Uke that before us. This mistake the tion. The answer of an infant by his
demurrer admits. If there had been any guardian ad i/tem, though it be responsive
circumstance which the defendant could to the bill, and sworn to by the guardian,
hare set up to show that a correction of is not evidence in his favor.
But whether the answer be regarded as
this mistake at this time would be inequitable, it should have been shown to responsive or not, the proofs were quite
If such circumstan- sufficient to warrant the learned master
the court by answer.
in finding, as he did, the truth of every
ces do exist, they may yet be presented,
as the case goes back to enable the defend- material averment in the bill. His find"
The ings of fact are in strict accord wth the
ant to take defense upon the merits.
defendant company, having been declared uncontradicted testimony, and his coninsolvent, was duly dissolved, on appli- clusions of law are so manifestly correct
cation of the attorney general, more than that his report should have been unhesiand decree made in
a year before the answer was filed by Mr. tatingly approved,
Ritchie, the then president of the Real-Es- accordance
No testimony,
therewith.
tate Title Insurance Company, which, in either written or oral, was introduced b.v
the interim, appears tohave been appoint- or on behalf of the defendant.
All the
No material facts on wbich plaintiff's equity
ed receiver of the defunct company.
plea or answer was ever filed by any offi- is grounded were as clearly and conclucer of said company, nor b.v any one, on sively established as if they had been adIts behalf, who had any knowledge, othermitted by answer, or by demurrer to the
wise than by information obtained from bill; BO that practically we have now beothers, of the facta averred in the bill. fore us' BubBtantially the same questions
Mr. Ritchie and bis company were entire that were fully considered and determined
strangers to the transaction, and neither when the case was here before. In that
ot them aupears to have bad any knowl- appeal the fourth and fifth Bpeciflcationa
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of errors are quotations from the opinion
of the learned president of the court helow dismissing the bill, wherein," speaking
of the new contract, he says:
(4) lb was
not a contract induced by a mistake
about facts, but a contract made in view
of doubtful facts, and because of the
doubtful facts. (5) It was in the nature

citation

of authorities can be ' needed.
* The learned judge who beard
this
case in the court below, and who is thoroughly familiar with the principle to
which we have referred, seems to have
been misled in regard to the facts set up
in the bill. He treats the arrangement
made between Mrs. Riegel and tbe comupon the pany on the 20th of March as a comprofounded
of a compromise,
doubts which existed, not upon any mis- mise of a claim against the company for
take of the facts." In this appeal the the alleged death of Leisenring,
which
third specification, quoted from the opin- Mrs. Hiegel was unable to establish, heion of same learned judge, again dismiss- cause unable to show the death. As the
ing the bill, is that "the new contract fact of the death, and the consequent liawas not a contract Induced by mutual bility of ttie company on the policy, were
mistake about the facts, but a contract uncertain, it was a case for the appliea/made in view of doubtful facts, and be- tion of the doctrine that the adjustment
cause of the doubtful facts." The second of a doubtful claim constituted a valid
specification iu this is in effect the same as consideration for the surrender of the polthe fifth in tlie former appeal. These prop- icy and the acceptance of the new one,
ositions go to the very heart of the plain- and upon this theory the decree was enThey substantially involve tered. But it nowhere appears that Mrs.
tiff's case.
the only cardinal questions that are or Biegel made any claim on the company,
ever have been in it, and about which or supposed that she had any. She was
asking relief from future payments of prethere is the slightest room for doubt.
They are the very questions that were miums on a policy on which she supposed
considered and decided by this court when future payments would have to be made,
the case was here before. That clearly and, to get this relief, she was willing to
appears iu the opinion, wherein, after re- sacrifice more than one half of the sum
citing the facts averred in the bill. It is insured. The company was willing, in
said: "The case presented on these facts consideration of the large reduction of its
was that of a contract entered into under liability, to give her a policy for what her
the influence of a mutual mistake, and a payments would purchase, and relieve her
claim for relief from such contract. The in future.
This is an exchange often
mistake was in relation to the fact of made, and adjusted by well-settled rules.
Leisenring's death. Both parties evident- It was a compromise of nothing.
We do
ly supposed and acted on the supposition ■^not doubt thecorrectness of the rule applied
that he was alive, and that theannual pre- by the learned judge in cases to which it
miums upon his life, which had become is fairly applicable, but this is not one of
burdensome to Mrs. Biegel, must be con- them. The plaintiff distinctly avers that
tinued indefinitely until his death should she did not know of the death of Leisentake place. As It had become difficult for ring until some 10 days after the exchange
her to pay these premiums, the only way of policies was effected, and that' both parin which she could be relieved from them ties to the transaction were acting, in rewas to surrender her policy, and accept a spect thereto, on the basis that Leisenpaid-up policy for such smaller sum as the ring was alive.'
She distinctly avers that
premiums already paid would purchase. the object of the arrangement was to seBather than take the risk of losing the cure relief for herself from the indefinite
entire amount of the policy, by her inabil- payment of premiums that had become
ity to keep up the annual payments, she burdensome to her; that the new policy
surrendered her policy for $6,000, and ac- was accepted for that reason, and the old
cepted in lieu of it a paid-up policy for one surrendered, at a time when, had she
$2,500. This was ttie contract she made known the fact, she was entitled to dewhile in ignorance of Leisenring's death. mand the entire sum upon which she had
At the time she made it she was already so long and so steadily paid the burdenrelieved from the burdensome premiums,
some premiums."
and the entire amount of the policy was
Little, if anything, can be profitably
honestly due her from
the company.
added to what is so clearly and forcibly
What was the effect of the mistake upon said in the foregoing quotations in supher? Simply to take from her the differ- port of our former decree.
The error inence between the two policies, and give to which the learned judge of the common
her absolutely nothing for it. She sur- pleas appears to have unintentionally
rendered a policy for $6,000, on which the fallen in the outset, and to which be
liability of thecompany was already fixed, seems to cling so pertinaciously, is not so
and received one for .$2,500, to secure relief much in regard to the weU-settled princifrom a burden already removed.
The ples of equity, upon which relief is granted
company parted with nothing. She se- in cases of mutual Ignorance or mistake
cured nothing. The whole transaction of material facts, as in the construction
was a mistake, and, if the decree of the which he put upon the undisputed acts
court stands, the result will be to take and declarations of the parties to this con$3,500 from Mrs. Hiegel and give it to the tention, and -the circumstances connected
insurance company.
These facts seem to therewith. Sufficient reference to those
us to present a clear and a strong case for principles is made in our former opinion,
equitable relief, so strong, indeed, that .but it may not be amiss to revert to some
a mere statement of them is the only ar- kti them.
The general rule is that an act
gument necessary -for its support. The Idone or a contract made under a mistake
duty of a chancellor to relieve in cases of 'of a material fact is voidable and rellevamutual mistake is so well settled that no \ ble in equity. The fact must of course be
•
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material to the act or contract; for,
though there may be an acoidental mistake or ignorance ol the fact. yet. If the
act or contract is not materially affected
Thus, A.
by it, relief will not be granted.
buys from B. an estate to which thelatter
is supposed to have an unquestionable title. It turns out, upon due investigation
of the facts unknown at the time to both
parties, that B. has no title; as, if there
be a nearer heir than B., who was supIn
posed to be dead, but is in fact living.
such a case equity would relieve the purchaser and rescind the contract. But suppose A. buys from B. an estate the location of which was well known to each of
them, and they mutually believed it contained 20 acres, w lien in f.^ct it contained
only 19% acres, and the difference would
not have varied the pnrchase in the view
of either party; in such a case the mistake would not be ground for rescission of
the contract. 1 Story, Eq. Jnr. §§ 140. 141.
It makes no difference in application of
the principle that the subject-matter
of
the contract be known to both parties to
be liable to a contingency which may destroy it immediately; for, if the contingency .has, unknown to the parties, already happened, the contract will be
avoided, as founded on a mutual mistake
of a matter constituting the basis of the
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 143a, 1436.
contract.
The principle is illustrated by familiar
examples, employed by text writers, thus:
A. agrees to buy a certain horse from B.
It turns out that the horse is dead at the
time of the bargain, though neither party
was then aware of the fact. The agreement is void. A. agrees to buy a house
belonging to B. The house was previously destroyed by fire, but the parties dealit
in ignorance of that fact. The contract,
not being for sale of the land on which the
bouse stood, was not enforceable.
So,
too. A., being entitled to an estate for the
life of B., agreed to sell it to C. B. was
dead, but both parties were ignorant of
the fact. The agreement was avoided.
For similar reasons, a life insurance cannot be revived by payment of a premium
within the time allowed for that purpose
by the original contract, but after the life
had dropped, unknown to both insurer
and assured, although it was in existence
when the premium became due, and although the insurer has waived proof of
the party's health, which, by the terms of
the renewal, it might have required.
The
waiver applies to the proof of health, not
to the factof his beingalive.
Pritchard v.
Society, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 622. Mr. Pollock,
in his excellen t treatise on the Principles
of Contract, (page •441,) states the general
principle thus: "An agreement is void if it
relates to a subject-matter (whether a
material subject of ownership, or a particular title or right) contemplated by the
parties as existing, but which in fact did
not exist." This is followed by an interesting discussion of the subject, with numerous illustrations of the principles involved. See Cochrane v. Willis, 1 Ch. App.
58; Allen v. Hammond,
Pet. 71; Hitchcock V. Giddings, 4 Price, 135; Hore v.
Becher, 12 Sim. 465; Couturier v. Hastle, 5
B.L.Cas.673. In many of thecases prominence is given to failure of consideration.
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resulting from , mutual mistake or Ignorance of material facts, butentire failure ol
consideration is not an essential ingredient
in any case.

It cannot be doubted that In exchanging
the old for the new policy both parties
acted on the basis that Leisenring was
then alive. Their every act in the transaction was predicated 'of that as an as'
Bumed fact.
The new policy, like the old
one, was a risk on a life assumed to be
then in being.
The difference between
them wsfe that the one carried with it an
obligation on the part of theholdertopay
annual premiums during the life of Leisenring; the other exempted her from that
obligation. Shepurehased thatexemption
by surrendering seven twelfths of the original insurance, or $3,500. If the exchange
was not made on the assumption by both
parties that Leisenring was then alive, the
company stultified itself by Issuing a paidup policy on the life of one who was then
in his grave; and the plaintiff was guilty
of the supreme folly of paying $3,500 for
exemption from a liability which, by the
previous death of Leisenring, had ipso
facto ceased. In other words, at the time
the exchange of policies was made, the
plaintiff had a perfectly valid claim upon
the defendant for the full amount of the
insurance, $6,000, and surrendered $3,500
of that to secure exemption from a liability that had ceased to exist; but she
and the company were both at that time
ignorant of the fact that the life on which
the original risk was taken had previously dropped.
The supposed element of
doubt as to whether Leisenring was then
dead or not never entered into the contemplation of either party; nor did it
'form any part of tlie consideration for exchange of policies.
The positive and uncontradicted proof by the actuary of the
company was that the amount of the
paid-up policy was ascertained and fixed,
according to the established rules of the
company, at the very sum that would
have been required if Leisenring had been
personally present in the office when the
terms of exchange were settled.
The central fact underlying the transaction, and
to which every circumstance
connected
therewith clearly points, was the assumption by both parties that Leisenring was
then in full life. When last theretofore
heard from he was alive, and the presumption was that he continued to live.
In the absence of any knowledge to the
contrary, it was quite natural and reasonable that the parties, in making the
exchange, should act upon that presumption, and assume, as they evidently did,
that he was still alive. Of course they
could not know positively that he was
then alive, any more than any one can
certainly know that a friend from whom
by distance is now livhe is far separated
ing. In view of theundisputed facts as to
the acts of both parties, and everything
connected with the transaction, it would
be wholly unreasonable
and unwarranted to hold that the parties treated upon
the basis that the fact which was the subject of their agreement was doubtful, or
that the contract was made "in view of
doubtful facts, and because of the doubtful facts. " In the light of the proofs upon
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which tbeflndlngs of the masterare based,
and of all the circumstances, the acts of
the parties are not susceptible of any such
construction as has been put upon thefti
by the learned jadge of the common pleas.
In short, the facts established by the unproofs, and found by the
contradicted
master, are essentially the same as those
and upon
by the demurrer,
admitted
which our former decree was based. Certainly they are not less favorable to the
plaintiff now than then. It therefore appears to us that a proper consi'deratiori
of the orderly administration of justice
should have resulted in a decree in accordance with the views expressed in our former opinion.
This proceeding is not grounded upon a
previous rescission of the agreement under which the exchange of policies was
made, but is for the purpose of enforcing
a rescission by decree of this court, etc.

It is therefore adjudged that the decree of
the' court of common pleas be reversed
and set aside, and exceptions to master's
report dismissed ; and it is now adjudged
and decreed that the contract under which
said exchange of insurance policies was
made be rescinded; that the paid-up policy for $2,500 be surrendered and canceled;
and that the original policy of insurance
be reinstated, as of date of Its surrender;
and it is further adjudged and decreed
that the defendant company pay to tbe
plaintiff the sum of $6,000, with interest
from October 4, 1889, and also all thecosts
of this proceeding.

J.

PAXSON,C.
I dissent, and would affirm the decree, upon the clear and able
opinion of the learned judge below.

MITCHELL, J.

I concur with

justice in his dissent.

the chief
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NEWTON ▼. TOLLES.
TOLLBS V. NEWTON.
(19 Aa. 1092, 66 N. H. 136.)
Supreme

Court of New Hami>shire.
ough. March 14, 18S0.

Hillsbor-

Bill in equity for the rescission of a contract for the purchase of a farm and other
property, and for the return of money paid
as a part of the purchase money. Pacts
The defendant, Sophia
found by the court:
A. ToUes, employed K., a real-estate agent in
Nashua, to sell her farm. In May, 1886,
Newton, seeking to buy a farm, applied to K.,
who informed him of the Tolles farm, told
him it contained 200 acres, took him to see
it, and there pointed out to him such of the
courses and boundaries as he knew; but he
did not know, or undertake to point out,
all of them. Afterwards, E., as agent of
Tolles, and Newton executed an agreement
by which Tolles agreed to sell, and Newton
to buy, the Tolles farm for $5,400, to be paid
$200 on the execution of the agreement,
$1,000 on the delivery, on or before June 1,
1886, of a bond for a deed, $1,000 on or before July 10, 1886, and $3,200 on the delivery, on or before October 20, 1886, of a good
and sufficient deed, "said Newton to have all
the stock, tools, hay, grain," etc.
On the
margin of the agreement, "farm contains
about 200 acres" was written.
Newton paid
$200 May 15, Tolles executed and delivered
to Newton a bond conditioned to convey to
him "a certain lot or parcel of land situated
in Nashua," and particularly described by
metes and bounds, "meaning and intending
to convey all the homestead farm, containing
about two hundred acres, as by deed of heirs
of Horace G. Tolles, to me, and all other
land and right in said homestead farm,"
upon Newton's payment of $1,000 on the
delivery of the bond, $1,000 on or before July
10, 1886, and $3,200 on the delivery, on or
before October 20, 1886, of a good and sufficient deed. On the margin of the deed was
writtfen:
"It is agreed, for the above consideration, that said Newton is to have all the
stock, tools, hay, grain, &o., and that said
Tolles is to remove only household furniture
and family stores from said premises. " Prior
to 1879 the Tolles farm comprised about 203
acres, of which tliedefendant and her husband
owned a part in common, and each a part in
In that year the heirs of Horace
severalty.
C, then deceased, conveyed a parcel of about
25 acres to Xenophon Tolles. and all their interest in the rest of the farm to the defendant.
In January, 1886, the defendant sold about
18 acres to C, who sold to Roby.
A parcel
of about 25 acres, called the "Salmon Brook
Meadow,." was half a mile distant from, and
had no connection with, the rest of the farm,
except in its use as a part of it.
These parcels were not shown to Newton by R., and
are not covered by the particular description
given in the bond. Newton at the time of
the bargain did not understand that they
were included in his purchase, but be unH.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.>-15
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derstood that he'was buying the Tolles farm,
and that it contained 200 acres.
The defendant did not intend to convey, nor understand
that she agreed to convey, the three parcels,
or any- of them; but she understood and believed that the farm, as described in the
bond, contained about 200 acres.
It in fact
contains about 135 acres.
In June, 1886,
Newton discovered that Tolles owned the

Salmon Brook meadow, and learned of its
connection with the farm.
He thereupon
claimed possession of it, and that it was included in the bargain, but his claim was denied. He refused to pay the installment due
July 10th and August 21st. Tolles' brought
a suit at law to recover it, which is the record of the above-named actions. About the
1st of August, Newton found by a survey
that the farm as described in the bond contains only 185 acres.
October 20, 1886,
Tolles tendered to Newton a warranty deed
of the premises of which he is in possession,
and demanded payment of the balance of the
Newton refused to accept
purchase money.
the deed, and on the same day filed his bill,
in which he offers to restore the real and personal property to the defendant, and give up
and cancel the bond, and to account for the
rents and profits while he has been in possession.
He has consumed the hay and
grain, but has other hay and grain out of
which he can return an equivalent. He sold
four cows in August, but replaced them with
four others of greater value. The farm has
not deteriorated in value. Evidence to show
that the property which Tolles by her bond
was obliged to convey was of the value of
$5,400 or more was excluded, subject to the
defendant's exception.
&. B. S. French and H. B. Cutter, for
Newton.
C. W. Hiott and E. 8. Cutter, for
Tolles.

Oahpentek, J. There was a mutual mistake in the quantity of land. The defendant
understood she was selling, and the plaintiff
It
that he was buying, a farm of 200 acres.
in fact contains only 135 acres. The defendant, believing that the farm contained 200
acres, informed the plaintifE that it did conThe plaintifE relied on
tain that number.
her statement. Under the influence of the
error common to both parties, the transaction
The mistake was one of
was consummated.
fact in a material point affecting the value
Boynton v. Hazelboom, 14
of the property.
Allen, 107, 108. Its prejudicial consequences
to the plaintiff are the same as if the defendant's statement had been designedly fraudulent. Spurr V. Benedict, 99 Mass. 463, 467.
The deficiency is so great that it would "naturally raise the presumption of fraud, imposition, or mistake in the very essence of the
contract," if the mistake were not affirmatively found. Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason,
414, 420.
A material mistake in the quantity does not, in its effect upon the equitable
rights of the parties, differ from a like mistake in the character, situation, or title of the
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bargained property. Itls equivalent to a mistake in the existence of a material part of the
subject of the contract. The ease is as if before the contract was executed, and without
the knowledge of either party, a parcel containing 65 acres of the 200 contracted for had
sunk in the sea. Allen v. Hammond, 11 Pet.
63, 71, 72; Hitchcock v. Giddings, 4 Price,
135 ; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 141, 142. The error is
as injurlofis to the plaintiff as if 200 acres were
comprised in the state boundaries, and the
defendant had no title to a parcel of 65 acres,
or as if she had title to only 135-200 of the
whole in common with a stranger. Hooper
The defendant
V. Smart, L. E. 18 Eq. 683.
could not sustain a bill to compel a speciflo
performance of the contract by the plaintiff,
because it would be inequitable.
Pickering
V. Pickering, 38 N". H. 400, 407, 408; Eastman Y. Plumer, 46 N. H. 464, 479. The party
against whom a contract, made under a mutual mistake of material facts, will not be specifically enforced, is in general entitled to
rescind. Pom. Spec. Perf. § 250. If there
are exceptions to the rule, this case does not
fall within them. It is inequitable, in the
highest degree, that the defendant, by reason of her negligent and erroneous, though
not fraudulent, representation, should make
a profit of the sum at which the parties valued
65 acres of land, and that the plaintiff, without fault on his part, should lose that sum.
Equity will prevent such a result by rescinding the contract, or decreeing a specific performance with compensation in behalf of the
injured party, at his election, or by refusing
specific performance on the application of the
other party. Hill v. Buckley. 17 Ves. 395;
Price V. North, 2 Younge & C. 620; Dalby v.
Pullen, 3 Sim. 29; Leslie v. Tompson, 9
Hare, 268; Barnes v. Wood, L. E. 8 Eq. 424;
Whittemore v. Whittemore, Id. 603; IronWorks v. Wickens, L. E. 4 Ch. 101; Denny
V. Hancock, L. R. 6 Ch. 1; Torrance v. Bolton, L. R. 8 Ch. 118; In re Turner, 13 Ch.
Div. 130; Belknap v. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 144;
Paine v. Upton, 87 N. T. 327 ; Cous'e v. Boyles,
4 N. J. Eq. 212; Thomas v. Perry, 1 Pet. 0.
C. 49; Daniel v. Mitchell, 1 Story, 172; Doggelt V. Emerson, 3 Story, 700; Smith v. Babcock, 2 Woodb. & M. 246; Quesnel v. Woodlief, 2 Hen, & M. 173; Lawrence v. Staigg,

8 R. I. 256; Noble v. Googins. 99 Mass. 231.
Neither of the parties understood that the
contract to convey "about" 200 acres was
Wilson
performed by conveying 135 acres.
V. Eandall, 67 N. Ye338, 341, 342, and cases
above cited.
No laches can be imputed to the plaintiff.
He had a right to rely on the defendant's
He could not disstatement of the quantity.
cover the mistake by examining the external
boundaries. Paine v. Upton, 87 N. Y. 327,
When, by the defendant's tender of a
337.
deed and demand of payment, he ascertained
that she would not voluntarily correct the
mistake, he immediately filed his bill. .
The personal property formed no substanIt is not
tial part of the consideration.
named in the body of the bond, but is mentioned, apparently as an afterthought, on the
margin. Upon the rescission, for any cause,
by a vendee in possession of a sale of farm
lands, there must in most cases, necessarily,
be an accounting, in order to restore the parties to the situation they occupied prior to the
contract. Upon such an accounting, all the
property, the possession of which passed from
the defendant to the plaintiff, or its full
equivalent, together with the income derived
from it, may be fully restored to her. It is
no objection to a rescission, in a uase of
this character, that such articles as are necessarily consumed in the proper and ordinary
management of a farm cannot be restored in
It does not appear that the plaintiff,
specie.
after his discovery of the mistake, took any
action by which he intended to affirm the
contract, (Montgomery v. Pickering, 116
Mass. 227,) or that he did anything with the
property not reasonably necessary for its preservation, or which equity would not require
The plaintiff is to be relieved
to be done.
upon such terms as justice to both parties requires. Wiswall v. Harriman, 62 N. H. 671,
672;2Story,Eq. Jur. §707. The offered evidence of value was immaterial, and was propIn the suit at law, there m ust
erly excluded.
The details
be judgment for the defendant.
of the decree will be settled at the trial term.
Decree for the plaintiff.

Allen, J.,
curred.

did not sit.

The others con-
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discharged by this instrument for the simple
that it was not based upon any consideration. It was not in the nature of a
composition of a debtor with his creditors,
and cannot be sustained upon the principles
It
applicable to composition agreements.
does not even appear that each creditor signed it upon the consideration that other creditors would also sign It. It was a mere agreement to discharge debts without payment,
and such an agreement cannot be upheld.
Down to this period of time there is no
claim that there was any fraud or mistake
which influenced the conduct of the plaintiff
and the other creditors, and the position of
the plaintiff and the defendant was as follows: While the plaintiff could legally enforce the payment of the $10,000 (the defendant being able to pay), he was under a moral
obligation not to do so; and the defendant
Intending not to be legally bound to pay,
was yet under both a legal and moral obligation to pay.
The defendant continued in business until
August, 1868, when on account of failing
health and despondency,
he sold out his
whole stock of goods to the firm of H. & A.
Strousburgh & Co. for the sum of $225,000,
they agreeing to pay the most of that sum
upon certain of his debts, and also to pay
him one-third of what the goods should sell
for above the sum of $275,000. The value
of the goods was not known to the defendant or his vendees, and there is no claim that
this sale was not made In good faith. Soon
after this sale the plaintiff, having heard
thereof, called upon the defendant, and was
duly informed of the sale and the terms
thereof, and of the amount of his property at
that time aside from his interest in the onethird of the surplus. As to that one-third,
the defendant informed him that that was
not worth much, and that he had offered to
sell it for $18,000 or $20,000. There is no evidence or claim that in this conversation the
defendant made any intentional mis-statement.
He had offered to several parties to
sell his one-third interest for the sum named,
and there is no evidence that he then believed it to be worth more.
He actually made
an arrangement to sell it for $20,000 to one
A few days after however he
Von Keller.
repudiated this arrangement but Von Keller
claimed it was valid.
Defendant's vendees went on and sold the
goods, and they brought $576,981; and his
one-third interest amounted to about $100,000.
The defendant knew as early as the
8th day of October, 1868, that goods to the
amount of $400,000 had been sold, and that
some yet remained to be sold.
On the lastnamed day he went to the plaintiff and said
to him that he understood
that the previous
paper signed by him—the discharge above set
out— was not a legal release, because he had
not paid any thing on account of the $10,000,
and he wanted to know If the plaintiff would
sign a legal release upon payment of $5,000.

reason

55.)

of New York.

1878.

Action to set aside a release under seal,
and to recover a balance for money lent defendant by the firm of C. F. Dambmann &
Co., of which firm plaintiff was a partner,
The facts
and to whose rights lie succeeded.
Judgment for
are set forth In the opinion.
plaintiff.
Wil0. Bainbridge Smith, for appellant
liam "Watson, for respondent

EARL, J. Prior to 1866, the defendant had
for many years been a merchant extensively
engaged In business in the city of New Tork.
In February of that year he had become
and contemplated
financially embarrassed,
an assignment for the benefit of his creditors.
He was finally dissuaded from making an
by the promise of his creditors
assignment
to loan him the sum of ?100,0(X> to aid him
There was eviin meeting his obligations.
dence tending to show that the sums thus to
be loaned were to be repaid when he became
able; but he testified that it was to be optional for him to repay them. In case he
paid the debts, which he then owed, in full.
The court at special term found that the arrangement was that he was to repay these
In pursuance
sums when he became able.
of this arrangement the firm to which plaintiff belonged, and to whose rights he had
succeeded, loaned defendant $10,000. On the
7th day of March, 1867, defendant had paid
in full all the debts he owed when the money was loaned to him, and then, at his request all the creditors who made the loans
executed and delivered to him an instrument,
of which the following is a copy, to- wit:
"We the undersigned agree, In consideration
of one dollar paid to us, to discharge H.
Schulting from the legal payment of the mon1, 1866,
ey loaned to him February
said
Schulting giving his moral obligations to refund the said money, in part or whole, as his
means will allow in future."
This was not
a sealed instrument and was executed upon
the request of the defendant, upon the claim
by him that he had done as he had agreed
when the money was advanced to him.
It
was the clear intention of the parties, by this
Instrument to discharge the defendant from
all legal obligation to pay the money advanced, leaving an obligation simply binding
upon his conscience, but not enforceable at
law, to pay when he became able, in whole
or in part. If this instrument had been under seal or based upon a sufficient consideration, no proceedings in law or equity could
have been thereafter taken to enforce payment against the defendant
But according to the finding of the special
term, before the execution of this instrument
the defendant was legally liable to pay when
he became able, and this liability was not
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The plaintiff said he would. Nothing more
was said, and defendant paid him $5,000; and
then the plaintiff executed to him, undar seal,
a full and absolute discharge from all liability. This action was brought to set aside
this release, and to recover the balance of the
$10,000.

The plaintiff seeks to imi)each this release
on account of fraud, and the court at special
term decided in plaintiff's favor that the release was inoperative, as obtained by misrepof material
and concealment
resentation
facts. The court did not find that there was
any fraudulent misrepresentation, and there
was none in fact So far as I can discover,
there was no misrepresentation of any kind. .
Neither did the court find that there was any
of any facts; and
fraudulent concealment
there was no evidence to justify such a finding.
The plaintiff had executed a discharge
of his claim, which was illegal, and the defendant went to him and informed him of
this fact, and stated that he wanted a legal
release, and that he would pay him $5,000 if
he would give it; and he gave it. He stated
to the plaintiff that he was not discharged,
that he wanted to be, and the plaintiff discharged him.
He made no statement and
used no artifice to throw him off from his
guard or to entrap or mislead him. There
was no reluctance on the part of the plaintiff,
and the defendant had no reason to suppose
there would be, as the plaintiff had already
agreed in writing to discharge him. The prior instrument shows that it was the understanding of the parties that the defendant
should, so far as concerned any legal liability, have just such a discharge.
Is
The claim, under these circumstances.
that the defendant was bound to disclose to
the plaintiff the change in his pecuniary cirsince the prior conversation in
cumstances
August, above alluded to, and that he had no
right to leave him under the erroneous impression occasioned by that conversation. It
must be borne in mind that the declarations
made by the defendant in that conversation
were made in entire good faith, and that they
were not made in any business transaction
with the plaintiff, and that they had no refThe
erence to or connection with the release.
plaintiff,. In executing the release, had no
right to rely upon them.
The general rule is, that a party engaged
in a business transaction with another can
commit a legal fraud only by fraudulent misrepresentations
of facts, or by such conduct
or such artifice for a fraudulent purpose as

will mislead the other party or throw him off

from his guard, and thus cause him to omit
inquiry or examination which he would otherwise make.
A party buying or selling
property, or executing instruments, must by
inquiry or examination gain all the knowlHe cannot proceed blindly,
edge he desires.
omitting all inquiry and examination, and
then complain that the other party did not
volunteer all the information he had.
Such

is the general rule. But there are exceptions
to this rule.
Where there is such a relation of trust and confidence between the parties that the one is under some legal or equitable obligation to give full information to
the other party— information which the other
party has a right, not merely In foro conscientiae, but juris et de jure, to have, then
the withholding of such information purposely may be a fraud. Story, Eq. Jur. § 207 et
seq.; Hadley v. Importing Co., 13 Ohio St
502, 82 Am. Dec. 454; Bench v. Sheldon, 14
Barb. 66; Paul v. Hadley, 23 Barb. 521.
It is not always easy to define when this
relation of trust and confidence exists; and
no general rule can be formulated by which
its existence can be known. It is sufiicient
for this case to say that it did not exist here.
The defendant had no reason to make the
disclosure which it is claimed he should
have made, and the plaintiff had no right
to expect it The defendant had no reason to
suppose that the plaintiff would be imder
the infiuence of the casual conversation which
was had some two months before.
And
further, if the defendant thought upon the
subject, he had no reason to suppose that if
he stated all the facts within his knowledge,
it would prevent the plaintiff from giving a
discharge which he had agreed to give.
While he would have stated that unexpectedly his share In the proceeds of the goods
was much larger than $20,000, yet he would
also have stated that he had contracted to
sell the share for $20,000, and that the vendee
That
claimed to hold him to the contract
the claim was a serious one is shown by the
fact that la January, 1869, Von Keller sued
him, and in April, 1870, after a trial before
a referee, sustained the contract and recovered a judgment for upward of $100,000,
which defendant was able to defeat finally
only after a litigation of several years and a
decision by this court. Von Keller v. SchultIng, 50 N. Y. 108.
In October, 1868, the defendant could have informed the plaintlfC
what his interest In the proceeds of the goods
was, subject to the chances of a litigation,
but what it was actually worth no one could
then have told.
Without therefore questioning the facts
found by the court at special term, we are of
opinion that there was error In the legal conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to any relief on account of fraud.
It is further claimed that the plaintiff
ought to be entitled to relief on account of
mistake. He testified that he would not have
executed the release if he had known the defendant's financial condition. But as already
shown, the defendant was in no way responsible for his ignorance, and was under no legal
or equitable obligation to disclose the facts
as to his pecuniary circimistances. The plaintiff could have learned the facts by inquiry
of the defendant or his vendees. There was
no mistake as to any fact intrinsic to the
Plaintiff knew that the defendant
release.
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had not been legally discharged from his liaWlity, and that for the $5,000 he was to give
him an absolute release;
and he gave him
just such a release as he intended to. There
was no mistake of any intrinsic fact essential
to the contract or involved therein.
The defendant's financial condition was an extrinsic
fact, which might have Influenced the plaintiffs action if he had known
But ignorance of or mistake as to such a fact is not
ground for aflSrmative equitable relief.
The
following illustrations of mistakes as to in-

it

trinsic
which
in the
which

facts essential to contracts, against
courts of equity will relieve, are found
books.
A. buys an estate of B. to
the latter is supposed to have an unquestionable title. It turns out, upon due investigation of the facts, that B. has no title;
in such a case equity wiU relieve the purchaser and rescind the contract
Bingham v.
Bingham, 1 Ves. Sr. 126.
If a horse should
be purchased,
which is by both parties believed to be alive, but is, at the time, in fact
dead, the purchaser would, upon the same
ground, be released by rescinding the contract.
Allen T. Hammond, 11 Pet. 71. If a
person should execute a release to another
party upon the supposition, founded on a mistake, that a certain debt or annuity had been
discharged, although both parties were innocent, the release would be set aside.
Hore
V. Becher, 12 Sim. 465. If one should. execute
a release so broad in its terms as to release
his rights in property, of which he was wholly ignorant, and which was not In contemplation of the parties at the time the bargain
for the release was made, a court of equity
might either cancel the release or restrain its
application as intended.
Cholmondeley y.
Clinton, 2 Mer. 352; Dungers v. Angove, 2
Ves. Jr. 304.
On the other hand, if the vendee is In possession of facts which will materially enhance the price of the commodity
and of which he knows the vendor to be ignorant, he Is not bound to communicate those
facts to the vendor, and the contract will be
held valid. Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat 178.
In such a case the facts unknown to the
vendor are extrinsic to the contract and are
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not of Its substance; and hence there is no
ground for the interference of a court of
equity.
It is clear from these and other Illustrations which might be given, that a court of
equity will not give relief in all cases of
mistake. There are many extrinsic facts surrounding every business transaction which
have an important bearing and influence upon its results.
Some of them are generally
unknown to one or both of the parties, and
if known, might have prevented the transaction. In such cases, if a court of equity could
Intervene and grant relief, because a party
was mistaken as to such a fact which would
have prevented him from entering into the
transaction if he had known the truth, there
would be such uncertainty and instability
in contracts as to lead to much embarrassment. As to all such facts, a party must rely
upon his own circumspection, examination
and inquiry; and if not imposed upon or defrauded, he must be held to his contracts. In
such cases, equity will not stretch out its arm
to protect those who sufCer for the want of
vigilance.
Judge Story lays it down as a general rule
"that mistake or ignorance of facts in parties
is a proper subject of relief only when it
constitutes a material ingredient in the contract of the parties, and disappoints their intention by a mutual error; or where it Is
inconsistent with good faith, and proceeds
from a violation of the obligations which are
imposed by law upon the conscience of either
party. But where each party is equally Innocent, and there is no concealment
of facts
which the other party has a right to know,
and no surprise or imposition exists, the mistake or ignorance, whether mutual or unilateral, is treated as laying no foundation for
equitable Interference." Story, Bq. Jur. § 151.
We are therefore of opinion that ujwn the
facts disclosed in the record before us, tlie
plaintifC was not entitled to any relief, and
the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide event. All concur
except MIDL.EB, J., not voting.
Judgment reversed.
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et al.

Wis. 431.)
March 2, 1881.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Appeal from circuit court, Dane county.
The case established by the pleadings and
evidence is correctly stated in the brief of
"This
counsel for the plaintiff, as follows:
action was brought to foreclose four certain
mortgages made by Martin Osborne and wife
upon 80 acres of land In Dane county, three
of which mortgages had been satisfied of
of the acrecord before the commencement
tion. The facts are that on November 11,
1871, Martin Osborne was seized in fee of
the W. V2 of N. W. % of section 25, town 8,
range 9, Dane county. November 11, 1871,
Osborne and wife gave a mortgage thereon
to John W, Allen for $800 and interest. This
is still in force as a first mortgage on the
property, and is not one of the four mortgages for the foreclosure of which the acIt confers a right of
tion was brought
property prior to the rights of all parties
hereto, and further reference to It in the
November 23, 1871, Oscase is unnecessary.
borne and wife gave a mortgage thereon to
Patrick Duffy for $200 and interest. This
mortgage bears date prior to the Allen mortgage, but was executed later, and in terms
October 1, 1875, Osmade subject thereto.
borne and wife gave another mortgage thereon to Patrick DufiCy for $250 and Interest
December 2, 1876, Osborne and wife gave a
mortgage thereon to Elizabeth Duffy for $135
February 21, 1878, Osborne
and Interest.
and wife gave a mortgage thereon to Michael
C. Conner, the plaintiff, for $229 and interest,
which mortgage has never been satisfied of
March 1, 1878, the defendant Christrecord.
Ian K. Stein caused judgment to be entered
against Martin Osborne in the circuit court
for Dane county upon a judgment note, with
warrant of attorney, by his attorneys, Welch
& Botkin, a law firm of which the defendant
William Welch was a member.
March 2,
1878, the defendant Stein assigned said judgment to said William Welch. March 4, 1878,
the said mortgages, numbers two, three, and
four, for $200, $250, and $135, were assigned
to the defendant Stein.
March 5, 1878, the
■defendant Stein, by his attorneys, the said
Welch & Botkin, brought suit to foreclose
the said mortgages, numbers two and three,
for $200 and $250, making parties defendant
thereto Osborne and wife, the mortgagors,
and Conner, the plaintiff herein, holding the
subsequent mortgage,
number five, above
but not making a party defendmentioned,
ant the said Welch, holding by assignment
the said judgment number six, March 8,
1878,
Osborne and vrtfe, by deed of quitclaim, conveyed said premises to the plaintiff, Conner, who, at the time, had an actual
knowledge of the Stein judgment and its assignment to Welch. April 9, 1878, at the
office of Welch & Botkin, in the presence of
Botkin, the plaintiff, Conner, paid to the de(8
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fendant Stein the amount, principal and Interest, of the mortgages in suit, (Nos. 2 and
3,) together with about $115, costs of suit
At the time of payment he was still without
knowledge of the Stein judgment
Neither
Stein nor Botkin spoke of it Botkin, when
asked if he had told Conner of the existence
of the Stein judgment, testified: 1 do not
think
did. He (Conner) paid the money,
and then said that he wanted the mortgages
satisfied, and asked Mr. Stein to come right
up with him and satisfy the mortgages, at
the register of deeds' office, and get done
with it; and he and Mr. Stein went out of
the office for that purpose.
It was at Conner's request Not a word was said by me
or Stein in regard to satisfying. There was
not a syllable or whisper in regard to it'
The two mortgages were then satisfied by
April 29, 1878, the plaintiff, Conner,
Stein.
paid Stein the amount, principal and interest, of the mortgage for $135, number four,
which, with the accompanying note, was
delivered to him. Thereupon, at plaintiff's
instance and request, Stein went to the regby plaintiff, and
ister's office, accompanied
satisfied the mortgage; Stein knowing, and
the plaintiff not knowing, of the judgment
the plaintiff first
1878,
About December,
learned of the existence of the judgment
from the officer having an execution thereon
against this property." The complaint prays
that the discharges of the three Duffy mortgages be cancelled, and for the usual judgment of foreclosure and sale in respect to
those mortgages, and the mortgage for $229
to the plaintiff, dated February 21, 1878.
It is claimed In the complaint that 40 acres
of the mortgaged land was the homestead of
Osborne,
and an Injunction was prayed
against the sale of such 40 acres, on execuAs to
tion Issued upon Stein's judgment
the agreement between the plaintiff and Osborne, pursuant to which the latter conveyed
to the plaintiff the land mortgaged, the plaintiff testified as follows: "I bought the place
of Osborne.
was to pay the mortgages.
I did not give him any money besides the
* • • 1 gave him an account
mortgages.
I held against him, more or less. * » •
He had no money, and I paid for the making
out of these papers.
Forget how much that
was. That is all I paid for his deed to me,
except that
released him from his liability
on the note of $229. Think it was agreed
that
should let Osborne have his note and
mortgage.
Have no further claim on him or
his land for that" The witness testified later that he understood he took the property
in satisfaction of his claims, but that it was
no part of the consideration of the deed;
and, further, to the question, "Didn't you regard the giving to you by Osborne of the
quitclaim deed as, between you and Osborne,
a settlement of your note and mortgage
against him for $229?" the plaintiff answered: "I presume so, but that was omitted in
putting the amount in the deed."
This Is

I

I

I

I
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the substance of all the evidence on the subject.
The court found— "First, that all the facts
stated in the complaint are true, except that
no part of the mortgaged premises was the
homestead of Osborne when Stein recovered
his judgment, and that Stein is not the ownsecond, that the deer of such judgment;
fendant Welch purchased said judgment
from the defendant Stein, and took the assignment thereof absolutely, for full value,
and without notice, fraud, or collusion, and
that he paid therefor by crediting the said
Stein on the account of the firm of Welch &
Botkln, of which the defendant Welch was
then and still is a member, with the face
amount thereof, towards the payment for legal services theretofore rendered by the said
Welch & Botkin for the said Stein, and that,
the said Welch and the said
as between
Botkin, it was agreed that the amount of
said judgment should be received by the
said Welch on his individual account; third,
that Mr. Botkin, the law partner of the said
defendant Welch, transacted the business in
the foreclosure suits set out in said complaint, and that said Welch had no knowledge of the details of said foreclosure, and
of the satisfaction of the mortgages as set
out in said complaint; fourth, that the cancellation of the mortgages as set out in said
complaint was founded upon a mistake upon
the part of the plaintiff.
That mistake was
the supposition that the several mortgages
of record, including his own, to the amount
In all of the full value of the premises, were
the only liens prior to his deed from said Osborne."

As conclusions of law, the court found
that the mortgage for $229, executed by Osborne to the plaintiff, is a valid subsisting
lien on the land; that the discharge of the
three Duffy mortgages should be cancelled,
and those mortgages adjudged to be valid
and subsisting liens; and that the plaintiff
is entitled to a judgment of foreclosure in
respect to all four mortgages, and to a sale
of the land mortgagedj but not to a personEil
judgment against either defendant. The defendants have appealed from the judgment
entered pursuant to such findings.
S. W. Botkin, for appellants.
vens & Morris, for respondent.

Sloan, Ste-

J. As we understand the testiof the plaintiff he accepted the quitclaim deed of the mortgaged premises from
Osborne pursuant to an express agreement
between them that the note and mortgage of
February 21, 1878, for ?229, was thereby satisfied and discharged.
His testimony seems
to admit of no other construction.
By this
agreement the $229 mortgage was discharged, and the satisfactions of the Duffy mortgages by Stein, in the proper records of the
county, at the request of the plaintiff, discharged those mortgages. Hence, by the acts
and procurement of the plaintiff, the four
LYON,
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mortgages in controversy were cancelled and
cease to be liens upon the land covered
by them. Were these subsisting mortgages,
we might not find it very difficult to hold,
under the authorities dted, that the interest
represented by the $229 mortgage was not
merged in the legal title conveyed
to the
plaintiff by Osborne, and that the plaintiff
should be subrogated to the rights of the
mortgagees
in the Duffy mortgages, so that
all of these mortgages could be made available to protect the plaintiff against the lien
of the Stein judgment, which is junior thereto.
But before the questions of merger and
subrogation can be raised at all, the mortgages now cancelled and discharged must
be restored and vitalized.
This can only be
done by cancelling and holding for naught
the satisfactions of the Duffy mortgages,
which the plaintiff caused to be entered of
record, and his express agreement with Osborne to accept the conveyance of the legal
title in full satisfaction and discharge of the
$229 mortgage.

The precise question Is, therefore, wheth..
er, under the circumstances of the case, the
plaintiff is entitled to be relieved of those
satisfactions and of such agreement.
Has
he shown himself entitled to have them set
aside, cancelled, and held for naught?
The
circuit com-t found (no doubt correctly) that
there was no fraud or collusion on the part
of thie defendant Welch, the owner of the
Stein judgment, and granted the relief prayed on the sole ground that plaintiff acted In

ignorance of the existence of that judgment,
In the matter of thie satisfaction and discharge of the mortgages. Undoubtedly the
plaintiff knew nothing of the judgment, and,
presumably, (although he has not so testified,) had he known of its existence he would
not have had the mortgages discharged, or
made the contract he did with Osborne for
the conveyance.
But that alone Is not suflBclent to entitle him to have the discharged
mortgages reinstated as valid liens upon the
land. He must also have exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain whether subsequent liens had been put upon the property.
A court of equity never relieves a man from
the consequences of his own culpable negligence.
Discussing the rules upon which
courts of equity proceed In relieving, or refusing to relieve, against contracts made or
acts done through mistake, or in ignorance
of material facts. Judge Story says that
"where an unconscionable advantage
has
been gained by mere mistake or misapprehension, and there was no gross negligence
on the part of the plaintiff in falling into the
error, or in not sooner claiming redress, and
no intervening rights have accrued, and the
parties may still be placed in statu quo, equity will interfere, in its discretion, in order to
prevent intolerable Injustice."
1 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 1381. In section 146 the learned author says: "It is not, however, sufficient in
all cases to give the party relief, that the

"
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fact Is material; but it must be sucb as he
could not by reasonable diligence get knowlFor
edge of when he was put upon inquiry.
if, by such reasonable diligence, he could obtain knowledge of the fact, equity will not
relieve him, since that would be to encourage
culpable negligence." In a note to the sec"If a court
tion last cited is the following:
of equity is asked to give relief in a case
not fully remediable at law, or not remediable at all at law, then it gi-ants it upon its
own terms and according to its own doctrines. It gives relief only to the vigilant
and not to the negligent; to those who have
not been put upon their diligence to make
inquiry, and not to those who, being put upon inquiry, have chosen to omit all inquiry,
which would have enabled them at once to
correct the mistake, or to obviate all ill effects therefrom. In short, it refuses all its
aid to those who, by their own negligence,
and by that alone, have incurred the loss, or
may suffer the inconvenience."
In Mamlock v. Fairbanks, 46 Wis. 415, 1
N. W. 167, this court made an application of
the rule above stated.
That was an action
to rescind a contract of sale of a certain ilote
and mortgage by the defendant to the plaintlfC, and to recover the money paid therefor.
The ground upon which relief was claimed,
was that the defendant misrepresented
the
identity of the debtors, which misrepresentation affected the value of the securities.
It
was held that if, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the plaintiff had the present
means of ascertaining the Identity of the
debtors, and was not prevented from doing
so by any artifice of the vendor, there could
be no recovery.
The opinion contains some
of the authorities for the rule, not specially
cited herein, and the case is a very strong
one against the plaintiff.
Levy V. Martin, 48 Wis. 198, 4 N. W. 35,
is not In point.
There the mortgage sought
to be reviV(Bd was discharged without the
consent of the plaintiff, and against an express agreement between him and the personal representatives of the deceased mortgagor that It should be assigned to him.
Under these circmnstances we found no difficulty in cancelling the satisfaction, and
subrogating the plaintiff to the rights of the
original mortgagor. There was no question
of diligence in the case.
We have examined the cases cited by the
learned counsel for the plaintiff on the subject of the rescission of contracts or instruments for Ignorance or mistake of material
facts, but in none of th'ein, so far as we
have perceived. Is the question of diligence
raised or passed upon.
We are now to consider the question
whether the present plaintiff used proper
diligence to ascertain the condition of the title when he made his agreement
with Osborne, and when he paid and procured the
discharge of the Duffy mortgages.
The plaintiff is a man of some wealth,

and Is apparently familiar with the usual
modes of transacting ordinary business.
He
evidently knew that a judgmient against Osborne would be a lien upon the mortgaged
premises,
and also the effect upon the title
of a discharge of the mortgages.
He knew
also that Osborne was utterly insolvent and
thriftless. The number and amount of mortgages which the latter had put upon his
land during the preceding seven years, absorbing its whole value, was sufficient notice to him of Osborne's pecuniary condition.
The known insolvency of Osborne would naturally make an ordinarily prudent man more
cautious when dealing with the title to his
land. Then, again, the mortgage of Allen
nearly or quite one-half of the
represented
value of the land, and was paramount to all
the others.
Stein Is a merchant in Madison,
and plaintiff knew him well. It does not appear that he is a dealer in real estate to any
considerable extent.
The very fact that he
had purchased the Duffy mortgages, which
were junior to the Allen mortgage, would
seem to suggest to a reasonable mind that
he must have had some special reason for
doing so, and that such reason might well
be that he became Interested in some way
In the land. But these ch:cumstances, suggestive as they were, failed to open the lips
of the plaintiff. He made no inquiry concerning the title either of Stein or Botkin or
Had he done so, and been told
Osborne.
that no encumbrance had been placed upon
the land subsequent to his mortgage for
$229, he might stand in a very different. position In this action.
But this is not all. A month after he took
the conveyance from Osborne, he went witli
Stein to the office of the register of deeds to
have the latter discharge the tfwo oldest Duffy mortgages, and some weeks later went
again to the same office to have the other
Duffy mortgages discharged. Of course, he
was in close proximity to the office of the
clerk of the circuit court, and could easily
have gone there and ascertained whether
any judgments had been entered against Osborne.
It seems to us that common prudence required him to do so, or else to Interrogate Stein or Osborne or Botkin as to the
condition of the title.
Yet he made the
agreement,
and took the conveyance from
Osborne, and procured Stein to discharge the
Duffy mortgages, without doing either. He
suffered the matter to rest In statu quo until an execution was issued on the judgment
and, so far as it appears, first asserted the
rights claimed in this action on the day the
land was sold by the sheriff under the execution, which was about 10 months after
the last Duffy mortgage was discharged*
Our minds are impelled to the conclusion
that, under these circumstances, the plaintiff
vras guilty of most culpable negligence
In
failing to inform himself of the existence of
the Stein judgment, and hence that he has no
standing in a court of equity to obtain the
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relief he seeks. If there Is any case in the
boolis which grants such relief, where the
act sought to be relieved against was the
result of negligence so gross and inexcusable,
we hare failed to find it Certainly, no such
The application of
case is cited by counsel.
this rule may work hardship In some cases;
perhaps it does in this case.
But the rule
requires nothing unreasonable and is a most
salutary one. It is infinitely better that men
should be held to the consequences
of their
own culpable carelessness, than that courts
of equity should und'ertake to relieve there-
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from. The rule requires reasonable caution
and prudence in the transaction of business,
and is deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence.
It is within the principle and, reason of caveat emptor.
Mamlock v. Fairbanks, supra.
The abrogation of the rule would tend to
encourage negligence, and to introduce uncertainty and confusion in all business transactions.
The judgment of the circuit court must be
reversed, and the cause remanded,
with directions to that court to dismiss the comDlalut
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TORRANCE, J. This Is an action brought
to recover damages for the breach of a written contract, dated December 14, 1888. The
contract is set out in full in the amended
complaint. It Is in the form of a written
addressed by the plaintiff to the
proposal,
defendant, and Is accepted by the defendant in writing upon the face of the contract Such parts of the contract as appear
to be material are here given: "We propose
to supply you with fifteen net tons of tool
steel, of good and suitable quality, to be
furnished prior to January 1, 1890, at" prices
set forth in the contract for the qualities of
"Deliveries to be made
steel named therein.
i. o. b. Pittsburgh, and New York freight alTo be specified for as
lowed to Hartford.
your wants may require." The contract
was made at Hartford, by the plaintiff
through its agent A. H. Church, and by the
defendant through Its agent J. B. Clapp.
After filing a demurrer and an answer,
which may now be laid out of the case, the
defendant filed an "answer, with demand
for reformation of contract," in the first
paragraph of which it admitted the execution of said written contract. The second,
third, and fourth paragraphs of the answer
are as follows:
"The defendant avers that
it was
, 1888,
bn or about December
agreed by and between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff acting by its said
agent, A. H. Church, that the plaintiff should
supply the defendant prior to January 1,
1890, with such an amount of tool steel, not
exceeding
fifteen tons, as the defendant's
wants during that time might require, and
of the kinds and upon the terms stated in
said contract, and that the defendant would
purchase the same of the plaintiff on said
by the mistake of the
terms.
(3) That
plaintiff and defendant or the fraud of the
plaintiff, said written contract did not embody the actual agreement
made as aforesaid by the parties. (4) That the defendant
accepted the proposal made to It by the
plaintiff, and contained In said written contract relying upon the representations of
the plaintiff's said agent, then made to it,
that by accepting the same the defendant
would only be bound for the purchase of
such an amount of tool steel of the kinds
named therein as Its wants prior to Janu-

ary 1,
fendant

mlgbt require, and flie dethen believed that suoh proposal
embodied the terms of the actual agreement
made as aforesaid by and between the plaintiff and defendant"
The fifth and last
paragraph of the answer Is not now material. The answer claimed, by way of equi- .
table relief, a reformation of the written
In reply the plaintiff denied the
contract
three paragraphs above quoted; denied specifically that the written contract did not
embody the actual agreement made by the
parties; and denied the existence of any
joint mistake . or fraud. Thereupon the court
below, sitting as a coiu't of equity.i heard
the parties upon the Issues thus formed,
foimd them in favor of the defendant and
adjudged that the written contract be reformed to correspond with the contract as
set out In paragraph 2 of the answer.
At a
term of the court final Judgsubsequent
ment in the suit was rendered In favor of
The present appeal is based
the defendant
upon what occurred during the trial with
reference to the reformation of the contract Upon that hearing the agent of the
defendant was a witness, on behalf of the
defendant and was t.^ked to state "what
conversation occurred between him and A.
H. Church in making the contract of December 14, 1888, at and before the execution
thereof, and relevant thereto." The plaintiff "objected to the reception of any parol
testimony, on the ground that the same was
inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms
of a written instrument or to show any other or different contract than that specified
In the instrument, or to show anything relevant to the defendant's prayer for its reformation." The court overruled the objection,
and admitted the testimony, and upon such
testimony found and adjudged as hereinbefore stated.
The case thus presents a single question,
- -whether the evidence objected to was admissible under the circumstances; and this
depends upon the further question,
which
wUl be first considered, whether the mistake was one which, under the circumstanoes disclosed by the record, a court of equity
will correct The finding of the court below is as follows: "The actual agreement
between the defendant and the plaintiff was
that the plaintiff should supply the defendant, prior to January 1, 1890, with such an
amount of tool steel, not exceeding fifteen
tons, as the defendant's wants during that
time might require, and of the kinds and
upon the terms stated in said contract and
that the defendant would purchase the same
of the plaintiff on said terms.
But by the
mutual mistake of said Chunch and said
Clapp, acting for the plaintiff and defendant
respectively, concerning the legal construction of the written contract of December 14,
1888,
that contract failed to express the
actual agreement of the parties; and that
said Church and said Clapp both Intended to
1890,
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hare the said written contract express the
actual agreement made by them, and at the
time of its execution believed that It did."
No fraud is properly charged, and certainly
none is found, and whatevOT claim to relief
the defendant may have must rest wholly on
the ground of mistake.
The plaintiff claims
that the mistalie in question is one of law,
and is of such a nature that It cannot be
corrected in a court of equity. That a court
of equity, under certain circumstances, may
reform a written Instrument founded on a
mistalie of fact is not disputed; but the
plaintiff strenuously insists that it cannot,
or will not, reform an instrument founded
upon a mistake Uke the one here in question,
which is alleged to be a mistake of law. The
distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact is certainly recognized in the
and decisions, and to a certain
text-books
extent is a valid distinction;
but it is not
practically so important as it is often represented to be. Upon this point Mr. Markby, In his "Elements of Law" (sec>tions 268
and 269), well says: "There is also a peculiar class of cases in which courts of equity
to undo what has been
have endeavored
' done imder the influence of error and to reThe
store parties to their former position.
courts deal with such cases in a vgry free
doubt whether it is possible
manner, and
to bring their action under any fixed rules.
can judge by
But here again, as far as
what find in the text-books and in the cases
referred to, the distinction between errors
of law and errors of fact, though very emphaticaUy announced, has had very little
practical effeot upon the decisions of the
courts.
The distinction is not ignored, and
it may have had some influence, but it is
always mixed up with other considerations,
which not unfrequentiy outweigh it The
distinction between errors of law and errors
of fact is therefore probably of much less
importance than is commonly supposed.
There is some satisfaction In this, because
the grounds upon which the distinction is
made have never been clearly stated."
The
distinction in question can therefore afford
little or no aid in determining the question
under consideration. Under certain circumstances a court of equily "will, and imder
others it will not, reform a writing founded
on a mistake of fact;- under certain circumstances it win, and under others it will not,
reform an instrument founded upon a mistake of law. It is no longer true, if it ever
was, that a mistake of law is no ground for
relief in any case, as will be seen by the
Whether, then, the
cases hereinafter cited.
mistake now in question be regarded as one
of law or one of fact is not of muoh consequence;
the more important question is
whether it is such a mistake as a court of
equity wiU correct; and this perhaps can
only, or at least can best, be determined by
seeing whether it falls within any of the
well-recognized
classes of cases in which
«uch relief is furnished.
At the same time

I

I

I

235

fundamental equitable principle which
was specially applied in the case of Northrop V. Graves, 19 Conn. 54.8, may also, perhaps, afford some aid in coming to a right
conclusion. Stated briefly and generally,
and without any attempt at strict accuracy,
that principle is that in legal transactions
no one shall be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of another through
or by reason of an innocent mistake of law
or fact, entertained without negligence by
the loser, or by both.
If we apply this principle to the present case, we may see that, by
means of a mutual mistake in reducing the
oral agreement to writing, the plaintiff, without either party Intending it, gained a decided advantage over lie defendant, to
which it is in no way justiy entitied, or at
least ought not to be entitied, in a court of
equity.
The written agreement certainly fails to
express the real agreement of the parties in
a material point; it fails to do so by reason of a mutual mistake, made, as we must
assume, innocenfly, and without any such
negligence on the part of the defendant as
would debar him from the aid of a coin:t of
equity. The rights of no third parties have
intervened. The instrument, if corrected,
will place both parties just where they Intended to place themselves in their relations
to each other; and, if not corrected, it gives
the plaintiff an inequitable advantage over
the defendant. It is said that if, by mistake,
words are insKfted in a written contract
which the parties did not intend to insert, or
omitted which they did not intend to omit,
this is a mistake of fact which a court of
equity will correct in a proper case. Sibert
If, then, the oral
V. McAvoy, 15 lU. 106.
agreement In the case at bar had been for
the sale and piu:chase of 5 tons of steel, and,
in reducing the contract to writing, the parties had, by an unnoticed mistake, inserted
"15 tons" instead of "5 tons," this would
have been a mistake of fact entitling the defendant to the aid of a court of equity. In
the case at bar the parties actually agreed
upon what may, for brevity, be called a conditional purchase and sale, and upon that
only. In reducing the contract to writing,
they, by an innocent mistake, omitted words
which would have expressed the true agreement, and used words which express
an
agreement differing materially from the only
one they made.
There is perhaps a distinction between the supposed case and the actual case, but it is quite shadowy. They differ not at all in their unjust consequences.
In both, by an innocent mistake mutually
entertained, the vendor obtains an uncoa
scionable advantage over the vendee, a r*suit which was not intended by either.
There exists no good, substantial reason, as
it seems to us, why relief should be given
in the one case and refused in the other,
other things being equal.
It Is hardly necessary to say that, in cases like the one at
bar, courts of equity ought to move with
the
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great caution.
Before an instrument is rethe proof
formed, under such circumstances,
of the mistake, and that it really gives an unjust advantage to one party over the other,
ought to be of the most convincing character.
"Of course the presumption in favor of the
written over the spoken agreement is almost
resistless; and the court has wearied Itself
In declaring that such prayers (for relief of
this kind) must be supported by overwhelming evidence, or be denied." Palmer v. Insurance Co., 54 Conn. 501, 9 Atl. 248. We
are not concerned here, however, with the
amount or sufficiency of the proofs upon
which the court below acted, nor with the
sufficiency of the pleadings; we must, upon
this record, assume that the pleadings are
sufficient, and that the proofs came fuDy up
to the highest standard requirements In such
oases. Upon principle, then, we think a court
of equity may correct a mistake of law in a
case like the one at bar, and we also think
the very great weight of modem authority
is in favor of that conclusion. The case
clearly falls within that class of cases where
there is an antecedent agreement, and, in reducing it to writing, the Instrument executed,
by reason of the common mistake of the parties as to the legal effect of the words used,
fails, as to one or more material points, to
It Is perexpress their actual agreement.
haps not essential In all cases that there
should be an antecedent agreement, as appears to be held in Benson t. Markoe, 37
Minn. 30, 33 N. W. 38; but we have no oocasion to consider that question in the case
at bar. The authorities in favor of the conelusion that a court of equity in suchi cases
will correct a mistake, even If it be one of
law, are very numerous, and the citation of
a few of the more important must suffice.
In Hunt V. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 1 Pet 1,
decided in 1828, it Is said: "Where an Instrument is drawn and executed which professes, or Is intended, to carry into execution an agreement, whether in writing or by
parol, previously entered into, but which by
mistalie of the draftsman, either as to fact or
law, does not fulfill, or which violates, the
manifest intention of the parties to- the
agreement,
equity wlU correct the mistake
so as to produce a conformity of the instrument to the agreement"
It was said in
the argument before us that this was a mere
obiter dictum, but that is hardly correct
It
Is true the case was held not to fall within
the principle, but the principle was said to
be "incontrovertible" (page 13), and was applied to the extent at least of determining
that the case then before the court did not
come within It
In Snell v. Insurance Co.,
98 U. S. 85, the court applied the principle so
clearly stated in the case last cited, and reformed a policy of insurance, though the
mistake was clearly one as to the legal effect of the language of the policy. In numerous
other decisions of that court the
same principle has been cautiously but repeatedly applied, but it is not necessary to

cite them.
On the general question, whether a court of equity will relieve against a
mistake as to the legal effect of the language
of a writing, the case of Griswold v. Hazard,
141 U. S. 260, 11 Sup. Ct 972, 999, is a strong
case, though perhaps hardly an authority
upon the precise question in this case. Canedy V. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373, was a case
where the oral contract was for the sale of
two-thirds of certain premises, but the deed,
hf mistake of the scrivener, conveyed the entire premises.
The words used were ones
intended to be used in one sense, the error
being that all concerned
supposed
those
words would carry out the oral agreement
This was clearly a mistake "concerning the
legal construction, of the written contract,"
but the coiurt, by Chief Justice Shaw, said:
"We are of the opinion that courts of equity in such cases are not limited to affording
relief only In cases of mistake of fact, and
that a mistake in the legal effect of a description in a deed, or in the use of technical
language, may be relieved against upon propIn Goode v. Riley, 153 Mass. 585,
er proof."
28 N. B. 228, decided in 1891, the court says:
"The only question argued Is raised by the
defendant's exception to the refusal of a ruling that, if both parties intended that the
description should be written as it was written, the plaintiff was not entitled to a reformation. It would be a sufficient answer
that the contrary Is settled in this commonwealth,"— citing a number of cases. In Kennard t. George, 44 N. H. 440, the parties, by
mistake as to Its legal effect, supposed a
mortgage deed to be valid when It was not
The court relieved against the mistake, and
said: "It seems to us to be a clear case of
mutual mistake, where the instrument givea
and received was not in fact what all the
parties to it supposed It was and intended
it should be; and in such a case equity will
interfere and reform the deed, and make it
what the parties at the time of its execution intended to make it; and in this respect It makes no difference whether the
defect In the instrument be in a statutory or
common-law requisite, or whether the parties failed to make the instrument in the
form they Intended, or misapprehended
its
legal effect"
In iEastman v. Association, 65
N. H. 176, 18 Atl. 745, decided in 1889, the
mistake was as ta the legal effect of an insurance certificate, but the court granted relief by way of reformation. The comrt sayst
"Both parties intended to make the benefit
payable to Gigar's administrator. That it waa
not made payable to him was due to theit
mutual misapprehension of the legal effect of
the language used in the certificate. • • •
Equity requires an amendment of the writing
that wHl malice the contract what the parties
supposed it was, and Intended It should be,
although th^ mistake is one of law, ajid not
of fact"
In TrusdeU y. Lehman, 47 N.
J. Eq. 218, 20 Ati. 391, the marginal note is
as follows:
"Where it clearly appears that
a deed drawn professedly to carry out the
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agreement of the parties, previously entered
into, Is executed under the misapprehension
that it really embodies the agreement, ■whereas, by mistake of the draughtsman either as
to fact or law, It fails to fulfill that purpose,

equity will correct the mistake by reforming
the instrument in accordance with the contract" In a general way, the same rule is
recognized and applied with more or less
strictness In the following cases: Clayton t.
Freet, 10 Ohio St. 544; Bush v. Hicks, 60 N.
T. 298; Andrews v. Andrews, 81 Me. 337, 17
AtL 166; May y. Adams, 58 Vt 74, 3 Aa
187;, Grifath v. Townley, 69 Mo. 13; Benson
V. Markoe, 37 Minn. 30, 33 N. W. 38; Gump's
Appeal, 65 Pa. St 476; Cooper t. Phibbs,
L. R. 2 H. L. 170. See, also, 2 Pom. Eq.
And,
Jut. § 845, and Bisp. Eq. §§ 184r-191.
whatever the law may be elsewhere, this is
certainly the law of our own state.
Chamberlain V. Thompson, 10 Conn. 243; Stedwell
V. Anderson, 21 Conn. 144; Woodbury Savings Bank v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 31 Conn.
v. Insurance Co., 64 Conn.
518; Palmer
488, 9 Atl 248; and Haussman
t. BurnIndeed,
ham, 59 Conn. 117, 22 AtL 1065.
since the time of Northrop t. Graves, supra,
it is difficult to see how our law could have
We conclude then that by
been otherwise.
our own law, and by the decided weight of
authority elsewhere, the defendant was enIf tliis is so, then
titled to the relief sought
clearly he was entitled to the parol evidence
which the plaintiff objected to; for in no
other way, ordinarily, can the mistake be
"In such cases parol evidence is
shown.
admissible to show that the party is entitled
to the relief sought"
Wheaton v. Wheaton,
9 Conn. 96.
"It is settled, at least In equity,
that this particular kind of evidence, that Is
to say, of mutual mistake as to the meaning
of words used, is admissible for the negative
purpose we have mentioned.
And this principle is entirely consistent with the mle that
you cannot set np prior or contemporaneous
oral dealings to modify or override what you
knew was the effect of your writing." Goode
T. RUey, 153 Mass. 585, 28 Atl. 228; Eeyn.
Theory Ev. § 69; 1 GreenL Ev. (15th Ed.) i
269a; Steph. Dig. Ev. ! 90.
The view we have taken of this case renders it unnecessary
to notice at any length
the cases cited by connsd for the plaintiff

In his able argument before us. Upon tila
brief, he cites five from lUinois, two froip
Indiana, and one from Arkansas.
After an
examination of them, we can only say that
most of them seem to support the claims of
the plaintiff.
If so, we think they are opposed to the very decided weight of authority, and do not state the law as it is held in
this state.
Before closing, however, we ought to notice the case of Wheaton v. Wheaton, Supra,
upon which the plaintiff's counsel seems to
place great reliance. The case is a somewhat peculiar one. Even in that case, however, the court seems to recognize the principle governing the class of cases within which
we decide the case at bar falls, for it says:
"It is not alleged that the writings were not
so drawn as to effectuate the intention of the
parties, through the mistake of the scrivOn the contrary it is alleged that the
ener.
scrivener was not even Informed what the
agreement between the parties was." From
the statement of the case In the record and
In the opinion. It clearly appears that the
mistake was not mutual; indeed. It does not
even appear that at the time when the note
was executed the other party even knew
that there was any mistake at all on he part
of anybody. Upon the facts stated, the
plaintiff in this case did not bring it within
the class of cases we have heesn. considering.
The case was correctly decided, not on the
ground that the mistake was one of law,
but on the ground that the mistake of law
was one which, under the circumstances alleged, a court of equity would not correct
The court, however, in the opinion, seems to
base its decision upon the distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact;
holding in general and unqualified terms, as
was once quite customary, that the latter
could be corrected and the form^ eould not
The court probably did not mean to lay the
law down In this broad and unqualified way;
but if it did, it is sufficient to say that it Is
not a correct statement of our law, at least
since the decision of Northrop v. Graves,
supra. On the whole, this case of Wheaton
v. Wheaton can hardly be regarded as supporting the plaintiff's contention. There Is
no error apparent upon the record. In this
opinion the other judges concurred.
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MR. JUSTICE ClilPFORD delivered the
opinion of the court
•
Trusts are either express or implied, the
former being such as are raised or created
by the act of the parties, and the latter being such as are raised or created by presumption or construction of law. Cook t.
Fountain, 3 Swanst 585, 592.
Implied trusts may also be divided into
two general classes: First those that rest
upon the presumed intention of the parties.
Secondly,
those which are independent of
any such express intentions, and are forced
upon the conscience of the party by operation of law. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1195.
Sufficient appears to show that Sarah S.
Walden, the complainant on the sixth day
of May, 1874, filed her bill of complaint in
the court below against the respondents, to
wit, Darius S. Skinner and John N. Lewis
and Charles S. Hardee, executors of Charles
S. Henry, deceased, who in his lifetime was
' the trustee of Penelope W. TefCt and her
three children. Preliminary to the charging
part of her complaint she alleges and states
that on the 28th of October, 1847, she intermarried with William P. TefCt who on the
9th of August,' five years later, departed this
life Intestate and without children, leaving
the complainant as his sole heir and legal
representative; that on the 4th of June,
six years subsequent to the death of her first
husband, she Intermarried with Charles O.
^Walden, who, on the eighth day of December of the nest year, departed this life testate, leaving no children by the complainant
and that he by his will bequeathed to her
all the property and rights owned and possessed by her at the date of their marriage;
and that the father of her first husband
died intestate on the 30th of June, 1862, but
that no administration was ever had upon his
estate, and that his widow, the mother of
her first husband, departed this life testate
on the 11th of September eleven years later;
that her first husband had two brothers at
the date of her marriage neither of whom
ever married and both of whom died without
children; that at the death of the elder of the
two he had a life policy of insurance for
$5,000, which his administrator collected and
paid to his two living brothers.
Allegations then follow in the bill of complaint which relate more Immediately to the
BUbject-matter
of the controversy,
from
which It appears that Ellas Fort June 28,

K

L
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conveyed a certain tract of land to
Charles S. Henry and Stephen C. Greene, as
trustees and in trust for Penelope W. Tefft
and her three sons, William P. Tefft Henry
D. Tefft, and Charles E. Tefft and it Is
therein declared that the said property is
for the use of the mother during her lifetime and the three sons, and that after the
death of the mother It shall be for the use
of the three sons alone as tenants in common, and that in case of sale "the proceeds
to be reinvested upon the same uses and
trusts as aforesaid, and if not sold, then
the property, after the death of the mother,
was to be distributed by said trustees to
each of the said sons as shall survive and
attain the age of twenty-one years."
Greene, one of the trustees, subsequently
died, leaving Charles S. Henry the sole surviving trustee tmder the trust-deed, and she
charges that on the 19th of July, 1848, the
mayor and aldermen of the city of Savannah
conveyed to him as such trustee a certain lot
of land numbered five, Monterey Ward, in
said city, the lot being then subject to certain annual ground-rents, as specified in the
conveyance,
and the complainant avers that
the conveyance is informal and incomplete.
Inasmuch as the trustee never signed It as
it was intended, and that it falls to set forth
and express the trust interests of the three
children as It should do. Wherefore she alleges that it should be reformed and be made
to conform to the purposes of the trust as
created and set forth in the original trust1831,

S. 577.)
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deed.

Persuasive and convincing reasons in support of that request are alleged which will
hereafter be reproduced when the merits of
the controversy are considered.
Relief specific and general Is prayed, as is
Promore fully set forth in the transcript
cess was served and the respondents appear■ed, and after certain Interlocutory proceedings filed separate answers.
All of the defenses to the merits are set
up in the answer of the first-named respondent, who admits all of the preliminary matters alleged in the bill of complaint He
also admits that there was in existence at
the time of the first marriage of the complainant the trust estate held by the surviving trustee arising under the conveyance
from Ellas Fort to the said two trustees,
which, as he alleges, was held for the sole
and separate use of the mother during her
life, and remainder at her death to her three
sons as tenants In common.
Prior to that transaction there is no controversy between the parties as to the facts,
and he also admits that the authorities of the
city conveyed the lot called Monterey Ward
to the surviving trustee, but he alleges that
by the terms of the conveyance
the legal
title to the lot vested in the trustee in trust
for the sole and separate use of the mother,
the trust being executory only so long and.
for such time as the cestui que trust should.
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remain a feme covert; and he denies that
the conveyance is informal and incomplete in
any particular, or that It was ever expected
hy any one that the trustee
or Intended
should sign the same, and he avers that it
by the trustee for the pur■was accepted
poses therein set forth.
Attempt is also made to enforce that view
by a specific denial of most of the reasons
assigned in the bill of complaint in support
of the request that the conveyance to the
trustee of the lot called Monterey Ward may
be reformed so as to conform to the trusts
created and expressed in the antecedent trustdeed.

Both of the other respondents allege that

they are citizens of the state where the suit
is brought, and deny that the circuit court
had any jurisdiction to make or execute any
order, judgment, or decree against them in
the premises.
Proofs were taken, the parties heard, and
the circuit court entered a decree in favor
dismissing the bill of
of the respondents,
Prompt appeal was taken by the
complaint.
complainant to this comt, and since the appeal was brought up she has filed the assignment of errors set forth in the brief of
They are ten in number, all
her counsel.
of which will be sufficiently considered in
the course of the opinion, without giving
each a separate examination.
Before examining the questions presented
in respect to the second deed, it becomes necessary to ascertain the true construction and
meaning of the original trust-deed so far
as respects the second trust therein created

Eight hundred dollars constiand defined.
tuted the consideration of the conveyance,
and it was made upon the trust that if, during the lifetime of the mother of the three
sons, it should be deemed advisable by her
to sell and convey the premises, then upon
this further trust that the trustees as aforesaid, or the survivor of them, upon her application and with her consent, signified by
her being a party to the conveyance, will sell
and convey the lot and Improvements for the
best price which can be obtained for the
same, to any person or persons whatsoever,

without applying to a court of law or equity
for that purpose to authorize the same, and
the proceeds thereof upon the same trusts
as aforesaid to Invest in such otha: property
or manner as the mother of the sons shall
direct and request for the same use, benefit,
and behalf.
Explicit and ■unambiguous as that provision is, it requires no discussion to ascertain its meaning; nor is it necessary to enter into any examination of the third trust
as it Is conceded
specified in the conveyance,
that the trust property was sold by the surviving trustee for reinvestment during the
lifetime of the mother at her request, she
Joining in the conveyance as required by the
terms of the Instrument creating the trust.
Twenty-four hundred dollars were receiv-

23»

for the conveyance of the trust property,
and all of that sum, except $600 turned over
to the mother,
was invested in buildings
then being erected upon lot numbered five,
Purchase of
called the Monterey Ward.
that lot had previously been made by the
surviving trustee named m the original trustdeed, and it appears that the parties understood that it was to be upon the same uses
and trusts as were contained in the trustdeed by which the title to the lot sold was
acquired.
Proof that the new lot numbered five,
called Monterey Ward, was purchased by. the
father and the three sons during the lifetime of the father seems to be entirely satisfactory, and it is equally well established
that each contributed one-fourth part of the
sum of $240 paid for the purchase-money
of
the lot. Satisfactory proof is also exhibited
that Henry D. Tefft, one of the three brothers, died Aug. 13, 1849, unmarried and intestate, and that he had a valid subsisting
insurance upon his life in the sum of $5,000,
which his administrator collected and paid
to his surviving brothers.
Eighteen hundred dollars of the proceeds
arising from the sale of the property acquired by virtue of the first trust-deed were
appropriated towards erecting buildings on
the new lot purchased by tlie father and lihe
three sons while in full Ufe, and when the
one whose life was insured deceased, the two
survivors appropriated each his proportion of
to the same purpose,
the money received
with the understanding that the property
was subject to the same uses and trusts as
the property previously acquired and sold.
Competent proofs of a convincing character are also exhibited in the transcript that
the first husband of the complainant contributed other sums towards completing the
buildings, leaving no doubt that he paid his
full proportion for the improvements as well
as for the lot purchased of the city authoPr
Ities.
Enough appears to show that the buildings
were completed more than two years before
the first husband of the complainant died Intestate and without children, when it is
obvious that she became the sole heir to all
the Interest he possessed in the said estate,
whatever it might be. Two years elapsed
after the buildings were completed before the
father of the three sons died, and the proofs
show that during that period the complainant resided with the parents of her husband,
and that her rights as his heir-at-law were
by the family;
uniformly recognized
that
she continued to reside there with her mother-in-law after the death of the senior Tefft
until the decease of his widow, and that
throughout that period she paid one-half of
all repairs, taxes, insurance, and other expenses of the property as if she were equally
in the same with her mother-ininterested
law, and was liable to bear an equal proportion of all such expenses.
ed
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Opposed to that is the proof that the mother-in-law, one year before her death, when
in a low and depressed frame of mind, bequeathed the whole of the lot in question t»
the first-named respondent, who is her nephew, and on the same day executed a deed
to him of the entire property, to take effect
Sole title to
in possession after her death.
the premises in fee-simple is claimed by the
respondent under those instruments, and he
brought ejectment against the complainant
to dispossess her of the premises, and it appears that she was at great disadvantage in
attempting to defend the suit, because the
trustee had omitted to see that the title was
conveyed in trust for the benefit of the cestuis que trust as in the prior trust deed, as
he should have done, to carry into effect the
understanding of all the parties to the sale
of the prior trust premises and the purchase
What she alleges is
of the lot in question.
that the purchase of the new lot' was made
for the same cestuis que trust as those described in the deed of the old lot, and that
the understanding of all was that the deed
of the new lot should contain and declare
the same uses and trusts in favor of the
same persons, and the proofs to that effect
are full and entirely satisfactory.
Support to that view is also derived from
the fact that the surviving trustee in the old
deed is the grantee in the new deed, and that
as
he is therein more than once described
trustee, and in tlie Introductory part of the
instrument is denominated
trustee of Mrs.
Penelope W. TefEt, wife of Israel K. Tefft,
of the city and state previously mentioned In
the same instrument.
Ten years before the suit was instituted
the trustee in the new deed departed this
Ufe, and the other two respondents were appointed and qualified as his executors.
Unable to obtain complete redress at law, the
complainant prays that the deed of conveyance from the city of the lot and improvements in question may be reformed and be
made to conform to the true intent and purpose for which the lot was purchased,
and
to that end that it may be made to Include
the same uses and trusts raised,
created,
and declared in the prior deed from Ellas
Fort, according to the understanding and
agreement of all the parties.
Besides that she also prays that her equities In and to the property,
including the
improvements,
may be set forth, decreed,
and allowed by the court, including such as
are In her favor from the payment of taxes,
insurance, and repairs upon the property during the lifetime and since the death of her
mother-in-law, and that tie first-named respondent may be enjoined from further proceeding in his ejectment suit to recover possession cif the premises.
Courts of eqiiity afford relief In case of
mistake of facts, and allow parol evidence to
vary aad reform written contracts and in-

struments, when the defect or error arises
as properly
from accident or misconception,
forming an exception
to the general rule
which excludes parol testimony offered to
vary or contradict written
instruments.
Where the mistake is admitted by the other
party, relief, as all agree, will be granted,
and if it be fully proved by other evidence.
Judge Story says, the reasons for granting
relief seem to be equally satisfactory. 1
Story, Bq. Jur. § 156.
Decisions of undoubted authority hold that
where an instrument is drawn and executed
that professes or is intended to carry into
execution an agreement, which is in writing
or by parol, previously made between the
pairties, but which by mistake of the draftsman, either as to fact or law, does not fulfill
or which violates the manifest intention of
the parties to the agreement, equity will correct the mistake so as to produce a conformity of the instrument to the agreement, the
reason of the rule being that the execution
fairly and legally made is
of agreements
one of the peculiar branches of equity Jurisdiction, and if the instrument intended to
be from any cause
execute the agreement
insufficient for that purpose, the agreement
remains as much unexecuted as if the party
had refused altogether to comply with his
and a court of equity will, In
engagement,
the exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction,
afford relief in the one case as well as in
the other, by compelling the delinquent party to perform his undertaking according to
the terms of it and the manifest intention of
the parties. Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'rs,
1 Pet. 1, 13; Id., 8 Wheat. 174, 211.
Even a judgment when confessed. If the
agreement was made under a clear mistake,
will be set aside if application be made, and
the mistake shown while the judgment is
vrithin the power of the court. Such an
agreement, even when made a rule of court,
will not ,be enforced if made under a mistake, if seasonable
application be made to
set it aside, and if the judgment be no longer in the power of the court, relief, says Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall, may be obtained in a
court of chancery. The Hiram, 1 Wheat

440, 444.

Equitable rules of the kind are applicaWe
to sealed instruments, as well as to ordinary
vrritten agreements, the rule being that if
by mistake a deed be drawn plainly different
from the agreement of the parties, a court
of equity will grant relief by considering the
deed as if it had conformed to the antecedent
agreement.
So If a deed be ambiguously
expressed In such a manner that it is difficult to give it a construction, the agreement
may be referred to as an aid in expounding
such an ambiguity;
but if the deed is so
expressed that a reasonable construction may
be given to it, and when so given it does not
plainly appear to be at variance with the
agreement,
then the latter is not to be re-
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In the construction of the former.
mistake in a written contract In favor of
the complainant seeking a specific performHogan V. Insurance Co., 1 Wash. C. O. 419,
ance, especially where the contract in the
422, Fed. Cas. No. 6,582.
Rules of decision in suits for specific per- first instance is Imperfect without referring
to extrinsic facts. Keisselbrack
v. liviagformance are necessarily affected by considBton, 4 Johns. Ch. 144; Cathcart v. Robinson,
erations peculiar to the nature of the right
5 Pet. 264.
sought to be enforced and the remedy emMany cases support that proposition withWhere no
ployed to accomplish the object.
out qualification, and all or nearly all agree
question of fraud or mistake is involved, the
that it is correct where it is invoked as derule with respect to the admission of parol
fence to a suit to enforce specific performevidence to vary a ■written contract is the
ance,
little or no disagreement is found In
same in courts of equity as in those of comthe adjudged cases to that extent, but there
nion law, the rule in both being that when
are many others where it is held that the rule
an agreement is reduced to writing by the
is unsound when applied in behalf of a comact and consent of the parties, the intent and
plainant seeking to enforce a specific performmeaning of the same must be sought in the
instrument which they have chosen as the ance of a contract with variations from the
repository and evidence of their purpose, and
virritten instrument. Difficulty, it must be
Proof admitted, would arise in any attempt to
not in extrinsic facts and allegations.
of fraud or mistake, however, may be ad- reconcile the decided cases In that regard,
but it is not necessary to enter that field of
mitted in equity to show that the terms of
contest and conflict in the case before the
the instrument employed in the preparation
by
coifft for several reasons:
1. Because
of the same were varied or made different
comparing the original trust deed with the
by addition or. subtraction from what they
deed of the lot in question, in view of tha
were intended and believed, to be when the
the inference is very
same was executed.
, attendant circumstances,
Evidence of fraud or mistake is seldom I cogent that the second was designed and
found In the Instrument itself, from which it I intended as a complete substitute for the first.
follows that unless parol evidence may be 12. Because the proof shows to a demonstraadmitted for that purpose the aggrieved par- |tion that the consideration for the purchase
ty would have as little hope of redress in a lof the second lot was paid in equal proporcourt of equity as in a court of law.
Even ftions by the father and each of the three
3. Because it appears that the expenat law, all that pertains to the execution of I sons.
sive improvements made upon the lot la quesa written instrument or to the proof that
tion were made from the moneys of each of
the instrument was adopted or ratified by the
the three sons, advanced at the request of
parties as their act or contract, is necessarily
the father. 4. Because it appears that the
left to extrinsic evidence, and witnesses may
family and every member of. it understood
consequentiy be called for the purpose of imfrom the first and throughout that the trustee
peaching the execution
of a deed or other
■held the property in trust for the mother and
writing under seal, and showing that its sealthe three sons. 5. Because the father, from
ing or delivery was procured by fraudulentiy
the date of the deed to the time of his death,
substituting one instrument for another, or by
recognized the premises as acquired and held
any other species of fraud by which the comfor the benefit of his wife and their three
plaiolng i>arty was misled and Induced to put
the mother of the three
6. Because
sons.
his name to that which was substantially difsons, after the decease of the first husband
Thoroughferent from the actual agreement
of complainant, recognized her as interested
good's Case, 4 Coke, 4.
in the property, and continued to do so at all
When the deed or other written instrument
times throughout her life until about the time
is duly executed and delivered, the courts of
I she conveyed the lot in question to the relaw hold that it contains the true agreement
of the parties, and that the writing fm-nishes
1spondent.
Both the deed and her will bear date Sept.
better evidence of the sense of the parties
than any thai can be supplied by parol; but
28, 1872, and the proofs show that she was
courts of equity, says Chancellor Kent, have
at the time In a low, depressed state of mind,
a broader jurisdiction and will open the writand that she departed this life within one
ten contract to let in an equity arising from
year subsequent to the execution of those inPrior to that, and throughout the
facts perfeetiy distinct from the sense and
struments.
Pursuwhole period subsequent to the death of her
construction of the instrument itself.
ant to that rule, he held It to be established
husband, the proofs show that she uniformly
recognized the complainant as the owner of
that relief can be had against any deed or
a moiety of the lot and the improvements,
contract in writing founded on mistake or
fraud, and that mistake may be shown by I and always required her to pay one-half of all
parol proof and the relief granted to the in- / repairs, taxes, insurance, and other expenses
jured party whether he sets up the mistake
of the property.
By the terms of the original deed the propGillesaffirmatively by bUl or as a defense.
pie V. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585, 596.
erty was conveyed to the trustees, subject to
assessments,
and
of taxes,
payment
the
Parol proof, said the same learned magisground-rent, to and for the sole and separate
trate. Is admissible in equity to correct a
H.& B.E(j.C2d Ed.)— 16
garded
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use, benefit, and behoof of the mother and
her three sons during her lifetime, and after
her death to the three sons as tenants in common in equal parts, with the provision that if
the mother during her lifetime should deem it
advisable she might sell and convey the preniisee, and that in that event the further trust
was raised and created that the trustees or
the survivor of them, upon her application
and with her consent signified by becoming
a party to the conveyance, might sell and con(or the best
vey the lot and improvements
price which could be obtained for the same,
without any application to a court of law or
equity for that purpose, and to Invest the
proceeds thereof upon the same trusts in such
other property or manner as the mother should
direct, and for the same use, benefit, and
behalf.
Provision was also made that if no such
sale and re-investment was made during the
lifetime of the mother, then the trustees were
to sell the same for the sole use and benefit
of the three sons or the survivor or survivors
of them, share anni share alike, until the
youngest should arrive at the age of twentyone years, when the trustees might sell and
convey the same at the request of such survivor or survivors, and divide the proceeds to
the survivor or survivors, share and share
alike.
Taken as a whole the proofs show to the
entire
satisfaction of the court that the lot in
I
.'question was purchased and conveyed to the
surviving trustee upon the same trusts as
I
/ those raised and created in the first deed, and
through mistake, failed to
,' that the trustee,
have those trusts properly declared in the
deed of trust to him as he should have done,
and that the prayer of the bill of complainant, that the deed of the lot and Improvements in question ought to be reformed and
the rights of the complainant be ascertained
and adjudged as If the deed in question contained the same trusts as those raised and
created in the original trust deed is reasonable
and proper and should be granted.
Courts of equity, beyond all doubt, possess
the power to grant such relief, and the proofs,
in the judgment of the court, are such as to
entitle the complainant to such a decree, unless the remaining defence set up by the respondent must prevail. Cooper v. Phibbs, Li.
R. 2 Oh. App. 149, 186; Cochrane v. Willis, 34
Beav. 359, 366.
Such a decree, of course,
cannot now be made against the trustee, as
he is not living; but the executors, as contended by the complainant,
are competent to
perform that duty, and she prays that the
decree may be adapted to the present state
of the parties.
Suppose all that is true, still it is contended
by the principal respondent that the decree
below Is correct, because the claim Is barred.
Much discussion of that defence will not be
necessary, beyond what is required to ascertain the facts.
When the father died, the complainant was

/

living on the premises, and she continued to
reside there most or all the time during the
widowhood of the mother of her first husband, except while she lived with her second
husband,
when he died she returned to
ai^d
live with her mother-in-law. During all that
time the proofs show that she was constantly
recognized as the lawful heir to the estate of
her deceased husband, until about a year before the decease of the mother, who also resided

on

the

premises.

Prior

to

that,

the

rights of the complainant were unmistakably
recognized,
and nothing of consequence had
occurred to indicate any intent to call her
just right in question.
Soon after that, however, the respondent
commenced
an action
of ejectment against her to recover possession of the entire lot and improvements, she
still being in possession, and doubtless hoping
and expecting that her rights would yet be
acknowledged
without the necessity of expenExpectations of the kind not
sive litigation.
being realized, she filed the present bill of
complaint.
Laches are imputed to her; but
the court, in view o£ the circumstances
and
growing out of the
of the embarrassments
obvious defects in the conveyance intended to
secure her rights, is of the opinion that the
evidence of laches is not sufficient to bar her
right to recover in the present suit Without more, these remarks are sufficient to show
that the defence cannot be sustained, and it
is accordingly overruled.
Two or three remarks will be sufficient to
show that the objection that the circuit court
has no Jurisdiction to enter the required decree against the executors
of the deceased
trustee cannot be sustained.
Jurisdiction as
between the complainant and respondent Is
unquestionable; and. If so, it is clear that the
fact that the trustee if living was a citizen
of the same state with the complainant would
not defeat the jurisdiction in a case where he
is a mere nominal party, and is merely joined
to perform the mlQisterlal act of conveying the
title if adjudged to the complainant.
Where
that Is so, the executor, in case of the decease of the trustee, if authorized by the law
of the state to execute such a conveyance,
may also be joined in the suit under like circumstances merely to accomplish the like purpose. Where the real and only controversy
is between citizens of different states, or an
alien and a citizen, and the plaintiff is by
some positive rule of law compelled to use the
name of another to perform merely a ministerial act, who has not nor ever had any
interest in or control over it, the courts of the
United States will not consider any others as
parties to the suit than the persons between
whom the litigation before them exists. McNutt V. Bland, 2 How. 9, 15; Browne v.
Strode,
v.
5 Cranch, 303; Coal Company

Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172, 177.
Cases arise in the federal courts In which
nominal or even immaterial parties are joined,
on the one side or the other, with those who
have the requisite citizenship to give th« i^rr*
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Jurisdiction in tbe case; and where that is so,
tte rule is settled that the mere fact that
one or more of such parties reside in the
same state with one of the actual parties to
will not defeat the jurisdicthe controversy
Decisive authority for that
tion of the court.
proposition Is found in a recent ruling of Mr.
Justice Miller, in which he states to the effect that mere formal parties do not oust the
jurisdiction of the court, even if they are
without the requisite citizenship, where it appears that the real controversy is between
Arapahoe Oo. v.
citizens at different States.
Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., 4 Dill. 277, 283, Fed.
Cas. No. 502.
Nothing Is claimed of the executors in this
case except that they shall perform the ministerial act of conveying the title. In case the
power to do so is vested in them by the law
of the state, and the court shall enter a decree against the principal respondent to that
effect From all which it follows that the
complainant
is entitled as between herself
and the principal respondent
to the relief
prayed in the bill of complaint; but the court,
in view of all the circumstances, wUl not proceed to determine either the proportion of tfie
trust property which belongs to the complainant or the amount she is entitled to recover
of the said respondent Instead of that,
those matters are left to be ascertained
and
by the circuit court, with audetermined
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thority. If need be, to refer the cause to a
master to report the facts, with his opinion
thereon, subject to the confirmation of the
circuit court.
Executors of the trustee. In such a case as
the complainant alleges, are under the law of
the state the successors of the deceased trustee, and that as such they may execute whatever remains executory in the trust at the
time of his decease; from which It would follow, if that be so, that it wUl be the duty
of the executors of the deceased trustee In
this case, when the rights of the complainant
are fully ascertained, to make the necessary
conveyance to perfect her title to the same
extent as the trustee might do if in full Ufe.
Express authority is reserved to the circuit
court to ascertain the rights of the complainant as if the trust-deed was reformed, and
to make the necessary decree to perfect her
title in such mode and form as the law of
the state and the practice of the state courts
Crafton v. Beal, 1 Ga.
authorize and provide.
322; Brown v. Tucker, 47 Ga. 485.
Costs In this coOTt wiU be taxed to the
principal respondent in favor of the complainant but no costs will be allowed against the
other two respondents.
Decree will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedinge in conformiiy
with the opinion of the court.
So ordered

jl/
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METROPOLITAN LUMBER CO. v. LAKH
SUPERIOR SHIP-CANAL, RAILWAY & IRON CO. et al.
(60

N. W.

278,

101

Supreme Coort of Michigan.

Mich. 577.)
Sept 25,

1894:.

Appeal from circuit court, Iron county, iB
chancery; John W. Stone, Judge.
Bill by the Metropolitan Lumber Company
against the Lake Superior Ship-Canal, Railway & Iron Company and others. From a
decree for complainant, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.

Ball & Ball, for appellants. Mead & Jennings (E. E. Osbom, of counsel), for appellee.

HOOKER, 3. Complainant's bill Is filed
to correct a contract for the purchase of timber, by adding to It the description of certain lands which Is claimed to have been

omitted by mistake. The negotiations took
place in Chicago, between the presidents of
the corporations, complainant and defendant. The contract conveying the timber was
subsequently prepared by defendants' counsel in Michigan, and was afterwards signed
by the respective parties.
Upon discovering the omission, which discovery was made
some time after the contract was signed by
complainant's president, defendants were
asked to correct the mistake, but declined to
Some time afterwards
do so without suit.
this suit was instituted. The learned circuit judge who heard the cause filed a written opinion, in which he quotes the testimony at length, which, we think, is as fair
a review of the case as could be made.
We
agree with him that the evidence shows that
the parties who negotiated the deal, both
understood that the "Perch Lake Group" of
lands was Included in the purchase.
It appears to have been omitted because defendants' president, Mr. Davis, did not specifically mentiou it In his telegram of instructions,—if it can be called such,— which he
sent to Mr. Longyear, who was agent for the
defendants at Marquette, from whom the
upon
attorney received the information
which he prepared the contract. The telegram read as follows, viz.: "Chicago, June
6th, 188—.
J. M. Longyear: Have sold to
Atkinson all groups under refusal to him;
[Signed] Theo. M.
also the Felch group.
Davis."
It appears that complainant had
written options on all the land covered by
the negotiations, except the Felch group and
the Perch lake group.
The latter, not being
mentioned in the telegram,
was omitted.
All of the witnesses who were present at the
Chicago Interview agree that this group was
talked about, and specifically mentioned as
one of the tracts to be included. Davis himself concedes this, but claims that he was
figuring upon the basis of the amount of
timber upon the groups, for which the complainant had written options, and that he

supposed the Perch lake group was one of
these.
He admitted, however, that he consented to take $500,000 for the timber, exclusive of the Perch Ijike group, and that he
asked $250,000 for that As these sums aggregate $750,000,— the exact amount paid,—
there seems little doubt of the justice of,
complainant's claim. We are satisfied that
the complainant is justly entitled to relief.
It remains to inquire whether there is any
legal obstacle to granting
It is opposed
upon several grounds, viz.: (1) The mistake
was not mutual. (2) The mistake on part of
complainant was committed through gross
negligence,
and equity will not relieve in
such cases.
(3) Delay in attempting to enforce complainant's claim, and going on to
carry out the contract after refusal by the
defendants to correct the contract, until it
was impossible to put the parties in statu
quo, constitutes a waiver of complainant's
claim. (4) The addition of more land to the

it

description, upon evidence of a parol contract, is contrary to the statute of frauds.
We are satisfied that the omission was the
result of the mistake of defendant's president in sending the telegram, supposing It
to be full enough to cover the Perch lake
group. There is no reason to believe thai
be intentionally caused this omission.
We
cannot accede to the proposition that complainant's president was so negligent in executing the contract without discovering the
omission as to deprive the complainant of
property worth $250,000. He had no reason
to anticipate an attempt to cheat his company, and therefore had no occasion to be
more than ordinarily careful.
He was dealing with a concern whose business was methodically conducted, and he knew that it
was in possession of accurate descriptions.
The contract was drawn by a reputable and
able lawyer. To hold that he was negligent
would be to say that acceptance of a deed or
writing without a comparison and verification of descriptions is such negligence as to
preclude relief against mistake, no matter
how serious the consequences.
Atkinson
died before these proceedings were commenced, and we have not the llglit tnat Uis
testimony might throw upon the question
of caution. From the testimony of Mr. Barrett, one of the defendants' witnesses, it
would seem that he took the trouble to bring
the contract to defendants' office, to make a.
comparison of the descriptions, which was
During
done, and he went away satisfied.
this time he was ill, with a malady from
which he died soon aft«'.
The claim that a
mistake had been made was asserted as soon
as it was discovered, and was insisted on at
all times afterwards.
It is true that suit
was not immediately commenced, but complainant never gave the defendants reason
to suppose that it had abandoned or intended to waive its claim.
No injury resulted to
the defendants from the delay, and the complainant was Justified in exhausting persoft*
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to litigation, especially in view of Davis' repeated admission that
he understood the Perch lake land a part of
It Is strenuously urged that
that contract
the statutes of frauds preclude the relief
by complainant, the negotiations
sought
having been oral. There ia conflict in the
liooks upon the question of the effect of the
of
statute of frauds upon the jurisdiction
courts of equity to reform instruments made
in pursuance of oraJ agreements, where the
correction sought is the addition of lands to
those described.
We are cited to the case of
Macomber v. Peckham, 16 R. I. 485, 19 Ati.
910, as a recent adjudication upon the subject, and to Climer v. Hovey, 15 Mich. 18,
in support of defendants' contention. In
the former case the court was careful to
withhold an opinion beyond what was required by the facts before ft. In stating the
facts, Durfee, C. J., says: "Nor is it a case
in which it is claimed that the contract is
taken out of the operation of the statute of
frauds by part performance on the part of
It presents the naked
the complainant.
question whether oral testimony will be received in equity for the purpose of reforming a written contract for the sale of real
estate on the ground of mutual mistake, and
of enforcing it specifically when reformed."
Opposed to this case is that of Hitchins v.
Pettingill, 58 N. H. 386, decided 11 years
earlier by the supreme court of the state of
New Hampshire, which was not noticed by
It was there held
the Rhode Island court.
that "when reformation is sought of a deed
which, through fraud or mistake, conveys
less land than was orally bought, and paid
for, the case does not staid as if there were
no deed; and the error may be corrected
without proof of such part performance as
is necessary for a decree of specific performance compelling a conveyance of the whole
land when no part of it has been conveyed."
Many cases are cited in the opinion as supporting this preposition. This subject is also thoroughly considered in the notes to
Woollam V. Heam, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas.
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Eq. 1008 et seq. The case of Climer v. Hovey, 15 Mich. 18, like the Rhode Island case,
was one where the parties had not acted under the contract
In the language of Campbell, J.: "No payments are alleged, and no
acts of part performance. We are therefore
brought down to the simple inquiry whether
mere mistake, when neither party has parted
with or done anything beyond signing an
executory contract for one description of
land, can authorize a court of chancery to
enforce a parol contract by applying the
terms written concerning one estate to anThe bill
other not referred to in writing."
was dismissed, Mr. Justice Campbell basing
his opinion upon the fact that nothing had
been done imder the contract, and that it
was therefore within the operation of the
Statute of frauds. Chief Justice Martin concurred in the result Mr. Justice Cooley reserved his opinion as to the power of the
court to correct a mistake in a suit to enforce it concurring upon other grounds, and
with him Mr. Justice ChrisUancy concurred.
But, whatever may be the rule where nothing has been done under the oral contract,
we think that in this country , the overwhelming weight of authority supports the
jurisdiction
where part performance
Is
shown sufficient to warrant a specific performance under an oral contract
In this
case a payment was made, and the purchaser proceeded to lumber the tracts not in dispute, before the omission was discovered, as
was the case in Hitchins v. Pettingill,
above cited.
The case of Toll v. Davenport,
T4 Mich. 397, 42 N. W. 63, appears to recognize the jurisdiction of chancery In such
cases, when a parcel- was omitted from a
mortgage, relief being denied, for the reason
that the rights of a bona fide purchaser intervened. In the later case of Kimble v.
Harrington, 91 Mich. 281, 51 N. W. 936, a
mortgage was reformed by the insertion of
the description of a 40-acre parcel a mile distant which was omitted by mistake. The
decree of the circuit court will be affirmed,
with costs.
The other justices concurred.

it,

§

1.

FOSTER, J. When reformation is sought
of a deed which, through fraud or mistake,
conveyed less land than was orally bought
and paid for, the case does not stand as If
there were no deed; and the error may be
corrected without proof of such part performance as is necessary for a decree of specific
performance compelling a conveyance of the
whole land when no part of It has been conveyed.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 15^-161; Adams,
Eq. 169, 171; 3 Greenl. Ev. §§ 360, 363;
Bloomer v. Spittle, Fisher, Ann. Dig. (1872)
131; Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385, 392; Purcell V. Miner, 4 Wall. 513; Prescott v. Hawkins, 12 N. H. 19, 28, 16 N. H. 122; Way v.
Cutting, 17 N. H. 450, 451; Bellows v. Stone,
14 N. H. 175, 201; Smith v. Greeley,
14 N.
H. 378; Craig v. Klttredge, 23 N. H. 231,
236; Busby v. Littlefield, 31 N. H. 193, 199,
33 N. H. 76; Webster v. Webster, 33 N. H.
18, 22, 23, 26; Doe v. Doe, 37 N. H. 268, 285;
Herbert v. Odlin, 40 N. H. 267; Brown v.
Gllnes, 42 N. H. 160; Kennard v. George, 44
N. H. 440; Leach v. Noyes, 45 N. H. 364;
Peterson v. Grover, 20 Me. 363; Farley v.
Bryant, 32 Me. 475; Tucker v. Madden, 44
Me. 206; Adams v. Stevens, 49 Me. 362; Burr
V. Hutchinson, 61 Me. 514;
Beardsley v.
Knight, 10 Vt 185, 190; Griswold t. Smith,
10 Vt 452; Goodell t. Field, 15 Vt 448;
Blodgett T. Hobart, 18 Vt 414; Brown v.
Lamphear, 35 Vt 252; Shattuck v. Gay, 45
Vt 87; Allen v. Brown, 6 R. I. 386; Holabird
T. Burr, 17 Conn. 556; Wooden v. Haviland, 18
Conn. 101; Stedwell v. Anderson, 21 Conn. 139;
Knapp T. White, 23 Conn. 529; Blakeman v.
Blakeman, 39 Conn. 320; GUlesple v. Moon, 2
Johns. Oh. 585; Wlswall v. Hall, 3 Paige, 313j

§

for

a

& Femald and Mr. Hobbs,
Mr. Bartlett, for defendants.

a

Wlggin
plaintiffs.

a

on it.

•

The court found the following facts: The
plaintiffs, by oral agreement, bought a farm
of the defendants for $2,500, paid the price,
and took the deed of which they seek reforA part of the farm containing ten
mation.
acres, included in the bargain and paid for,
was, by the fraud of the defendants, omitted
in the deed. After receiving the deed, the
plaintiffs moved into the farm buildings
which were on the land described in the deed,
occupied that land, and made valuable Improvements
upon it, but made no improvements upon, and did not take possession of,
the ten acres.
The defendants continued in
possession of that lot, and paid the taxes

a

Suit by one Hitcliins and another against
one Pettingill and another for the reformation of a deed. Decree ordered for plaintiffs.

a

August,

187&

•

Court of New Hampshire.

*

Supreme

•

(58 N. H. 386.)

Johnson v. Taber, 10 N. Y. 319; De Peyster
V. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 582; Rider v. PoweU,
28 N. y. 310; WeUes v. Yates, 44 N. T. 525;
Bush V. Hicks, 60 N. Y. 298; Ginschlo v. Ley,
Barile v. Vosbury, 3 Grant,
1 Phlla. 383;
Cas. 277; Wyche v. Greene, 16 Ga. 49; Durant v. Bacot 13 N. J. Eq. 201; Weller y.
Kolason, 17 N. 3. Eq. 13; Ehleringer v. Morlarty, 10 Iowa, 78; Barber v. Lyon, 15 Iowa,
37; Canedy v. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373; Metcalf
V. Putnam, 9 Allen, 97, 100.
In the last of these cases, Bigelow, J., delivering the opinion, says: "Upon elementary principles, the plaintiff Is entitled to have
his deed reformed so that It may truly set
•
•
•
xjpon
forth the whole contract.
proof of fraud in the omission of material
stipulations In a written contract, a court of
equity will admit -parol evidence to establish
the agreement as It was understood and concluded between the parties." The defendants rely upon Glass v. Hulbert 102 Mass. 24,
where the doctrine of reformation of vrritten
contracts was subjected to a limitation at
variance with the settled law of this state.
A court cannot disregard a valid statute,
nor regard it with favor or disfavor, nor take
out of its operation a case that is within
nor grant relief, at law or in equity, against
it The judicial question Is, What purpose
of the legislature appears in its acts, upon the
established rules of construction? "No accontract for
tion shall be maintained upon
the sale of land, unless the agreement upon
which it is brought or some memorandum
12.
thereof, Is in writing."
Gen. St c. 201,
"The supreme court shall have the powers
of a court of equity in cases cognizable in
such court and may hear and determine, according to the course of equity, In case of
charitable uses, trusts, fraud, accident or
mistake;
of specific performance ot
contracts;
and in all other cases
where there Is not plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law."
Gen. St c. 190,
These provisions, though printed in different
chapters,
are consistent parts of one law.
We are not to give either of them
strained
construction,
liberal or strict for the special
purpose of justice m
particular case, or for
the general purpose of making the law what
In our judgment It ought to be. The meaning of one act may be shown by other acts.
There may be several acts, neither of which
can be properly administered in
particular
case, except as part of one law comprising
them all. It may be necessary to consider
one statute on any subject a part of the
whole law, statutory and common, on that
subject, as
is necessary to consider one section or word of a statute a part of that statute.
The stitute of frauds, severed from all
other law, written and unwritten, and taken
In Its literal sense, would deny these plaintiffs the relief of specific performance, even
they had taken possession of the ten-acre
•
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lot and made valiiable Improvements upon It,
and would leave people remediless In a great
number of cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, for wbich ample remedies are provided
by the statute of equity jurisdiction; and the
latter statute, torn from the general body of
the law, takHi literally, and administered aa
if there were no other law, would deprive the
community of safeguards which the statute
of frauds and the common law w«re designed
to afford, and which the statute of equity was
not designed to take away. The well-known
general objects of these statutes are the -priaThe statcipal guides for their construction.
ute of equity authorizes this court to administer the legal principles of the general system of equity, which, as a great branch of the
law of their native country, was brought over
by the colonists, and has always existed as a
part of the common law, in Its broadest sense,
Wells t. Pierce, 27 N.
In New Hampshire.
H. 503, 512; Walker v. Cheever, 85 N. H.
The statute of frauds prevents
339, 349.
wrong being done In certain cases by the testimony of witnesses.
If, without vyritten evidence of a contract
for the sale of land, the vendee pays for the
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land, and, with the knowledge and consent of
the vendor, takes possession of It, and makes
valuable improvements upon It, he Is entitled
to the relief of specific performance. Upon
the literal construction of the statute of
frauds there could not be a decree for specific performance in such a case, and there
could not be, by parol evidence, a reformation of a deed enlarging Its operation; but the
statute, rightly construed,
does not destroy
either of these remedies, as the statute of
limitations does not destroy the remedy in
cases of fraudulent concealment of the cause
of action (Bank v. Fairbanks, 49 N. H. 131,
141), as the registry laws do not destroy the
effect of actual notice of an imrecorded deed
(Gooding v. Riley, 50 N. H. 400), and as the
statute of frauds does not disturb a boundary
and possession
fixed by parol agreement
(Kellogg V. Smith, 7 Gush. 375; Knowles v.

Toothaker, 58 Me. 172).
The plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for a
conveyance of the ten-acre lot
Case discharged.

STANLEiY, J., ad not sit
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HUNTER

V.

BIIiTETT

et aL

(30 111. 228.)

Jan. Term, 1863.
W. H. Herndon, and S. P. Moore, for appellant J. & D. Gillespie, for appeUees.
Supreme Court of Illinois.

BREESB, J. John B. Hunter, as administrator of Samuel W. Hunter, deceased,
brought his action in the circuit court of
Bond county, against Wesley A. and Finis
Bilyeu, on a note executed by them to the
intestate,
dated March 30, 1850, and due
March 30, 1855. Pending the action the defendants obtained an injunction on their
bill of complaint, to which the administrator, and the heirs-at-law of the intestate,
who were minors, and their guardian, together with Joseph Smith, were made defendants.

The bill alleges, that the note sued upon, together with others which were paid, was
one and the last of a number of notes they
for certain
had executed to the intestate,

lands lying in Bond county, for which a
bond for a deed was executed and delivered
That they were
to them by the Intestate.
put into possession of the lands, and made
lasting and valuable improvements on some
of the tracts, but have discovered that one
or more tracts, which they supposed they
had bought, were not included in the bond.
One of those tracts is described as "the old
field tract" lying south-east of Shoal creek,
and being part of the west half of the northwest quarter of secticm twenty-three, in
town five north, range four west, containing
forty and nineteen-himdredths acres; and the
other, the "Gillespie tract," being the east
half of the north-west quarter of the northeast quarter of the same section, township
and range, containing twenty acres; the undivided half of both which tracts, the complainants allege, was purchased by them of
the intestate, and was to have been included
in the title bond, but by mistake was leift
out, and these tracts subsequently sold by
the intestate to Joseph Smith.
The bill also alleges, that some time anterior to the commencement of this suit on
the note, the administrator had filed a petition in the circuit court, at the September
term, 1855, praying the court for an order to
authorize him to make a deed to complainants for the land described in the bond; that
this petition contained the same errors and
mistakes as are now complained of, with
another error superadded In describing the
lands as being in section "twenty-five." The
complainants admit they were made defendants, and had due notice of the pending of
the petition, but they did not appear to defend, supposing the lands were described as
in the bond, and their being made defendants was a mere ceremony, and the proceedings consistent with their rights. That these
errors and mistakes were carried into the
Aecree rendered on this petition, and in the
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deed which the administrator tendered to
No exhibit is
them, and by them refused.
or of this deed.
made of these proceedings
The title bond is alleged to have been written by the intestate, and delivered to the
complainants and accepted by them without
any objection, on the 30th of March, 1850.
In the following year, 1851, the intestate left
the state, and in 1852 died, leaving these in-

fant defendants his only heirs at law.
The prayer of the bill Is. that the court
would order and direct the defendants to
convey to complainants all of the land agreed
to be conveyed to them by the Intestate, and
to annul and hold for naught the order of
the circuit court in behalf of. the administrator, or to amend and correct the decree so as
to comport with justice and good conscience,
and perpetually enjoin the collection of the
note sued on, until they are able to comply
'
with the understanding of Samuel W. Hunter, the intestate.
The bond is made an exhibit, and describes
the lands sold, and to be conveyed on payThey are:
ment of the purchase money.
"The undivided half of a certain lot, beginning at the south corner of the south-west
quarter of section 14, town 5 north, of range
4 west of the third principal meridian; thence
running north fifty poles; thence west to the
middle of the channel of Shoal creek; thence
down the channel of Shoal creek, to the section line; thence east to the beginning corner, containing thirty-eight a<!res, more or
less. Also, the undivided half of so much of
the west half of the north-west quarter of
section 23, town 5 north, range 4 west of the
third principal meridian, lying on the west
side of Shoal creek. Also, twenty poles south
from the creek on the east line of said half;
thence west to said creek: thence up said
creek to the beginning. Also, the undivided
half of twelve acres, more or less, of the
south-west quarter, town 4 west of the third
principal meridian, commencing at the southwest corner of said section; thence north
fifty; thence east to the middle of the channel of Shoal creek; thence down said creek
to the section line; thence west to the heginning. Also, two acres and a half of the
west half of the north-west quarter of section
23, in same township and range, commencing

at a stake on the east line of said land at tha
south-east
corner of the mile post; thence
twenty poles; thence
south
west twenty
poles; thence north twenty poles; thence
This
east twenty poles, to the beginning."
last tract was In a separate bond to Finis
Bilyeu, one of the complainants, made at the
same time and on the same conditions, as
the bond to complainants jolntiy, and for
convenience,
no question being made on it,
both bonds are considered as one.
There Is a slight apparent ambiguity In the
description of the undivided half of twelve
acres, which Is explained by the plat sworn
to by the witnesses, and Is the tract on the
west Bide of the creek, contained within the
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nortb and south lines of the tract of thirtyeight acres, if extended west to the section
There is no dispute about this tract.
line.
The tract described as "also twenty poles
south from the creek on the east line of said
half; thence west to said creek; thence up
said creek to the beginning," is understood
to describe the mill yard, having the shape
of a rectangular triangle, the south line being the perpendicular, the west line the base,
About this
and the creek the hypothenuse.
tract there is no dispute.
The administrator demurred to the biU,

which was afterwards withdrawn, and his
answer filed, not admitting the mistake alleged, to which there was a replication. At a
subsequent term, he also filed a plea of the
Smith also
statute of frauds and perjuries.
answei'ed, denying any knowledge when he
purchased, of any sale of the tract south-east
of Shoal creek, in section twenty-three. On
the hearing, the bill was dismissed as to him.
Much testimony was introduced on behalf
of complainants, for the purpose of showing
by the declarations of the intestate, that an
undivided half of other tracts besides these,
namely, the tracts known as the "old field"
tract, sold to Smith, and the "Gillespie" tract,
were bargained for' and sold. but. for some
cause not fully explained, omitted from the
title bond.
The lasting and valuable improvements
were made by complainants on other tracts,
about which there is no dispute.
The bill Is. in effect, a bill to reform by
parol, this title bond by Incorporating into it
vhe part lying south-east of the creek, called
the "old field" ti-act, and the "Gillespie"
tract, and when reformed, to decree a specific
performance.
The contract must be reformed before such a decree can pass.
This presents a question which has been
much discussed in the courts of this country and of England, and on which there is
great contrariety of opinion.
The question is, in a bill to reform a written instrument, in the absence of any allegation or proof of fraud, and on the ground of
accident and mistake alone, is parol evidence admissible to prove an agreement to
do something further than is contained in
the writing, the statutes of frauds and perjuries being relied on in the defense, and
which that statute requires to be proved by
writing?
Whilst In England, the weight of adjudications seems to be opposed to the admission
of parol evidence, in this country, it appears
to be the other way.
One of the leading
cases In England, is that of Woollam T.
Hearn, 7 Yes. 211. It is prominent among the
Leading Cases of White & Tudor (pt 1,
vol. 2), with copious notes by Hare & Wallace, 510.

In this case the bill filed by Wm. Woollam
against Hearn, stated that the rent of seventy-three pounds ten shillings was Inserted In
the written lease by mistake, or with some
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unfair view; the real agreement being that
the plaintiff was to have the lease upon the
same rent as the defendant paid to Ids lessor,
and that he did not pay more than sixty
pounds.
The prayer was for a specific performance, and that the defendant may be
decreed to execute a lease according to the
agreement,
at the rent of sixty pounds, or
such other rent as the defendant paid his
lessor.
The defendant, in his answer, denied
pounds ten shillings was
that seventy-three
inserted by mistake, or witli any unfair view ;
or that the agreement was that the plaintiff
shcruld pay the same rent as the defendant
paid, which he admitted was sixty-three
pounds.
The bill was proved by depositions.
Sir Wm. Grant, M. R., said: "By the rule
of law. Independent of the statute (of frauds
and perjuries), parol evidence cannot be received to contradict a written agreement.
To
admit it, for the purpose of proving that tlje
written instrument does not contain the real
agreement,
would be the same as receiving
it for every purpose.
It was for the purpose
of shutting out that inquiry, that the rule of
law was adopted.
When equity is called upon to exercise its peculiar jurisdiction by decreeing a specific performance, the party to
be charged is let in to show, that, under the
circumstances, the plaintiff is not entitled to
have the agreement specifically performed;
and there are many cases in which parol
evidence of such circumstances has been admitted, as in Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 383.
There on the face of the instrument, a specific sum was to be given for the timbers,
but it was shown, by parol, that the defendants were induced to give that, upon the
representation that it was valued by two
timber merchants which was not true. If
this had been a bill brought by this defendant
for a specific performance, I should have
been bound by the decisions to admit the
parol evidence, and to refuse a specific performance. But this evidence is offered, not
for the purpose of resisting, but of obtaining
a decree, first to falsify the written agreement, and then to substitute in its place a
parol agreement to be executed by the court
There is no case in which the court has gone
The evidence offered
the length now desired.
is to vary an agreement in a material part,
and having varied it, to procure it to be executed in another form. There is nothing to
show that ought to be done; and my opinion being that it ought not, I must dismiss
the bill."
In the case of Rogers v. Earl, 1 Dickson,
294, which was a bill to rectify a mistake of
the solicitor in drawing a marriage settlement; in Thomas v. Davis, Id. 301, to rectify
a mistake in a conveyance by the omission of
one of the parcels of land intended to be conveyed; in Sims v. Urry, 1 Ch. Cas. 225, to
prove a mistake In the penal sum of a bond,
by writing it forty Instead of four hundred
pounds,—verbal evidence was admitted.
In Hardwood v. Wallace, cited In Targus v.
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It does not appear that tb» statute of frauds
and perjuries was pleaded in any of these
cases, though referred to in the argument,
and in the opinion of the court.
In Woollam v. Heam, and in many of the
cases referred to in Hare & Williams' notes
to that case, a distinction is made between
seeking and resisting specific performance,
as to the admission of evidence.
It is said,
though a defendant resisting a specific performance, may go into parol evidence to show
that by fraud the written agreement does
not express the real terms, a plaintiff cannot do so for the purpose of reforming the
agreement and obtaining a specific performance of it as reformed.
This doctrine is critically examined In Gillespie V. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585, before cited. In that case the bill was filed to rectify
a mistake In the conveyance
which> by an
error in the description of the land, conveyed the whole lot, or two hundred and fif^
acres, instead of two hundred acres, parcel of
the same.
The mistake Is positively denied in the answer, and the point was, is parol proof of
this mistake admissible, in opposition to the
plain language of the deed, and especially in
opposition to the defendant's answer?
It will be seen the statute of frauds and
perjuries was not set up in the case.
Aiter entering minutely into the parol
proof of the fact of the mistake. Chancellor
Kent says: "The rule in courts of law
that the written instrument does. In contemplation of law, contain the true agreement of the parties, and that the writing furnishes better evidence of the sense of the
parties, than any that can be supplied by\
parol. But equity has a broader jurisdic-\
tlon, and wiU open the written contract to
let in an equity arising from facts perfectly
distinct from the sense and construction of
the instrument itself.
have looked
into
most. If not all the cases on this branch of
equity jurisdiction, and
appears to me to
be established on great and essential grounds
of justice, that relief can be had against any
deed or contract in writing, founded in mistake or fraud. The mistake may be shown
by parol proof, and the relief granted to the
Injured party, whether he sets up the mistake affirmatively by bill, or as a defensa"
After reviewing many of the decisions on
this question, the chancellor decides that
parol proof was admissible, and that
established the mistake as charged in the bill.
It will be observed, the contract in this
case was an executed
contract, a deed of
conveyance
having been made; there was
no prayer for a specific performance of
contract, but to correct a mistake in the
deed. The
chancellor remarks: "Whether
such proof be admissible on the part of
plaintiff, who seeks a specific performance
of an agreement in writing, and at the same
time seeks to vary
by parol proof, has
been made a question. Lord Hardwicke, lo
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Alderson said: "I cannot help feeling that
in the case of an executory agreement, first
to reform and then to decree an execution
of it, would be, virtually, to repeal the statute of frauds."
In cases within the statute of frauds,
verbal evidence was held Inadmissible, as in
Dwight v. Pomeroy, 17 Mass. 303, where the
plaintiff, being creditor of an insolvent debtor who had executed a deed of assignment
in trust, for the benefit of his creditors, filed
his biU against the trustees to reform an alleged mistake in the trusts expressed in the
deed. And in Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80,
where the written agreement was for the conveyance of a lot of land in Windham, formerly owned by J. E., and the plaintiff proposed to prove by parol that it was intended
to include the adjoining land in Westbrook,
under the same ownership, but that this was
omitted by mistake. In Osbom v. Phelps,
for the sale of
19 Conn. 63, an agreement
land was drawn in two separate instruments,
one to be signed by the vendor, and the
other by the purchaser, and neither of the
instruments contained any reference to the
other, but each was signed by the wrong
party by mistake. This the plaintiff sought
to prove by parol evidence, but the court
held it inadmissible.
In other American cases, such evidence has
been held admissible. In Gillespie v. Moon,
2 Johns. Ch. 585, which was a bUl for relief
of a tract of land,
and for the reconveyance
which had been included by mistake or
fraud In a deed of conveyance, verbal evidence of the mistake, on a review of all the
cases, was admitted, and a reconveyance decreed. In Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385, where
tenants in common agreed to make partition
pursiiant to a verbal award, and executed
deeds accordingly; but, in the deed to the
plaintiff, a parcel assigned to him was omitted by mistake; in a bill for relief, verbal
evidence
was held admissible, and relief
thereupon decreed.
So In Langdon v. Keith,
9 Vem. 299, where upon the transfer of a
part of several promissory notes, secured by
mortgage, an assignment of the mortgagee's
entire interest in the mortgage was made, by
mistake, instead of a part, relief was decreed
upon verbal proof.
In De Riemer v. Cantillon, 4 Johns. Oh. 85, where a portion of the
land purchased at sheriff's sale was by mistake omitted in his deed to the purchaser,
upon parol evidence of the fact the judgment
debtors were decreed to convey to the purchaser the omitted parcel.
Several
other
cases are referred to in this note.
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Puget, 2 Ves. Sr. 195, where it was proposed
to prove a mistake in drawing a settlement;
and in Attorney General v. Sitwell, 1 Young
& C. 559, etc., where it was proposed to
show, by parol, that in a contract with the
crown for the sale of a certain manor, with
the advowson was omitthe appurtenances,
ted by mistake, — such evidence was rejected,
or deemed inadmissible. In this case Baron
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Jacques v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388, seemed to
think it might be done, but such proof was
rejected in Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 211
(which we have cited at length); and in Higginson v. Clowes, 15, Ves. 516; and when Lord
said, in Clinan v. Cooke,
1
Redesdale
Schoales & L. 39, that he could find no decision in wliich a plaintiff had been permitted
to show an omission in a written agreement,
by mistake or fraud, he must be understood
to refer to the cases of bUls for a specific per^
which was the
formance of an agreement,
•case then before him."
This case would seem to decide nothing
more than this: that In a bill to correct a mistake In an executed contract, parol proof of
the mistake is admissible, and that such
proof is as available for one party, or for one
purpose, as for another,— as available for the
plaintiff in setting -up a claim, as for tKe
defendant in resisting it. It is nowhere said,
that a bill to reform an executory contract,
and then decree a specific performance when
reformed, against a denial, in Ihe answer, of
any mistake, and the plea of the statute of
frauds and perjuries, can be sustained byparol evidence.
This decision,

so far as It goes, has been
followed by the courts of many other states.
The cases are referred to by Hare & Wallace,
on pages 539, 540, but in none of them was
the denial in the answer accompanied by a
plea of-i:he statute of frauds and perjuries.
Nor do these cases go farther than to assert
principle, that independent of
the general
this statute, where It is not set up as a defense, parol evidence will be received to correct an alleged mistake in a written executed
contract, when asserted by a plaintiff, and
is as available for him, as for defendant.
;.'
The cases go to the extent of declaring,
' that parol evidence
shall be admissible to
% correct a writing as well for a plaintiff as
against him, thus establishing mutuality and
equality in the operation of the doctrine.
In 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 161, In commenting
on the" distinction set up, the learned author
says, in a note, that It is of a very artificial
character, and difficult to be reconciled with
the general principles of courts of equity.
He says: "The ground is very clear, that a
court of equity ought not to enforce a contract, when there Is a mistake, against the
insisting upon and establishing
defendant
the mistake; for it would be Inequitable and
And If the mistake is vital
unconscientious.
to the contract, there is a like clear ground,
why equity should Interfere at the instance
of the party as plaintiff, and cancel it; and if
the mistake is partial only, why, at his Instance, it should reform It. In these cases,
the remedial practice is equal; and the parol
evidence to establish it. Is equally open to
both parties to use as proof. Why should
not the party aggrieved by a mistake in an
agreement, have relief in all cases when he
is plaintiff, as well as when he is defendant?
If the doctrine be founded upon the impro-
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priety of admitting parol evidence to contradict a written agreement, that rule is not
more broken In upon by the admission of It
for the plaintiff than it Is by the admission
of it for the defendant.
If the doctrine had
been confined to cases arising under the statute of frauds, it would, if not more Intelligible, at least have been less inconvenient in
practice."
In a subsequent case,— Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. 145,— which was a bill
for the specific performance of an agreement
In writing to execute a lease for lives "containing the usual clauses, restrictions and
reservations contained in the leases given by
defendant," the bill stated that a lease was
offered, containing a provision that upon every sale of the demised premises, one-fifth of
the purchase or consideration money should
be taken by the defendant to his own use,
which complainant refused to receive, alleging, that at the time of the execution of the
writing, It was agreed no such quarter or
fifth sales should be demanded or paid.
The defendant did not. In direct and clear
terms, deny any such agreement, but denied
■.any other or different contract than the one
set forth made in writing, and as to the validity of the supposed verbal agreement, he
pleaded the statute of frauds.
The point in the case was, whether this
verbal agreement could be established by paroL The learned chancellor says, It did not
appear to him, that the statute of frauds
had any bearing on the case. "The agreement for the three life lease Is in writing, and
it has been partly performed, by possession
taken and transferred, and rent paid. The
right of the plaintiff rests upon the contract
In writing, and the only inquiry is, whether
there Is not a mistake in the generality of
the expression, that the lease was to contain
the "usual clause,' etc., and whether the parties did not Intend an exception in respect
to the quarter sales.
There Is no doubt of
their declared Intention to make such an exception at the time the agreement was drawn;
and
am inclined to think that the writing
Is, and ought to be, susceptible of amendment and correction In that particular."
The proof was admitted, and the mistake
partly upon the ground, that the
corrected,
writing Itself let In parol proof, to show
which were "the usual clauses," etc., and such
proof being let In by the contract itself. It
might, on the principle of the agreement itself, be applied to correct any mistake manifestly shown to exist, in the general and unqualified terms of that part of the written
agreement which depended for Its explanation upon external proof.
This court has held, as a general proposition, that the terms of a written agreement
cannot be changed by parol. Baker v. Whiteside, Breese, 132; Penny t. Graves, 12 111.
And so It is held by all courts.
298.
At the
same time, we have said, that whatever covenants an absolute deed may contain, parol
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evidence may be admitted to show that It
was intended as a mortgage, or mere security
for the' payment of the debt, and the grantor can have relief in equity, and this, where
Purviance v. Holt,
mistalse la not alleged.
3 Gilman, 405; Ferguson v. Sutphen, Id. 547.
And it is also held, In Harlow v. Boswell, 15

111. 57, where parties commit their contracts
to writing, this forms the only evidence of
Its terms.
In Scott V. Bennet, ? Gilman, 254, this
court said, it Is a familiar principle that you
may give evidence to explain, but not to vary,
add to, or alter a written contract.
Courts
cannot make a new contract for the parties.
But If there is doubt and uncertainty, not
about what the substance of the contract is,
but as to Its particular application, It may
be explained, and properly directed.
As a general principle, where a contract Is
reduced to writing, the writing affords the
only evidence of the terms and conditions of
the contract; aU antecedent and contemporaneous verbal agreements are merged in the
written contract
There is an apparent contradiction In these
several opinions, but we think a few familiar
considerations will serve to reconcile them, or
show that it is not real.
The subjects peculiarly proper for the jurisdiction of courts of
are well understood
to be, fraud,
equity,
trusts,
mistake, and these courts
and
accident
I
I are vested with the power to afford relief In
all cases, wherein, by reason of the universality and rigor of the rules of the common law,
a remedy
cannot otherwise be had.
The
power to correct a mistake In a writing. Is as
much within the scope of this jurisdiction as
any other mistake.
The whole realm of
mistake is laid open to the court, and Its powers are limitless to correct, on a proper case
made.
That it should be dormant, when invoked to correct a mistake in a written conIt is no antract, would be strange indeed.
swer to say, that within the rigid rule of law,
the power may be exercised, but not outside
of It, as that would destroy the rule.
In our
judgment. It has no such effect.
The jurisdiction of a court of chancery to correct
mistakes, is no less important to the due administration of justice, and the safety of the
dtlzen, than the rule of the common law, that
parol evidence cannot be received to add to,
or vary a written contract, and In a court of
equity, it must be determined, on the circumstances of each case, which shall prevail, the
exercise of an unquestioned
power of the
court, or the rule of the common law.
The doctrine is undisputed and Incontestable, that a deed, absolute on Its face, may be
shown, by parol, to have been Intended by
the parties to It, as conditional, merely, and a
court of equity, on proper proof, will so hold.
This contract is explained by parol evidence,
and If it Is made to speak a language Its
words do not Import, who will deny that it
is within the competency of that court to ascertain the real contract of the parties, and
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then enforce It, according to the Intention of
the parties? If a court of equity has not the
power to correct mistakes In a deed, or other
writing, on convincing proof of the existence
of the alleged mistake, great injustice would
be perpetrated
with impunity. A man sells
a vacant lot adjoining the lot on which he
has a costly residence, but by the mistake of
the scrivener, the deed describes the lot of
his residence.
An ejectment Is brought— the
purchaser claiming under his deed— and If
no power exists In a court of equity to correct the mistake, he must surrender that
which he never sold, and the purchaser recover a property he never bought
A court
of chancery should not hesitate to receive parol evidence of this mistake, and on suflacient
proof, correct it, else the most flagrant Injustice would be perpetrated, and an undoubted
power of that court be rendered ineffectual
and worthless. There can be no danger in
exercising this power, since the court has
before it all the facts, and If they are not convincing, the stern rule of law will prevail.
The court has, in many cases, acknowledged and exercised this power, and we do
not know that it has been questioned by the
bar here or elsewhere.
The doctrine is fully recognized In the case '
of Broadwell v. Broadwell, 1 Gilman, 599,
that a court of chancery will always correct
any mistakes of fact which have occurred in
drawing up a paper, when a proper case is
presented and clearly proved, and then carry /
into effect the instrument when thus corrected.
And herein is found the safeguard for
those so litigating, a proper case must be
presented and clearly proved. If it be clearly proved, who shall say that a court of equity transcends Its powers, or violates the
rule of law, in declaring the contract to be
as the parties have made it? We cannot
think the statute of frauds and perjuries has
any application to such cases.
Here the bill is filed to reform this contract,
by Inserting in It several tracts of land, alleged to have been omitted from It by mistake, and parol evidence is relied on for such
purpose; and when reformed, then the prayer
is, to decree a specific performance of the contract This proof makes the contract different from what its words Import, and adds
to It, and varies It very materially. It, In
fact, makes a new and different contract;
yet if the mistake is clearly established,
which should give way, that rigid rule of the
common law, or that power residing In a
court of equity, to correct mistakes?
The
strongest and most convincing evidence will
be required, before the common law rule is
postponed, and the power of the court exerNow, what Is the testimony in this
cised.
case?

It consists. In great part, of loose conversations held by one Gillespie and others, with
the intestate, In which he said, there was a
mistake In the bond; that the tract lying
south-east of Shoal creek, being part of thi^

MISTAKE— PAROL EVIDENCE TO CORRECT.
half of the north-west [quarter] of
twenty-three was not in the bond,
or not in right, and the Bilyeus had found it
out This witness states nothing in positlye
terms, but "thinks" the facts were so and so,"
He "thinks" all the
as he details them.
lands claimed by complainants were Included
in the bond, except the Gillespie tract, and
thinks that intestate told him some of the
numbers were wrong, and some of the land
was not named in the bond. He spoke of the
west half of the north-west [quarter of section] twenty-three lying south-east of Shoal
creek, as not included in the bond, and that he
would not rectify the mistake because they
could not agree upon a division of the lands
according to his understanding of the conThis witness says that he can neither
tract.
read nor write, and details only such parts
of the conversation, as he "thInJis" was had
with the intestate. He does not say in positive terms, that the intestate admitted to
him he had sold this tract to complainants,
or that it was left out of the bond by misNo testimony could be more unsatistake.
factory than his, taking the whole of it toFenton says he "thinks" Hunter
gether.
told him he drew the bond himself and that
there was a mistake in it, but does not recolHe says It was
lect what the mistake was.
his understanding a bond was given by Hunter to complainants, and notes given for the
payment of the money — does not say he ever
saw the bond or notes —says the complainants
never took possession of the Gillespie tract—
on the tract south-east of the creek; they cut
some timber off, put a blacksmith shop upon,
and pastured the field on it while they and
Hunter were In partnership; there was some
money paid on the general contract, but don't
know how much.
Paine states that Hunter told him complainants were to have half of this tract,
when he. Hunter, sold or left, according to
the contract as made with complainants, in
He
the sale of the mill, which was In 1850.
had this conversation in the winter after the
sale of the mlU property; that complainants
have cut and hauled saw logs, and Hunter
and complainants buUt a blacksmith shop on
complainants rethis land;
and "thinks"
paired the fences some, but is not certain,
and they used It as a pasture in connection
with Hunter.
Hunter also said he had sold
the' GUlespIe tract to them, and that David
Hunter was to make a deed to It. Don't
know that complainants ever exercised any
acts of ownership over this tract.
Hunter
said there was a mistake in the bond, and if
his health would permit, he was coming to
town to get it fixed; "thinks" the mistake applied to the tract south-east of Shoal creek,
on which there was an old field.
Does not
know of complainants exercising any acts of
ownership over this "old field tract," since
they and Hunter dissolved partnefship; don't
know the numbers of the land.
The testimony of Clouse, and of lb G. Bilwest
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from thai
of other witnesses.
Smith says, Hunter told him, that all the
lands the complainants were to get, were included in the bonds; that half ot the timber
on the tract lying on the south-east side of
Shoal creek, on which there was an old field,
was included in the contract with complainants, and that they had got their share off,
and that he had not sold the land to them.
Wesley Bilyeu had stated to witness that he
had an Interest In this tract, and Hunter then
told him as above stated.
Hunter had possession of this tract when witness bought It,
and had com standing In the field on It
George Smith stated that Hunter told him
that complainants had no right to the tract
lying south-east of Shoal creek, but as soon
as he could buy a piece from John Clouse, he
would make it right, but they were to have
It when he sold or left; understood this same
tract was included in the original contract
This is the substance of the evidence to
prove the mistake In the bond, and part performance, which, it Is very clear, Is wholly
insufficient for either purpose.
It would be
relaxing too much those salutary rules of evidence, which require a contract to be clearly
proved, before a specific performance of- it
wUl be decreed.
It Is discretionary with the
court, in all such cases, to decree or not a
specific performance of a contract, and that
discretion will not be exercised except in a
verv clear case.
This contract was made in March, 1850,
and the intestate remained In the state until
1851, during a part of which time he was in
partnership with complainants, in using the
mill property. They paid their notes as they
became due, and not a word of complaint is
heard of any mistake. They were impleaded, by the administrator of the Intestate, in
a petition in chancery, for the purixise of obtaining an order of court, authorizing him to
make a deed to them In performance of the
covenant; in which suit, it was fully competent for the complainants to have litigated
all these matters, but which they neglected
Though these proceedings are not
to do.
pleaded, or set up In bar by the defendants,
they might have been, successfully, and the
case thus disposed of, rendering unnecessary
the examination we have been compelled to
give it on the issues made.
We are satisfied nothing has been shown to
establish a mistake, its nature, or extent, so
clearly, as to leave no doubt on the mind of
the actual existence of the alleged mistake.
The decree, as to the old field tract, being a
part of the west half of the north-west quarter of section twenty-three, lying north-east
of Shoal creek, and as to the Gillespie tract,
Is reversed, and the decree so modified as to
exempt those tracts from Its operation.
The
Injunction will be dissolved, and the administrator, the appellant here, will be allowed to
proceed with his action at law.
Decree modified.
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to be the same line previously pointed out by
him to the plaintiff, and that it would strike
(102 Mass. 24.)
the highway within one rod of said bridge;
whereas in fact the land of said McDaniels
Siipreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Sept. Term, 1869.
did not extend so far as to the southeast corner of the defendant's land as pointed out
Bill in equity for the reformation of a conby him, and the south line, running at right
veyance of lands, and for further relief. The
angles therefrom to the highway, did not
case was reserved by the chief justice "for
strike the same within one rod of said bridge;
the consideration and decision of the full
and the deed so written and accepted did not
court upon the question whether, upon the
include a considerable part of the land so
allegations of the bill, the plaintiff is entitled
to be sold, and inoffered and represented
to relief in equity, and whether the plaintifC
by the plaintiff to
understood
tended
and
has not a full, adequate, and complete remhave been purchased by him; the part so
edy at law; the defendant also relying in
excluded consisting of about 17 acres of
his answer upon the statute of frauds."
land, comprising the greater part of the
W. H. Swift and S. W. Bowerman, for meq,dow land In the tract as pointed out by
plaintiff.
M. Wilcox and W. T. Filley, for the defendant.
defendant.
The plaintiff, by his bill, does not seek to
rescind the contract and conveyance, and
WPit/LS, J. The plaintiff purchased cerdoes not offer to reconvey or release to the
tain lots of land of the defendant, received a
defendant the land conveyed, nor pray that
deed, and paid the whole amount of the purhe may be allowed to do so, and recover back
chase money.
This suit is brought for relief the purchase money paid and bonds delivered
or redress in several particulars, dissimilar
In payment
The relief prayed for is that
In character, but all connected with the al- the defendant may be required to convey to
leged oral contract of purchase.
He com- the plaintiff the portion of the tract which
plains: First That a proviso was Inserted
was so by fraud or mistake omitted from the
conveyance already made to release the plainIn his deed, imposing upon him the burden of
supporting the whole fence upon the south
tiff from the proviso In his deed in regard to
line of the land conveyed;
the fence, and to pay to the plaintiff the
and that he was
induced to assent to Its Insertion upon the
aforesaid amount of premium and interest
consideration, and false representation of the
upon said bonds. .
defendant, that the whole fence upon the east
The argument of the plaintiff is addressed
mainly to the question of the equity jurisdicside of said land was to be maintained by
tion of this court in cases of fraud or mistake
the adjoining proprietor, PatricK McDaniels,
by virtue of a written obligation to that eflike that alleged in the present suit There
fect, and that the plaintiff would be relieved
can be no doubt upon that point There is
from all liability to maintain any fence upon no ground upon which jurisdiction In equity
is so readily entertained and freely exercised,
that side; as well as by certain other false
representations of the defendant in relation
It Is given to this court without restriction.
thereto.
If the parties have not a plain, adequate,
Second. That he delivered to the
defendant, in part payment of said purchase
and complete remedy at law. Gen. St c. 113,
money, three bonds of the United States of
Having jurisdiction, the question is as
§ 2.
51,000 each, upon the agreement of the deto the appropriate remedy. Jurisdiction in
equity is often maintained, even when there
fendant that he would allow the full market
value of the same, including premium and acIs a remedy at law, for the sake of the greater facility it affords for adapting the proper
crued interest at the time of the transfer
thereof; and that the defendant refuses to relief to the peculiar necessities of each case.
If the party suing is entitled to no relief othallow and pay him the value of such premium and interest, amounting together to er than that wbich may be had in an action
at la^, he is remitted to his remedy in that
the sum of $315; that sum being in excess
of the whole purchase money due to the de- form. Even In a proper case for an appeal
fendant Third. That during the negotiations
to equity the remedy must be sought in reffor the sale and purchase of said lands the erence to certain recognized rules and princidefendant pointed out the southeast corner
ples of chancery jurisprudence, and is often
of the premises proposed for sale, and reprerestricted by provisions of positive law. It
sented that the land of the adjoining propriIs not administered arbitrarily.
It must flow
etor, McDaniels, extended to that point, and
out of and accord with the agreements and
that the southerly line of the land sold would
obligations of the parties, and be adapted to
extend from the same corner to a point on
the condition of facts to which it Is to be
the highway near a bridge; that the deed
applied.
was accordingly written and accepted, deIn the present case, the principal ground of
scribing the land as bounded on the south by
action Is the fraud or mistake by which an
a line running from the southwest corner of
Important part of the subject-matter of the
land of said McDaniels, at right angles to
alleged contract of sale and purchase was
the westerly line of said McDaniels, to the
omitted from the deed of conveyance.
If ths
highway, the defendant representing said line
allegations of the bill should be sustained by
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the proofs, they would show a clear right to
have a rescission of the contract; and, upon
reconveyance of the land covered by the deed,
to have restoration of the bonds and money
But this rethat were delivered in payment
lief the plaintitP does not seek; and his bill
contains no offer to reconvey, without which
The prayer of
he cannot have such relief.
the bill, and its sole purpose in this particular, is that the defendant may be compelled
to convey to the plaintiff the 17 acres of land
which he alleges were included in the oral
contract of sale, or represented by the defendant to be so included, but omitted from the
deed.
the case stood merely upon the oral contract of sale, with a conveyance of part and
a neglect or refusal to convey another part of
the land which was the subject of the alleged conti-act, we do not think it would be
contended that the plaintiff could compel a
conveyance of the other land, against a party
denying the contract and setting up the statute of frauds.
Courts are bound to regard
The
that statute in equity as well as at law.
only remedy in equity, in such case, would
be by a rescission of the entire contract, In
which the aid of the court could be obtained.
If necessary, upon proper grounds.
There has been no part performance here,
such as, according to the general practice in
courts of equity, would be held to take the
case out of the statute of frauds.

If

1.

Payment of the whole consideration is

2.

Possession by the purchaser, under such

not sufficient for that purpose. Hughes v. Morris, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 356; Thompson v.
Gould, 20 Pick. 134, 138; Browne, St Frauds,
! 461; Fry, Spec. Perf. § 403; Dale v. Hamilton, 5 Hare, 369; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Schoales
& li. 22, 41; Allen's Estate, 1 Watts & S.
383; Purcell v. Minei;, 4 Wall. 513.
a deed as was given to the plaintiff, is possession according to the title thereby conveyed; and is not such a possession as to
afford ground for enforcing an alleged oral
agreement to convey other land, claimed to
have been embraced in the same oral agreement with that conveyed.
Moale v. Buchanan, 11 Gill & J. 314.
The plaintiff does not
appear to have been let Into actual possession of the 17 acres, nor to have been induced to do any acts thereon, as owner, under his supposed rights as purchaser.
3. The conveyance
of a portion of the land
Is neither a part performance, nor is It a
recognition of the alleged oral contract, so far
as it relates to the remaining land not included in the deed.
On the contrary, it Is In

distinct disregard and Implied disavowal of
such a contract The deed was given and accepted In execution of the entire contract of
sale. Its terms are In literal conformity with
the agreement as made.
The plaintiff concedes that the southern boundary was stipulated to be described as It Is written in the
deed, to wit, running from the southwesterly
corner of land of McDaniels, and at right
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angles with his westerly line, to the highway.
But the plaintiff claims that he In fact purchased the whole of a certain tract of land
which included the 17 acres now in dispute;
that the description of the boundaries, as
agreed upon and inserted in the deed, was so
agreed on and inserted upon the representation of the defendant and the belief of the
plaintiff that it did Include said 17 acres;
and that the failure of the deed to embrace
and convey that part of the land, was occasioned either by the mutual mistake of the
parties as to the position of the southwest
corner of land of McDaniels, or else by the
misrepresentation, deceit, and fraud of the
In either aldefendant In relation thereto.
ternative, the plaintiff contends that he Is
entitled to a reformation of the deed, to
make It conform to the sale actually contracted by the parties.
Such a reformation not only requires a description of the subject-matter of the sale,
different from the express terms of the oral
contract, but would enlarge the effect and
operation of the deed as a conveyance.
It
Involves the transfer of the legal title to land
not covered by the deed already given. It
requires a new deed to be executed and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Whether that deed shall embrace the entire
subject of the alleged contract of purchase,
with a corrected description to make it conform to facts and abuttals as they were represented to be, or merely convey the 17 acres
omitted from the deed already given, the order for its execution will enforce the specific
performance of a contract for the sale of
lands, for which there exists no memorandum, note, or other evidence In writing signed by the party to be charged therewith.
As to the 17 acres In dispute, the obligation
to convey them rests solely In the oral contract.
The defendant denies any contract
which Includes them. The plaintiff seeks to
establish such a contract by parol evidence,
and enforce it The deed itself furnishes no
means of making the correction sought for,
and no evidence of the contract relied on for
this purpose; nor Is it in any sense an acknowledgment of the substance of the alleged oral agreement
The power to rectify deeds and other written instruments undoubtedly exists in this
court, under the clauses of the statute giving
equity jurisdiction In cases of fraud, accident, and mistake, or the clause giving It generally where there Is no adequate remedy at
law. It has been exercised in several cases.
Canedy v. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373; Metcalf v.
Putman, 9 Allen, 97. But the power will be
exercised In subordination to other fixed principles of law, and especially to statute provisions. If the rules, restricting the administration- of judicial remedies, which are prescribed by the statute of frauds, were to be
disregarded In this branch of equity procedure, it would open the door to all the
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forms of fraud which that statute was In-

tended to prevent The statute is not a mere
rule of evidence, but a limitation of Judicial
It requires
authority to afford a remedy.
that contracts for the sale of lands. In order
must
to be enforced by judicial proceedings,
This probe substantiated by some writing.
vision of law cannot be dispensed with merely for the reason that the want of such
writing was occasioned by accident, mistake,
unless some
or fraudulent representations,
other ingredient enters into the case to give
rise to equities stronger than those which
stand upon the oral contract alone, which

estop the other party from setting up the
statute.
It makes no difference whether the want
of a writing was accidental or Intentional, by
way of refusal or by reason of mutual mistake; nor that there were false representations, and a pretence of conveying the land,
but a fraudulent evasion, by means whereof
in fact, and no
there was no Conveyance
proper written evidence of the agreement to
convey.
From the oral agreement there can
be derived no legal right, either to have per-

formance of its stipulations or written eviSo long, therefore, as the
dence of its terms.
effect of the fraud or mistake extends no further than to prevent the execution, or withhold from the other party written evidence
of the agreement, it does not fmrnish suflScient ground for the court to disregard the
statute of frauds, and enter into the investigation of the oral agreement for the purpose of aiforcing it. And we do not see that
the present case stands otherwise in this respect than it would if there had been no conAs alveyance of any part of the land.
ready shown, that conveyance was not in execution or recognition of the contract which
the plaintiff seeks, by this bill, to enforce;
and does not furnish any reason for taking
the case out of the statute, on the ground of
part performance. Indeed, the rule seems to
be tliat no part performance by the party
sought to be charged will take an agreement
out of the statute of frauds, except in those
cases where the statute itself provides for
It is part performance by the
such effect.
party seeking to enforce, and not by the other party, to which courts of equity look, in
giving relief from the statute.
Caton v.
Caton, 1 Gh. App. 137, L. R. 2 H. L. 127;
Mundy v. JoUiffe, 5 Mylne & O. 167; Buckmaster V. Harrop, 7 Ves. 369; Browne, St.
Frauds, § 453.
When the proposed reformation of an Instrument involves the specific enforcement of
an oral agreement
within the statute of
frauds, or when the term sought to be added
would so modify the instrument as to make
It operate to convey an interest or secure a
right which can only be conveyed or secured
through an instrument in writing, and for
which no writing has ever existed, the statute of frauds is a sufficient answer to such a
proceeding, unless the plea of the statute can
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be met by some

ground of estoppel to deprive the party of the right to set up that
defence.
Jordan v. Sawkins, 1 "Ves. Jr. 402;
Osbom V. Phelps, 19 Conn. 63; Clinan v.
Cooke, 1 Schoales & L. 22.
The fact that the omission or defect In the
writing, by reason of which It failed to convey the land or express the obligation which
it is sought to make it convey or express,
was occasioned by mistake, or by deceit and
fraud, will not alone constitute such an estoppeL
There must concur, also, some
change In the condition or position of the
party seeking relief, by reason of being Induced to enter upon the execution
of the
agreement, or to do acts upon the faith of
It as If It were executed, with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the other party, either
express or Implied, for which he would be
left without redress If the agreement were
to be defeated.
Upon a somewhat extended examination
of the decisions Id regard to the effect of the
statute of frauds upon the right to have equitable relief where the writing Is defective,
although many of them, where relief has
been granted, hardly come within this definition in the apparent character of the particular facts upon which they were decided,
yet we are satisfied that this principle of discrimination is the only one which can give
consistency to the great mass of authorities
upon this subject
The case of Smith v. XJnderdundc, 1 Sandf.
Oh. 579, Is nearly like the present in its facts;
and the opinion of the assistant vice-chanceUor would seem to sustain the right of the
plaintiff here. There was no fraud in the
preparation of the deed. The judgment was
based mainly upon the ground of part performance.
It was held to be sufficient to
take the case out of the statute that the
plaintiff had been let into possession as purchaser; and the opinion indicates that possession under and In accordance with a deed
of part would be a sufficient possession of
the whole for the purpose of requiring a deed
of the remainder. But the decision rests upon the fact of possession by the plaintiff of
the entire premises, including the part for
which the biU was brought. The case arose
upon demurrer to the bill, which of course
admitted the contract, and the alleged possession of the whole tract. The question of
the statute of frauds did not arise therefore.
That the purchaser has been let into possession in pursuance of a parol agreement
has been very generally recognized as sufficient to take It out of the statute. The reasoning by which this result was reached Is
far from satisfactory; and even where the
rule prevails there are frequent intimations
that it is regarded as trenching too closely
upon the spirit as well as the letter of the
If it were now open to settle the
statute.
rule anew, we cannot doubt that it would
be limited to possession
accompanied with
or followed by such change of position of the
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purchaser as would subject him to loss for
which he could not otherwise have adequate
or other redress; and that
compensation
mere change of possession would not be held
to take a case out of the statute. However
it may be elsewhere, we are disposed to hold
the rule to be so in Massachusetts.
Previously to the Statutes of 1855, e. 194,
and 1856, c. 38 (Gen. St c. 113, § 2), the
power of the court to direct specific performance was confined to written contracts.
Rev. St c. 74, § 8. That power was held to
be

strictly limited to contracts in which the

was exwhole obligation to be enforced
Dwight v. Pomeroy,
pressed in the writing.
17 Mass. 303; Brooks v. Wheelock, 11 Pick.
439; Leach v. Leach, 18 Pick. 68; Buck v.
Dowley, 16 Gray, 555; Park v. Johnson, 4
Allen,

259.

The

provision

conferring

that

power specifically in case of written contracts is still retained in the Gen. St. c. 113,
the subsequent clauses, conferring
§ 2.
jurisdiction generally, are to be construed,
as we think they are, to extend the power
of the court so as to give relief by way of
performance, either of contracts
specific

If

wholly unwritten,

or of stipulations

proved

by parol and incorporated into a contract by

judicial rectification of a written instrument,
as in Metcalf v. Putman, 9 Allen, 97, still
that power ought to be exercised with constant reference and in subordination to the
condition that "the party asking relief has
not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at common law," which accompanied each
of the equity power of the
enlargement
court, and which prefaces and closes the
enumeration of those powers in the General
Statutes.
The force of this consideration is
not lessened when applied to agreements
within the statute of frauds.
Mere possession of land does not expose
the party to loss or danger of loss without
redress at law. The parol agreement of sale
and purchase,
with permission to enter,
though not to be enforced as a valid contract
of sale, will constitute such a license as will
protect the party from liability for acts done
before the license is revoked, and for all acts
necessary to enable him to remove himself
and hia property from the premises after
such revocation.
If possession be taken
without such permission, express or Implied,
it is no foundation for relief in equity, according to any of the authorities. The argument, for the admission of parol evidence to
prove an agreement
within the statute of
frauds in order to enforce it in equity, drawn
from the admissibility of such evidence to
maintain a defence, either at law or in equity, seems to be based upon a misconception of the purport and force of the statute,
which reaches no farther than to deny the
right of action to enforce such agreements.
In this commonwealth, the possession of
land by a purchaser is not even notice to a
third party of an unrecorded deed.
The
whole spirit of our laws in respect to real esH.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 17
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tate Is against the policy of enabling parties
to acquire or confer title, either legal or equitable, by mere parol and delivery of possession.
The possession
of the plaintiff,
therefore, even if it extended to the tract in
dispute, is not sufl3cient to entitle him to re-

lief against the statute.

The principle, on which courts of equity
rectify an instrument, so as to enlarge its
operation, or to convey or enforce rights not
found in the writing Itself, and make it conform to the agreement as proved by parol
evidence, on the ground of an omission, by
mutual mistake, in the reduction of the
agreement to writing, is, as we understand
it that in equity the previous oral agreement is held to subsist as a binding contract,
notwithstanding the attempt to put it in
writing; and upon clear proof of its terms
the courts compel the Incorporation of the
omitted clause, or the modification of that
which is Inserted, so that the whoW agreement as actually intended to be made, shall
be

truly

expressed

and

executed.

Hunt

v.

Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 1; Oliver v. Mutual
Commercial Marine Ins. Co., 2 Curt 277,
Fed. Cas. No. 10,498. But when the omitted
term or obligation is within the statute of
frauds, there is no valid agreement which
the court is authorized to enforce, outside of
the writing. In such case, relief may be had
against the enforcement of the contract as
written, or the assertion of rights acquired
under it contrary to the terms and intent of
the real agreement of the parties. Such relief may be given as well upon the suit of a
plaintiff seeking to have a written contract,
or some of its terms, set aside, annulled, or
restricted, as to a defendant resisting its
specific performance. Canedy v. Marcy, 13
Gray, 373; Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch.
085; Kelsselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch.
148.

Relief In this form, although procured by
parol evidence of an agreement
differing
from the written contract, with proof that
the difference was the result of accident or
mistake, does not conflict with the provisions of the statute of frauds. That statute
forbids the enforcement of certain kinds of
agreement without writing; but it does not
forbid the defeat or restriction of written
contracts; nor the use of parol evidence for
the purpose of establishing the equitable
grounds therefor. The parol evidence is introduced, not to establish an oral agreement
independently of the writing, but to show
that the written Instrument contained something contrary to or in excess of the real
of the parties, or does not propagreement
erly express that agreement.
Higginson v.
Clowes, 15 Ves. 516; Clowes v. Higginson, 1
Ves. & B. 524; Squler v. Campbell, 1 Mylne
& C. 459, 480.
But rectification by making the contract
Include obligations or subject-matter
to
which its written terms will not apply is a
direct enforcement of the oral agreement, as
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much In conflict with tlie statute of frauds
as if there were no writing at all. Moale v.
Buchanan, 11 Gill & J. 314; Osborn v. Phelps,
19 Conn. 63; Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80. In
Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 14 Johns. 15, 32,
it is said that, "where it is necessary to
make out a contract in writing, no parol evidence can be admitted to supply any defects
in the writing." Per Thompson, C. J. Such

rectification, when the enlarged operation includes that which is within the statute of
frauds, must be accomplished. If at all, under
the other head of equity jurisdiction, namely,
fraud. Imham v. Child, 1 Brown, Ch. 92;
Davies v. Fltton,
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 770a;
2 Dru. & War. 225; Wilson v. Wilson, 5 H.
t,. Cas. 40, 65; Manser v. Back, 6 Hare, 443;
Clarke v. Grant, 14 Ves. 519; Cllnan v. Cook,
1 Schoales & L. 22.
The fraud most commonly treated as taking an agreement out of the statute of frauds
is that which consists in setting up the statute against its performance, after the other
party has been induced to make expenditures, or a change of situation in regard to
the subject-matter of the agreement, or upon the supposition that it was to be carried
into execution, g.nd the assumption of rights
thereby to be acquired; so that the refusal
to complete the execution of the agreement
is not merely a denial of rights which It
was intended to confer, but the infliction of
an unjust and unconscientious injury and
loss. In such case, the party is held, by
force of his acts or silent acquiescence,
which have misled the other to his harm, to
be estopped from setting up the statute of
frauds. Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770;
Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Johns. Ch. 274,
14 Johns. 15; Browne, St. Frauds, § 437 et
seq.; Fry, Spec. Perf. §§ 384r-388; Caton v.
Caton, 1 Ch. App. 137, 147, L. R. 2 H. L. 127.
In the last named case it is said that "the
right to relief in such cases rests not merely on the contract, but on what has been
Per
done In pursuance of the contract"
See, also, 1
Lord Chancellor Cranworth.
Story, Bq. Jur. § 759. But the present case,
as we have already seen, does not come
within the principle of this ground of equitable relief.
Fraud, which relates only to the preparation, form, and execution of the writing, is
to vitiate the instrument so made.
su£Blcient
It may be set aside either in equity or at
law. If It is made to include land not the
subject of the actual sale, it is inoperative
as to such land; and the fraud may be
shown, for the purpose of defeating its reWalker
covery, in an action at law.
v.
Swasey, 2 Allen, 312, 4 Allen, 527; Bartlett,
It has been quesV. Drake, 100 Mass. 174.
tioned whether any other effect can be given
to such fraud than to defeat the operation of
the instrument altogether; and whether a
court of equity can reform by giving it a
narrower operation, as modified by parol
proof, tn a case within the statute of frauds.
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Attorney General v. Sltwell, 1 Younge & C.
Eich. 559. The difficulty Is that, if the
fraud vitiates and defeats the instrument,
then the modified agreement to be enforced
must be that which is proved by parol evidence;
and this seems to violate the statute. But the instrument. In such case, is
not void. It is voidable only; and that not
at the election of the party who committed
the fraud. He is not entitled to control the
extent of the effect that shall be given to
his fraudulent conduct; and it is not for
him to object that the fraud is availed of
only to defeat the rights, which he has secured by fraud, beyond what he is fairly entitled to by the terms of the real agreement
between the parties. When those are separable, and the nature of the case wUl admit of it, the court may enforce the written
contract in accordance with Its terms, giving
relief against the fraudulent excess, or the
clause improperly inserted. Parol testimony,
used to defeat a title or limit an Interest acquired under a written instrument, or to convert it into a trust, does not necessarily conflict with the statute of frauds. It has been
held that an absolute deed may, in this
mode, be converted. In equity, into a mortgage.
Washburn v. Merrill, 1 Day, 140;
Taylor v. Luther, 2 Sumn. 228, Fed. Cas.
No. 13,796; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Stoiy,
181, 293, Fed Cas. No. 7,266; Morris v. Nixon, 1 How. 118; 4 Kent, Comm. (6th Ed.)
143.' vrheiner this can be done in MassachuNewton v.
setts has not yet been decided.
Fay, 10 Allen, 505. But If it were to be so
held, it would not be upon the ground of enforcing a parol agreement to reconvey; but
upon the ground that such an agreement, together with proof that the deed was given
and accepted only as security for a debt,
made out a case of fraud, or trust, which
would warrant a decree vacating the title of
the grantee, as far as be attempted to hold
contrary to the purposes of the conveyance.
In such cases the court acts upon the estate
or rights acquired under the written instrument; and within the power over that instrument which is derived from the fraud or
other ground of jurisdiction.
But when it
is sought to extend that power to Interests
In land not Included in the Instrument, an^
In relation to which there is no agreemen*
in writing, the case stands differentlyFraud may vitiate the writing which ia
tainted by It, but It does not supply that
which the statute requires. It may destroy
a title or right acquired by Its means; but
It has no creative force. It will not confer
title. In the absence of a legal contract by
the agreement of the parties. It will not establish one, nor authorize the court to declare one, bjr Its decree.
This distinction is Illustrated by the analogous rule in regard to implied trusts. Gen.
St. c. 100, § 19. Parol evidence may charge
the grantee of lands conveyed with a resulting or Implied trust, which equity will en-
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force. But such evidence will not create a
trust in lands already held by an absolute
title.

A fraudulent misrepresentation, although

sufficient to sustain an action for damages,
cannot be converted into a contract to be
Neither will it furnish the
enforced as such.
measure by which a written contract may be
In this discussion we have asreformed.
sumed that there was a clear agreement between the parties, which the deed fails to
carry out, and to which it might properly be
made to conform, but for the obstacle in the
statute of frauds.
It has been often asserted that where one by
deceit or fraudulent contrivance prevents an
agreement intended to be put in writing
from being properly written or executed, he
shall not avail himself of the omission, and
shall not be permitted to set up the statute

of fraud against the proof and enforcement
of the parol agreement, or of the parol stipulation improperly omitted.
But in our opinion this doctrine would practically annul the
statute. The tendency of the human mind,
when fraud and injustice are manifest, is to
strain every point to compass its defeat; and
to render full redress
to the party upon
whom it has been practiced. Mundy v. Jolliffe, 5 Mylne & C. 167; Taylor v. Luther, 2
Sumn. 233, Fed. Cas. No. 13,796. This Influence has led to decisions in which the facts
of the particular case were regarded more
than the general considerations, of public policy upon which the statute Is founded and
entitled to be maintained. Courts have sometimes regarded it as a matter of judicial merit to wrest from under the statute aU cases
in which the lineaments of fraud in any
form were discernible.
But the impulse of
moral reprobation of deceit and fraud, however commendable
in itself, is liable to mislead, if taken as the guide to judicial decrees.

We apprehend that in most instances where
fraud occasioning
a failure of written
evidence of an agreement or particular stipulation has been held to tal£e the case out of the
statute of frauds, there was some fact of
prejudice to the party, or change of situation consequent upon the fraud, which was
regarded as sufficient to make up the elements of an equitable estoppel.
In such case,
the argument
Is transferred to the simple
question of the sufficiency of the additional
circumstance
for that purpose.
The cases
most frequently referred to are those arising
out of agreements for marriage settlements.
In such cases the marriage, although not regarded as a part performance of the agreement for a marriage settlement, is such an
irretrievable change of situation, that, if procured by artifice, upon the faith that the settlement had been, or the assurance that it
would be, executed, the other party is held
to make good the agreement,
and not permitted to defeat it by pleading the statute.
Max-
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well V. Mountacute, Prec. Oh. 526; Browne,
St. Frauds, §§ 441-445.
Another class of cases are those where a
party acquires property by conveyance or devise secured to himself under assurances that
he will transfer the property to, or hold and
appropriate it for the use and benefit of, another.
A trust for the benefit of such other
person Is charged upon the property, not by
reason merely of the oral promise, but because of the fact that by means of such
promise he had induced the transfer of the
property to himself. Brown v. Lynch, ]
Paige, 147; Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vem. 296;
Oldham v. Litchfield, 2 Vem. 506; Devenish
V. Baines, Prec. Ch. 3; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §
768.

When these cases are cited in support of
the doctrine that artifice or fraud in evading
or preventing the execution of the writing is
alone sufficient to Induce a court of equity to
disregard the statute and enforce the oral
agreement,
the subsequent change of situation or transfer of property, without which
the deceit would be innocuous,
seems to be
overlooked, because it Is not strictly in part
performance of the agreement sought to be
enforced.
It must be manifest, however, that '
without such consequent act there would be
no standing for the case in a court of equity.
That which moves the court to a decree to
enforce the agreement is not the artifice by
which the execution of the writing has been
evaded, but what the other party has been
induced to do upon the faith of the agreement for such a writing.
It is not that deceit, misrepresentation, or fraud, of Itself, entitles a party to an equitable remedy; but
that equity will interfere to prevent the accomplishment of the fraud which would result from the enforcement of legal rights contrary to the real agreement of the parties.
Indeed, the fraud which alone justifies this
exercise of equity powers by relief against
the statute of frauds consists in the attempt
to take advantage of that which has been
done in performance or upon the faith of an
agreement,
while repudiating its obligations
under cover of the statute.
When a writing
has been executed, the courts allow the fraud
or mistake by which an omission or defect in i
the instrument has been occasioned to defeat
the conclusiveness
of the writing, and open*
the door for proof of the real agreement/ jf
But the obstacle of the statute of frauds to '
the enforcement of obligations, or the security
of rights not expressed in the instrument remains to be removed in the same manner as
if there were no writing. Phyfe v. Wardell,
2 Edw. Ch. 47; Moale v. Buchanan, 11 Gill &
J. 314. The power to reform the instrument
is not an independent power or branch of equity jurisdiction, but only a means of exercising the power of the court under Its general
jurisdiction in cases of fraud, accident, ^.nd
mistake.
We are aware that the limitation which we

l
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have undertaken to define has not been nnlformly observed or recognized.
In Wiswall v. Hall, 3 Paige, 313, Chancellor Walworth granted a perpetual injunction,
and ordered a deed of release of title to land
omitted from a deed by fraud and secret contrivance. There was no discussion of the authorities, nor of the principles upon which the
and no reference to the
case was decided;
statute of frauds; and the statute does not
appear, by the report, to have been set up

against the prayer for relief.
In De Peyster v. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 591,
a similar decision was made in the court of
Here again there is
appeals in New Yorli.
no reference to the statute of frauds, no discussion of the principles involved In the decision, and no authority or precedent cited except that of Wiswall v. Hall. The mortgagor
whose deed was reformed put In no answer
The defence was made by parties
whatever.
claiming under him, and the statute of frauds
Dedoes not appear to have been pleaded.
nio, C. J., in giving the opinion, proceeds to
say: "It is unnecessary to refer to cases to
establish the familiar doctrine that when
through mistake or fraud a contract or, conveyance fails to express the actual agreement
of the parties, it will be reformed by a court
of equity, so as to correspond with such actual agreement.
The English cases have been
ably digested by Chancellor Kent, and the
principle has been stated with his accustomed care and accuracy. In Gillespie v. Moon,
2 Johns. Ch. 585."
But in Gillespie v. Moon the relief sought
/
and granted was by way of restricting, and
not by enlarging, the operation of the deed.
Such relief would not, as already shown, conflict with the statute of frauds; and neither
the discussion In that case nor the citation
of authorities had reference to the bearing of
the statute of frauds upon the question of affording relief upon contracts relating to land.
Indeed, the English ca^ea furnish but little
aid upon that point, for the reason that the
courts there have generally, without reference to the statute of frauds, refused to enforce written contracts with a modification
or variation set up by parol proof. WooUam
V. Heam, 7 Ves. 211, and notes on the same
In 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 404; Nurse v. Seymour,
13 Beav. 254.
The principle which was maintained by
Chancellor Kent, and upon which the English authorities were cited by him la Gillespie V. Moon, was that relief in equity against
the operation of a written instrument, on the
ground that by fraud or mistake it did not
express
the true contract of the parties,
might be afforded to a plaintiff seelmig a
modification of the contract, as well as to a
defendant resisting Its enforcement
That
proposition must be considered as fully established. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 161. It is
quite another proposition, to enlarge the subject-matter of the contract, or to add a new
term to the writing, by parol evidence, and
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enforce it. No such proposition was presented by the case of GlUespie v. Moon, and it
does not sustain the right to such relief
against the statute of frauds.
That Chancellor Walworth, In Wiswall v.
Hall, did not Intend to decide that the statute of frauds could be disregarded if properly
set up against such an enlargement of the
operation of the written contract Is apparent
from the remarks of the same learned judge
in the subsequent case of Cowles v. Bowne,
10 Paige, 535. He says: "Whether a party
can come into this court for the specific performance of a mere executory agreement for
the sale of lands, which in its terms is materially variant from the written agreement
between the parties that has been executed
according to the statute, where there lias
been no part performance or other equitable
circumstance sufficient to take the case out
of the statute of frauds, as a mere parol contract between the parties, is a question
which it wiU not be necessary for me to consider in this case."
In Gouvemeur v. Titus, 1 Edw. Oh. 480,
there was a deed of land described as being
in the northwest comer of a township by mistake for the northeast comer. The grantor
admitted the real contract, and had corrected
the mistake by deed. The only question was
whether equity would enforce the corrected
deed against tibe lien of a judgment creditor,
In the opinion
who had notice of the mistake.
it is said: "It Is a case in which this court
would interfere, as between the immediate parties, to correct the mistake." The judgment
was clearly right The dictum we are disposed to question, unless the deed itself coif
tained some other description by means of
which the land might be identified and tlie
mistake corrected.
In Newson v. Bufferlow, 1 Dev. Eq. 379, a
deed was reformed, which was made, by
fraud, to include land not sold; and the fraudulent grantee was required to execute a reconveyance of the excess.
The opinion contains
a remark of the court that this power may be
exercised as well by Inserting what was omitted as by striking out what was wrongfully included. But this remark Is clearly
obiter dictum, and is not sustained by the
authority cited, namely, Gillespie v. Moon.
In Blodgett v. Hobart, 18 Vem. 414, a
mortgage was reformed by including other
lands omitted by mistake. The statute of
frauds was not set up in the answer nor referred to in the opinion of the court and the
answer was considered by the coiu:t to be
evasive in regard to the alleged agreement
for security upon such other lands.
In Tllton V. Tllton, 9 N. H. 385, the court
controvert the doctrine of such a limitation,
as declared in Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80; but
the decision did not Involve the question so
discussed.
The case arose from an attempted
partition between tenants in common of real
estate.
There was a written agreement for
partition according to the award of certain
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arbitrators named, and the only question was
as to tlie effect of a substitution of other arbitrators by parol. Deeds had been executed,
and the plaintifE had fuUy performed his part
of the agreement It was a case of part performance sufficient to take the case out of
the statute of frauds, and was decided upon
Besides, a partition of lauds,
that ground.
though effected by mutual deeds of release,
is not a contract for the sale of land.
Craig V. Kittridge, 3 Fost. (N. H.) 231,
arose upon a partition, and was decided upon
Smith t.
the authority of Tilton v. Tilton.
Greeley, 14 N. H. 378, was a decree upon default, without argument or opinion, against
the executors and heirs of a party whose
deed, by mutual mistake, failed to include
certain land sold. It does not appear whether
there was written evidence of the agreement,
nor whether there was possession or acts of
It was sufficient, perhaps, that
performance.
the statute was not pleaded, and the default
Tadmltted
,
i
'
;

•'
)
(

the agreement.

Caldwell v. Carrington, 9 Pet. 86, was an
agreement for exchange of lands, and stands
entirely upon the ground of part performance.
Notwithstanding contrary decisions and dicta, we are satisfied that upon principle the
conveyance of land cannot be decreed in equity by reason merely of an oral agreement
therefor against a party denying the alleged
agreement and relying upon the statute of
frauds, in the absence of evidence of change
of situation or part performance creating an
This
estoppel against the plea of the statute.
rule applies as well to the enforcement of
by way of rectifying a
such an agreement
deed as to a direct suit for Its specific performance.
We are satisfied also that this Is
the rule to be derived from a great preponv.
derance of the authorities. Whitchurch
Bevls, 2 Brown, Ch. 559; Woollam v. Hearn,
7 Ves. 211; 2 Lead. Cas. Bq. (3d Am. Ed.)
notes, ['414], Am. Notes, 691; Townshend
V. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328; Beaumont v. Bramley, Turn. & B. 41. See, also, Moale v. Bu-

261

chanan, 11 Gill & J. 314; Osbom v. Phelps,
19 Conn. 63; and Elder v. Elder, 10 Mei. 80,
already cited above; Adams, Eq. 171, 172;
Churchill v. Rogers, 3 T. B. Mon. 81; Purcell
V. Miner, 4 Wall. 513.
The prayer in regard to the fence stands
differently. If that stipulation
had been
fraudulently inserted in the deed, the agreement being otherwise, the deed might be reformed by striking out that provision, or requiring a release of it, so as to make the writing correspond
with the actual agreement.

But upon the allegations of the bill there is
no other agreement
by which to reform the
deed, and to which to make it conform. The
plaintiff admits that the stipulation in the
deed is precisely In accordance
with the actual agreement The fraud which he alleges
relates only to the consideration or inducement upon which he was led to make that
agrpement; not to the form of the agreement
itself. If that stipulation were to be stricken
out, the writing would then not express the
agreement actually made by the parties. The
court cannot rectify an instrument otherwise
than in accordance
with the actual agreement. It cannot make an agreement for the
parties. Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 1,
14; Brooks v. Stolley, 3 McLean, 523, Fed.
Cas.
No. 1,962. If the subject-matter of
this stipulation were of sufficient materiality,
the fraud alleged might have the effect to
defeat the whole instrument. But this effect
Is not sought. The plaintiff's remedy, therefore, is at law. In damages for the deceit and
false representation.
The alleged agreement in regard to the premium and accrued interest upon the bonds
transferred In payment for the land will not
sustain a bill in equity. If such an agreement
was made and broken, we see no reason why
an action of assumpsit will not lie upon the
agreement or for the overpayment of the
agreed price of the purchase.
The remedy
at law is as effectual as it can be in equity.
The entry must therefore be, bUl dismissed.
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This was a civil action tried before BotJ., and a jury at spring term ol the superior court of Pasquotank county. The
■^
complaint was as follows: (1) That on
the 22d day of April, 1884, the plaintiff and
defendants entered Into a contract with regard to the sale and division of the Great
Park estate; that a paper writing, purporting to contain the terms of said contract, was executed by Timothy Ely and
wife, Hannah, by their duly-authorized
agent, Harvey Terry, and by the plaintiff,
i
■
, through hie agent, William J. Griffin,
V
A
^
copy of this writing is hereto attached,
"
marked
Exhibit A," and is made a part
of this complaint.
(2) That the recitals and
agreements set forth in said contract, down
Section numbered 40, are all true. (3)
That the agreement which was intended to
be embodied in the contract, of which the
exhibit hereto attached is a copy, was
made by Francis Davis, Esq., father of the
^
said John F. Davie, and Harvey Terry,
agent of Timothy Ely, and wife, Hannah.
(4) That, before the contract could be re^ .A duced
to writing, the said Francis Davis left
1
■eElizabeth City for his home in Ohio, and directed oneW. J. Qrlffln, an attorney at law,
Y
£ to draft said contract, and have the same
\3
'
) '*^>Xexecuted and recorded. (5) That the said
Y'draughtsman was compelled to rely upon
^^— ^ statements of the said Terry, and, by false
by said
representations
and fraudulent
.^ \^Terry,
the said contract, or that portion
set forth in the paragraph numbered 40 of
)the exhibit, hereto attached, does not set
) forth the true terms agreed on.
(6) That
the Great Park estate was incumbered by
a mortgage which had been purchased by
Timothy Ely, and the equity of redemption
w^as held by a firm known as Conrow,
vBush & Lipplncott; that the said John F.
^A Davis had entered into a contract with
the said Conrow, Bush & Lippincott for the
',^
\■ purchase of their Interest in the Great Park
estate, except a portion known as the
" Hall Tract," and the said Davis bound
o,
^-Mmself to pay off and discharge the mort^ gage, which was then held by the plaintiff
Ely, and thereby leave the Hall tract to
Conrow, Bush & Lippincott, unincumbered.
V^^This contract of Davis with Conrow, Bush
7 & Lippincott was well known to Harvey
*" Terry, the agent
of the defendant Ely.
~
(7) That the said Terry, as agent of the
said TitQothy Ely, had obtained a judg■•■V
KIN,

•s,-_

\
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J

J

O

i

i

J

t,menc of foreclosure on his mortgage, and
the sale of the Great Park estate was ad^vertised to take place April 22, 1884 ; that,
- after the advertisement had been posted,
.„ the said John F. Davis applied for and ob, tained a restraining order, commanding
,>,the commissioners to desist from the sale
<'of the Great Park estate until a certain
ytime mentioned in said restraining order.
(8) That thesaid Francis Davis and TimoOthyEly and Harvey Terry met in Elizabeth
City on the 21st day of April, 1884, and on
"^ that day verbally made a contract which
was intended to be embodied In the contract hereinbefore set out. It was only

i

J
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when the said Davis and Terry had thus
come to terms that ttie said Davis consented to the sale mentioned in said contract. (9) Thesaid Francis Davis, as agent
for his son, John F. Davis, refused to treat
with the said Terry upon any basis except
that the Hall tract should be given or set
apart to his son, John F. Davis, In order
that the said John F.Davis might perform
bis contract with the said Conrow, Bush &
Lippincott. (10) That, after much talking,
it was finally agreed that the said Hall
tract should be excepted, and the balance
of the Great Park estate should be divided
Into two parts, equal in area, by a line running north and south, and the western hall
thereof should be given or allotted to John
F. Davis and the eastern half to Timothy
Ely, and. In addition to the western half,
the said Davis should have the portion
known as the "Hall Tract." (11) That the
said Terry, represented unto the said Davis
that thesaid Hall tract contained butl,300
acres, which the said Terry well knew to
be false. In truth and In fact this complainant has been informed that the said
Hall tract contains 3,000 acres. (12) That,
having confidence In the Integrity of said
Terry, and having urgent business engagements In Ohio, the said Francis Davis left
Eliza bethaty on the 22d day of April, 1884,
and this plaintiff did not learn of the error
in the agreement for some time thereafter,
and instituted suit as soon as he heard
thereof. Wherefore plaintiff prays— i^Vrst,
that the said contract may be reformed so
as to speak the true agreement of the parties as herein set out ; second, that the defendants be decreed to pay all costs of this
proceeding ; and third, for such other and
furtherrellef as to thecourt may seemmeet.
The answer fully denied all the allegations
Imputing fraud, and the following issues
were submitted without objection to the
jury. (1) Does the written contract dated
April 22, 1884, contain the true agreement
entered Into between the parties ? (2) Was
It the agreement between the parties that
John F. Davis should have the Hall tract
and one-half of the balance of the Great
Parker estate, and the defendants the other
half of the Great Parker estate? (3) Was
the reservation of the Hall tract to J. F.
Davis omitted from the written contract
by reason of false and fraudulent representations made to the draughtsman by the
defendants, or either of them ? The issues
show the true contention of the parties.
The plaintiff offered evidence tending to
show the fraud set out In the complaint,
and all the other allegations of the complaint, for the purpose of reforming the
contract. The defendants objected to the
testimony, unless it was Introduced lor the
purpose of rescinding the contract, whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff stated
that the purpose of the testimony offered
was to reform the contract, and not to rescindlt. Thecourt excluded thetestimony,
holding that it was not admissible for the
purpose of reforming the contract, but
that it was admissible for the purpose of
rescinding the contract. Upon this Intimation the plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit,
and appealed. •
C. W. Gruudy, for appellant.
Terry, for appellees.

Harvey

jlISTAKE— PAROL EVIDENCE TO COEEECT.

263

J., (after stating the facts as
There is a hopeless conflict of authority upon the question whether a court
of equity will correct an executory contract
on the ground of fraud or mistake, and enforceitwith the variation. InEngland and
several of the American states such relief is
denied, although a defendant, for the purpose of resisting specific performance, may
show that by fraud or mistake the written
contract does not express the real terms of
the agreement. In other states this distinction is repudiated, and thecontract will
be corrected and enforced in proper cases at
the instance of either party. Where such
executory contracts, within the statute of
frauds, are corrected and enforced, there is
a further diversity, some courts holding
thatthey will only exercise the powerwhere
the object is to restrict the subject-matter
of the contract, while others hold that the
contreict will be corrected, although its subject is enlarged. Of this latter opinion is
Mr. Pomeroy (2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 862 et seq.)
and other writers of great respectability.
Opposed to this view we have the English
authorities, (Woollam v. Heam, 2 White &
T. Lead. Gas. Eq. 920,) and Bisp. Eq. § 383;
Whart. Ev. § 1024, and many decisions in
the United States, of which the leading case
is Glass V. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24. In this
" when the procase the court says that
posed reformation of an instrument involves the specific enforcement of an oral
agreement within the statute of frauds, or
when the terms sought to be added would
so modify the instrument as to make it
operate to convey an interest or secure a
right which can only be conveyed or secured through an instrument in writing,
and for which no writing has ever existed,
the statute of frauds is a suflicient answer
to such a proceeding, unless the plea of the
statute canbemetbysomeground of estoppel to deprive the party of the right to set
up that defense.
Jordan v. Sawkins,lVes.
Jr. 402; Osbom v. Phelps, 19 Conn. 63; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Schoales & L. 22. The fact
that the omission or defect in the writing
by reason of which it failed to convey the
land or express the obligation which it is
sought to make it convey or express was
occasioned by mistake, or by deceit and
fraud, will not alone constitute such an
estoppel. * • • Rectification, by making the contract include obligations or subject-matter to which its written terms will
not apply, is a direct enforcement of the
oral agreement, as much in conflict with the
statute of frauds as if there were no writing
at all." This decision, in so far as it holds
thatthe subject-matter of thecontract may
Qot be enlarged, is supported by abundant

within the statute it is obvious that to
carry the rule in Gillespie's Case to the extent of holding that an agreement (for example) to convey fifty acres may, for the
sake of justice and equity be construed to
mean a contract to convey one hundred,
would beto repeal the statute of frauds and
to give effect to a simple verbal agreement
to sell land. Where, however, the contention of the complainant is that something
which is actually embraced in the writing
was not intended to be included therein, to
suffer him to show this is not to enforce a
parol contract in relation to land. It is
simply to prove that a written contract did
not embrace all that, on its face, it appeared to include. Such was the actual
state of the case in Gillespie v. Moon." It
maybe remarked that inmost of thestates

is often cited to sustain the other view, but
the argument there seems to be directed
against the distinction between parties
seeking and parties resisting specific performance. It refers to the decisions of Chancellor Kent in Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns.
Ch. 585, and Keiselbrack v. Livingston, 4
Johns. Ch. 144. In neither of th^se cases
was the subject-matter enlarged.
In Gillespie's Case (so often cited) the correction
m«dp was the strikingout of 50 acrew from
a written agreement which included 250.
Bisp. Eq. 445, says that "in cases which fall

solutely necessary to subserve the ends of

Shepherd,

above.)

Authority.

Story's Equity Jurisprudence

where such relief is granted the doctrine of
is recognized, and the
proof required is but little short of that
which is necessary to enforce a contract
upon that ground. In North Carolina, so
far from correcting such executory contracts within the statute so as to enlarge
their terms, the tendency of our decisions is
to confine such corrective relief to executed
contracts alone. Wehave been able to find
Hali.,
no decision inpoint,butthewordsof
J., in Newsom v. Bufferlow, 1 Dev. Eq. 379,
strongly show the disinclination of the
court to depart from the statute, except
upon the most imperative demands of jusThejearned judge says:
tice and equity.
" It is altogether unnecessary to inquire in
this casehowfarcourts of equity have gone
in carrying into effect written executory
contracts or varying them by parol evidence.
Sufiice it tosay that the reason why
they have declined giving relief in m any such
cases is that the plaintiff had a remedy at
law. Thatreason is not applicable to executed contracts. In thesecases the plaintiff
has no remedy at law, and, unless a court
of equity will give relief, he can have no redress."
This distinction between executed
and executory contracts is clearly put by
Adams, Eq. 171 : " Where land is thesubject
of the erroneous instrument, the reformation of an executed conveyance on parol
evidence is not precluded by the statute of
frauds, for otherwise it would be impossible
to give relief. * * * But it does not appear that, where the defendant has insisted
on the benefit of the statute, the court has
ever reformed such an executory agreement
on parol evidence and specifically enforced

"part performance"

it."

Land is regarded as such a high species of
property that exceptional safeguards have
and sebeen devised for the preservation
curity of its title, and these should not be
departed from unless such departure is ab-

justice.
Under the former system the equitable relief we have mentioned was administered by the trained minds of learned
judges, sitting as chancellors, who appreciated the grave evils which the statutewas
designed to prevent, and who gave full effect to the rule which required the clearest
and most cogent testimony.
Even then the
relief in this state was confined, it seems,
to executed contracts, and surely there is
nothing in the new method of trying equitable issues which encourages us to leave the
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old moorings and venture upon a sea of
trouble, confusion, and insecurity.
On the
ground of necessity we correct conveyances
by adding clauses of defeasance and words
We also restrict or enlarge
of inheritance.
the subject-matter, but we decline to do this
in the case of executory contracts, where
there can necessarily be no other object
ithan, as in the case before us, to have it
.specifically enforced. Itis believed that no
.great hardship can result from such ruling,
tas the court will, upon rescission, endeavor
|to place the parties in statu quo, and damages maybe given for the fraud and deceit.
The court is liberal in the adjustment of
^equities arising in such cases ; but, even if
occasional instances of hardship occur, it is
far better that these sliould be endured than
that every title in the state should be exposed to the assaults of false and fraudulent oral testimony. What we have said
has no reference to the correction of ordinary executory contracts in aid of actions
tor damages at law, such as the correction
of the terms of a bond and the like. Equity
will always make the correction, and the
party can sue upon the corrected contract
at law. The two jurisdictions being now
blended, such relief will be granted in a
single action.
It may be that in cases of
personal property, where there is a,pretium
affectlonis, the contract may be corrected

and specifically enforced, but it is unnecessary to pass upon that question here.
The relief sought In this action Is to correct the contract so as to include the " Hall
tract." It seems from the complaint that
the alleged fraud consisted.in certain false

representations as to the number of acres
made to the plaintiff when the parol agreementwasmade. Falserepresentations are
also alleged to have been made to Mr. Griffin, the draughtsman; but these are not
specified, so we must assume that they
were the same as those made to his principal, Davis.
However this maybe, we have
here a plain case where it is proposed to
correct an -executory contract for the sale
of land by making it include a larger quantity than is stated in the writing. The
plaintiff does not wish to rescind, and offers
the parol testimony solely for the purpose
of reformation. We think that to admit
the testimony in such cases would be, ai
has been said, virtually repealing the sta
ute of frauds, and opening the door to
flood of evils, the extent of which it wouli
be Impossible to estimate.
The plaintil
may enforce the contract in its present form
or he may rescind it, and ask for an adjusi
ment of any equities which may have gro wi
out of the transaction. We think that tto
testimony was properly rejected, and that'
there is no error.
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MILLER

et al. v. SOAMMON.

(52 N.
Supreme Judicial

H.

609.)

Court of New Hampshire.
June, 1873.

In equity. The bill by Frank W. Miller
W. Marston against Stephen
and George
Scammon alleged that the plaintiffs were the
ot a daily newspaper, that the
publishers
defendant, fraudulently intending to deceive
and injure the plaintiffs, and to expose them
to loss and to a prosecution for libel, persuaded, and procured them to insert in their
newspaper an advertisement over the signature of the defendant, and which he said
was true, and which he alleged was necesto protect him against
sary and designed
being compelled to pay certain notes therein
described, which he then and there solemnly
declared had been wrongfully obtained, and
purporting to have been for a valuable consideration, and to have been signed by the
defendant, and which he then and there pretended and asserted he never signed, and upon which he might be sued, or which might
be set up in a suit against him.

The bin then avers that the allegations of

were false, and the presthe advertisement
ent plaintiffs, as well as the defendant, were
indicted and convicted for publishing a false
and malicious libel in said advertisement,
and the present plaintiffs were fined $150,
which they have paid, with costs taxed at
$21.63, together with other costs for coimsel'
fees and other expenses amounting to $50,
amounting in the whole to $221.63.
The plaintiffs pray that the court will ascertain the amount which they have had to
pay and the damages they have suffered by
reason of the fraud and deceit of the defendant, and that he may be ordered and decreed
to pay the same to the plaintiffs, with interest, and for such other relief as may be just.
To this bill there was a general demurrer,
and the questions of law thus raised were
reserved.
W. H. Y. Hackett, for plaintiffs.
for defendant

Mr. Wig-

gin,

FOSTER, J. As a declaration in case, to
recover damages for the deceit and fraud of
the defendant,
the plaintiffs' biU does not
seem wanting in the essential and ordinary
forms of pleading.

The prayer of the bill
may ascertain what the
plaintiffs "have had to pay, and the damages
they have suffered by reason of the fraud
and deceit" of the defendant, and that he
may be ordered and decreed to pay the same;
but the damages are specifically enumerated
in doUars and cents In the bill, and no aid
In equity is required for their ascertainment.
No reason is suggested In the bill why the
plamtiffs have chosen to proceed in equity
rather than by the usual course of the law,
which is ample in its form and power for the
redress of such grievances as the plaintiffs
complain of, provided they are entitled to reis that the court
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lief or satisfaction. If the plaintiffs' remedy
at law is not as plain, full, complete, and
adequate as it is by proceedings in equity,
neither the fact nor the reasons why are
suggested In this biU, which, if it may be
adopted for the disposition of such a case
as the present, may just as well serve hereafter as a precedent, mutatis mutandis, for
a bill to recover damages tot deceit, in any
case in which such damages are now sought
by means of an action of tort.
It is quite true that, not only by force of
our statutes, but upon general principles,
courts of equity exercise a general jurisdiction in cases of fraud, sometimes concurrent
with, and sometimes exclusive of, the comGen. St. c. 190, § 1; Snell,
mon-law courts.
Eq. 359. And it is said that in some cases
of fraud, for which the common law affords
complete and adequate relief, chancery may
Snell, Eq. 359.
have concurrent jurisdiction.
This general proposition, however, is too
broad when applied to our practice, under
the rules of evidence which permit or require
parties to testify. In the English practice,
and perhaps in some American states, equity
may entertain this concurrent jurisdiction,
because, although the remedy at law may be
said to be adequate, the means of obtaining
the truth, where discovery by the oath of
the party is essential, may be wanting or
deficient In the courts of common law. f'The
jurisdiction of the courts of equity for the
enforcement of dvil rights, as distinguished
from the jurisdiction of the courts of common law, derives much of its utility from
the power of the great seal to compel the
defendant, in a suit, to discover and set
forth, upon oath, every fact and circumstance within his knowledge, information,
and belief material to the plaintiff's case."
Adam, Eq. 1. But to a very great extent the
right to enforce discovery, and to search the
conscience of the party, which was formerly
only to be had In chancery, is afforded in the
practice and by the statutes of our law
courts as fully and effectually as by a court
of equity.
"Perhaps the most general, if not the most
precise, description of a court of equity, in
the English and American sense," says Judge
•
Story, "is that It has jurisdiction in cases
of rights recognized and protected by the
municipal jurisprudence, where a plain, adequate, and complete rem'edy cannot be had in
the courts of common law. The remedy
must be plain, for. If It be doubtful and obscure at law, equity will assert a jurisdiction. It must be adequate, for. If at law it
falls short of what the party Is entitled to,
that foimds a jurisdiction in equity; and It
must be complete, that Is, it must attara the
full end and justice of the case. • • »
The jurisdiction
of a court of equity Is,
therefore, sometimes
concurrent with ttie
jurisdiction of a cpurt of law. It is sometimes exclusive of it, and it Is sometimes
auxiliary to It" 1 Story, Bq. Jur. i 33.
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In the matter of actual fraud, Blackstone

said that "courts of equity are established to detect latent frauds and concealments which the process of the courts of lawis not adapted to reach." 3 Bl. Comm. 431.
And although It may still be that courts of
liberal equity powers may entertain concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of law,
even in those cases of fraud which are effectually remediable in the latter, such jurisdiction is . very seldom exercised anywhere,
as we believe, and never, to our knowledge,
in this state. Its ordinary application is
restricted to cases in which a decree is required compelling the wrongdoer, specifically,
to make good his default; "and therefore,"
says Mr. Adams, "if the wrong require specific redress, and such specific redress is not
attainable at law, there is a prerogative
jurisdiction in equity to relieve." Adams'
also,
Eq., Introduction *xxxv. Sometimes,
where the remedy at law would seem to be
equity will entertain jurisdiction
effectual,
for the sake of avoiding circuity of action
Smith, Man. Eq. §
or multiplicity of suits.
Indeed, as we regard it, the correct prin1.
ciple is laid down by Judge Story in his
Equity Pleadings (section 473), where he
says, "In general, courts of equity will not
assume jurisdiction where the powers of the
ordinary courts are sufficient for the purposes
of justice, and therefore it may be stated
as a general rule, subject to few exceptions,
that where the plaintiff can have as effectual
and complete a remedy in a court of law
as in a court of equity, and that remedy is
direct, certain, and adequate, a demurrer,
which is In truth a demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court, will hold; but where there
is a clear right, and yet there is no remedy
in a court of law, or the remedy is not plain,
adequate, and complete, and adapted to the
particular exigency, then, and in such cases,
com'ts of equity will maintain jurisdiction."
And see 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 610.
Although the plaintiffs have not told us,
in their complaint, wherein their remedy is
deficient at law, they have suggested it in
They say, "It is a recognized
argument
rule that equity will give relief against fyaud
upon less direct proof than would induce a
court of law to afford the same relief."
But
the only difference in the quality of proof
seems to be with regard to the matter of
presumptions; and although it Is said, in
support of the plaintiffs' general proposition,
that courts of equity will grant relief upon
the ground of fraud, established by such
presumptive evidence as courts of law would
not always deem sufficient proof to justify
a verdict (1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 190), it seems
quite manifest from the charge of the plaintiffs' bill that they cannot support or derive aid to their claim from any presumptions other than those which could as well
be deduced In a court of law as in equity,
from the circumstances which may be disclosed and developed before a jury.
has

Again, the plaintiffs say, "In equity the
plaintiffs are entitled to search the conscience of the defendant, and to have the
benefit of his answer under oath, or of his
refusal so to make it; and it is not quite
certain that the defendant could be compelled to state facts as a witness which,
while they would make out the plaintiffs'
case, woiUd expose him to another indictment." But our statute, permitting and compelling the testimony of parties in civil actions, seems to afford all the advantages
claim'ed for chancery jurisdiction in this respect; and an answer to a question, searching the defendant's conscience to its lowest
depths, could not, after his conviction for
the libel which he uttered and the plaintiffs published, be now avoided
on the
ground of its tendency to expose him to a
criminal prosecution, that prosecution and
its consequences having once been suffered
and expiated.
And, finally, they submit that "the remedy
may be neither plain nor adequate, which
depends upon the unwilling testimony of a
convicted llbeler." But a remedy will not
be regarded as inadequate simply because it
may be said that the evidence required to
enforce it is that of an tmwilling, or perhaps
an untruthful, witness; and, moreover, it
is not very apparent that equity is more effectual than the law to extract truth from
the lips of an unwilling "convicted liheler."
In the one tribunal, as in the other, the process is the same; in the one tribunal, as in
the other, both parties may testify, and both
be cross-examined.
In short, we are unable to discover any
sufficient grounds for entertaining equitable
jurisdiction of the plaintiffs' case. If the
plaintiffs are entitled to relief, their remedy
Is plain, and not doubtful or obscure. It is
by an action on the case for deceit. It is
adequate, and does not fall short of what the
party is entitled to, that Is, It entitles him to
a verdict for full and ample damages, and
with
a judgment and execution thereon,
costs, to be levied upon his goods or estate,
And
and, for want thereof, upon his body.
In this particular It is complete, attaining
the full end and justice of the case, which
requires no other decree than such a judgment and execution. In all these particulars, the definition of the terms "plain, adequate, and c;mplete," as furnished by the
books, is fully satisfied.
1 Story, Eq. Jur.
§

33.

It is unnecessary to entertain the question
whether the plaintiffs, upon the statements
contained in their bill, might have a remedy
at law. It would seem that everything alleged In the bill might, upon the indictment
against them, have been shown in evidence.
Whether, if proven by credible testimony. It
would constitute a legal defense, we need
not now inquire. It is said that, before a
person gives general notoriety to oral calumny by circulating it in print, he must be

FRAUD-JURISDICTION
to prove Its truth to the letter.
An editor gives publicity to a private slander
at his ovyn -risk, for he has no more right
to take away the character of a man, without being able to prove the charge that he
has made against him, than he has to take
his property, without being able to justify
the act by which he possessed himself of it.
Add. Torts, 775, 776. And even the truth
of the thing charged is in many jurisdictions
inadmissible as a justlflcation, and, If admitted at all, can only be received to rebut
or refute the proof or inference of malice.
prepared
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which is said to constitute the essence of
the offense.
Whart. Cr. Law, 850.
It would seem that if the plaintiffs might
have shown the facts which they now allege
in defense of the indictment upon which
they have been convicted, or if the proffered testimony was Inadmissible, because
affording no justification, the conviction must
be regarded as putting all the partis to this
bill in pari delicto, and that the plaintiffs
can therefore have no claim, either in law
or equity, for relief.
BUI dismissed.
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BUZARD

et al. v.

(7 Sup. Gt. 249,

HOUSTON.

119 U. S. 347.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

Dec. 13,

1886.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Unitfor the Western District of Texas.

ed States

This was a bill In equity, filed November
1881, by Buzard and Hillard, jcitizens of
Missouri, against Houston, a citizen of Texas,
the material allegations of -which were as
follows:
That the plaintiffs were partners in the
of pasturing and breeding cattle
business
upon a tract of land owned by them In the
state of Texas, and on October 14, 1881, negotiated a purchase from the defendants of
1,500 cows and 50 bulls, to be delivered at
Lampasas, in that state, in May, 1882, at
the price of $15.50 a head, one-half payable
and the
upon the signing of the contract,
other half upon dehvery of the cattle; that
the terms of their agreement were stated in
of that date, signed by the
a memorandum
parties, and intended as the basis of a more
formal contract to be afterwards executed;
and that the plaintiffs at once paid to the
That
defendant $500 in part performance.
on October 31, 1881, the parties resumed neand met to complete the congotiations,
tract; that the defendant then proposed that,
in lieu of the contract with him for the cattle mentioned in the memorandum, the plaintiffs should take from him an assignment of
a similar contract in writing, dated August
13, 1881, and set forth in the bill, by which
one Mosty agreed to deliver to the defendant
an equal number of similar cattle, at the
same time and place, at the price of $14 a
bead; that the defendant then stated that
he had paid the sum of $15,000 on the contract with Mosty; and asked that, In case of
his assigning that contract to the plaintiffs,
they should pay him that sum, and also the
difference of $1.30 a head In the prices mentioned in the two contracts, but finally proposed to deduct from this 25 cents a head;
that, as an inducement to the plaintiffs to
make the exchange of contracts, the defendant represented to them that Mosty was good
and solvent, and able to perform his contract; that he was better than the defendant, and then had on his ranch 1,200 head
of the cattle; and that there was no doubt
of the performance of this contract, because
one McAnulty was a partner with Mosty In
its performance; of all which the plaintiffs
knew nothing, except that they knew that
McAnulty was a man of wealth, and fully
able as well as willing to perform his contracts.
That on November 1, 1881, the plaintiffs,
believing and relying on the defendant's representations aforesaid, accepted his proposition, and paid the sum of $14,500, making,
with the sum of $500 already paid, the
amount of $15,000, which he alleged he had
23,
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paid to Mosty on his contract, and executed
and delivered to the defendant their obligation to pay him, on the performance
by
Mosty of that contract, an additional sum of
$1,837.50, being the profit on the contract
with Mosty in the sale to the plaintiffs, less
the deduction of 25 cents a head; and returned to him his original contract with
them, and in lieu thereof received from him
liis contract with Mosty, and his assignment
thereof to the plaintiffs indorsed thereon, and
set out in the bill, containing a provision that
he should not be responsible in case of any
failure of performance by Mosty; that the
aforesaid representations of the defendant
were absolutely untrue, deceitful, and fraudulent, and were known by the defendant to
be false, and the plaintiffs did not know and
had no means of knowing that they were
untrue; that those representations
were intended by the defendant to deceive the plaintiffs, and did deceive them, to their great
injury, to-wit, to the extent of the amount of
$15,000 paid by them to him, and to the further extent of $10,000 for the expenses necessary to obtain other cattle, and for the loss
of the Increase of such cattle for the next
year by reason of the impossibility of obtaining them In the exhausted condition of
the market; and that Mosty, at the time of
the assignment, was absolutely insolvent, and
had no property subject to be taken by his
creditors, and his contract was utterly worthless, as the defendant then knew.
The bill then stated that the plaintiffs
brought into court the contract between the
defendant and Mosty, that it might be delivered up to the defendant; and also the assignment thereof by the defendant to the
plaintiffs, that It might be canceled.- The
bill prayed for a discovery; for a rescission
and cancellation of the assignment of the
contract -with Mosty, and also of the plaintiffs' obligation to pay to the defendant the
sum of $1,837.50; for the repayment to the
plaintiffs of the excess of money received by
the defendant from them beyond the amount
which they were to pay him under the original contract; for a reinstatement and confirmation of that contract, and its enforcement upon such terms as the court might
deem just and proper; or. If that could not
be done, that the defendant be compelled to
restore to the plaintiffs the sums of $500 and
$14,500 received from them, and also to pay
them the sum of $10,000 for damages which
they had sustained by reason of the defendant's fraudulently obtaining the surrender of
the original contract, and by reason of the
other Injuries resulting to them therefrom;
and for further relief.
The defendant demurred to the bill, assigning as a cause of demurrer that the hill
showed that the plaintiffs' only cause of action. If any, was for the sums of money paid
by them on the contract, and for damages
for breach of the contract, for which they
had an adequate and complete remedy at
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The circuit court overruled the demurlaw.
rer. Tlie defendant then answered fully under oath, denying that he made any of the
alleged, and repeating the derepresentations
fense taken by demiu-rer; the plaintiffs filed a

general replication; conflicting testimony was
taken; at a hearing upon pleadings and proofs
and the
the bill was dismissed, with costs;
plaintiffs appealed to this court.
j

H. E. Barnard, for appellants Buzard and!
Jas. P. Miller, for appellee Hous-\

another.
ton.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case
delivered the opinion of
as above reported,
the court.
In the judiciary act of 1789, by which the
first congress established the judicial courts
of the United States, and defined their jurisdiction, it Is enacted that "suits in equity
shall not be sustained in either of the courts
of the United States, in any case where plain,
adequate, and complete remedy may be had.
Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20,
at law."
Five days
§ 16 (1 Stat. 82; Rev. St. § 723.)
later, on September 29, 1789, the same congress proposed to the legislatures of the several states the article afterwards ratified as
the seventh amendment of the constitution,
which declares that "in suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed

twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
1 Stat. 21, 98.
be preserved."
The effect of the provision of the judiciary
act, as often stated by this court, is that
to
"whenever
a court of law Is competent
take cognizance of a right, and has power to
proceed to a judgment which affords a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy, without the
aid of a court of equity, the plaintiff must
proceed at law, because the defendant has a
constitutional right to a trial by jury." Hipp
Insurance Co.
V. Babin, 19 How. 271, 278;
T. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 621; Grand Chute v.
Winegar, 15 Wall. 373, 375; Lewis v. Cocks,
23 Wall. 466, 470; Root v. Railway Co., 105
U. S. 189, 212; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110
U. S. 568, 573, 4 Sup. Ct 232. In a very recent case the court said:
"This enactment
certainly means something;
and, If only de-

claratory of what was always the law. It
must, at least, have been intended to emphasize the rule, and to Impress it upon the attention of the courts." New York Guaranty
Co. V. Memphis Water Co., 107 U. S. 205, 214,
2 Sup.

Ct. 279.

Accordingly a suit In equity to enforce a
legal right can be brought only when the
court can give more complete and effectual
relief. In kind or in degree, on the equity side,
than on the common-law side;
as for instance, by compelling a specific performance,
or the removal of a cloud on the title to real
estate; or preventing an Injury for which
damages are not recoverable at law, as in
Watson V. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; or where
an agreement procured by fraud is of a con-
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tinuing nature, and its rescission will prevent
of suits, as in Boyce v. Grundy,
3 Pet. 210, 215, and In Jones v. Bolles, 9
Wall. 364, 369. In cases of fraud or mistake,
as under any other head of chancery jurisdiction, a court of the United States will not
sustain a bill in equity to obtain only a decree for the payment of money by way of
damages, when the like amount can be recovered at law in an action sounding in tort
or for money had and received.
Parkersburg
V. Brown, 106 U. S. 487, 500, 1 Sup. a. 442;
Ambler v. Choteail, 107 U. S. 586, 1 Sup. Ot
556; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 5 Sup.
a multiplicity

Ct

820.

In England,

Indeed, the court of chancery.
In cases of fraud, has sometimes maintained
bills in equity to recover the same damages
which might be recovered In an action for
money had and received.
But the reason for
this, as clearly brought out by Lords Justices
Knight Bruce and Turner, in Slim v. Orouclier, 1 De Gex, P. & J. 518, 527, 528, was that
such cases were within the ancient and original jurisdiction In chancery before any court
of law had acquired jurisdiction of them, and
that the assumption of jurisdiction by the
courts of law, by gradually extending their
powers, did not displace the earlier jurisdiction of the court of chancery.
Upon any
other ground, such bills could not be maintained. Clifford V. Brooke, 13 Ves. 131;
Thompson v. Barclay, 9 Law J. Ch. 215, 218.
And we have not been referred to any Instance In which an English court of equity'
has maintained a bill In such a case as that
now before us. In Newham v. May, 13 Price,
749, Chief Baron Alexander said: "It is not
in every case of fraud that relief is to be
administered by a court of equity. In the
case, for instance, of a fraudulent warranty
on the sale of a horse, or any fraud upon the
sale of a chattel, no one, I apprehend,
ever
thought of filing a bill In equity."
r The present bill states a case for which an
action of deceit could be maintained at law,
and would afford full, adequate,
and complete remedy.
The original agreement for
the sale of a number of cattle, and not of any
cattle in particular, does not belong to the
class of contracts of which equity would decree specific performance.
If the plaintiffs
should be ordered to be reinstated In all their
rights under that agreement,
and permitted now to tender performance thereof on
their part, the only relief which they could
have in this suit would be a decree for damages, to be assessed by the same rules as in
an action at law. The similar contract with
Mcsty, and the assignment thereof to the
plaintiffs, are in the plaintiffs' own possession, and no judicial rescission of the assignment is needed.
If the exchange of the contr.act was procured by the fraud alleged, it
would be no more binding upon the plaintiffs
at law than in equity; and In an action of
deceit the plaintiffs might treat the assignment of the contract with Mosty as void.
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and, upon delivering up that contract to the
defendant, recover full damages for the nonNo
performance of the original agreement.
relief is sought against Mosty, and he is not
made a party to the bill. The obligation executed by the plaintiffs to the defendant is
not negotiable, so that there is no need of an
injunction. A Judgment for pecuniary damages would adjust and determine all the rights
of the parties, and is the only redress to
vrhich the plaintiffs, if they prove their alleThere is therefore no
gations, are entitled.
ground upon which the bill can be maintained.
Insurance Co. v. Baiiey, 13 Wall. 616^
and other cases above cited.
The comparative weight due to conflicting
testimony such as was introduced in this
case can be much better determined by seeing and hearing the witnesses than upon
written depositions or a printed record.
This case does not require us to enter upon
a consideration of the question under what
circumstances a bill showing no ground for
relief, and praying for discovery
equitable
as incidental only to the relief sought, is open
to a demurrer to the whole bill, or may, if
discof ery is obtained, be retained for the purposes of granting full relief, within the rule
often stated in the books, but as to the proper
limits of which the authorities are conflicting. It is enough to say that the case clearly
falls within the statement of Chief Justice
Marshall: "But this rule cannot be abused
by being employed as a mere .pretext for
bringing causes, proper for a court of law, into a court of equity.
If the answer of the
defendant discloses nothing, and the plaintiff supports his claim by evidence in his own
possession,
imaided by the confessions
of
the defendant, the established rules, limiting
the jurisdiction
of courts, require that he
should be dismissed from the court of chancery, and permitted to assert his rights in a

court of law."

Russell

v.

Clark,

7

Cranch,

also, Horsburg v. Baker, 1 Pet.
232, 236; Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503.
The decree of the circuit coiu-t, dismissing
the bill generally, might be considered a bar
to an action at law, and it Is therefore, in
69, 89.

See,

with the precedents in Rogers v.
U. S. 644, 1 Sup. Ot 623, and the
cases there cited, ordered that the decree be
reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree dismissing the bill
for want of jurisdiction, and without prejudice to an action at law.
accordance

Durant,

106

BRADIiEY,

J.

(dissenting.)

I

dissent from

judgment in this case so far as it directs
by the court below
le bill to be dismissed
fir want of equitable jurisdiction. The compjainant had been induced to give up a con,ct for cattle made to him by the defendnt, and to accept in lieu of it an assignment
from the defendant of a contract which he
had from a third person who was insolvent,
and whose insolvency was not known by the
complainant, but was known by the defendant, though he asserted that the third person
was entirely responsible.
The bill seeks to
abrogate and set aside the assignment, and
to restore to complainant his original contract, on account of the fraud and misrepresentation practiced upon him.
Having
been induced to pay $15,000 in the transaction, and suffered a large amount of damages, he adds to the relief sought a prayer
le

to have

his

damages

assessed

and

decreed.

This is the case made by the bill. I think it
is clearly within the scope of equity jurisdiction, both on account of the fraud, and from
the nature of the relief asked by the complainant; namely, the cancellation of an
agreement, and the reinstatement of a contract which he had been fraudulently induced to cancel.
If the bill had prayed nothing
else, it seems to me clear that it would have
presented a case for equity.
A court of law
could not give adequate relief. The existence of the assignment,
and the cancellation of the first agreement, would embarrass
the plaintiff in an action at law. It is different from the case of a lost note or bond.
Fraud is charged, and documents exist which
in equity ought not to exist. I think the
crmplainant Is entitled to have the fraudulent transaciion wiped out, and to be restored
to his original status.

FRAUD-JURISDICTION
et al.

Mich. 367.)
Supreme Court of Michigan.
Jan. Term,
(31

1875.

Appeal from circuit court, Berrien county;
In chancery.

Edward
S. Clapp

Bacon, for complainant.
George
Darwin Hughes, for defend-

and D.

ants.

J.

GRAVES, O.
The real grievance alleged
by complainant is, that defendants combined to defraud him, and the substance of the
transaction,
and its incidents, which he relates at much length, may be stated from the
bill as follows:
The defendant Stewart resided In St. Jo-

seph, Berrien county, and owned a stock of
goods, including a quantity of boots and
shoes. This property was at Bangor, Van
Buren county, and was yalued by Stewart at
some fourteen thousand dollars, and he wished to sell it.
One Sherwin, residing in Illinois, owned a tract of about two hundred
acres of land in Berrien county, which he desired to dispose of.
Complainant was an
acquaintance of Sherwin, and after some negotiations, it was agreed between the different parties, that Stewart should transfer to
complainant
the boots and shoes and onehalf of the remainder of the stock, and that
complainant, in consideration thereof, should
procure Sherwin, upon certain terms agreed
on between
Sherwin and complainant, to
convey the land to Stewart, but subject to
an existing mortgage on it of one thousand

dollars; that Carroll should buy the remaining half of the stock of Stewart at two thousand five hundred dollars; that complainant
in a few days received from Sherwin the
deed going to Stewart, and called on the latter to deliver it, and get possession of the
boots and shoes and his share of the other
goods; whereupon Stewart stated that complainant would have no trouble about the
goods, as Carroll was at Bangor, in charge
of them and making an inventory; that complainant expressed himself as unwilling to
deliver the deed unless Stewart would give
him some writing which would assure to him
his portion, as he had nothing to do with
Carroll; that Stewart then stated his readiness to give such a paper, and one Devoe, a
brother-in-law of complainant, being present,
it was arranged that the writing should run
to Devoe instead of complainant; although,
as was understood,
complainant was solely
interested;
that Stewart then made a bill of
sale to Devoe of the boots and shoes, und
half of the rest of the stock, and added an
order to Carroll to make delivery; that complaumnt then gave up the deed to Stewart,
who subsequently put it on record, and Devoe received the bill of sale and order, and
proceeded to Bangor for the property; that
complainant and Devoe then called on Carroll
for
when Tie refused to deliver any of it,
or to allow any of
to be taken, and claimed

it

it,

the whole in virtue of
purchase by himself
of Stewart; that complainant succeeded in
getting a part of the boots and shoes, but
was precluded by Carroll from getting anything more; that complainant discovered, after this claim by Carroll, that subsequent to
the conclusion of the termg of the bargain
as before mentioned, but before the delivery
of Sherwin's deed to Stewart, and the making of the bUl of sale and order by Stewart
to Devoe, Carroll and Stewart had fraudulently, and without complainant's knowledge,
and with intent to cheat him, made an arrangement by which Stewart had given a bill
of sale of the whole property to Carroll, ard
had taken back a mortgage on
for two
thousand" five hundred dollars; that complainant had neither knowledge nor notice of
this transaction when the deed was delivered
to Stewart, and the bill of sale and order received from him, and first became aware of
it when CarroU refused to allow anything to
be taken; that Stewart and Carroll refused
to recognize any right of complainant in or'
to the property, and refused to allow him to
have any of it; that Stewart and Carroll, or
one of them, have converted a portion of
it and appropriated the proceeds, and mixed
with the rest of the old stock other goods
since procured; that Devoe has assigned to
complainant, but that Stewart and Carroll
wholly deny his right.
The bill waived answer on oath, and asked
no preliminary or final relief by injunction.
Neither did it seek to get rid of the deed
made to Stewart, or to obtain the land conveyed by Stewart to complainant.
The defendants answered separately, and
denied the fraud charged, and most of the material matter tending to show the grievance
alleged in the bill. Their account of the
transaction was in substance, that complainant was not known to Stewart in the transparty in any way to
action as vendee, or as
the trade concerning the goods, and that Carroll was sole vendee.
They further explicitly claimed that the
bill did not make a case of equitable cognizance, and insisted that his remedy, if any,
was at law.
Proofs having been taken, the court on final
hearing decreed that the defendants, within
forty days after the 11th of August, 1874,
should pay to complainant, or his solicitor,
two thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars,
with interest from that date at seven per
cent., together with complainant's costs, and
that he should have execution therefor. The
defendant Stewart thereupon appealed, whilst
the defendant Carroll acquiesced in the de-

it

STEWART

a

V.
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cree.

It appears to me quite Impossible, in the
face of the objection taken and insisted on,
to sustain this decree without sanctioning
the right to come into equity in all cases to
recover damages where the grievance asserted is a fraud committed by one upon another in a dealing in personal property.
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If

the right contended for and carried out
by the decree can be maintained, no reason
Is perceived why, upon the same principle, a
party claiming to have been cheated in a
horse trade, or in a purchase of any chattels

where the amount is sufficient, may not at
his election proceed to sue in chancery for
damages, and preclude an investigation before a jury.
The principles and course of practice of the
court are, however, not in harmony with any
such procedure.
It is admitted that the books commonly say
that equity has jurisdiction in all cases of
fraud, but every one knows that the proposition is not to be accepted literally.
It must
always be understood in connection with the
general and specific remedial powers of the
These, confine it absolutely to civil
court.
suits. They also confine it, when the point
is seasonably and properly made and insisted
on, to transactions where, in consequence of
the Indicated state of facts, there appears to
be ground for employing some mode of action, or some kind of aid or relief not practicable In a court of law, but allowable In
equity.
In the present case no injunction was called for, and there was no ground for discovery, and no discovery was sought, as the bill
f waived an answer on oath.
No claim was set up to have the deed from
Sherwin to Stewart set aside, or to have the
land conveyed to complainant, and no case la
made to warrant such a claim, since the bill
contains nothing to show that third persons
may not have acquired interests on the faith
of Stewart's title.
Indeed, no circumstances are set forth to
call specially for equitable intervention or for
any assistance or mode of redress peculiar to
chancery procedure.
/" The facts as given, and the case as shaped,
just the action and relief peculiar to
f point to
They look to a single judga court of law.
ment for damages, and nothing else.
The case, then, was really of legal, and not
v^ln strict propriety of equitable cognizance.
The objection was timely made and urged.

and complainant was bound to regard It; and
unless it is to be maintained that in all cases
standing on the same principle, a complaining party is to be allowed by his election to
try in chancery, and prevent an investigation
by juiy, the point made by appellant must
be sustained, and In my judgment it should
Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 72-74; 1 Spence, Bq.
be.
Jur. 691-700; Adams, Eq. Introduction, pp.
57, 58; Shepard v. Sanford, 3 Barb. Oh. 127;
Bradley v. Bosley, 1 Barb. Oh. 125; Monk v.
Harper, 3 Edw. Oh. 109; Pierpont v. Fowls,
2 Woodb. & M. 23, Fed. Gas. No. 11,152; Vose
T. Philbrook, 3 Story, 335, Fed. Cas. No. 17,010; Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616;
Hipp V. Babin, 19 How. 271; Parker v. Manufacturing Co., 2 Black, 545; Jones v. Newhall. 115 Mass. 244; Suter v. Matthews, Id.
253; Foley v. Hill, 2 H. li. Oas. 28; Crampton V. Varna K. Co., 7 Oh. App. 562, 3 Eng.
R. 509; Hoare v. Bremridge, L. H. 14 Bq.
522, 3 Eng. B. 824, cited by Lord Hatherly
with approbation in Ochsenbein v. Papelier,
8 Oh. App. 695, 6 Eng. B. 576; Kemp v.
Tucker, 8 Oh. App. 369, 5 Eng. R. 596; Warne
V. Banking Co., 5 N. J. Eq. 410; Haythom v.
Margerem, 7 N. J. Eq. 324.
There would be more reason than there is
for wishing to escape from the objection noticed, if complainant's version of the afCair
was placed by the proofs beyond fair controversy; but it is not. The evidence is extremely conflicting in regard to the true nature of the transaction, and there is room for
arguing in favor of the theory advanced on
each side.
The case is, then, specifically
suited for investigation by jury, where the
witnesses can be seen and their trustworthiness be better understood.
think that, so far as the defendant Stewart is concerned, who alone has appealed,
the decree should be reversed, and the bill
dismissed, with his costs of both courts, but
that the dismissal should be without prejudice to any proceedings at law against him
the complainant may think proper to take.

I

OAMPBBtili and COOLEX, JJ., concurred.
CHRISTIANOY, J., did not sit in this case.

ACTUAL FRAUD.
HICKS

ai

V.

STEVEN'S.

N. E. 241, 121

Supreme Court of Illinois.

The evidence

111. 186.)

March

22,

1887.

Error to appellate court, First district
Stevens, the plaintiff, was introduced to
. Hicks, the defendant,
by Jones, who had the
option for purchasing the rights in tube-closer,
an invention of Hicks, for the state of New
York. Stevens talked with Hicks about investing In it. Hicks asked $50,000 for each
of several states, including Pennsylvania and
Ohio, and that the rights for each of these
states were worth that sum, as were also the
rights for the state of New York. After several interviews, Stevens told Jones he should
have to give it up, as Hicks' prices were
Jones then asked him to take half
too high.
of New York with him, and that they go
in as partners on an option he had to purchase that state for $20,000. Negotiations
were had, and a number of interviews took
place, at which representations were made by
Hicks as to the capabilities and merits of his
invention, and Hicks gave Stevens a circular
containing a description of such capabilities.
May 30, 1883, an agreement of purchase was
executed by the parties, wherein Hicks sold
to Jones and Stevens the territorial rights for
the state of New York to make and sell the
executed
his
Stevens
Hicks Tube-eloser.
three notes for $2,500 each, and delivered
them to Hicks, and shortly thereafter paid
him $2,500 In cash.
Jones did the same.
Stevens paid Jones $250, half of the amount
This sum
he paid Hicks for the option.
Hicks gave Stevens credit for on one of his
Being unable to sell the tube-closer,
notes.
and Jones gave
October 16, 1883, Stevens
Hicks a reassignment of their rights, and demanded their money and notes, which Hicks
refused
to give up. October 23d, Stevens
notified Hicks in writing that he rescinded
the contract, and demanded a return of the
consideration.
November 5th he filed his bill
and recover the
to rescind the contract,
money and- notes.
The judge found that the
patent was worthless; that Hicks' representations were material and false; and decreed
that the contract be rescinded, and that the
$2,500 paid and the notes be returned,
but
did not decree the repayment of the $250 paid
by Stevens to Jones, and indorsed by Hicks
on one of Stevens' notes.
On appeal the appellate court affirmed the
decree, except that it added the $250 paid by
Stevens to Jones to the money decree.
H. W. Wolseley, for plaintiff in error.
UtlEdward A. Dicker, for de-

man Strong and
fendant in error.

SHOPS, J. There is no disputing as to the
making of the contract of Sale in this ease,
or as to its terms; the principal controversy
being whether Hicks, before the sale, made
material representations as to the utility and
value of the invention sold, which were relied on by Stevens, and which were false.
H.&B.Eq.(2c1E(1.)-18

273

satisfies us that, prior to the
consummation
of the sale, the parties had frequent interviews, in which Hicks represented
to Stevens and Jones that the Hicks Tubecloser was a new and valuable Invention, and
would save both steam and fuel; that It was
a good and profl'bable thing to sell, and would
bring great profits.
Hicks also gave Stevens
a printed circular setting
forth therein Its
capabilities and merits, which, among other
things, stated that "the use of the tube-closer
demonstrates
to a positive certainty its ability to show by the steam-guage, in the morning, before firing up, the same steam pressure
that Is felt at night after the day's work. It
will even hold steam in the boiler from Saturday night until Monday morning. It is
guarantied to save fully 15 per cent, of fuel,
or whatever fuel is usually required to raise
steam in the morning. The Hicks tube-closer
will do it. It will save its cost every month."
Hicks also assured Stevens, in some of the
interviews, that the right to make and sell
the tube-closer In either of the states of Ohio
or Pennsylvania was worth $50,000; that the
right to the state of New York was worth the
same sum; and that ^the appliances could be
manufactured for five dollars apiece, and
would sell for $30 each, and that there was
not less than 2,000 boilers in each of the
states named.
Most of these representations,
especially those in the circulars, are not deHicks, by his answer and testimony,
nied.
claims that all the representations he in fact
made were true, but, whether true or false,
they were not relied on by Stevens In making
the purchase.
It is claimed there was an error in admitting in evidence the verbal statements made
by Hicks, in regard to the tube-closer, prior
to the written agreement for Its sale.
Such
'
statements were not admitted for the purpose
of changing the terms of the written contract,

but to show that Its execution was procured
through fraudulent misrepresentations
on the
part of the vendor, and for that purpose It
was certainly proper.
But It is said there
is no charge of fraud in the bill, and hence
there was no foundation in the pleadings to
justify the admission of the evidence. This
is a misapprehension.
Good pleading requires
fraud t!0 be charged specifically, and not in
general terms.
The facts relied on as constituting fraud should be set forth so as to
apprise the opposite party what he is called
on to meet.
Elston v. Blanchard, 2 Scam.
420; Davis v. Pickett, 72 pi. 483. The bill
sets forth the specific representations
made by
Hfeks which Induced the complainant to make
the purchase, and then charges "that the representations In the circular given b^ Hlcks to
the complainant and Jones, and the representation that by Hicks' experience, by the use
of said Invention, great saving of steam and
fuel could tie made, and other representations of like effect, whereby complainant and
Jones were Induced to purchase said rights,
are and were utterly false, and said inven-
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tlon Is worthless, and by Its use no saving of
any practical value can be made," and were
known by Hicks to be worthless and of no
value.
The facts alleged in the bill. If true,
constitute a fraud. If it were otherwise,
Hicks should have interposed a demurrer or
motion to dismiss for want of equity.
It is urged that Stevens did not rely on any
made by Hacks, but
of the representations
acted upon his own judgment; and that, if he
did rely upon them, he was guilty of such
negligence, in falling to properly investigate,
relief.
as to deprive him of any equitable
To entitle a party to relief, either legal or
equitable, on the ground of a fraudulent misrepresentation,
he must have relied upon the
representation
as true; for unless the representations are believed to be true, and acted
It is
upon, it can cause no legal Injury.
necessary that he Should trust the representation, but it is not essential that the false
representations
should be the sole inducement
2 Pom. Eq.
to his entering into the contract.
Jur. § 890; 2 Pars. Cont. (5th Ed.) 773. The
party acting upon a representation must, under the circumstances
of the ease, have been
justified in relying upon it, in order to entitle him to relief. As stated in Pom. Eq.
Jut. § 891: "It may be laid down as a general proposition that where the statements
are of the first kind, [relating to substantial
matters of fact, and not mere opinion,] and
especially when they are concerning matters
which, from their nature or situation, may be
or unassumed to be within the knowledge
der the power of the party making the representation, the party to whom it is made has
a right to rely on them; and, in the absence of
any knowledge of his own, or of any facts
which should arouse suspicion and east doubt
upon the truth of the statements, he is not
bound to make inquiries and examination for
himself. It does not, nnder such circumstances, lie In the mouth of the person asserting the fact to object or complain because the other took him at his word. If he
claims that the other party was not misled,
he is bound to show clearly that such party
did know the real facts; the burden is on
him of removing the presumption that such
party relied and acted upon his statements."
And In, section 8^ the same author says:
"When a representation
Is made of facts
which are, or may be assumed to be, within
the knowledge of the party making it, the
knowledge
of the receiving party concerning
the real facts, which shall prevent his relying
on and being misled by it, must be clearly
and conclusively established by the evidence."
When a party, ignorant of the real facts,
and having no ready means of information,
makes a purchase, or enters into a transaction as to the subject-matter of which representations
have been made which are material, the law will presume, as a matter of
fact, that he relied on them.
Redgrave v.
Hurd, 20 Ch. Div. 1; Nlcols' Case, 3 De
Gex & J. 387; Fishback t. Miller, 15 Nev.

Benj. Sales (4th Am. Ed.) 465, note
false representations
are made as to
matters of fact, and the means of knowledge
are at hand, and equally available to both
parties, and the purchaser, instead of resorting to them, trusts the vendor, the law, as
a general rule, will not relieve him from his
own want of ordinary prudence.
Cooley,
Torts, 487.
This Is the case where the property is tangible and Is at hand, and subject
to Inspection,
but a different rule obtains
when the property is at a remote distance,
or where the property right is intangible, and
the falsity of the representations
cannot be
In Smith v. Richdetected by inspection.
ards, 13 Pet. 26, it is held that when a sale
is made of property, but at a remote distance, which the purchaser knows that the
seller has never seen, but which he buys
upon the representation of the seller, relying
on Its truth, such representation
in effect
must be deemed to amount to a warranty, or
at least that the seller is bound to make it
good.
Cooley, Torts, 488; Maggart v. Freeman, 27 Ind. 531; Lester v. Hahan, 25 Ala.
428;
b.

445.

If

In the case at bar the pmrchaser was
wholly unacquainted with the use, operation, and management of steam-boilers, and
of the utility and value of the Invention, and
it is doubtful whether its capabilities, usefulness, and practical value could then have
been determined,
even by experts, without
very considerable use and long experiment
At the date of this contract, the patent,
though allowed, bad not been issued, and
but few of the tube-closers had been used or
tested by others than the inventor.
Stevens
testifies that he had not seen the tube-closer
In use or operation before he signed the contract; that he inquired of several to whom he
was referred by Hicks, but could learn nothing as to their merits, except from one party,
who said they had tried it, but had thrown
it away. When Hicks was informed of this,
he said he had met a similar case, and had
fixed It up so that it worked all right, and
that be would do the same with this one.
Hicks was the inventor,, and claimed to have
made thorough tests of his Invention, and
presumably had a greater knowledge of its
use, capabilities, utility, and value than any
other person.
From these facts, and his
profession of friendship to Jones, and of his
desire to put him Into a good paying busifaess, we think Stevens
and Jones not only
plied upon the representations, but had a
right to rely on them in making their purchase.
Allin v. Millison, 72 lU. 201.
It Is true that Hicks told Stevens and
^
Jones not to take his word, but to satisfy
themselves
as to the merit of his invention
before buying, but this cannot relieve him
made
from liability for his misrepresentation
for the purpose of Inducing the purchase.
He must have known that but little, if any,
information could be obtained by inquiry,
from the fact the tube-closer had not been

Actual fraud.
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proof showed that practically
was of no
value In the respect mentioned in the circular. These circulars were printed and distributed for the purpose of inducing others
to purchase rights of him, and the statemore
ments therein may be regarded as of
condeliberate character than if made in
They were properly admitted.
versation.
881, and also Cooley,
See
Pom. Bq. Jur.
Torts, 477.
As general rule, representations as to the
value of property sold, though exaggerated,
do not constitute fraud, but
has some exceptions.
As said in Cooley, Torts (page.
"There are some cases, however, in
484:)
which even
false assertion of an opinion
fraud; the reason beilig
will amount to
that under the circumstances the other party
right to rely upon
has
without bringing^
his own judgment to bear.
Such is the case
when one is purchasing goods, the value of
which can only be known to experts, and is
relying upon the vendor, who is
dealer in
such goods, to give him accurate information
coueerning
them.
The same rule has been
applied when
dealer in patent-rights sold
certain territory to one who was ignorant
of its value, representing it to be very valuable, when he knew it was not."
See Allen
V. Hart, 72 111. 104.
The value of a patentright for the purpose of sales depends largely upon the usefulness of the invention, and
the demand for the article patented.
Objection is made to the admissibility of
some other evidence.
In chancery
will be
presumed that the court considered and acted only upon such as may be proper.
As the
other evidence in the case is sufficient to sustain the decree of the superior court. It will
not be necessary to consider the objection.
It is also claimed that the appellate com-t
erred in directing that the $250 paid by
Stevens be added to the money decree.
Before Stevens was introduced to Hicks, the
latter made sale to Jones of an option to purchase the right to the state of New York at
$20,000, and Jones had paid him $500 therefor. Jones was not bound to take the right
for the state of New York, but, if he did
not, he could not recover back the money
he had paid for the option.
Stevens bought
half interest in the option, for
of Jones
which he paid Jones $250. To this transparty. If Jones and
action Hicks was not
Stevens together failed to purchase the state
right, Stevens could not have called on Hicks
to refund to him the money he had paid to
Jones; and, when the contract for the purchase of the right for the state of New York
was rescinded,
was the same, in substance,
as if
had never been made. Hicks was
again placed where he was before his sale,
and Jones and Stevens having failed to exercise their option, could not compel Hicks to
return the price paid for it. The bill did not
seek to set aside and rescind Jones' contract for the purchase of the option; nor
did Hicks refuse to let either Jones, or Jones

it

brought Into general use. The inquiries made
proved fruitless, as he must have known they
would. In 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 896, it is said:
/"It, therefore, the party accompanies or follows his misrepresentations by words of gen/
eral caution, or by advice to the other that
he consult his friends or professional adj
1
visers before concluding the agreement,
he
1
does not thereby counteract any effect ujwn
\ the transaction which his untrue statement
V would otherwise produce;" citing Reynel v.
Sprye, 1 De Gex, M & G. 709; Smith v.
Richards, 13 Pet. 26. In Eaton v. Winnie,
20 Mich. 156, the court say:
"When one assumes to have knowledge upon a subject of
which another may well be ignorant, and
knowingly makes false statements regarding
it, upon which the other relies, to his injury,
we do not think it lies with him to say that
the party who took his word, and relied upon
it, was guilty of negligence in so doing, so as
to be precluded from recovering compensation
for the injury which was inflicted upon him
under cover of the falsehood;" citing Railroad Co. V. Ogier, 35 Pa. 72; Gordon v.
Railroad Co., 40 Barb. 550; Ernst v. RailSee, also, Walsh v.
road Co., 35 N. Y. 28.
Hall, 66 N. C. 233; Oswald v. McGehee, 28
Miss. 340; McClellan v. Scott, 24 Wis. 81;
Starkweather v. Benjamin, 32 Mich. 305;
Kendall v. Wilson, 41 Vt. 567; Pierce v. Wilson, 34 Ala. 603.
To maintain an action at law "for fraud
and deceit arising from false representations
of a material matter connected with a transaction, it is necessary to show that the party
making it knew it to be false, or occupied
ly such a position as that the law would imi pute to him a knowledge of the fact
A person cannot,
is believed, be free from fraud
in court of equity when he makes a positive
of
material fact which he
representation
does not know to be true, or has good reason
to believe is true, and which in point of fact
Is false. In Allen v. Hart, 72 111. 104, it is
held that
Is not indispensable to a right to
rescind
contract that the party making the
representation linew it to be false, provided
is material, and the other party had right
to rely upon it, and did so, and was deceived;
and this is believed to be sustained by the
weight of authority. In this ease, Hicks'
facilities were superior to those of any one
else for knowing whether the representations
made by him were true. If he did not in fact
know them to be true, he should not have so
asserted to Stevens, whom he knew had no
means at hand by which to detect their
falsity.
There was no error in admitting in evidence the printed circular of Hicks, showing
The
the valuable qualities of his Invention.
proof shows that he gave Stevens one of
them during their negotiations, containing
mateiial and important representations of
what his inventinn would accomplish as
meaiis of saving steam and fuel; that
month; while the
would save Its cost in
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and Stevens, purchase tbe right for the state
of New York, Imt on the contrary, -was anxioiis to haye them take It This ruling of
the appellate court is, we think, clearly erroneous.

The judgment of the appellate court will
be reversed as to so much of its Judgment as
adds to the decree the said sum of $250, and
the decree of the superior court Is affirmed.
Reversed in part, and affirmed in part

AOTITAIi FRAUD.
STIMSON

▼.

HELPS

et al.

0.0 Tar. Rep. 290, 9 Colo. 33.)
Suprpme Court of Colorado.

Feb.

26, 1886.

Appeal from county court, Boulder county.
The complaint sets out that on the sixth
day of October, 1881, William Stlmson leased
to the defendants in error the S. W. % of section 21, in township 1, range 70 west, in said
county, for the period of four years and six
months, for the purpose of mining for coal,
under the conditions of said lease; that they
had no knowledge of the location of the
boundary lines of said tract at the time of
the leasing, and that they so informed Stimson, the defendant in the case; that they requested Stimson to go with them and show
them the boundary lines; that the defendant,
pretending to know the lines bounding said
land, and their exact locality, went then and
there with plaintiffs, and showed and pointed
out to them what he said was the leased
land, and the boundary lines thereof, especially the north and south lines thereof;
that plaintiffs not then knowing the lines
bounding said land, nor the exact location
thereof, and relying upon what the defendant
then and there pointed out to them as the
leased land, and the lines thereof, then and
there proceeded to work on the land pointed
out, and sank shafts for mining coal thereon,
and made sundry improvements thereon, —
made buildings, laid tracks, etc.; that all the
said work was done and. labor performed
and improvements made on the land pointed
out by defendant to plaintiffs as the leased
land, and that plaintiffs, relying upon the
statements of defendant as aforesaid, and
not knowing otherwise, believed they were
performing the work, and making all the improvements on the land they had so leased,
which they did by direction of the defendant; that while they were working on the
said land Stimson was frequently present,
and told the plaintiffs they were on his land,
and received royalty from ore taken therefrom; that aljout April 10, 1882, they were
notified to quit mining on said ground by
the Marshall Coal Mining Company; that the
land belonged to said company; that none of
the said improvements were put on said
leased land; and that they were compelled
to quit work and mining thereon; that the
improvements
made by them were worth $2,000;
that Stimson falsely represented to
them other and different lines than the true
boundaries of said premises, and showed and
pointed out to them other and different lands
than the lands leased them, and thereby deceived them, and damage(l them, in the sum
of $2,000.
Issue joined, and trial to the court.
Motion by defendant's counsel for judgment
on the pleadings, and evidence
overruled.
Judgment for the plaintiffs in the sum of
$2,000, and costs.
Wright & Griffln, for appellant

ley, for appellees.

G. Berk-

«77

ELBERT, J. The law holds a contracting
party liable as for fraud on his express representations concerning facts material to the
treaty, the truth of which he assumes to
know, and the truth of which Is not known
to the other contracting party, where the
representations were false, and the other
party, relying upon them, has been misled
to his Injury. Upon such representations so
made the contracting party to whom they
are made has a right to rely, nor is there any
duty of Investigation cast upon him.
In
such a case the law holds a party boimd to
know the truth of his representations. Bigelow, Fi-aud, 57, 60, 63, 67, 68, 87; Kerr,
Fraud & M. 54 et seq.; 3 Wait, Act. & Def.
436.
This is the law of this case, and, on the
evidence,
warranted the judgment of the
court below.
The objection was made below, and is renewed here, that the complaint does not state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Two points are made: (1) That the
complaint does not allege that the defendant
knew the representations to be false; (2)
that it does not allege intent to defraud.
It is not necessary, in order to constitute
.a fraud, that the party who makes a false
should know it to be false.
^^presentation
He who maJces a representation as of his
own knowledge, not knowing whether it be
true or false, and it is in fact untrue, is
guilty of fraud as much as if he knew it to
In such a case he acta to his
be untrue.
own knowledge falsely, and the law imputes
a fraudulent intent. Kerr, Fraud & M. 54 et
seq., and cases cited; Bigelow, Fraud, 63,
2
84, 453; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 488 et seq.;
Estee, Pr. 394 et seq. "Fraud" is a term
which the law applies to certain facts, and
where, upon the facte, the law adjudges
fraud, it is not essential that the complaint
should, in terms, allege it It is sufficient if
the facte stated amount to a case of fraud.
Kerr, Fraud & M. 366 et seq., and cases
cited; 2 Bstee, PI. 423.
The complaint in
this case states a substantial cause of action, and is fully supported by the evidence.
The action of the county court in refusing
to allow the appellant to appeal to the district court after he had given notice of an appeal to this court, and time had been given in
which to perfect it, cannot be assigned as
error on this record. If it was an error, it
was error not before, but after, the final
judgment from which this appeal is taken.
The judgment of the coiu-t below is affirmed.
[Note from 10 Pac. Rep. 292.]

A contract secured by false and fraudulent
cannot be enforced.
Mills v.
representations
Collins, 67 Iowa, 164, 25 N. W. Rep. 109.
equity
will
decree
a
of
rescission
of
A court
a contract obtained by the fraudulent represenof
one
of
parties
the
conduct
or
thereto,
tations
on the complaint of the other, when It satisfactorily appears that the _ party seeking the
rescission has been misled in regard to a ma-
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terial matter by such representation or conduct,
But when the facts
to his injury or prejudice.
are known to both parties, and each acts on his
own judgment, the court will not rescind the
contract because it may or does turn out that
they, or either of them, were mistaken as to
the legal effect of the facts, or the rights or obligations of the parties thereunder, and particularly when such mistake can in no way injurieusly affect the right of the party complaining
under the contract, or prevent him from obtaining and receiving all the benefit contemplated
by it, and to which he is entitled under it. Seeley V. Reed, 25 Fed, Rep. 361.
When, by false representations or misrepresentations, a fraud has been committed, and
by it the complainant has been injured, the general principles of equity jurisprudence afford a
remedy. Singer Manuf'g Co. v. Yarger, 12
Fed. Rep. 487.
42
See Chandler
v. Childs,
Mich. 128, 3 N. W. Rep. 297; Cavender v.
Roberson, 33 Kan. 626, 7 Pac. Rep. 152.
When no damage, present or prospective, can
result from a fraud practiced, or false repremade, a court
sentations or misrepresentation
of equity will not entertain a petition for relief.
Dunn V. Remington, 9 Neb. 82, 2 N. W. Rep.
230.

A person is not at liberty to make positive
assertions about facts material to a transaction
unless he knows then) to be true;
and if a
statement so made is in fact false, the assertor cannot relieve himself from the imputation of fraud by pleading ignorance, but must
respond in damages to any one who has sustained loss by acting in reasonable reliance upon
Lynch v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
such assertion.
18 Fed. Rep. 486.
Equity will not relieve a,gainst a misrepresentation, unless it be of some material matter
constituting some motive to the contract, something in regard to which reliance is placed by
one party on the other, and by which he was
actually misled, and not merely a matter of
opinion, open to the inquiry and examination
of both parties. Buckner v. Street, 15 Fed.
Rep. 365.
False representations may be a ground for
relief, though the person making them believes
them true, if the person to whom they were
made relied upon them, and was induced thereby to enter into the contract.
Seeberger v. Hobert, 55 Iowa, 756, 8 N. W. Rep. 482.
\ Fraudulent representations
or misrepresentations are not ground for relief, where they are
immaterial,
even though they be relied upon.
Hall V. Johnson, 41 Mich. 286, 2 N. W. Rep.
See, to same effect. Lynch v. Mercantile
55.
Trust Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 486; Seeberger v. Hobert, 55 Iowa, 756, 8 N. W. Rep. 482.
In fraudulent representation or misrepresentation the injured parties may obtain relief, even
though they did not suppose every statement
made to them literally true. Heinemau v. Std. ger, 54 Mich. 232, 19 N. W. Rep. 965.
Where the vendor honestly expresses an in-

correct opinion as to the amount, quality, and
value of the goods he disposes of in a sale of
thereof, and the
his business and good-will
purchaser sees or knows the property, or has an
opportunity to know it, no action for false representations will lie. Collins v. Jackson,
54
Mich. 186, 19 N. W. Rep. 947.
"dealing
in
sale
talk"
the
of goods, unMere
less accompanied by some artifice to deceive
the purchaser or throw him off his guard, or
some concealment of intrinsic defects not easily
detected by ordinary care and diligence, does
Reynolds v.
not amount to misrepresentation.
Palmer, 21 Fed. Rep. 433.
False statements made at the time of the
sale by the vendor of chattels, with the fraudulent intent to induce the purchaser to accept
an inferior article as a superior one, or to give
an exorbitant and unjust price therefor, will
render such purchase voidable; but such false
statement must be of some matter affecting the
character, quantity, quality, value, or title of
such chattel. Bank v. Yocum, 11 Neb. 328, 9
N. W. Rep. 84.
A statement recklessly made, without knowledge of its truth, is a false statement knowingly made, within the settled rule.
Cooper v.
Schlesinger, 111 U. S. 148, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860.
Whether or not omission to communicate
known facts will amount to fraudulent representation "depends upon the circumstances of
the particular case, and the relations of the
parties.
Britton v. Brewster, 2 Fed. Rep. 160.
Where a vendor conceals a material fact,
substantially the consideration of the
is
which
contract, and which is peculiarly
within his
knowledge, it is fraudulent misrepresentation.
Dowling V. Lawrence, 58 Wis. 282, 16 N. W.
Rep. 552.
Evidence of fraudulent representations must
Wickham v. Morebe 'Clear and convincing.
house, 16 Fed. Rep. 324.
Where a man sells a business, and the contract of sale contained a clause including all
right to business done by certain agents, evidence that the seller was willing to engage in
the same business with such agents is not proof
of fraud in making the contract. Taylor v.
Saurman, 110 Pa. St. 3, 1 Atl. Rep. 40.
It was recently held by the supreme court of
Indiana, in the case of Cook v. Churchman, 104
Ind. 141, 3 N. B. Rep. 759, that where money
is obtained under a contract, any fraudulent
representations employed by a party thereto as
a means of inducing the loan to be made, if
otherwise proper, are not to be excluded because of the statute of frauds; also that where
parol representations
are made regarding the
credit and ability of a third person, with the intent that such third person shall obtain money
or credit thereon, the statute of fraud applies,
and no action thereon can be maintained, a1
though the party making the representations
may have entered into a conspiracy vrith such
person with the expectation of obtaining some
incidental benefit for himself.
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et al. v.
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111. 498.)

Jan. Term, 1872.
court,
McLean county;
circuit
from
Appeal
Thomas F. Tipton, Judge.
Bill in chancery by Abner Mitchell and
wife to rescind a conveyance of real estate
Prom a deagainst Archibald McDougall.
appeal.
cree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs
Supreme Court of Illinois.

Reversed.
The conveyance was made by plaintiffs to
defendant in exchange for property in Misthere
souri. At the time of the exchange
was a mortgage on plaintiff's property, which
also giving to plaintiff
defendant assumed,
his note for the difference in the exchange.
A-fter the exchange he added to the buildings
and tooli out insurance on the property.
Pending the bill the buildings exchanged to
defendant were destroyed by fire.
Plaintiff offered his wife as a witness to
prove misrepresentations of defendant as to
The
the value of the Missouri property.
co'Tt refused to permit her to testify.

R. E. Williams, for appellants.
for appellee.

Benjamin

& Weldon,

.

BRBESB, J. In Lockridge v. Foster, 4
icam. 569, which was a bill in chancery praying, in the alternative, for the rescission of
an executed contract for the sale of land, on
the ground of fraudulent representations by
the vendor, this court said, on the principles
of equity and justice, a contract, to be obligatory, must be justly and fairly made.
The contracting parties are bound to deal
honestly, and act In good faith -with each other. There should be a reciprocity of candor
Both should have equal knowland fairness.
edge concerning the subject-matter of the
contract; especially ought aU the facts and
which are likely to influence
circumstances
their action to be made known. If they have
not mutually this knowledge, nor the same
means of obtaining it, it is then a duty incumbent on the one having the superior in- J
formation to disclose it to the other. In mak-j
ing the disclosure, he is bound to act in goodi
faith and with a strict regard to truth. If
Le makes false representations respecting
material facts, or Intentionally conceals or
and
suppresses them, he acts fraudulently,
renders himself responsible for the consequences which may result. Fraud may con-.
sist as well in a suppressio veri as in a sug-l
gestlo falsi, for. In either case, it may operate!
to the injury of the innocent party. A falsef
by the vendor, which inrepresentation
fluences the conduct of the other party, and
Induces him to make the purchase, will vitiate
and avoid the contract. And In making the
representation.
It is Immaterial whether he
knows It to be false or not, for the conseIf he requences are the same to the vendee.
lies on the truth of the declaration, he Is
equally Imposed on and Injured, and ought
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to have redress from the one who has been
So a suppression or
the cause of the injury.
by the vendor of facts, which,
concealment
if known to the vendee, would have the effect to prevent him from making the purchase, will, In equity, equally vitiate the con- !
tract. A court of equity will not enforce and \
carry Into effect contracts thus unfairly and \
fraudulently made; and when the Injured /
party Invokes its aid in proper time, and the
circumstances of the case will permit it to be
done, the contract will be rescinded and the
parties restored to their original rights.
The court refers to 1 Story, Bq! Jur. §§ 191and 2 Kent, Comm. 482, 490.
197, 204r-207,
Sections 191-197, inclusive, treat of false
suggestions, and fully support the doctrine of
the case cited, on that point. Sections 204
to 207, Inclusive, treat of the doctrine of
veri, a doctrine which, though
suppressio
true in morals. Is not the doctrine recognized
by courts of equity, except under certain circumstances.
The extreme doctrine of some courts is, that
undue concealment of a fact resting in the
knowledge of one contracting party, which,
if known to the other, would have prevented
the contract, will vitiate the contract.

The true definition Is found in section 207,
supra, where it Is said undue concealmeni
which amounts to a fraud in the sense of a
court of equity, and for which it will grant
relief, Is the non-disclosure of those facts add
circumstances which one party Is under some
legal or equitable obligation to communicate
to the other, and which the latter has a right,
not merely in foro conscientiae, but juris et
de jure, to know.
Under such circumstances, the concealment
of an important fact would be Improper and
unjust; it would be an undue concealment
on account of the fiduciary relation existing;
but where two parties, in the absence of any
such relation, are treating for an estate, and
the purchaser knows, from surface indications, or otherwise, by actual boring, there
Is a valuable mine upon the land, the purchaser is not bound to disclose that fact to
the owner, for the means of information on the
subject were as accessible to the owner of the
land as to the purchaser.
The rule stated by Chancellor Kent, at page ,
482, referred to in the opinion in 4 Scam., su- ',
pra, is that each party is bound to communi- ,
I cate to the other his knowledge of the ma(
1 terial facts, provided he knows the other to j
I be ignorant of them, and they be not open/
land naked, or equally within the reach of his'
observation.
» This, we
admit. Is a rule of moral obligation, ||
but not enforced in the courts. It Is by, them
qualified, as we fiave stated above, that the
party in possession of the facts must be under some special obligation, by confidence reto communicate
posed, or otherwise,
them
truly and fairly, and this is the doctrine of
this court in the cases of Fish y. Cleland, 33
111. 243, and Cleland v. Fish, 43 111. 282, referred to by appellee's counsel.

'
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It Is qualified by Beach v. Sheldon, 14 Barb.
72; Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Whart 178; Knltzlng
V. McElrath, 5 Pa. St 467.
In Fox V. Mackeath, 2 Brown, Ch. 400,
Thurlow, Lord Chancellor, in delivering the
opinion in the case where undue concealment
of an important fact was charged, said:
have is, whether this case af"The doubt
fords facts from which principles arise to set
aside this transaction, which will not, by necessary application, draw other cases into hazard. And, without insisting upon technical
morality,
don't agree with those who say,
that where an advantage has 6een taken in
a contract, which a man of delicacy would
not have taken, it must be set aside. Suppose, for Instance, that A, knowing there to be
a mine in the estate of B, of which he knew
B was ignorant, should enter into a contract
to purchase the estate of B for the price of the
estate without considering the mine, could the
court set it aside? Why not, since B was not
apprized of the mine and A was? Because B,
as the buyer, was not obliged, from the nature of the contract, to make the discovery.
It is, therefore, essentially necessary, in order j
to set aside the transaction,
not only that a |'
great advantage should be taken, but it must j
arise from some obligation in the party to J
Not, as Justice Story/!
make the discovery."
says (1 Story, Bq. Jur. § 148), from an obli-M

I

I

,
)
I
I
j,
;
i

gation in point of morals only, but of legalf
\ duty. In such a case he says, a court of equity
will not correct the contract merely because a
man of nice morals and honor would not have
entered into it. Lord Eldon, in Turner v. Harvey, Jac. 178, approved the doctrine of Lord
Thurlow and the illustration of the mine, and
BO does Justice Story in 1 Eq. Jur. § 207.
But we are dealing in this case with the
doctrine of suggestio falsi and not of suppressio veri, as the charge in the bill is, false representations made by appellee of the value of
the land and lots in Missouri.
There is much testimony in the record, from
which we derive the knowledge that appellee
represented to appellant, who had never been
In Missouri (appellee having resided there before coming to Bloomington), that the land
was good land, and was the land occupied by
one Judge Smith, before the Rebellion, and improved by him. This land was the south part
of section eighteen and the north part of section twenty -four, in all one hundred and sixty
acres, and was worth, probably, fifteen dollars
per acre. The land conveyed was in section
fifteen, stony, poorly timbered, and comparatively worthless. The house in Montevallo,
Instead of being a desirable residence, and
worth one thousand dollars, as represented
by appellee, proved to be a mere shell, one
story high, occupied by hogs and goats, bringing not eight dollars a month rent "right
along," as represented, but unfit for human
abode, and worth, with the "lot and a half,"
not over two hundred and fifty dollars, and,
as we should judge, not at all saleable.
So
soon as appellant, by personal inspection on

j

a visit to the locality, discovered the facts, he
came to the conclusion appellee had imposed
upon him, and at once, on his return to
Bloomington, demanded a rescission of the
contract and a reconveyance of the Bloomington property, and tendering deeds for the Missouri property, together with appellee's note
for three hundred dollars, part of the purchase money. This being refused by appellee,
this bill was filed by appellants, and pending
the bill the house was consumed by fire, on
which, however, appellee had effected an Insurance of three thousand dollars.
The court dismissed the bill and complain-

ants appealed.'
There is no question of law made except
the one we have discussed, and there is Home
confiict in the testimony, but a careful examination of it, as we find it in the record, satisfies us appellant has not received from appelfor, and which conlee what he contracted
tract he made wholly on the representations
of appellee, which have proved to be untrue.
It is said by appellee, there was a mistake
in conveying the land as in section fifteen—
that he supposed the "Smith farm" was on
that section, but is willing and ofCers to convey the land in fact occupied by Smith in sections eighteen and twenty-four, and he insists, that a mistake being made Is no ground
for the rescission of the contract, as the court
can and will correct the mistake.
But this
consideration should not prevail in this case,
because appellee represented the land he was
selling to be worth twenty dollars per acre,
which he had purchased but a short time previously for four dollars per acre, and he asserted to appellant that such land was selling
for twenty dollars an acre in that neighborhood. This he based upon a letter said to
have been received by him from one Selsor, a
land agent in that county.
Selsor in his deposition says, the lands he referred to in that
letter were among the best improved farms in
that portion of Cedar and Verrlon counties;
he says he had no idea of fixing the price of
raw lands by these figures, and did not suppose any one would be so foolish as to attempt it.
That letter, which appellee says was burnt
up in the building when it was destroyed,
was to this efCect: "We have sold within the
last two weeks ten thousand dollars worth of
land, from fifteen to twenty-five dollars an
acre." This was so construed by appellee to
appellant as to Induce the latter to believe
they were lands in the neighborhood of those
he was about to purchase.
The town property was of small value
Now, under such circumstances, It would not
be just to allow appellee to correct the mistake In the land and claim the contract as
made, but it would be just, as a mistake was
made by appellee in the deed, to permit the
Injured party to avail of it, and, through that,
repudiate the entire contract. In a case where
false representations have been -made, it Is
the province of a court of equity. If applied to
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for that pvirpose, to rescind the contract, putting the parties in statu quo.
It is claimed by appellee that the Bloomington property was taken at a vay high raluatlon, and that he ought to be permitted to
show that appellant has received from him its
full value.
This we do not consider as the question before us. The question is, did appellant get
what he bargained for? That he did not we
think the evidence satisfactorily shows.
Appellant's right to the insurance money
will liardly be questioned, as the building upon the lot when sold, is now represented
by
that money, and after deducting the premium
paid by appellee and the cost of the addition
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to the building which he erected, and was
covered by the insurance, we are of opinion
the company should pay the balance to appel-

lant.
On the point that Mrs. Mitchell, appellant's
wife, was improperly rejected as a witness,
we think the court ruled correctly; the case
was In no correct legal sense bo' own case.
The views here expressed reverse the decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill.
The cause is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Decree

reversed.

SCOTT, J., did not hear the argument in
this case, and ga^e no opinion.
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ed States

J. This Is a bill in equity to
contract of purchase of a silver
mine on the ground of fraudulent representar
tions, and to recover the consideration paid.
The suit was commenced originally in the
superior court of Inyo county. Gal., on the
Sth of May, 1884; but on account of the divei-se citizenship of the parties, the plaintiff
being a corporation organized under the laws
'
of Nevada, and the defendant a citizen of
California, it was removed into the United
Demurrers to the origiStates circuit court.
nal bill and to an amended bill having been
sustained, the present "second amended" bill
of complaint was filed. Answer was filed by
replication by complainant, and
defendant,
issue was joined. Testimony was fallen, and
the case was heard, resulting in a decree
dismissing the bill on the 14th of March,
It appears from the record that on
1887.
the 15th of March, 1884, the appellant (who
was the complainant below) purchased from
the defendant a mining claim, linovro as
'
the "Sterling Mine," together with other
mining property, all situated in Inyo county, Gal., paying him therefor the sum of
$10,000.
On the Sth of May, 1884, the original bill of complaint was filed, charging, in
substance,
that complainant was induced
to purchase said mine and mining property
solely upon the representations made by Silva as to its condition, extent, and value;
that such representations were made to H.
M. Yerington, the president of said complainant company, and to one Forman, a mining
expert In his employ, in January, 1884, when
an examination of said mine was made by
them; that said representations were false
and fraudulent, and were well known to the
defendant at the time to be such; and that
said representations vrere, in substance and
in a somewhat different order, as follows:
(1) That there were 2,000 tons of ore in the
mine; (2) that the bottom of what is called
the "Ore Chamber" was solid ore, as good
as the ore exposed on the sides of the chamber; (3) that there were not less than 500
tons of ore in and about the said ore chamber;
(4) that the mine was worth $15,000;
and (5) that, after going through the mine,
the defendant represented to said Yerington
and Forman that he had shown them all the
work which had been done in or about the
LAMAR,

rescind

a

mine that would throw any light upon the
quantity of ore therein.
The answer of the defendant is direct positive, and unequivocal in its denials of the
allegations of the bill; and, as an answer on
oath is not waived, unless these denials are
disproved by evidence of greater weight
than the testimony of one witness, or by
that of one witness with corroborating cn-cumstances, the complainant will not be entitled to a decree; and this effect of the defendant's answer is not weakened by the
fact that the equity of the complainant's bill
is the allegation of fraud. Vigel v. Hopp,
104 U. S. 441; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1528; 1
Daniell, Ch. Prac. 844. The burden of proof
is on the complainant; and unless he brings
evidence sufficient to overcome the natural
presumption of fair dealing and honesty, a
court of equity will not be justified in setting
aside a contract on the ground of fraudulent
In order to establish a
representations.
charge of this character the complainant
must show, by clear and decisive proofFirst, that the defendant has made a repre- /
sentation in regard to a material fact; sec- X
ondly, that such representation is false;
thirdly, that such representation was not actually believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be true; fourthly, that it i
was made with intent that it should be acted
on; fifthly, that it was acted on by complainant to his damage; and, sixthly, that in (
so acting on it the complainant was ignorant
of its falsity, and reasonably believed it to
be true.
The first of the foregoing requisites excludes such statements as consist
merely in an expression of opinion or judgment, honestly entertained; and, again, (excepting in peculiar cases,) it excludes statements by the owner and vendor of property
in respect to its value.
The evidence in the case shows that in
the development of this mine a tunnel, called
the "Sterling Tunnel," had first been dug.
At a distance of about 140 feet along the line
of this tunnel, from its mouth, there are
branches running easterly and westerly.
About eo feet from the main tunnel, in the
eastern branch, winze No. 1 starts down.
About 38 feet below the level of the tunnel,
a level, known as th« "38-feet level," starts
off from this winze, and at the bottom of the
winze, a distance of about 82 feet vertical
below the main tunnel, therei is another level,
known as "82-feet level."
In the easterly
branch of the tunnel, about 30 feet from
winze No. 1, there is another winze starting
downward, Inclining to the southeast as it
goes down. This winze is numbered 2, and
is connected with the 38-feet and the 82-feet
levels.
Intermediate between these levels is
another level, known as the "55-feet level,"
which opens out to the eastward of winze
No. 2 into a chamber about 15 feet long and
about 8 feet wide. In the south-east comer
of this chamber was a little hole or shaft,
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downward a few feet only. In
sinking winze No. 2, Silva struck an ore
body at a point opposite the 38-feet level.
It was irregular In shape, dipping at an angle
Commencing at a
of about 45 degrees.
point, comparatively speaking, it increased
gradually as it descended, and was in form
At Its base it
somewhat like a pyramid.
measured 4 or 5 feet across, and it was about
The surface of this inclined
nine feet long.
pyramid formed the floor or bottom of the
There was, however,
a" small
chamber.
space between the base and opposite footwall, which is called the "bottom" of the
chamber by complainant's witnesses, and it
The
is the "bottom" spoken of in the bill.
ore comprising this pyramid was carbonate,
and, being friable, had slacked down over the
face of the pyramid to the bottom, partially
covering it, and partially filling up the little hole or shaft in the south-east comer.
As to the first alleged representation, as
classified above,— viz., that there were 2,000
tons of ore in sight in the mine, and that
Terington relied upon such statement when
he made the purchase, — the proof utterly
fails to establish either that Silva made the
statement, as a statement of fact, or that
Yerington relied upon such statement, even
SUva, both in his answer
had it been made.
and in his testimony, denies ever having
and the testimony of
made the statement,
Terington himself is to the effect that Suva's statement was qualified by the phrase
This, then, is shown to
"in his judgment"
have been nothing more than an expression
of opinion on the part of Silva as to the
But,
quantity of ore in sight In the mine.
even if Silva had made the statement imputed to him in the bUl, there is abundant evidence to show that Yerington did not rely
upon it in the purchase of the mine. Yerington's
own evidence, on this point, is
against him.
He testifies that he did not
believe that there were more than 1,000 tons
of ore in the mine, and that Forman agreed
with him on that point. And he further testifies that, valuing this ore at 32 ounces of
ore and 45 per cent, of lead per ton, (which it
appears was its approximate value, as deterand calculating
mined by several assays,)
that there would be 1,000 tons of ore there,
the mine would be worth $10,000,— the sum
he actually gave for it
This lacks much of
coming up to the rule that the complainant
must have been deceived, and deceived by
the person of whom he complains.
Atwood
V. Small, 6 aark & F. 232; Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term R. 57. Besides, the quantity of
ore "in sight" in a mine, as that term is understood among the miners, is at best a mere
matter of opinion.
It cannot be calculated
with mathematical, or even with approximate, certainty. The opinions of expert miners, on a question of this kind, might reasonIn the case of
ably differ quite materially.
Tuck V. Downing, 76 111. 71, 94, the court
say: "No man, however scientific he may be.
extending
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could certainly state how a mine, with tht
most flattering outcrop or blow-out, will
finally turn out. It is to be fuUy tested and
worked by men of skill and judgment
IMines'are not pm-chased and sold on a warranty, but on the prospect.
'The sight' determines the purchase. If very fiattering, a
party is willing to pay largely for the chance.
There Is no other sensible or known mode
of Celling this kind of property. It is, in the
nature of the thing, utterly speculative, and
every one knows the business is of the most
fiuctuating and hazardous character. How
many mines have not sustained the hopes
created by their outcrop!"
We approve the
position of the court below, that "Yerington
and his expert, Forman, were as competent
to judge how much ore there was 'in sight'
as Silva was. They were novices in matters
of that kind.
This misrepresentation, if
such it be, does not contain either the first,
fourth, or fifth element stated by Pomeroy
as essential elements in a fraudulent misrepresentation."
As stated above, the substance of the allegation of the bill is that Silva represented
that the bottom of this ore chamber, which
was covered with loose ore slacked down
from the pyramid, was composed of ore as
good as that exposed on the sides of the
Silva, in his answer, expressly
chamber.
denies ever having made such statement.
Forman testifies that with a little prospecting pick he had with him he raked through
the dirt and loose ore that had slacked
down, to see if it would reach the bottom of
the ore chamber, but that it would not.
He
further says: "I asked Silva how the bottom was; if he had sunk below there.
He
said, 'No.'
I said, 'How is the bottom. You,
as a miner, know It Is a suspicious thing to
see a bottom covered up, or anything of that
kind.' He said the bottom was as good or
better than any ore which we saw in the
chamber." Yerington at first testifies that
Silva, in reply to a question by Forman,
stated that this floor was solid ore; but he
says that he does not think any comparison
was made between that ore and the ore in
the sides of the chamber, as narrated by
On the next day, however, YerForman.
ington having, as he says, refreshed his memory,—"and I [he] had the means of doing it,"
—was positive that the conversation between
Silva and Forman at that time was as Forman afterwards stated it Silva, In addition
to Ills positive denial in his answer, testifies
that "there never was a word said about
thought
that. They asked me this: 'What
of the ore body?' and I said 'I thought it
would be extensive.'
thourht so at the
time, and I think so yet"
The witness Bddy, who was present all the time in the ore
chamber, except when he went to the 38-feet
level to get a pick, does not know anything
about a conversation such as Yerington and
Forman narrate. On this point, then, the
testimony of Silva is directly to the contrary

I
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ef that of Yerington and Forman. Certain
other material facts in the case seem to indicate that there is just as strong probability
that Silva's statements in this matter are
true as that those of Yerington and Forman
are true. In the bill Yerington alleged, under oath, that Sllva had discovered the fact
that the bottom of the ore chamber was not
composed of ore, and had afterwards covered the bottom with ore, vein-rock, and matter,— in other words, had "salted" the mine.
There is no evidence in the record to prove
this, or tending to prove it; on the contrary,
the evidence of Yerington himself, and of the
other witnesses who were examined on that
point, is all to the effect that the ore covering the floor of the chamber had slacked
down from natural causes In fine particles
like wheat. Nor is there such evidence to
show that Sllva knew the character of this
floor, or of the extent of the ore vein, or deposit, (as it afterwards turned out to be,) as
would justify the interposition of a court of
equity to set aside the contract on the ground
He had come
of fraudulent representations.
onto the ore in excavating from the top.
The sides of the ore chamber contained some
ore of a good quality, and he had never demonstrated the extent and amount of ore in
the pyramidal wedge in the side of the chamber.
It Is shown by the evidence of Yerington himself that, in the side of a drift
running westerly from the ore chamber,
there was ore which appeared to be continuous with the body of ore in the chamber;
so that the statement Silva said he made,—
viz., that he thought the ore body would be
Upextensive,— at least, appears reasonable.
apparent
on all the facts and circumstances
of record, he might have made the statement he says he made, and believed he was
telling the truth. For there is also some
evidence to the effect that Silva had commenced to run a drift from the bottom of
winze No. 1, for the purpose of striking and
cutting the supposed downward extension of
the ore body in the chamber;
and this, before the examination of the mine by Yerington and Forman.
After the sale of the mine,
Coffin, the superintendejit for the complainant company, when he commenced work in
the mine, started in where Silva had left off
in this drift, and carried it immediately beneath the ore chamber, entering the chamber
by an up-ralse.
Then it was that the discovery was made that the ore body, instead
of being a continuous ledge or lead, was
merely a deposit.
Furthermore, the testimony of Yerington and Forman, as regards
the little hole or shaft in the south-east corner of the chamber, is directly opposed by the
testimony of Silva and Eddy. Both Yerington and Forman testify that this little shaft
was completely filled up with dirt arid loose
ore; while Sllva and Eddy both testify that
it was not so filled up, but that both Yerington and Forman stood in that shaft, and
took samples of ore from it It Is thus seen

that the evidence on this material point does
not clearly establish the fraudulent representations of Silva as claimed by tlie complainant; but that, on the contrary, the material
facts and circumstances as disclosed by the
record are entirely compatible with the theory that Silva did not make the representa^
tions charged against him, or, at most, that
he merely gave expression to an opinion as
to the extent of the ore body, erroneous
though it proved to be. This would not constitute fraud. In the language of the court
below: "This testimony was taken in June,
1866, about two and a half years after the
They were presconversations took place.
ent at the time, examining the mine, and engaged In conversation for an hour or more.
These discrepancies in matters of detail during a long conversation, related by different
parties, viewing the subject from different
stand-points after the lapse of so long a period of time, are no more than might reasonably be expected, even in honest witnesses.
There is no occasion to impute any
intention to testify falsely to either. • * *
Parties are extremely liable to misundeiv
stand each other, and, in looking back upon
the transaction in the light of subsequent
developments,
are prone to take the view
most advantageous to themselves."
As to the third alleged representation,— towit, that there were not less than 500 tons of
ore in and about that ore chamber,— Silva,
both in his answer and in his testimony, denies that he ever told Yerington and Forman, or anybody else, that there were 500
tons of ore there, or that there was any
amount fixed or agreed upon by them as to
the quantity of ore there; while the testimony of both Yerington and Forman is to
the effect that Sllva said, in his opinion, or in
his judgment, there were 500 tons of ore in
the chamber.
So that, taking the strongest
I
testimony produced on the part of complainant upon this point, it simply amounts to an
expression of opinion on the part of Silva as
to the amount of the ore in the chamber, n
and not a statement of fact. It therefore
does not constitute fraud.
It is equally true that any statem;ents that
may have been made by Silva with reference
to the value of the mine, cannot, under the
circumstances of this case, be considered an
act of fraud on his part sufficient to warrant
a court of equity in setting aside the contract
Yerington testifies that Silva said he
herein.
had been asking $15,000 for the mine, but
that he would take $12,500; while Forman
says he does not recollect that Sllva made
any statement as to the value of the mine,
but that he heard Silva say he thought it
was worth $15,000. Such statements are not
fraudulent in law, but are considered merely
as trade talk, and mere matters of opinion,
which Is allowable. Gordon v. Butler, 105
U. S. 553; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217.
Moreover, It is clear, beyond question, that
Yerington did not purchase the mine upon
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Silva's representations as to Its valne, as we
shall hereafter see.
This disposes of all the alleged fraudulent
representations, as arranged above, except the
last, adversely to the complainant; and it is
to this one that attention will now be directThis charge is, substantially, that Silva
ed.
represented to Terlngton and Forman, when
they visited the mine in January, 1884, and
had gone through it, that he had shown them
all the work which had been done In and
about the mine that would throw any light
on the quantity of ore therein. This representation is alleged to have been false and
fraudulent,
and well known by Silva to be
such, because at a cut a short distance from
the mouth of the main tunnel, at a point
known as the "point of location," a little hole
or shaft had been simk which had been filled
up, and was not observable at the time of
the examination of the mine in January, 1884,
and also because there had been a number of
drill-holes made in the sides of the ore chamber, and afterwards filled up before the examination in January, 1884, so that they were
not observable
at that time; which holes
•clearly developed the fact that the ore about
the chamber was nothing more than a sheU,
instead of a continuous body, as it appeareda
io the observer.
The existence of the plug-]
ged-up drUl-boles in the sides of the ore chamber is the worst feature of the case againstj
They could not have been made by
f Silva.
former proprietor of the mine, as is slightly
claimed in his behalf; for, as has been already shown in this opinion, Silva himself, or
at least persons in his employ, had excavated
that chamber after he had purchased it from
one Edwards, in 1876.
And certain it is that
the drill-holes were found plugged up within
a short time after he had sold the mine to the
complainant company, March 15, 1884.
The
question is, did Silva know of their existence
at the time he sold the mine, and, having
such knowledge,
did he falsely represent to
the complainant that he knew nothing of
them, thereby inducing complainant to act
upon such representations? Upon this question the evidence is somewhat conflicting.
Yerington testifies that after going through
the mine, he asked Silva if he had shown him
the whole of the mine, and he replied that he
had. And Forman testifies that Silva, in reply to a question from him, said that he had
shown him aU the work that had been done
in and about the mine that would throw any
light upon the quantity of ore in the mine, or
the extent of the ledge or deposit.
Silva admits that, in reply to a question by Yerington,
he told him that he had shown him all the
work that had been done In and about the
mine, either by himself or under his direction.
So that the question is narrowed down
to simply this: Were said drill-holes in existence at the time Silva made such statement?
If so, had they been made by him, or
under his direction, or did he know of their
existence?
In his sworn answer Silva ex-
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pressly "denies that he drilled any such hole
or holes through the ore into the country rock
or otherwise, or thereby or at all discovered
the extent of said ore, or that he filled up
said drill-holes, or concealed them from view,
or kept them secret from complainant," etc.;
and in his testimony he also denies having
any knowledge of their existence.
He says
that he drilled no holes in the mine except
what he had to do as a miner, and that he
concealed nothing from Yerington when he
showed him the mine.
And again he says:
"I showed Mr. Yerington all the work that
was done in the mine that I knew anything
of." There is no direct evidence going to
show who drilled the holes; and there is nothing in the entire record to connect Silva with
them, except the fact that he was the -owner
of the mine, and was in possession of it at a
time when it is most likely they were drilled.
But this circmnstance alone should not outweigh the positive denial of Silva in his answer, and also in his equally positive denial
in his testimony, of his knowledge of the existence of said drilled holes.
The law raises
no presumption of knowledge of falsity from
the single fact per se that the representation
was false. There must be something further to establish the defendant's knowledge.
Bamett v. Stanton, 2 Ala. 181; McDonald v.
Trafton, 15 Me. 225. This rule is fortified by
the consideration that, had he known of the
limited quantity of ore in and about the "ore
chamber," Silva would hardly have gone to
the expense and labor of starting a drift from
the bottom of winze No. 1, and constructing
it for a certain distance, before the sale of the
mine, for the purpose of reaching the supposed downward extension of the ore in and
Knowing that the ore
about that chamber.
body terminated within a few inches of the
surface of the chamber, and then, in the face
of that knowledge, actually constructing a
drift on the 82-feet level, at enormous expense, for the purpose of getting under that
limited quantity of ore, would not appear a
reasonable thing to do by any one, especially
by such an experienced and practical miner
as Silva is admitted to have been.
The testimony, therefore, and all the other facts and
circumstances of record, do not substantiate
complainant's theory of the case on this
point; in other words, there is not a satisfactory case of fraudulent representations on
this point made out,— not such a case as
would justify the interposition of a court of
equity to set aside the contract under consideration on the ground of fraudulent representations.
As regards the little hole or shaft
that had been sunk at the "point of location,"
and afterwards filled up, so that it was not
observable at the time of Yerington's visit in
January, 1884, there is absolutely no testimony at all to show that Silva knew anything about its existence.
He had done no
work at that place, or very little at most, and
was using the cut there as a sort of kitchen.
The sides of the cut indicated that there was
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It Is admitted that Fora ledge of ore there.
man asked SUva why he did not "go down"
on that ore, and that he replied that he considered the tunnel the best place to mine.
Silva denies, both In his answer and in his
testimony that he ever knew that a shaft had
been sunk at the point of location, and no one
is found who can testify that he did know
anything about it; on the contrary, the former owner of the mine, one Edwards, testifies that he himself dug that shaft, and filled
it up, prior to the time Silva purchased it, and
that to his knowledge SilTa did not know
anything about that shaft
It is essential that the defendant's representations should have been acted on by complainant, to his injury.
Where the purchaser
undertakes to make investigations of his own,
and the vendor does nothing to prevent his
investigation from being as full as he chooses
to make it, the purchaser cannot afterwards
allege that the vendor made misrepresentaAtwood V. Small, supra; Jennings ▼.
tions.
Broughton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 126; Tuck v.
Downing, supra.
The evidence abundantly
shows that Yerington had been willing to

give $10,000 for the mine prior to the time
he visited It, and made his exammation. In
January, 1884.
He had made Inquiries of
various persons f<H: months previous to that
visit Several experts in his employ had visited the mine, bad taken samples of ore from
It; and It must have been from reports tlius
received that Yerington had made up his
mind as to what the mine was worth. From
the letters of an agent (Woods) to Eddy, tlie
testimony of the witness Boland, the testi-

mony of the witness Anthony, Eddy's testimony, and from the testimony of Silva himself, there can be no doubt that Yerington
had offered $10,000 for the mine several
months before he had ever seen it; thus
showing that his examination of the mine in
January, 1884, merely went to coiroborate the
reports that he had received of it from his
experts, Forman, Bliss, et al., and that It was
upon such reports, and his own Judgment after an examination of the mine, that he made
the purchase of it
From all which it is clear to this court that
the complainant has not proven his case, and
tlie decree below is affirmed.
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Action by John T. Prewett, trustee, etc.,
against James G. Trimble for rescission of a
for the purchase of bank stock.
contract
Judgment (or defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
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19,

1888,

appellee,

president of the Exchange Bank of
Kentucky at Mt. Sterling, sold and transferred to appellant 20 shares of stock In that
bank at the price of $120 per share, and 21
shares in the Mt. Sterling National Bank
at $120 per share for 20 shares, and $118 for
the remaining one, payment for which was
then made partly in notes assigned to and
received by appellee at their face value, and
May 14, 1888, appellant
partly in money.
brought this action for rescission of the contract and restoration of the notes, or, if collected, payment of amount thereof, and the
by appellee, and interest
money received
on the whole; it being alleged and not denied that a tender and offer to retransfer
the stock and demand of repayment of the
purchase price had been made by appellant
and refused by appellee.
It appears that
December 31, 1887, a statement of resources
and liabilities of the Exchange Bank of Kentucky, signed by the cashier, was published
in newspapers of Mt. Sterling, and by printed cards, which were generally distributed;
there being at foot of the statement an announcement that the bank had declared its
usual semi-annual 4 per cent, dividend.
There was printed on the same card a statement, signed by the president and directors.
In which the cashier's statement was referred to as evidence of the prosperous condition
and increasing business of the bank.
According to that statement, the resources of
the bank,
having a capital of $100,000,
amounted to $32»,380.42, of which $245,790
were loans and discounts and $13,338.68 overdrafts, while the undivided profits were $15,851.41.
But no mention was made of any Insolvent debts being part of the aggregate of
either loans or overdrafts.
In respect to the
statement it Is alleged and appears that of
the total amount of loans and discounts more
than $30,000 consisted of stale and worthless
demands, and of overdrafts at least $7,000
were likewise worthless, the drawers being
insolvent;
and that, after charging off such
demands,
worthless
there would be left in
the bank no undivided profits at all.
It ' is
further alleged and proved that the books of
the bank showed at date of the statement
then
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about $7,600 more due to depositors, and,
consequently,
that much more liabilities than
disclosed by it
The evidence places beyond question that
when the statement was published and circulated the real value of stock in the Exchange Bank of Kentucky, calculated and
determined by the actual condition of Its resources and liabilities, was not over $70 per
share.
It is also satisfactorily shown that
when he made the purchase appellant did not
know, nor have any other means of knowing,
the true condition of that bank's affairs than
such information
as was afforded by the
cashier's statement,
and that given directly
to him by appellee, and that he believed and
acted on that information.
There is discrepancy in the testimony of the parties as to
what occurred between them when the contract was made; but that of another person,
present at the time, is substantially that appellee said, if not directly to, in hearing of,
appellant, that the notes held by the Exchange Bank of Kentucky were worth dollar
for dollar, and, being asked about value of
the stock, took in his hands the card upon
which was printed the cashier's statement,
one of which he had on a previous occasion
in person given to appellant, and, referring
to it, explained that, the capital being $100000, the surplus of $15,000 made the stock
worth $115 per share and more as an investment,
and that it was going at $120.
But, independent of what occurred between
the parties at the time of the contract, it is
manifest the cashier's statement was published and circulated by authority of the
president and directors for the purpose and
in expectation of it being accepted, and treated by the public as In all respects true and
reliable; thereby not only increasing business of the bank, but keeping up or enhancing market value of the stock, in which each
of them had a personal interest; and, as their
own accompanying statement was obviously Intended to be, it should be regarded a
deliberate affirmation of the truth of that of
the cashier, and as equivalent to a report of
the affairs of the bank, made directly by
them; and. If so, upon both principle and
authority no other relation or privity between the parties to this action need be
shown than the act of appellee as president
Indorsing and authorizing publication and
circulation of the cashier's statement, and
the resulting Injury to appellant,
who was
within the class designed to be influenced by
Cook, Stocks, §§ 353, 354, and
the statement.
Whether they published and
cases cited.
gave currency to the statement, knowing it to
be materially untrue, and for the fraudulent
purpose of deceiving the public as charged In
the petition, we need not Inquire; for it is
not, in order to maintain this action, indispensable that appellee be shown to have
known the statement was false, for it Is elementary doctrine that a false representation
may, in contemplation of law, be made with
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it,

means of knowledge, and owe a duty to
speak the truth or not at all about the matter. But, as observed by the author, "In all
these cases the distinction between statements relative to the prospects and capabilities of the enterprises,
and statements specially specifying what does or does not exist,
must be carefully borne in mind." In this
case, not the bank, but appellee personally,
profited by the bargain appellant was Induced by the false report or statement of Its condition to make with him; and therefore It
would be contrary to reason and justice for
him to be permitted to enjoy the benefit of
at the expense of appellant, upon the flimsy
ground of ignorance about the material matters In reference to which he made the delibfor, leaving
erate and positive representation,
out of view the question whether he did in
fact know the statement was untrue, being
In
situation to know, and where
was
his duty to know, he, In contemplation of
law, did know it, and consequentiy
such
statement Is to be held fraudulent; and apremedy for the loss sustained
pellee has
either by action In damages or for rescission,
for
is
settled rule that, even where one
who brings about
contract by misrepresentation commits no fraud, because his representation was. When made, innocent In the
ordinary sense, still if, when the fact of its
falsity becomes known, he refuses to relinquish the advantage!, upon offer of reciprocal
relinquishment received by the injured party,
would make him guilty of constructive
fraud, and the contract subject to rescission
by
court of equity.
In our opinion, appellant, as the record stands, was entitled to
rescission of the contract as prayed for in
his petition, and the court had jurisdiction
to grant it; wherefore the judgment
reversed, and cause remanded for judgment

it

a

is

knowledge of Its falsity,— that Is, made scienter,— so as to afEord a right of action in damages, and, a fortiori, ground for equitable
proceedings,
(1) without actual knowledge of
either its truth or falsity, as when the party
has affirmed his knowledge by a positive
statement which implies knowledge; (2) when
made under circumstances In which the party ought to have known, if he did not know,
of its falsity, as when, having "special means
of knowledge," it is his duty to know. Blgelow. Frauds, pp. 509, 516. In Story, Eq. Jur.
§ 193, it is laid down that affirmation of a
material fact that "one does not know or
beUeve to be true is equally, in morals and
law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of
what is known to be positively false; and
a.
even If the party InnocenOy misrepresents
material fact by mistake, It is equally conclusive, for it operates as surprise and imposition on the other." Representations by a
party having means of knowledge in regard
to a matter, not possessed generally, are apt
to be believed and acted on, especially if he
is in a situation where he owes , a duty to
the public to deal honestly and intelligently.
Therefor* something more than use of ordinary diligence to know the condition of a
bank should be required of the president in
order to exempt him from liability to a person who has suffered loss by a false statement or report of Its affairs, officially made
or affirmed by him, especially when he has
In Cook,
been thereby personally benefited.
Stock & S. § 145, It is said on authority of nuby
merous cases cited that any statement
the authorized agents of a corporation in regard to the status of the corporation, or material matters connected therewith, whereby
subscriptions of stock are obtained,
is a
fraudulent representation, for which a person
sustaining loss thereby may hold such agents
personally liable, or have the contract rescinded.
This is upon the principle and for
the reason that such agents have exceptional

a
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in favor of appellant.
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C.

J.,

not sitting.
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a
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^aper, of which the following Is a copy: "Mr
/Hadcock:
The Browns are good for what
I money you let them have. [Signed] L. Os*mer." The Hadcocks did not know the
Browns, but, as they knew the defendant, on
the strength of this paper Emmanuel Hadcock
lent them $400, taking their note therefor, and
on the same day they used the most of the
money to pay their debt to the defendant
Both of the Browns were insolvent at this
time, and, while the defendant may have believed they were good, he did not know whether they were good or not, and did not try to
Upon the trial of this action, which
find out
was brought to recover damages for false repby means of said paper, there
resentations
was but slight dispute as to the representations, their falsity, or the injury resulting
therefrom;
but the defendant insisted that,
as he did not know that his rep'resentations
were false, there could be no recovery against
him.
Through his counsel, he asked the trial
court to charge the jury "that there can be no
recovery In an action of deceit unless it appears tliat the defendant made the represenH.& B.Eq.(2d Ed.)— 19

\

I

it

an existing fact, intending that it should be
taken and acted upon as such, they might infer an intent to defraud; "because," as the
court continued, "a man has no right to state
a thing as a fact, which misleads the other
party to his damage, unless he knows whether it is true or untrue; and if he states it,
Isnowing and understanding that he does not
know whether it is true or not, he just as
much misleads the other man as though he
stated
with the knowledge that it was untrue."
An action to recover damages for deceit
cannot be maintained without proof of fraud
as well as injury.
Actionable deceit cannot
be practiced without an actual intention to
and
deceive, resulting in actual deception,
consequent loss.
But, while there must be
furtive intent, it may exist when one asserts
a thing to be true wliich he does not know to
be true, as
is a fraud to affirm positive
knowledge of that which one does not positively know. Where a party represents a
material fact to be true to his personal
knowledge, as distinguished from belief or
opinion, when he does not know whether it is
true or not, and it is actually untrue, he is
guilty of falsehood, even if he believes it to
be true; and if the statement
thus made
with the intention that it shall be acted upon
by another, who does so act upon it, to his
injury, the result is actionable fraud. Kountze
V. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 130, 41 N. E. 414;
Rothschild v. Mack, 115 N. Y.
21 N. E.
726; Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y. 562, 573;
Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238; Add. Torts,
1007;
Bigelow, Fraud, 514.
Such seems to
be the case now before us, as the facts are
presumed to have been found by the jury.
The plaintiff's testator did not ask for information in regard to the solvency of those
who wished to borrow money of him, but the
defendant volunteered to give It. He was Interested in the result of the loan, for the bulk
of the proceeds was for his benefit
On being told that the loan would not be made
is

VANN, J.
Prior to the 15th of September, 1888, Deloss Brown, as principal, and Joseph Brown, as surety, were indebted to the
defendant on a past-due note for over $300,
and payment thereof had repeatedly been deAfter trying in vain to borrow
manded.
money to pay the note, Deloss tojd the defend^
ant that he did not know where they could
get it, and asked if "he must have it.
The defendant said "yes," and, upon being further
asked by Deloss where the money could be
had, recommended him to call on one Benjamin Hadcock.
He did so, and was told by
Benjamin that he could not lend the money,
but that his brother, Emmanuel, who was
stopping with him, could let him have
Deloss reported to the defendant that he thought
he could get the money of "the Hadcocks,"
and that they would let him have it "some
time in October."
When the time came
around, the Messrs. Brown started to see if
they could get the money of Emmanuel Hadand
eocfe, but first went to the defendant,
asked him to go along.
He said that he could
not, when Deloss declared there was no use
of their going alone, and thereupon the defendant wrote and delivOTed to the Browns a

quested and to the charge as made.
In the
body of the charge, the court, after instructing the jury as to the difference between the
assertion of a fact and the expression of an
thp._
opinion, told them, in substa^r^^, Jlia.t
efendant madfe th^ representatio n, either
w Aw nt Knowing
Knowmg It t6 be "untrue,

1,

Henry

7,

Watson M. Rogers, for appellant.
Purcell, for respondent.
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Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Fourth department.
Action by Charles E. Hadcoeli, as executor;
against Luman Osmer, for deceit.
From a
judgment of the appellate division (38 N. Y.
Supp. 618) affirming a judgment entered on a
verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
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tations knowing them to be false, with Intent
to deceive, and that the plaintiff suffered
The court
damages in consequence thereof."
refused to so charge, except with the modification: "That, if he made the statement that
they were good as a fact, not as an opinion,
without knowing whether it was true or not,
then it was false in the sense that he made
a statement of fact as though he knew it to
be true, which he did not know to be true.
That, together with what I have already said
in my charge in regard to
will enable the
Excepjury to imderstand what
mean."
tion was taiien to the refusal to charge as re-

it

OSMER.

it

C!ourt

V.

N. E. 923, 153 N. Y. 604.)
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without his presence, he armed the proposed
borrowers with a written statement over his
own signature, containing a positive assertion of a material fact, with the intention
that It should be acted upon, and should inYet he did not
duce the loan of the money.
know the assertion thus positively made for
such an important purpose to be true, and he
did not investigate or sedi to discover whether It was true or not, although he had dealt
some with the Browns, and had some information as to their circumstances. He intended, as the jury has found upon sufficient evidence, that the lender should understand
him as communicating his actual knowledge,
and not as expressing his opinion, judgment,
Knowing that he did not know
or belief.
what he said he did, and what he intended
to cause another to believe he did, he took
the responsibility of its truth; and honesty of
belief in the supposed fact, under such circumstances, cannot relieve him from the imputation of falsehood and fraud. As was
said by Judge Peckham In Rothschild v.
Mack, supra: "He either knew or he did not
know of the financial condition of the makers of the note.
If he did know it, then he
knew that the note, as to both makers and
indorsers, was without value. If he did not
know its condition, he yet assumed to have
actual knowledge of the truth of his statement • • * He certainly meant to convey the impression of actual knowledge of the
truth of the representations he made as to
the value of the note, and he either knew
such representations were false, or else he
was conscious that he had no actual knowledge while assuming to have It, and Intending
If damage ento convey such impression.
sue, this makes an actionable fraudulent representation." The language of Chief Judge
Andrews, in Kountze v. Kennedy, supra, is
"One who falsely asserts
equally applicable:
of accurate
a material fact, susceptible
knowledge, to be true of his own knowledge,
and thereby induces another to act upon the
fact represented to his prejudice, commits a
fraud which will sustain an action for deceit.
This is not an fexception to, but an application of, the principle that actual fraud
must be shown to sustain such an action.
The purpose of the party asserting his personal knowledge is to induce belief in the
fact represented; and if he has no knowledge, and the fact is one upon which special
knowledge can be predicated', the inference
of fraudulent intent, in the absence of explanation, naturally results." The rule is the
same In other states and in England.
Thus,
In Furnace Co. t. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 18
N. E. 108, the court said: "The charge of
fraudulent intent, in an action for deceit, may
be maintained by proof of a statement made
as of the party's own knowledge, which Is
false, proviued the thing stated is not merely
matter of opinion, estimate, or judgment, but
is susceptible of actual knowledge; and in
such case It Is not necessary to make any fur-

ther proof of an actual Intent to deceive.
The fraud consists In stating that the party
knows the thing to exist, when he does not
know it to exist; and if he does not know it
to exist he must ordinarily be deemed to
know that he does not. Forgetfulness of its
after a former knowledge, or a
existence
inere belief of its existence, will not warrant
or excuse a statement of actual knowledge."
See, also, Bullitt v. Farrar, 42 Minn. 8, 43 N.
W. 506; Hexter v. Bast, 125 Pa, St. 52, 17
Atl. 252; Wells y. McGeoch, 71 Wis. 196, 35
N. W. 769; Swayze v. Waldo, 73 Iowa, 749,
33 N. W. 78; Craig v. Ward, 1 Abb. Dec.
454; Evans v. Edmonds, 13 C. B. 777. The
charge of the learned trial judge was within
these rules, and the exceptions under consideration furnish no ground for a reversal of
the judgment.
The court was further asked to charge that
"there can be no recovery in this case, in
any event, unless it be proven or be found
that there was an actual purpose or intent
on the part of the defendant, on the 15th day
of September, 1888, to defraud Emmanuel
Hadcock of his property."
The court so
charged, but added:
"Of course, that Is In
have already charconnection with what
ged, that it was not necessary It should have
when he made the paper,
been determined,
before they got the money, as to which of
the Hadcocks it was to go, but there must
have been an intention to cheat and defraud
the lierson to whom this paper should be delivered, the one or the other." The defendant excepted to the modification, and now argues that it was reversible error. In the
course of his charge the trial judge had said:
"If it was understood by the defendant that
there was a proposition to borrow of one or
more Hadcocks, and he sent out a general
paper addressed to Mr. Hadcock, why, then
you can say whether it was not fairly Intended to be delivered to such person of the family as would loan the money; and, if that Is
true, it is not essential that it should appear
to you that it had been determined, at tb»
time the paper was drawn, that the loan
should be from one or the other. If j«on find
that fairly the meaning, intention, and design
of the parties was that whoever loaned the
money should have this paper presented to
him, then it may be fah-ly said that the representation was made to whoever did loan
the money to those persons." While the "Sefendant had at first suggested that the money might be borrowed of Benjamin Hadcock,
he was finally told that "the Hadcocks"
would probably make the loan. Since *he
brothers Hadcock lived together as members
oif the same family, and the paper was addressed generally to "Mr. Hadcock," it wes
properly left to the Jury to find whether It
was not the intention of the defendant that
the paper should be delivered to such member of the Hadcock family as would ma{»e
the loan, which was the primary object of
giving the writing.
As a general recommei<^
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dation of credit, knowingly given to an InEolTent person, 'will support an action for decelt In favor of any one acting thereon to
his Injury, so, as we think, a letter addressed
simply to "Mr. Hadcock" would Justify any
man of that name In acting upon It, at least
when It was delivered to him with the apparent authority of the writer, and there was
no direction from the latter as to which one
of the HadcockB It should he given. More-
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the evidence warranted the Inference
that the Browns had implied authority from
the defendant to deliver the letter to either
one of the Hadcocks, and hence to the plaintiff's testator. We agree ■>vith the conclusion
reached by the learned apppUate division, and
think that their Judgment should he affirmed,
All concur, except O'BRIEN, J.,
with costs.
who takes no part, and GRAY, J., absent
Judgment affirmed.
over,
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Appeal from appellate court, Fourtli district.
Bill by H. A. Kattleman against William R. Borders to set aside a sale for
obtained a decree,
Complainant
fraud.
which was affirmed by the appellate court.
AfBrmed.
Defendant appeals.
Koerner & Koerner, for appellant.
Clay Horner, for appellee.

H.

SHOPE, J. This was a bill In chancery
by appellee against appellant, Borders, to
set aside and rescind a sale of property on
the ground of fraud practiced by appellant
whereby the latter was inupon appellee,
duced to part with his property in exchange
for a comparatively worthless note and mortAbout the 1st of July,
gage of a third party.
deposited In the banking house
1884, appellee
of Borders & Boyle $2,000, taking a certificate of deposit therefor, payable in six months
after date, at 5 per cent, interest per annum.
A few months thereafter the firm became
embarrassed,
and was dissolved by the retirement of Boyle. A new firm was formed,
of James J. Borders and appelcomposed
lant, who, for a valuable consideration,
agreed to indemnify Boyle against all debts
and liabilities of the late banking firm.
Shortly after the maturity of the certificate
of deposit appellee applied to appellant at
the bank for payment of said certificate,
who then, as the weight of proof tends to
show, stated to him that he (.appellant) had
a tract of land In Randolph county worth
$2,800, which he had just sold and conveyed
to Crozier at that price; that Crozier had
paid $700 In cash, and given his promissory
for $2,142, secured
note to him (appellant)
by mortgage on the land.
It Is also shown
that he represented to appellee that the land
was well worth $2,800; was ample security
for the note, which would be promptly paid
at Its maturity. He advised appellee, as
appellee testified, to go and see Crozier, who
he represented was well jwsted in respect
of the land. The proofs leave but little, if
any, doubt that the sale of the land to Crozier was not a sale in good faith. It appears,
also, from the testimony that appellee did
call on Crozier for information, and was assured by him' that he (Crozier) had in fact
bought the land for $2,800, and given a mortgage on the same to appellant to secure a
note of $2,142. Appellant also. It seems,
represented their tract of land had 40 acres
cleared and under cultivation. Proof shows
there were only 8 or 9 acres cleared on the
tract. Appellant also represented to appellee, as the chancellor found from the evidence, that the firm of Borders & Boyle was
so embarrassed financially as to endanger
the loss of his money deposited with that

firm; that he told appellee that he did not
want to see him lose anything, and advised
him to take the Crozier note and mortgage
In exchange for his certificate of deposit, as
the only sure means of protecting himself
from loss. It is only just to say that appellant denies most of these alleged representations, or that he was guilty of deceiving appellee in respect of the value or nature of
the land. Appellant knew that James J.
Borders, one of the partners in the firm of
Borders & Boyle, was perfectly solvent, and
that the new firm of which appellant was a
member had obligated themselves to Boyle,
the outgoing partner of the firm of Borders
& Boyle, to protect him from all the liabilities of the late firm, which, of course, included appellee's
Appellee not
certificate.
closing with the terms offered at once, appellant wrote him, urging speedy and prompt
action in the matter. He wrote: "We are
settling very fast with out depositors.
In
•
* » i
this way, delay is dangerous.
could have used the note offered you, [Crozier note,] and can do so yet. If you want
It on the terms offered, to wit, trade my note,
for you to give me an order on Crozier for
difference, which order, if not paid, shall not
bind you, and you to become owner of full
face of note and interest, which terms, if satisfactory, put your name on It, without recourse, and send same to me, and I will send
you note and mortgage indorsed in same
way; mortgages duly recorded.
Answer by
return mail. * * * I will take pleasure
In showing you the land at any convenient
time. I am too busy now. Besides, the
ground Is covered with snow, and you could
not judge of the quality of the soil. I cannot put this matter off. Time Is very
precious with me now."
It is shown by the witness Stout that appellant told him he was about to sell this
land to a man named Kattleman, and that
if he cornered witness, and asked anything
about the value of the land, for the witness
to put the price up. After Borders had sold
the notes to appellee, this same witness asked him (appellant) how he came to sell the
land for the price he did, and appellant
replied, as Is testified, that he "had got hold
of a man that had more money than brains;"
and also said, in reply to a remark by the
witness, that Crozier would never pay the
notes,— "Of cofirse, that Is the calculation."
Most of the material representations shown
by the evidence to have been made by appellant to appellee, to induce the purchase of
the Crozier note and mortgage, are shown
to have been untrue. Some of them, at least,
if the evidence is to be credited, appear to
have been made under circumstances strongly tending to charge appellant with knowledge of their untruthfulness, or, at least, he
occupied such a position as to lead to the
presumption of his knowledge of their falsity. He admits that he knew that J. J. Borders, one of the firm of Borders & Boyle,
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he was endeavoring to Induce appellee to believe that the firm was Insolvent, and that
he was in danger of losing his money.
He
had owned the land in question some time
before the pretended sale to Crozier, professed to be familiar with it, and must be held
to have had notice of its value.
The point is made that, if the means were
at hand by which appellee might have satisfied himself as to the truth or falsity of the
representations,
he was bound to do so, and,
failing to avail himself of such means, he
is not entitled to the relief sought
appellant could make a defense based upon appellee's credulity and faith In appellant's representations,
it could not prevail here. It
appears that appellee did try to see the land
before concluding his purchase from appelBut, it being covered with snow, it
lant.
could not, as stated by appellant in his letter, be properly examined; and, moreover,
appellee was assured by appellant and Crozier, to whom the land had been conveyed,
that the land was of the value of $2,800,
and that practically one third of it was clearAppellant says in his leted and Improved.
ter, as has been seen, that he will take
pleasure in showing appellee the land at
any convenient time; that he was too busy
then; and that no proper judgment could
be formed by his personal inspection of it
at that time.
TSTule willing to show the
land at some convenient time in the future,
he was unwilling to delay concluding the
transaction with appellee.
He wrote: "I
cannot put this matter ofiE. If you do not
will place it
want the note, say so, and
elsewhere."
He wanted an answer by return mail. Time was exceedingly precious
to appellant then. Under such circumstances. It would be in the highest degree unconscionable
to permit appellant to take advantage of the fact that appellee gave credence to his word, and relied upon his statements as true. In such case, the party will
not be relieved from the consequence
of
his false representations,
because the party

If
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the ability to make any proper examination
Appelof the land without further time.
lant, it would seem, was Imperious In his
demand that the transaction be closed at
once, having first induced appellee to believe, as before stated is shown by the evidence, that he was in danger of losing his
money unless he took the Crozier notes and
mortgage.
Nor is it important that It should
be aiflrmatively found that the untrue representation should have in fact been known
to appellant to be false. It is well settled
that It is immaterial whether a party misrepresenting a material fact knows it to be
false, or makes the assertion of the fact
without knowing It to be true; for the affirmation of what one does not know to be
true is unjustifiable, and. If another act upon the faith of It, he who Induced the action
Story, Eq.
must suffer, and not the other.
Jut. § 193; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 877; Bigelow,
Frauds, p. 410 et seq.; Cooley, Torts (2d
Ed.) 582; Thompson v. Lee, 31 Ala. 292;
Railroad Co. v. Tyng, 63 N. Y. 653; Allen
V. Hart, 72 111. 104; Pauntleroy
v. Wilcox,
80 111. 477;

Hicks

v. Stevens,

121

111. 186-

N. E. 241. So it has been held that,
where the representations relate to facts
which must be supposed to be within the
defendant's knowledge, proof of their falsity
is a sufficient showing of his knowledge that
they were false. Cooley, Torts, 583; Morse
V. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 593; Morgan v. SkldAnd so a party selling
dy, 62 N. Y. 319.
property is presumed to know whether the
representations he aflarmatively makes In reIt he know
spect of it are true or false.
I
them to be false, it is a positive fraud; and
if he m ak e them withou t knowing ^j^^™ jp
e frueT fbf"uie"^rpo'se
of "inducing another
TO act "upon tnifem, It in ^guitvamj^ots to
'traiM. Minerv; Medbm-y, 6 Wlsn^SrS miffi
"t'^'"fi3chards, supra; McFerran v. Taylor, 3
Cranch, 270; Glasscock v. Minor, 11 Mo.
Taking the evidence on the part of
655.
by the letters of appelappellee, supported
lant and proof of extrinsic facts, we are unable to say that the chancellor was not justithereby injured trusted him, and parted with fied in finding that appellee was induced to
his property upon false representation of
part with his certificate of deposit by the
fact, which he assumed to know to be true.
statements and representations of appellant
Where the sale Is of property at a distance,
of matters materially affecting the transacso that the purchaser has not the means at
tion, and which are shown to be untrue.
hand of ascertaining the truthfulness of the
All fraud and untrue statement, and that he
vendor's representations, the vendee may remade any' untrue representations, is denied
ly upon their truth, and have redress If they
by appellant, and his version of the transare shown to have been materially false.
action Is consistent with his honesty and
Smith V. Richards, 13 Pet. 26; Maggart v. good faith; but in the confiict we think the
Freeman, 27 Ind. 531; Harris v. McMurray,
preponderance of the evidence is with ap23 Ind. 9;
Ladd v. Pigott, 114 111. 647, 2 pellee, and sustains the material allegations
N. E. 503; Savage v. Stearns, 126 Mass. 207.
of the bill. The decree of the circuit court
Here, as It appears, appellee did not have
will accordingly be affirmed.
197,
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

et al.
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Nov. 6, 1898k

Appeal from court of common pleas,
est county; Charles P. Noyes, Judge.

For-

Bin by Elizabeth P. NeUl against B. F.
Shamburg and H. W. Shamburg, administrators of Q. Shamburg, deceased, to rescind a contract of sale by plaintiff to
defendants' Intestate of an undivided half
interest in a leasehold of a 200-acre tract of
oil land. The price consideration of the contract of sale was $550 paid in cash, and $100
to be paid in case a well producing six or
more barrels of oil per day should be foimd
on the land.
The bill was dismissed, and
complainant appeals.
Affirmed.
T. F. Bichey and Samuel T. Neill, for appellant Julius Byles, Samuel D. Irwin, and
Eugene Mackey, for appellees.

MITCHELL, J. There are two main questions of fact upon which the plaintiff's claim
to relief must ultimately rest — First, serious
inadequacy of price; and, secondly, fraud,
actual or constructive. If either of these
grounds fails, the case must fall. The master finds that there was no Inadequacy of
price, and, as the learned court concurs In
this finding, it would be sufficient for us to
say that we have not been shown that it
was clear error. But an examination of the
•whole evidence, in deference
to the earnestness of cotmsel, who regard this as a turning point in the case, leads us to the same
conclusion. At the time of the sale.-^July,
1879,— the 200-acre tract was undeveloped,
except for one well, No. 8, which had been
in op^iation about three months.
The most
favoraUe evidence as to this well was given
by James, who said, "My recollection ia
that it started off between five and seven
barrels, somewhere," while the Mclntyres,
Tuck«, and other witnesses, put its production at from one to three barrels. The same
witnesses describe the neisrhboring territory
as "spotted," good wells and dry holes being
found close together. The 50-acre tract adJoining on the northwest had at that date
three wells, two of which, Nos. 5 and 6, were
small, and one. No. 7, was a valuable weU,
having iM-oduced as high as 75 barrels, and
ranging down, according to the different witnesses, from that to 7 or 8 barrels, which
James Mclntyre says was Its production In
July, 1879. Business was dull, and there
was no active market for leases In that
neighbwhood, (Jenkins .and Fogle.) Under
these circumstances, It is plain that the value
of the lease was almost entirely speculative.
Indeed, James testifies that the value of oil
territory is always speculative, until It Is
actually developed.
It Is a business with
elements of great uncertainty, and that appears to have been peculiarly so In the presEverything depended on whether
ent case.

No. 7, or the little wells near It, should be
taken as the best Index of the nature of the
territory. The three witnesses for plaintiff
put the value of the lease at from twenty
thousand to eight or ten thousand dollars;
the highest estimate being given by Egoff,
whose testimony Is badly handicapped
Dy
the fact that he was a discharged employe,
who admitted that he had come forward in
the case partly "to get even with" his former
employer. On the other hand, we have the
testimony of eight or nine witnesses, most
of them with superior local knowledge, and
several owners of land in the Immediate
vicinity, with certainly no bias to depreciate
the neighborhood, aU concurring that the
lease was worth nothing beyond the royalty. The decided weight of the evidence Is
In favor of the adequacy of the consideration
paid.
As this finding takes away the foundation
of the plaintiff's claim to relief, the other
matters may be dismissed briefly.
There was no proof of actual fraud. No
express misrepresentations were shown, all
that there was on the subject being the
clause in the assignment of the lease stipulating a "further consideration of one hundred dollars when a well Is found on said
lease producing six barrels per day," etc.
The master construed this as "a practical
representation that no such well had then
been found."
In view of the fact that this
Is writing Into a paper in which the plaintiff
Is the grantor, and which the grantee has
not signed, a representation by the latter
which is not to be found In the words used,
this construction might be difficult to maintain; but, as it is in favor of the appellant,
we need not consider It further.
Even conceding that the representation was thus
made, the master finds that It has not been
shown to be untrue.
It is further claimed that Shamburg, Intentionally and In bad faith, concealed from
the plaintiff facts relating to the production
of oil on the 50-acre lease, which she was
entitled to know. It was certainly shown
that Shamburg had directed liis employes
not to give information on tills subject, but
to refer parties to him. The plaintiff had
no Interest In the 50-acre lease, but we may
concede that, when she was about to sell her
part of the othei; lease to her cotenant, she
became entitled to know such facts with regard to Its production as would bear upon
the value of the other. But, imless there is
some exceptional circumstance to put on
to speak, It Is^e right oi !
Mnufll g duty
"
every roM to keep his business to himself .
"Tossibly, SKamburg was unduly suspicious
on this point, but the nature and position of
his business suggested caution. Fogle testifies that Shamburg was the only person
operating in that neighborhood, and James
says that Shamburg told him he had 'spent
near $150,000 In developing that territory,
"and now all these fellows are anzioua t»
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pry Into my business." We do not find In
the acts of Shamburg, under the circumstances, anything more than a positive intention and effort to reap the benefit of his
enterprise, by keeping the knowledge of its
results to himself, and we agree with the
master that this "falls far short of establishing fraud."
The daim of constructive fraud Is based
on the relations of the parties as partners,
The masand as mortgagor and mortgagee.
ter has rightly fotmd that there was no partThe parties were tenants in comnership.
mon.

M^^t^m^pSonlSrrsmiersV^lSc^

that relation; Walkeir v. , Tupper, 152^
Pa. St 1, 25 AtL Rep. 172; Dunham v. Loverock, 27 Ati. Rep. 990, (not yet officiary reAnd there was no evidence from
ported.)

■-ff6m
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which to infer a partnership by Intention
and agreement of the parties. The relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee, like that
of tenants in common. Is in some respects,
and to a limited degree, one of confidence.
There are certain things, approximating to,
If not actually Involving, a breach of good
faith, which neither will be permitted to do,
to the prejudice of the other. But we do
not find In the present case anything which
requires the application of this principle.
The mortgage
was merely for indemnity
against a contingent loss by having to pay
a guaranty to third persons.
tfntU such loss
occurred, Shamburg had no claim on the
mortgaged premises which changed the relar
tion of the parties as tenants in common.
Decree affirmed.
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were such services as a son or brother might
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Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
Term,

gift

October

1882.

On bill, answer and proofs taken
court.

In open

Keen, S.
H. Pennington, and
Oscar
John
Thomas N. McOarter, for complainant.
R. Emery and Henry 0. Pitney, for defendant.

VAN FUE^ET, V. C. This is a bill by a
principal against her agent The complainant
charges the defendant with many acts of misconduct in the course of his agency, some of
which constitute gross frauds. The relation
of principal and agent was formed between
The complainthe parties in January, 1873.
She
ant's husband died Novemlser 29, 1872.
was then about 68 years of age, childless, and
She lacked
without experience in business.
both a knowledge of business and an inclination to acquire it. Her husband, by his
will, gave his whole estate to her. His personal estate amounted to about $60,000. He
had, by a writing, which has not been put
in evidence, but the existence of which has
been fully proved, recommended the defendant as a at person to assist the complainant
in the management of her estate. The defendant had been associated with the complainant's husband for many years as a ruling
of the spiritual
elder in the superintendence
affairs of' one of the most influential PresbyHis
terian churches of the city of Newark.
reputation as a capable and trustworthy busiHe was president of
ness man stood high.
one of the most prominent fire insurance comHis high repanies of the city of Newark.
ligious character, and the position of trust he
were aloccupied in the business community,
most sure to give him the confidence of the
Very shortly after the
most cautious person.
death of her husband, the complainant surrendered into the possession of the defendant
all her papers and securities, and requested
him to have the safe in which her husband
had kept his securities removed to his oflSce,
In order that he might manage her affairs
with less inconvenience to himself. This he
did.
From this time forth until the latter
part of December, 1879, the defendant exercised over the securities and moneys of the
complainant a dominion almost as absolute as
he did over his own.
The complainant.
In
describing her relations to the defendant,
says:
"I looked to the defendant for everything without anxiety. I just threw myself
on his fidelity, as a child would on a parent,
without questioning."
And the defendant, speaking on the same
subject, says that the complainant and he
were on terms of close friendship and intimacy; that she looked upon him as her adviser, comforter and friend, and that what
he did for her was done as a friend, and

I

This narrative shows that the relation between the parties was one of great trust and
almost blind confidence on one side, and complete control on the other. _Ihe defendant,
feerefore,, oc cupied a position tow ar ds the
^mpla'San^ wEere he was bo ig^^^ [only to
aeai with her honestly
a nd~^jTlggyr but "to
tJC'i'iipuTonsly avoia engaging m any transaction," in respect to her estate, in whidll Es
interests might be put-ifi- antagonism to hers.
He was required, in all things relating to
her estate, to subordinate
his interests to
hers, and carefully abstain from using his
power and influence over her for his own
advantage
and to her harm.
The law by
which he was bound to regulate his conduct
is a law of jealousy, and under its wise provisions he can keep nothing that he has ob'
tained from her, under the guise of a contract to which he cannot show a title entrenched in the utmost good faith. His title
must have been acquired openly, on a full
and frank disclosure of every fact likely to
Influence her conduct, and his contract must
be shown to have been just and honest m
every particular.
The flrst of the several claims to relief presented by the bill, which I shall consider, is
that in which the complainant charges that
the defendant is liable for the profit made on
the purchase and sale of certain railroad
Among the property which the comstock.
plainant acquired, under the will of her husband, were 67 shares of the capital stock of
the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey. After this corporation became insolvent
and passed into the possession of the chancellor,
very
the complainant became
much
troubled about what was best to do with her
stock, whether to sell it or to keep it. She
sought information in many directions, consulted the defendant almost daily, and after
undergoing much perturbation of mind upon
the subject, at last, under a strong fear that
if she continued to hold it, the whole would
be lost,

she gave

the

defendant

peremptory

direction to sell it at $16 a share. This direction was given about the 1st of May, 1878.
The defendant did not sell the stock, bnt\
caused it to be transferred to his vrife, and)
paid the complainant for it at the price it I
was then selling for on the market The
amount he paid was $1,072. He did not tell
the complainant that he intended to purchase
the stock himself or of his purpose to have
it transferred to his wife, but on the contrary, by his answer, he says that after he
made up his mind to buy, he went to the
complainant and told her that a sale had been
effected, or could be effected, at $16 a share.
In his evidence, he says that the idea of purchasing the stock for himself, as a speculation, first entered his mind after he had received direction to sell it and after he had

J
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bad an interview
with VermUyea & Co.,
of the City of New York, in
stockbrokers

which they told him that they thought the
market price of the stock would advance.
At
the time ^e told the complainant that a sale
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retreating from the purpose to sell, and he
afterwards found it necessary to adhere to it
to escape her reproaches for not dealing with
her openly and fairly.
The legal principle to be applied in deciding whether the defendant can successfully
resist the complainant's claim is too firmly
established to warrant even the most astute
and courageous counsel in attempting to overthrow it or to narrow its scope. The general Interests of justice and the safety of
those who are compelled to repose confidence
in others alike demand that the courts shall
always Inflexibly maintain that great and ,
salutary rule which declares tnat an agent
jmployed to sell cannot make nimself ^ g

had been effected, or could be effected, at ?16
a share, he did not teU her that he had consulted these gentlemen, nor what opinion they
had expressed.
After the stock was transferred, the defendant paid to the receiver in
charge of the affairs of the corporation under
scheme, the sum of $500,
the re-organization
and in return received an adjustment bond,
and also surrendered five shares of stock,
On
and in return received an income bond.
January 30, 1880, he sold the 62 shares still
"purchaser, nor, if employed to pu rcnase, can
standing in the name of his wife, for $5,The defendant's wife had no benefi- "he be himself the seller! xne moment Ee
091.75.
cial interest in the transaction, she paid no
ceases to be the representative of his employpart of the purchase money, and received no
er and places himself in a position towards
part of the proceeds of sale.
his principal where his interests may come in
The defendant's reticence under the circumconflict with those of his principal, no matstances was not only unnatural, but undutiter how fair his conduct may be in the parof inforful. It amounted to a concealment
ticular transaction, that moment he ceases
matlon whic h, I thi nk , he was boung to give ,. to be that which his service requires and his
He is no
duty to his principal demands.
He Khew that tne complainant naa long been
longer an agent but an umpire; he ceases to
in a state of painful anxiety about her stock,
that she had been reaching out in almost
be the champion of one of the contestants
every direction for help, and that she seized
in the game of bargain, and sets himself
upon every scrap of information that came
up as a judge to decide, between his prinin her way with the greatest avidity; he
cipal and himself, what is just and fair.
knew, also, that her mind had been in a
The reason of the rule is apparent; owing to
very unstable condition as to what it was
the selfflshness and greed of our nature,
best for her to do, and that she had great
there must, in the great mass of the transas well as his
confidence In his shrewdness,
actions of mankind, be a strong and almost
integrity, and that she would be likely to be
ineradicable antagonism between the interI strongly influenced by his conduct.
am
ests of the seller and the buyer, and universal
thoroughly persuaded that he concealed from
experience has shown that the average man
her the fact that he intended to buy for the
will not, where his interests are brought in
purpose of inducing her to sell, believing that
conflict with those of his employer, look upif he told her he Intended to become the pur- on his employer's interests as more important
chaser himself, she would at once refuse to
and entitled to more protection than his
sell.
own.
This conviction is greatly strengthened by
In such cases the courts do not stop to inShortly after the quire whether an agent has obtained an adconduct
his subsequent
stock was transferred, its market price bevantage or not, or whether his conduct has
and the complainant exgan to advance,
been fraudulent or not, when the fact is espressed regret that she had sold, and applied
tablished that he has attempted to assume
to the defendant to know whether she could
two distinct, and opposite characters in theHe told her same transaction, in one of which he acted
not get the stock back again.
He did not ac- for himself and in the other pretended to act
she had spoken too late.
'
knowledge that he was its purchaser,
and
for another person, and to have secured for
frankly state, as think he should have done,
each the same measm-e of advantage that
would have been obtained If each had been
that he was unwilling to return it. Subse• quently,
represented by a disinterested and loyal repwhen applied to for information as
resentative; they do not pause to speculate
to whom the complainant's stock had been

1^

I

I

sold, he answered that he did not know,
but said it had been sold through Vermllyea
& Co. This statement, it will be perceived,
involved something more than concealment.
The evidence renders it entirely clear,
think, that from the time the defendant
made up his mind to buy the stock, up until
the evidence of his purchase was discovered, he made a constant effort to conceal from
the complainant the fact of his purchase.
His motive for adopting this course originally was to prevent the complainant from

I

concerning the merits of the transaction,
whether the agent has been able so far tocurb -his natural greed as to take no advantage, but they at once pronounce the transaction void because it is against public policy. The salutary object of the principle is
not to compel restitution in case fraud has
been committed or an imjust advantage has
been gained, but to elevate the agent to a
position where he cannot be tempted to betray his principal. Under a less sti'ingent
rule, fraud might be committed or unfair
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advantage taken, and yet, owing to the imperfections of the best of human Institutions,
the Injured party be unable either to discover
it or prove it in such manner as to entitle
him to redress.
To guard against this imcertainty, all possible temptation is removed,
.and_the prohib ition ag^ainst an agent acting
in a^ual c haf &dter is made oroad enougfi
to co ver all 1113 transactions. The rights of
TBB~grmcipai will not De changed, nor the
capacity of the agent enlarged, by the fact
that the agent is not Invested with a discretion, but simply acts under an authority to
purchase a particular article at a specified
price, or to sell a particular article at the
No such distinction is recogmarket price.
nized by the adjudications, nor can It be
established without removing an important
safeguard against fraud. Benson v. Heathorn, 1 Younge & O. Ch. 326; Conkey v.
Bond, 34 Barb. 276, 36 N. T. 427.
In pronouncing the judgment of the court
of errors and appeals in Staats v. Bergen,
17 N. J. Eq. 554, 558, the present chief justice has discussed this whole subject vrith his
usual vigor and perspicuity. "The rule,"
just stated, he says, "is one of public polthink, it
icy.
The trustee,"—and here,
should be said that the persons referred to
are not simply those who are strictly entitled
to be called trustees, but the term is used
in its most comprehensive sense, and intended to embrace all persons who act in a representative capacity, whether, according to
they are styled agents,
exact nomenclature,
factors, executors, administrators or trustees,
—"the trustee is not prevented from bidding
for property which he himself sells, on the
of actual
ground simply of a supposition
fraud, but because the law has established,
as an inflexible rule, applicable to every
emergency, that he shall not place himself in
a situation in which he will be tempted to
take advantage of his cestui que trust This
is a wise public regulation, intended to protect a species of property which otherwise
would be constantly exposed to peculiar hazard. The trustee, therefore, must submit to
this regulation, and if he does an act in violation of it, tin jTiattp r how pure his Intention may be, ^uch act Is voidable _at the In-'
Stance ot the person" whom he represe nts.
*"""•■-* — At tnese sales, then, tne trustee is"
forbidden to purchase, because his interest,
as such purchaser, is opposed to the interest
of his cestui que trust, and he acts, therefore, under a bias In his own favor.
Nor
does this rule rest, to any considerable
extent, in the fact that, in a particular line of
cases, the trustee has peculiar opportunities
for the practice of fraudulent acts with regard to the property in his charge. The rule,
to be efficacious, must be general, and the
law Implies, therefore, that In all cases of
trusts such opportunities may exist, and
consequently
the prohibition is universal.
* * • So jealous is the law on this point,
that a trustee may not put himself in a posi-

I

tion in which, to be honest, must be a strain
on him."
The cases are numerous in which
these principles have been enforced against
persons acting in the capacity of agents.
I
shall cite only those most pertiijent.
Ex
parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 625; Brookman v. Rothschild, 3 Sim. 153; Rothschild v. Brookman,
2 Dow & C. 188; GUlett v. Peppercome, 3
Beav. 78; Moore v. Moore, 5 N. Y. 256;
New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Protection Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85.
It is possible for an agent, dealing directly
with his principal, to make a contract whici
the courts will uphold; but such transactions, to be maintained, must be characterized by the utmost good faith. There must
be no misrepresentation, and an entire absence of concealment or suppression of any
fact within the knowledge of the agent,
which might Influence the principal; and the
burden of establishing the perfect . fairness
of the contract, in such cases, rests upon the
agent.
Condit v. Blackwell, 22 N. J. Bq.
481.
Such transactions are never upheld,
unless it is clearly shown that there has been,
on the part of the person trusted, that most
marked integrity, that uberrima fides, which
removes all doubt respecting the fairness of
the contract. Rothschild y, Brookman, ubl
supra.

My conclusion Is that the defendant Is lla-\
ble to the complainant for the profit made I
on the purchase and sale of the complainant's!
—
railroad stock.
The second claim to relief which I shall
consider is that in which the complainant insists that she is entitled to have the sum
which shall be found to be due her in the
transaction just discussed, charged as a lien
for unpaid purchase money on certain real
estate which she conveyed,
at the defendant's instance, to the defendant's wife. This
claim rests upon the foUovnng facts: In
March, 1874, the defendant purchased a house
and lot on High street, in the city of Newark,
for a residence for himself, for the sum of
$15,000. On the 1st of April, 1874, he procured them to be conveyed to the complainant, and paid the purchase money as follows:
The complainant and defendant executed two
bonds of $4,500 each, which were secured by
two mortgages,
made by the complainant
alone, on the property conveyed,
and the
complainant also assigned to the vendor a
mortgage held by her against Leopold and
Herman Graf for $4,000, and the balance of
the purchase money, viz., $2,000, was paid In
cash.
The defendant admits that at the time
he made this payment he might have had
$2,000 of the complainant's money in his
hands.
During the year Immediately succeeding
the conveyance, the defendant says he made
improvements on the property which cost
$7,000. The complainant continued to hold
the title to the property until she severed her
relations with the defendant
On the severance of their relations, the complainant

'
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demanded that the defendant should take
the title to the High street property, discharge her from liahiUty on the bonds which
she had executed In his behalf, and return
to her such part of the purchase money as
her money and securities had paid. This
was done. The house and lot were conveyed
to the defendant's wife January 7, 1880, and
the defendant then paid to the complainant,
in cash. In satisfaction of the money and
securities belonging to her, which he had
used in paying for the house and lot, the
sum of 34,594.90. The funds he used in making this payment were the proceeds of the
sale of the railroad stock, which the defendant had Induced the complainant to transfer
Under the force of these facts,
to his wife.
the complainant insists that inasmuch as the
moneys which the defendant paid to her
were the proceeds of her property, and were,
therefore, in equity hers, and not his, that it
should be adjudged that the consideration
which the defendant agreed to pay for the
conveyance to his wife has not been paid,
and consequently that she is entitled to a
lien as for unpaid purchase money.

Two things are undisputed. First, that
part of the consideration which the defendant was to pay for the conveyance to his
wife, was to make restitution to the complainant, in money, of so much of her property as he had used, at the time of the purchase, in paying for the house and lot; and
second, that in going through the form of
making such restitution, he simply gave to
the complainant what in equity was hers already.
If the defendant, in going through
the form of paying the complainant, had
belonging to
used money in his possession
her, the legal nature of the transaction would
have been so conspicuously clear that it
would have been impossible to misunderstand it. So too. If he had secretly converted one of her secittitles into money and handed that over to her as payment, though he
might have deceived her for the moment, his
act would have not constituted a payment,
but a fraud. This Is exactly what he did
do. He converted property which in equity
was hers. Into money, and attempted to pay
her with her own money.
He attempted to
use that which was hers as his, and to discharge his obligation to her by giving her
that which he had attempted, wrongfully, to
take from her and to vest in himself. Except we travesty reason and ridicule truth, it
is impossible to call such a transaction a

payment.

This conclusion makes it the duty of the
court to declare that the whole of the consideration which the defendant agreed to give
for the conveyance to his wife has not been
given, and this places the complainant in a
position before the court where she is entitled to the aid of the court In enforcing her
equitable rights against the land conveyed.
The right of a vendor of lands to a lien in
equity for unpaid purchase money, has been
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fully and repeatedly

recognized by this court
and is now a part of its established jurisprudence.
This lien will be enforced, not
against the purchaser, but against all who
claim under him as volunteers or donees.
Graves v. Ooutant, 31 N. J. Eq. 763.
My judgment is that the complainant Is i
entitled to a lien as for unpaid purchase \
money, against the house and lot conveyed
1
by her to the defendant's wife, to the ex- j
tent that the defendant used the money of /
the complainant in paying the consideration /
he agreed to give the complainant therefor, y
The third claim made by the complainant
presents the question whether or not the
defendant Is liable for $1,000 of the purchase
money of a lot of land conveyed by the complainant to one David Brackin, in July, 1874.
The lot was sold for $1,200, $200 of which
was paid in cash, and the balance, as the
complainant alleges, was to be secured by
a first mortgage on the property sold.
The
defendant, she says, had charge of the whole
matter, and, instead of securing the balance
of the purchase money by a first mortgage I
on the lot sold, accepted a second mortgage /
on another lot, and that since then the first j
mortgage has been foreclosed, the mortgaged I
premises sold and the whole of her money *
lost I shall not restate or discuss the evidence pertinent to this branch of the case.
It is enough to say that, according tb my
view, the evidence entirely falls to establish a case against the defendant. It should
be said that it clearly appears that the complainant Is entirely wrong in the facts on
which she rests her right to relief. It was i
not the first mortgage that was foreclosed, I
but the one held by the complainant. At the r
sale of the mortgaged premises they were '
bid in by the solicitor employed by the defendant, for the complainant, to foreclose
her mortgage, for $700.
The complainant refused to take title to the mortgaged premises, and they were afterwards conveyed to
the defendant's daughter by his direction,
and he subsequently assumed control over
The defendant paid the taxed costs
them.
of the suit and the expenses of the sale,
but nothing more, though he procured the
mortgaged premises to be conveyed to his
daughter. In stating the account between
the parties the defendant must be charged
with the sum for which the premises were
sold, and credited with whatever he has paid
on account thereof.
The complainant also seeks to hold the defendant liable for making an improper or
Insecure investment of her moneys.
In
March, 1875, the complainant received from
the sale of some land located in Pennsylvania the sum of $6,000, and handed it over
to the defendant to invest for her. The defendant, March 17, 1875, deposited the money
to an account he kept In one of the Newark
banks, as trustee. He is unable to tell how
many different trusts this account represented, or when this particular $6,000 waa

\
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disbursed, or to whom. On March 6, 1875,
William A. Pruden and Amos W. Austin
executed a second mortgage on a lot in Commerce street, in the city of Newark, to the
defendant as executor of Robert O. Stoutenburgh, deceased, for $6,000. The defendant
says he invested the complainant's money in
The prior mortgage on this
this mortgage.
lot secured the sum of $10,000. The defendant says, before investing the complainant's
he
money in the mortgage just described,
told her it was a second lien, that he was
satisfied the security was sufficient and that
the mortgagors were good and prompt payers, and that she thereupon directed him to
was
make the investment. The mortgage
not assigned to the complainant at the time
the investment was made, but the defendant
says he took it from the package containing the papers of the Stoutenburgh estate,
and placed it among the papers he held for
The mortgage was not
the complainant
formally assigned until after the complainant had revoked the defendant's authority as
her agent, and called upon him to surrender
her property. The defendant made seven indorsements of interest on the bond after he
says he placed the mortgage among the pafour of them are
pers of the complainant;
made by him as attorney, two as executor
and one without any designation.
It is evident at a glance that the defendant's conduct in this transaction is open to
the very gravest suspicion. The security, In
the first place, was one that a trustee could
not accept without rendering himself personally liable in case It proved to be worthless
or inadequate. Gilmore v. Tuttle, 32 N. J.
Eq. 611. The defendant, therefore, occupied
a position in respect to this security which
entirely disqualified him, as the trusted adviser of the complainant, from giving her
such counsel respecting it as she was enSimply placing the mortgage
titled to have.
among the complainant's papers, without
other evidence of her ownership, not only
put her title to it In a condition of extreme
/jeopardy, but left the defendant free to use
it, as occasion might seem to require, as a
I security belonging to both funds, and thus
\make it answer a. double purpose. The defendant kept no account of his transactions
on behalf of the complainant, and she was,
therefore, deprived of the protection which
the performance of that duty would have afforded her. The defendant's conduct in this
matter deserves, as I think, the severest condemnation.
But while It appears to be very clear that
the defendant's
conduct In this transaction
has been highly improper,
stiU
think It
equally clear on the proofs as they now stand
that no case is established against the defendant which can be made the basis of rerlief to the complainant.
It has not been
shown that the mortgage in question is either
I
I a worthless or an inadequate
security.
No
> loss has as yet been sustained,
nor has any

/

I

attempt been made to show that the complainant must Inevitably or will probably
suffer loss. All that has been shown is that
the defendant has Invested the complainant's
money in a second mortgage.
I know of no
authority which goes to the length of dedartng that a trustee shall be liable, whether loss
is sustained or not, simply because he has invested the funds in his hands in a second
He is bound to make safe investmortgage.
ments, such as will yield a reasonable income
and a return of the principal when required.
If he does that, though the secmity he takes
may not be the most desirable, he incurs no
He should not, as a genpersonal liability.
eral rule. Invest in second mortgages;
if he
does, he takes the risk of bemg personally answerable in case loss ensues, but he is not
liable, as I understand the rule, simply because he has made such an investment, If no
loss has been sustained, and In the absence
of evidence that any will be sustained.
The next claim made by the complainant
Among the property which
Is uncontested.
the complainant received under the will of
her husband were ten shares of the stock of
a corporation known by the name of the PeDividends, in
ters Manufacturing Company.

)

both cash and stock or bonds, were declaired
on this stock in 1873, 1874, and 1875.
Those
of 1873 were 30 per cent, ta cash, and 40 per
cent. In stock; In 1874, 40 per cent, in cash,
25 per cent, in stock, and 35 per cent, in
bonds; and In 1875, 30 per cent m cash, and
20 per cent, in bonds.
The defendant collectHe paid the cash
ed all these dividends.
dividends to the complainant, but had the
stock and bond dividends
issued to himself
His explanation or justification
as trustee.
of his conduct in this matter is this: he says
when the first stock dividend was declared,
he inquired of the complainant what he
should do with it, and that she replied he
might do with it what he liked, or what he
had a mind to, and that he understood her by
this form of expression to say to him that she
meant that he should take it as a gift Wh
the subsequent dividends were declared, he
says he supposed that she entertained thesame intention with respect to them, and he
procured them also to be Issued to himself,
though he made no further inquiry of her respecting her purpose, and she made no furThe dether declaration of her Intention.
fendant sold the stock and bonds thus obtataed, in January, 1877, for $1,300. But before
making the sale, he had received on the stock
so obtained by him dividends in cash to the
amount of $561.
The defendant, by his answer, admits that he Is liable for the value
of the stock and the amount that he has received thereon in dividends,
and says that
he is willing to account to the complainant
for the same, if she insists that he shall doso. She does so insist This claim Is one of
the foundations of her bill. The defendant
in the accounting, must be charged with what
he received on the sale of the stock and'
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and also ■with whatever he has receivas dividends.
1 shall dispose of the other questions at issue between the parties by simply stating my
conclusions, without attempting to review the
evidence or stating the argument upon which
they rest
1. The complainant Is not entitled to a de<;ree setting aside the deed made by her to
for
the defendant's daughter as compensation
the defendant's services.
in the accounting, is en2. The defendant,
titled to a credit of $50 for money paid to
the complainant In December, 1879.
in the accounting, must
3. The defendant,

"bonds,

ed thereon
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charged with the dividends received by
him for the complainant on her stock in the
American Insurance Company, for the years
1876, 1877 and 1878; also with three sums,
of $17.50 each, for unpaid interest on the
Graf bonds and mortgages, due February 1,
1873, August 1, 1873, and February 1, 1874;
and also with $6.20 which, in his account, he
charged
against
has erroneously
the complainant
The account between the parties will be
Eistated and settled by the vice chancpJlor.
ther party may brlnj: on the hearing on the
accounting on ten days' notice to the other.
The complainant is entitled to costs
be
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VIBGINIA LAND
(19

OO. v.

HAUPT.

S. E. 168, 90 Va. 533.)

March
of Virginia.
& 1894.
Error to circuit court of city of Roanolre.
Action by the Virginia Land Company
against one Haupt. Judgment for defendant,
Affirmed.
and plaintiff brings error.
Robertson,
for plainWatts, Robertson &
Griffin & Glasgow, for defendtiff in error.
ant in error.

Supreme Court of Api)eals

LEWIS, P. The defendant In error was

sned
by the Virginia Land Company to recover certain unpaid assessments on the stock of the
The principal
$2,800.
company aggregating
grounds of defense were (1) frand In procuring the contract of subscription; and (2)
the prospeca material variance between
The
tus and the charter of the company.
jury found for the defendant, and the court
refused to disturb the verdict. The defendant subscribed for the stocli at the Instance
of one O'Leary, who was a real estate agent
at Roanolie, and one of the promoters of the
It was proposed in the prospectus
company.
"to organize a company for the purchase of
a certain tract of land, lying near the said
city, containing about 550 acres, and to lay
it out in residence lots, and to develop Its
natural attractions." By the charter subsequently obtained the company was authorized to buy land, not exceeding 5,000 acres,
also personal property, and to issue mortgage bonds; to loan money to develop lands;
to construct street railways, and to use cars

Impelled by any kind of motive power; to
erect and operate motor, gas, and electric
works, etc. O'Leary was known to the defendant as a successful business man, and
his name headed the subscription list. When
he solicited the defendant to subscribe he
informed him, in answer to a specific inquiry,
that the land proposed to be purchased belonged to Gates, Moorman & Moorman.
In
'point of fact, O'Leary and one Christian,
another subscriber to the stock and a promoter of the company, held options on the
land, which fact was not mentioned to the
O'Leary recommended the stock
defendant.
to the defendant as a. desirable investment,
and upon his advice the defendant agreed to
take 100 shares.
After the organization of
the company the land was transferred to
O'Leary
the company,
and in consequence
and Christian realized a very large profit
rhe company was chartered early In March,
1890, and on the 19th of the same month the
first stockholders' meeting was held, at which
meeting O'Leary represented
the defendant
as his proxy.
At the same meeting an assessment of 10 per cent, of the capital stock
was ordered, notice of which was afterwards
sent to the defendant; and on the 23d of
the ensuing August another assessment of
5 per cent, was ordered.
Upon receipt of
notice of this last assessment the defendant

wrote the secretary of tlio company as folhave your notice of
lows: "Dear Sir:
September 1st, calling for an assessment of

I

$500.00,— five per cent, on one hundred shares
you will please refer to
of your stock.
my letter of AprU the 28th, addressed to
your treasurer, you will notice that am not
Although
a stockholder in your company.
have never received a reply to this letter,
take it, In the absence of such acknowledgment, my stock was, as a matter of course,
So that there may be no further
canceled.
misunderstanding la the matter, however,
am not a stocliholder in
beg to advise that
the Virginia Land Company, having paid no
whatever on the subscriptton."
assessment
In the notice of the 10 per cent assessment
of March 19, 1890, it was said: "This amount
must be paid promptly, or the stock wUl be
declared forfeited;" and in response to this
the defendant's letter of the 28th of April,
above referred to, was vyritten, which is as
have your favor of
"Dear Sir:
follows:
the 24th lust, calling attention to ten per
cent, assessment of the Virginia Land Company's stock, and in reply beg to say that
recent financial arrangements In another direction, that
am suddenly called upon to
provide for, vriU make It impossible for me
to i>ay this assessment now; and to prevent
delays, as well as to avoid being a hindrance
In any way to the success of the company,
wlH be glad if you will consider my stock
forfeited, as provided for in notice of assess* • •
vyiU be glad, therefore, if
ment.
you vrtll dispose of my stodi to other parties.
have been Informed that the stock is selling
presume there vsoll be no
at a premium, so
difficulty in doing this. Having paid nothing
am, of course, not entitled to
on the stock,
anything from It" At the trial the defendant testified that when he made the contract
of suljscription he had no other information
respecting the proposed enterprise than such
as he obtained from the prospectus and wliat
was told him by O'Leary; that he was induced to subscribe by the urgent solicitation
of O'Leary, in whose judgment and integrity
he had confidence, and who earnestly recommended the scheme as a good investment
He also testified that he had no idea that
O'Leaiy was interested in the land which
it was proposed to buy otherwise than as a
stockholder, and that, so far from the fact
being disclosed to him, O'Leary, when questioned on the subject, represented that It belonged to Gates, Moorman & Moorman. He
testified further that he would not have consented to subscribe
had he known of the
promoter's interest in the land, and that he
had no intimation of any such thing as a
"promoter's fund" until several weeks after
he had subscribed.
The court, among other things. Instructed
the jury that If they believed from the evidence that O'Leary and Christian held options on the land, and that O'Leary induced
the defendant to subscribe In Ignorance of

If
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that fact, relying on his (O'Leary's) supposed

disinterested and superior judgment, and that
he, the defendant, was thereby misled, to his
Injury, into making a contract that he otherwise would not have made, then the subThis
scription was voidable, at his option.

propounds the law correctly.
The authorities are abimdant in support of
the general rule tliat one who is fraudulentiy
. Induced by an agent of a corporation— and a
promoter is an agent of the proposed corsubscribe to its capital stocl:
poration—to
may, at his option, repudiate the contract;
and that a fraud may consist as well in the
suppression of what Is true as in the repof what IS false. Indeed, the
resentation
law is that, where the person solicited to
subscribe has no other information on the
subject than that the agent chooses to convey,
the statement of the agent ought to be characterized by the utmost candor and honesty.
Gooii, Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law (3d Ed.)
Crump v. Mining Co., 7 Grat 352;
§ 147;
Bosher v. Land Co., 89 Va. 455, 16 S. E. 360;
0u-ectors, etc., v. Kisch, L. R. 2 H. L. 99.
It is contended, however, that the defendant
has by his conduct waived the right to annul
But there can be
the contract in question.
no waiver in a case «f this sort without full
of the facts, and such knowlknowledge
edge of the facts and such knowledge on
the part of the defendant has not been
He says he had an intimation a
shown.
few weeks after the organization of the company that the re was* large promoters' fund,
interested In
but as to wh<r'wSre'^lie"^rti^S
He made
the fund he was not informed.
inquiry on the subject, he says, but could
• ascertain nothing definite; and that he relied
on his letter of the 28th of April, in reply
to the notice of the first assessment, to which
he received no reply. And afterwards, when
he
notified of the 5 per cent, assessment,
promptiy replied, calling attention to his said
letter, and saying he was not a stockholder.
H^ also called the attention of one of the
directors of the company to the intimation
he had had In regard to the promoters' fund,
construction
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and informed him that he repudiated the
It is true, he gave a proxy to
contract
O'Leary to represent him at the first stockholders' meeting, at which meeting the facts
in regard to the promoters' options on the land
were disclosed; but, as was well said In the
argument. It would be absurd to hold that
he was affected by notice to O'Leary of
what the latter knew from the beginning,
and f aUed to disclose to him. And if he was
not affected by notice to O'Leary, then there
is no proof that he received any certain Information of the facts constituting the fraud
complained of before the Institution of the
In treating of laches as a
present action.
bar to the subscriber's remedies, Cook says:
"The date from which laches begins to run
is the time when the subscriber is first
chargeable with notice that a fraud has been
perpetrated upon him. Mere suspicions or
heard in public or In
random statements,
do not necessarily
stockholders' meetings,
But, after a subscriber's
constitute notice.
suspicions are reasonably aroused, it Is his
duty to investigate at once. The corporation
has the burden of proof in asserting that the
subscriber had notice and was guilty of
laches." Cook, Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law
Applying these principles to
(3d Ed.) § 162.
the present case, we are of opinion upon the
ground of fraud the case is with the defendant, and that there has been no waivra: of
the fraud on his part; and, as this view is
decisive of the case, it is needless to consider
whether the case is within the ruling in
Manufacturing Co. v. Hockaday, 89 Va. 557,
16 S. E. 877, on the groimd of a variance
between the prospectus and the charter of
the company.
There were a number of exceptions taken
to the rulings of the court during the progress of the trial, to review which seriatim
would extend this opinion to a great lerigtlu
It is enough to say In -this connection that
the case was submitted to the iaty in 8ul>stantial conformity with the views expressed
in this opinion, and that the judgment must
be affirmed.
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ZAHN
(36

et al. v.

Atl.

188,

McMILLIN
179

et aL

Pa. 146.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan.

4, 1897.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Lawrence county; William D. Wallace and S. H.
Miller, Judges.
Action by William A. Zahn and others
From a
against B. A. McMillln and others.
plaintiffs appeal.
Judgment for defendants,
Reversed.
S. W. Dana, S. D. Long, A. Leo. Well, and
C. M. Thorp, for appellants. J. Norman Martin, D. B. Kurtz, and L. T. Kurtz, for appellees.

DEAN, J. On April 22, 1891, through negotiations conducted by E. A. McMillin, he
and William Smith took by assignment from
Thomas A. Book 19 oil and gas leases in
The written assignment
Lawre>nce county.
was to Smith, he to hold the same in trust as
of three-fourths for
One-eleventh
follows:
McMillin, and ten-elevenths of three-fourths
for such persons as should contribute towards the common enterprise and the cost of
of
drilling two wells for the development
Smith resided
the common property for oil.
In Pittsburg, and McMillin in Newcastle;
the last named, not far from the territory to
It was alleged by plaintiffs
be developed.
that McMillin got his brother, J. M. McMillin,
of Newcastle, to join in' the project. Smith
Induced a number of his friends in Pittsburg to join as contributors, they to share In
the profits in proportion to their contributions. From the money, two wells were drilled, which developed as good gas producers,
but no oil was struck. At the time he made
the assignment to Smith, Book had reserved
one-fourth the oil or gas to be developed,
which was afterwards purchased by E. A.
McMillin, plaintiffs alleged, for himself and
brother.
As to the three-fourths in name of
Smith, he made a written declaration that
he held the same in trust for himself, the
McMillins, and the other contributors. The
production of the wells indicated that the
property was valuable for gas purposes, and
efforts were made by the parties to sell it at
a profit.
A committee, of which B. A. McMillin was one, was appointed to bring the
property to notice of purchasers and conduct
Meetings were hejd
negotiations for a sale.
in Pittsburg; two of them, at least, attended
by both the McMillins, and others by B. A.
McMillin alone. In January, 1893, both the
brothers opened negotiations with O. 0. Redick for the purpose of selling the property
to him. They discovered from him, in their
conversations,
that the salt water which was
obstructing production in one of the wells
could be shut off at a small expense, and this
would add largelyto the value of the property.
Full examination of the property by Redick
resulted in an offer from him to take the gas,
pipe it at his own expense to Newcastle, sell

it, and pay to the owners one-half the gross
Immediately after securproceeds of sales.
ing this offer, B. A. McMillin, on January 17,
1893, wrote to W. A. Zahn, one of his coowners and one of these plaintiffs, at Pittsburg, asking him if he could get the consent
of the contributors to take one-fourth the
net earnings, and pay one-fourth the cost of
drilling new wells. In this letter he concealed from his co-owner, Zahn, Redick's offer of one-half the gross proceeds of sales.
Zahn replied that he thought he could get
B. A. McMillin then went to
such consent.
Pittsburg with a contract drawn, naming the
Pittsburg parties as the assignors, and the
In this
two McMillins as the assignees.
agreement it was set forth that all the parties were associated together as owners of
the property, and it was stipulated that the
McMillins were to take the gas, pipe it to
Newcastle, and pay one-fourth the net proceeds to all the owners, including themselves;
they to retain three-fourths.
The Pittsburg
parties were urged to immediately execute
the contract, but, as one or more of them desired to consult counsel, its execution vras deferred. They finally prepared another draft
of a contract, embodying substantially the
same terms, with the names of the purchasThis was executed January
ers left blank.
As to this contract, it is not dis31, 1893.
puted that J. M. McMillin solicited plaintiffs
No disclosure of
to aflBx their signatures.
the Redick offer was made to the Pittsburg
parties when they signed.
After signature,
lue McMillins filled in the blank with their
names as purchasers, and the same day contracted with Redick according to the terms
He piped •
of his proposition already noticed.
the gas to Newcastle, and paid to the McMillins one-half the gross proceeds of sales.
About a year afterwards plaintiffs discovered
the facts, and filed this bill against both the
McMillins for an account; averring them to
be Joint owners or tenants in common witB
them of the leaseholds, and that a fraud had
been practiced upon them in obtaining the
The defendcontract of 31st January, 1893.
ants made answer, denying all the material

averments of plaintiffs' bill. J. M. McMillin
especially denied having any interest in common with plaintiffs and his brother prior to
the execution of the contract of 31st January,
1893.
The court below, after full hearing,
dismissed the bill, and from that decree we
have this appeal by plaintiffs.
The principal errors alleged are the finding of fact that
J. M. McMillin was not interested in the original project, and the conclusion of the court
that he was not liable to account, on the
facts, even if his interest commenced at the
date of the second purchase.
The court does not seem to question that on
the evidence the bill could have been maintained if filed against B. A. McMillin alone,
but being against the brothers jointly, and
not sustained as to J. M. McMillin, it must he
dismissed.
The learned court below> in its
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opinion, ^)eaks as follows: "There are two
main questions of fact upon which plaintifCs"
claim for relief must ultimately rest: First,
that J. H. McMUlin had an interest in the
leases mentioned in plaintlfite' bill, and was a
tenant in contmon with plaintiffs In said leases
on January SI, 1893; second, fraud, actual or
constructive, on the part of the defendants in
procuring from plaintiffs the contract Exhibit
A. If either of these grounds fall, the case
of the
must fall. • • * An examination
whole evidence fails to show the relationship
of tenant in common between the plaintiffs and
J. M. McMlUln. We would hesitate to find
from the evidence of the
such a relationship
Botb J.
plaintiffs, if it was not contradicted.
M. McMUlin and E. A. McMiUln, however, positively deny such relationship in their answer,
and also upon the stand as witnesses, and their
by plaintiffs' counsel does
cross-examination
The
not in the least weaken their evidence.
plaintiffs also contend that, even if J. M. Mo
Milhn was not a co-tenant, he ogcupied such a
fiduciary relation towards them which required
him to disclose the offer which Redick had made
prior to January 31, 1893, and which offer was
concluded in the contract of February 1, 1893.
They urge that he had so conducted himself
as to lead the plaintiffs to believe he was acting with them and for them. They also urge
that he misrepresented the facts, by stating
that the terms of the contract he was obtaining
ft-om them were the best that could be obtained for the property.
We have already
found that J. M. McMillin was not a co-tenant
with the plaintiffs and E. A. McMillin.
We
find nothing in the evidence which should have
induced the plaintiffs to believe that he was a
co-tenant, or that he was acting in any fiduciary capacity for them or with them. It is true
that he was present at two meetings of the
parties in Pittsburg, but there was no evidence
to show that he took any part in the proceedings, or acted other than as a spectator.
The
value of the property was purely speculative,
and the plaintiffs had the same opportunity to
form an opinion, as to its prospective value as
J. M. McMillin. It is true, Redick had proposed
to him to lease the premises on more favorable
terms than what the plaintiffs were to get by
their contract, but there was no such fiduciary
relation subsisting between J. M. McMUlin and
them as required him to disclose Redlck's offer."
Whether a tenant In common, or merely a
partner in a project for gain. El. A. McMillin,
on the undisputed facts, by reason of his confidential relation with his co-contributors to the
common enterprise, perpetrated upon them, a
palpable fraud,—not a constructive fraud merely, but an actual fraud. If the brother aided
and abetted him in consummating this fraud,
that they two might reap the fruits of it, and
they have succeeded, they are jointly bound to
make restitution.
On sufficient evidence, the
court below has found that J. M. McMillin had
no interest in the purchase from Book, April
22, 1891.
There was much evidence ts the
H.& B.BQ.(2d Ed.)— 20
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contrary, but the error Is not so clearly manifest in the finding as to move us to disturb It.
Therefore we assume as a fact that his property Interest dated from the contract of 31st JanIt Is not denied— nor could It be, in
uary, 1893.
the face of the evidence— that by that contract
J. M. shares In the fruits of the fraud to which
E. A. was an active party, and for which he is
answerable in an account. But did J. M., by
his declarations and conduct, aid his brother in
procuring the fraudulent contract, so as to render him accountable In equity to these plaintiffs? The learned court below thinks not, because he was not one of the contributors to the
first enterprise, and therefore must be treated
as a stranger dealing at arm's length with the
co-partners or co-tenants of his brother.
This
Is a mistake, for that one fact warrants no
such conclusion.
If he had been a member of
the first association, and had imtruthfuUy represented a material fact to his associates, to induce them to part with their interests, that
would have been conclusive against him, because of the legal presumption of a confidential
relation; but, if there was not presumptively a
confidential relation, still was there one in fact,
or such relation as warranted them In relying
on the truthfulness
of his staterhents?
The
principle controUing such cases, and deducible
from aU the authorities, is well stated by Perry on Trusts (volume 1, p. 179): "There are
cases where a party must not be silent upon
a material fact within his knowledge, although
he stands in no relation of trust and confidence.
♦ • * If a party knows that another is relying upon Ills judgment and knowledge in contracting with him, although no confidential relation exists, and he does not state material
facts within his knowledge, the contract will
be avoided; for knowingly to permit another
to act as though the action was confidential,
and yet not state material facts, is fraudulent.
It is said that a party in such circumstances is
bound to destroy the confidence reposed in him,
or to state all the facts that such confidence
demands."

The court's twelfth finding of fact is that,
at the time the contract was entered into, J.
M. McMillin represented to the Pittsburg
parties that the terms, one-fourth the net
proceeds of the oil, embodied in the contract
he was soliciting them to sign, were the best
that could be got. This representation was
jin11fii"r -^"^sp He admits that Redick- had
made an offer of double that price, which
had been accepted by him and his brother, on
which a contract had been framed, which
he had in his pocket, ready to be signed as
soon as the Pittsburg parties signed the contract for one-fourth. In whose interest was
he acting when this falsehood was uttered?
It is argued, his own expectant interest in
the contract with the Pittsburg parties. But
he was also dealing as the agent of his brothThey two were the purchasers, parties
er.
of the second part to the contract which inured to the benefit of both. He was there
to conduct the negotiations and close the con-

i
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tract In pursuance of his brother's letter to
Zahn of 10 days prerlous, which did not
hint at Bediclz's offer. There can be no
severance of the falsehood by Imputing one
half of it to E. A., who held a legal, confidential relation, and the other half to J. M.,
who, if representing himself alone, did not
I hold the same relation.
By taking his brother's place and representing him, he spoke for
both, and put himself in a position where
the brother's co-tenants were justified in relying on this false statement of a most maUterial fact. This gave him a vantage ground
which naturally invited confidence
in his
statements, and he must be held to the same
rule of conduct as B. A. would have been
held to had he, on the same representation,
personally solicited the assent of his co-partners to a sale at half price.
"It is naught, it
is naught, saith the buyer; but when he is
gone his way he boasteth himself."
This is
the attitude of a stranger towards the seller
whose wares he depreciates, and the one the
court below finds J. M. to have held.
It Is
not the one the facts put him in. To hold J.
M. answerable, it Is not essential that another case exactly like this on the facts
should have been decided fraudulent. This,
clearly. Is within the scope of established
principles, where in equity a party dare not
falsely represent a material fact. "Courts
have never laid down as a general proposition what [facts] shall constitute fraud, or
any rule beyond which they will not go, lest
other means of avoiding equity will be
found" (2 Pars. Cont. 769), and certainly
have never held that, where a party aiding
in a fraud has not theretofore acquired a
fractional interest In the property which Is
the subject of the fraudulent bargain, he
cannot be called to an accounting. But, if
he had no direct interest of his own, the misrepresentation went still further than as a
representative of his brother, for the very
agreement he had asked them to sign says:
"Whereas, the said parties of the first part
and of the second part are associated together as owners of leases for oil and gas
purposes on one thousand acres of land In
Shenango and Slippery Eock township, Lawrence county, ♦ • * the said first parties
owning one hundred and twenty shares and
parties owning fifty-six
the said
second
shares;
and whereas, two wells have been
drilled at the joint expense of all of said
owners; • • • and whereas, all of said
owners are desirous of having said gas used
* * • so as to realize a profit. * *
*"
True, tnis was not tne agreement signed tnree
days thereafter, but It was one B. A. McMlUIn had, acting for both, asked them to
sign.
E. A. was then acting for J. M. In
efforts to secure a contract in which both concurred, and which was framed with a view
to accepting the Redick proposition, and was
therefore a false representation
by both. It
was not signed only because the Pittsburg
parties desired their own counsel to frame it.

The one adopted by the two brotners, ana
first exhibited to the Pittsburg parties, contained a deliberate declaration in writing that
J. M. McMillin was then a co-partner. This
was a direct Invitation to the co-partners to
deal with them in securing the best price.
The conduct of J. M. for months before, and
during all the negotiations, seems to us, on
this printed testimony, reconcilable only with
the theory that he was interested in the leases
at the date of the contract with the Pittsburg parties. Assuming, however, that, when
he said on the witness stand he was not interested, he told the truth, he did not tell the
truth to the confidants and partners of hia
brother when he contracted for himself and
his brother at half price for their interests.
The law cannot undertake to draw a line between his misrepresentation
as agent for E.
A. and his misrepresentation In his own interest as a stranger to the original association. And If his declarations and conduct
misled, as they plainly did, the Pittsburg parties, and induced them to believe him interested with' them in a common enterprise, he
Is estopped now from denying the truth of
the representations.
On both grounds the bill "J
Is sustained as against him, and both should
account to plaintiffs as prayed for In the bill.
Aa to the lemark of the court that when the
contract was made the value of the property
was purely speculative, and all parties had
the same opportunity for forming an opinion, it is certainly an error.
The court must
have overlooked the fact that J. M. McMil-'
'
lin had in his pocket, at the very time fi&wag
solicItlDg the signatures of the plaintiffs, the
draft of the proposed agreement with Redick, which was to be signed as soon as the
Pittsburg parties had executed their contract,
and which was afterwards, on the same day,
actually executed by Redick. As concerned
the McMIUins, there was nothing speculative
In their estimate of value. They knew exactly the worth of the property, by knowing
what they were to get for it. Their profit
depended only on how low they could heat
down the price by methods which some dealers call only shrewd, but which the law pronounces fraudulent, and holds the parties to

a strict accountability.
It is ordered that the decree of the common
pleas be reversed and plaintiffs' bill be reinstated, and further:
(1) That the said B. A.
McMillin and J. M. McMillin were trustees
ex malefido for all the owners of said leaseholds In making said contract with Oliver 0.
Redick, and that said contract, and all the
rights of the first parties thereunder, arc the
property of all the present owners of said
leaseholds, to whom, through their treasurer,
all payments under the same should be made.
(2) That the said E. A. McMillin and J. M.
McMillin account to the orators for, and pay
over to the said treasurer, all moneys recraved by them under said contract with
isOUver C. Redick.
(3) That an injunction
sue, restraining the said E. A. and 3. M. Mo-
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Millin from selling, assigning'. Incumbering,
or in any manner ^spostng of said last-mentioned contract (4) Tliat an injunction Issue,
restraining
the Big Meadow Gas Company
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from paying any further sum or sums of
money to the said B. A. and J. M. McMlllin
under said last-mentioned contract It is further ordered that defendants pay the costs.
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Court of Cihancery of New Jersey.

Not. 13,

1888.

On order to show cause, wby. an injunction
Bhall not issue to restrain the defendant from
taking proceedings to enforce a judgment at
law.

Bill for injunction by George E. Phillips
against Ralph L. Pullen to restrain proceedings to enforce a judgment

Wm. X. Johnston and John P. Stockton,
Atty. Gen., for complainant. Geo. O. Vanderbilt, C. H. Beasley, and W. D. Holt, for
defendant

McGILL,

The judgment In question
Gh.
was recovered in a suit upon an agreement by
the complainant to pay $7,500 in settlement
of an action that had been commenced
against him by the defendant for damages for
debauching the defendant's wife, enticing her
away, and harboring her. Upon a writ of
error to Mercer circuit court, where the cause
in which the judgment was recovered was
tried, the court of errors and appeals affirmed the judgment of the court below, and
thereby confirmed tHe decision of many of
the questions sought to be again raised by
the bill In this case. That decision determined that the complainant's attorney had authority to make the agreement sued upon;
that the agreement did not lack consideration; that the consideration of the agreement
that there was no aban■was not executory;
by
donment or rescission of the agreement
the defendant, Pullen; and that proof of the
fraud, which is here alleged, was admissible
in defense in that suit, but that the evidence
of it there offered and admitted, was inadequate to establish it. Phillips v. Pullen, 50
All those matters
N. J. Law, 439, 14 Atl. 222.
must now be considered as settled between
The doctrine is well
the parties to this suit.
settled that this court will not, on the anpliCation of the defendant in a judgment at law,
who has had a fair opportunity to be liear
upon a defense, over which the court pp
nouncing the judgment had full jurisdlctio:

enjoin the enforcement of the judgment simply on the ground that it is unjust. A court
of equity limits its interference with the enforcement of a judgment at law to cases
where that appears which clearly shows it to
be against conscience to execute the judgment, and of which the injured party could
not have availed himself in the court of law;
or of which he might have availed himself at
law, but was prevented by fraud or accident,
unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents. Insurance Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 332; Hendrickson v. Hinckley,
17
How. 443; Powers' Ex'is v. Butler's
Adm'r, 4 N. J. Eq. 405; Vaughn v. Johnson,

Eq. 173; Moore v. Gamble, Id. 246;
9 N.
Beeves v. Cooper, 12 N. J. Eq. 223; Holmes
V. Steele, 28 N. J. Eq. 173; Bank v. Manufacturing Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 486, 35 N. J. Eq.
344; Simpson v. Hart, 1 Johns. Ch. 91; 3
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1361, and note. It Is Insisted
for the complainant that the contract upon
which the judgment in question is based, was
so grossly unconscionable that this court will
here interfere, and stay the enforcement of
the judgment. The action of the court must
depend upon the questions whether the defendant is too late in his application, whether
of the contract
the gross unconsclonableness
is a distinct principle of equity which could
not be urged in defense of the suit at law,
and whether in fact the contract was grossly
will consider these quesunconscionable.
tions in the order In which
have stated
them.
The complainant makes his application by
supplemental bill, in which he alleges that by
his original bill he sought to avoid the agreement for fraud, and because it was grossly
unconscionable; and that he was denied an
injunction to restrain the suit at law, because the grounds upon which the equity of
bis bill rested were good defenses to the action, at law. The defendant, by his answer
to the supplemental bill, claims that the decision of the chancellor (Runyon) was based
upon the defendant's denial of the facts upon
which the equity of the complainant's bill
was founded. No reasons for the chancellor's decision were given.
It appears to me
to be better that
shall assume that the merits of the last two questions under consideration were not passed upon, and that the original application for Injunction affords an excuse for the apparent laches of the complainant in asking the aid of this court. It is established that for mere inadequacy of consideration, unconnected with fraud, a court of
equity will not set aside a contract.
Willis v.
Jernegan, 2 Atk. 251; Griffith v. Spratley, 1
Cox, 383; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266; Low
V. Barchard, 8 Ves. 133; Osgood v. Franklin,
2 Johns. Ch. 1; Crane v. Conklin, 1 N. J. Eq.
346; Wintermute's Ex'rs v. Snyder's Ex'rs, 3
N. J. Eq. 489; Weber v. Weitling, 18 N. J.
Eq. 441; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 251; 2 Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 925. The cases of expectant heirs or

I

I

I

reversioners, who have bound themselves la
unconscionable bargains with respect to their
expectancies,
have been regarded In many
Bemy v.
cases as an exception to this rule.
Pitt, 2 Vern. 14; Nott v. Hill, Id. 27; Wiseman V. Beake, Id. 121; Twisleton v. Griffith,
1 P. Wms. 310; Curwyn v. Milner, note c, 3
P. Wms. 292; Barnardlston v. Lingood, 2
Atk. 133; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Brown, Ch. 9;
Coles V. Treeothlck, 9 Ves. 246; Evans v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 512.
Where, however, such In1adequacy of price is so gross that it shocks
the conscience, courts of equity will interfere,
not upon distinct principle, but upon, the
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ground that such Inadequacy amounts to conof fraud.
In Osgood v.
clusive evidence
Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 18, Ohancellor Kent

"The doctrine is settled that in setting
said:
aside contracts on account of inadequate consideration, the ground Is fraud arising from
In Gopis v. Middleton, 2
gross inequality."
Madd. 410, the vice-chancellor said: "Mere
inadequacy of price, to invalidate a contract,
must, per se, be so excessive as to be demon-

strative of fraud." In Wintermute's Bx'rs
V. Snyder's Ex'rs, 3 N. J. Eq. 489, 496', Chancellor Vroom said: "Still there may be such
unconscionableness,
such palpable and excessive Inequality in a bargain, as to induce
/'equitable interference. But in all such cases
I the court goes on the ground of fraud, being
I satisfied that gross imposition or undue inmust have been practiced. If the inV^uence
it
adequacy be such as to shock conscience,
will amount to evidence of fraud, and will be
In GifEord v. Thorn, 9 N. J.
so considered."
Eq. 7CS, 740, in the court of errors and ap"Unpeals. Justice Potts uses this language:
doubtedly, if this transaction is to be considered as a matter of bargain and sale, here is
a gross inadequacy of consideration; such an
inadequacy as raises a violent presumption of
fraud, deception,
Ignorance or imbecility."
In Weber v. Weitling, 18 N. J. Eq. 441, Chan►cellor Zabriskie said: "For mere inadequacy
of consideration equity does not set aside a
by fraud, or unless
deed, unless accompanied
the inadequacy is so gross as to Imply fraud."
Judge Story, In his work on Equity Jurisprudence (volume 1, p. 256,) after saying that
inadequacy of consideration is not of itself a
distinct principle of relief in equity,
adds:
"Still, however, there may be such an unconscionableness or Inadequacy in a bargain as ta
demonstrate
some gross Imposition or some
undue influence, and in such cases courts of
equity ought to interfere upon the satisfactory ground of fraud. But then such unconscionableness, or such inadequacy,
should be
made out as would (to use an expressive
phrase) shock the conscience, and amount in
itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of
fraud." Professor Pomeroy, in his work on
Equity .Jurisprudence (section 927) says: "Although the actual cases in which a contract
or conveyance has been canceled on account
of gross inadequacy merely, without other
equitable incidents,
are very few; yet the
doctrine is settled by a consensus of decisions
and dicta, that, even in the absence of all
other circumstances,
when the inadequacy of
the price is so gross that it shocks the conscience, and furnishes satisfactory and decisive evidence of fraud, it will be a sufficient
ground for canceling a conveyance
or contract, whether executed or executory.
Even
then fraud, and not inadequacy of price, is
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the true and only cause for the Interposition
of equity, and the granting of relief."
At this point we are again confronted with
the adjudication already had between the parties to this cause. Equity can interfere only,
iTnn n thg yrnnnf| nf fraud : and the question
bi il'aud In the agreement, as I have stated,
has been heard by a court having fuU jurisdiction over that question, and decided.
Jhstice Magie, who wrote the opinion of the
court of errors and appeals in the case there
between the parties to this suit, disposed of
the suggestion that the price Phillips agreed
to pay is evidence of fraud, in the concluding
"In an
sentences of that opinion, as follows:
action on an undertaking to pay a specific
sum, the rule for measuring damages is compensation, which can only be afforded by a
verdict for that sum, with interest.
No reason why this case should be taken out of that
rule is suggested, but that the agreement was
unreasonable or unconscionable. But, if it
might have been avoided in equity upon that
ground, nothing short of fraud will affect it
at law: and fraud would not be ground for
reducing damages, but for defeating recovery. There is nothing in the stipulated sum
to justify an inference of fraud.
The original suit sought to recover damages Incapable
of accurate determination. Had it proceeded
to trial, the quantum of damages must have
been determined by a jury upon the circumstances.
Where the parties, knowing the clr-K
liquidated the damages by
cmnstances,
an|
agreement not brought about by deceit or imJ
position, it cannot be said that such damages/
are unconscionable."
If gross unconscionableness of a bargain were a distinct principle upon which equity would relieve,
it
would be impossible for me to say that the
bargain, in this instance, was of that charLord Thurlow, in Gwynne v. Heaton,
acter.
1 Brown,
Ch. 8, said of such bargains:
"There must be an inequality so strong,
gross, and manifest that it must be Impossible to state it to a man of common sense,
without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it" If there is nothing in the
sum agreed to be paid that will justify an inference of fraud in the law courts, it can
hardly be that there is so much in it here as
The
to shock the conscience of this court
reasoning of Justice Magie, in which I concurred in the court of errors and appeals, satisfies me that t here is nothing in the stinu lated suni tfi ""■^'<<'psti f^"« s ineq uaUty.
Nor
is there anything in the condition of the parties to make such gross inequality apparent.
Both are farmers. Pullen has property valued at $1,000 or $1,500, and Phillips admits
that he is worth $12,000, while the answer
puts his estate at $40,000. I will discharge
the order to show cause, with cosfs.
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EAKESTRAW
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lyANIBR.

(30 S. B. 735, 104 Ga. 188.)
Supreme Court of Georgia.

April

13, 1898.

Error from superior court, Screven county; R. L. Gamble, Judge.
Action by A. B. Lanier against Chauncey
Decree for plaintiff.
Eakestraw.
Defendant brings error. Reversed.
The following Is the official report:
On August 10, 1895, Lanier and Rakestraw, physicians residing in the town of
Oliver, formed a partnership for the pracsurgery, and obstetrics.
tice of medicine,
The articles of co-partnership contained,
among other stipulations, the following:
"In consideration of the advantages and
benefits that will flow to said Rakestraw by
reason of the formation of said firm and
partnership business, he hereby agrees that
in the event said firm shall at any time
hereafter be dissolved, that he will not locate or engage In the practice of medicine,
surgery, or obstetrics at said town of Oliver, or at any place within fifteen miles
radius from the drug store of said Lanier,
unless he shall first have obtained the written consent of said Lanier.
And, in the
event the said Rakestraw shall violate the
terms of this article, the said Lanier shall
be entitled to sup and recover, as his damages, the sum of one thousand dollars annually from said Rakestraw so long as he
shall violate the terms of this article; said
sum of $1,000 being agreed now between
the parties hereto as damages, and not as a
penalty. This partnership shall continue for
the space and term of twelve months from
the date when signed by the parties hereto,
unless sooner dissolved. This partnership
may be dissolved by either member giving
to the other. In writing, a notice of his intention to withdraw from the partnership;
and, at the expiration of thirty days from
the service of such notice by either member
on the other, said firm shall be dissolved."
On June 3, 1896, Lanier wrote to Rakestraw
as follows:
"Under the provisions of our
contract, a thirty-days notice is required to
dissolve the same; and you are hereby notified that, on the third day of July next,
you may consider the contract between us
In the practice of medicine ended. This will
enable you to make all collections of your
one-third interest In all accounts now on our
books, or what may become due within thirty days, at which time I shall expect a partner in the practice here.
If you desire, you
can fully withdraw from all office practice
and drug-store duties from date.
shall expect to abide by the contract In the letter
and In the spirit In which it was written."
The partnership was accordingly dissolved.
After the dissolution, Rakestraw continued
to reside In the town of Oliver, and to prac-

I

tice medicine, surgery,
and obstetrics therein, and within the radius of 15 miles re-

ferred to In the contract.
On September 18,
1897, Lanier wrote to Rakestraw, at Oliver,'
as follows:
"Under our contract, yon are
now due me $1,000, which you will pay at
once, or discontinue practice in this place."
Rakestraw refused to comply with this demand; and on October 26, 1897, Lanier
brought to the superior court his petition,
setting out the foregoing facts, and alleging that Rakestraw was still engaged in the
practice of medicine, surgery, and obstetrics
in the locality mentioned, contrary to hig
contract, in violation of equity and good conscience, and In fraud and damage of petitioner; that by reason of this breach of the
contract, and under the express terms thereof, defendant became Indebted to him in the
sum of $1,000 at the expiration of the year
from the date of the dissolution, and is still
so indebted; that defendaxit
Is hopelessly
Insolvent; that petitioner has no adequate
remedy at law; and that the injury complained of is continuing In Its nature, and
will necessitate a suit at the expiration of
each year, and by reason of the bad faith of
the defendant, and the nature of petitioner's
business, his age, and his circumstances,
the
Injury Is Irreparable In damages. Waiving
discovery, he prayed a Judgment against defendant for $1,000, a perpetual Injunction,
and, until the final hearing, a temporary Injunction, restraining the defendant from engaging in the practice of medicine, surgery,
or obstetrics at the town of Oliver, or any
place within a radius of fifteen miles from
the drug store of petitioner, unless he shall
have first obtained the written consent of
petitioner. The defendant demurred and answered, and, at the hearing of the application for temporary injunction, urged that
the petition set forth no ground for Injunction or other relief against him; that the
stipulation in the contract upon which the
petition was based Is against public policy
and Illegal, and is not valid or enforceable
against the defendant; that It Is not a reasonable or proper stipulation, vrithin the
meaning of the requirements of the law,
and Is unjust, unfair, and against good conscience;
that It is without sufficient consideration to support It, and is lacking In mutuality, and does not put the plaintiff under such obligation as would make the agreement of the defendant valid and binding;
and, further, that, under the facts, the plaintiff was not entitled to the Injunction or other relief. Defendant denied that he had acted in bad faith, or was Infilctlng any legal
Injury upon the plaintiff. He denied that
he was hopelessly insolvent, but admitted
that his assets, which consisted of personal
property only, would not, If sold at public
outcry, net more than enough to pay what
he owed. He alleged:
Before signing the
agreement, plaintiff called his attention to
the stipulation in question, and said that it
had been put In by the lawyer as a matter
of form, and that he (plalntlfl) doubted its
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legality, and gave defendant to understand
that he need not apprehend Its enforcement.
Before the agreement was entered into, certain residents of the town of Oliver had advertised in the newspaper that a physician
was needed in the town, and plaintiff, understanding that defendant might locate in Oliver, induced him to sign the contract, with
the purpose of thereby getting rid of deThis purpose was
fendant's competition.
fraudulent, and vitiated the contract. If othDuring the continuance of the
erwise legal.
partnership, and before any notice of dissolution was given, plaintiff so conducted
himself with reference to the defendant as
to deprive him of the possibility of gaining
any advantage from the association, and
made the partnership the means of injuring and damaging defendant, and of efforts
to blast his good name and prospects.
Plaintiff, before the notice, circulatea reports which were untrue and unfounded, reflecting grossly upon the character and life of
defendant, and which are set out In the anPlaintiff did not comply with his obswer.
He declined
ligations under the contract.
upon different occasions to practice with defendant, declined to recognize notes addressed to the firm in the firm name, and announced that he would not notice any request for a visit that was not addressed to
him personally.
While the co-partnership
continued, plaintiff announced that he intended to ruin defendant, and would drive
As to these allehim out of the country.
gations the evidence at the hearing was conflicting.
The court, after hearing the evidence, ordered that a temporary Injunction
as prayed for be granted, unless a bond with
security,
conditioned to pay the eventual
condemnation money, should be given by the
defendant within 45 days from the date of
the order.
Defendant excepted.
Denmark, Adams & Freeman, for plaintiff
Giquilliat & Stubbs and Oliver &
in error.
Overstreet, for defendant in error.

J.

LITTLE,
Counsel for plaintiff In error,
both by his argument and brief, rests his
case on the proposition that the petition on
which the judge below granted an injunction
in default of bond sets forth no cause for relief, because the contract sought to be enforced is not a legal and binding instrument
Hence this court is called upon to determine
the question whether the contract which is
set out in the foregoing report is void, as contrary to public policy, or whether the same is
valid, and therefore to be enforced.
This
question is to be settled by the rules of law
governing
contracts made In restraint of
trade, and, in seel^ing to make application of
such rules, we find ourselves furnished with
precedents which seem to be authority for all
phases of the question, and rulings distressingly in conflict.
The plaintiff In error submits that the terms of the contract render It
invalid, because It is harsh and unreasonable;
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It Is against public policy; it Is not a reasonable or proper contract, within the meaning or
the requirements
of the law; that it is withIf either one
out consideration to support it.
of these contentions is established, then, as
we understand the law applicable to contracts
of this character, the courts must refuse to
because
enforce
the contract relied upon,
agreements which are unlawful, without regard to the manner of execution, never In law
become contracts, although frequently denominated and dealt with under the name of
illegal contracts.
We cannot, within reasonable limits, undertake to reconcile conflicting
opinions in treating of contracts in restraint
of trade, nor cite the authorities which bear
upon the different constituent elements which
render such contracts valid, or the want of
which make them void, for the reason that
the first are irreconcilable, and the latter inharmonious. It must sufiSce that we shall in
this case present the rales which we consider
established by the most satisfactorily reasoned cases of other jurisdictions, arid the adjudications of our own court,
Mr. Clark, In his work on Contracts, says,
on authority, that at one time in England it
was considered that a contract was contrary
to public policy If it placed any restraint at
all on a man's right to exercise his trade or
calling, but that, gradually, exceptions were
recognized, until at last the court, in a leading case (Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms.
181), established the rule that a contract in
restraint of trade, upon consideration, which
shows it was reasonable for the parties to enter into It, is good; "that whenever a consideration appears to make it a proper and
useful contract, and such as cannot be set
It
aside without injury to a fair contractor.
ought to De maintained," etc. By reference
to that case, we find the conclusion of the
court to be that "in all restraints of trade,
where nothing more appears, the law presumes them bad; but, if the circumstances
are set forth, that presumption is excluded,
and the court Is to judge of those circumstances, and determine accordingly, and if, upon
them. It appears to be a just and honest contract, it ought to be maintained."
Some
question has arisen as to the proper construction of our Code, which declares that "contracts in general in restraint of trade are
void" (Civ. Code, § 3668), and as to whether
the proper interpretation 'of these words
would have the effect to declare that contracts
in general restraint of trade are void, or that
contracts generally in restraint of trade are
Speaking for myself, I Interpret the
void.
language to mean that contracts generally in
restraint of trade are void.
The words of
this section were not codified from any act
of the general assembly, but the same language appeared in our first Code (1863), and
ran without change through successive editions and revisions up to and Including the
Civil Code of 1896, from which
Infer that,
If the words were not intended to be accepted
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tracts in restraint of trade are void) were inInto the codification of laws In
corporated
force in this state as expressing a recognized
legal, principle sanctioned by the highest authority. In Ross V. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 168,
Mr. Justice Bronson says: "The law starts
out with the presumption that a contract In
restraint of trade !s void." The same rule
Is stated in Pol. Cont. side page 311; is recognized in the leading case from 1 P. Wms.,
supra; and the principle laid down in Clark,
Besides, such a construction
Cont. p. 447.
seems to be in harmony with the policy of
To one class of persons
the law in this state.
at least— corporations— contracts of this character are forbidden when they tend to lessen
in their respective
business
competition
(Const. 1877; Civ. Code, § 5800); and various
acts of the legislature seem to indicate such
However this may be, it is
a policy to exist.
rethat contracts In imreasonable
certain
straint of trade are contrary to public policy,
and void, because they tend to' Injure the
parties making them; diminish their means
of procuring livelihoods and a competency for
their families; tempt improvident persons, for
the sake of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power to make future acquisitions, and expose them to imposition and oppression;
tend to deprive the public of ths
and caservices of men in the employments
pacities in which they may be most usefUl^to
disthe community as well as to themselves;
courage industry and enterprise, and diminish
the products of Ingenuity and skill; prevent

1969;

is

it
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competition,
and enhance prices, and expose
Clark,
the public to all the evils of monopoly.
Cont. p. 446. Against evils like these, wise
laws protect Individuals and the public by
Alger v.
declaring all such contracts void.
Thacher, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 51.
Since the early
legislative history both of England and this
country, statutes have been of force looking
to the prevention of monopoly, and the interdiction of restraints upon the exercise of
business, trades, or professions; and in no instance has a contract which Imposed an unreasonable restraint upon the same, in the eye
of the Judiciary, been upheld; and the question of the reasonableness
of the restriction
is one of law for the court.
1 Whart. Cont.
i 433; Blsh. Cont § 517; Benj. Sales, § 527;
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 934; MaUan v. May, U
Mees. & W. 653; Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97
Ind. 66. In determining whether such restriction is reasonable, the court will look
alone to the time when the contract was entered into.
Bannie v. Irvine, 7 Man. & G.
Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175.
It Is,
however, satisfactorily established that,'^ a
matter of law, such a contract Is to be upheld
the restraint imposed is not unreasona-

ble, is founded on a raluable consideration,
and Is reasonably necessary to protect the interest of the party In whose favor
imposed, and does not unduly prejudice the InClark, Cont. p. 446. In
terests of the public.
some jurisdictions
Is held that a. contract in
restraint of trade which is unlimited as to
space is void on its face, and will not be enforced.
Id. p. 450, and authorities cited.
has been held that
On the other hand,
contract restraining the exercise of
trade or
throughout the kingdom or state
business
may be reasonable, and therefore valid. Eousillon V. Kousillon, 14 Ch. DIv. 351; Beal v.
Chase, 31 Mich. 490; Match Co. t. Eoeber,
In determining,
421.
however,
35 Hun,
whether such a contract Is reasonable, the
court wiU consider the nature and extent of
the trade or business, the situation of the
and
parties, and all the other circumstances;
even if the presumption to which we have before referred does not exist against the validity of such contracts, so as to require persons
seeking to enforce them to show that they
consideration,
were made upon
sufficient
and that the restrictions they impose are reasonable (Angler v. Webber, 92 Am. Dec!, note
on page 753), yet. In law, all such contracts
are void, if considered only in the abstract,
and without reference to the situation or objects of the parties, or other circumstances
under or with reference to which they were
made; and this, though the pecuniary consideration paid may have been sufficient to
support the contract in any other aspect, or
any ordinary contract for a legal purpose, or
may be sufficient in value to
even though
compensate the restraint imposed.
But
considered
with reference to the situation,
business, and objects of the parties, and in
the light of all the surrounding circumstances
with reference to which the contract was
made, the restraint contracted for appears to
have been for a just and honest purpose, for
the protection of the legitimate interests of
the party in whose favor
is imposed, reasonable as between them, and not specially
Injurious to the public, the restraint wiU be
held valid. The true test, therefore, of the
validity of such a contract, is whether
supported by a sufficient consideration,
am
whether the restraint is reasonable.
The plaintiff in error contends that the contract imder review is without sufficient consideration to support It, and that for this reason
void.
That there must be an actual
valuable consideration to support such
contract, and such consideration should be
shown on the face of the declaration or com
plaint, although the contract be under Beaij_
are propositions well established.
Bish. Cont.
126; Mete. Cont. p. 233;
Whart. Cont
434; Mitchel v. Reynolds,
P. Wms. 181;
Davis V. Mason,
Term R. 118; Hutton v.
Parker,
Dowl. 739; Pierce v. Fuller,
Mass. 223; Weller v. Hersee, 10 Hun, 431.
That the consideration must thus be shown
Ja generally said to be the only exception to

I

as -written, subsequent codlflers, If not subwould, by change or
sequent legislatures,
more clearly have expressed a
amendment,
take It that the
But
different meaning.
words "contracts In general in restraint of
trade are void" (meaning that, generally, con-
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tbe rule that a contract nnder seal Imports
which the party will not be
a consideration
Mete. Gont g 233. And
permitted to deny.

in earlier times It was held that the considMitchel v. Reyeration must be adequate.
nolds, supra; Gale v. Reed, 8 East, 80; Young
T. Timmins, 1 Tyrw. 226. The courts, however, long since departed from this doctrine;
and it may now be taken as settled that, if
it will not be
there is a legal consideration,
inquired whether or not it is adequate, or,
in other words, equal in value to the restraint
See authorities cited in note
agreed upon.
to case of Angier v. Webber, 92 Am. Dec.
As was said by Tindal, O. J., in the
754.
case of Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Adol. & E.
"It is enough that there Is actually a
438:
consideration for the bargain, and that such
consideration is a legal consideration, and of
Accordingly, in the case of
some value."
Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223, one doUar was
held to be a sufficient consideration for a
covenant not to run a stagecoach between
given points, in opposition to the plaintiff.
The consideration upon which the defendant
Entered into the contraST-nnaer review as
expressed was the advantages ang~15enefltg"
that woul d flow to'liim by reason of th e "forftiatft'ii' "Of "siid 'lifffl an'g partnerstjlp^ti^y
"ne ss." TMs7 under the authorities cited, is
•
^sufficient legal conside ration, in__so_iar as~
'*'sucA TOntfacts are depmdent on a cgnsiderafl fo Te 'susjEaineST The" exact value of t he
" ^"
"c'onsicleratibn r^e'''c5u"rt ought noti"aiid,"' i n
"the nature
of t hing s, ca nn ot, undert eike to
measure.
There is nothing in the record of
the case which shows such gross inadequacy
of consideration
as to shock the conscience,
and amount in itself to evidence of fraud.
See Mete. Cont. p. 271.
The remaining objections urged against the
validity of the contract may all be passed
upon in considering the other question upon
which the validity of the contract depends,
namely. Is the restraint which it imposes reasonable?
While public policy forbids any
agreemMit which unreasonably restrains a
person from exercising his trade or business,
it is equally true that public policy also requires that the freedom of persons to enter
into contracts shall not be lightly interfered
with. Clark, Cont. p. 447. The contract under consideration
imposed
a restraint unlimited as to time, but limited as to space.
We are aware that it has been repeatedly
held that, where the restraint is otherwise
reasonable, the circumstances that it is indefinite as to time will not affect its validity
(1 Whart. Cont § 432; Mete. Cont. p. 232; BenJ.
Sales, i 525; Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Adol. &
B. 438; Pemberton v. Vaughan, 10 Q. B.
87; Catt v. Tourle, 4 Ch. App. 654; Cook
v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175; Bowser v. Bliss,
7 Blackf. 344); and that our court, In more
than one case, which will be presently referred to, held the same doctrine.
Nevertheless,
if the test of the validity of the contract is,
as we have shown It to be, that It must be
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founded on a yaluable consideration, and that
the restraint Imposed must be reasonable, and
such as la reasonably necessary to protect
the interest of the party In whose favor It is
imposed, and at the same time not unduly
prejudice the interest of the public, it seems
to us that the question of time in the restriction imposed cannot be arbitrarily said
to have no effect on the validity of a contract
which, being reasonable in all other respects
except in point of time, is, from the circumstances, unreasonable and oppressive as to
the latter. See Mandeville v. Harman (N. J.
Ch.) 7 Atl. 37; Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. St.
469.
In the case of Hitchcock v. Coker,
supra, Lord Denman, construing a contract
which imposed a restraint on one who, having entered the service of the plaintiff (who
was a druggist), agreed that he would not at
any time after leaving such service engage in
the business of a druggist In that town, said:
"It is not limited to such time as the plaintiff
should carry on business in Taunton, nor to
any given number of years, nor even to the
life of the plaintiff; but it attaches to the
defendant as long as he lives, although the
plaintiff may have left Taunton, or parted
with his business, or be dead;" and he accordingly held the restraint to be unreasonable and oppressive.
That case was reversed on writ of error, but the point of
reversal was that a restriction so extensive
in point of time was necessary for the protection of the promisee in the enjoyment of
the good will of his trade; and, as we understand the principle ruled in that case, a restriction so extensive is reasonable, and not oppressive, when it prevents the destruction of
a property right or interest or the good will
of a trade or business.
See review of the
case in Clark, Cont. pp. 455, 456.
The contrary of this doctrine, however, is directly
held in French v. Parker, 16 R. L 219, 14

Atl.

870.

With conflicting authorities as to the application of the rules for testing the validity

of contracts in partial restraint of trade, upon which all agree, we think a clear distinction must be taken between the class of
cases binding one who has sold out a mercantile or other kind of business, and the
good will therewith connected, not to again
engage in that business within a given territory, and that class of cases binding one
to desist from the practice of a learned profession.
can readily perceive that a successor of a merchant, broker, or shopkeeper
might reasonably expect to retain the former
patronage of the place of business, but fully
concur with the views expressed by the
court In the case of Mandeville v. Harman,
supra, that professional skill, experience,
and reputation are things which cannot be
They constitute part of the
bought or sold.
Individuality of the particular person, and
die with him. In that case the court said:
"There can be no doubt, I think, that If the
complainant was the most distinguished phy-
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sldan of the city of Newark, and had by far
the most lucrative practice in that city, and
he should be so unfortunate as to die next
month or next year, it would be impossible
for his personal representative to sell his
good will or practice, as a thing of property
distinct from the office which he had occupied prior to his death, for any prjce; and
I think it is equally obvious that, if it were
sold in connection with his office, the only
possible value which could be ascribed to it
would be the slight possibility that some of
the persons who had been his patients might,
when they needed the services of a physician, go or send there for the next occupant
of the office. The practice of a physician is
a thing so purely personal, depending so
absolutely on the confidence reposed In his
personal skill and ability, that, when he
ceases to exist, it necessarily ceases also,
and after his death can have neither an intrinsic nor a market value. And, if the complainant should make sale of his practice in
his lifetime, it is manifest all the purchaser
could possibly get would be Immunity from
competition with him, and, perhaps, his implied approval that the purchaser was fit to
be his successor;
but it would be impossible
for him to transfer his professional skill and
ability to his successor, or to induce anybody
to believe that he had."
So far as we have been able to examine,
the cases which have ruled that, if the restraint is reasonably limited as to space, the
fact that it is unlimited as to time will not
render the agreement void, were cases in
which some business or property, or property right, either of goods or good will, had
been sold, and the restriction as to unlimited
time was not considered unreasonable, because it afCected property rights.
Our own
court has considered a number of cases involving contracts in restraint of trade, and
in some of them held that restraints unlimited in point of time did not render the con^tracts voi d; but in ever y one o f such cases,
aa_f ar as''Wti''li S.vejfigasiB I37^'lS^5ff5ri!rJ fltgresF^as
tnval^e drThe" first la tliat of
tkolmes V. Ma,rtin, 10 Ga. 503.
In that case
Holmes conveyed to Martin a house and lot
in the town of Lawrenceville, with this restriction in the deed: "That said house and
lot shall not be occupied by the said Martin
or his assignees as a public tavern or hotel,
which right is reserved In said property by
Holmes."
In that case the court held this
contract to be good, and that contracts in
partial restraint of trade only may be supported, provided the restraint be reasonable,
and the contract founded on a consideration.
In the case of Mell v. Mooney, 30 Ga. 413,
no question arose which called for a ruling
of the validity of contracts in restraint of
trade, the points in the case relating alone
to pleading.
In the case of Jenkins v. Temples, 39 Ga. 655, it appeared
that Jenkins
had bought of Temples an entire stock of
groceries
and confectioneries
at very high
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prices, and Temples had agreed that he
would use all of his influence for Jenkins
with his former customers, and bound himself not to deal in any of said articles at
Spring Place until January, 1869.
Temples
violated the agreement.
The court below
held the contract to be void, and this court
ruled, reversing the judge below, that a
party might legally bind himself for a valuable consideration not to conduct a particular trade or business in a particular place
for a reasonable and definite period of time.
'-m the case of Spier v. LamDam, 45 Ui."!iiy,'
Lambdin sold to Spier an unexpired lease
of the Barnesville Academy, with the consent of the trustees, for the consideration of
$475, representing that he wished to abandon school teaching, and would use his influence for Spier's benefit.
The contract v^a
held to be good and enforceable.
In the
case of EUis v. Jones, 56 Ga. 504, Ellis &
Palmer had purchased a stock of merchandise, consisting of dry goods, groceries, etc.,
from Jones & Co., and the store house containing the same, together with their custom and good will. Jones & Co. having recommenced business in the same place, Ellis
& Palmer filed a bill to enjoin such action.
The injunction was refused. It does not
satisfactorily appear In the case that Jones
& Co. covenanted not to engage in the same
business. In the case of Goodman v. Henderson, 58 Ga. 567, the suit was upon a writ
ten agreement, whereby Goodman, in consideration of $100 a month for two years,
and a further money consideration, agreed
to retire from the business of purchasing
green hides, sheep skins, etc., in the Savannah market forever, and that he would use
his influence in favor of the purchaser, and
sold to him the good will of the business.
This court held in that case that the limit
as to time made no difference if the contract was limited as to space.
In the case
of Brewer v. Lamar, 69 Ga. 656, there was
an agreement to sell a certain proprietary
medicine, and the seller agreed never to use
or permit his name to be used on any preparation for the same class of complaints
for which this medicine was made, and
agreed also to surrender his trade-mark, and
give to the purchasers the exclusive right to
sell and manufacture the same under the
old name.
The consideration of the purchase was $275.
The court held that the
contract was in partial restraint of trade,
and could be enforced. In the case of Newman V. Wolfson, 69 Ga. 764, Newman sold
to Wolfson a stock of goods, etc., together
with the good will of the business, for $1,466,
and covenanted not to engage in a like business In that city for a period of five years.
The court in this case held that the contract
was not unreasonable. In the case of Swanson V. Kirby, 98 Ga. 586, 26 S. B. 71, this
court held that where one has sold out a
given business, and contracted not to again
carry on the same In a particular locality,

CONSTEUCTIVE
though unlimited as to time, such a contract,
heing reasonable and proper when limited
as to place, and In other respects, was valid.
In this case the consideration paid was
and the property purchased was a
$1,500,
In the American Ticliet Brokmembership
ers' Association, a burglar-proof safe, desli,
typewriter, and other office fixtures. The
covenant was not to open a ticket office in
the city of Atlanta without the consent of
Kirby. In that case the court held that
while contrac ts in total restraint of faa de.

wefrSI SrwEere tSeres traint was^Eg^tiaLJfeaion^S..anafoim3e3~tip^-«'^odcon;
lion, the conSacf wduld~tJ6~e5rofced.
'it

has never been decided In this state that
between professional men (where
no property rights were involved in the contract which imposed the restriction) so extensive in duration as that under consideration In the present case is valid. As was
said by the court in the case of Mandeville
V. Harman, supra: "It is one of the natural
rights of every citizen of this state to use

' -a covenant

his skJU and labor in any useful employment, not only to get food, raiment, and
and
shelter, but to acquire property;
think it may be regarded as very certain
that the courts will never deprive any one
of this right, or even abridge it, except in
obedience to the sternest demands of jus-

I

tice."

We test this contract by the rules before
referred to, and find it supported by a legal
Being limited as to space,
consideration.
although unlimited as to time, we find that
it may properly be classed among contracts
in partial restraint of trade.
When we seek
its terms to ascertain whether It is reasonable, made to protect the promisee, and not
■oppressive on the promisor, we find that no
a,nd no
money was paid by the promisee,
property sold by the promisor. We find
that the promisor, by the nature of the contract, must have rendered
for all
service
the benefits he received.
We find that, under the terms of this contract, if the promisee, the defendant in error, should remove
from the town of Oliver, from the state of
Georgia;
If he should become permanently
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by disease, from continuing
Incai>acitated,
the practice of medicine;
If he should die,—
the promisor, in any event, would not be at

liberty to practice his profession In Oliver,
nor within 15 miles radius of that town. No
matter what the changed conditions might
be. It was so nominated In the bond that he
should not exercise his calling within the
territory prescribed. It must be clear, therefore, that the restrictions imposed upon the
promisor In this contract were larger than
were necessary for the protection of the
promisee.
Full protection would have been
afforded to the latter if the time in which
the restraint should apply had been limited
to the life of the defendant in error, or to
the time In which he was engaged In the
practice of his profession in the county of
Screven.
Had this contract been so limited.
It Is obvious from the view which we take
of the law that it should be upheld and
But, when the term^
would be enforced.
of the contract prohibit one party from at
any time in the future practicing his profession at a given place, without regard to
the fact that the other party should not be
engaged in the competitive business, without
regard to the fact that he may have removed
from the county and state In which such
territory was located, without regard to the
fact of the inability of the party, from age
or physical infirmity, to continue his practice, it would seem to be unreasonable,— Jt
not necessary for the protection of the party
In whose favor the restraint was imposed,
oppressive to the party restrained, and opposed to the Interests of the public; and,
such being the case, the contract cannot be
enforced.
If it be said that It would be
the right of the plaintiff In error, under
any of the circumstances we have mentioned, to pray for a modification or rescission of
such contract, the reply is that we are not
dealing with such question. We are to construe it as It Is written, and, so construing
It, we hold it to be void a nd of no binding
fnr^A an/l W pct
lie .lud^meni: of the Vourl
All the justices
TelowmustBe reversed.
concurring, except COBB, J., absent for
providential cause.

f

k

M
OONSTBUCTIVB FHAUD.
COWBB
(75

T.

COENELL.

N. T. 91.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Not. 12, 1878.
Appeal from order of the general term of
the supreme court in the Third judicial department, reversing a judgment entered upon
the report of a referee.
Plaintiff made a claim against the estate of
Latham Cornell, of whose will defendants
were the executors, for interest upon a promThis
issory note executed by the deceased.
claim was rejected, and was referred by stipulation.
The facts, as stated by the referee, are in
substance as follows:
Latham Cornell, the deceased, was the
grandfather of Latham C. Strong. He was
possessed of large property, consisting of real
estate and of personal property Invested in
stocks, bonds and other securities. He died
in 1876 at Uie age of ninety-five. For four
years prior to his death he was partially
blind.
From July, 1871, until the time of
his death, his grandson at his request attended to his affairs, writing his letters, looking after his banking business and his rents,
making out his bills, cutting off his coupons,
reading to him, and on occasions going away
In
from home to transact other business.
July, 1871, Cornell gave to Strong a deed of
two adjoining houses in the city of Troy,
valued at about $32,000, in one of which
houses the grandfather lived until the time
of his death.
The grandson moved into the
adjoining house in the spring of 1872, and
resided there until after his grandfather's
During the time that the two thus
death.
lived in adjoining residences, they were in
daily conference upon business matters of the
old gentleman, in the house occupied by the
grandson.
The grandson with his family
consisting of five persons, during all this time
lived at the sole expense of the grandfather,
and claims to have received, in addition to
the note in suit, as gifts from his grandfather, $30,000 in government bonds and the
assignment of a mortgage for about $1,700.
At what particular time it is claimed these
Mr. Corgifts were made Is not in evidence.
nell made his will in 1871, providing a legacy
of $15,000 for Mr. Strong. In the fall of
1872, Mr. Strong expressed a desire to go into business for himself and to be independent
of his grandfather, and actually was In negotiation with different persons in Troy and
New York with a view of forming business
Mr. Cornell became uneasy at
associations.
the prospect of losing the services of his
grandson and caused him to be written for
to come home.
Mr. Strong came back to
Troy, and bis grandfather said to him then,
as he had previously said, that he wanted
him to give up his ideas of leaving and to
devote his whole time to the business of his
grandfather.
Mr. Cornell further said that
be had no one else to look after his business,
and frequently said that there was money

for all of them. Mr. Strong Immediately abandoned his business projects and
devoted his whole time and attention to his
grandfather's business, until the death of the
latter. After this Mr. Cornell sent for his
legal advisers and proposed to alter his will
so as to make provision to compensate bis
grandson for having devoted himself to his
business.
What provision was intended is
not disclosed by the evidence.
The lawyers
advised that his will be left unaltered, and
that he take some other way of compensating his grandson. Mr. Cornell gave to Mr.
Strong the note in question.
It is as follows:
Troy, April 1, 1873. Five years
"$20,000.
after date I promise to pay Latham L. C.
Strong, or order, $20,000, for value received,
with interest yearly. L. Cornell."
The note was on a printed form, the name
of the payee being printed "Latham Cornell"
The note was filled up in the handwriting of
the maker, but in striking out with his pen
the name of the payee he left the word
"Latham" and afterwards interlined the full
name, "L. C. Strong."
Annexed to the note
was a stub with some printed forms, on
which Mr. Cornell wrote: "Troy, April 1st,
1873, L. C. Strong, $20,000 at five years, to
make the amount the same as Chas. W.
Cornell." The stub was on the note when it
was delivered to the payee, but was torn off
by him before it was transferred to the plaintiff; and there is no evidence that the plaintiff ever knew of the existence of the stub.
The stub and note were taken from a blank
book which belonged to decedent.
No payment of interest was made upon the note
during the lifetime of the maker.
The referee found that the note was given for a
valuable consideration. Mr. Strong sold the
taking his
note to the plaintiff for $19,000,
note, payable in one year after date. What
that date was has not been disclosed.
Mr.
Strong testified at the trial that he still held
the note. Mr. Strong was one of the executors.
Further facts are stated In the opinion.
enough

Irving Browne, for appellant
for respondents.

John Thomp-

son,

HAND, J. The counsel for respondents
suggested at the close of his argument before us that there was no evidence of a delivery of the note to Strong, the payee, and
the finding of delivery by the referee was
entirely unsupported. He does not however
make this a point in his printed brief, and
did not present it strenuously or with any

emphasis in his oral remarks.
It Is true that the evidence In this respect
Ordinarily the
was not very satisfactory.
possession and production of the note by the
payee will raise a presumption of delivery
to him. But this presumption must be very
much weakened when the possession is
shown not to precede the possession of all
the maker's papers and effects by the payee
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as executor, when the note appears to have
heen all in the handwriting
of the maker
and to have been taken with a stub attached,
also in his handwriting,
from a bank book
belonging to him, and when installments of
interest falling due in the maker's life-time
were not paid and although years elapsed
after they so became due before his death
there is no proof of any demand of them by
the payee or recognition of liability by the
am not prepared to say however
deceased.
that these circumstances absolutely destroy
the presumption from possession and production of the instrument. While some evidence
on the part of the plaintiff, showing that the
note had been delivered to Strong in his

I

grandfather's life-time, or at least negativing the idea that Strong found it in the bankbook or among the papers of the deceased
when he took possession of them as executor,
could probably have been easily produced if
consistent with the fact, yet we cannot hold
its absence conclusive against the plaintiff
upon this point, upon the record as it stands.
No motion for judgment or to dismiss was
made on this ground by the respondents although the trial was in other respects treated
by the counsel on both sides as one before a
referee appointed in the ordinary way to
hear and determine and direct judgment as
in an action, and we cannot say but that if
the plaintiff had been notified of such an objection, the evidence would have been supplied. The finding of the delivery by the
referee was not even excepted to, although
there were exceptions to the finding of consideration.
Under these circumstances we
must, I think, assume an acquiescence in the
truth of the finding by the respondents for
reasons known to them, and which if disclosed would probably be entirely satisfactory.

The majority of the general term put their

I

reversal of the judgment upon the ground
that it conclusively appeared from the stub
attached tliat the note was intended as a
gift and was without consideration. In this
I am unable to concur.
The referee's finding that the note was delivered not as a gift but for a valuable consideration has some evidence to support it, in
the proof of the services rendered by Strong
to the deceased, and his abandonment of a
profession at the request of the deceased, in
the intention- expressed by the latter to make
some compensation
for those services, and
the conversation
had with his counsel not
very long before the date of this note, in
which he was dissuaded
from making this
compensation by will and advised to do it
whUe alive, to which he assented.
What appears upon the stub is not in my opinion
conclusive against this result.
There is perhaps difficulty in giving any
entirely
satisfactory construction to this
memorandum made by the deceased; but the
interpretation
of the general term seems to
■my mind inconsistent with the known facts
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of the

Strong certainly had had and
case.
the deceased knew that he had had property
of the value of $32,000 given him before the
date of this note, and perhaps $30,000 more
In bonds. The $20,000 note could not have
been therefore as the general term supposes,
a gift to make him equal in gifts with his
cousin Charles, to whom only $20,000 had
been given in all.
But not only do the circumstances show
that the memorandum could not mean that
this gift of the $20,000 to Strong would
make him equal in gifts to Charles, but the
memorandum itself does not say so. Its
language is "to make the amount the same
as Chas. W. Cornell." While, as has already been said, there is probably insuperable difficulty in discovering precisely all
that the deceased meant by this expression,
its intrinsic sense is merely that the amount
of this note, $20,000, is so fixed to make it
the same as an amount possessed in some
way by Charles, and this is consistent with
both amounts being gifts, or the one being
fixed upon in the testator's mind as a fair compensation for Strong's services and at the
same time equal to an amount he had given
or intended to give to Charles. On the whole
was a piece of
think this memorandum
evidence to be submitted with the other evidence to be considered by the referee on the
question of fact. His decision upon all this
evidence cannot be disturbed by this court.
The same may be said of the proof of
large gifts to Strong either all before, or
some before and some after the date of the

I

note.

The reversal by the general term Is not
stated to be upon the facts, and on the argument it was conceded by the counsel for the
respondents to be upon the law merely.
It
may be that a finding upon aU the evidence
that the note was without consideration and
a gift would not be disturbed, and would be
held by us as not unauthorized by the evidence. On the other hand, we cannot accede
to the proposition that a finding to the contrary, such as has been made by the referee
here, must by reason of the contents of this
stub or other testimony be reversed as erin law.
follows that except as bearing upon unand the relations of parties
due influence,
hereafter considered, the inadequacy of the
services or the extravagance of the compensation are not material. That was a matter
purely of agreement between Strong and the
deceased, and with which the court will not
ordinary
circumstances.
under
Interfere
Earl V. Peck, 64 N. Y. 597; Worth v. Case,
42 N. Y. 362; Johnson v. Titus, 2 Hill, 606.
Although the consideration of a promissory
note is always open to investigation between
the original parties (and we agree with the
court below that the plaintiff here has no
better position than Strong himself), yet as
pointed out by the chief judge in Earl v.
Pock, supra, mere inadequacy in value of the
roneous

It

\
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thing bought or paid for is never Intended
by the legal expression, "want or failure of
consideration." This only covers either total
worthlessness to all parties, or subsequent
destruction, partial or complete.
Assuming then, as
think vsre must, that
there was no error as matter of law in the
finding of the referee that this note wa s
that
sfiven for a valuable co nsideration, and
the adequacy of that ctmsiaeraiion is something with which we have no concern If the
parties dealt on equal terms, the only point
remaining to consider Is the relations existing between the deceased and Strong at the
date of the note.
It Is Insisted strenuously by the learned
that these were
counsel for the respendents
such as to call for the application of the doctrine of constructive fraud, and threw upon
the plaintiff the burden of proving not only
that the deceased fully understood the act,
but that he was not induced to it by any undue influence of Strong, and that the latter
took no unfair advantage of his superior Influence or knowledge.
The court below were hardly correct In the
suggestion
that the plaintiff conceded this
burden to be upon himself, and for that reason, instead of resting upon the statement of
consideration in the note, gave evidence in
opening his case of an actual consideration;
for this may have been done to show In the
first instance that the note was not a gift
and hence void under the law applicable to
gifts. Indeed It appears from the findings
and refusals to find, and the opinion of the
referee, that such was not the theory upon
which the action was tried or decided.
We return then to the question whether
this case was one of constructive fraud. It
may be stated as universally true that fraud
vitiates all contracts, but ^h a fr^nprai thim
It Is not presum e d but muat~~b e
""the party seekmg t6 r elieve himself frnni ^.ti
(flg^atlogTTnr-tMsrtrpSSii^- WhSSvef, however, the relaHorfe" between the contracting
\ parties appear to be of such a character as
they do not deal on
J to render it certain that
on the one
f terms of equality, but that either
side from superior knowledge of the matter'
! derived from a fiduciary relation, or from
overmastering influence, or on the other from
I
weakness, dependence or trust justifiably rein a transaction is
posed, unfair advantage
rendered probable, there the burden Is shifted. the transactio n is presujiedTg'*^ and It
is incumbent upoiii tWstronger party to show
affirmatively that no deception was practiced,
no undue inflaence was used, and that all
was fair, open, voluntary and well understood. This doctrine is well settled.
Hunt,
J., Nesbit V. Lockman, 34 N. Y. 167; Story,
Bq. Jur. § 311; Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y. 268;
Huguenln v. Basely, 13 Ves. 105, 14 Ves.
273, and 15 Ves. 180; Wright v. Proud, 13
Ves. 138; Harris v. Tremenheere, 15 Ves. 40;
Edwards v. Myrick, 2 Hare, 60; Hunter v.
Atkins, 3 Mylne & K. 113. And this is

I

I

I
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think the extent to which the well-considered cases go, and is the scope of "constructive
fraud."
The principle referred to. It must be remembered,
is distinct from that absolutely
forbidding a purchase by a trustee or agent
for his own benefit of the subject of a trust,
and charging it when so purchased with the
trust. That amounts to an incapacity in the
fiduciary to purchase of himself. He cannot
act for himself at all, however fairly or innocently, in any dealing as to which he has
duties as trustee or agent The reason of
this rule Is subjective. It removes from the
trustee,
with the power, all temptation to
commit any breach of trust for his own benefit. But the principle with which we are
now concerned does not absolutely forbid the
dealing, but It presumes It unfair and fraudulent unless the contrary is affirmatively
shown.
This doctrine, as has been said, is well
settled, but there is often great difficulty in
applying It to particular cases.
The law presumes In the case of guardian
and ward, trustee and cestui que trust, attorney and client, and perhaps physician
and patient, from the relation of the parties
itself, that their situation is unequal and of
the character I have defined; and that relation appearing itself throws the burden upon
the trustee, guardian or attorney of showing
the fairness of his dealings.
But while the doctrine is without doubt to
be extended to many other relations of trust,
confidence or inequality, the trust and confidence, or the superiority on one side and
weakness on the other, must be proved in
each of these cases; the law does not presume them from the fact for Instance that
one party is a grandfather and old, and the
other a grandson and young, or that one is
an employer and the other an employe.
The question as to parties so situated is a
question of fact dependent upon the circumstances In each case. There is no presumption of Inequality either way from these relations merely.
In the present case It cannot be said that
the fact that the deceased employed Strong
as his clerk to read and answer his letters
and cut off his coupons, and make out his
bills, or as his bailiff to collect his rents, or
that at this time he was old and of defective
vision, or that Strong lived near htm and
was his grandson, taken separately or together raise a conclusive presumption of law
that their situation was unequal, and that
dealings between them as to compensation
for these services were between a stronger
and a weaker party, a fiduciary In hac re
and the party reposing confidence.
These
relations as a matter of fact may have led
to or been consistent with controlling Influence on the part of the grandson, or childish
weakness and confidence on the part of the
grandfather, but this was to be shown, and
Is not necessarily derivable or presumable
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stratagems or "speck of Imposition" on the
part of Strong as to this note.
We are not permitted to supply these findings even if we thought them proper for the
referee to make, nor can we sustain a reversal of the original Judgment upon facts
not found and not necessarily inferable from
uncontradicted evidence in the case, the general t«rm not having in any way interfered
with the findings of the referee.
On the whole therefore we reach the conclusion that there was no good reason for
disturbing
the judgment of the referee.
This large claim upon the estate of the deceased Is not so clearly justified and explained in the evidence as we could have wished,
and the circumstances are such as to compgl
this court to look upon the case. If not with
suspicion, certainly with anxiety, yet after
careful examination we can find no material
error in the original decision.
The order granting a new trial must be
reversed and judgment for plaintiff affirmed,
with costs.

;')

ftom the relations themselves, as In the case
of trustee, attorney or guardian.
Prom these relations and the large gifts
to Strong, and
shown from the deceased
from the extravagant amoimt of the compensation In the note, it is very possible the
referee might have found as a fact the existence of weakness on the one side, or undue strength on the other, which rendered
applicable the doctrine of constructive fraud,
and threw upon the plaintiff the burden of
disproving such fraud. These circumstances
may have well been of a character, If not
sufScient to shift the presumption, at least
to authorize a setting aside of a contract
without any decisive proof of fraud, but upon the slightest proof that advantage was
taken of the relation, or of the use of "any
arts or stratagems or any undue means or
the least speck of imposition." Whelan v.
Whelan, 3 Cow. 538, Liord Eldon, L. C; Harris V. Tremenheere, 15 Ves. 40, Lord Brougham; Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Mylne & K. 135.
But the referee not only has' not found as
fact any inequality in the situation of the
deceased and Strong, but refused to find as
a matter of law its existence, and there Is
really no evidence whatever of any arts or
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concur, except MILLBR
absent
Judgment accordingly.

All

JJ.,

^,

and

EARL,
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Conrt of the United States.
(94

Sapreme
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1876.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United
for the Eastern district of Michigan.
Xbe facts are stated in the opinion of the
'
court
States

Alfied Bussell, for appellant. A. B. Maynard, contra.
Mr. Justice

FIELD

dell-vered the opinion of

the court.

This is

a suit brought by the heir at law of
Genevieve Thibault, late of Detroit,
Mich., to cancel a conveyance of land alleged
to have been obtained from her a few weeks
before her death, when, from her condition,
she was incapable of understanding the na^
ture and effect of the transaction.
The deceased died at Detroit on the 4th of
February, 1S64, intestate, leaving the complainant her sole surviving heir at law. For
many years previous to her death, and until
the execution of the conveyance
to the defendant, she was seised in fee of the land in
controversy, situated in that city, which she
occupied
as a homestead.
In November,
1863, the defendant obtained from her a conveyance of this property.
A copy of the conveyance is set forth in the bill.
It contains
covenants of seisin and warranty by this grantor, and immediately
following them an
agreement by the defendant to pay her $250
upon the delivery of the instrument; an annuity of $500; all her physician's bills during
her life; the taxes on the property for that
year, and all subsequent taxes during her
life; also, that she should have the use and
occupation of the house until the spring of
1864, or that he would pay the rent of such
other house as she might occupy until then.
The property was then worth, according to
the testimony in the case, between $6,000
and $8,000.
The deceased was at that time
between sixty and seventy years of age, and
was confined to her house by sickness, fi'om
which she never recovered.
She lived alone,
in a state of great degradation, and was without regular attendance In her sickness. There
were no persons present with her at the execution of the conveyance, except the defendant, his agent, and his attorney. The $250
stipulated were paid, but no other payment
was ever made to her; she died a few weeks
afterwards.
As grounds for cancelling this conveyance,
the complainant alleges that the deceased,
during the last few years of her life, was
afUicted with lunacy or chronic insanity, and
was so infirm as to be incapable of transacting any business of importance; that her
last sickness aggravated her insanity, greatly
weakened her mental faculties, and still more
disqualified her for business; that the defendant and his agent knew of her inflrmity,
and that there was no reasonable prospect of
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her recovery from her sickness, or of her long
surviving, when the conveyance was taken;
that she did not understand the nature of the
Instrument; and that it was obtained for an
insignificant consideration, and in a clandestine manner, without her having any independent advice.

These allegations the defendant controverts,
and avers that the conveyance was taken
upon a proposition of the deceased; that at
the date of its execution she was in the full
possession
of her mental faculties, appreciated the value of the property, and was capable of contracting with reference to it, and of
selling or otherwise dealing with it; that
since her death he has occupied the premises,
and made permanent improvements
to the
value of $7,000; and that the complainant
never gave him notice of any claim to the
property until the commencement of this suit
The court below dismissed the bUl, whereupon the complainant appealed
here. The| ^
question presented
for determination
is, <
whether the deceased, at the time she execut- (
ed the conveyance in question, possessed sufficient intelligence to understand fully the nature and effect of the transaction; and. If so,
whether the conveyance was executed und^
such circumstances as that it ought to be upheld, or as would justify the interference of
equity for Its cancellation.
Numerous witnesses were examined in the
case, and a large amount of testimony was
taken. This testimony has been carefully analyzed by the defendant's counsel; and it
must be admitted that the facts detailed by
any one witness with reference to the condition of the deceased previous to her last illand apart from
ness, considered separately
the statements of the others, do not show incapacity to transact business on her part, nor
establish insanity, either continued or temporary. And yet, when all the facts stated by
the different witnesses are taken together,
one is led irresistibly by their combined effect
to the conclusion, Uiat, If the deceased was
not afflicted with insanity for some years before her death, her mind wandered so near
the line which divides, sanity from insanity
as to render any important business trajisactlon with her of doubtful propriety, and to
justify a careful scrutiny into Its fairness.
Thus, some of the witnesses speak of the
deceased as having low and filthy habits; of
her being so Imperfectly dad as at times to
expose immodestly' portions of her person;
of her eating with her fingers, and having
vermin on her body.
Some of them testify
to her believing in dreams, and her imagining
she could see ghosts and spirits around her
room, and her claiming to talk with tBwja;
to her being incoherent in her conve^sation^^
passing suddenly and without cause from one
subject to another; to her using vulgar and
profane language; to her making Immodest
gestures; to her talking strangely, and making singular motions and gestures In her
neighbors' houses and in the streets.
Other
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witnesses testify to further peculiarities of
life, manner, and conduct; but none of the
mentioned,
considered singly,
peculiarities

veyance.
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It is not necessary, in order to secure the
aid of equity, to prove that the deceased was
at the time insane, or in such a state of
mental imbecility as to render her entirely incapable of executing a valid deed. It is suf-"
flcient to show that, from her sickness and infirmities, she was at the time in a condition
of great mental weakness, and that there was ]
gross Inadequacy of consideration for the con'
veyance.
From these circumstances, imposltion or undue Influence wUl be inferred. In
the case of Harding v. Wheaton, 2 Mason, 378,
Fed. Cas. No. 6,051, a conveyance executed by
one to his son-in-law, for a nominal consideration, and upon a verbal arrangement that
it should be considered as a trust for the maintenance of the grantor, and after his death
for the benefit of his heirs, was, after his
death, set aside, except as security for actual
advances and charges, upon application of his
heirs, on the ground that It was obtained from
him when his mind was enfeebled by age and
other causes. "TjiYtrpm e weakng
-Tnatirfl Story, in deciding th e case, will raise
T^,.o.
— -* «-«.«<.o.o,.,t
ne cessary presumption of imposialmost
an -■■
tion. eveh'''w5Sirtr'gt6ps"^flgh of legal incapaoity; and though a contract, in the ordinary
course of things, reasonably made with such a
person, might be admitted to stand, yet if it
should appear to be of such a nature as that
such a person could not be capable of measuring its extent or Importance, its reasonableness or Its value, fully and fairly, it cannot be
that the law is so much at variance with common sense as to uphold it." The case subsequently came before this court; and, in de-
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with no one else about the purchase.
With
him and with his attorney he went to the
house of the deceased, and there witnessed
the miserable condition in which she lived,
and he states that he wondered how anybody
could live in such a place, and that he told
Dolsen to get her a bed and some clothing.
Dolsen had previously Informed him that she
would not sell the property; yet he took a
conveyance from her at a consideration
which, imder the circumstances,
with a certainty almost of her speedy decease, was an
insignificant one compared with the value
of the property.
In view of the circumstances stated, we are\
not satisfied that the deceased was, at the
time she executed the conveyance, capable of
comprehending fully the nature and effect of
the transaction. She was in a state of physical prostration; and from that cause, and
her previous infirmities, aggravated by her
sickness, her intellect was greatly enfeebled;
and, if not disqualified, she was unfitted to
attend to business of such "importance as the
disposition of her entire property, and the
securing of an annuity for life. Certain it is,
that, in negotiating for the disposition of the
property, she stood, in her sickness and infirmities, on no terms of equality with the defendant, who, with his attorney and agent,
met her alone in her hovel to obtain the con-

show a want of capacity to transact business.
wlU readily occur to every one
Instances
where some of them have been exhibited by
good judgment in the
persons possessing
and disposition of property.
management
But when all the peculiarities mentioned, of
life, conduct, and language, are found In the
same person, they create a strong impression
that his mind is not entirely sound; and all
transactions relating to tils property will be

narrowly scanned by a court of equity, whenever brought under its cognizance.
The condition of the deceased was not ImThe testiproved during her last sickness.
mony of her attending physician leads to the
conclusion that her mental infirmities were
aggravated by it. He states that he had studled her disease, and for many years had considered her partially Insane, and that in his
opinion she was not competent in November,
1863, during her last sickness, to understand
like the instrument executed.
a document
The physician also testifies that during this
month he informed one Dolsen, who had inquired of the condition and health of the deceased, and had stated that efforts had been
made to purchase her property, that in his
opinion she could not survive her sickness,
and that she was not in a condition to make
any sale of the property "in a right way."
This Dolsen had at one time owned and
managed a tannery adjoining the home of
the deceased, which he sold to the defendant.
After the sale, he carried on the business,^*the defendan t's agent . Through him the transof the property was
'action~T(5FTBe°purchase
conducted. The deceased understood English
Imperfectly, and Dolsen undertook to explain
to her, in French, the contents of the paper
she executed.
Some attempt is made to show
that he acted as her agent; but this Is evidently an afterthought. He was in the employment of the defendant, had charge of his
business, and had often talked with him
about securing the property; and in his interest he acted throughout. If the deceased
was not In a condition to dispose of the property, she was not in a condition to appoint an
agent for that purpose.
The defendant himself states that be had
seen the deceased for years, and knew that
she was eccentric, queer, and penurious. It
Is hardly credible that, during those years,
carrying on business within a few yards
her house, he had not heard that her mind
was unsettled;
or, at least, had not inferred
that Buch was the fact, from what he saw of
her conduct.
Be that as It ma v- Dnlijpn's.
knowledgg_was hl3_] ^owledg e; and, when he
"TilSvelHntedToTISy" the^ annuity, some inquiry
must have been had as to the probable duration of the payments. Such covenants are
not often made without inquiries of that nature; and to Dolsen he must have looked for
Information, for he states that he conversed
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elding It, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of this, and. It would seem, of other deeds
by the deceased, said: "If these
executed
deeds were obtained by the exercise of undue
Influence over a man whose mind had ceased
to be the safe guide of his actions, it is against
conscience for him who has obtained them to
derive any advantage from them. It Is the
peculiar province of a court of conscience to
set them aside. That a court of equity will
interpose in such a case is among Its bestHarding v. Handy, 11
settled principles."
Wheat. 125.
The same doctrine is announced in adjudged
cases, almost without number; and it may be
stated as settled law, that w hene ver there is.
g reat wealine ss of mind'Tn^"iS^rson'"ex'e cut!ng^
"g'feoavevMee ui: ikm,'TiTimg'rimr^^sr^i^
''^^?i^iM!mm S^-J:?^^ '^^°^
amoiib^^
con"■■~W'MsoIme^^'quaIIS^'Botf,'"9BH^ffie

fhet tifpaaSct
rd~Bet:"the CM ivpjpiff^a'fti'p'"'°"X"Tifl
li case comes directly witfiln this principle.
In the recent case of Kempson v. Ashbee, 10
Ch. Gas. 15, decided in the court of appeal in
chancery in England, two bonds executed by
a young woman, living at the time with her
mother and step-father,— one, at the age of
twenty-one,
as surety for her step-father's
debt, and the other, at the age of twenty-nine,
to secure the amount of a judgment recovered
on the first bond,— were set aside as against
her, on the ground that she had acted in th*
transaction without independent advice; one
of the justices observing that the court had
endeavored to prevent persons subject to Influence from being induced to enter into trans-

actions without advice of that kind. The principle upon which the court acts in suh cases,
of protecting the weak and dependent, may always be invoked on behalf of persons in the
situation of the deceased spinster in this case,
of doubtful sanity, living entirely by herself,
without friends to take care of her, and conAs well on
fined to her house by sickness.
this ground as on the ground of weakness of
mind and gross inadequacy of consideration,
we think the case a proper one for the interference of equity, and that a cancellation of
the deed should be decreed.
Ji The objection of the lapse of time— six years
—before bringing the suit cannot avail the deIf during this time, from the death
fendant.
of witnesses or other causes, a full presenta-

I\

tion of the facts of the case had become InA
possible, there might be force In the objectioa\
But as there has been no change In this
re-|
spect to the Injury of the defendant, it does I
not lie In his mouth, after having, in the manner stated, obtained the property of the deceased, to complain that her heir did not sooner brln^ suit against him to compel its surrender.
There is no statutory bar in the case.
The Improvements made have not cost more
than the amount which a reasonable rent of
the property would have produced, and the
complainant, as we understand, does not object to allow the defendant credit for them.
And as to the small amount paid on the execution of the conveyance, it Is sufficient to
observe, that the complainant received from
the administrator of the deceased's estate only
$113.42; and there is no .evidence that he ever
knew that this sum constituted any portion
of the money obtained from the defendant. A
decree must, therefore, be entered for a cancellation of the deed of the deceased and a
surrender of the property to the complainant,
but without any accounting for back rents,
the improvements being taken as an equivalent for them.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded with
directions to enter a decree as thus stated.
Mr. Chief Justice

STRONG, concur.

WAITE

and Mr. Justice

Mr. Justice BRADLEY (dissenting). I cannot concur In the judgment given in this case.
Were there no other reason for my dissent, it
would be enough that the complainant has
been guilty of inexcusable laches. He knew
every thing of which he now complains, in
February, 1864, when the grantor of the defendant died, and when his rights as her heir
vested;
and yet he waited until six years and
nine months thereafter before he brought this
suit, and before he made any complaint of the
sale she had made. Meanwhile, he accepted
the money the defendant had paid on account
of the purchase, and he stood silently by, asserting no claim, while the defendant was
making valuable Improvements upon the lot,
at a cost of $6,000 or $7,000, a sum about
equal to the value of the property at the time
of the purchase.
To permit him now to assert that the sale was invalid, because the
vendor was of weak mind, is to allow him to
reap a profit from his own unconscionable silence and delay.
cannot think a court of
equity should lend itself to such a wrong.

I
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Appeal from common pleas of New York
city and county, general term.
brought by William
Action originally
Koworth, to vacate transfers of certain property made by liim to his sons, Joseph G. and
Pending the decision,
John W. Koworth.
William Roworth died, and the action was
revived in favor of the present plaintiffs,
Emma T. Greene and others. A judgment
for plaintiffs was reversed in part and affirmed
in part on appeal to the general term of the
supreme court, and defendants now appeal
to this court.
Thomas Darlington, {Samuel Jones, of
/. M, & A. H. Van
counsel.) for appellants.
Cott, for respondents.
Etjgee, 0.

J.

The reversal by the general

term of so much of the judgment of the special term as awarded relief to the plaintiffs
in respect to the conveyance of personal
property, eliminated from the case all quesupon rulings in relation
tions predicated
This determination left the issues
thereto.
in respect to the validity of the conveyances
of two parcels of real estate as the only subjects of controversy on the appeal to this
court.
The evidence of the exercise of fraud and
undue influence by the defendants Joseph and

John Roworth, in obtaining from their father, William Koworth, deeds of such property,
was quite sufficient to sustain the findings of
The evthe trial court respecting the same.
idence tended to show that for many years
prior to January, 1877, William Koworth
and his son Samuel carried on the business
of manufacturing confectionery at 354 Pearl
street in the city of New York, under the
firm name of Samuel W. Koworth &Co., and
had established a prosperous business
William Roworth was then the owner of a onehalf interest in the assets of said firm; of a
three-quarters interest in the lot and building in which the business was carried on ; of
a house and Jot in Devoe street, Brooklyn,
and another in Fifth street in the same city;
a mortgage on property in Detroit for ^2,000 y
In Janand deposits in bank of about $500.
uary, Samuel W. Koworth died, devising his
interest in the assets of said firm equally to
the defendants, his two brothers, John and
Between the
Joseph, and to his two sisters.
time of Samuel's death, in January, 1877,
and March, 1880, the defendants John and
Joseph had obtained from William Koworth,
without consideration except a promise to
'
pay him a small sum weekly from the partnerahip business, all of the property possessed
by him.
This was effected by transfers and
conveyances of such property, or its proceeds,
made successively at different times by William Roworth to one or both of said defendants, between the dates aforesaid.
At the
time of the death of Samuel the two defend-

ants were each upwards of 45 years of age,
had been unsuccessful in the business
operations theretofore carried on by them respectively, and were not then possessed of
any property.
They were supporting themselves as workmen, upon a small salary, in
the employ of Samuel W. Roworth & Co. In ■
1877, William Koworth was 76 years of age,
His
and had become quite infirm in health.
memory had greatly failed, and he was practically incapable of taking an active and responsible part in the management of his business, although he continued for some time
thereafter to attend at the store and factory,
and make entries in the books, draw up bills,
and render other small services which he had
been theretofore accustomed to perform.
He
had become very nervous and susceptible,
being frequently overcome by emotion, and
easily affected to tears, and subject to the influence of those surrounding him.
He had
an aged wife, who survived him, and was
The flnd^
dependent upon him for support.
ings of fact made by the trial court as the
basis of its judgment with respect to the two
deeds which remain as the subject of controversy on this appeal are substantially the
same, and that one relating to the transfer of
No. 354 Pearl street. New York, reads as
That "the said William Roworth,
follows:
at the time of the execution and acknowledgment of said instrument, did not know or
comprehend the legal effect of the said instrument," and that its "execution, acknowledgment, and delivery * * * were procured
by fraud and undue influence, exercised upon
said William Roworth by the said defendants,
Joseph G. Roworth and John W. Roworth,
and by their taking advantage of his age and
infirmities, and his confidence and trust in
them, and his dependence and reliance upon
them; and the signing and delivery of the
same by William Roworth was reckless and
'
improvident, was done without proper advice
of counsel, ana upon a grossly inadequate
consideration, and while he was acting nnder the influence of said defendants, unduly
The evidence, as vre
exercised upon him."
have said, fully supports this finding, and<
indeed, we are of the opinion that the proof
would not have justified the contrary conclusion. In the consideration of this case the
court cannot shut its eyes to the significant
fact that William Koworth has been substantially stripped of all of his property by some
one; and however or to whomever it passed
originally, either the property or its proceeds
found their way to a common end, viz., to
the benefit and possession of the defendants.
Whatever the defendants advanced, if anything, towards the acquisition of any part of
the property, has been for their own advanfrom funds which
tage, and substantially
they bad received from their father.
The only material question in this case
arises over an aUeged inconsistency between
the findings made by the trial court as the
basis of its judgment, and a single one also
found by the court out of 105 special requests
and
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to And on questions of fact submitted by the
It is undefendants at the close of the trial.
doubtedly an established rule of this court,
where findings of fact, mad!e by the court
or referee, which are inateriiil to the determination of the case, are irreconcilably conflicting, that we will be governed by that
finding which is most favorable to the party
appealing; but this rule presupposes such a
So, far, therefore,
difference in the findings.
as these findings areconfiicting, it is the duty
of the court to endeavor to reconcile them,
It
and give to each some office to perform.
is only when this cannot, by a reasonable
construction, be accomplished, that the court
are bound to accept that finding most favorBennett v. Bates, 94
able to the app 'llant.
N. T. 354; Redtteld v. Eedfield, 110 K. Y.
671, 18 N. E. Bep. 373.
It was said in the
latter case that " we have held that, where the
special findings of a judge or referee differ
from the findings formally made as the basis
of the judgment, the appellant has the right
to rely upon such findings as are most favorable to him.
Those decisions were made at
a time when the practice authorized the submission of proposed findings * * * after
the decision of the case was rendered; and
under that practice such findings were passed
and
frequently
upon, generally weeks,
months, after the formal findings had been
made.
And we held that where such findings differed from the prior findings, and contradicted them, that the appellant had the
right to rely upon them if most favorable to
him. Tompkins v. Lee, 59 N. Y. 662;
Sch winger v. Raymond, 83 N. Y. 192; Bonnell V. Griswold, 89 N. Y. 122. Since those
decisions, the practice has been changed, and
now the proposed findings must be presented
at the submission of the case, and the presumption is that those findings are passed
upon when the case is decided and the formal
Hence, for the purpose of
findings made.
'construing the findings, we must look at all
of them, both the general and special findings, and if they are in confiict we must attempt to reconcile them." In accord with
1the rule thus stated, we must look at the findings in question, to see how far they are inconsistent. Theformal finding will be found
much broader than the one alleged to be inconsistent therewith, as it especially finds that
the deed was fraudulently procured, in ignorance of its effect by the grantor, and these
facts' are not negatived by any subsequent
There is undoubtedly an apparent
finding.
inconsistency between the additional and
some parts of the formal findings, but upon
examination we think it does not necessarily
nullify the effect of the formal finding. The
additional finding is as follows: "That the
said Joseph Gr. and John W. Roworth did not,
about said month of April, or at any time,
persuade or influence said William Roworth
to sign said alleged paper, or make any representations in respect thereto."
"We infer
that this finding relates to the deed in question. In the same connection the court re-
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find that the said William Roworth
was not "by reason of bodily infirmities unable and incapacitated from participating in

■fus.ed to

or taking part in the management and control of his business, property, and affairs," or
that "Joseph G. and John W. Roworth were
not intrusted by William Roworth * * *
with tha exclusive and entire management
and control of his property and business," or
that "he was not dependent upon the said
Joseph G. and John W. Roworth for the
proper management and control of his property and business, and was not solely reliant
upon their advice in regard thereto," or that
he was cognizant of "the real purpose and
effect of his deed to Joseph G. and John W.
Roworth. " It seems quite evident, by these
refusals to find, that the court did not intend,
by its informal finding, to nullify the general
force and effect of the formal findings. The
court had, in its original findings, on seven
distinct and separate occasions applying to as
many different transfers of property, reiterated in substance the findings of franri and
undu e influence on the part oiJJifls e dofond SntlTlllUbtjiuiugumih transfers. The several
findings were presumptively passed upon at
the same time, and it is quite improbable that
the court intentionally determined to leave
two findings in the case radically inconsistent
with each other, or to nullify and contradict
its repeated findings, often expressed and confirmed in its previous statement of facts.
We are of the opinion that the court, by
the additional finding, intended only to say
that there was no direct or positive evidence
of any special influence or persuasion with
reference to the procurement of the deed
in question, but left the judgment to stand
upon the legal presumption of fraud arising upon the facts and circumstances of the
case.
The informal finding was substantially a finding as to the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence, and not upon an
existing and independent fact itself, and in
that respect was rather a finding upon a
question of law than one of fact. In that
view it may be said to be erroneous, and as
The
not affecting the judgments rendered.
leading facts of the 'case have been found,
and are not impaired by any contradictory
finding. They were, substantially, that the
deed was secured by parties who had already
obtained tlie larger portion of the grantor's
property, without any adequate consideration
therefor; that this conveyance left him comparatively destitute of property, and was
made without consideration, in the absence
of any legal adviser, by an aged man, whose
mental and physical condition was much enfeebled, and in ign^j-ance of its legal effect,
to persons occupying a confidential relation
towards him, and who had the management
and control of his property and business affairs, and upon whose advice and counsel he
was accustomed to rely. That these facts
afford sufficient g round to Support a hP^'"g .
■6f fraud ahd Uhdue mliuence, eveu"Wn^'
positive or direct proof of persuasion or in-
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fluence, cannot be questioned.
Tliey present a situation from whicli fnuid is legally

imputable to those benefited, and requiring
an explanation from them, which was not
furnished by the defendants.
As was said by Judge Hand in Co wee v.
Cornell. 75 N. Y. 99: "We return, then, to
the question whether this case was one of
constructive fraud. It may be stated as universally true that fraud vitiates all noTitranta.
but as a gen-ferai thing itis not presumed ,
but must be proved by tB5~p5rty seeking to
relieVfl' fiimsell Irorn an obligation on that
Whenever, however, the relations
ground.
betvfeen the contracting parties appear to be
of such a character as to render it certain
that they do not deal on terras of equality,
but that, either on the one side from superior
knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or from overmastering influence, or, on the other, from weakness, dependence, or trust justifiably repqsed, unfair
advantage in a transaction is rendered probable, there the burden is shifted, the transaction is presumed void, and it is incumbent
upon the stronger party to show affirmatively that no deception was practiced, no undue
influence was used, and that all was fair,
" The
open, voluntary, and well understood.
remarks of Judge Andrews in Be Will of
Smith, 95 N. T. 516, are so pertinent to the
question that we repeat them here: "jjnr'"''
influence, whi ch is a species of fraud, wheg.
transaction inter vari
iipon to annul atransaction
tes, or a testamen ta ry aispo sinnn, "tuatr
iiut the
pfoVOd, ahJ~cdIlflot be pre sumed,
i-Blation lu Which Ihe ptlrll«li"lO a Transaction
stand to each other is often a material circumstance, and may of itself, in some cases.

^
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be sufficient

to raise a presumption of its
existence. * * * and, when the situation is shown, then there is cast upon the
party claiming the benefit or advantage the
burden of relieving himself from the suspicion thus engendered, and of showing, either
by direct proof or by circumstances, that tlie
transaction was free from f rassd or undue influence, and that the other party acted without restraint and under no coercion, or any
pressure, direct or indirect, o*' the party benefited.
This rule does not proceed upon a
presumption of the invalidity of the particular transiiction, without proof. The proof is
made in the first instance when the relation
and the personal intervention of the party
claiming the benefit is shown." The general rule is stated in 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 238:
"The doctrine, therefore, may be laid dow
as generally true that the acts and contracts
of persons who are of weak understandings,
and who are therefore liable to imposition,
will be held void in courts of equity if the
nature of the act or contract justify the conclusion that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but that he has been im
posed upon, circumvented, or overcome by
If,
cunning or artifice or undue influence."
therefore, we should give fuU effect to the
special finding, and come to the conclusion
that the giving of the deed in question was
the voluntary, unrestricted act of the grantor, it would not, under the circumstances
of this case, justify the retention by the grantee of the property conveyed, or furnish a
reason for refusing relief to the improvident
grantor.
We are therefore of the opinion
that the judgment should be affirmed. All
concur.
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Supreme

V.

Wall.

PIBRC®.
205.)

Court of the United States.

Dec.,

1S68.

Error

to the supreme

court, Nebraska ter-

ritory.
Brown filed his bill in September, 1860, in
the court below against three persons, Pierce,
and Weston, alleging that in the
Morton,
spring of 1857, he settled upon and improved
a tract of land near Omaha; that he erected
a house on the tract and continued to occupy
it until August 10th, 1857, when he entered
the tract under the pre-emption laws of the
United States; that Pierce claimed the land
by virtue of the laws of an organization
known as the Omaha Claim Club; that this
organization, consisting of very numerous
armed men, sought to, and did to a great extent, control the disposition of the public
lands in the vicinity of Omaha in 1857, in defiance of the laws of the United States; that
it freqixently resorted to personal violence in
enforcing its decrees; that the fact was notorious in Omaha, and that he, Brown, was
fully advised in the premises; that as soon
as he had acquired title to the land. Pierce,
together with several other members of the
of
club, came to his house and demanded
him a deeU of the land, threatening to take
his life by hanging him, or putting him in
the Missouri river, if he did not comply with
that the club had posted handthe demand;
bills calling the members together to take
action against him; and that knowing all
this, and in great fear of his life, he did, on
the 10th of August, 1857, convey the land by
deed to Pierce; that he. Brown, received no
consideration whatever for the conveyance;
that from the date of his settlement upon
said land, until the time of filing the bill, he
had continued to keep possession either actually or constructively; that Morton claimed
an interest in the premises by virtue of a
judgment lien, and that Weston also made
some claim.

The prayer was, that the deed might
declared void, and Pierce be decreed to
convey, and for general relief.
The bill was taken pro confesso as to
'
the defendants, except Morton, who
swered.

be
re-

all
an-

Tills answer, stating that he, Morton, was
not a resident of the territory, and had no
knowledge or Information about the facts alleged in the bill, but on the contrary was an
utter stranger to them, and therefore could
not answer as to any belief concerning them,
—set forth that on the 28th August, 1857,
Pierce was "the owner and in possession of,
and otherwise well seized and entitled to, as
of a good and indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple," the tract in controversy; that being so, and representing himself to be so, and having need of money in
business, he applied to him, Morton, to borrow the same, and that he, Morton, being in-
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duced by reason ot the representation, and
also by the possession, and believing that
he.
Pierce, was the owner, he was thereby induced to lend, and did lend to him $6,000, on

the personal security of him. Pierce; that
before the filing of this bill by Brown, he,
Morton, had obtained judgment against
Pierce for $3,400, part of the loan yet unpaid; that this judgment was a lien on the
lands; and that as he, Morton, was informed
and believed, if he could not obtain his
money from this land, he would be wholly
defrauded out of it.
The answer further stated that the defendant was informed and believed that Brown,
the complainant, entered upon the lands as
the tenant of Pierce, and that the suit by the
complainant was being prosecuted in violation of the just rights of Pierce, as well as
of him, Morton.
There was no replication. Proofs were
taken by the complainant, and they showed
to the entire satisfaction of the court that all
the matters alleged in the bill and not denied
by the answers, were true. See 7 Wall. 213.
There thus seemed no doubt as to the truth
of all the facts set out in the bill.
The court l>elow declared Brown's deed
void, and decreed a reconveyance from Pierce
to him, and that neither Morton nor Weston
had any lien on the premises.
Morton now
brought the case here for review.
Carlisle & Woolworth, for appellant Redick & Briggs, contra.
Mr. Justice

CLIFFORD

delivered

the opin-

ion of the court.

Representations of the complainant were,
that on the tenth of August, 1857, he acquired a complete title to the premises described in the bill of complaint, under the
pre-emption laws of the United States, and
that thereafter, on the same day, he was
through threats of personal viocompelled,
lence and fear of his life, to convey the same,
without any consideration, to the principal
respondent
Framed on that theory, the bill
of complamt alleged that the first-named respondent was at that time a member of an
unlawful association in that territory, called
the- Omaha Claim Club, and that he, accompanied by three or four other persons belonging to that association, came to his house
a few days before he perfected his right of
pre-emption to the land in question, and told
the complainant that if he entered the land
under his pre-emption claim, he must agree
to deed the same to him, and added, that unless he did so, he, the said respondent and
his associates, would take his life; and the
complainant further alleged, that the same
respondent accompanied,
as before^ by certain other members of that association, came
again to his house on the day he perfected
his pre-emption claim, and repeated those
threats of personal violence, and did other
acts to intimidate him, and Induce him to believe that they would carry out their threats
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lie refused to execute the deed as required.
Based upon those allegations, the charge is

that the complainant was put in duress by
those threats and acts of intimidation, and
that he signed and executed the deed, and
conveyed the land by means of those threats
and certain acts of Intimidation, and through
fear of his life, and without any consideration; and he prayed the court that the conveyance might be decreed to be inoperative
and void, and that the grantee might be required to reconvey the same to the complainant
Two other persons were made respondents,
as claiming some interest in the land in conPierce, the principal respondent,
troversy.
and Weston, one of the other respondents,
and were served by pubwere non-residents,
lication pursuant to the rules of the court
They never
and the law of the jurisdiction.
appeared, and failing to plead, answer, or
demur, and due proof of publication in the
manner prescribed by law havftig been filed
in court, a decree was rendered as to them,
that the bill of complaint be taken as confessed.
Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 201.
Morton, the other respondent, appeared and
filed an answer, in which he alleged that the
principal respondent, on the twenty-eighth of
August, 1857, and for a long time before, was
the owner in fee of the premises; that he
was informied, and believed, that the complainant entered upon the land as the tenant
of the principal respondent, and that he was
prosecuting this suit in violation of the just
rights of all the respondents; that the principal respondent wanting to borrow money,
he, the respondent
before the court, loaned
him a large sum, and accepted bills of exchange for the payment of the same, drawn
to the order of the borrower of the money,
and which were indorsed by the drawer;
that the bills of exchange not having been
paid when they became due, he brought suit
against the drawer and indorser, and recovered judgment against him for three thousand one hundred dollars; that the judgment so recovered is in full force and unsatisfied, and that the same is a lien on the
premises described in the bill of complaint.
No answer, from any knowledge possessed
by the respondent, is made to the allegation
that the complainant acquired a complete
title to the land under the pre-emption laws
of the United States, nor to the charge contained hi the bill of complaint, that the deed
was procured by threats of personal violence
amounting to actual duress.
On the contrary,
the answer alleged that the respondent before
the court was an utter stranger to all those
matters and things, and that he could not
answer concerning the same, because he had
no information or belief upon the subject.
Authorities are not wanting to, the effect,
that all matters well alleged in the bill of
complaint, which the answer neither denies
nor avoids, are admitted; but the better opinion is the other way, as the sixty-first rule
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adopted by this court provides that if no exception thereto shall be filed within the period
therein prescribed, the answer shall be deemYoung v.
ed and taken to be sufficient.
Grundy, 6 Cranch, 51; Brooks v. Byam, 1
Story, 297, Fed. Cas. No. 1,947.
Material allegations in the bill of complaint ought to be answered and admitted, or
denied, if the facts are within the knowledge of the respondent; and if not, he ought
to state what his belief is upon the subject,
if he has any, and if he has none, and cannot
form any, he ought to say so, and call on the
complainant for proof of the alleged facts, or
waive that branch of the controversy; but the
clear weight of authority Is, that a mere
statement by the respondent In his answer,
as in this case, that he has no knowledge
that the fact is as stated, without any answer as to his belief concerning it, is not
such an admission as is to be received as full
evidence of the fact Warfleld v. Gambrlll,
1

Gill &

J.

503.

an answer does not make It necessary for the complainant to Introduce more
than one witness to overcome the defence,
and the w^-known omissions
and defects
of such an answer may have some tendency
to prove the allegations of the bill of complaint, but they are not such an admission
of the same as will constitute a sufficient
foundation for a decree upon the merits.
Young V. Grundy, 6 Cranch, 51; Parkman v.
Welch, 19 Pick. 234.
'Proper remedy for a complainant, in such a
case, is to except to the answer for insufficiency within the period prescribed by the
sixty-first rule; but if he does not avail himself of that right, the answer is deemed sufficient to prevent the bill from being taken
pro confesso, as it may be if no answer Is
filed.
Hardeman v. Harris, 7 How. 726;
Stockton V. Ford, 11 How. 232; 1 Daniell,
Ch. Prac. 736; Langdon v. Goddard, 3 Story,
13, Fed. Cas. No. 8,061.
Attention is called to the fact, that no replication was filed to the answer; but the sugSuch

comes too late, as the respondent proto final hearing In the court below
without interposing any such objection.
Mere formal defects in the proceedings, not
objected to in the court of original jurisdiction, cannot be assigned in an appellate tribunal as error to reverse either a judgment
at law or decree in equity.
Legal effect of a replication Is, that It puts
in issue all the matters well alleged in the
answer, and the rule is, that if none be filed,
the answer will be taken as true, and no evidence can be given by the complainant to

gestion
ceeded

contradict anything which is therein well al-

1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 249; Mills v. Pitleged.
man, 1 Paige, Oh. 490; Peirce v. West, 1
Pet 0. C. 351, Fed. Cas. No. 10,909; Story,
Eq. PI. 878; Cooper, Eq. PI. 329.
Undenied as the answer is by any replication, it must have Its fair scope as an admission; but the court is not authorized to
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anything not expressed in it, beyond
is reasonably implied from the language employed.
Proofs were taken by the
complainant,
and they show, to the entire
satisfaction of the court, that all the matters
alleged in the bill of complaint, and not de-
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threats of personal violence and by duress,
and without any consideration.
Argument to show that a deed or other
written obligation or contract, procured by
means of duress, is inoperative and void, is
hardly required, as the proposition is not denied tn the answer, are true, and the conclu- Inled by the respondent.
Actual violence is
sion of the court below was, that the commot necessary to constitute
duress, even at
plainant acquired a complete title to the land /common law, as understood in the parent
claim, and that the 'country, because consent is the very essence
under his pre-emption
deed from him to the principal respondent
of a contract, and, if there be compulsion,
was procured in the manner and by the
there is no actual consent, and moral compulsion, such as that produced by threats to take
means alleged in the bill of complaint.
life or to inflict great bodily barm, as well as
Nothing is exhibited in the record to supthat produced by imprisonment,
port any different conclusion, or to warrant
is everywhere regarded as sufficient, in law, to deany different decree, unless it be found in one
stroy free agency, without which there can
or the other of the first two defences set up
\be no contract, because. In tl^at state of the
in the answer.
First defence Is, that the principal respond- yjase, there is no consent.
Duress, in Its more extended sense, means
ent, on the twenty-eighth of August, 1857,
and long before that time, was the owner in (that degree of constraint or danger, either
actually inflicted or threatened and impendfee of the premises; but neither that part of
ing, which is sufficient, in severity or in apthe answer, nor any other, denied that the
prehension, to overcome the mind and will of
complainant
acquired a complete title to the
a person of ordinary firmness.
Chit Cent
land, as alleged in the bill of complaint, nor
set up any defence in avoidance of those alle- j 217; 2 Greenl. Bv. 283.
Text-writers usually divide the subject ingations, nor made any attempt to present any
to two classes, namely, duress per mina a and
defence against the direct charge, that the
dure ss of imprisonna ent, and tBat classificadeed under which, the respondent claimed title
was procured from the complainant through
tion was uniformly adopted in the early history of the common- law, and is generally
threats of personal violence and by means of
preserved
in the decisions of the English
duress.
Indefinite as the allegation of title
is, the answer must be construed as referring
courts to the present time. 2 Inst. 482; 2
Eolle, Abr. 124.
to the title under the deed in controversy,
as
it is not pretended that the respondent ever
Where there is an arrest for an improper
purpose, without just cause, or where there
had any other, and, if viewed in that light,
it is in no respect inconsistent with the conis an arrest for a just cause, but without
clusion adopted by the supreme court of the
lawful authority, or for a just cause, but for
territory.
an unlawful purpose, even though under
proper process, it may be construed as duress
Such an indefinite allegation cannot be conany sufficient answer,
sidered as presenting
of imprisonment; an d if the person arre sted
either to the alleged title of the complainant
execute
a contra<!t~5r pay money^jforjofi
or to the charge made in the bill of com- ■release, Ee~"may avoid the contract as one
plaint.
procured by duress, or may recoverbiack the
Briefly stated, the second defence set up in
money in an action for money had and receivthe answer is, that the respondent
was ined.
Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 508;
formed and believed that the complainant enWatkins v. Baird, 6 Mass. 511; Strong v.
Grannis,'26 Barb. 124.
tered upon the land as a tenant, but the time
when the supposed entry was made is not
Second class, duress per minas, as defined /I
alleged, nor are the circumstances
attending
at common law. Is where the party enters/
the entry set forth, nor is any reason assigninto a contract (1) for fear of loss of lifei 1
ed why the allegations were not made more
(2) for fear of loss of limb;
(3) for fear of j
definite, nor is there any fact or circummayhem; (4) for fear of imprisonment; and I
stance alleged which shows or tends to show
many modem decisions of the courts of thafti
that there was any prior owner to the land,
country still restrict the operations of theu
except the United States, nor that the rerule within those limits. 3 Bac. Abr. tltl
spondent ever pretended to have any other
"Duress," 252.
title to the same than that derived from the
They deny that contracts procured by mencomplainant.
ace of a mere battery to the person, or of
Viewed in any light, those allegations must
trespass to lands, or loss of goods, can be
be regarded as evasive and insufficient; and
avoided on that account, and the reason asthey are not helped by the omission of the
signed for this quaUflcation of the rule is,
complainant
to file the general replication.
that such threats are held not to be of a naThose parts of the answer being laid out of
ture to overcome the mind and will of a
the case as insufficient to constitute a defirm and prudent man, because it is said that
fence, the conclusion
Is inevitable that the
if such an injury is inflicted, sufficient and
title to the land was In the complainant as
adequate redress may be obtained in a suit
alleged, and that he parted with it through
at law.
supply
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Cases to the same effect may be found
also in the reports of decisions in this country, and some of our text-writers have adopted the rule, that it is only where the threats
uttered excite fear of death, or of great bodily harm, or unlawful imprisonment, that a
contract, so procured, can be avoided, because, as such courts and authors say, the
person threatened with slight injury to the
person, or with loss of property, ought to
have sufficient resolution to resist such a
threat, and to rely upon the law for his remedy. Skeate v. Beale, 11 Adol. & B. 983;
Atlee V. Backhouse, 3 Mees. & W. 642; Smith
v. Monteith, 13 Mees. & W. 438; Shep. Touch.
6; 1 Pars. Cont. 393.
On the other hand, there are many American decisions, of high authority, which adopt
a more liberal rule, and hold that contracts
procured by threats of battery to the person,
or the destruction of property, may be avoided on the ground of duress, because in such
a case there is nothing but the form of a conFoshay v.
tract, without the substance.
Ferguson, 5 Hill, 158; Bank v. Copeland, 18
Md. 317; Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 12; 1
Story, Eq. Jur. (9th Ed.) 239; Harmony v.
Id., 1 Duer, 229;
12 N. Y. 99;
Bingham,
Fleetwood v. New York, 2 Sandf. 475; Tutt
v. Ide, 3 Blatchf. 250; Astley v. Reynolds, 2
Strange, 915; Brown v. Peck, 2 Wis. 277;
Gates v. Hudson, 5 Eng. Law & Bq. 469.
But the case under consideration presents
no question for decision which requires the
court to determine which class of those cases
' is correct,
as they all agree in the rule that
i a contract procured through fear of loss of
by the threats of the other
! life, produced
party to the contract, wants the essential eleI
, ment of consent, and that it may be avoided
for duress, which is sufficient to dispose of,
the plresent controversy. 2 Greenl. Ev. 283;

-ir^rcbmm.
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Next question which arises in the case is,
whether the judgment set up by the appellant creates a superior equity in his favor
over that alleged and proved by the appellee.
Before proceeding to examine this question,
it will be useful to advert briefly to the material facts exhibited In the record.
Title was acquired by the complainant under the pre-emption laws of the United States,
and on the same day the principal respondent, through
threats to take his life, if he
refused, compelled him to convey the same to
that respondent, and the record shows that
the respondent
before the court, within the
same month, loaned the money to the grantee in that deed, for which he recovered
judgment, although the grantor was then in
possession of the land, and has remained in
possession of the same to the present time.
The judgment Is founded upon the bills of
exchange received for that loan. Judgments
were not liens at common law, but several
of the states had passed laws to that effect
before the Judicial
system of the United
States was organized,
and the decisions of
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this court have established the doctrine that
congress,
in adopting the processes of the
states, also adopted the modes of process prevailing at that date in the courts of the several states, in respect to the lien of judgments within the limits of their respective
jurisdictions.
Williams v. Benedict, 8 How.
Ward v. Chamberlain, 2 Black, 438;
Bayard v. Lombard, 9 How. 530; Riggs v.
Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166.
Different regulations, however, prevailed In
different states, and in some neither a judgment nor a decree for the payment of money,
except in cases of attachment or mesne process, created any preference
in favor of the
creditor until the execution was issued, and
had been levied on the land. Where the lien
is recognized, it confers a right to levy on
the land to the exclusion of other adverse interests acquired subsequently to the judgment; but the lien constitutes no property or
right in the land itself. Conard v. Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 443; Massingill v. Downs, 7
How. 767.
Such judgments and decrees were made
liens by the process acts in the federal districts where they have that effect under the
state laws, and congress has since provided
that they shall cease to have that operation
in the same manner, and at the same periods,
in the respective federal districts, as like
processes
do when issued from the state
courts.
Federal judgments and decrees are
liens, therefore, in all cases, and to the same
extent, as similar judgments and decrees are,
when rendered in the courts of the state.
Express decision of this court is, that the
lien of a judgment constitutes no property in
the land, that it is merely a general lien securing a preference over subsequently acquired Interests in the property, but the settled
rule In chancery Is, that a general lien is controlled in such courts so as to protect the
rights of those who were previously entitled
to an equitable interest in the lands, or in
the proceeds thereof.
Specific liens stand upon a different footing,
but it is well settled that a judgment creates
only a general lien, and that the judgment
creditor acquires thereby no higher or better
right to the property or assets of the debtor,
than the debtor himself had when the judgment was rendered, unless he can show sopae
fraud or collusion to impair his rights.
Drake, Attach. § 223.
Correct statement of the rule is, that the
lien of a judgment creates a preference over
subsequently acquired rights, but in equity
it does not attach to the mere legal title to
the land, as existing in the defendant at its
rendition, to the exclusion of a prior equitaIn re Howe, 1
ble title in a third person.
Paige, Ch. 128; Ells v. Tousley, Id. 283;
White V. Carpenter, 2 Paige, 219; Buchein v.
Lounsbury v.
Sumner,
2 Barb. Ch. 181;
Purdy, 11 Barb. 494; Keirsted v. Avery, 4
Paige, Ch. 15.
Guided by these considerations, the court

Ill;
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of chancery will protect the equitable rights
of third persons against the legal lien, and
will limit that lien to the actual interest
which the judgment debtor had in the estate
at the time the judgment was rendered.
Averill v. Loucks. 6 Barb. 27.
Objection is also made, that the affidavit

FRAUD.

showing that the defendants were non-residents, was not tn due form, and that the order of notice, and the publication of the
same, were insuflBcient to give the court Jurisdiction; but the proposition is not supported by the record, and must be overruled.
Decree

affirmed.
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and Newton until his marriage in
Up to the latter date and longer they
and John Leffler "worked" the home farm
and adjoioing farms purchased by thedr
father. The deeds sought to be set aside are
the following:
A deed of 160 acres, executed on January 5, 1869, by Robert B. McGhance to Sylvester Wilkinson; a deed of 80
acres, executed
on February 16, 1870, by
James A. McChance and his wife to Alonzo
Wilkinson; four deeds executed by Solomon
Wilkinson, all dated May 27, 1873,— one of
133 acres to Sylvester WiUdnson, one of 187
acres to Newton Wilkinson, one of 111 acres
to John Leffler, and one of 169 acres to
Frances Leffler; a deed dated May 27, 1873,
executed by said Sylvester to said Alonzo,
conveying one-half of the 160 acres conveyed
to Sylvester by Robert B. McChanoe; a deed
of 160 acres, dated October 21, 1874, executed by Davis Lowman
and wife and
Daniel Surge and wife to said Sylvester,
Alonzo, Newton, and John.
The first two
deeds were recorded on the respective dates
of their execution.
The five deeds executed
on May 27, 1873, were recorded on July 28,
By the above deeds there were con1876.
veyed to Sylvester 253 acres, to Alonzo 200
acres, to Newton 227 acres, to John Leffler
151 acres, to Frances Leffler 169 acres, making 1,000 acres in all. The evidence showed
that the sons participated In the profits and
produce realized from the business of the
farms, and received their respective shares
of such business up to 1873, or perhaps

in

1876,

1881.

147 111. 370.)

Court of Illinois.
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Appeal from circuit court, Stark county;
T. M. Shaw, Judge.
Bill by Charity Francis and others against
Sylvester Wilkinson and others.
From a decree dlsmls^ng the bill, complainants appeal.
Affirmed.
The other facts fully appear to the following statement by MAGRUDBR, J.:
This Is a biU filed on the 2d day of September, A. D. 1886, by Charity Francis, of Kansas, Rachel Curfman, of Kansas, and Nancy
Oox, of Stark coimty, HL, daughters of
Solomon Wilkinson, deceased, formerly of
Stark county, lU., against Sylvester Wilkinson, Alonzo Wilkinson, and Newton Wilkinson, of said county of Stark, sons of said
Solomon Wilkinson, deceased, and Frances
Leffler, of said coimty, also a daughter of
said Solomon, and John Leffler, of said county, a son of said Frances Leffler, and grandson of said Solomon, to set aside certain
deeds executed to the defendants by the said
Solomon In his lifetime, and for partitioQ
of the lands described in said deeds among
the said children of the said Solomon.
Answers were filed by said defendants denying
the material allegations of the bUl. Since
the beginning of the suit Rachel Curfman,
Frances Leffler, and John Leffler have died,
and their representatives have been made
parties. After hearing had upon testimony
oral and documentary, and upon evidence
submitted in the form of depositions, the circuit court dismissed the biU for want of
equity, and the present appeal is prosecuted
from said decree of dismissal
Solomon Wilkinson
came from Ohio to
Stark county. 111., in 1849, being at that time
about 50 years old. He brought some money
with him, and at once purchased a farm of
200 acres, on which he lived imtQ his death.
He died on April 2, 1885, leaving seven children,
the four daughters and three sons
above named, to wit, Rachel, Charity, Nancy,
Frances, Sylvester, Alonzo, and Newton. His
wife died In the spring of 1871.
The oldest
daughter, Prances, married in 1850, but her
husband died in about six weeks, leaving
one child, John Leffler.
She never left her
father, but kept house for him, and managed the household affairs after her mother's death; and she and her son John, who
became of age In 1872, lived with the old
man on the home place xmtll his death.
Charity married In 1853, Rachel In 1856, and
Nancy in 1857 or 1858, each leaving home
at the date of her marriage. It Is In evidence that the last three daughters assisted
In the woirk of the farm up to the dates of
their respective marriages. Sylvester became of age In 1863, Alonzo In 1865, and
Newton in 1868.
The three sons remained
farm, Alonzo until his marOQ the home
nsge In 1875, Sylvester until his marriage

1881.

Miles A. Fuller and Frank A. Kerns, for
appellants. C. C. Wilson and Frank Thomas,
for appellees.

MAGRUDBR, J., (after stating the facts.)
The grounds upon which the biU seeks to set
aside the deeds are: First, want of mental
capacity; second, the exercise of undue influence.
The three daughters of Solomon
Wilkinson who ffled the bill do not claim
that he showed any want of mental capacity
until after the death of his wife, in the spring
of 1871. He was not able to read or write,
but there is no testimony on either side that
he was not a vigorous man, both mentally
and physically, prior to 1871.
Hence the
deed of 160 acres, executed In January, 1869,
to his son Sylvester Wilkinson, by Robert
B. McChance, and the deed executed in February, 1870, to his son Alonzo Wilkinson, by
James A. McChance, cannot be Invalidated
because of any want of mental capacity.
Nor are we able to discover that the execution of those deeds was procured by any
kind of fraud, deceit, or undue influence.
The two tracts were purchased by Solomon
WUkinsoii, but the proof shows that he knew
of and consented to the conveyances of them
to his sons Sylvester and Alonzo, who had
remained with him after reaching the age of
majority, and had assisted him, the one for
six and the other for five years, in his busl-
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Ordiof farming and stock raising.
the complainant who seeiis to set aside ut
executed deed for want of mental capacity
narily, where a purchase of real property is
or for the exercise of undue influence to prove
made by a father in the name of his legitimate chUd, no trust results in favor of the
the allegations of his bm by a preponderance
English r. Porter, 109 BL
father, but Hie transaction is presumed to
of the evidence.
2 Pom.
285.
be a gift for the benefit of the child.
Unduejnfluenee willn^^be
Eq. Jur. § 1039.
We do not think that there is in this case
inferred frogithe re lation of pa^ nraSiTchflg jt^ preponderance of the evidence in favor of
a want of mental capacity. In 1873, Solowhere tlie gift'ls iirom the parffirjW^ffie
child; unlesnBF former attlie~Tlme'of~ffiS'
mon Wilkinson was about 72 or 73 years old.
gift ,is under the control and dominion "of the
Witnesses for complainants swear that, after
30 N. B.
OUphant v. LeverBidge,
the death of his wife in the spring of 1871,
"latTef:
was much
Eep. 334, 142 HI. 160; Burt v. Quisenberry,
he showed signs of feebleness,
J. H. Cox, affected by the loss of his wife, was not as
132 ni. 399, 24 N. E. Rep. 622.
clear and active in his mind as he had been,
the husband of one of the complainants, says
was complaining and despondent, would somethat the deceased directed the deed of the
times shed tears in talking of his wife,
160 acres to be made in 1869 to Sylvester,
showed the infirmities of age, complained of
because he had then concluded to give each
not being able to attend to his business aa
of his children 160 acres of land. If such
ho had done, etc
Some of these witnesses
was his intention at the time, he did not
give It as their opinion, based upon their
subsequently carry it out as to the complainconversations with him, that he was not
lants. The fact that a grantor, many years
his
competent to do business in 1873.
On the
|befo;re making a final distribution of
contrary, an equal number of witnesses testi/property by the execution of deeds, expressed
fying for the defendants say that they saw
an intention to divide it equally among his
no particular change In him after 1871, exchildren, affords no evidence of undue incept such as was Incident to advancing age;
fluence, or mental incapacity, where a differthat they saw no difference In his business
ent disposition of his property Is made.
capacity; that he seemed to know as much
The labor
Rutherford v. Morris, 77 HI. 397.
as he ever did; that, although he fretted
i of the sons for their father during a number
about his wife, "his mind was all right;"
\of years constituted some consideration foi
that "he was a very smart old man." One
Ithe conveyances which were made to them
by his vendors at his direction. Where a
of the physicians who attended upon him for
eight or ten years before his death and in
father disposes of property by way of adhis last sickness says that he would sit by
vancement or distribution to his children during his life. Instead of disposing of it by
his fireside and talk with him about the comwill, courts will not be as rigid in considermon topics of the day, and that he noticed
ing the adequacy of the consideration paid
no failing except what old age would account
as if the transaction was with strangers.
for. Another doctor, who was called in as
consulting physician during his last illness,
Clearwater v. Kimler, 43 lU. 272. The deceased had the legal right to dispose of the
and had known him and his wife for 30
years, says that he was low-spirited after
two tracts In question as he pleased, and, if
her death, but with that exception he noticed
he saw proper to malie his two sons the recipients of his bounty, the other children have
no difference In his mind. All the witnesses
strong man
Id.
on both sides agree that he was
no cause of complaint.
physically, and before 1871 was an unusually
But the main contention between the parcompetent man as a farmer and stock dealer.
ties is as to the deeds executed by the deParticular instances are mentioned where he
ceased on May 27, 1873, thereby dividing 600
transacted business after 1873.
acres among his sons, his grandson, and his
In 1876 or
1877 he went to Peoria, 25 miles from his
daughter Mrs. Leffler. .It is first Insisted
home, and paid a Judgment of about $1,800
that these deeds were Invalid for an alleged
which had been obtained against himself
want of mental capacity in Solomon WiMnand his son-in-law. Cox, upon a note signed
to malie them.
We have frequently deby him as security for Cox; and the owner
man has sufficient mental cacided that
of the judgment states that at that time his
pacity to dispose of his property by wiU or
mental condition was good, "his m'nd was
deed if he is capable of transacting ordinary
as strong and reasonable as anybciy's," aiid
business, and of acting rationally in the or"he was capable of attending to any other
dinary affairs of life. Buying and selling
property, settling accounts, collecting and
business." In 1884, the year before his death,
paying out money, or borrowing or loaning
at the age of 83 or 84, he went to the office
money, have been mentioned as instances of
of a lumber merchant In Wyoming, distant
what is meant by the transaction of the ordiabout two miles and a half from his house,
nary affairs of business.
and directed an answer to be written to letMeeker v. Meeker,
75 lU. 260; Brown v. Biggin, 94 lU. 560;
ter about a pension dalm, which he had reSchneider v. Manning, 121 lU. 376, 12 N. B.
ceived from the commissioner of pensions,
Rep. 267; Freeman v. Basly, 117 lU. 317,
dictating the replies to be made to the quesN. E. Rep. 65(); Perry v. Pearson, 135 HL
tions In the letter, listening to each answer
218, 25 N. E. Rep. 636.
when
was read to him, and approving of
The burden is upon
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was not thereby rendered Incapable of understanding and protecting his own Interests.
A deed will be permitted to stand notwith-i
standing the fact that the Intellectual powers) 1
have been somewhat impaired by age, if
fuU com-'/
appears that the grantor retained
prehension of the meaning, design, and effect!
of his acts. Perry v. Pearson, supra.
It is next insisted that these deeds were
obtained by the undue influence of the granWilkinson, and
tees therein over Solomon
that for that reason they ought to be set
aside. Undue Influence which will justify the
setting aside of an executed deed must have
been of such a nature as to deprive the grantor of his free agency, and thus to render
his act more the offspring of the will of another than of his own will. Rutherford v.
Morris, 77 lU. 397; Burt T. Qui-senberry,
Some of the witnesses for the comsupra.
plainants testify that after the death of his
wife in 1871, Solomon Wilkinson left the
management of his bustnees more to his sons
than he had formerly done, while witnesses
for the defendants say that he seemed to exercise no less control after that date than before. The sons themselves swear that each
of them was given an Interest In the proceeds and earnings of the farm after he became of age, on condition of his remaining
at home and assisting his father. But, even
if It be true that the father gave his sons
greater control over his business affairs after
1871 than they had previously had, that fact
alone does not establish such a dependence
upon them that he could not freely exercise
his own win In reference to the disposition
of his property. There was money in the
right to draw when he
bank, which he had
He came and went as he saw fit
pleased.
Burt V. Qulsenberry, supra. Where the natural position of parent and child is so changed that the former becomes subject to the
dominion of the latter, and where their situation is such that the child has a controlling
Influence over the wiU and conduct and interests of the parent, equity wUl interpose
Its jurisdiction to set aside instruments executed between them, and, under such circumstances, gifts from parents to diildren will
be set aside, unless most satisfactory evidence Is produced that they were not obBurt v. Quisentained by undue influence.
berry, supra; Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147;
Barb. B33. But the fraud
Brice v. Brlce,
or undue Influence which will render a will
or deed invalid must be connected with tJie
execution of the instrument, and operating
when It is made; Pooler v. Cristman, (lU.
Sup.) 34 N. E. Rep. 57; Guild v. Hull, 127
HI. 523, 20 N. B. Rep. 665;) and although
father may act under the advice of his son
In his ordinary affairs, and may be Influenced
by that advice yet such relation and influence do not tend to prove the exercise of
undue Influence* in the execution of a conveyance by the former to the latter, (Brownfield V. Brownfldd, 43 lU. 148; Rutherford
T. Morris, supra.) We discover nothing In
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was giving directions about the work on the
farm. A merchant In Wyoming swears that
he sold him hardware in 1876 and 1878, t»
be used on the farm, and that his mind was
sound, and he was able to transaxst ordinary
business.
Another merchant swears that the
old man did business with Mm at his store
fi'om 1873 to 1881, and paid the accounts
from 1873 to 1876, and understood the nature
of the business he was transacting, and that
there was no Impairment of his mind.
The grantor at the time of making the deed
must know and comprehend the transaction
In which he Is engaged; or, In other words,
the mental capacity to be considered Is that
which exists at the time of the execution of
the deed. 1 Redf. Wills, p. 124; Campbell
V. Campbell, 130 lU. 466, 22 N. B. Rep. 620.
The notary who wrote the deeds made on
May 27, 1873, and before whom they were
acknowledged, swears that Solomon Wilkinson came to his office In Wyoming on that
day, In pursuance of a previous appointment;
that he had his title papers with him, arranged and classified, so as to enable him to
know what piece of land he wanted to convey to each grantee; that there was no one
present while he was writing the deeds, although his son Sylvester may have come lnt»
the office with him; that the old man
seemed to understand just what he wanted;
that 'he said he was going to divide a portion of his property; that he would hand
over one package of title deeds and then
another, and direct how the property described in each should be conveyed;
that
the conveyances written on that day wwe
read over to him after they were drawn
up, and were signed by him by his mark;
that he was not especially feeble, except s»
far as there was feebleness incident to declining years; that his hands were trembling,
and tears came into his eyes, and he said he
had reached that age when he did not fed
able or competent to attend to his business;
that he said he intended to provide for his
other children In some other manner.
While
the evidence shows that on May 27, 1873,
the deceased was somewhat infirm by reason
of old age, and that he was conscious of not
possessing as much vigor as would enable
him to manage his large farms, and attend
to the raising of stock thereon, with the efficiency of former years, yet we think that he
was mentally capable of executing the deeds
signed by him, and of making the division of
property consummated by him on that day.
Old age and loss of memory do not necessarily and of themselves indicate a want of caBurt v. QuIpacity to make a conveyance.
senberry, 132 HL 399, 24 N. E. Rep. 622;
Pooler V. Cristman, (111. Sup.) 34 N. E. Rep.
57. There was here no such mental weakness as will Justify a court of equity In setting aside the deeds, inasmuch as the grantor
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It as teing what he wanted. In 1878 he
Bold a hoi-se, making the trade himself, and
the party buying the horse from him says
that "his mind was all right," and that he
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the testimony In tMs case to Indicate that the
deceased was under any such control as that
he was not able at all times to act freely
The
and according to his own judgment
circumstances already detailed in regard to
the transaction of May 27, 1873, show that
the execution frf the deeds made by the deceased on that day was his own act, and not
the offspring of another's will. He made no
conveyance to Alonzo^ but, in addition to the
80 acres conveyed to the latter in 1870, his
brother Sylvester deeded to him 80 of the
160 acres which he obtained the title to in
1869.
The notary testifies that Sylvester thus
conveyed the 80 acres to his brother Alonzo
at the request of their father, and that such
conveyance was referred to by the father as
a part of his arrangement for the division of
his property. The same considerations already presented apply to the deed made by
Lowman and Burge to the sons and grandson in 1874. Burge swears that he made the
deed to the sons and grandson while they
and Solomon
were present; that Solomon
gave his notes for a part of the purchase
money, and that his mind was i)6rfectly
sound.
This conveyance was a consummation of the division made in 1873, and, while
it does not appear when the notes were paid,
yet the evidence shows that the land was
paid for out of the proceeds of the farm, as
earned by the labors of the grantees in the
deeds. The father may have been influenced
by affection for the three sons and grandson who remained with him and aided him
in managing his farms, and for the widowed daughter,
who stayed at his home, and
Jk^ kept house for him, and managed his household affairs. "But influence secured through
affection is not wrongful, and therefore, alV >though a deed be made to a child at his so^
licitation, and because of partiality Induced
Iby affection for him, it will not be undue injfluence" If it is not such as to deprive the
grantor of his free agency. Burt v. Quisenberry, supra.
The testimony shows that the complainants
and their husbands received from their father from time to time about $2,000 apiece,
paid in land and money and in the discharge
of security debts. They had married many
years before their father's death, and had
left home, and reared families, and acquired
property of their own. The husband of one
of the complainants was a witness to the
execution
of the deeds made on May 27,
They knew of those deeds soon after
1873.
their execution, and two of them received

X

FRAUD.

money from their father a short time thereafter. The fact that they did not receive as
much as the defendants is no ground for invalidating the deeds to the latter. Inequality in the distribution of the property is not
of Itself conclusive evidence of undue influence, although It may be considered as a
circumstance tending to establish imdue influence.
The grantor or testator may give
one child more than another without invalidating the conveyance or will. Salisbury v.
Aldrich, 118 111. 199, 8 N. E.' Rep. 777;
Schneider v. Manning, 121 lU. 376, 12 N. E.
Rep. 267; Burt v. Quisenberry, supra; Pooler V. Cristman, supra.
Nearly all the testimony introduced by the
complainants in this case for the purpose of
showing the exercise of undue influence consists of proof of declarations made by Solomon Wilkinson
after his execution of the
deeds herein attacked. Those declarations
were to the effect— First, that he had been
persuaded by his sons; second, that he put
the tltie out of himself in order to keep the
property from being lost through suits
brought against him on account of his signing notes for his son-in-law. Cox. But it
Is well setUed that the declaration of a
grantw: when the grantee is not present
cannot be admitted for the purpose of Invalidating the deed. Parties making deeds or
wills cannot invalidate them by thar own
parol declarations, made previously or subsequently. Dickie V. Carter, 42 HI. 376; Bennett v. Stout, 98 HI. 47; Bentley v. O'Bryan,
111 m. 53; GuUd v. Hull, 127 HI. 523, 20 N.
E. Rep. 665; Burt v. Quisenberry, supra.
There was also some evidence of declarations
made by one or more of the sons of Solomon
Wilkinson, to the effect that he made the
conveyances
to them in order to keep the
property from being swept away by the
debts Incurred as security for Cox. If such
declarations made by the father and sons
were properly admissible, the fraud upon
creditors which they tended to show could
In no way operate to the benefit of these
complainants, wlio sue as heirs of the fraudulent grantor. The general rule is that voluntary conveyances, although void as to creditors, are valid as to the parties, and cannot be set aside by the grantor or his heirs.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 371;
MUler v. Marckle,
21 HI. 152; Harmon v. Harmon, 63 HI. 512;
Rawson v. Fox, 65 HI. 200; Campbell v.
Whitson, 68 HI. 240; McBlroy v. Hiner, 133
HI. 156, 24 N. E. Rep. 435. The decree of
the elrcuit court is affirmed.
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—
spintuai adviser, for the purpose of proROSS V. CONWAY et al. (No. 13,341.)
curing her to make such disposition of her
(28 Pac. 785, 92 Gal. 632.)
property. Upon these issues there was
much conflicting evidence before the court,
Supreme Court of California. Jan.
1892.
both in the testimony of the witnesses
Department
Appeal from superior who were examined, as well aa in the circourt, Sonoma county; S. K. Dougherty, cumstances under which the instruments
were executed, and the purposes held by
Judge.
Suit by James B. Ross against John M. Mrs. Ross with reference to her son and
Conway et al. to annul, on the ground of to the church. Upon the evidence before
undue influence, a trust-deed
made by it the court found in favor of the plainhis mother,
Elizabeth G. Ross, for the tiff. This finding was in accordance with
benefit of defendants.
Plaintiff had judg- the verdict of the jury, and upon a motion for new trial, in which the evidence
ment, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
George D. Collins and Genrffe A. Jobn^ was again brought before the court tor
son, (D. M. Delmas, of counsel,) for ap- consideration, it adhered to its former
Under these circumstances
pellants. John A. Wright, for respondent. conclusion.
we cannot disregard Its finding. Inas'V«^

HARRISON,

J.

The plaintiff, as the solo
heir of his mother,
Elizabeth G. Ross,
brought this action to cancel and annal
two certain deeds of trust conveying certain real estate in Santa Rosa, executed
by his mother, August 11, 1888, and August 18, 1888, respectively, alleging that at
the time of their exerution
his mother
was weak in body, and that her mind was
impaired, and that the defendant Conway, who was the pastor of the Roman
Catholic church of Santa Rosa, of which
she had been for many years a member,
and who was also her spiritual adviser,
had thereby acquired great influence over
her, and, talking advantage of such in-

much,

however,

as counsel

have

elabo-

a

2

a

a

a

rately argued the facts, we have examined
the record, and are of the opinion that
the evidence fully justifies the findings of
the court.
The court finds that at the dates of the
execution of the deeds of trust Mrs. Ross
was of weak .mind, and in a dying condition, and that she died on the 20th of August; that the defendant Conway was,
and had for a long time previously been,
the pastor of the Roman Catholic church
at Santa Rosa, and the spiritual adviser
of Mrs. Ross; that a confidence was reposed in him by her, and that there existed on his part an influence and apparent authority over her arising out of his
fluence and of her mental weakness, had relation to her as her spiritual adviser,
caused her to execute the said deeds of and that he took an unfair advantage of
trust for the benefit of himself and of the this Influence, and used this confidence
church of which he was the pastor. The and authority for the purpose of procurdefendants denied these allegations, and ing her to execute the two deeds of trust.
the cause was tried by the court, a jury The court also finds that Mrs. Ross had
having been called in as advisory to the in December, 1887, executed a will of all
court upon certain issues. The verdict of her estate, with the exception of some
the jury and the findings of the court minor legacies, in favor of the plaintiff
were in support of the allegations of the herein, and that the provision in the deeds
complaint, and judgment was rendered in of trust for the defendants, other than the
favor of the plaintiff. A motion for a new defendant Conway, were without any
trial having been made and denied, an consideration from them, but were made
appeal has been taken from both the judg- solely through the influence of Conway.
ment and the order denying
new trial.
The rule is inflexible that no one who^
The two deeds of trust re substantially holds
confidential relation towards
the same, the last onehaving beenexecuted anothwr shall take advantage of that remerely for the purpose of correcting an lation in favor of himself, or deal with
erroneous description in the first. Under the other upon terms of his own making;
the trust created by the deeds the trus- that in every such transaction between
persons standing in that relation the law
tees are directed to sell one of the parcels
of land "as soon as practicable," and out will presume that he who held an influence
of the proceeds thereof apply $8,000 in the over the other exercised it unduly to his
improvement of the other parcel, and pay own advantage; or, in the words of Lord
v. Barsham,
the remainder of the proceeds to the de- Langdale in Casborne
fendant Conway. Out of the income to Beav. 78, the inequality between the transbe derived from the parcel to beimproved, acting parties is so great "that, without
f75 per month was to be paid to the plain- proof of the exercise of power beyond
tiff, and the remainder monthly "to the that which may be inferred from the natpastor of the Roman Catholic church in ure of the transaction itself, this court
Santa Rosa, to be disbursed by him in" will impute an exercise of undue influence;" that the transaction will not he
such manner as he may deem charitable.
Other provisions contingent upon the upheld unless it shall be shown that such
of the other had independent advice, and that
death or change in circumstances
plaintiff are unnecessary to be repeated his act was not only the result of his own
here. The issues before the court were, in volition, but that he both
understood
substance,
whether Mrs. Ross was, at the act he was doing and comprehended
This rule finds its
the respective dates on which the deeds its result and effect.
of trust were executed, of weak mind, or application with peculiar force in
case
able to comprehend the provisions of the where the effect of the transaction is to
Instruments; and whether the defendant divert an Estate from those who, by the
Conway used the influence which he had ties of nature, would belts natural recipacquired over her, by virtue of being her ients, to the person through whose influ-
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the diversion Is made, whether such
divbi'sion be for his own personal advantage, or for the advantage of some interIt
eat of which he is the representative.
has l)een more frequently applied to transactions between attorney and client or
guardian and ward than to any other
relation between the parties, but the rule
itself has its source in principles which
underlie and govern all confidential relations, and is to be applied to all transactions arising out of any relation In which
It is termed
the principle is applicable.
by Lord Ei.don " that great rule of the
court that he who bargains in any matter
of advantage with a person placing confidence in him is bound to show that a
reasonable use has been made of that con" Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 278. It
fidence.
was said by Sir Samuel. Eomii^ly in his
argument In Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves.
" the relief stands upon a general
300, that
principle applying to all the variety of
relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another," — a
principle which was afterwards affirmei)
by liord Cottekham in Dsnt v. Bennett,
4 Mylne & C. 277, saying that he had received so much pleasure from hearing it
uttered in that argument that the recollection of it had not been diminished by
the lapse of more than 30 years.
That the influence which the spiritual
adviser of one who is about to die has
over such person is one of the most pow^erful that can be exercised upon the human mind, especially if such mind is im
paired by physical weakness, is so consonant with human experience as to need
no more than its statement; and in any
transaction between them, wherein the
adviser receives any advantage, a court of
, <;q|uit.v will not enter into an investiga/^tion of the extent to which such influence
Any dealing between
Has been exercised.
will be
j/hem, under such circumstances,
set a-side as contrary to all principles of
/equity, whether the benefit accrue to the
/adviser, or to some other recipient who,
/ through such influence, may have been
made the beneficiary of the transaction.
These principles have been so invariably
announced whenever the question has
arisen that a mere reference to the authorities will sufiice. Norton v. Eelly, 2 Eden,
286; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273;
Thompson v. Heffernan, 4 Dru. & War.
291; Dent v. Bennett, 4 Mylne & C. 269;
In re Welsh, 1 Kedf. Sur. 246; Richmond's
Appeal, B9 Conn. 226, 22 Atl. Rep. 82; Ford
V. Hennessy , 70 Mo. 580 ; Pironi v. Corrigan ,
Eq. 135, 20 Atl. Rep. 218; Connor
47 N.
V. Stanley, 72 Cal. 556, 14 Pac. Rep. 306; 1
ence

J.
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the 9th of August she bad exprpssed to
Conway a desire to make a testamentary
disposition ot her property, and, upon his
suggestion that Mr. Collins was a suitable person, she requested that he would
send him to her at the hospital where tihe
was lying. He thereupon sought Collins,
and, telling him the wish of Mrs. Boss,
accompanied him to the hospital. On
their way be told Collins of the mode in
which she proposed to dispose of her
property, and, after their arrival, remained in the room with tbera while she
was giving directions about the will, going out, however, occasionally, for short
intervals to visit other people in the hospital, and leaving the building before tb»
will was formally executed. Two days
later he visited Collins at his office, and,
after hearing the will read, he made to
Collins a suggestion of some changes,
and whether a deed of trust would not be
preferable to a will.
An appointment
was then made between him and Collins
to meet that afternoon in theroomof Mrs.
Ross at the hospital. After their arrival
at the hospital, Conway made a suggestion to her that she execute a deed of
trust instead of a will, and also other suggestions in reference to her disposition of
Only himself and Collins
the property.
were in the room during this consultation,
he, however, leaving It temporarily
a
few times during the period over which
the interview extended, but remaining until Collins had received all the directions
that she gave. Assuming that, by virtue
of his relation to her, he had acquired an
influence over her, it must be held that in
the transaction under investigation there
was an undue exercise of such influence;
that by not insisting that she should
have independent adYice, and by continuing to remain in her presence during the
interview with the only other person
whom he permitted to see her, .he exercised an influence over her actions which,
though unseen and inaudible, was none
the less effective in its results.
"The question is, " said Lord Ei.don in Huguenin v.
Baseley, 14 Ves. 300, "not whether she
knew what she was doing, had done, or
proposed to do, but how the intention
was produced ; whether all that care and
providence
was placed round her, as
against tbose who advised her, which
from their situation and relation with respect to her they were bound to exert
on her behalf." While the contract of
purchase
made between the defendant
Conway and the trustees under the instruments sought to be annulled was irrelevant to any material issue before the
court, and would have been properly excluded from evidence, we are unable to
see that its admission could in any way
have been prejudicial to the rights ot the
appellants. The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.

BigPlow, Fraud, 352; Story, Eq. Jur. § 311.
The finding of the court that Mrs. Ross
did not have any independent adviceupon
the subject of making the deeds of trust
Is fully sustained by the evidence. It appears from the record that the attorney
who prepared the instruments was introduced to her by Conway, and that the onWe concur: DE HAVEN,
ly persons with whom she had any interview, or from whom she could receive any LAND, J.
advice respecting the same, were this attorney and the defendant Conway. On
Hearing in bank denied.
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WILLIAMSON.

(2 Ch.

Court

App. 55.)

of Appeals in Chancery.

Dec.

IT,

1866.

This was an appeal by the defendant,
Robert Williamson, from a decree of Vice
Chancellor Wood^ setting aside a sale, on
the ground that the purchaser stood in a
fiduciary relation to the vendor, and did not
make a full disclosure to him of all material
facts within his knowledge relating to the
value of the property. The facts of the case
fully appear in the report of the case before
the vice chancellor (L. R. 1 Eq. 528) and the
judgment of the lord chancellor.
Mr. W. M. James, Q. C, and Mr. Little,
In support of the decree. Attorney General
(Sir J. Rolt), and Mr. Brlstowe, for the appellant.
Solicitors for the plaintiff: Messrs. N. C.
& C. Milne.
Solicitors for the appellant; Messrs. Clowes
& Hickley.

•

;

;
I
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LORD CHELMSFORD, L. C. In this case
the vice chancellor has made a decree that
an agreement for the sale by the intestate,
William Clowes Tate, to the defendant, Robert Williamson, of the undivided moiety of
an estate called the "Whitfield Estate," in
the county of Stafford, consisting of messuages, lands, and coal mines, ought to be set
aside, upon the ground of the defendant not
having communicated to the intestate all
the information which he had acquired with
reference to the value of the property, and,
in particular, of his not having communicated an estimate of the value of the mines
which was obtained by the defendant pending the agreement
The question raised by the appeal is
whether any such relation existed between
the defendant and the intestate as to render
It the duty of the defendant to make the
communication.
exercised by courts of
The jurisdiction
equity over the dealings of persons standing
in certain fiduciary relations has always been
regarded as one of a most salutary description. The principles applicable to the more
familiar relations of this character have been
long settled by many well-known decisions,
but the courts have always .been careful not
to fetter this useful jurisdiction by defining
Wherever
the exact limits of its exercise.
two persons stand in such a relation that,
while it continues, confidence is necessarily
reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is posis
sessed by the other, and this confidence
abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain
an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person so availing himself of
his position will not be permitted to retain
although the transaction
the advantage,
could not have been impeached if no such
confidential relation had existed.
H.& B.Eq.(2d Ed.j-22
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Did, then, the defendant, R. Williamson,
when he put himself in communication with
clothe himself with a charthe intestate,
acter which brought him within the range
of the principle?
In considering this question, it will be necessary to bear in mind the situation of both
the parties at the time when the agreement
for the sale of the property was entered
into.
The intestate, when he was quite an infant,
had become possessed of the property in
question independently of his father. He
contracted habits of extravagance at the university, and in consequence of some displeasure
which he had occasioned to his
father on the subject of his debts, the father's doors were closed against him. He was
thus thrown upon the world at an early age
without any one to control him, and with
scarcely a friend to counsel him, and towards
the close of his life he became addicted to
drinking and died prematurely at the age
of twenty-four. The defendant is the nephew
the
of Mr. Hugh Henshaw Williamson,
great uncle by marriage of the intestate,
who had been the trustee and manager of
the property, and the receiver of the rents,
which latter duty the defendant had for some
short time been deputed to perform for him.
It does not appear that the defendant by
his employment acquired any particular information respecting
the property, but as
he states in his answer that he had "previously" (to his first interview with the in"some idea of endeavoring to be
testate)
the purchaser of the estate, in case the same
should come into the market," it is reasonable to suppose that he was not altogether
ignorant of its character,
and must have
formed some idea of its value.
I think no stress can be laid upon the circumstance of Mr. H. H. Williamson having
been the trustee of the property. The trusas to the intestate's moietyi, had
teeship,
come to an end upon his (attaining his majority, in July, 1857. The accounts had been
settled, and Mr. Williamson, in surrendering
his trust, had behaved generously to the inThough he continued after this petestate.
riod to receive the rents and manage the
property, yet there appears to have been
nothing in the office which he undertook
after his trusteeship expired which would
have prevented his dealing with the intestate upon the same terms as a mere stranger. Much less could the mere receipt of
the rents for his uncle have placed Robert
Williamson in a different position from that
of any ordinary purchaser. But a new and
peculiar relation arose out of the circumstances which afterwards occurred.
In the
year 1859 the debts which the intestate owed
at the university were causing him considerable embarrassment He had been pressed
by Mr. Holloway, acting for his Oxford creditors, for payment of an amount of £1,000.
He was unable, in consequence of the unfor-
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tunate quarrel with his father, to apply to
him for advice, and, having before experienced the kindness of Mr. H. H. Williamson, he turned to him again in his difficulties. The letter by which the intestate made
his situation known to Mr. Williamson is
not forthcoming. The defendant, in his answer, says that he was informed by Mr. H.
H. Williamson that it stated he was again
Involved, and either asked for assistance,
or for advice as to the mode of procuring
I should have been glad if we
assistance.
could have seen the terms of this letter, as
it might have explained the exact nature of
the office which Mr. Williamson was asked
to undertake. In the answer to this letter,
dated the 30th of July, 1859, which is set
out in the bill, in paragraph 52, Mr. Williamson invited the intestate to his house,
and desired him to bring with him "a correct account of his debts, omitting nothing,
and he would see what could be done."
The intestate did not accept the invitation,
and nothing more was heard of the matter
until about the 26th of August following,
when Mr. H. H. Williamson received a list
of the intestate's debts due to Oxford creditors, amounting, as already mentioned, to
£1,000. The defendant, in his answer, says
"that the list was given to him by Mr. H.
H. Williamson, and that he, after perusing
the same, remarked that the charges were
excessive, and that the bills might probably
be settled for half the amount; that Mr.
H. H. Williamson thereupon requested him
to see the intestate, and ascertain upon what
terms he could be relieved from his debts,
and, if this could be done for £500 or a
little more, he authoiized the defenda,nt to
advance the intestate that amount on further security of the property." The defendant accordingly wrote to the intestate on
the 26th of August, 1859, the letter, which
Is set out in paragraph 58 of the bill, in
which he states that his uncle is not sufficiently well to attend to business; that the
list of debts owing forms a very heavy
amount, which Mr. HoUoway expects to have
paid immediately; and adds, "I will meet
you in the course of a few days In London,
upon having a couple of days' notice, and,
after hearing your views on the subject, will
talk over the matter, and see in what way
it can be arranged." The counsel for the
defendant say that his office was merely
to see whether a compromise of the debts
could be effected, and that, at the time of
the purchase,
his mission was at an end.
One can hardly believe that his advice and
assistance could have been understood
to
be of this limited character.
He knew that
Mr. HoUoway was pressing for immediate
payment to the Oxford creditors, and that
If he refused to reduce the amount the whole
must be paid. It does not appear that, if
Mr. HoUoway had insisted on a payment
In full, Mr. H. H. Williamson would not have
been disposed to advance a larger sum than

that which he had mentioned, as the property would have been an ample security for
any amount required to cover the whole
of the debts. And the defendant must have
been perfectly aware that the intestate's
property in Staffordshire was the only fund
out of which the debts could be discharged.
The account of the defendant's Interview
with the intestate we have from the answer
He states that he offered to negotiate
alone.
with the intestate's creditors for an abatement of their claims, telling him "that he
was authorized by his uncle to advance £500
or more if required" (I suppose he must have
added "upon the security of the property"),
"but that the intestate positively refused to
allow him to ask for any deduction from his
debts, saying that any such application would
injure his character." The answer then proceeds: "But he at the same time stated that
he was desirous to sell his share of the WhitMr. Bristowe, for the defendfield estate."
ant, said the instant the intestate refused to
allow any attempt to compromise his debts,
the defendant's office of adviser came to an
end, and from that moment the parties, to use
were dealing "at
expression,
the familiar
arms' length." I cannot accept this view of
the defendant's position. I think that bis visit
to London was not solely for the compromise,
but generally for the arrangement of the intestate's debts; that he came with authority
which involved a dealing with the property of
the intestate, as he was to advance his uncle's
money on the security of this property.
And
it may be observed that he had his attention
particularly directed to the mode of satisfying
the debts by a mortgage.
He knew, too, that
if the payment of the debts In fuU was insisted upon, and his uncle refused to advance
a larger sum than "£500 or a little more," a
sufficient amount to discharge all the debts
could easily be raised upon the security of the
property, which was subject only to a mortgage for £1,000. It seems to me that the defendant had placed himself in a position which
rendered it incumbent upon him to give the
best advice to the intestate how to relieve
himself from his debts, and ho one can doubt
that if his judgment had been unbiased that
he would have recommended a mortgage, and
not a sale. But it appears, from the defendant's own statement, that he had a reason for
not giving his a,dvice. As already stated, he
had previously thought of purchasing
the
estate in case it should come into the market
for sale, "an event," he says, "he thought was
not unlikely to happen."
I asked the defendant's counsel what he understood by these
words, and was answered that the defendant's
expectation
was founded upon the hiconvenient nature of property consisting of an undivided moiety. This may have first led the
defendant to expect that he might have an
opportunity of purchasing the property at no
distant period, but his belief in the probabUity of a sale must have been considerably
strengthened at the time of his interview with
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the intestate, from the knowledge he had of
his embarrassments.
Whether the conversation between the defendant and the intestate
turned so abruptly from the intestate's refusal
to compromise his debts, to the expression of
his desire to sell his share of the Whitfield
estate, as represented by the defendant or not,
it is quite clear to my mind that the confidential relation between the parties had not

terminated when the negotiation for the purchase of the property by the defendant commenced, and that he did not then, or at any
rime afterwards, stand in the situation of an
ordinary purchaser.
This being so, the defendant, pending the
agreement, was bound to communicate all the
information he acquired which it was material
for the intestate to know in order to enable
him to judge of the value of Ms property. It
was admitted that the valuation of Mr. Cope
was in the hands of the defendant at the time
he wrote his letter of the 10th September, 1859.
The defendant Is charged 'With making untrue representations in that letter. If he had
done so, it would of course strengthen the
case against him, but
find nothing in the
letter which amounts to a misrepresentation,
nor anything more than a flisparagement of
the property, not uncommon with a purchaser
when he desires to stimulate the owner of
the property to close with his offer.
Having stated my opinion with regard to
the duty cast upon the defendant to communicate Cope's valuation to the 'ntestate. It seems
unnecessary to pursue the case further. The
fair dealing, In other respects, of the defendant during the negotiation, and before the
agreement was signed, becomes almost irrelevant.
The refusal of the solicitors to proceed with the agreement
unless the young
man had some legal assistance, the recommendation of the defendant that the intestate
should apply to his father for advice, the opportunity afforded him pending the negotiation of consulting any friends who were
capable of advising him, the reference to Mr.
Payne whether merely for the purpose of
completing the agreement, or to afford the intestate an opportunity of obtaining his opinion
as to the value, all these considerations are of
when once it Is established
no consequence,
that there was a concealment of a material
fact, which, the defendant was bound to dis-

I

close.

Nor, after this, is it of any importance to
the real value of the property.
Even if the defendant could have shewn
that the price which he gave was a fair one,
this would not alter the case against him.
The plaintiff, who seeks to set aside the sale,
would have a right to say, "You had the
means of forming a judgment of the value of
ascertain

FRAUD.

339

the property in your possession, you were
bound, by your duty to the person with whom
you were dealing, to afford him the same opportunity 'which you had obtained of determining the sufficiency of the price which you
you have failed in that duty, and
offered;
the sale cannot stand." But, in truth, there

are strong grounds for thinking that the price
agreed to be paid by the defendant is quite
inadequate to the value of the property. There
is no occasion to weigh the opposite opinion
of the engineers and surveyors, and to form
a conclusion from them.
It is sufficient to
take the valuation of the mines by Cope,
amounting to £20,000, and the valuation of
the surface by the defendant's own witnesses,
ranging from £10,000 to £11,290, and making
every allowance for a reduction of the value
of the intestate's share, In consequence of its
being an undivided moiety, it will appear
that the value, by the defendant's own shewing, must have been at the least £14,000. For
this property the defendant agreed to pay
£7,000 apparently about half the value, and
that not at once, but £1,500 was to be advanced to the intestate, which was to bear
interest till the day for the completion of the
purchase, which advance must have been intended to enable the Intestate to pay off his
debts immediately; £2,000 was to be paid on
the 25th March, 1860, and the residue by yearly instalments in the four following years.
It appears to me, upon a careful review of ^
the whol,e case, that it would be contrary to
the principles upon which equity proceeds, in
judging of the dealings of persons in a fiduciary relation, to allow the purchase by the defendant, Robert Williamson, to stand.
I am satisfied that the defendant had placed
himself in such a relation of confidence, by his
undertaking the office of arranging the In
testate's debts by means of a mortgage of his
property, as prevented him from becoming a
purchaser of that property without the fullest
communication of all material information
which he had obtained as to its value; that j
this openness and fair dealing were the more
necessary when he was negotiating with an
extravagant and necessitous young man, deprived at the time of all other advice, eager
to raise money, and apparently careless in
what manner it was obtained; and the defendant having, by concealment of a valuation which he had privately obtained, prn
cured a considerable advantage In the pnce
which the seller was induced to take, and
which even the defendant's witnesses prove
to be grossly inadequate,
he cannot be permitted so to turn the confidence reposed in
him to his own profit, and the sale ought to
be set aside.
Decree affirmed.
Petition of
appeal dismissed, with costs.
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and vouchers had been lost, either by his attorney or by the commissioner, after they
(1 S. W. 408, 84 Ky. 219.)
had been so given him; that he was not
Sept. 14, 1886.
present when the commissioner's report was
of Kentucky.
Appeals
of
Court
made, or when it was confirmed, or when the
Appeal from circuit court. Barren county.
order was made directing him to pay said
This Is an action by appellant for a new sum to the commissioner, nor did he
know
trial In the case of Buford W. Thompson,
that such orders were made, or that his reetc., against George R. Price, Administrator
ceipts and vouchers were lost, until after
The court below
of Joseph Price, Deceased.
execution had issued against him. He prayFrom that
refused to grant a new trial.
ed the court to set aside the report of the
this
prosecuted
George
R.
Price
judgment
commissioner, the order and judgment diBuford W. Thompson, etc., against
appeal.
recting him to pay said sum to the commisof Joseph
George R. Price, Administrator
sioner, the sale of his land, and grant him
Price, was an action to settle the accounts
The court granted him an
a new trial, etc.
of said administrator, and sell lands of his
injunction until further orders, but, on final
By the commissiondecedent to pay debts.
trial, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed
er's report in said action the administrator
From that judgment he appeals
his petition.
in
was found to be indebted to the estate
to this court.
the sum of $295.50.
This report was conThe appellee Dickey made a joint answer
firmed, and an order entered directing the
with
the other defendants. They do not
administrator to pay said sum to commisdeny that appellant did not know that the
sioner, in default of which execution issued,
cor.imIssioner had reported an indebtedness
and land belonging to administrator was
against him of $295.56, and that the court
levied on and sold.
The equity of reaemphad confirmed the report, and ordered him
tion was afterwards levied on, but, before
etc.,
to pay the money to the commissioner,
the sale, this action was brought.
or that his receipts and vouchers had been
W. P. D. Bush, Finlay Bush, and Bales,
lost, until after execution had been issued
George R.
Nuckols & Gorin, for appellant,
against him. Besides, he swears in his depPrice, Adm'r, etc.
W. L. Porter, for aposition to the same thing.
The evidence,
pellees, B. W. Thompson and others.
therefore, as to that matter is conclusive.
The allegation of the petition is that the
receipts and vouchers were placed in the
BENNETT, J. The appellee filed his petition in the Barren circuit court against the hands of the attorney "to file with the comiippellees, Buford W. Thompson, and T. M.
missioner in making ssiid settlement, and
they were either lost by said Bales (the atDickey, the master commissioner of the Bartorney) or by said commissioner after they
ren circuit court, and others; In his petition
ie alleges that appellee Thompson filed his were given to him." The answer in refer"They have no 1
ence to that allegation Is:
petition in the Barren circuit court against
knowledge or information sufficient to form
him, as the administrator of Joseph Price,
a belief as to whether they were placed In
deceased, for the purpose of having the dethe hands of said Bales to be filed with the
cedent's estate settled, and the sale of land
commissioner."
So the answer does not
to pay debts, etc.; that appellee T. M. Dickdeny that said receipts and vouchers were
ey, to whom the case was referred as the
filed with the commissioner, or that "they
master commissioner of the court, reported
had been lost by the commissioner after they
that appellant was indebted to said estate,
had been given to him." The commissioner
as administrator, in the sum of $295.59; that
certainly knew whether such was the fact
said report was confirmed without objection,
or not, and his silence is conclusive against •
and appellant was ordered to pay said sum
him. Besides, the attorney. Bales, swears:
and In default of which
to the commissioner,
"I placed them, as I now believe, and aften
execution was ordered to issue; no payment
having been made, execution issued in the the judgment in the cause was rendered
then believed, in the hands of T. M. Dickey,
name of the commissioner, and by his direcmaster commissioner of the Barren circuit
tion, against appellant, which was levied on
court If
a tract of land containing 99 acres, belongdid not so place them, I lost
ing to appellant; that said land was sold at them; but they were all put together in a
paper, and handed to Dickey, and I find a
execution
sale for the sum of $250, which
part of them allowed, and the others not,
was less than two-thirds of its appraised
The appellee Dickey purchased it.
and, as they were not disallowed or rejected,
value.
Afterwards a second execution was issued,
took it Mr. Dickey mislaid them." Appeland levied on the equity of redemption In
lant swears that he did pay said claims
said land. He alleged that he had paid off against the estate, which were properly provand discharged various just claims and deed, etc.
Mr. Bales also swears that said
mands against the estate of his decedent,
claims were properly proved, etc. No witin amount the sum of $296.56;
exceeding
ness contradicts them, nor did appellees offer
that he gave the receipts and vouchers eviany evidence at all. So it may be regarded
dencing these payments to his attorney, to as conclusively proven (1) that appellant had
file with the commissioner; that said receipts paid and discharged said debt; (2) that l\e
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placed the receipts and vouchers evihad a new trial, and the injunction sustained,
dencing the payment in the hands of his atcharging
and the report of the commissioner
torney, to be filed with the commissioner;
him with $295.56 set aside, and the order directing the payment of it to the commissioner
(3) that they were placed in the hands of the
commissioner, and were lost or mislaid, so
set aside.
that they were not allowed by him in his
Appellant also asks that the sale of his
settlement, and, by reason thereof, judgment
land under said execution be set aside. It is
was obtained against appellant on a demand
contended that this should not be done, for
which he had already paid.
the reason that the reversal of an erroneous,
We understand the general rules of law
not void, judgment does not and cannot set
governing applications for new trials to be:
aside the sale of property made thereunder.
for newly-discovered evidence,
That is, no doubt, the general rule.
But in
(1) When
"the names of the witnesses who have been
this case the return of the officer who made
discovered;" (2) that the applicant has been
the sale shows that the appellee T. M. Dickvigilant In preparing his case for trial; (3)
ey, the master commissioner,
to whom the
that the new facts were discovered after the case was referred, was the purchaser of the
trial, and would be inrportant; (4) that the property at the execution sale.
It is also
evidence discovered will tend to prove facts
alleged in the petition that he was the purwhich were not directly in issue on the trial,
chaser at that sale.
The answer says that
or were not then linown, nor investigated
the return of the officer in that regard was
by the proof; (5) that the new evidence is
a mistake; that he was not the purchaser,
not merely cumulative, etc,.
but he offers no proof as to that matter, and,
Here the evidence was not newly discovthe return of the officer being presumptively
ered, but was known to appellant before the
correct, the commissioner'
must be regarded
.trial, and had been prepared by him to be as the purchaser.
So the question arises, was
used on the trial; and, judging from the rechis purchase valid? Had_he, been^^ree from_
ord, had it been used on the trial, the issue
a fiducial character, "ffiere can be no doubt
would certainly have been decided for the apthat" his purchase would , have been valid;. .
pellant.
So the question
now is, was the tmf^ standing in a fiducial relation to deceappellant vigilant in preparing his case for
dent's estate^quity devolved upon him the
duty to protect the interest of that estate.
Ordinarily, we would say not.
trial?
Had
the trial of the case been before a jury, or ^n such eases "the fiduciary cannot avail himbefore the court by depositions, it would have
self of the influence which his position gives,
been his duty to see that his witnesses were
for th e purposes of his own gain^.nr_.heneflt,
duly subpoenaed to attend court to testify, or ■[tojie _5reju(il£e,.Qr. Tnlury of those Interests
It is a rule \
that their depositions were duly taken.
which it ishis duty to protect.
Nor
would it be reckoned proper vigUance to leave
of equity "that no man'can acquire an interest \
these matters in the hands of his attorney to
where he has a duty to perform inconsistent J
The rule which prevents/
attend to; for the attorney is but his agent,
with that interest.
and his want of proper vi^lance is also that
a person, standing in a fiducial relation, from
acquiring an interest which is inconsistent
of the principal. But a different case is presented here.
The commissioner is the oflBcer
with those fiducial duties, stands mainly upon
of the court,— "the hand of the court,"— whose
motives of general pubUc policy; nor can a.
duty it is in such cases to receive all vouchers
man, standing in such relation with respect
presented to him, and preserve them, and, if
to property, be allowed to purchase the prop- \
\
properly proven, to allow and report them to
erty at a judicial or execution sale, unless
I
This being his official duty, and the the entire responsibility of obtaining the highcourt.
presumption being that he will discharge his est price has been removed or taken out of his /
If he continues under the duty of '
hands.
duty, it cannot be said that after a person
seeing
with him, properly
the property bring its highest price, y
has filed his vouchers
from purchasing.
he is incapacitated
proven, that it is his duty to keep a watch
These principles apply, not only to trustees
over him, as in the case of a private person,
proper, but to all persons invested with fiduto see that he discharges that duty by reportadministrasuch as executors,
cial power;
ing the claim to be allowed by the court.
Had appellant's attorney, with whom he in- tors, assignees of a bankrupt, commissioners
of bankrupts, sheriffs, and judicial officers in
trusted these vouchers to be delivered to the
See,
See Kerr, Frauds, 150, 160.
commissioner,
failed to deliver them, then it general.
also, Stapp V. Toler, 3 Bibb, 450.
could be' truly said that he was wanting in
While the same general principle governs
proper vigilance; for Id that case his attoraU persons occupying a fiducial character, yet
ney's negligence would be his negligence.
there are two classes controlled by "different
But his attorney having delivered the vouchspecial rules."
The first class includes all
ers to the officer of the court,— the hand of
in which the fiduciary and
those instances
the court, in such matters,- properly proven
those with whom he stands in that relation
as vouchers, that was all that was necessary,
consciously
and intentionally deal with each
under the circumstances. That officer having
other, each knowingly taking a part in the
lost them, and appellant not being apprised of
it until after judgment and execution had transaction from which results a contract or
Here the contract is not necesconveyance.
been obtained against him, he should have
had

\
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sarlly voidable,— It may be valid; but a presumption of Its invalidity arises, and that so
strong that nothing short of clear evidence
of good faith, of full knowledge, of adequate
thought,
consideration,
and of independent
The
consent, and action, can overcome it.
second class is where the fiduciary, acting
with reference to his trust, deals with himself in his private or individual character;
as where an agent to sell, sells the property
to himself, or a sheriff buys the property at
his own sale. Such transactions are always
voidable at the suit of the party concerned.
They are not merely presumptively invalid,
as in the first class, where good faith, full
independknowledge, adequate consideration,
ent thought, consent, and action, may be proved; because the sale or purchase, If made
privately. Is not known, or, if made publicly,
by coercive authority, cannot be controlled.
Therefore the good faith, full knowledge, etc.,
For these reasons the predo not control.
sumption of invalidity in the first class is reof invalidity
buttable, and the presumption
in the second clasb is conclusive.
3 Pom. Eq.
Jur. i§ 956, 957. These rules being soimd,
and so well sustained by authority, this cburt
does not hesitate to adopt them for the government of all persons occupying a fiduciary
whether of a private or a public
character,
natiire.

Officers whose powers are not merely per-1
suasive, but coercive, ex parte, and arbitrary, i
should be held to strict impartiality, fidelity,
and integrity in the discharge of their trusts.
All temptation to make private gain, to take
directly or indirectly,
vmfair advantage,
should be removed.
The most effective way
to do so is to declare all such transactions
conclusively invalid. The master commissioner, Dickey, was still acting as commissioner
in the case at the time he purchased the land
at execution sale. It was to the Interest of
the estate that the land should bring its full
value.
It was his duty to encourage its bringing its fuU value.
Therefore, for him to become a bidder for it at the sale antagonized
his private interest with his fiducial duty.
This he had no right to do. For these reasons the injunction should have been sustained, a new trial granted,
the report of the
commissioner allowing the $295.56, and the
order of court directing its payment, set aside,
and the sale of said land set aside, and appellant allowed credit for any sums proved to
have been paid by him for said estate, not
otherwise allowed. Wherefore the judgment
of the lower court Is reversed, and cause remanded
for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

LEWIS, J., not sitthig.
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BliMORB

V.

JOHNSON

et ux.

(32 N. EJ. 413, 143 111. 513.)
Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 31, 1892.

Appeal from superior court, Cook county;
Hawes, Judge.
Bill by Susie K. Elmore against Frank A.
Johnson and Annie C. Jolinson to set aside
a deed.
The bill was dismissed for want
of equity, and complainant appeals.
Affirm-

Kirk

ed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by Magruder, J.:
This is a bill filed in the superior court of
Cook county on December 11, 1890, by the
appellant against the appellee and his wifu
for the purpose of setting aside a deed made
by the appellant to the appellee on January
17, 1884, conveying to him the W. % of lots
6, 9, 20, and 23, in the subdivision of S. %
of S. W. % of N. W. Vi of section 22, township 39 N., range 13 E., etc., in Cook county; said west half consisting of 16 of the
32 sublets into which said lots 6, 9, 20, and
Also for the purpose
23 were subdivided.
of requiring Annie O. Johnson, the wife of
appellee, to convey to appellant the title held
by her to said west half; and also for the
purpose of taking an account of moneys
paid out by appellee for appellant, and of
moneys
received by him for her, and of
services by her to him and by him to her,
and of losses alleged to have been caused
by want of diligence and skill and by alThe defendants anleged misconduct, etc.
swered the bill. Replications were filed to
Proofs were taken, and, the
the answers.
cause coming on to be heard in May, 1891,
the bill was dismissed for want of equity,
etc.
The present appeal is prosecuted from
such decree of dismissal.
The deed was executed by appellant to
appellee in payment for his services to her
as her solicitor and attorney in the matter
hereinafter mentioned. The bill charges that
the defendant Johnson was negligent and
unskillful in the conduct of the complainant's business; that his services were worth
less than the value of the 16 sublets conveyed to him;
that the complainant was
without means, and when defendant began
to insist upon pay for his services she
agreed to pay him $400 if he would obtain
title for her to the 4 lots or 32 sublots; that,
after a decision had been rendered in her
favor, and before the execution of the master's deed to her, the defendant induced
her, by fraudulent representations and false
promises, to convey to him the west half
of said lots; that she supposed the deed
made by her to be a deed of an undivided
one-half part of the lots when she signed
it; that between the summer of 1883 and
November, 1888, she did certain typewriting
work for the defendant in his office, for
which he had not paid her; that an execution Issued in the attachment suit herein-
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after mentioned was returned no part satis-

fied;
that the executions issued upon the
decree for alimony hereinafter mentioned
could have been collected or secured; that
a mortgage
suit against the property was
allowed to go by default; that the lots had
been sold for taxes; that complainant did
not know any of the facts in regard to said
executions, or the abandonment of the mort-

suit, or the value of defendant's services in the chancery case until the day before filing her bill; that she first retained
the defendant to collect her alimony, and
obtain title to the lots "for a reasonable fee
and reward;" that she did not learn of the
tax sales until "somewhat over a year" before filing her bill; that she fijst discovered
the facts as to defendant's negligence and
misconduct, etc., within a few days before
filing the bill.
The answer of the defendant denies all
the allegations of the bill as to fraud, neglect, or misconduct, and as to the agreement
to take $400 for services, and sets forth a
history of his professional relations with the
complainant, and gives his explanation of
the various matters referred to in the bill,
and charges laches, etc.
On September 24, 1879, the complainant,
who was then about 33 years old, and had
been divorced from' a former husband named
Elmore, delivered to one Collins Pratt, an
attorney in Chicago, government bonds, owned by her, to the amount of $600, to be by
him converted into money, and loaned out
upon real-estate security.
Pratt used this
money to purchase said lots 6, 9, 20, and 23,
and obtained a deed of the same to himself
He then executed
on September 24, 1879.
his own note, dated October 4, 1879, for $600,
paj-able in two years, to the order of complainant, with interest at 8 per cent., and
also a trust deed to secure the same, upon
said lots, to one Paul Mackenhaupt, as trustee, and delivered said note and trust deed,
On March 8, 1880,1
to the complainant.
Pratt, who was at that time engaged to be I
married to the complainant, obtained the/
note and trust deed from her upon some
'
representation that it would be necessary to
change the securities in view of their approaching marriage, and applied to Mackenhaupt for a release of the trust deed, which
was executed and delivered to Pratt on said
8th day of March, 1880. On March 24, 1880,
the complainant and Pratt were married,
and lived together until about May 1, 1880,
when he abandoned her. During said marriage, and on April 13, 1880, Pratt borrowed
$500 of one Elmers, and executed his note
of that date for that amount, payable in two
years, to the order of Eimers, and to secure
said note he and appellant conveyed said
lots 6, 9, 20, and 23 to Charles Thornton,
trustee, by trust deed of same date. On the
same day, April 13, 1880, there was filed for
record a warranty deed, executed by Pratt,
and purporting to have been also executed
gage
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by complainant as his wife, conveying said
lots 6, 9, 20, and 23 to one Addie Pratt, a
reputed sister of Collins Pratt, in whose
name subdivision was made of the 4 lots
into the 32 sublets above referred to. On
April 80, 1880, the defendant executed his
unsecured note to the complainant for $600,
payable two years after date, with 8 per
cent, interest. This latter note complainant
claims to have known nothing about until
long afterwards, when she was trying to
collect the $600 from Pratt, and he stated
She
that he had given his note therefor.
says that she then examined her trunk and
and found the note for the first
papers,
time. - On November 1, 1881, complainant obtained a decree of divorce from Collins Pratt
upon the ground of adultery, which decree
required him to pay her $40 every month
as alimony, and changed her name to Susie
K. Elmore. Mr. John W. Waughop was her
solicitor in the divorce suit. Soon after the
separation between complainant and Pratt,
she employed Mr. Leonard Swett to collect
the $600 from Pratt, and Mr. Swett succeeded in obtaining $250 of that amount for
her.
About the time of the decree of divorce, or soon thereafter, Mr. Waughop had
made an agreement for her with Pratt, by
the terms of which Pratt was to pay $500
in full discharge of alimony and of the balance due upon the claim for $600, said sum
of $500 to be paid at the rate of $5 per
week.
She was paid $5 per week up to
and until February 18, 1882.
It would appear that Mr. Swett received $50 for his
By
services,
and Mr. Waughop nothing.
deed dated January 7, 1879, one Arnold and
his wife sold and conveyed to Collins Pratt
and Edgar M. Wilson lots 2, 13, 16, and 27
in said subdivision for an expressed consideration of $600; and ta secure their note
for $500, payable in three years, to order of
William Fitzgerald, with 10 per cent, interest, Pratt and Wilson executed a trust deed,
dated January 21, 1879, conveying said lastnaijied lots to O. T. Hartlgan, trustee.
Such being the condition of affairs, the
complainant, about the middle of February,
1882, applied to the defendant Johnson
to
act as her attorney and solicitor in recovering what might be due to her in money or
property from her former husband, Collins
Accordingly, on February 23, 1882,
Pratt.
the defendant filed a bill for the complainant, as her solicitor, in the circuit court of
Cook county, against the said Collins Pratt,
Addie Pratt, Elmers, and Thornton.
This
bill was sworn to by Mrs. Elmore. It sets
up the facts hereinbefore stated.
It charges
that the note of April 30th was never delivered to her or accepted by her; that Pratt
obtained the $600 to use for himself, and
deceived her in respect thereto, and attempted to defraud her out of the money; that
Either her signature to the deed to Addie
Pratt was forged, or obtained from her by
fraud and misrepresentation, and without

consideration; that lots 2, 13, 16, and 27
are of the value of $1,000, and are the only
property owned by Pratt; that said $600
was not loaned to Pratt, but intrusted to
him for conversion into real-estate securities
drawing 8 per cent;
that the note and
Mackenhaupt trust deed were obtained from
her in order to cheat and defraud her, and
get a release of the trust deed;
that the
Elmers note and Thornton trust deed were
without consideration, or accepted with notice of her rights, and with the intent to
The bill offers to
cheat and defraud her.
return and cancel the note of April 30th.
It contains the following averment: "Your
oratrix believes, and on belief avers the fact
to be, that said defendant purchased said
real estate (lots 6, 9, 20, and 23) with the
money so intrusted to him as aforesaid, to
be invested by him in good real-estate seThe bill prays that the release
curities."
deed made by Mackenhaupt may be set
aside and canceled, and that the trust deed
to him may be declared to be in full force,
and a valid lien upon said lots for the balance of the $600 due from said Collins; and
for such other relief as the nature of the
case may require and -inay seem' meet. On
March 18, 1882, the bill was amended by
averring that Pratt was then the owner of
said lots 6, 9, 20, and 23, and held an unrecorded deed, dated February 9, 1882, from
Addle Pratt to himself. On March 10, 1883,
the prayer of the bill was amended as follows: "Or that Pratt may be declared to
*
*
*
hold the title * * * in trust,
and may be required to convey the same
to your oratrix, and that the said deed
*
*
* to said Addie Pratt may be declared null and void, and may be set aside,"
etc. At the April term, 1882, Collins Pratt
answered the bill, alleging that complainant loaned her money upon his note secured
by the trust deed to Mackenhaupt, after investigation and advising with others; that
said trust deed was released in order tc bor,row $500 to buy household fvu:niture in riew
of the approaching marriage; that complainant has some of the goods bought with the
money borrowed of Elmers;
that she accepted the note of April 30th; that he has
paid $290, instead of $250; that she fully
understood the contents of the deed to Addie
Pratt.
The answer admits the purchase of
lots 6, 9, 20, and 23, and the ownership of
an undivided half of lots 2, 13, 16, and 27,
and denies all charges of deception and fraud
or forgery or misrepresentation, and also denies that he now owns lots 6, 9, 20, and 23,
or holds an unrecorded deed of tiie same
from Addie Pratt.
Addie Pratt also filed
an answer to the bill, denying that the deed
to her was without consideration, or obtained by fraud, or that complainant's signature
thereto was forged, or that defendant had
made a deed to Collins Pratt; and averring
that said deed to defendant was executed
for a good consideration, and was under-
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by complainant when she signed it.
1882, replications were filed to the
answers. March 17, 1883, the bill was dismissed as to Elmers and Thornton, and the
cause placed upon the trial calendar.
The
hearing took place on November 23 and 27,
1883,
the defendants being represented by
counsel.
The decision was in favor of the
complainant, and a decree in accordance
with the decision was entered on December
8, 1883.
The decree found that Pratt purchased lots 6, 9, 20, and 23 with complainant's money; that the note to Elmers and
trust deed to Thornton were valid, but that
the $500 borrowed of Elmers was used by
Pratt, and exceeded the amount which had
been paid by him to complainant; that a
resulting trust had therefore arisen in favor
of complainant, and she was entitled to have
the title acquired by Pratt in said lots conveyed to her; that the deed to Addle Pratt
had been procured by fraud; that the lots
had been sold under decree ui favor of Elmers; that the unsecured note of April 30th
had been surrendered on the hearing; the
decree set aside the deed made by Collins
Pratt to Addie Pratt, and ordered said Collins to execute a deed of the lots to complainant, subject to the right of the purchasee under the foreclosure decree of Elmers, within 30 days, and upon his failing
to do so that the master execute said deed.
On January 16, 1884, the master executed to
the complainant a deed of lots 6, 9, 20, and
23, and on the next day, January 17, 1884,
complainant executed and delivered to the
defendant the deed of the west half of said
lots above referred to. The deed from the
master to her was not recorded until January
17, 1884.
Some time in June, 1882, Elmers
filed a bill to foreclose the trust deed securing his note upon lots 6, 9, 20, and 23. Appellee entered the appearance of appellant
in said foreclosure suit, but a decree of sale
was entered therein, and said lots were sold
under said decree on September 3, 1883, to
Elmers, for $676.23. The certificate of sale
was purchased by appellee and appellant
from Elmers on August 23, 1884, for $731;
one half— $365.50— having been paid by appellee, and the other $365.50 by appellant.
The certificate was assigned to Mrs. JohnAs soon as the time for redemption
son.
wbich was on December 3, 1884,
expired,
the master took up the certificate, and made
a deed conveying the whole of the four lots
Thereupon, on December
to Mrs. Johnson.
her hus8, 1884, Mrs. Johnson and appellee,
band, united in a deed conveying all their
Interest in the east half of the lots to the
appellant.
In addition to the chancery suit, appellee
On March 1, 1882,
took other proceedings.
he began an attachment suit to recover
$388.38 sworn by the complainant to be the
balance of the $600 then due to her, charging
that the debt had been fraudulently conThe attachment writ was levied
tracted.
stood

April

13,
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upon lots 6, 9, 20, and 23, and also upon lots
Judgment was rendered
13, 16, and 27.
therein on April 5, 1882, and general and
special execution issued on November 15,
1882.
No levy, however, was made under
the execution, but it was returned unsatisProceedings were also commenced to
fied.
enforce the decree for alimony, and to set
aside the agreement to settle for $500, payable at the rate of $5 per week.
On March
6, 1882, appellee filed in the divorce suit an
aflRdavit sworn to by complainant on March
2, 1882, setting up the decree for alimony,
the receipt of $5 per week up to February
18, 1882, the delivery to Pratt of the $600,
the release of the trust deed, etc., and alleging that there was due to her $388.38;
that the settlement for $500 had been made
upon representations as to Pratt's poverty,
and had never been fully approved of by
her; that she had given notice of her intention not to accept the $500; that Pratt had
purchased lots 6, 9, 20, and 23 on September
2,

1879, for $600, "and affiant is informed
that they are now worth about $3,000, and
are incumbered to the extent of $540 only;"
that Pratt owns lots 2, 13, 16, and 27, hicumbered for $600; that he refuses to pay
$75 due to her for alimony. A rule was entered by the court after a contest and after
reading other affidavits, requiring Pratt to
Upon his
pay the $75 within a certain time.
failm-e to do so, an attachment was issued,
and he was arrested for contempt of court,
and entered into a recognizance
to appear
in May, 1882, to answer the charge of conHe did not appear, however, but fled
tempt.
from the state, and went to Dakota, where
During the pehe has remained ever since.
riod from April 8, 1882, to August 21, 1883,
appellee caused six executions
to be issued
upon the decree for alimony for the amounts
thereof accruing from time to time, but realized nothing. On May 6, 1882, Hartigan sold
lots 2, 13, 16, and 27 under the trust deed
to him for default in the payment of the
principal of the note secured thereby, and
Interest thereon, and executed a trustee's
deed to the purchasers, Edgar M. Wilson and
Edward B. Holmes. All the lots were so
29,

sold

for

$682.43.

Alex. S. Bradley, for appellant. James
Munroe and F. A. Johnson, for appellees.

V

E

MAGRUDBR, J., (after stating the facts.>
Appellee testifies that the deed made to him
by appellant, conveying to him the west half
of the lots in controversy,
was executed by
her in pursuance of a previous contract
which she had made with him in reference
to payment for his legal services.
He swears
that by the terms of this contract she was
to pay all tne costs, and he was to have a
contingent fee of one-half of what should be
recovered both in the suit for alimony, and
in the chancery suit in regard to the lots.
The evidence shows that this contract was
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made during the pendency of the legal proceedings which the appellee was conducting
It was not entered into
for the appellant
before or at the time of his original employment, which took place on February 15, 1882,
nor did it exist when he filed the bill on
His answer states that
February 23, 1882.
"early in the spring or summer of 1882
•
*
*
•
* it was *
mutually agreed
that this defendant should have and receive
oneas a contingent fee for his services
half."
He testifies that he cannot fix the
date of the agreement, but that, to the best
of his recollection, "it was in March or April,
had a
discovered
possibly in May, after
pretty good-sized job on hand, and a good
deal of work to do, and had done a good deal
of work. * * * She claimed to have no
and could
money early in the proceedings,
not pay my fees in money, and that was why
subsequently
made a different arrangement
with her." Appellant swears that she never
made an agreement with the appellee to give
him one-half of the money or of the land
to be recovered.
The deed to appellee was
also executed while the relation of attorney
and client existed between himself and the
appellant. That deed was made on January
17, 1884,
and he concedes that he did not
cease to be appellant's solicitor until some
time thereafter. In England "it is a settled
doctrine of equity that an attorney cannot,
while the business is unfinished in which he
had been employed, receive any gift from his
client, or bind his client in any mode to make
him greater compensation
for his services
than he would have a right to demand if no
contract should be made during the relation."

I

I

I

Weeks, Attys. at Law (2d Ed.) § 364. More
^than 50 years ago the English doctrine was
adopted by the supreme court of Alabama
in an able opinion in the case of Lecatt v.
Sallee, 3 Port. 115, where it was held that
'
> "an agreement
made by a client with his
counsel, after the latter has been employed
in a particular business, by which the original contract is varied, and greater compensation is secured to the counsel than may
have been agreed upon when he was first revtained. Is invalid, and cannot be enforced."
The reason for the doctrine is to be found in
the nature of the relation which exists between attorney and client.
That relation is
one of confidence, and gives the attorney
great influence over the actions and interests
of the client In view of this confidential
relation, transactions between attorney and
client are often declared to be voidable which
would be held to be unobjectionable between

other parties. The law is thus strict, "not
so much on account of hardship In the particular case as for the sake of preventing
what might otherwise become a public mischief."
Lewis V. J. A., 4 Edw. Oh. marg.
p. 599, top p. 622.
"No single circumstance
has done more to debase the practice of the
law in the popiQar estimation, and even to
lower the lofty standard of professional eth-

ics and self-respect among members of the
legal profession itself in large portions of our
country, than the nature of the transactions,
often in the highest degree champertous, between attorney and client, which are permitted,
judicial
and which have received
It sometimes would seem that the
sanction.
fiduciary relation and the opportunity for undue infiuence, instead of being the grounds
for Invalidating such agreements, are practically regarded rather as their excuse and
justification."
3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 960, note
1.
Before the attorney imdertakes the business of the client, he may contract with reference to his services, because no confidential relation then exists, and the parties deal
The same
with each other at arm's length.
is true In regard to dealings which take
place after the relation has been dissolved.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. (13th Ed.) §§ 310-313.
But
the law watches with unusual jealousy over
all transactions between the parties which
In the case
occur while the relation exists.
at bar it does not appear that any definite
contract in regard to fees existed between
appellant and appellee prior to the spring of
1882; but. Inasmuch as he undertook to manage her legal interest before that time, there
was an implied contract, created by operation of law, which entitled him to receive
such reasonable compensation as his services
might be worth.
"If the amoimt of com-^
pensation be not fixed by the terms of the
contract by which an attorney or- solicitor
was employed, he would be entitled to be
paid such reasonable fees as have been usually paid to others for similar sei^ices^
Lecatt v. Sallee, supra.
The question, then, arises, what was a
reasonable compensation for the services rendered by the appellee to the appellant? He
has introduced no Independent evidence upon
this subject
His only witness is an ofBce
companion,
who says that, in his opinion,
appellee's legal services were worth $30 per
day, but does not claim to have fuU knowledge of the services rendered in the matter
herein Involved. Appellee is unable to state,
except approximately, the time spent by him
in attending to appellant's matter, but he
says:
"I believe that In the whole matter
* • •
spent at least forty days." Forty
days' services at $30 per day would be $1,200.
We do not think, however, that the
proof establishes $1,200 as the value of the
services.
Mr. W. J. Culver swears that the
customary and usual charge for all the work
done by appellee In the divorce attachment
and "resulting trust" case would be $250 in
money.
Mr. B. F. KIcholson, the attorney
for Pratt, swore that appellee's services In
the chancery or "trust" suit In regard to the
land were reasonably worth from $300 to
$350, and he made the following statement:
"If the fee was contingent upon services,
I think he would be justified in charging
somewhat more. I hardly think double that,
because I think the success was so reason-
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ably assured
there was not very much
doubt." What was the value of the lots of
which appellee was to have one-half?
In
the affidavit filed by appellant in the divorce
proceeding on March 6, 1882, she swore that
she had been informed that the lots were
then worth $3,000, and were incumbered for
$540, only: This affidavit was drawn by appellee, and was presented to the court upon
an application to set aside the agreement of
settlement for $500. We cannot suppose that
the value of the lots was exaggerated
in
order to induce the court to believe that
Pratt was not too poor to pay more than
$500. Taking $3,000 as the estimated value
of the lots on March 6, 1882, then, by appellee's agreement
for fees, he was to get
property worth $1,500, less $270 of incumbrance, amounting to $1,230.
This amount
exceeded
to
compensation
the reasonable
which appellee would have been entitled imder the implied contract imder which he
We! have
began his services for appellee.
recently held in Morrison v. Smith, 130 111.
23 N. B. 241, that a sale by a client to
J304,
Ian attorney will be sustained if it is fair and
honest, and in no manner tainted with fraud,
I undue influence, or corruption, and that the
law does not go so far as to hold such a
%ale voidable at the election of the client.
In that case the subject-matter of the purchase by the attorney from the client was a
judgment obtained by the former for the latThe judgment debtor was Insolvent,
ter.
except as to his ownership of an undivided
interest In land which was subject to a life
The doctrine of that case Is the law
estate.
of this court as applied to such a purchase
by an attorney from a client as Is there deThe litigation had reached the
scribed.
point where judgment had been obtained.
The judgment was a lien upon a reversionary
interest in land. Its value could, therefore,
be easily ascertained by ascertaining the
value of the interest In the land subject to
the life estate. But there is a manifest distinction between a purchase by an attorney
from a client and a contract made during
the pendency of a litigation for the conveyance or transfer by the client to the attorney
of a part of the property involved in the litigation as a compensation for his legal servWhere a purchase ia proposed,
ices therein.
the seller Is always, to a certain extent, put
He knows that it is for the
on his guard.
interest of the buyer to get the property as
He has every motive
cheaply as possible.
to inquire into and learn the value of the
But, In case of the conthing to be- sold.
tract above indicated, the client is at a great
disadvantage. The value of the property in
litigation depends upon the result of the litigation, and, being unable to understand the
legal aspects of the case, he Is unable to
He must
foresee what such result will be.
rely, not upon his own judgment, but upon
the Judgment and statements of his attorney.
Moreover, he Is unable to judge as to the
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value of his attorney's services, because he
cannot know what legal steps are necessary
to be takrai In the conduct of the case. The
advantage Is overwhelmingly on the side of
the attorney where such a contract Is made.
Whatever may be the rule as to a purchase
by an attorney from a client, we think that,
where the title to property is so Involved in
litigation that the value of the property depends upon the decision as to such title, a
contract made during the pendency of the
litigation to compensate the attorney for his
legal services with a part of the property
involved therein should be held to be voidable at the election of the clien t irresp gctive o f the fa l rnegs or iin fai ^jj^fjsa of the nnntract, provicleS. such election is exercised
within a reasonable time.
Such a rule as
this Is demanded by public policy, and in
the interests of a wholesome administration
of justice.
The distinction here noted is\
pointed out in Berrien v. McLane, 1 Hoff.\
Ch. 420, where it is said: "A voluntary gift, \
made while the connection
of attorney and |
client subsists, is absolutely void, and the
property transferred by it can only be held /
as security for those charges which the at-'
tomey can legally make.
Next,, • • • a
transfer of property, made upon an ostensibly valuaole consideration, such as a lease
or sale, is presumptively void.
The client
has the advantage of driving the attorney to
produce evidence to prove its fairness, and
to show that the price or terms were as
beneficial as could have been obtained from
And, lastly, • • • a transa stranger.
fer of a part of the property actually In litigation,
or a contract to transfer a part,
•
* * is void,—illegal,— because of the existing relation of the parties. • • • Such
a contract will not be enforced on the application of the attorney; and, if the client
applies, will be canceled on equitable terms."
The above passage from the Berrien Case is
quoted for the purpose of showing that a
distinction is recognized between a sale and
a transfer of a part of the property in litigation in payment of fees or a contract to
transfer the same; but we do not go so far
as to hold with the learned vice chancellor
in that case that such a contract or transfer
Is absolutely void, but that It is voidable at
the option of the client. The view here exby the following aupressed is supported
Rogers v. Marshall, 3 McCrary,
thorities:
76, 9 Fed. 721, and note to the first opinion,
and cases cited in note;
4 Kent, Comm.
(12th Ed.) p. 449, note b; WaUis v. Loubat,
2 Denlo, 607; Lecatt v. Bailee, supra; Pearson V. Benson, 28 Beav. 598; Newman v.
Payne, 2 Yes. Jr. 199; Wood v. Downes, 18
Ves. 119; Lewis v. J. A., supra; Starr v.
Vanderheyden, 9 Johns. 253; West v. Raymond, 21 Ind. 305; Simpson v. Lamb, 40
Eng. Law & Eq. 59; Hall v. Hallet, 1 Cox,
134; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 717; Weeks,
Attys. at Law, (2d Ed.) § 273; Armstrong
T. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio, 552; Gray v. Em-
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mons, 7 Mich. 533; Merritt v. Lambert, 10
Paige, 352; Bolton v. Daiiy, 48 Iowa, 348;
1 Perry, Trusts (3d Ed.) § 202.
But even if tlie rule which applies to a ptircbase by an attorney from bis client should
be held to be applicable in the present case,
he contract and the deed made in pursuance
thereof must be subject to a rigid test. In
case of such a purchase, the transaction is
presumptively fraudulent, and the burden is
on the attorney to show "fairness, adequacy,
He must
Lewis v. J. A., supra.
and equity."
remove the presumption against the validity
of the transaction "by showing affirmatively
the most perfect good faith, the absence of
inundue influence, a fair price, knowledge,
tention and freedom of action by the client,
and also that he gave his client full informa2 Pom. Bq.
tion and disinterested advice."
Jur. § 960. In order to sustain the deed
made to appellee on January 17, 1884, it must
appear that the consideration received by appellant was "adequate," and that the appellee
paid "a fair price." This involves the determination of the question whether the services
rendered to appellant were worth what the
property was worth on the day of the delivCounsel on both sides have
ery of the deed.
presented this as one of the material issues in
the case, and have introduced testimony to
show the value of the lots in January, 1884.
Of appellant's witnesses three swore that the
lots were then worth $3,200, two that they
were worth $4,000, and two that they were
Of appellee's witnesses two
worth $4,800.
placed the value of the lots at that time at
about $900, one at from $1,000 to $1,400, one
at $1,200, and one at from $1,950 to $2,400.
It is claimed by counsel for appellee that the
valuations of his witnesses are based upon
actual sales, while the valuations proved by
appellant are matters of opinion, formed from
It has been
a general knowledge of values.
well said that "there is no more important
factor in determining the value of particular
property than the sale of similar property in
the same neighborhood at about the time in
We
Lewis, Em. Dom. § 448.question."
have held that "actual sales of property in
the vicinity and near the time are competent
evidence, as far as they go."
Culbertson &
Blair Packing & Provision Co. v. City of Chicago, 111 111. 651.
But, while such sales may
be the most satisfactory evidence of value,
yet they are only one of the modes of proving
value, and not the only mode.
Railroad Co.
V. Haller, 82 111. 208.
It is true that the witnesses of appellant do not testify to actual
knowledge of sales made in the neighborhood where these lots are located in the year
1884, or about that time, and that some of the
witnesses of appellee do refer to sales.
Purchases made in 1879 are not an exact criterion
of values in 1884.
Nor are forced sales under trust deeds and foreclosure decrees always a correct indication of value.
After
making allowance for the difference thus indicated between the testimony produced by
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appellee and that produced by appellant, we
are tmable to reach the conclusion that the
value of the services rendered to the appellant was equal to the value of the lots conveyed to appellee in January, 1884.
We cannot say, however, after a careful review of the evidence, that the contract for
and the deed made in pursucompensation,
ance thereof, are liable to any other objec*
tions than these two: First, they were executed during the existence of the relation of
attorney and client; second, they secured a
for legal services than
larger compensation
We see no
those services were really worth.
evidence of any undue influence exercised by
the appellee over the appellant, except, perhaps, in the matter of obtaining from her a
renewal of the contract. In the fall of 1882
appellee seemed to fear that appellant would
make a settlement with Pratt without consulting him, or upon a basis not approved by
him; and on November 24, 1882, he wrote
her a letter, In which, after referring to her
previously expressed desire that he should
conduct her business "upon a contingent fee
of 50 per cent, of the amount recovered," he
said, "A definite understanding is therefore
necessary before any further action is taken."
He says that after this date she renewed the
contract for one-half of what should be recovered;
and thereafter, in March, 1883, as
the record shows, he amended the bill by
praying that Pratt be declared a trustee, etc.
It was said in Bolton v. Daily, supra: "We
think that where an attorney sets up an express agreement to pay more than an ordinary fee, exacted of a client where the work
was two-thirds done, under a threat of withdrawing from the case if the agreement was
not made, nothing but the best of reasons
would be sufficient to uphold the agreement."
Here, however, the implied threat to take no
further action without a definite understanding had reference to reaffirming a contract
already made, rather than to the making of
Appellee had
a contract for the first time.
perhaps good reasons for asking for a defiappellant had
nite understanding.
The
thrown out intimations of a settlement for
her litigation. She had shown herself to be
changeable
in her humor, and had already
employed two attorneys besides appellee in
her lawsuit.
She had repudiated the agree
ment of settlement entered into with her second husband.
She had made some incorrect
statements to her counsel;
for example, she
had charged that the note to Eimers and the
trust deed to Thornton had been obtained by

fraud, when the evidence overwhelmingly established the fact that those securities represented a bona fide loan, and that she herself
had voluntarily united in the execution of the
trust deed. Aside from the haste with which
appellee
secured his deed on January 17,
1884, we are satisfied
that the action of appellant in the execution of that deed was free
and voluntary. She admits that she was
pleased with the result reached In getting a
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follow the period of limitation fixed by stat-lvJf
Parties'^,
ute and enforced in courts of law.
will be required to assert their rights within
shorter time in states where the valrapidly, and
ues of real estate Increase
greater temptations are thereby afforded for
Burr v. Borden, 61 111.
speculative litigation.
389.
But the party who is entitled to set the
transaction aside cannot be charged with deor confirmation,
lay, or with acquiescence
unless there has been knowledge of all the
Acts
facts, and perfect freedom of action.
which might appear to be acts of acquiesthe client
cence will not be held to be such
ignorant of the circumor cestui que trust
stances, or under the control of the original
Influence, or otherwise so situated as not to
Rogers v. Marbe free to enforce his rights.
shall, supra; Hawley
v. Cramer, supra.
Confirmation may be evidenced by long acquiescence, "as by standing by and allowing
the purchaser to lay out money in the firm
belief that her title would not be contested."
Pearson v. Benson, 28 Beav. 598.
Let us see how the appellant stood related
to the two objections theretofore pointed out
on January 17, 1884, and for nearly seven
years thereafter. She must be held to have
known that the property which she conveyed
to appellee was worth more than' his services. She alleges in her bill in this case that
she agreed to pay him $400, and, while that
allegation is not sustained by the proof, she
must be held to be bound by it. In her testimony, after stating that appellee introduced the subject of his fees after Pratfs
arrest, she says:
"I asked him
what would be his fees for attending to all
my business,
and making everything perfectly clear and straight for me.
great deal of work
He said there was
about the case, and would probably be
great deal more, and he would have to have
She swears that she thus knew the
$400."
value of his services as fixed by himself.
On January 17, 1884, with knowledge, according to her own evidence, that his services were estimated by himself to be worth
only $400, she conveyed to him one-half of
property which she had sworn to be worth
$3,000 In March, 1882, and which was of
greater value in 1884.
With admitted knowledge as to the disparity between the value
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upon the application of the party in interest,
<^^
it has at the same time been held that such j ,
application must be made within a reasonable time, to be judged of by the court unHaw-^
der all the circumstances of the case.
ley V. Cramer,
Cow. 717; Smith v. Thompson's Heirs,
B. Mon. 310; Fox v. Mackreth,
White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. pt.
(4th
113; Id., p. 257; McCorAm. Ed.) p. 188,
mick V. Malln,
Blackf. 509; Williams v.
Mason, 405, Fed. Cas. No. 17,733.
Reed,
What is
"reasonable time" cannot well be
defined, but must be left, in large measure,
to the determination of the court in view of
.,
Equity does not always .4-1
the facts presented.

a

decree for the lots.
The proof does not sustain her in the claim which she now makes,
—that she thought she was conveying to appellee an undivided one-half of the lots, so
that as cotenant she would have the benefit
of his services in the ftu:ther management of
the property.
On the contrary, the proof
shows that the deed was fully explained to
her, and that she well imderstood it to be a
conveyance of the west half of the lots, and
that she chose the east half in preference to
the west half upon being given her choice.
We think the proof also shows that appellant
was fully advised of all the steps taken in the
suit.
She was acfjuainted with the value of
the lots, and received information in relation
thereto from the beginning of her troubles,
having accepted a trust deed thereon in 1879,
and having executed a trust deed thereon in
In 1882 she had made an affidavit as
1880.
Afterwards she is
to the value of the lots.
shown to have talked with a number of persons in regard to the future' outcome of the
property. She was a shrewd, capable, business woman; had been engaged in business
before she married Pratt; and, though without much ready money, owned a house and
two lots in a suburb called Melrose.
* If appellant had filed her bill within a reasonable time, we are of the opinion that she
would have been entitled to have the deed to
appellee set aside, either upon the ground
^ that both the deed and the contract which
preceded it were obtained from her while the
''■**("''''relation of client and attorney existed be«'
or upon the
tween herself and appellee,
ground that the property agreed to be given
to appellee as
and subsequently conveyed
«^ compensation for his legal services was
^^ worth more than the reasonable and customlary value of those services. But, inasmuch
could not
*Sls the contract, which appellee
have enforced, was fully completed and executed by the conveyance to him of one-half
the property, the question arises whether or
not appellant has not been guilty of laches
in not sooner filing her bill to have the deed
1884,
when the
set aside. From January,
deed was made, to December, 1890, when the
present bill was filed, a period of almost seven
In connection with the quesyears elapsed.
tion of laches it is a fa'ir subject of inquiry,
under the facts of this case, whether the conduct of the appellant does not show acquiescence, if not confirmation, on her part
Where bills are filed to set aside contracts or
parties standing in a confideeds between
dential relation to each other, the defense of
laches is not usually regarded vnth favor.
It has been said that "length of time weighs
less in such a case than in any other," and
that it is "extremely difficult for a confidential agent to set up an available defense
grounded
on the laches of his employer."
Wood V. Downes, 18 Ves. 120, note 1. But
even in cases where it has been held that
such contracts and sales, without reference
to their fairness or honesty, will be set aside
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of the land and the value of the

services,
she permitted the appellee to deal with the
west half of the land as his own, and recognized him as the owner thereof, for 6 years
and 11 months, without giving any intimation that she intended to disturb his title.
In December, 1884, he paid ofC one half of
the incumbrance held by Elmers, and she not
only permitted him thus to spend his own

money on the property, but furnished him
with the money to pay off the other half of
the incumbrance for herself. From June 30,
1884, down to the time of filing the present
bill, she paid taxes on the east half of the
property, and suffered him to pay taxes on
the west half; sometimes taking the money
over to the treasurer's olEce for him, and
paying his taxes for him on the west half.
A little more than a month before filing the
biU she paid $83.35 for an outstanding tax
title against the east half, and he at the
same time, with her consent, paid the same
amount for a tax deed to himself of the
same outstanding title against the west half,
1888 and 1889 she made efCorts not only
to sell her own lots in the east half, but also
to sell for him the lots in the west half which
she had conveyed to him. She went out to
the property in 1885, and employed a man to
plant trees for her on the east half, telling
him that appellee owned the west half. In
1886
she had some negotiation with one
Whittemore about selling one of her lots in
the east half to him, and spoke of Johnson
as the owner of the west half by deed from
At another time she was
herself for services.
present when appellee offered to sell his lots
in the west half for $75 a lot, and talked to
the same party about buying her own lots in
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the east half.
In 18S7 she occupied a part
of the otfice of a real-estate agent named
Hdpson, and proposed to him that he should
seU her lots, referring to appellee as the owner of the adjoining lots, and as being willing
to sell them.
The evidence shows that between January, 1884, and December, 1890, a
belt line railroad was built to the west of
these lots, and the Wisconsin Railroad Company laid its tracks in the neighborhood, and
certain locomotive works were located in that
vicinity. On accoimt of these improvements,
the lots, which had been bought for $600 in
1879, had become worth $16,000 in 1890.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant went into the office of the appellee
as a typewriter in 1883, and did the busmess
of a typewriter for several years. The appellee and two other attorneys had each a
private room, and a large reception or waiting room. The appellant was permitted to
use a typewriter belonging to appellee, occupying the reception room for that purpose.
She was allowed the use of the room and of
the typevrriter without charge, and, in consideration thereof, she did for appellee such
typewriting as he required. We cannot see
that the appellee owed her anything for work
done under this arrangement. While she was
in his office she seems to h^ve done a profitable business as a typewriter for outside parties.
When she procured a typewriter of her
own, and took another oflJce in the same
building, he paid her for the services which
Upon the ground of laches
she rendered.
and acquiescence we think that the court helow properly dismissed the bill. The decree
of the superior court of Cook county is af-

firmed.
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who is a party^to the secret agreement, to ac?
In view of the common interest in making
(82 N. Y. 393.)
the composition. Fair dealing and common
If the
honesty condemn such a transaction.
Ccnrt of Appeals of New York. Not. 9, 1880.
defendants here were plaintiffs seeking to enAppeal from judgment entered upon an orforce the note, It is clear that they could not
der reversing a judgment for plaintifE upon
recover.
Cockshott v. Bennett, "2 Term R.
an order overruling a demurrer to the com763; Leicester v. Rose, 4 East, 372. The Illeplaint. The judgment of the general term
gality of the consideration upon well-settled
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the principles
The
would be a good defense.
complaint
plaintiff, although he was cognizant of the
The facts appear in the opinion.
fraud, and an active participator in It, would
nevertheless be allowed to allege the fraud to
Abram Kling, for appellant. William M.
defeat the action, not it is true, out of any
Ivens, for respondents.
tenderness for him, but because courts do not
sit to give relief by way of enforcing illegal
ANDREWS, J. The complaint alleges in contracts, on the application of a party to
substance that the plaintifE, to induce the dethe illegality. But if he had voluntarily paid
fendants to unite with the other creditors of
the note, he could not according to the genNewman & Bernhard in a composition of the eral principle applicable to executed contracts
debts of that firm, made a secret bargain
void for illegality, have maintained an action
with them to give them his negotiable note
to recover back the money paid. The same
for a portion of their debt beyond the rule which would protect him in an action to
amount to be paid by the composition agreeenforce the note, protects the defendants in
ment He gave his note pursuant to the barresisting an action to recover back the money
gain, and thereupon
the defendants signed paid upon it. Nellls v. Clark, 4 Hill, 429.
\.
the composition. The defendants transferred
It is claimed that the general rule that a
the note before due to a bona flde holder,
party to an illegal contract cannot recover
and the plaintiff liaving been compelled to
back money paid upon it does not apply to
pay it, brings this action to recover the monthe case of money paid by a debtor, or in his •><'
ey paid.
The complaint also alleges that the behalf, in pursuance of a secret agreement,
plaintifT was the toother-tn-law oL Neyman,
exacted by a creditor In fraud of the compoand entertained for him a natural love and
sition, and the cases of Smith v. Bromley, 2
affection, and was solicitous to aid him in
Doug. 696, note; Smith v. Cuff, 6 Maule & S.
effecting the compromise, and that the de160; and Atkinson v. Denby, 7 Hurl. & N.
fendants knowing the facts, and taking an 934,— are reUed upon to sustain this claim.
unfair advantage of their position, extorted In Smith v. Bromley the defendant, being the
the giving of the note as a condition of their
chief creditor of a bankrupt, took out a combecoming parties to the composition.
mission against him, but afterward findiu.^
f We tliink this action cannot be maintained. no dividend likely to be made, refused to sign
The agreement between the plaintiff and the the certificate unless he was paid part of his
defendants to secure to the latter payment of
debt, and the plaintiff, who was the banka part of their debt in excess of the ratable
rupt's sister, having paid the sum exacted,
proportion payable under the composition
brought her action to recover back the money
The
Lord
wa a a fraud upon the other _c reditQES.
paid, and the action was sustained.
fact that the agreement to pay such excess
Mansfield in his judgment referred to the
was not made by the debtor, but by a third
statute 5 Geo. II. c. 30, § 11, which avoids all
contracts, made to induce a creditor to sign
, person, does not divest the transaction of its
^
fraudulent character.
the certificate of the bankrupt, and said:
A composition agreement Is an agreement
"The present is a case of a transgression of a
as well between the creditors themselves as
law made to prevent oppression, either on
Each
between the creditors and their debtor.
the bankrupt or his family, and the plaintiff
creditor agrees to receive the sum fixed by
is m the case of a person oppr«>ssed, from
The signthe agreement In full of his debt
whom money has been extorted and advantage taken of her situation and concern for
ing of the agreement by one creditor is often
an inducement to the others to unite in it.
her brother." And again: "If any near rela-i
If the composition provides for a pro rata, tion is induced to pay the money for the\
bankrupt, it is taking an unfair advantage]
payment to all the creditors, a secret agreement, by which a friend of the debtor underand torturing the compassion of his family." /
In Howson v. Hancock, 8 Term R. 575, Lord
takes to pay to one of the creditors more
Kenyon said that Smith v. Bromley was dethan his pro rata share, to induce him to
unite In the composition, is as much a jaaiL. cided on the ground that the money had been
paid by a species of duress and oppression,
upon the other cr editorsasi f the agreerng gt
and the parties were not In pari delicto, and
"was_direeUy_betw^|jfle_,debtor_aad^
this remark is fully sustained by reference to
_Jgredi^^ lfvioiatesTheprinaple~oFequity,
Lord Mansfield's judgment. Smith v. Cuff
and the mutual confidence as between credwas an action brought to recover money paid
itors, upon which the agreement Is based,
by the plaintiff to take up his note given to
and diminishes the motive of the creditor
V.
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In Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush.'57, the rule
was applied where a surety sought to plead
his own coercion as growing out of the fact
that his principal was suffering illegal Imprisonment as a defense to an action brought
upon the obligation of the surety given to secure his principal's release.
But the rule in
Cro. Jac. has been modified so as to allow a
father to plead the duress of a child, or a
husband the duress of his wife, or a child the
Wayne v. Sands, 1
duress of the parent.
Freem. 351; Baylie v. Clare, 2 Brownl. & G.
276; 1 Rolle, Abr. 687; Jacob, Law Diet
"Duress."
We see no ground upon which it can be
held that the plaintiff in this case was not in
par delictum in the transaction with the defendants.
So far as the complaint shows he
was a volunteer in entering Into the fraudulent agreement.
It is not even alleged that
And
he acted at the request of the debtor.
in respect to the claim of duress, upon which
Smith V. Bromley was decided, we are of
opinion that the doctrine of that and the subsequent cases referred to can only be asserted
in behalf of the debtor himself, or of a wife
or husband, or near relative of the blood of
the debtor, who intervenes in his behalf, and
that a person in the situation of the plaintiff,
remotely related by marriage, with a debtor
who pays money to a creditor to Induce him
to sign a composition, cannot be deemed to
have paid under duress by reason simply of
that relationship, or of the interest which he
might naturally take in his relative's affairs.
The plaintiff cannot complain because the
defendants negotiated the note, so as to shut
out the defense, which he woxild have had to
it in the hands of the defendants. The negotiation of the note was contemplated when it
was given, as the words of negotiability
show. It is possible that the plaintiff while
the note was held by the defendants, might
have maintained an action to restrain the
transfer, and to compel
Its cancellation.
Jackman v. Mitchell, 13 Ves. 581. But it is
unnecessary to determine that question in
this case. The plaintiff having paid the notejkf
although under the coercion resulting from l\
the transfer, the law leaves him where the )'
transaction has left blm.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.

the defendant,
for the balance of 'a debt
owing by the plaintiff, which was exacted by
the latter as a condition of his signing with
The dethe other creditors a composition.
fendant negotiated the note and the plaintiff
was compelled to pay it. The plaintiff recovered.
Lord Ellenborough said: "This is not
a case of par delictum; it is oppression on
the one side and submission on the other; it
never can be predicated as par delictum
where one holds the rod and the other bows
to it." Atkinson v. Denby was the case of
money paid directly by the debtor to the
creditor. The action was sustained on the
authority of Smith v. Bromley and Smith v.
Cuff.

It is somewhat difHcult to understand how
a debtor who simply pays his debt in full
can be considered the victim of oppression or
extortion because such payment is exacted by
the creditor as a condition of his signing a
or to see how both the debtor
compromise,
and creditor are not in pari delicto. See remark of Parke, B., in Higgins v. Pitt, 4 Bxch.
312.
But the cases referred to go no further
than to hold that the debtor himself, or a
near relative who out of compassion for him
pays money upon the exaction of the creditor,
as a condition of his signing a composition,
may be regarded as having paid under duress
and as not equally criminal with the creditor.
These decisions cannot be upheld on the
ground simply that such payment is against
public policy. Doubtless the rule declared in
these cases tends to discourage fraudulent
transactions of this kind, but this is no legal
ground for allowing one wrongdoer to recover back money paid to another in pursuance
of an agreement, illegal as against public
policy. It was conceded by Lord Mansfield
in Smith v. Bromley, that when both parties
are equally criminal against the general laws
of public policy, the rule is "potior est conditio defendentis," and Lord Kenyon in Howson V. Hancock, said that there is no case
where money has been actually paid by one
of two parties to the other upon an illegal
contract, both being particeps criminis, an action has been maintained to recover it back.

It is laid down in Cro. Jac. 187, that "a man
shall not avoid his deed by duress of a stranger, for it hath been held that none shall
avoid his own bond for the imprisonment or
danger of any one than himself only." And
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Appeal from supreme court, general term,
first department
Action by the Hanover National Bank of
the City of New York against Sarah F.
Blake. From a judgment of the general
term (20 N. Y. Supp. 780) affirming a judgment for defendant rendered at special
term plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.

r

'/

;

i

!F.

f

The action Is brought by the payee of a
promissory
note against the indorser. The
\^
facts were not in dispute, and were stated
by the general term as follows: Frederick
D. Blake and Charles Waterman were partners engaged in the dry-goods business under the firm name of F. D. Blake & Co.
They were indebted to various creditors,
including the plaintiff, and, becoming insolvent, executed a general assignment of
all their property to James H. Thorp on the
On the 4th of
24tli day of April, 1888.
June, 1888, the creditors of F. D. Blake &
Co. signed a composition agreement by which
they agreed to take 40 per cent, of their
respective claims, to be paid by four notes,
made by the members of the firm, each for
10 per cent of the claim; two payable in
and two in 18 and 24
6 and 12 months,
months,— the latter' two Indorsed by Sarah
Blake. The Hanover Bank, desiring to
have the security of Mrs. Blake upon all the
notes, asked that she indorse the first two
as well as the last two, which she did. This
was not known to the other creditors, and
was a security additional to that provided by
the terms of the composition agreement
The note in suit is the third of the series,
payable In 18 months, and properly indorsed
by Mrs. Blake, In accordance with the composition agreement
At the trial both parties moved for judgment, which the court
directed for the defendant
At the general
term that judgment was affirmed, and the
plaintifC has again appealed to this eourt

V

i

Thos. S. Moore, for appellant
bridge Smith, for respondent.

0. Bain-

J. (after stating the facts). In the
term opinion the question of law
was stated thus: "Did the secret agreement, by which Mrs. Blake Indorsed the
first two notes, invalidate the whole composition agreement,
so that notes given in
pursuance of its terms are not enforceable
by the plaintiff?" The learned jtKtices,
finding no controlling authority in this state,
determined the question adversely to the
plaintiff, and upon the ground, in substance,
that, as the agreement was fraudulent, the
fraud permeated and vitiated the whole
composition agreement, and disabled the
creditor from recovering anything under It
In this view we are not able to agree with
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 23
GRAY,

general

I

N. B. 519, 142 N. Y. 404.)
Court of Appeals of New York. June
(37

them.
It may Be true that there was rto
decision, in the courts of this state, in its
features so precisely in point as to compel
adherence to its authority, and it is true that
the view of the general term has support
think,
in decisions of English courts.
however, that in our state there are expres-

sions of opinion by eminent judges of this
court, and by a former very distinguished
judge of the superior court of the city of
New York, which rather commit us to a
contrary view, and which should commend
themselves to us, as furnishing a wise and
more politic rule in these cases of composition by an insolvent debtor with his creditors. The general principle has been long
settled in England and here that a secret
agreement which induces a creditor to agree
to a composition by the promise of a preference, or of some undue advantage, over
the other creditors, is utterly repugnant to
the composition agreement,
and, from Its
fraudulent nature, is avoided by the law.
The very essence of a composition agre&ment
that all creditors come In upon
terms of equality, and that equality would
be destroyed If the secret agreement
were
given effect.
In Leicester v. Rose,
East,i^
372,
at page 381, Lord Ellenborough observed that the principle of all the cases
was "that where the creditors, in general,
have bargained for an equality of benefit
and mutuality of seciu^ty. It shall not be
for one of them to secure any
competent
'
partial benefit or secm-ity to himself."
In
Russell T. Rogers, 10 Wend. 474-479, Justice (afterwards chief justice) Nelson said:s
"So scrupulous are courts In compelling
of good faith
creditors to the observance
towards one another in ca,ses of this kind,
that any security taken for an amount beyond the composition agreed upon, or even
for that sum, better than that which is
common to all, it unknown to the othar creditors, is void and inoperative." It is In the"
extent of the operation of the principle,
which was thus early asserted, that we wiU
find the divergence of judicial opinions between English judges and those of this state.
It Is curious to observe that, though Leicester
T. Rose was relied upon as the basis of authority for their conclusions, the application of the doctrine of that case has been
different In each country. Leicester v. xtose
was decided in 1803.
Its facts were that
several creditors of the insolvent refused to
sign unless collateral security, which was
to be given for the first two installments
of the composition payment, should also be
given for the last two. The defendant
agreed to procure this additional security,
and, not having done so, the action was
brought to enforce his agreement Lord
Ellenborough stated
the question to be
whether any legal effect could be given to
such an agreement,
which gave to some
creditors a better security than to others;
and he held that
could not, as
was a
4
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fraud upon the rest of the creditors. The
ease of Howden v. Haigh, 11 Adol. & B.
1033, was decided in 1840, and was a suit
By a secret agreeupon composition notes.
ment between the plaintitC and defendant
that the latter should indorse to him a bill
accepted by a third party, in order to give
him a preference beyond the other creditors, the former had been Induced to sign
the composition deed. It was held that he
Lord Denman, relying
could not recover.
upon Leicester v. Rose and Knight v. Hunt,
5 Bing. 432, held that every part of the
transaction was avoided by reason of the
Littledale,
deceit upon the other creditors.
J., while agreeing with him that the fraud
extended over the whole, remarked, rather
significantly, "It is possible that the plaintiff
may be entitled to sue for the original debt"
The case of Knight v. Hunt, 5 Bing. 432, referred to by Lord Denman, if we are to re
gard the language of the opinion, did not
expressly decide that the whole transaction
In that case the plaintiff had
was avoided.
refused to accede to a composition of 10
shillings in the pound until a brother of the
debtor agreed to supply him with coals to
an amount in value equal to half the debt.
The coals were furnished; but the notes remained unpaid, and the plaintiff brought
Best, 0. J., stated the
this suit upon them.
principle that the judgment of the creditors
is influenced by the supposition that all are
to suffer in the same proportion, and briefly
with the remark: "Here the '
concluded
plaintiff has had his ten shiUtngs in the
pound in coal, and he cannot have it again
In Mallalieu v. Hodgson, 16
in money."
Adol. & B. (N. S.) 689 (decided in 1851),
Erie, J., held that "where any creditor, in
fraud of the agreement to accept the composition, stipulates for a preference to himself,
his stipulation is altogether void. Not only
can he take no advantage from it, but he is
also to lose the benefit of the composition."
In this ruling he railed upon Leicester v.
The plaintiff
Rose and Howden v. Haigh.
there was seeking to recover for the balance
of his original debt, after allowing for the
amount of the composition and the value of
It was his claim that the
a preference.
composition deed had not released the debt
to him, because he had been induced to believe that he alone was preferred, whereas
some other creditors had also been secretly
preferred. It will be observed that, in Mallalieu V. Hodgson, it was unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff had lost the benefit of the composition.
The question was
whether the plaintiff could defeat the effect
of the composition
agreemjnt by the plea
that he had been deceived into supposing that
he was the only creditor secretly preferred.
As an expression of judicial opinion, it must,
however, be accorded its weight as evidencing the continuance of the authority of Ho.wden V. Haigh.
That case furnishes the sole
basis of authority on which subsequent de-

FRAUD.

cisions and text writers have rested the doctrine that the fraud in the secret agreement
with the creditors so vitiates the whole ti'ansaction of composition as to disable him from
recovering even the amount of the composition. Leake, Cont. 768; Chit Cent C94;
say the sole au"Wald's Pol. Cont 239.
thority, because Leicester v. Rose did not
go so far as that, and Howden v. Haigh was
an extension of the principle which was supposed to be justified by Lord BUenborough's
The doctrine
decision in the former case.
of Howden v. Haigh, it may hi observed,
did not go whoUy unquestioned in England,
as may be inferred from the remarks of Littledale, J., in that case, which
have quoted,
and of Baron Alderson in Davidson v. McGregor, 8 Mees. & W., at page 768; who
said he was "alarmed at the extent to which
that decision goes."
In this state, with the case of Leicester v.
Rose before him. Judge Duer, In Breck v.
Cole, 4 Sandf. 79, formed quite a different
conclusion as to the extent of the effect of a
secret agreement which attempts to secure to
a creditor an advantage over the other creditors.
Breck v. Cole was an action upon a
promissory note secretly given to the plaintiff, in addition to the composition notes, as
an inducement to him to agree to the composition. Judge Duer, in his opinion, comments upon the fraudulent nature of the
agreement in its effect upon the other creditors; observing that "it is, in all cases, the
concealment of a fact which It was material
for them to know, and the knowledge of
which might have prevented them from assenting to the composition. * • • Every
composition deed is. In Its spirit if not m its
terms, an agi'eement between the creditors
themselves, as well as between them and the
debtor. It is an agreement that each shall receive the sum or the security which the deed
stipulates to be paid and given, and nothing
more, and that upon this consideration the
debtor shall be wholly discharged from all
the debts then owing to the creditors who
The learned judge then adsign the deed."
verts to the violation of the equality among
creditors worked by secretly giving additional
security, and states this conclusion: "Hence,
• •
either the composition deed itself, ♦
which seeks to
or the private agreement,
evade— and, if valid, would defeat— it, must
be set aside; and sound policy and the principles of good faith require that the latter
It Is perfectly
course should be followed.
just that every creditor who signs a compoation deed should be estopped from setting up
any private agreement repugnant to its terms,
lor inconsistent with Its intention and spirit
* • •
* ♦ every private agreement
'^d *
♦ • •
lis of this character, and consequently
an
such
security
of
which ia the fruit
[every
He reviews
agreement is illegal and void."
the early decisions in the courts of England
and of this state, and concludes that "it is the
clear and inevitable result of the decisions

I
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where a composition is made with creditors, every security given to a particular
creditor, not provided for in Uie terms of the
deed, and not disclosed, iaj5Qi4i.j:Sa fraild
upon the creditors from whom it IS~T!5S^
The importance of this expression
cealed."
of judicial opinion shotild not, in my judgment, be underestimated.
It was delivered
by one of the most eminent judges in this
state, and was concurred in by his associates,
Judges Mason and Campbell. It does not appear from the opinion that Howden v. Haigh
was before him, although it had been decided
But, whether his attention
10 years before.
was called to it or not, the learned judge's
opinion was formed after considering the
same early English cases as were considered
by Lord Denman in Howden v. Haigh and by
Justice Brie in Mallalieu v. Hodgson. Judge
Duer limited the effect of the fraudulent secret agreement to the nullification of any
rights or advantages attempted to oe gained
under it, and regarded it as^ something quite
separable
from the composition agreement
From all tlie early cases In England
itself.
and in this state, the inference from the decisions is, not that the composition agreement is avoided, but, as Justice Nelson stated
it in Russell v. Rogers, "the security taken
for an amount beyond the composition agreed
upon, or even for that sum, better than that
which is common to all, * • • is void and
inoperative."
So in Fellows v. Stevens, 24
"Wend. 294, Justice Cowen held that the law
would set aside "all secret terms made by the
creditors with the debtor, more favorable to
the former than is allowed to the other cred-.
It is the secret agreement itself |
itors."
which is fraudulent and void. Bliss v. Mat-^
teson, 45 N. Y. 22; Harloe v. Foster, 53 N. Y.
think Leicester v.
385. And that is all that
Rose decided.
White v. Kuntz, 107 N. Y.
518, 14 N. B. 423, is one of the latest cases in
which this court has considered the effect of
composition agreements.
In that case the
plaintiff had signed a composition agreement
by which he agreed with other creditors of
the debtors to accept one-third of the Indebtedness due them in four notes, to be indorsed
by the father of the debtors.
To induce the
plaintiff to sign this agreement, Kuntz, the
father of the debtors, secretly agreed to purchase of him the composition notes within a
specified time, and to pay $10,000; the composition notes aggregating only about $6,000.
This secret agreement Kuntz refused to perform, alleging that it was null and void.
Thereupon, plaintiff brought an action, alleging these facts in his complaint, and also
that several other creditors had been induced
to sign by a secret agreement to pay them a
larger percentage than the one-third provided
for in the composition agreement, and, upon
the ground that that agreement was void as
to him, demanded its cancellation, and that
of the notes delivered under it, and a judgment against the debtors for the amount of
Demurrer to the
the original indebtedness.
complaint was sustained below, and in this
that,
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It was
court the judgment was sustained.
plaintiff
between
held that the agreement
and Kuntz, the debtors' father, was fraudulent, and could not be enforced, and that the
composition agreement, as to all the innocent
As the' plaintiff was
parties, was avoided.
not an Innocent party, but had himself taken
a fraudulent advantage, he could not set up
The opinion disthe fraud of the creditors.
It was said
cusses what were his rights.
that he had not forfeited all claims upon his
debtors; that "he must have either the composition notes, or his original notes;" that he
could not avoid the composition agreement as
to himself, and enforce his original notes for
their full amount, as that would unjustly result in an advantage over the other creditors,
and "he should be held to the composition."
"His only remedy," it was said, "against the
defendants,
is upon the composition notes."
Judge Earl, in delivering the opinion in
White V. Kuntz, cited the English case of
Mallalieu v. Hodgson, supra, as an authority
in point; but that he did not adopt the opinion, in all its expressions, is evident, for he
held that there was "no ground upon which
he [the creditor in the case before him] can
It is very plain, ^
be deprived of all remedy."
from the opinion in White v. Kuntz, that it
Is the secret agreement, by which the creditor
receives an undue advantage, which is deem-'
It was so considered,
ed to be avoided.
again, by Judge Andrews, in Meyer v. Blair,
109 N. Y. 600, 17 N. E. 228, who, referring to
White V. Kuntz as authority for the statement that a collateral agreement is void in
composition cases, which secures to one creditor an advantage over others, said, "The\
court refuses to enforce the secret bargain, |
and confines the creditor, who is a party to I
the fraud, to a remedy to recover the sum /
which, by the terms of the composition,
he^
agreed to accept."
In Solinger v. Earle, 82
N. Y. 393, the facts were that a third party
had given his note for a portion of the insolvent's debt to the defendants, to induce
them to agree to the composition. Having
paid the note to a transferee thereof, he
brought an action to recover back from the
defendants the money so paid. It was held
that the action could not be maintained, for,
though the transaction was a fraud upon the
other creditors, the parties were in pari delicto. Judge Andrews, remarking that fair
dealing condemned such a transaction, said:
"If the defendants here were plaintiffs seeking to enforce the note, it is clea'r that they
could not recover." Inasmuch as the note
sued upon was for an additional amount beyond the amount of the composition agreement, the remark of the learned judge was in
line with aU the authorities. He held the secret agreement was void, and could not have
been enforced.
The case is in no wise in
conflict with White v. Kuntz or Meyer v.

J

Blahr.

If we should say that the fraud of the secret agreement made by the creditor operated to avoid the whole transaction of compo-
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sitlon, the result would be to leave him with
If the
the original Indebtedness unreleased.
composition agreement, by which the debt
was compromised, is to be deemed nullified
do not see
by the fraudulent transaction,
why the creditor would not be at liberty to
pm-sue the original debt; a view which Littledale, J., regarded as possible in Howden
It would certainly seem to be the
V. Haigh,
logical outcome of the proposition asserted
below that, if the composition agi-eement has
been avoided, it has become inoperative as
We assert a
an agreement for any purpose.
wholesome rule, and one which works a just
result, if we hold that the secret and fraudulent agreement itself is illegal, and is inoperative to confer any rights or advantages
upon the creditor.
Perfect equality is to be
maintained among the creditors.
It was
thought below that the secret agreement and
the composition agreement constituted but a
single and indivisible transaction or agreement
am not prepared to accede to that
proposition, though it has support in some of
the English cases referred to.
It seems to
me the case falls easily within the rule which
permits a severance of the illegal from the
legal part of the covenant
Pickering v.
Railway Co., L. R. 3 O. P. 235, 250; U. S.
In Mallam v.
V. Bradley, 10 Pet 343-360.
May, 11 Mees. & W. 653, the plaintifCs, who
were surgeon dentists, agreed to take the defendant as an assistant, and to instruct him
for a term of yeai's, and he agreed, at the
expiration of that term, not to practice his
profession "in London, or any of the towns
in, or places in, England or Scotland, where
the plaintiffs might have been practicing."
It was held that the covenant as to not practicing in London was valid, and that not to
practice elsewhere was illegal, but that the
valid part was not affected by the illegality
of the other part. Here, the agreement with
other creditors for a composition was lawful
and valid, imless they should elect to rescind
it upon the discovery of the secret agreeBut the
ment—an element not present.
agreement for, and the giving of, additional
security, was unlawful and void. Is there
any reason why the bad may not be rejected,
and the good retained? If the alternative
Is, as it presents itself to my mind, that the
composition
agreement shall stand as a reoriginal demand, or
lease of the plaintifC's
that it shall fall, and leave the plaintiff at
liberty to recover the original debt,
am for
upholding it, and
fail to see why the legal
part of the transaction had with it cannot
be severed from the illegal part
We should
be careful, in our desire to punish the harsh
and imscrupulous creditor, who presses his
debtor, and bargains for an advantage over
other creditors, by deprivation of legal rights
and remedies, that we do not go too far, and
lay down a rule which may result unjustly
in other ways. It ought not to be possible
that through his fraud he may be reinstated
in his original position as a creditor for the

I
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whole sum due. The operation of a secret
agreement
is such that the other Innocent
creditors may, because of the fraud of their
debtor, elect to refuse to be bound by their
agreement of composition with him.
the
secret agreement is executory, they may not
so elect, and may rely that the creditor secretly seeking to obtain some promise of advantage over them will be prevented from
enforcing 'it, and from gaining anything by
his fraud. Its illegality is a perfect defense
in the hands of the promisor. The composition agreement is one thing, as an agreement
all the creditors to release some
between
part of the insolvent's indebtedness to them,
upon terms equal as to each; and the secret
fraudulent agreement with one or more of
them- is a stipulation which, from its inception, was unlawful, and which the law annuls.
Bliss V. Matteson, 45 N. T. 22.
It was also suggested in the opinion below,
In support of the rule there asserted, that if
it did not obtain there would be an inducement to an imscrupulous creditor to commit
a fraud, for his only risk would be to lose
his additional security, while assured of the
amount of his composition. To a certain extent, that may be true; but, on the other
hand, it may be suggested that if it were
the rule the insolvent debtor would have the
inducement to ensnare his creditors into
some secret arrangement, and thus, by tridi
and device, to leave them wholly remediless,—
disabled to recover the amount of the composition, and disabled from pursuing the original debt which the composition agreement
It seems wiser simply to regard
released.
the secret agreement as one which the law
The creditor makes it
avoids for its fraud.
with the risk of its worthlessness.
if repudl;
ated, and the debtor makes it with the peril
that its discovery will furnish cause for his
other creditors to avoid the composition
agreement.
The conclusion reached is the result of a careful examination of- the authorities, and the doctrine they teach, and it is in
accord with a wiser policy. It must not be
forgotten that the defendant's contract of indorsement is within the terms of the composition agreement with respect to the note
In suit We know nothing of the fate of the
earlier notes, the indorsement upon which
by defendant was secretly and fraudulently
procured to be added.
She had a perfect defense to the enforcement of her contract
We are only concerned now with the question
of whether the plaintiff shall have the

If

amount of the composition, notwithstanding
it may have been agreed secretly that It
should have some better secmrity for the payment of some of the composition installments.
This question, for the reasons stated, should be answered In the affirmative;
and therefore the Judgments below should be
be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with
costs to abide the event
All concm*, except
ANDREWS, 0. J., and PECKHAM, J., dissenting. Judgments reversed.
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of Delaware.
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1867.

Bill

to set aside a conveyance made in
of marriage by Elizabeth Chandler
and another by next friend against Mary
Ann HoUingsworth and others.
Decree for
complainant.
E. G. Bradford and Mr. Higgins, for complainants. Mr. McCauUey, for defendants.
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BATES, Ch. The case presented for relief
William Chandler, three days before

is this:

his marriage with the complainant Elizabeth
Chandler, while under an engagement of marriage with her, made a voluntary conveyance
of all his estate, real and personal, thereby,
if it be allowed to operate, defeating the
right of dower which otherwise would have
accrued from the marriage, ■and also withdrawing from his own control the means he
then had, whereby provision mght be made
for his intended wife and the issue of the
marriage, either through a will or by law in
This conveyance
case of his dying intestate.
was made without notice to her, and, as we
must take it, without her knowledge derived
in any way whatever before the marriage.
Yet no misrepresentation as to his means ap. pears; nor any positive deception as to what
was done beyond simple nondisclosure. Nor
are we to consider it as an element in the case
that Mrs. Chandler, before the engagement,
knew that Chandler had held this property
or that she had formed any expectations with
regard to it.
We may now take the legal question presented by such a case. Will a court of equity
relieve against a voluntary conveyance by
the husband of all his estate, made pending
or, as the English cases term
an engagement;
it, pending a treaty of marriage made without
any disclosure to the intended wife or knowledge on her part, though without any express
misrepresentation or deception practiced by
the husband? This is the general question;
but it is to be considered in two forms:
(1) Will equity relieve, at least so far as to
save to the wife her dower in the real estate,
even though the conveyance must stand as it
affects the personal estate and also the real
estate, except as this may be subject to dower?
(2) Will equity go further, and set aside
the deed wholly, thereby admitting to take effect the same consequences
which would
have followed if no such deed had been executed, so that, as Chandler in fact died intestate, the whole property shall descend or
be distributed as in ordinary cases of intestacy?
Either form of relief will give Mrs. Chandler her dower. On the latter depends her
claim to a share of the personal estate, and
the claim on behalf of the Infant complainant
as heir at law and distributee.
The
1. Let us consider the first question.
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English court of chancery has from the earliest times protected the marital rights of the
husband against a fraudulent settlement by
the wife pending a treaty of marriage. It Is
considered that he becomes a purchaser of
the wife's property, in consideration of the
charge he assumes of her maintenance and
the payment of her debts; that this is a right
upon which fraud may be committed, and
which ought to be protected.
Lord Thurlow,
in Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Ves.
Jr. 27. This view has commanded universal
consent from the beginning. But until a recent date the doubt has been as to what circumstances should be held to render the settlement fraudulent,— whether there
must
have been some misrepresentation or deception practiced upon the husband, such as
amounts to actual fraud, or whether mere
nondisclosure was sufficient as a fraud in
law to invalidate the settlement;
especially,
whether mere nondisclosure should be fatal
where the husband was at the time of the
marriage ignorant as well of his wife's having held the property as of its having been
disposed of away from him.
The first full examination of this subject
was in Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes (decided in 1789) supra.
That was a bill filed
by Bowes, the husband, to set aside a settlement made before marriage by his wife, the
Countess of Strathmore. There was also a
cross bill filed by the wife to set aside a deed
revoking the settlement, on the ground of
duress by the husband in obtaining it from
her. First, upon an issue directed to Inquire
whether the deed of revocation was obtained
by the duress, and, a verdict so finding, that
deed was set aside. 2 Brown. Oh. 345. Then
the cause came to be heard upon the bill to
set aside the settlement,
before Justice Buller, sitting for the lord chancellor. He decreed in favor of Lady Strathmore. Upon a
rehearing before Lord Chancellor Thurlow,
the decree was affirmed; and, finally, it was
affirmed again on appeal to the house of
lords. The argument before Justice Buller
and his opinion are reported in 2 Cox, Ch. 28.
The rehearing before the lord chancellor, with
his opinion, are reported both in Cox, Ch.
and in 1 Ves. Jr. 22. Upon the rehearing the
arguments are best reported in Ves. Jr., but
the opinion of Lord Thurlow, in Cox, Ch. As
a decision the case is of no importance upon
the question before us, since the settlement
made by Lady Strathmore was not a fraud
upon the marital rights of her husband under
any—the most liberal— construction of fraud.
It was made before she knew Bowes, her
future husband, even pending a treaty of marriage with another man, and with his consent; and her marriage to Bowes was itself
obtained by a gross fraud on his part But
the case is valuable as containing a full review of all the prior decisions.
Justice Buller considered that the decisions had gone
only so far as to relieve the husband in
cases of some actual fraud practiced upon
him, and he so lays down the rule. The re-
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suit, lie says, is "that, if tlie wife is guilty of | subject is approached treat the principle a^
any fraud, and holds out to the husband that one of undoubted acceptance in this court;
there Is nothing to Interfere with his rights, and it must be held to be the rule of the
then any deed executed by her in prejudice court, to be gathered from a uniform curof such representation
shall be void." Bari
Bare- rent of dicta, though resting upon a very
slender foundation of actual decision touchconcealmeint he he ld not to be sufficieni_
'^ox,tSfl5Tr''LordTliurlow, though it did not ing the simple point." This was in 1833.
In England v. Downs (1840) 2 Beav. 522,
affect the result of that case, seems to have
held to the more liberal construction of in which the question concerned the validity
frauds, which includes concealment as, well of a settlement made by a widow upon chilas positive misrepresentation. In his opinion dren of a former marriage before a second
"If a woman, during marriage, the master of the rolls, Lord Lang(1 Ves. Jr. 28) he says:
proved
the course of a treaty of marriage with her, dale, considered it not suflaciently
makes, without notice to the intended hus- that the settlemen-f was made pending a
band, a conveyance of any part of her prop- treaty of marriage; or, if so, that it was
erty, I should set it aside, though good primaj concealed up to the time of the marriage;
facie, because affected with that fraud." It and on these grounds he sustained the setis true, according to Justice Buller's view, tlement.
But he states the law quite fully
that the early decisions were upon cases of on the point before us, and clearly in acactual misrepresentation or deception, but it cordance with Goddard v. Snow, that mere *
is also true that the distinct question whether concealment is sufficient to avoid an ante- 1\
bare concealment was itself fraud had never nuptial settlement by the wife.
He adds a
before been raised; and thei-efore the cases qualification, not necessary to be here conprior to that of Strathmore v. Bowes are to sidered, viz. that the concealment is evidence of fraud, rather than fraud per se,
be considered rather as presenting examples
of fraud as they occurred in fact, than as de- and therefore is open to explanation; so
ciding in what fraud on marital rights must that cases may occur in which noncommuniconsist so as to limit the construction of it cation would not be held fraudulent.
Next is Taylor v. Pugh (1842) 1 Hare, 608.
Lord Thurlow must so have regarded them in
laying down his view of fraud in terms more In this case, a settlement made before marcomprehensive
than Justice Buller had done, riage, to the exclusion of the husband, was
embracing in his definition mere concealment,
sustained* on the special ground that the
which Justice Buller had expressly excluded. husband had previously seduced the woThe later decisions in England and America man, thus putting her in a situation in
which she must submit to a marriage withhave sanctioned the view of Lord Thurlow.
The first of these is Goddard v. Snow, 1 out being able to stipulate for a settlement
Buss. 485, decided by Lord GifCord, master out of her own property. In his opinion,
of the rolls, in 1826.
In that case, the wife, the vice chancellor, Sir James Wigram, noten months before her marriage, settled to tices, with strong disapproval, the argument,
her separate use for her life, and subject to that to avoid such an antenuptial settlement
her appointment after her deatjh, two sums by a wife, without the intended husband's
of money, £900 in all, being not the whole linowledge, actual fraud or deception must be
of her estate.
Her intended husband was proved; and he cites as the true rule a stateignorant both of her possession of the funds ment from 2 Ropers, Husb. & Wife, 162, that
and of the settlement made of them, and "deception will be inferred if, after the comof the treaty for marriage, the
so continued until after her death, when he mencement
filed his bill to set aside the settlement as wife should attempt to make any disposione made in fraud of his marital rights. tion of her property without her intended
No actual misrepresentation was alleged, husband's knowledge or concurrence."
nor deception other than was implied in the
It is true that the cases cited subsequent
concealment.
Here the precise question was to that of Goddard v. Snow give only the
presented whether bare concealment was in dicta of judges in support of the rule of that
itself a fraud.
In the argument and deci- case; but they show at least a concmrrent
sion of this case. Countess of Strathmore v. judicial opinion, from that case down, in
Bowes was fully reviewed, and the opinions favor of the rule which holds mere conof Justice Buller and Lord Thurlow consid- cealment to be at least evidence of fraud.
Lered. Concealment alone was held to be a jThe real doubt has been whether the concealment should, in all cases, per se avoid
V fraud, and the settlement was set aside.
Next is a case in which the subject is con- the settlement, or whether a settlement not
sidered by Lord Brougham, though the deci- disclosed to the husband might, neverthesion went upon other grounds. St. George less, be sustained upon such equitable conV. Walie, 1 Mylne & K. 610.
Lord Brough- siderations as the meritorious character of
am raises the question, and upon a review the objects provided for, such as children of
of the cases says that in none, except God- a former marriage (Hunt v. Matthews, 1
dard V. Snow, had there been a positive de- Vern. 408; King v. Cotton, 2 P. Wms. 675);
cision avoiding a settlement by the wife so the poverty of the husband and his inon the mere ground of want- of linowledge ability to make any settlement upon his
by the husband. "Yet," he proceeds to say, wife (King v. Cotton, supra; St. George v.
"it is certain that all the cases in which the Wake, 1 Mylne & K. 610); so the fact that
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of part only of the wife's
property, which was the ground in De Manneville v. Crompton, 1 Veas. & B. 354.
The only equitable consideration relied upon in the pending case was that Mrs. Chandler, as we must assume, had no knowledge
that William Chandler had held the property in controversy; and hence the expectation of it could not have been an inducement to the marriage.
But this circumThe true
stance is certainly
immaterial.
ground of relief is not the disappointment
of an expectation, but fraud upon a legal
right; that is, the right to a marriage without any secret
alteration of the circumstances of the parties as they stood at the
The husband's
time of the engagement
ignorance of the property settled, though
urged in Goddard v. Snow and Taylor v.
Pugh as a ground for sustaining the settlement, was expressly overruled and was disIn the latapproved in England v. Downs.
ter case Lord Langdale says: "If both the
property and the mode of Its conveyance
pending the marriage treaty were concealed
from the intended husband, as was the case
in Goddard v. Snow, there is still a fraud
practiced on the husband. The nonacquisition of property of which he had no notice
is no disappointment;
but still his legal
right to property actually existing is defeated, and the vesting and continuance of a
separate power in his wife over property
which ought to have been his, and which is,
without his consent, made independent of
his control, is a surprise upon him, and
might, if previously known, have induced
him to abstain from the marriage." In Taylor v. Pugh the same consideration was rejected by the vice chancellor; and he reasoned with great force that no equitable
considerations arising out of the circumstances of the particular case, such as those
before referred to, shall excuse a concealment from the husband, or sustain a settlement made without his knowledge.
.,
In this country the ignorance of the hus/ band of a settlement by the wife pending a
1 treaty of marriage has of itself been uniformly held fatal to the settlement, though
no actual misrepresentation or deceit might
appear. The cases are collected in 1 White
' & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 317. See, especially, Linker V. Smith, 4 Wash. C. C. 224, Fed. Cas.
No. 8,373; Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Me. 124;
Logan V. Simmons, 3 Ired. Eq. 487; Spencer
V. Spencer, 3 Jones, Eq. 404, 409; Poston v.
Gillespie, 5 Jones, Eq. 258; Kamsay v. Joyce,
1 McMul. Eq. 236 (in which latter case an
issue was directed to the single question
whether the husband had knowledge of the
settlement); and Manes v. Durant, 2 Rich.
Eq. 404. In North and South Carolina the
whole subject of fraud on marital rights
has been examined in a series of cases contemporaneous with the later English decisions, and without reference to them, but
reaching the same conclusion, viz. that no
the settlement Is
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antenuptial settlement by the wife can be
valid if made without the husband's knowledge; it matters not how meritorious may
be the objects provided for by the wife, or
what may be the circumstances of the husband. He is considered as having rights
springing out of the treaty of marriage, not
to be controlled by any equitable considerations between the wife and third person.
And in North Carolina the result reached by
frequent Investigations of the subject has
been to establish a rule requiring, in order
to sustain a settlement by the wife, not only
that the husband have general knowledge of
her intention to make one, or that she has
done so, but requiring his consent to the
very act or instrument by which the settlement is made. Spencer v. Spencer, 3 Jones,
Eq. 409; Poston v. Gillespie, 5 Jones, Eq.
262.

We see, then, both in England and in this
country, since the decision of Countess of
Sti'athmore v. Bowes, and the cases prior to
it, the course of judicial opinion has tended
more and more to strengthen the protection
of marital rights against -settlements made
to their prejudice
by enlarging the
(1)
ground of invalidity.
This originally was
only actual fraud, evidenced by positive misrepresentation or deceit, but now it includes
also constructive fraud, such as arises from
mere nondisclosure; and (2) by excluding all
the exceptions founded on equitable considerations in the particular case, which were
originally allowed to support such settlement; thus making in all cases the husband's knowledge, at least, and in some
courts his positive assent, essential to the
validity of a conveyance or settlement made
after an engagement to marry.
Now, wishing to lay down a rule only for
the case presented, it is enough to say that
this court will protect a husband against a
voluntary conveyance or settlement by the
wife of all her estate, to the exclusion of her
husband,
made pending an engagement
of
marriage, without his knowledge, prior to the
marriage, even in the absence of express
misrepresentation or deceit, and whether the
husband knew of the existence of the property
'The concealment _ of what._it Js the
■oi:,,not,.
right of the husband to knoWj_and_Hiiat_it,
is tIrfi"Tluty of thE -aafe to discl ose, is itself
frajidLinJaw. it is a doctnne of equity, not
so fully developed at the date of Strathmore
V. Bowes as now, that the concealment, to the
prejudice of another party with whom one
is dealing, of facts which, if known to him,
might affect his decision, and which there is
an obligation arising out of the transaction
to disclose, is a fraud. It is so treated in
equity without respect to the motive of the
party In the concealment, being what is termed a "constructive fraud."
But whether a
conveyance or settlement made under the circumstances I have stated is always void, or
whether it may be sustained upon sucn equitable considerations as were admitted in the
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earlier English cases, and in St George v.
Wade, 1 Mylne & K. 610, such as the reasonableness of its provisions as being made for
children of a former marriage, or its embracing only a part of the wife's estate, or such
as the husband's inability to make a settleleave as questions open
ment upon the wife,
in this state until they arise judicially.
We now reach a question which was discussed with much earnestness and ability on
both sides: Will equity extend to the wife
against an antenuptial
the like protection
conveyance by her husband which we have
^een it afEords to the husband against her?
After a patient examination of the argu.' ment and authorities,
find no just ground
of discrimination against the wife. First,
f
dower is a right of property, and, as such, a
proper subject of protection; indeed, a right
!
above all other rights of property favored.
l Again, dower is a marital right, as well as
is the husband's interest in the wife's prop\grty. Protection, maintenance, and dower are
the rights inuring to her from the marriage;
and, though her dower is inchoate only until
the husband's death, it is none the less, in
his lifetime, a legal right, vested and indefeasible, except by her own act. This is so
far recognized that a release of it by the wife
is held a sufficient consideration to support a
postnuptial settlement upon her, and to make
It available, If bona fide, against the husband's
creditors. Ath. Mar. Sett. (27 Law Lib.) 162;
Again, the
BuUard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533.
wife is a purchaser of her marital rights, as
much so as is the husband.
She takes them
consideration,
rendered by her in the
for^a
marriage,— a consideration not, indeed,
the
same m kind as that rendered by the husband for his marital rights, but, considering
all the. consequences involved in marriage,
what the wife surrenders is In value or measure more, certainly not less, than what she
receives.
She surrenders her person,
her
services, her self-control, her means of selfsupport; ^nd, as to property, far more than
However, it should
the interest she acquires.
be said that whether the wife's dower, as
well as the husband's interest in her estate,
is to be protected against fraud, depends not
at all upon such considerations as the comparative value of the consideration rendered by
each, or the value of their respective rights,
buT solely upon the fact that there exists a
marital right, which, in common with all
legal rights, is a proper subject of legal protection, whether it be itself of more or less
value, or whether it spring from a larger
or less consideration rendered. If there could
be any ground, in addition to the mere existence of a right defrauded, to evoke a
swifter interposition for one sex rather than
the other, it would be the consideration that
the wife, being of the weaker sex, the more
needs legal protection.
It was argued by the defendant's counsel
that in England dower is not protected as a
marital right against a conveyance by the
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the marriage, even though
made on the eve of marriage and expressly to
exclude the wife, that under the English decisions, the husband and wife, in this respect,
stand on a different footing. There is no
decision upon the precise question, but the
weight of opinion is in favor of the position
taken. Prior to the statute of uses, estates
were largely held in trust; and it was, from
the beginning, considered that dower did not
attach to a use, even when it was one reserved
to the husband under a conveyance made by
himself. Whether a conveyance with a use
reserved to himself by the husband, made on
the eve of marriage, and with the express
purpose of barring dower, was, at that period,
held to be effectual, does not appear by any
decided case. The case Ex parte Bell, 1 Glyn

husband before

&

J.

282,

Law Lib.)

cited in

1

Roper, Husb. & Wife

(32

354n, that a voluntary settlement
though set aside as
made by the husband,
his
prevents
fraudulent against creditors,
wife's right of dower, cannot be taken as a
decision upon the question, since it does not
appear whether the settlement was made
pending a marriage treaty. The dicta on
this point are conflicting. Lord Chief Baron
Gilbert is reported to have said that such a
conveyance
would be fraudulent as to the
wife. 4 Cruise, Dig. 416; 1 Roper, Husb. &
Wife (32 Law Lib.) 354n. In 1 Crusie, 411, .
and in 4 Cruise, 416, it is laid down that a I
by the husband, in trust
secret conveyance
before marriage, to defeat dower, is void;
and the whole doctrine as to antenuptial settlements by the wife is expressly applied to
conveyances by the husband made under like
On the other hand. Lord
circumstances.
Hardwicke, in Swannock v. Lyford, Co. Litt.
208a, note 1, also reported fully In Park, Dower, 382, treats it as admitted "that if a man,

'i

marriage, conveys his estate privately,
without the knowledge of his wife, to trustees
in trust for himself and his heirs in fee, that
will prevent dower." Upon this authority.
Park, Dower, 236, so lays down the rule.
So, also, does 1 Washb. Real Prop. 161. After
the statute of uses, which converted all uses
into legal estates, and so admitted dower to
attach to them, another mode of avoiding
the inconveniences of dower was resorted to
by the practice of settling jointures in lieu
of dower. By a statute of Henry VIII., which
was passed to remedy the inconvenient effect
of the statute of uses as to dower, the husband was authorized to settle upon his intended wife, before the marriage, a jointure,
which, if reasonable, was held effectual as an
equivalent for dower, and barred it, even
though made without the wife's privity, the
courts of equity reserving the power to relieve the wife against a jointure unfair or
Such, after much contromerely illusory.
versy was the construction finally given to
this statute In Earl of Buckingham v. Drury,
3 Brown, Pari. Cas. 492, cited in 1 Roper,
Husb. & Wife, 477. The effect was that
dower, under the English system, became a
before
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precarious, and, In the case of large estates,
an infrequent mode of provision for the wife;
and hence its value as a marital right, and the
importance of protecting it, was the less appreciated. Marriage was not presumed to have
been contracted in expectation of it, unless
upon representations to the wife that she
would become entitled to it. This may account for what otherwise must appear as an
unjust discrimination made by the English
courts of equity in withholding from the wife
such protection as is given to the husband
against secret antenuptial settlements.
Such
"^
'^
a reason is suggested in the note to 1 Roper,
~i
Husb. & Wife, 354. But in this country,
clearly the same reasons do not apply. Her
~
dower is the only provision made by law for
the wife out of the husband's real estate.
^>
Practically it is a most important resource,
and the only form of provision out of real
^
estate enjoyed by her, except under wills.
It does, in fact, to a large extent, enter into
>^~^
the wife's expectations in cpntracting marVriage, and properly so. It, therefore, ought
to receive all the protection accorded to any
marital right. To refuse it would, in this
-i
countiy, where jointures are unknown, render the right of dower precarious, if not
wholly illusory.
'
^^ none of the American
cases has this
/subject been thoroughly examined; but so
^
far as they have gone they treat the wife's
t
I
marital rights and their claim to protection
I
^
»
as being on the same footing with those of
\ the husband.
In Swaine v. Ferine, 5 Johns.
t-Ch. 482, a conveyance was made by a husJ
band before marriage, with a view to defeat
the wife's dower. The deed was to his
daughter, was kept concealed for many
years, and possession did not go with it.
,; After the husband's death the widow filed
f her bill for dower, and it was decreed to
I her; the deed being adjudged fraudulent as
against her. It is true, that In a previous
suit, the deed had been held void as against
a mortgagee claiming under a mortgage subsequent in date to the deed; but the widow
was admitted to her dower not at all In consequence
of the decree previously made,
that the deed was void as against the mortgagee.
It was expressly declared to be
fraudulent as against her also; and she
would have been relieved quite as certainly,
had there been no previous controversy between the husband's representatives and another party touching the deed. It is also
true that this was treated by the chancellor
as a case of fraud in fact. It is, then, an
authority for the relief of the wife against
an antenuptial conveyance by the husband,
fraudulent In fact; but whether she should
be relieved against a conveyance on the
ground of mere nondisclosure is a question
not decided in Swaine v. Ferine.
To the same extent precisely is the ruling
of Petty V. Petty, 4 B. Mon. 215. In that
case a settlement by the husband, on the eve
of marriage, of all his property, upon his
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children by a former marriage, was declared
void so far as it affected the wife's dower in the real estate. It was a case of fraud
in fact, very gross In its circumstances, being in violation of express representations
before marriage, in order
m^ade to the wife
This case, like
to
induce her consent
Swaine v. Ferine, decides nothing as to the
It is, however,
effect of mere concealment.
In one oi its features, a valuable recognition
of the meritorious character of dower as a
marital right, and of its claim to legal protection; for the wife was relieved upon a
bill filed In her husband's lifetime, while her
dower was inchoate only, the deed being adjudged void, lest it should, through delay,
become an Impediment to her right of dower in the event of her surviving the husband.
Now, although, in Swaine v. Ferine and
Petty V. Petty, relief was given against
fraud in fact, yet in weighing the effect of
these decisions upon the case before us this
They recognize the
is to be considered.
wife's dower to be a marital right, and as
such a proper subject of protection In equity
against a fraudulent antenuptial conveyance, placing it upon an equal footing In
this respect with the husband's marital
rights. Then, with respect to the sort of
fraud against which she should be relieved;
whether It must be only what is termed
fraud "in fact," or whether she should be
protected against "constructive fraud," such
as bare concealment, the same rule must apply In her favor which we have already
seen has become settled for the husband's
protection, viz. that constructive, as well <as
actual, fraud will Invalidate an antenuptial
conveyance.
Two cases,

at least, have carried the protection of the wife thus far. One is Cransom V. Cransom, 4 Mich. 230. A husband,
two weeks before his marriage, made a voluntary conveyance of his lands to his sons,
with the design to exclude his Intended
wife.
There was no misrepresentation to
the wife; no positive deception.
It was a
case of mere concealment. The deed was
held void on two distinct grounds, viz. the^
absence of a sufficient delivery> and also
that, "being executed secretly, for the purpose of cutting off the wife's dower, it was
a fraud in law upon her rights accrued directly from the marriage."
The other case
of this class is Smith v. Smith, 6 N. J. Eq.
515.
A husband, on the day of the marriage, but before it, without
the wife's
knowledge, settled property upon himself
and a daughter by a former marriage, with j
intent to defeat dower. Actual misrepresentation was alleged by the bill, but denied by
No proof to that effect apthe answer.
pears, and the decision does not rest upon
any such feature; but the chancellor assumes the broad ground that "a voluntary
conveyance by a man on the eve of marriage, unknown to the Intended wife, and
made for the purpose of defeating the in-
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terest which she would acquire by the marriage in his estate, is fraudulent as against
I see no sound distinction," he adds,
her.
"between this case and the like conveyance
by a woman under the like circumstances."
In 1 Scrib. "^ower, 561, there are cited, 'to
the same point, Littleton v. Littleton, 1
Dev. & B. 327, and Rowland v. Rowland, 2
Sneed, 543; but these cases
have not seen.
Scribner refers to the American decisions as
"not being entirely uniform";
and in 1
Washb. Real Prop. 175, it is said that "the
conflicting."
cases are singularly
On examination of the cases, I find no conflict
whatever as to the power of a court of equity to relieve the wife. It is only in courts
of law, where a legal seisin is essential to
dower, that the claim. to it against the husband's conveyance prior to marriage has
been denied; as in Baker v. Chase, 6 Hill,
482.
The other case cited in Washburn as
against the doctrine of Swaine v. Ferine is
Jenny v. Jenny, 24 Vt. 324. I have examined this case, and think It not relevant to
the question, though, not having it by me,
cannot state Its circumstances. The rule to
be derived from the equity decisions Is that
the wife's dower will be protected against a
voluntary conveyance of the husband, made
pending a marriage engagement, under precisely the same circumstances In which the
husband Is relieved against an antenuptial
settlement by the wife.
I am therefore of opinion that Mrs. Chandler is entitled to dower out of the real estate described In the deed of trust, notwithstanding the execution of the deed before
her marriage, together with one-third of the
rents and proflts accrued since her husband's death.
It appears from the answer
that part of the real estate— a lot in Wilmington—has been sold by the trustees for
$400, Its value. Assuming, as it Is proper to
do, that the purchaser was a bona flde purchaser, without notice, the court will not
follow this lot into his hands; but the
widow Is nevertheless entitled, as against
the defendants, to an assignment of such a
share of the remaining real estate as she
would have taken if the lot had remained
In their hands; and therefore, in assigning
the dower, although it will be assigned only
out of the remaining real estate, yet in estimating her share of that, the whole real estate, including the lot sold, will be consid-
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2. It now remains to consider briefly the
claim of the complainants to relief beyond
the allowance of dower to the widow. The
prayer is that the trust deed be declared
wholly void, so that the real estate may descend under the Intestate law, and the personal estate be distributed precisely as if no
deed had been executed.
This relief the
court cannot decree.
A court of equity will not interffere to set
aside a voluntary conveyance, because the
conveyance disappoints hopes or expecta-
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tions,

just and reasonable;
it violates obligations, If

however

not
i
they
\}
are only natural or moral ones. Courts of M '^
'
equity, as well as of law, protect only legal
|\
rights, and enforce legal obligations; legal,
|'
mean, as distinguished from such as are {\C/^
" '
merely natural or moral. For example, a
promise, however solemnly made and binding in morals, If without a consideration, is
not enforced In equity any more than at
law; nor is the obligation of a parent to
provide for children after his death.
So a
conveyance will be set aside on the ground
of fraud only when It is in fraud of some
legal right, and one existing at the time it Is
Now, In this case, we may waive the
made.
fact that, as to the infant complainant, he
was not in esse at the execution of the trust
deed.
It Is a consideration decisive of the
whole of this branch of the case that, even
had William Chandler not conveyed his estate, his marriage would have vested no
rights in it, nor have restricted his absolute
,
control of it beyond the wife's dower in the
real estate.
He could, after marriage, have '
even because

I

effectually disposed of his whole personal;^
estate and of the inheritance of his real estate by just such a trust deed as this. It
follows that his control of the property
could not be less absolute before the mar-l(
rlage than after It; for, otherwise, an en-'
gagement to marry would be of more force
than marriage Itself. Besides, as any disposal of property before marriage, which he
could as freely have made after marriage,
defeated no right, but removed only a bare
chance that the complainants might succeed
to It If Chandler should continue to hold it
and die intestate, the loss of such a chance
cannot be treated as the disappointment of
a just and reasonable expectation in marriage, nor as so altering the circumstances
of the husband as to have Influenced the
decision of the Intended wife.
Again, it is
clear that this deed would have stood
against any attempt by Chandler to dispose of the personal estate and the inheritance of the real estate by another deed or
by will. That he made no such attempt,
but died intestate, so that, as It happened,
these complainants would have succeeded
to the whole property but for this deed,
cannot affect the deed. A conveyance can
be set aside only for causes affecting it
when it is made, as for fraud then committed, or for the protection of rights then
existing.
Its validity cannot be held In suspense, to be determined by future contingencies.
This would subject titles to a distressing uncertainty.
But it was argued for the complainants
that the deed, being fraudulent In respect to
dower, is, therefore, wholly void, passing no
title whatever; so that the heir at law may
succeed
to the real estate, and the distributees to the personal estate, as a consequence of the fraud on the right of dower,
though they themselves might have no equl-

,
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CfONSXRUCTIVE FRAUD.
ty to set the deed aside. Such would be the
effect if the deed -were illegal; as where it
violates the provisions of a statute which
avoids the deed itself. It is then a nullity,
and stands in the way of no claim which
otherwise would be valid.
And so, where a
conveyance is tainted with fraud in fact, in
which the parties claiming under it are implicated, such a conveyance is wholly void;
for no effect whatever can be given to an
instrument actually fraudulent; and therefore it is that, although a conveyance which
is merely voluntary, and not fraudulent ■in
fact, is invalid only against existing creditors, and not against subsequent creditors.
Yet, if the conveyance is tainted with actual
fraud, it is void altogether, and subsequent
^
creditors are let in. But such is not the efThe object of
fect of cgnstructive fraud.
the doctrine of constructive fraud is to protect some right or interest which, in equity,
, ought to be preserved, against the efCect of
La conveyance which is in. other respects
Ikvalid; and therefore equity does not avoid
the deed altogether, but saves against it the
rights or interests which are to be protected.
A deed containing some provisions or hav-

3G3

ing some operation forbidden by statute or
public policy, or contrary, as in this case, to
some equity, is held invalid only so far as
the statute or policy or equity requires, upon the principle "ut res magis valeat quam
pereat." Bredon's Case, 1 Coke, 76; Shep.
Touch. 68; Doe v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 359;
Darling v. Rogers, 22 Wend. 483. Thus a
voluntary conveyance, if not fraudulent in
fact, passes the title to the grantor, but subject to the rights of existing creditors,
■v^fhich are preserved by raising an implied
trust in the grantor. See 1 Story, Eq. Jur.
So in this case the trust deed is
§ 371.
effectual between the parties, but equity
preserves the right of dower against the
real estate in the hands of the grantees.
Precisely as at law, dower follows real esby the husband after the
tate conveyed
man'iage, though the conveyance is otherwise good.
It does not seem accurate to
say that a deed is void for constructive
fraud. The deed is valid; title under it
passes, but subject in equity to those rights
which are affected by the fraud.
Decree for complainant, Mrs. Chandler, in
accordance with the foregoing opinion.
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the party creatingi^ grantingj_as,^|ging^surrendering or^declaring the .j?aBiev.,Sr^_hS_
lawful agent thereuntoi autharizeg^ bx^.writ^
Ing." 2 Rev. St. p. 135, § 6. After the revision a trust of the diar acter claimed l)y thg
pl aintiff~in ttiia case could not be creat ed or
establis hed except by a deed or oonvsyance

a

6

2

7

g

g

'1J

Appeal ftom supreme court, jeneiral term,
first depaitmeat.
But by chapter 322 tSTEe'TSws
"In "wffHng^
Action by Elizabeth B. Hutchlns, as execu^■"1860~the legislature restored the law to
trix," etc., "^^nst AbraJiaBn^^Vag^^JVecMmi^to
Its original condition by an amendment to
Iiave adjudged that de fendant held cerSiin
section su'^tantlally providing
■ae seventh
fearppoper^=raSCife5^''.°***^* axising..tCMi
that adedarati^of trust in lands might b e
ffi§"p6ssession thereof, in trust for the Joint
and equal benefll'of "iUmself aSid plaintifC's. fTfoved by any " w riting subscribed by tSg"
~
traTly"deeiat1h g ffie'same . It Is not ne cesFrom a judgment of the general
testator.
deefa or a formal
"safy~hbw o~p"roduce
term (20 N. Y. Supp. 751) affirming a judgAfrtended for the pi ^pose in order to
writin
ment for plaintifC, defendant appeala
prove ffie trust.
firmed.
butlettCT^or miormai mem^
partyl" and ev en admisoraMSTHpiedTiyThe
Augustas
Matthew Hale, for appellant
arpleading In anothwacHon'Sitween"
slonsin
S. Hutchins and Charles N. Morgan, for reSfheF'parti es, If signed by the party with "
spondent.
]aiowledg«"^"ns contents, wiU. satisfy the reqmrSnients of the statute,' If lEey^^OTtain"
O'BRIEN, J. Tlie judgment In favor of enough to"^h"oiw" the nature, character, i^
Forster v. Hale,
extent of the trust Interest
the plaintiff In the courts below adjudges
that the defendant, under a deed of conveycrVesnS96r~Fisher V. Fields, 10 Johns. 494;
Wright v. Douglass,
N. Y. 564; Cook v.
ance fo Mm by Reuben E.JE'€into.onJ3ie.23d_
day of Decem ber, ISIQ^-olLxeia aitn lands In
Barr, 44 N. Y. 156; Loring v. Palmer, 118
Story, Eq. Jur.
Sup. Ot 1073;
&e county of Chautauqua, Jhen became and
U. S. 321,
"was," and"~ever since has been, seised and
972; McArthur t. Gordon, 126 N. Y. 597,
27 N. E. 1033; TJrann v. Coates, 109 Mass.
possessed^ thereof, and^of the proceeds, rents,
lisuS, and profits, in tnist for Waldo HuJ^581.
S^r'ffie"pTaihafC;s_testatorj2.fS'a^
The evidence produced In beha lf of th9_
?¥!§?*. o?
plaKtffi~wargufflcifint wi^SjB^ rule, to"
an equalundivld^ one-ha]f,par|t,.tI]iej'.e^aa
"tenants .iif" common. 1 It appearing that the
^tablisE'an interest la. tbglffl ads by her tesdefendant, before the commencemenr ofthe
Stor at tiie tim g of hja death, which occurred
The conacHonTEacTsoId tEe*lana, the"title '£o which ■^ihe 9th '^y'irf February. 1891.
Kr^held'tff hi's'own'namerW' accdimffng^n"veyance to'the defendant was shown by the
ceming th"e proceeSs'anS' the rents Mff^ciproduction of the deed, which appeared to
its was_^irected.hefflre a referee ■"designated
have been recorded in the proper clerk's ofThe pM aQg-jgOL
fn^eludgment. There Is little. If any, dis- fice December
1875.
duced andputjn_eviden£eJixfiaj»aiieca-fouili.
'im?e with "ref eirence to the facts, and practically the only question presented by the apm ffie safe of M r. Hutchins
ueratT'envelope
to
peal is whether the trust impressed by force
Mer^mr'deatErinajwhi.(aL3reTe--shown
of the judgment upon tiie defendant's title
MveT)earin~Eis"p^ession_dunBS..^S-lif^
wassuffic iently or lega JIy estahiisiied. T^de ^ (1) Ajgojverof attorney" UBdSc^ the hand and"
fendant relies upon the provMons of J^gjtatseal of the defenda'nt to Jolin ja5,.P.latt wj*
ute, of frauds concerning tniste of this charwas at the time of Its execu tion "the law
ate ■I'ui
acter, and it therefore becomes necessary to
partner of the deceased, bMunng
determine whether the plaintiff's proofs are
1873, acknowledged befwe a nogg^^^^^
such as that statute requires. The English
in the citj^ of New Yorkj_who alsp becamea
This tnstrument
subscribing witness thereto.
statute on this subject, (29 Car. n. c. 3,) in Its
essential features, was enacted in this state
authorized and "conferred fuU power upon _
by the act of February 26, 1787, the twelfth
Piatt to sell the land fOT^i g8.000.._ paym_ent to
section of which provides that "all declarabe made In the "niaimer_ aiid as spedfled
tions or creations of truste^of any langs^shall
tJiereln. (2) A letter^ the defendant's handof the
6e mamfested' and 'proved by some writigg
wrTEGig, and bearing his signatiu'e.
signed by tKe party entitled by law tod^
same dkte as the power of atto rney, ad^^
"
Bare the trust."" Thus the law stood for cCfegsed to Piatt, in whi^ aiter„ Efifemug
about 40 years, until the geneiial revision of
to the p'OW'er of attorney, and giving nstmcthe statutes, when it was changed, and made
Sons permitting Mm to take certa,in_ notes
to read as follows: **'!(7o"es&te'OT"lnterest
in ■for the purchase price of tiigJIaadj-fiie.Jelands, other 'than' leases for a term not to
iendairt says: "Whatever Is_realizedi_xo'^
exceed one year, nor any trust or power oyer
-^m^'underetand
that
belra^ tOt .JEaJdO
or concerning lands, or ln_ any manngr reHutchins and myself, j[olntiy_an4. eqijaUy;
lating thereto, shall hereafter be created,
and any further instructions Mr. Hutchins
~
"granted, assigned, surrendered" of declared,
ffiay give you, you may co mply withJ '" (3)
uialess "by act or operation of law, or Jby_a
Another paper, unsigned, but wholly in the
'3eed or conveyance In writing subscribed by
d'fefOiaant's hand-writifigTileScribing ffie liaE3~
d
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conv eyed to him by Fenton. It begins with
tHg"Sta.tement that ttie "dggd fogmJFenton to
m-e is a warranty dee<l, w im full covenantsT'
and, after tlie description, ends with the
statement that "the aboye is the description of the property as contalneii in a Seed
t5^Tae;~nething
about our being entitled to
T5g~"pl g &iUl] i: also "prodticed
600 Inch es."
"severa l letters
written by the defendant
tp the" dfecea sed autft mg-Ttf-fat gr-Bcms; after
the exe cution of the power of" att&rney,
-letinregr3"*lo taxes on" the "tennlt~31gora
""
ter w ritten"'°By" "~the defendant to "E. H.
Fenfoiirthen a "fenant of a portion of the
land, bearing date February
in
14,
1SS7,
which the defendant states that, " althongh
thfi-tltl e of th e_whole property i^ln me,jthere
exIs another p ar&iJghyOLhas an interest
pect to go to New York some time next week,
when
will see him, and let you know what
it is decided to do." It__ls not necessary to
the plain tig's case to show that the trust
\ was created by, or originated in, a wrlilng.
i TKg statu te" eilacts arfflelof evidence, and is
satisf ied ift h e U u!a "Ts|maB[ifesred or proved
I
I by a writ ing, however~it originated, whether
by parol arrangement or oth3rwise. Crane
Thn
V. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379, 34 N. E. 911.
defend ant's letter to Piatt refers to the power

I

I

of

at1J5Pagy,'~ahd
^MTfefetS'tS^ the dee3"unOOT^which
the Title" was hel3T givffig" Its
dalgr and theparties to it. IBSararenslgned
By the defeuJau trandlfeadtng-Hiem toge ther,
Un j
s faoaW be; "the sub jecf ^matter" and
attent oTttrgtrusTis sufflciSt^deflned and

^

y

without the unsigned paper
This, proof. is^saffisjisaLte
Judge.
\ sustain tiie fiSTEKnjg of the lear ned trial
\to the eirect tnat the . jdeteitdant took and
i ^eld the title to the land in his own name,
but in trust for the beneSF^Himself and the
plainflB's testator, in 'eqiST shares, as teh"SatgriirTO miEttaa;
Tt_was'not, of "couiree; one
of .aifi-^Sress tn ist^ ^jitiiofized by "atatnti*;
but one arising under the forty-seventh section, which, in equity, entitied the deceased
to a beneficial interest, and vested in him an
estate of the same quality and duration as
such interest
BUwood v. Norfhrup, 106 N.
y. 172-179, 12 N. E. 590.
We agree with the learned counsel for the
defendant that a trust cannot be Impressed
upon what appears by the deed alone to be
an absolute tifle in the defendant, without
clear proof showing a beneficial interest in
another, as well as its nature, character, and
extent, and that a failure to execute or deliver the necessary legal evidence to qualify
Wadd v.
the tiUe is fatal to such a daim.
Hazelton, 137 N. Y. 215, 33 N. E. 143; Van Cott
V. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 N. B. 257. With
this point clearly in view, we have carefully
sgecltiM,

I
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ev^B

otheVife tte^.

365

the rery able argument ef eounsd
In behalf of the defendant, mainly devoted
to the proposition that the proof in this case
does not come up to the standard which the
law demands in such cases. But we think
that the written evidence produced at the
trial is not fairly open to any construction
except that given to it by the learned trial
judge, and is consistent only with the theory
that the deceased had in fact a beneficial
interest in the lands. The defendant stated
under his own signature, when authorizing
his attorney in fact to sell the property, that
he was entiUed to one-half the price, and
directed the attorney to consult with him in
regard to the execution of the agency.
Ther.e is nothing In the case to warrant the
belief that this division of the proceeds of
the sales, when made, referred to compensation as a broker, or to anything else, save
an interest in the property to be sold. That
is the natural conclusion which the judicial
mind must reach upon reading the letters
and papers in the light of aU the circumstances.
The trust, it is true, must be es^
taM lshed w EgEIMS ^'^Tting^uffl.cieSt" wTthinTfie statute; but, when_ the w riting is pi-oducedj, it must be interpreted, Tffie aU other
contracts "and written -instromentsj-acCiSfarhg
t"o "IEe~ in tenti"dh of the parties, ascertained
from the language tKed, and all "the surThe fact that no
r'oi5uQaTng~^cuniitances.
"proof was ilven by the plaintiff of payment by the testator of any part of the
consideration is not material. It is not always-possible, after the death of the party
interested, to give such proof, and it is not
essential to the process of establishing the
trust. A writing without any consideration
whatevCT affOTds'sufflcient proof ffiat'the title
conveyed by the "deed_Js for" the benefit of
another. The unsigned paper and the letters of the defendant bearing date subsequent to the power of attorney, and the
letter which accompanied it, relating to the
taxes on the land, and the nature of the
defendant's interest therein, were properly
admitted in evidence. They were all In the
defendant's handwriting, presumptively sent
or delivered by him to the deceased; and they
explained, and tended to confirm, what the
defendant had stated in the first letter in regard to the Interests of the parties iit the
land.
There are some other exceptions In the
record, but it is not necessary to refer to
them in detail. It is sufficient to say that
we have examined them all, and have found
nothing In them that would warrant us in
disturbing the Judgment, and it should therefore be afBrmed, with costs. AU concur, except PECKHAM, J., not sitting.
considered

'over to th9_sai3"Isaa(rS*rKan3~wBateVef "Balance shairrema^oyer
and ab6vejtie_ ainount
"
"necessatry to discfiafge^ my orfgiMLl claim|
'
figainst Isaac P. Rand, ,and the" charges
against the said estate, ,:^lch, by jmy purc'Ease of the same have become vested In^me,

pay ment to be"^y[e'wT rea_aJi^]Buch

ffie^said

(jlaimF^['Md^__c^rgeF5Kn3^S^J^^I^Tiy
liquidated_smd_discharged. • • ♦ And also
in"aircS arge s and exp enses which have been
dTsEall be incuiTed by meW'ray"li5IFs"In "discharging the above cMinS' ana^charges and
BenjamRrTKEind."
iir^nf^g_^onJEBe_estate.
TEis""was followed'!^ the memorandum
which is given in the opinion. The plaintiff ,
who is the as sig nee of A., brings this action
against the heffand
a.dminls^ator or ±8." to
recovertEej^ianee rCTn"ainRiga?teFthe satisfactlon of the clajms of B.

J. E. Maynadier, for plainB. D. Sohier & 0. A. Welch, for defend-

H. P. French. &

tiff.

ants.

COLT,

J.

whlcH^

It jiT^ls^g^Lifeat^ttils tni^

ia.

The bill_ charges that Benjamin
Rand held the land conyeyeff to him Tjy the
absolute deed oFlsaacnK^Sand^ upon trust \o
£pp0" the"avalls^^ it 'tb^fEe^'payinent of cer-'
faK'TncTMibrances and "debts dtie him, and
to account for any surplus" to Isaac P. Rand,
the grantoTjto _whose right^he^^aintifC, as
_ >i..i— . . ■'■Sg;s""'succee2e3r~'The
writings by
de-

it

la alleged
clared are Jujly^ set forth, ajid
that under the tKUSj..saies have been made
of mo?ft,jtJ[an enough to pa Jffl demands and
charges, leaving a surplus, to wMeh the plaintiff is ep]tl±le.d,„
The def eiLdan% file a plea denying that
Benjamm"in his lifetime held the land upon
any" such trust, of that any trust was" devolved upon them, asTiis r^resentatiyes, by
Ms death. The puri)ose,"no"3dui6T,"Ts
to obtain first the decision of the court upon the
question whether, upon the facts disclosed,
any trust is raised which can be enforced;
for, if no trust shall be found to exist, then
the investigation of long and detailed accounts will be avoided.
This is the point
which was argued at thebar, and we proceed
to Its consideration without regard to sui)posed irregularities in the pleadings.

e

^HTfTF^SOTBiS^^^OTa^^K^TFIBor^Ster,
in th"e state of Massachnsetis, ^TiS'deed deItveFed to me on July 21, 18ti5 , do hereby
Sgree" anJTBind myself and my fielifsTo'^y

at and before the time of the deliveryoFthe
deed of the equity, and as part of the transaction, that any surplus over auad^^^iove_^s
claim that rnight remain of the estateor its
^oceeds should befong to fsaac P. No written memorandum' of "ffie agreement was made
before the delivery of the deed, but It_was
suggested at the time that B enjamin should
pSt It in the shape of a memorandum, safely
Mpositea^n^case"ahytiHng' sBoffld'Eappen to
HifrT "TrTfi Benjamin "afterwards Informed
Isaac P. that soon after the transaction he
No
made a memorandum of the agreement.
such paper was ever delivered to, or came
Into'the'possession" of, T^ac P., but after tnedeath of Benjamin a wtltingjDfJhatdracrigdepasited'inTils bank_"
Hon w"asr?^nS~safely
truh"E_^ By the terms2gf~"t his~wfTtmg, Eie
a^eed to pay over any balance of the estate
remaElng, substahtiaily^TnaccOTuance with
It was si^ed by^^fflathe "oral agreement.
fnin, and dated July 2r, ISesT'iiadjjnfeneath the first signature was an additional
Statement, also signed, in these^words: "This
memorandum is made by me for the. use of
my exMutor or administrator only, Nojj^pr
Isaac P^ Rand, ""''J^!""" "^"'TllT'ff ""'^'*'' ^i'"',
Save anyl egaior equitable claim against m
oF 'E^'"^tater but u pon the payment of my
debtriBterest; and all charge as abo ye"menpnnre to ^jie henetimiedT- any "balance^shall
fit'of'Tsaac" P. KanTandl^Se claiming un'~~

d^mffl:"

—

are of opinion that this writing Is suf■^le
jaclent asja, declara tfin "of trust, within the
jneani"ngliijO>J ir statute. It is much more
formal and particular in Its statement than
declarations of this description by letter, by
answer in chancery, affidavit, recital In bond
or deed, or in pamphlet, which have all been
held sufficient, and with reference to which
it is held to- be no objection that they were
drawn up for another purpose and not addressed to, nor intended for the use of, the
cestui que trust See cases cited in Browne,
St. Frauds,

98,

99.

IJJg^not essential that the m emorandum relied n should have beende Uvered "to a5
ongjiaa declaration or tfBE' It is a question
of fact,
ail cases, whether the trust bad
been perfectly created; and upon that question the delivery or nondelivery of the Instrument is a significant fact, of greater or less
weight according to the circumstances.
If
the alleged trust arises from mere gift, delivery of the writing by which
is declared
is not always required as proof that the gift
was perfected, for the court will consider all
the facts bearing upon the question of intention, and
has been held that If a party execute a voluntary settlement, and the deed

r_

March, 1872.
veyed
A. con
to B. certain lan d by an ajteolute conveyance, _B^ ag reeing oral^Jto.6old^
"In toistJOr A.'aftwisatlsfjtag claims he held
against^ \^B.'s d eath the fSnogng writIng'was fonnaamong his papers.
''*rBostonr"July'2l.lS8Sr" iryen.1amln Rand,
havin g _ purchased the ^iteite^^ Isaac^ P.
Ra^^TR6xbu ry,'saiar esta.te bei ng Bituated

The la nd in ques tion was
afiBplOT g' qmicTaip^ deed, dated on the 15th,
■But"3Jllvered
on the 21st day of July, 1865,
to Benjamin, who then heldJ.arge,_demMds
agaaiist'IsaacTP; TRand, seciareOoCeMffltgake
(ffi the same premises.
The evidence suffi~ciently proves that Benjamin oraUy^^greed,

it
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recites that It Is sealed and delivered. It will
be binding on the settlor, even If he never
parts with It and keeps it in his possession
until his death. Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns.
Ch. 329; Perry, Trusts, § 103, and cases cited.
It must always, however, appear that the
fiduciary relation is completely established,
and not left as a matter of executory agreement only, regard being had to the situation
of the property, the relations of the parties,
and the purposes and objects had in view.
In this case the verbal agreeme nt in which
the trust orlgtnatgC was_made_injegnsid,sai
tibn of tBeroCveyaiice by Isaac P. of his Interest^InPEEe" reaT estate, "ajad"'the'Trust is"
founded on a" good consideration: —Th ti fafTB
or weight jn aiding the co urTto carry' out the
iStaitions of the parties; and the want of a
delivery or the memorandum becomes of less
^nlflcance l
"The law as thus laid down is to be found
mainly in decisions under the words of the
English statute, which requires that all declarations and creations of trust shall be manifested or proved in writing. These were the
words of our earlier law (St 1783, c. 37, § 3),
and they remained until the first general revision of the statutes; the requirement of the
present statute being that thgjmst-shall-be
creat ed or deg kgefl-m-JgJitlng. Gen. St c.
iTOTl 19l Tlie same change has been made
in other states; and in those in which the
question has been incidentally before the
courts the tendency is to rule that this abbreviation in the words does not change the
law, and that "created or declared" are
equivalent to "manTfestied" or proved." 'JrHste
may be crea teiTTn the first instan^ceja. writing! They mpife commonly originate in the
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oral agreements and transactlonsj)f^ttejarties, a nd "Me subsequently declared Jn writlngr~Dijr^sHute' "embraces both descriptions.
tt^ad been^ettlga"]57^^^t ed' decisions" un-^
der the oig statute, wnen mis cnange was
made, that an expresslSust" was sufficiently
declareaTTsEown by "any proper written evlaracediseiDSlng-faetsw^lilch
created a fiduciary relation. Undei- this construction, the
'isnaarttoha vTords of the old statute, seemed
immaterial, and are omitted.
And we are of
opinion that no change in the meaning or efPerry,
fect of it was Intended or made.
Trusts, § 81, and cases dted.
In view of the law thus stated, the fact
that there was no delivery of the memorandum in this case is not of controlling importance.
It Is Impossible to account for its
existence and safe preservation, unless there
was an intention that it should be used, if
necessary, to prove a trust. The statement
that it is made for the use of the executor or
administrator of the trustee implies this. The.
its. existence;
c^tuI^j£e_taist_wasIflJ^ja£i,of
andl^byjts terms-A-perfect ,trust is declared.
It is, indeed^ declared that neither Isaac P.,
nor those claiming under him,' have any legal
of equitable claiSr against "the m_a,ker or his
But this "statement, if such was its
"estate.
Intention^ caniwt control the effect of the
m establishing the trust. That
memorandum
fesults," as matter of law, from the proof.
We are Inclined to think that its intention
was not to defeat an equitable claim to the
proceeds of the estate conveyed, but only to
protect the maker against personal responsibility beyond the actual receipts In administering the trusts.
Decree for the plaintiff.
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BATES
(65

Supreme

Judicial

Bill In equity
accou

nt

et al.
Me.

t. HURD.
180.)

Court of Maine.
May 2, 1876.

Franlilin.

to declare a trust and
■
~

P. H. Stubbs, for plaintiff,
for defendants.

for

an

H. L. Whlt-

comb,

BARROWS, J. I n 1847 one Kennedy gave
to Nicholas Bates and his br other Thomas,
the piaintifC, a bond conditiong rTiSTtBe 'conveyance or certain p^rc fels ot jLand_.(g§flBMtte3
^at about two_M5gfeg andflfty acresjugon
payment of the obligee's noles!^ rnl.851, be iMfelE ematuH^of alt the "rOtes, a n adjustof
ment was maSe, by wh ich, fiTiatisfactian
the boflflrtiglmgasT'oaVeyances of the bonded
land in t\TO"sepafgre"^|[TSeIs,^^n'e 'to'Wm7W'.
Bates, sTMrarvmaierrsxKftES'Wier to Nlcholas, wh6~XwTEBr~WmrW.
aSGtEe"'pla,intffiJ
suFscfrBe3iiSi3~3eIivered to Kennedy a re5i!]^ln3wSea~^OTr^^ bond,"siSt!ng' foHh
that lie'imd recaved the deed of'Bis'portioii,
"for himself and In"~ti'a:sr2for;ilS."lB'iJtoCT
Thomas Bates, "acc6f3mg to what_ttie_jald
Thomas Has oV may 5ay~towards the same
're aT"eBtafeli'w BlSBTmounfa~at"

present

losev-

Mily-five"aonHBK^ T]K[^JHce~onEg"parcd
fS^' conveyed to Nicholas was "$450, and
jSTicTiollas "seems tb"'Eave

a'dtnittea^a' r'esulfing;

trus| in favor of th'eiaamgg to the alBsmt
oTone-sixth bi 'fEepurcbase, which was bind-

Tng" upon" hiiri and fill claiming under" Mm
wifh hofica
"TSdeed the writing snba cribjeAJbK. Nicholas
Bates seems to be Ja^temount,Jfi.,a _4eclaraEion of ajTeS^^ trusC so as to Gati£fj[ Rev.

St

c. 73.
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money, ajn d su bs equently . made two other
'morEgage3"Hereon to Philip M. ijtubba. ttte
BcrlYener 'winrdrie w'"the cojnveyances from
^'iinedy and wrote the indorsement upon tha
"bond containing the' declaration o f .the trust
feoth' 'of these Jast-named mortgfa ges were
^^me3rW 'PHiicp^'l^om pson, who had no
^novHeSge of the trust, and has given notice
of forWosure, but has nev er been in~"posses^lon bf t^e propfr^.
"T^ic SoIaF'ffi^es died in January, 1866, leaving a Widow, Keziah M. Bates, now Keziah
"Ja. aura, who is one of the respondents. and_
who to ok out letters of administration on his
the land as subject to th^ ""
•estateTThventoried
^morrgage~to'^nrice"'TS^"pson, ^'and being
alsb'Tield^as'a InM "estate for Thomas Bates
WTSraBTo imt-or^TOUI !|»140:" This sum I§
appareirnyn;]ife" aiH6ttht of aie~$Vb originally

rtne:

•tooneyrwitinmgg^r

UI> lu the tlme"cKnEe
The widow conof TE e~InYentory.
of Ihe land, recel^gg'
"'^^^^^^"^irT^^swsion
flSe rents and pr o fits untu Novemoer, IMhC
when she made sale thereof by license from
tflg" proraWcSnit; "Witholit maKing menno'H
oTTEeTirufErTo Dapier pgynriHnngrt^ g:
IFb'acS'to'BSirfor part oTthe purchase m on^
anff" took'posgeggiBHr^Thg^JWi dow pgfflea
5egi'gi§"'E ^gr'1EEe''other respondent, and on
"
beptembeF 9, 1870, took a quitclaim Bee
From Day, and since then the two defendants
Eave^ccupied or had the exclusive u se, in"^
come, and proritof the premises.
'TrEi^ptaI nflff''gSey'nbt claim anyjc lghts as
agains£_^^|]m^^^eSr~TBe"Eeiraof~Mclio!as"ffi!tes "'are''"n'o' longer interested, as the
sale by the administratrix; devested them of
all right and title in the premises.
her jBTQWtQry. aj^£g.-Jaft5^Mgatr.fe.Ja
the plaintl fC's rights, and Is fully
mTOed_
"
c!BgrgeaEle withlipfiee of ^^em . TOe 'ISthg
Respondent,
her husband, seems to have~6c-

'E^ETng

f

The words_"created jnd declared" In that
statute seem to be construed" by the courts
"manifested, and tMpsgtmiy uneerh^rnBiiraJbiai
to be synonjmous jwith
ec^t^
'By^fiemj.ial.iM.jmt s
proved" as they "stood In tTielOT^glnai sevand^oflts i s admitte3
^tb section of the statute of frauds,— 29 Car. tn "ffiieagreed statemSnt'''' He is "there tore fg"
n. a 3. Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 707, 5 Ves. sgdnsible to' the jplalntiff on Tihis 8c br*"wRh
308; Unitarian Society v. Woodbury, 14 Me. ,^^"~The testimony' estabTishes the ScFtEat
281; Barrel! v. Joy, 16 Mass. 221; Pinnock
the plaintiff made a claim upon the adminisV. Clough, 17 Vt 508.
tra^rirTBrTnrTHfeTem;'l[na'TEST
From the_ cases lust _ie!ted, and numerous
Ebre"or"lessTiegHfati<ffi"betweerr'15em looking to an aTdjustment" it is 'unfoffianaSTor
others we see that a letter, memorandum, or
recital subscribed "by IHe^xustee, whether ad- both tMt'Hl'^'^'Mble adjustment could not
be reached without litigation.
ffi:«BB6d-terorl3S|)osile"3"with' the cestui que
frust ofh6t,"oFwBStll^THIende37whenm
In the hands of these res pondents It Is obfo be evidence of "tfie trust'or'nK; 'wliribe sgf;! vious tSatrihe._Btfllifi! Sy Is subject to the _
triistwhlc h the plaintiff seeks to enforce.
£3Srf6"^ffiSnsO]E"tr^L5S^S^^§5u§Jert,
^^^3ect that he migKt have had an adetfes and th'ejr. relations to ItjanjL.each other,
quate remedy aVlaw by' a'suit'lf bF'His_jhMe
""~"-'~
'
appear with reasonable certainty.
are,
oflEEe income." "But cases of
undffl^
trUgttir favor of the "bur statute, specially inadg7Jrust
The existence"'©?^
the buBjSCST
rtaintifC, which h,e, may enforce agaihsrMcbreniedles In equity, and^ moreover, it mig ht
olas Bates and his represratalWgS; "aiia HI "be desirable for him to hav e
jhie decree io
miming under "him with ndtlce'bf the trust which he ls~enS;itled in equ ity as agalMt
may be regarded as established^'
poSablll ty of a redemp tHemrHrVtB^ronhe
' -.-.«»— -——-™. — -_.
Bates
jEe
mortgaged
property
to
tlon.
"TJU-holas
Kenned y to secure a balanced the purchase '" Unless the parties can agree as to the
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proper sum to be allowed for the past rents
"
■
■
- ■
and profits, a master must be appointed to as•
.—
cCTtaiatHem
±siu sustained.
Estate declared anblect In
the h ands of these leenondentB^ to the trust
H.&B.EQ.(2dEd.)— 24
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C osta for the complaina nt. Mas'
ter to be appointed at nisi prlus, lf~requlred.

i asserted.

APPLBTON,

FORTH,

and

C.

J.,

PETERS,

and WALTON, DANJJ., concurred.
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A. Quayle, for

Theodore Little,

a

It

F. Axtell and

com-

for defendant.

p

C.

plainant

tI

On final hearing on bill, answer, and proofs
taken before a master.

t

(10 Atl. 178, 43 N.

Court of Chancery

Ij. declares
ly prescribes
rule of evidence.
that the adstence of an express trust of ands
shall be proved by nothing but vyrittSi evlaence and rigorougJY Mfi'"'^f'' "" other pvi>
dence a s"a means of establishing the fact of
does no
the existence of such a trust, but
Inhibit the creation of trust of this kind by
arol.
nas accordmgiy been held that
valid express trust of land may De created"
is subsequently declared
py arol, provided
aiTd manifesteTIn the manner directed by the

McVAT.
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VAN FLEET, V. C. This suit is brought statute^
In Smith v. Howell, 11 N. J. Eq. 349, the
^to enforce an express tru'sL""ifirwr" to April
2, "ISTS," the compla inant "wa s the owner of a
trust sought to be enforced was not declared
'
by writing until more than 16 years after its
lot of land InMprristown. OiTIEat day iie
"
"coni feye'd'Yf 10 E Ts^sgtt JCSa, wBg* ontgg Same
creation, and yet the court decreed its exeaSy* conveyed h^ to tE e™complairi
cution. Chancellor AVilliamson in that case
anFs]^^wfe.
said the st atute does not require that the
Thejc^piajn]Both deeds w ere Yoiuntarr!
ant's wife continu ed to hold tE e title' u nRI trust Shan 6e created by writing, but that
shall hft_manifested
SovemDer iatt, ISSITwhen "sEe and complain^
and proved by writing .
a!ht conveyed
it to their' 'aaii^HteF' Cellg^.'lhe '"SnSTEe also held that where the integrity of
Celia, on the sa^e a trust not put in writing at the time of its
a^SScEffiT in "ffii£ suit.
flay^lindTa s part,, of fee; trangACtion by wliifih
creation, but subsequently declared by writing, was assailed, parol evidence was comshe became invested with title, made a deed
W the complainant.". Th e object of 'T£ e two petent to show whether or not it had in fact
"conveya nces was to cEange t he jEiSe'^^Tgroi
been created at the time the conveyance was
"A question
t'Ee'vriTe'" to tJie husSMd ." liTo
made.
On this point he said:
"
jras pitld tor'STOSP.' CelTa, at'
of fraud— that is, whether the trust was realtransaction, was a minor, bein^ onl^„ 19 ly created at the time of the execution of the
^ars^Cage ~Her deed, therefore, while a't instrument or deed to which the manifestaNo acts, in confirmation tion of the trust refers — is always an open
void; was Toiga.|ji^
judgment or' some other
of her deed, performed smcesne attained full
question.
Suppose
Since at lien has attached to the property in the inage^are either alleged or proved.
taining full "age," she "has. refused to execu te
terval between the execution of the deed
a deed in coniirmatlon of the one she made
and the declaration of the trust,
would be
necessary,
in order to defeat such lien, to
while a minor, but now insis't's"tli'at that defed,
'
show that the trust was bona fide created at
jay reason ''of,._heFjBmol'it;y,
rs___of "no^eBrectj
jb
'ffiat~the
the
the time of the execution of the deed. This
title
to
remains
land^jtill
_and
may, however, be done by parol evidence, beTSef,' and 'tHttt"sEe is under no duty to convey
'
cause the statute does not require that the
^rto"Tlir"t !cnapfa3lLailt . "Th e -coai t)lainant7"on
trust shaU be created, but only manifested
by writing."
The doctrine of this case was
BH^^ubJecF'to a 'trusV,''T5e"'trusT beingj9S.t
fully approved by the court of errors and apandjayffl|"JB(nfla"^6ntey'thelanajKTiim,
peals in Jamison v. Miller, 27 N. J. Eq. 586.
Ing thiuF far failed to e xecute it eSeet uajly .
Parol eviden ce was dmitted in this case to
'^ro*n^W''fSfa's^g'tydo'' so,''''ffiie'''co^^
estabilsii tne lac't that a trust bad been cr »
compel
herTo execute it.
"
parol coiitetnpoifaneougiy
with
atea
Thefe"caE'"Be'no douSFabout the fact. The
execution of the deed
circumstances attending the transfer of the
which the title was
title to the defendant render it conspicuously
made jto the trusteei
T he trust was declared; some time ubs equenF to
clear that the purpose of aUjBSESaaS-CfllifiSEacr eation, Py
ed in the
^nsactioru was_^to change, ,tfte_U tle severai_writings^ one of which was the de"The
S.,ia oMpua "Tehdant's answer. The court said:
i^ffiI3?'Ci^'!!l^!.'ISi'.'?i§]3aB^"Wfitingg
[meaning the declaration of trust]
the trust is anterior and
_ls clear, therefore, that the de fendant tooF are but evidence;
title"~su'bject "to a trust, an d th at the trusT- independent;
and the rights which the court
regards are those that spring from the crewas an"_ express one, The"onIy question
ation, not the mere proof of the trust" JTh"
which the case presents is, is the trust manrule must be consider
ifested in such manner _ttatj|SnHI!^2;;^^
val id
settled that
The ejclstparol trusT or land may be created by par ol,
eognizffil'ce'of';W''ana"enforceJt?
ence of such a trust can be prqy^d.Jt'yii PP thbut the existence of the j;rust a nnot be provmg short of _writign,.fijidence. The direction
ea~ except by "wntteh evidenced
The written
the statute .of .frauds upo n this subject
gyiaence,
owever, "may~be made long subsej^era;tive. It declares that^l declarations quenFtoTHe creatw^^oflSSrusE
and creations oftrnBtyflgnag"§Hgll"ba'
HUlaTEe "'onlTFvw'ltten evidenc
or manifes tagon
ffested and proved by some wBtitig gl'glied
of *IEe trust wSich the cnrnplaJTu^n
^na nfFerBy'the party enabled "to 'declare"the trust, or
ed in this case js that which is.containg^in
aie they shall be utterly "volTI and of no the pleadrngi^ The blTl allegea th^, the land
ilevision, 445,
eTffect.
3. TEisstaHile'mire^
In question was dbnveyed by ^e compl ajn-
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y,

a

a

tI

,

^
^

i

ant and liis wJfe to the defendant for the sole
Th defendant n ..this case sigped the affipurpose~aga with the express understanding
dav'it to h^ ans-w^er not only for ttie_purxjose
thgrthe'detendant should, immediately afte r or authenticating. tn £aiiaiy!e£ but ijgs. for the
acquiring tmerTSHVeyTrnrnTe <:omplamant . purpose of verifmng its ^gontents.
must
The defendant wife l^equirea to answei^ under
valid trust in ttLg
therefore be held that
oath, and has done so. Ry her answer she . land in qu esHTO' itiTat iSt of T3Ie" complainant
"^
says that she , has no reason to doubt
^^ nas peeiT prbved by evidence of the kind reallegation
r^
f^"
ve
TMs being so, the
quired by the statute.
of the bill.
ti^n
t^lith
Does this constitute steh evidence of tli<> ciMpiMMiit now'stan da invested~wi_th
full
tjust as to render it proper for the court to and complete estate in equity injthe^landjn^
decreeTtS fexfecution ? The toroof of the trust.
^estion. The ianflT in equity, belongs to the
in my judgment, is complete . The declara- compTaiha nt, "and" the defenda3FsimpjjTol3s
"
tion is in writing; it is signed by the trustee; the dr "n a'Ked "legal title "intinist for the
it was made after she became competent to complainaht. In_giis condition of affairs, the
declare a trust; it is verified by her oat h;
aerM[aant^gaji,p,9J|; defeat jffie com^aihant's
ngEt to a conveyance by showing that~lhe
and its terms ar e plainly stated , 'rne pr inciple_ js settled that an answer to aTbilll n' land "was conveyed to her, or to her grantor,
e quity
be sufficient, as a de claration o f Tff fraud Ton agaitors: '-€hvnes v. Ownes, 23
a'trust , to j ustify the cour j: in decreei ng its STT. Eq. 60, is decisive against the validity
Execution. Uhanceubr" Vroom, In Uutcmnson
of such
defense.
Chancellor Zabriskie in
V. Tindall, 3 N. J. Eq. 357, held that where
that case said: "I know of no case in which
a complainant flies a bill, alleging that a
a court of equity has refused to enforce a
trust, actually declared and vested, on actreed made to l!tie_de t'endaiit is subject to a
trust in "his favor, and praying IhUl It lllSiy
count of fraud in the conveyance to the trusBe~ so 'decfeefl, ""anH the~d6f endaUt TtflSWgps,
The fraud here
tee who declared the trust."
charged is against the conveyance by which
admitting"tEe~tPtts^
-the defendants answer
will constitute~sufficient evidence of the trust title was put in the wife. The defendant
t o w arrant the court in •deerettfiig" rtS ' (i!t6(.'ti- says that the complainant put the title to the
land in controversy in his wife to defraud his
tion. And TBe'"same efficacy "was given by
the court of errors and appeals to an answer
creditors.
The proof in support of this
charge is of the most meager character.
in chancery, even in case where the declaraBut
tion was volunteered, or rather was not made
suggosejt be admitted that that conveyance
in response to the bUl. Jamison v. Miller, 27 wagjfraudulent 'SS'totllg' complainant's credX. J. Bq. 586.
It is wholly unimporta nt on itors ^flhere can be no doubt that itwaa.aia5
what part of the 'SeaarattOirgf trust"i|iejfrus-" ^gffisT him, nor that"lt'"garr to ]Ki£3vife~as
tee signs his' nam eM He m ay sign it at^the
ifull_^a complet&^;!ffi!fflg(|gg;C)ver;,Jl^land,
against everybody except his creditors, as an _
Dottom, at the top, at the sia^, or iriTEe'midbxl^MfaTjaiftMng Ms honest™ coliii-syairee' would "liave'j^nT As'
^gJSS^sigtt'
^against ev erybody~except" "creditors' her title
initials. 'W jiereyer or in wha tever form h is
signature may be mag^it_ wil[ be sijfficie nt
was unimpeachable, "and she congfifljiently
plight, 'as against aU the world except^ tbfi
wjthmjhejneanliig o|.JJia.staJtl!itei. if jjbaLbe
creditors of her Jiusbandj, make a~ valid. £onr,
jfoes is done for the purpose of giving^jithgajicity t'o'^the ingteument.^ Smith v. Howell, veyance of it
trust,orj3tthffiBdse.
X ^. 349.
The complainant is entitled to
decree.
a

jn

ll

jJ.

a
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VAN FLEET, V. C. The complainant^
the wi dow of DftjiiLiL !Danserr_^Iie gg^s
toHiave a pg,rol,. trust. es(tS.h4iSfiSSL^-fi?.-^"
forced'^.gainst ]thp,, defendant. She allege s
test 'fieFhusband. some. mantbSL. Bfilom J&ia
death'," 'assi gned th e b ond and mortgage in
upon ja,_ parqi
<»iifro>eifty"^_jtlie'''3[efendant,
tfust or understanBTnl'lHaOie
wouldfoi^■WffiTor'by a'"s!^|'day, teansfer them to her.
'Jhe "transfer to^the_defe.Bflaa.t-.wasr iateaflfid
tg"De merelL.Y a'gtiijB_T.egJting iifi£. witli title .
TSe" assignment to the defendant bears date
#eBruary 1, 187§^^ap4'_Danpe?- digjT onj^g
day of the following^ Septemljg.^jrh£
l^th
bond and mortgage were in Danser^s posses'sion at the time of his3,^& and "har^ since
fBSsnrgen eorisianiiy 'inJhTpossesiion of j^e
c'SmpIaina5f."!rEe~def en^n t has neye rasl^ edTor "{Eefn, nq^iitt6MptScl t^' get ^poascs.sJoeToI ttem. "Timohth or s'ixjreeks ^rior
IcTDanser's'Seafli, the'Se^uEnt directed an
assignment to"be drawn t o the com plainant.
itffiHBg'^to the person t o whom he gave t he
direction fhafBeTSusF^raw it for Danser^
who would pay hiin. He, at the same^tlffi'^i
said if
was'r^H tMt tlfeoia^^—^gfgjying
to the comptainant-jih^id have the ^onjl
and" fflSHi^^ger Bans'erj'^a.t this time, was
5W§tra"tedTBy"the
disease which shortly afterwards catised his death. The defendant
did not remain to execute the as?ignme2f;
BuT^aid he w6uI3""return"soon and do so.
day. He wassiife
He did"BStr6ttU-B-that
seguently informed,' on two.or .tijreeJJggjSBt
occasions, while Danser wasJlYing, that .the
assignment had been drawn and was ready
fOT"executiori! ~Ou each occasion he said he
iiaJ forgotten of n^lected jD^executejt,j3ut
would call soon and do so. ISenCTer fula"ftgr
filled his pr6^^S"""Two'oFSireeweelEs
DanseTs'^eathT ^e calle d for the assignment
Danser had made to him, and which "Eelidd
left when he gave direction for the draft of
the one to the complainant, amd stated that
he meant to do. what was ngtit'abdfft'tlie
matter, but he would not execufe'tfie^lSsigirmeut'to"t'Ke'complalnant"unQl~fKiBg;^]WOTe
Danser owed hti BaT' He took both
fixed up;
'
papefi, and iias never executed the assign—
fljjmfWllin (;ompla3iMmfe
only
comprises
those
facts
This narrative

which are not disputed by either party.
The defendant denies^ that the mortgage
was"transferred to him^^ubjecf to a tru s t ,
feut says, oil the contrary, "lEiFthe'assign"ment'was made to satisfy a promissory note
"Ke held against Danser; upon which there
■"was due $2,000 of principal "and" a_yearjmd.
six or seven months' interest flis explana-

i

yj^

George O. Beekman, for complainant
Parker, for defendant.

i

Oct. Term,

1880.

s

133.)

of New Jersey.

tion of the preparation, by his direction, of
an assignment to the complainant, is this:
He says, some time after the executlM of
the assignment to Tiin^- 1ib ascertai ned t Hat
tne person who m ade the mortgage h adTio
■ffffe on record for the mortgaged premise^
that htS wenr-at ouets to Uans'er, ana-tcrtdfiim Le~Ea;a "gwit rmggTBtfflTgS gTBarirBe'aia
not take the mortgage back"Se wou ld maEe
"
Mm. He says tli ainDans er replied that the
"imortga gor's title was all right, but If he w as
3is"satisfied he would pay him his dept, or
give him another securltyTandTie^ could then
i?eas^gn"the mortgag e. Melurther says that
H was'ultimateiy arranged tha t Uans'ef
should have two mortgages, which "w ere then
Itemrtl srTns" lands, canceled, and execute "a
hiortgage thereon to him,' and Jie was fEeS"
iC5 a^lgU'tgFitoortga ge'lircontroversy
to the
ctnnplamant. He say s it w as after this
SCh'yuielrajfl'' been agreea upon that he orfleF"
•
SO tliu aKS lgntnent to the com piaman T to be
<irawn „_
These sta tements p resent the question of
facT to D'e^eg iagar''Tne counsel of the
a^ "
f endant, however, insists "tfiat, as a matter
of law, the bill in this"Ta§S riTust b e dismis sea, regardless of~what th6 eviaence demon strates the tr uth to be in respect to the tniat
alleged, "^s contention being thatj;iie..to!§t
seT "up by the complainant ts"one which cannot "jbe established except by wriSSlesk
aen^j„ .The trust, it wUl be obse rved, affects
personal property, ana not~ gnds. Tlie subject of Ug_a.^.bt. That part "of the statute"'
pi fraudsw hich'enactsthat alOeclaraTioM"
and crea£ioHS"of"trusf shall be taanifested
slgHedTBy the party creating
b'y~WMtffig'ahd
the-ggme , or else- shall -be void and xif~no
ekect, applies only to trusts of lands, and
Hhs no application to trusts of personal propvalid trust of perso Salty may be
J^r--:£
created ve rbally, ^and^proyed by parol evi*ciencg, A trust of Pj'rsonat' nr operty. aln^os t
precisely^ike ihie "one under consideration,
aaa wMcff Had been "created by m«reji90kan
"
words, "and was su^piSHga"l5yTsnly-parol
evidence, was upheld by ChancellS?"WlMiaaigon In Hooper v. Holmes, 11 N. J. Eq. 122;
also Kimball v. Morton, 5 N. J. Eq. 26; Sayre
V. Fredericks,
16 N. J. Eq. 205; Baton v.
Cook, 25 N. J. Eq. 55; 2 Story, Eq. Jur.
§972; 1 Perry, Trusts, § 86. A valid trust
of a mortgage debt may be createETby patQli
for, tlioug h a trust thus created cannot em firace the la nd h eld in pledge, yet It is good
as to the dibt, ana win entitle tfleT ^ui
que trust to"~suffleT ^t of the proce"eds of
sale, wBeh the landls 'ronverted into mone
to pay the debt Sayre" v. Fredericks, supra;
BenboW V. Tftwnsend,
Mylne
K. 506;
CMlds V. Jordan, 106 Mass. 321.
It must be held, th en, that the, tru st alleged iiT this "case is valid, and if iFTias
been sufficiently "pfove'c
the complainant
mtRIea" to Fave
est^lis hed and enforced.
Tjtie question "then Is, lia sTt been prove y~I
high degree of eviffeirce should be required.
d

J.

Eq.

&

N.

WARWICK.

1

(33
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view as he describes took place, The tergiversation of the defendant upon this point
renders his testimony unworthy of credit.
I find it impossible to believe him.
"It must also be remarked that the (defendant's conduc iiuxelatioja. to JJg.cftgJody ot
by
as porga^^^
3MJt!md..-and-JlflIlgaS£>.
himself, shows verv-cle ajly that ^, Jidjaot
belieye^jthey _ were Jds^ proggjjty. He says
the bond and mortgage werejleliyered to
him, with theassignment, on the .^^;__^^jhe
date of tEe assignment, and thaT^M^Jcpk
tSem^to .a. h otel, in "which he and Danser
were Jointly Inter ested, and which was un"
9er the ma nagem ent "of Danser,^ and threw
testlmon.Y^
By his answer, which is under oath, he thga-in a deslLin ihe bar-ropm. He retainsays that after h e. seet ,Sig_a^ignmentto edJheassigflKient.
He ga ve them no furthe r
Ocean_£ajiiit3j. foe record, Jie w as informed care or attention, but'carried' the a^gnment
that the mortgag or had no' titl e on' record f or ^tSTiis TTouS^ahd "placed Tf in ^s safer"2[g^
the mortgaged p remises, ancTThat ne went does not know when or how Danser got BBSat once to see iJanser, and thalran: 'ai i aiig u- ' Session j)f the bond and' mortgage.
So far as
appears) he lias never tried to find out. Danment was~tEen made by which Oanser'was
either to itay his deht"6r substitute another ser did not live in the hotel, but occupied a
securityi' arid he was then to reasslgti "the dwelling in the village where the hotel was
mortgag e. His assignmeht was not IbagSd located. The defendant says, that while
for record u ntil October~23r' 1875. Daiiser Danser was sick, on the occasion of his last
had tuen 'B55ii~di6ara' mofe'lMaii a month, bo visit to him, Danser told the complainant to
ihat the~ ^TMgement7 at "tie' time^TtaiFSd, get the bond and mortgage and give them
"When the to him, but that she refused to do so, and,
^a s unqu estionably 'a'fabrica'tron'.
defendanf came to testifyTEe swore that, be- to repeat his own words, "she was just as
fore he lodged his assignment for record.Jje cross to me as she could be." He did not
ask Danser why he had taken them from
had_ heard . from one George P . Conoy er, tliat
t he mortgag o£_^aji.,n9 Jitle^ and he went at the desk, nor did he insist upon their beon ce to s ee Danser. But it is perfecQy cKSr; ing at once surrendered. He never a sked '
from the evidence, tharX3onover~couia' hot *<ffi.J??epi. after Danser'a,xtfiat Er nofata he
have"glveH' tBis"information.,untirTo' BgTtfter
of
makean2^jitteH*»t_ta..fl]3taia.,:E.O.gSgasifliu,
DahsePs death; for he_did_not have'it hlm- tBem; liivery phase of" his conduct evinces
seIir~C!S5over obtained his information from a eonsaousn^si;. that he""had "no" right
the mortgagSSi; and the mortgagor swears ffiem, and that any attempt to take^tJieiP
from the .^oggggsloa, of .fee _ complainant
he first obtained it from a search made
that^
in Decem ber,"IStC. The defendant was sub- would be met by a resistan cewhiclTte knew Sequently recalled and re-examined, against ^as grormded_m_jEagldt.Ag4Ja^
TSe evi the complainant's objection, and without an aSnce, in my._aBMfln.-fi]ILv. _establishes t H^
order for that purpose, and then swore th at trust'lilleg'ed.
one Edward P. Jacobus first {nformea ni m ^"^'e defendant also insists that_ the Jrust
that the mortgagor had no title , and tha t uj)pn which the complainant's
action ig
tEHlnfo Matlon was giv en t6""Eim" vftry """" founded should not ^e enJsEped, )?ecausfi \% ,,
after the assignment was made to him, gjit, was concoc'tea'to cEeat and defraud Dannp5H'~the examlna tioh of Jaco bus, it was "§gr's creditors. It is enough to say of this
ghOWh that the ij63jch from whicff'Be' oESin^ contention that nd" such^defgage Js. preseSnot maSeTinHl after eifTjj^thr ffl§werj_;and jtia.L the complaJa.e"cl his inf Ormationwas
Danser had' been" dead more th an "a month. anf^ Tight to a decree, cannot _be defeated
6y a def ehce'she Tias"had no" opportunity to
So irTB-pSFfectry cleai: that the information
which the defendant says led to his inter- meet and dlsprpye. „,
Ther e„mu st_ be_ a decree esta blishing th^
view with Danser did not come to him rftitil
after Danser was dead, and the conclusion t rusCand rggjiiriTi^ thp rlpfqu dant to m The defendant must pay costs.
Is therefore unavoidable that no such inter- ejjutejt
Before_the court I ngrafts a trust upon a
written instrument, ~aDsoiute "oh its tSX^, it
should requu:e the most cogfeg _
Such
___.
proof. T t hink, has b een furh"isEe5 in this
'
mSeT '^^r undisputed '?ac"tB~mali:e~a" strong"
case against the defendant. He attempts to
explain and moderate the force of the one
having the greatest weight.
refer, of course,
to the fact that he had an assignment drawn
to the complainant, and that when he gave
the order he said it was right that she should
have the bond and mortgage. H^. attempted
explanatio n has, howeveri.resi! ilted in a series
of__ct)ntra7TTpi;ujnj_w hich utterly destroy h is
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dower an d mesne pr ofp le'a d<id a pi'OVisioii'by win

Action to recover

itsTT Jetendtot
\,o

In UeiT' of dowefTand failure of tne wido w
elect There was a judgment for piatntiff, from wliich defendant appealed.

TRUSTS.
them, with full power and authority to rent
lease, repair and Insure any portion of the
estate during anv nerlod of time the mmf.
faay rem ain unsoLd-jor nndivided."
In Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y. 561, the
testator devised and bequeathed all of his
estate, real and personal,
to trustees;
the
real estate upon trust to sell after the death
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of his wife. The will provided that during
her life, the widow should "receive and take
for appellant
Charles
to her own use one-third part of the clear
T. W. Dwight,
yearly rents and profits of the real estate,
Tracy, for respondent
and that the residue of the clear yearly rents
DAVIS, J. The testator not having de- and profits should be deemed a part of the
'' personal estate, and subject to the disposiclared in expre ss terms that tne''proVlB10nB
'
tions of the will concerning the personal esmaae Tiy his''w ri'fo" his "widow ar given in
tate."
lieu of dower, she is not nnt to pr oTssfrfi"
The entire estate, with all its income, exunless ine_ .aaiz:isfis of the w ill "hg gn rt^nn^cept
the one-third of the rents and profits
nant to he clai m of dower, that the .Y-caniiot
of the land, was given (through the trusts)
N. Y.
stand togel EiEl! Lewis v. Smith,
to the testator's children and the children of
Denio, 430; Jackson
502; Church" V. Bull,
his daughters.
It was held that a claim of
v. Churchill,
Cow. 287; Savage v. Burndower could not stand consistently with
liam, 17 N. Y. 562. This rule is a familiar
these provisions, and that the widow was
nne, and needs no further citation of authorput to her election.
ity.
Upon the authority of that case. If the
In this case the provisions made by the
In /|iioBHn|^ nr qa,tes a trust and veata tha
■nrii]
will and codicil for the widow are as follegal estate in the trustees, the prolows: 1. The will gives her all the hous e- entire
vision
made for the widow is inconsistent
every
je
welry'
"
hold fur niture an
oJ
kind_ln
^th the right of dower, and'she w as bound '
to eiect,
n that case ner claim or dower,
oTeS rOn^aSFa' "y-fflg-net Income of all
if allowed! would inevitably defeat BEe
he real esfate )belonefing to the testator.
'
scheme
mut Will, fur
would urevti nrtBe
lter''payment of all taxes, assessments and
holding
gal title of the"
trustees from
interiest due, thereon, to commence to be paud
the_ le
whole estate, and receivin|r the entire ents
moa
-ffflia the testa ox . .ja fe ana
pronts for the purpose of paying
and to be paid to her every six month
eease^
jtssessments,
interest, repairs and inanmTipp^
Qiereafier. during her iird i'he codicil adds .
net income, of which
"a suitaPJe provision m money." "to bft na.i(i
'Itje paid to the widow, and the
one-third
'is"
to
nrlng
the flrst six months, till the
to ner^
resiaurtntmrgreiy ,to.,the other benehciaries.
payment of her provisions under the will
The first question then ia. aj-p tho ypcusnail commen ce," aiid the u se-jiluring her
torSjjindCT this vdU, made trustees of an exnkturai me.
the apartments In the house
press trust
The'~worT~''trust^'
or "trustee"'
t?o.
15 Fourth-Street. -New York, as occuIs not used in the will, but that is only
pied by her and he rjiji band. as a fisidence
circumstance to be noted in considering the
at llie date "of'Tihe cod icil,^ with the election
question.
"It is by no m eans necessary tha
any
TEaYe siiclS ^CT"sui^ble "residence in
the donee sflOPld be^expressly directed to
her . house ..he^^B ng to him at i:he' time
noig tne property; to certain uses or iii 'UHl,
of
his, decease that she*m ll6f prefer.
"
•
or as a trus tee.
is one of the fixmaking these provisions the will dis ^Xfter
ed rules of equitable construction, that there
poses of all the "rest, residue and remainder
directing in substance that is no magic in particular words; and any exOf the estate,"
pressions that show unequivocally +^ft jntonit be ivided equally among his surviving
of the parties to create a trust will hav
jion
of~ETs~geceased
children ana txi'e childr en
any there shouTT e," gl::^' mpnths ■ that eiteot it was said by Lord Eldon, that
Children,
~'^"
ffie"w'fffa 'trusl^ not being made use of, is a
after the death of is widow.
circumstance to be alluded to, but nothing
The will thennomihat^ executors,
and
more; and if the whole frame of the will
clothes them "with full power an authority
•
to carry out all the rovisions 61! tlie Will,"" creates a trust, the law is the same though
the word 'trusf is not used." Hill, Trustees
they deeih
and
nect^isary lit gW^fei' to" a
fail aivlHlou~t!fllU; property among the'par(3d Am. Ed.) 99; (Grig. Ed. 65) and cases
ties entitled therefo, to~giell~elther at-jj^lltr there dted.
We are in this case to determine the quesand realjestete,
OTTTrtr aitg-^alg-tlig-TiersoBar
or any portion thereof, and execute deeds
tion by the authority conferred and the dutTiereof, and to divide the proceeds ag Tlhere ties Imposed.
The executor
are ci"thp<1
j^elofe directed; but no sale to bejoaae "with fun power and authority to ren^, leaseT
till six months subsequeat to the death of jepair and insure" the estate "diuring any
the Testator and his wife. It also clothes
the time
shall rema^ unsold
^period
the xecutors, "t he "survivbr or survivors of
atlU
limlTv ided. "
That period is, at all
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trustees take the legal estate whenever they
are clothed with the authority which the
foregoing construction of the will gives to
the executors in this case.
"If land be devised to three persons and
their heirs in trust to permit A. to receive
the net profits for her life for her own use,
and after her death to permit B. to receive
has been
the net profits for her life, ete.,
held that the legal estate is in the trustees,
for that they are to receive the rents and
thereout pay the land tax and other charges
on the estate, and hand over the net rents
only to the tenant for life." Lewin, Trusts,
248; Baker v. Greenwood,
Mees.
W. 421;
' White V. Parker,
Bing. N. O. 573.
In White v. Parker, the trustees were to
permit the testator's wife and daughters to
receive the clear rents of three parts and his
son the clear rent of one part— the trustees
to pay all outgoings,
to repair and let the
premises.
It was held that the legal estate
In the note to
vested in the trustees.
Wms. Saund. 11, the rule is thus laid down:
"Where something Is to be done by the trus"tees which makes it necessary for them to
have the legal estate, such as payment of
the rents and profits to another's separate
use, or of the debts of the testator, or to pay
rates and taxes, and keep the premises in
repair, the legal estate is vested in them,
and the grantee has only a trust estate."
In Birmingham v. Kerivan,
Schoales &
li. 444, Lord Redesdale said that a direction
to keep a house in repair applied to the
whole house, and could not be considered
an obligation on a person claiming dower.
When therefore the testator authorized his
executors to repair, he did not expect that
they would control two-thirds of the estate
and the widow one-third, but that they would
manage the entire property.
The authcBdJx-to-xent and lease, to repair
a^'to insure, by necessary jmglicaUon vests
jUie truste^ with jH^je gal title . They must
nof'only* execute leases^ but "enforce them,
put in tenants and dispossess them, the proper performance of which requires, the title
of the, estate. So to repair there must be
such a right of entry and control in the truspnmplpte fiomin ion: and
tees as gives then
essity of ownership,
2S.iIlSl— -JTL^^H'y'^^^'^ n^^
for the policy mus be ^aJien in the name j^
tBe~trustegaL.lBut to repair and to insure
necessarily involve expenses chargeable upon the rents and profits; and an executor
who is authorized to lease, repair and insure
by necessary implication may so lease that
rents will come to his hands out of which
to pay repairs and insurance, and if
net
income is to be paid out of such rents, the
executor becomes the party whose duty
to ascertain and pay it In Leggett v. Perkins,
N. y. 297, the testator constituted his executors trustees of the estate devised to his
daughters for life, and authorized them to
take charge of, manage and improve the
same, and pay over to them from time to
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six months after the
^ hey are also In
general language clotBed "with full power
and authST l ty to egrr y out ai l tflfe lE)roTision 8
"of tnis wuL" 11 iS-a.DDax6ht tiia,tJihiRj^net
income of all the real ^tate" is to be a&<xx tained by.s ome person or person s onc6 in six
months during the life of thewragwr''*a#t«
all taxes, assesjmen@"ia.nd mterest que tnCT g"
"■yn ni-q naifj
Og g-tniiyof this net incom e
^ to be paid to tne wido w. Jjy whom Is
this d ut y to be perform ed^ It linearly Impractlcable for'T lFe .va finmR f a5S"<Sr he
.estate to perform, it: neither ollectively nor
indlvldnally
_haYe they the means of determining the facts upon which the aetTgggmeis ascertained, "anff It would be extremely
"enib al'faabiliia ao CO tt'tmni itiaiSW iSal ach
tenant snoma pe suDject to pay to the wiaow
ag~amoun
o? ius rent that shgtllJ dltiL'haxge
the propOTtToS his rent bore to tne n et "inco me ot the WhOie eatate. after payment ~of
all taxes, assessments and interest due on the
sTioIe.. C61iaiag "'TiTg'|gyfgpT"to"rpiyrnfax£
rppair, anfi jp ^ure. With the duty that rests
ahd
^omewhere to pay all taxes, assessment
inte rest, and men to pay to the wid ow onemrd of the net incoine arter suc payment,
here seems 'tcTTie n embarrassment in determimn
wh ere the duty rests,
lalssy
apparent ffiatlffiasciEiT nft t^f this
mind
.win requires that the whole inoome. rents
and profits of the real estate, shall" Ee received p tj&e executors until the sale and
division provraea for; an tnat tney are he
pay one-tn ird
gersons onj^om /ISe'giitY
flf the net incpme-tajjie -Wido w Is imposed .
They are to make the ultimate division, and
consequently to retain for that purpose the
income not paid semi-annually to the widow.
The rents and profits of all the real estate
are given to them for several purposes:
1.
To keep down taxes, assessments and interest by paying them; 2. To ascertain the "net
income" by deducting from the gross receipts the amount paid for those purposes;
3. To pay one-third of the net income thus
ascertained to the widow every six months;
4. To repair and insure the premises out off
the residue; and 5. To retain the balance!
for division, and finally divide it among the
daughters or their children after the decease
of the widow. The im position ofJ jj^ej aJiojis_duties by the wfll make the acting executors triastgesTor their' perfprma.nr.e in the
same extent as thongh declared to be so by
the mss&^sl^ai,.Jaaena^i The authority
"to-seiT'the real estate and execute deeds
thereof, as given by the will, standing by
itself, would confer nothing but a power;
but coupled as it Is with the various provisions for leasing, repairing and insuring,
with the obligation to give to the widow a
residence as she may elect in any of the
goes far to show
houses of the testator,
that it was the testator's intention to vest
But
the fee of the estate in the trustees.
is well settled that
however that may be,
evOTja^^ to

^deceas e
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time the rents, interest and Income thereof.
tate, with all its income, except the one-third,
It was held to be "very obvious that the !»■ is given in the clearest possible terms, to the
gal estate In the premises was necessary to
testator's children and the children of his
daughters. It is therefore impossible for her
enable the trustees to discharge theta: duties," and that the trust was a valid one
to receive any part of It, except what is e^under the third subdivision of section 55 of pressly given to her, without subverting the
the statutes of uses and trusts (1 Rev. St.
will to that extent."'
729), and that by section 60 of the same statThe circuit judge erred In directing a verute, the whole estate in law and equity vestdict for plaintiff.
ed in the trustees.
have considered
t he qn es tipn " as to th e
In Brewster v. Striker, 2 N. Y. 19, the tes- effecF og~tTie atTegeBr rele ase of dowe r. In
tator devised his real estate to his grand- 'my opTnTdn," ttS'lnsffumenf was riy^ fJpaig riwT—
for any" such purpose as a r elease of dower ,
cluldren, and then provided that the lands
and "ougM" riot"to"Fe so con strued.
should not be sold or alienated, but ttiat his
I ts object's af e'apparent' on Tts facef to-wit, to disexecutors should lease or rent the same and
pay the rents, issues and profits to his said '_^se of" the vexed question ^^ te^'^^Tlgpt s
grandchildren, etc.; it was held that the
mder tfie_5ro.Y?^§^^
J&?_.2yi directing
moneys tobe" paid_ toJiOTjtoF¥er_jul^ie
executors were trustees for the purposes of
support' ffieT!^"six mont^taZaa "protecting
the wiU, and tooli, by implication, the legal
the executors
on paying her a sum which
estate during the lives of the grandchildren.
might pro ve larger tha n was designed bv th«»
These authorities are conceived
to be
abundant to establish the proposition that
surrogye's decree." ajQdl the_instrument oug ht
the authority to lease, rent, repair. Insure, toT bie consfirSed accordingly.
I am not emBarrassed by the question of
pay taxes, assessments and interest, and pay
parties, nor the form of the judgment. The
net income to devisees, carried the legal title
Code authorizes all persons having conflictto the executors in this case, and created a
ing claims to be made pal^;ies.
trust in thenj valid under the statute.
Code, § 118.
It follows therefore from the decision of The defendants who appeared and answered,
this court in Savage v. Burnham, that a admitted the receipt of the rents and profits
as alleged In the complaint, putting nothing
claim of dower is totally inconsistent with
but the amount In Issue. They are the heirs
the provisions of the will, and the plaintifC
at law, and the statute authorizes the verwas not at liberty to take both the providict for rents and profits against them.
sions of the will and dower.
The judgment below should be reversed,
In the language of Comstock, J., in the
case cited: "During
her life she was to and new trial ordered, costs to abide event
All the judges concurring, the judgment
have one-third of the clear rent and profits,
was reversed and a new trial ordered.
and the other two-thirds were to go Into a
Judgment reversed.
general fund for distribution.
The entire es-
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nance;~affd""ffianhe lefta will of_which
shg
^ated th e"fgpon^ Br^te executor, and

"

"f

g

t

and neg^Ee'd arid~fSiSefftogi^
M m the saiy_^M teSts'ahd'"'pnvi!egt^^
or "ihake Tiim~°My
h^^3^fSi?^^PJ°,yg'^r'
'
'
reasonable compen saTt'lon instead iKferSSff
a

6

y

a

counting
ever afterwards was
clerk in
toom in B oston; that: up" to TBTtiffir of "Els
had never exceedmot.iier's"deatE''B is"sarar
ed S400 per annum, which "fac1t"~^sh "tyeO
,
"'
-'
"
'
-"
-"
knew; that in 1858. 1859 and -n
was_ at
tha rate, but from 860 to 1864 did not in
any year ex(;ee"d"$2(K)T 'Sat from "i8 64'u ^S'
Trne niiri^ of t"KinBi]r it ^was at the rate of
■^Pje^;;^^|g£-tHat -artKe'time of his exclusion from "the houSS'lh 18 83'ttr'had"saved.:««
Tom Ibis salary of >reviou8 years oiily $250;
that yea'r,^ In order
t£at af terwa.rds.i_d'uiing
toobtaln" means for Hs si^porT, 'he sold for
^00 jjis'revaKioh of aoine Itmd belongin to
ege_.two sums
his mot.he£a..fistote.;^.Jh8J;_tt

'

^it

1

g[_

-

jn ^Tnto

j

Thereto: that thereafter, until her '3eaffi"on'
May 17, I859 ,~she'^a "the respohdent,*wTEE"
these ~cHn 3raltpang "with another daughter,
thejssue of this' mairiage, lived together as
one Jamily inJh er~irotise. where she and her
chlldr gn had formerly resi ded; that the ex gen&M of "maihtaiiilng the family iB'a liber al
style suitable to their circu mstances w ere
"defrayed
chiefly'fWCT;3T Sg'7income of Ber
"
pi'Opait yp-the 'respondent having b ut little
prop el!ty-of--iii8"0Vv'Ii;''1S'tfraetins ' as tEeT^d
"
e ramu; ^.I M^gteg the general care thereof, and m anaging the'^ranfla for i^'^ ^pqintiv

from the respondent, without payment or charge therefor, the benefits and
privifeles which' "children of their'conciition
Hsua ffy^eceive ln heir own ^fllies, until,
on or about Agrll_!C,"186S, jffie^espondent, jo.
ttg^^mplainant's absencei^rfflmovecL,tte complainant's effects from the house, and ever
s!^e "forbade and prevented hlHTTf iHTcoihto receive

t,

" "• "*

iJaai4-tAXegl%.in.theJouseMlbefore,;and

•

— -

—
herTm ltr^
The-blU alle ged that on December 12. 1833.
the deceased^ being a widow, having a"
d«"frM gr and two so ns, ot whom tne com
plainant was one, and ownin g property to
the amonnt of mofe th^^TOOiHiJttJKas marTied to the responden^and her property secured by a setflem^t from any marltaTHgfit

lM:i

o

f

274.)

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Nov.. 1867.

Bill in equity filed September 4, 1865, ^y
a 'son of Sarah _I.,Bates, deceased, seekin g
jor a deCT ee to enforce" penEomianee by the
responde nt, Ms stepfather, of a ti?ti§tT!refft!6d
-•gy

death of the testatrix, the respondent under
.the clause of thg will first above
uoted.
the estate remafning after
took possession
payment of the debts; Jhat^he'compfainant
Dther and ujmareied sister con-'
.with. .his

i

(98 Mass.
Supreme
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nr-pmffTTfhprp wag a larg^ iggnFTTTa
"
^'
alLJIjJa.
aFC^ naying her debts.
'^agetterwithjbis. ga}ary,
"rmrmtrvSr^rmrtb m the bUl; bore mean^ of support^ except such provision
date of December 30. 1857; was indorsed
with the approval of the respondent under are wholly inadeqiiate thereto; thai he stood
date of October 1, 1858; was amended by a ^"heed"o3f' such sup port as he hadT been accustomed
receivelSnmTn-OttBf^rti miffl^
codicil dated April 14, 1859. in particulars
not needful to be recited; and disposed of 'XridTESOEe respondent, though wej"aware
therefor, refusthe estate during the respondent's life as fol- tBSSresrr^nd'offen'Trequested
lows:
"I give and-^bequeatb unto my husband,
Geo^ Bates aforiaia1d7ia:e'''Bg!gnncome'^n d and"Tliy liUMU WttS I'eseTvea ^ CEapinaBrJ.,
fulTcourE:
fd rthe considerattMnrfB
i mprovem^ m Of alT'the estate, real, 'personal
G^"(jr'S?fiafflck and J. B. Thayer, for comaS'd mixea ," ^r Wmch'TsEairgrf'Sgiggfand
possesse d, for and , guifng'l'^'Terni., jj^I^s
plainant. E. D. Sohier and C. A. Welch, for
natural life, in the full confidence that upon respondent.
my decease he will, _ as he has heretofor e
BIGELOW, O. J. We see no sufficient
5one, continue to glvfi and afford my chilground for calling in question the wisdom
dren" (enumerating tnem I "sueh nrotectinn .
j^mfort and support as they or either o^ or policy of the rule of construction uniformly applied to wills In the courts in Engthem may..ata Tid in nftftd-of Ji:
land and in most of the United States, that
Upon t he death of the respondent, It gave
recom me ndation or wish,
on^Tial fr^ the_.estate.to2t]lfc.,riOTP,nto\P?^ words of entreat;
ana his br other; and the _otlierha.lf to three
t^^>""^Tir"makeMm,,jjJEjjgtee]^?2^ji^S
persons
designated by, maftg, "4ei.Ja.the
Ijirrttors or'survivor "<* tbfTB. .ihlfav "'• hig ^^persQns3i" wJSose favor such... expxessiaaa.
are used, pro vidgfl„the-tes.ta.teft.rbaB~poini;ed
executors, administrators or assigns, to havy
ouF with "cleaim
and ce aint the, objecta
and to hold the; . ,B^me upon lind for the'i ises.
frnsts a n fl mim ose s mentioned and expresse d ^theJcus^^^dffiesubject-mattCT^^
islo attach oFftwm which it is to arise
of and- concerninj^ the' same, an then, jet
jorth TTi flfitgiv ;^^;f^rn.tr usts for the ben efiF andlSe'a'dmini^efearT'^nSe criticisms which
liave"Beeh sometimes applied to this rule by
of the tv yo daughter s.
alleged that, after the textwi-iters and In Judicial opinions vrlU be
The"1bTll furthe
found to rest mainly on its applications in
particular cases, and not to involve
Argued November, 186&
doubt
an"esBiT«»
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The nature and extaat of the trust .ISl clearly
of the rule Itself as a
correctness
stated and defined . It was such a siim~nf
sound principle of construction. Indeed, we
money as might be necessary to the comfort
cannot understand the force or validity of
and support of each one of the children of
the objections urged against it, if care Is
taken to keep it in subordination to the pri- -tne testat rix. JNor Is the amount nf thp ^na.
,nr withnnt
ficlal hiterest_lgfjL.tedelTiTlitP
mary and cardinal rule that gie intent. of the
a.
testator Is to govern, and to apply it only
Standard by .jeM-ciJijcan he .iaeasui£iL_lLi§
'wKSfe'the creation of a trust will clearly to_ b^. such_comfort.jai. sunn ort "^fi thev m
either of them may stand ih n eed of." The
subserve that intent. It may sometimes be
difficult to gather that intent, and there is gglgPtjog. such-a-Denenciai.. mt(ir6St canTe
ascertained
and enf orced by suitable pro always a tendency to construe words as
quity. , Thorp
obligatory in furtherance of a result which
teeamm'^&mef^ans:^: 01 m e
610;. Sanderson's
yr"Owen,
2 "Hare, 607,
accords with a plain moral duty on the part
of a devisee or legatee, and with what it Trust, 3 Kay & J. 497-507; Parwell v. Jacobs, 4 Mass. 634.
In the last case. It was
may be supposed the testator would do if he
held by this court that an action at law
could control his action. But difficulties of
would lie against an executor who was dithis nature, which are inherent in the subject-matter, can always be readily overcome
rected by the testator to furnish support to
in whose behalf the suit was
a person
by bearing in mind and rigidly applying In
brought.
But In the present case the. . phrase
all such cases the test, that |o create a trust
"
it, must clearly appear that the testatorTF* "comfort and support'' Is made moreSeflnite
by
express
reference In the
an
landed to govern ana controlTffiS^SSSsS ^^ and certain
ftt8-^n^--t5~wiiom'TOrT asguagrorthrwii i terms of the g ift to thfi._ c.oiitinuance of a
previously existing state of things in the fam iTajTOfeggearsflr'ma'iSor^s^Trasan^lusTBand. Sn whi^ii
pSfgggtp'or Indication of thafWBlca:;ffi r|es- Hy of' W't'ggiatMx-gaa'h
•
tator thougHt woulh be a reasonable esCT; ttteTcEildren of 'TEe'lormer had resided and
ydisCTeHSn whic hTie in tende.d..to jeNor is it
received support iinrinp; ^^r life.
cise^oF
objects to be overlooked tliat the iaT^f>ngp;e acaressea
pose in the leg atee ^or deyiage.'l iy
at tbe siip^^ed jrugL. a^^e-GerStSrand-^eiF- t o the respondent in the clause of the vrill
Inite; iftlie^proper^Mtowhich it is to attach
under consideration is no t coniine (? tn w/iri^T
is'^fe'SHr ■^tilCtecToufrirtlie' felaSons jad expressive or a wisn or. recomm endation, o nly.
'
^ftwanbff gf •tH rtegtatgr"t[gg^ge •"suropsed
hut the property i s given to tiie r espondent
"jTi thp"iull confidence"
that he" vrill affo rd
eStuis flue U'UBLyiTt" are "sucn j^t9_^gl|caTe
ttepart of to the child ren of the testatrix„ ,acL^qu fite suna"itraaf"rfiterest'atia'"ffio!ivron
tfieteSmSTTii -ffiSEnrffiem^af^SCTF of fils jg^J~STffiougE~these words would not necbtmmyrTilir'atSSfr'air "ir th'e'recbmmenda- essarily create a trust in a case where a different Intent is clearly indicated, they are *"
toryToTj^i'e'cataty clause I s 86 '»'fteg Ma_as to
strong and significant to snow
nevertheless
wa^anf "ffie^lnfeferice' th at it was^esiffled
that'suct' was 'the i)urposrt(f-tK|1gsSffl2r
to''Be pei'empfory on tlie dbiiee.^^Rie'just and
'
TegsonawrTHterpfeffftttm-i-s," thar^atriKt-is
wtfs!rtaKg
n;''^nfleetCT "wiy^ffier "tacts
rgafe
which is oBliga|or£' and3ia, be' enand circumstances
whicfihave a like tendc
forcecnft" equity" "SI" against the trustee Jjy ency.— WnpT v.' I'tkins, IT-TEST 255, 258,
those in'whose befialf the beneficial ^fi^ of
St)l! Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 542, 556.
Jarm. Wills, 333;
tfie"gift was Intended."
We think it also worthy of remark In that
T'ftedf. Wills, § IT, els. 11-13; Id. § 43; 2 connection that it is not left to the respondv.
Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1068-1070; Malim
ent to determine the amount or extent of the
Keighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 383, 529; Bernard v.
support which he was to afford to the chilMinshuU, Johns. Eng. Ch. 287; Williams v.
dren.
The^gif t to him is n ot in the confi Williams, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 358; Bonser v. Kin- dence that he will P'ivp'thpm s^i;ipj:\xi TOPOrt as
near, 2 GifC. 195; Knight v. Boughton, 11
hg m ay think proper, or as in his ludgment
tSey n iay need.'but' to such an extent as they
Clark & F. 513, 551; Harrison v. Harrison's
Adm'x, 2 Grat. 1; Coate's Appeal, 2 Pa. 129; BBainr"raar-''StaHaTn
I t was tn
Jne e^^^
McKonkey's Appeal, 13 Pa. 253; Erickson v.
be meas ur ed, n ot by tEe ^xercise,jof his discreWillard, 1 N. H. 217; Van Amee v. Jackson,
tion in the inafierTtrtft'" by Ine actual wants
"-^
35 Vt. 173.
The doctrine was recognized as
or^ESTcEIffien.
an established
rule of construction by this
The view which we have taken of the c oncourt in Whipple v. Adams, 1 Mete. 444, and
stru'ction of the clause of the vyil fby which
Homer v. Shelton, 2 Mete. 194, 206.
tK| properly of the testaSSlg givra tojffie
Jurning now to the clause of the will respondent for his life' Is' greatly 'fGri SSthene d
•v^ich islhe subject of the present eontM^er'take Into con siderat ion the relation s
w'Eien7W'£
sy, it seems to us that it does not leave ^iie
of all the parties toward eJch other, the na s'lSpport of the children of the testatrix to th«
ture^anyconditlon 'of TJie l^operty which was
discretion Of the- responaentrt(r be afforded
tfie"~subjecf "of tiie'gff^ and the ultim ate dis^
or withheld at his pleasure,'1)ut
positloir" WBTCh was- made "SOr^nffie^nr
"thatjthe devise to him was made on the trust
th^ he after the death of the respondent TTje obJtould fuMlsh sticli support so long as _he jectiS" for whose comfort and 'sujjini-t tlip teslived and received the mcome of her property,
tatnx was aiifl!^ to^pr'&'vige ^ere her__ own
ISe objects of the trust are distinctly named. childiin," tiSf ee of jienS* by "sTforme^ husBSid,
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f'a testatni wBrintg Mea-term'rect

conduct otECT "husband In
whi ch the right to give directions
cohti'br "belonged 4o~Jber. lii such^a

C'0'ilt r01"tll'fe

a

alia

o

tEe'will

tBSttCT"m

^g"

tjo

r

case, the wnri^iji iised. by.
are applic at
to another who is independent

,
p)^

a

is

a

a

of him, there
is nothing imperative; but if he recommends
person whom he has
that to be done by
only civilright to order to do it, the mode
ity." Malim v. Keighley, ubi supra.
careful consideration
of the case,
After

a

,

n favor of the coni fi,ina gt^ yhich it la our
as
court■"""■"■
of equity, to enforce.
d^ty, siton
^~**- ^^
TPHUrHti klicordirigiy,"'
g

f}

p

li^

t

er daughters for their-Efispectisfe. shares of
enher- estate. of which they areJaJtofiJ&s
re income after the d^th of her_hiKiband,
she" does not use words of entreaty, request
anff1recoiD5mS53alion,_jKF apt and technical
w^s by which to estsibliSbua jKiM-.m ..their
bej^lf. But w think this sugg estion .i§_not
entitled to muchlat fiialatl ^Ee migJitweU exdifferent language when
press herself in
addressing her husband from that which she
would use toward strangers, and at the same
Words of consimilar result.
time intend
fidence, entreaty
and recomm end ation were
natural and appropriate when "used to express

i

and one by the rt^ ^joTifiPTit.
T hev had alw ays lived in the family of the testatri x and
her nusband, and received all needfuT sup—
port as members the reof:
no pr opTW^~fSSa.
erty of their ownr"an"3. If taey were dfejU 'lVed after her death during tne me of the r espondent of all benefit o f the estate of their
mother, trom whien me s upport of the fami lr
ha d been chiefly drawn dWmg her life, th ey
woiild not only lose the support wmcn tnfe y
had previonslv enioy ed, hut would be In danger of being left without aaequate Uliuailii of
support, and without habits or abilities Wlil(!h '
would enable mem to optain a livel ihood. So
thpsp ^iigren she gives the entire benefici al
interest in her whole estate after tne deat h
nf her h uahaTid. Is it reasonable to supp cwe
that under snoh oironnistances
sne mtM Wfed
thaf; thps(> ''1iii'^™ji,js]ia,js^j ^_so^clearly the
cljjef objects of her bounty, should be left
dirn ng'^e'TttgH mr^"^ 'husbMd'~wahout
me rV Mt In -her-estate as
a^~gich'^'nggrt(r
'
would~"&iable "'"tBem^to
enforce a claim for
supptiWto-'the event tfia^ 'fr oni"aIien"atio n of
f ^llue,-MnT)iil'iTiTy'"or"miiid^ oF any other lili:e
cause, the resporigm't sJ&oISSl-15'e^TmwiIIin g or
unable to comply with hec wish o r to exerc ise
""""
a ais cretion m~tliefr"b"^att^
It is gnffffpgfifi^^ that
other clanqfi of th
will, in which she creates
trust in favor of
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(114 Mass. 56.)
Supreme

Court of Massachusetts;

Judicial

Nov.. 1873.

Charles Hess and A uueorgel A..
lie
persons_mterested
whicli j^U
KrameTi^to
in the '^estate were'^m^jgSESiLdgEfiHdant,

Bill in equity

S.Ut.'r

by

M er.::att;(!u toTs-t3f" tiig'wgroi:

court.
iSE"the'aife|p:^
!j:pff tijjl alleged ttiat.Matthlas Kramer,

^" ^'""^ "^t*?? ':^-?^'^'Ja'^ devisee under
the win of his father, flnd that the chllfii-i>n
bT Genevie ve Sineler. the surviving children
CT^gg^liin- TrramoT-, anrl .Jf^fjn T^rf^mpr, iyra|.
th ias K amer and Crescenz Kramer, mentioii -

JSJIS'^

r

fhe
A.,
diedJ}asiB&4gsi§ai«fi?s
fat,bec^fl£'George
of
property Ij)^. a, yuih 4S£..J6atSiSL.ESSt§_

wlll, one share; to my coup jItI iTftllB ..Kramer ,
'^T3verDool, In the state of Ohio, one share:
to' my cousin Matthiita KramOT. .nf"1S^^<'t7tM^oof nna" Sharp; arifl f/n my ccmSJJ^ Crescfiim
Kramer, of' said Boston, one ^hare."
'~
?rh'e'''b"M
then 'alleged that the greater por tion 'or r.ne Bs rq,^e devise
^Y (^"nrirn
\^
Kramer,
whose will thev wora PTivntnra
ra cony of the will ^^pj"" spt fnr.»h\ waa tT^^^
fll

SINGLER

remainder_^all

mtxedQncM^^ll^of_.t^:X^^^^
I may be entiHe d at

th e

£!."iLiam ^T: , To haye ana'To"'Boia'''tIf6 lanig
to him, nis heirs and assigns forever, _to his
■"a^tiieir ownHSeTbut'subject'Tiowe^^^Jo
and
t SeToII5Wn !lgighan ^eB^~namelyr To 'pa^
tor the u se^ supyor£ ana rnainte'nance ofjny
^Ife, Follx. J^Jb^^"^ ^dS during ^eF natural life, at themtejjf fifteen dollars a week:
dm-lng

and
Sineler.
for iiiiiii
Genevieve
II
1,1
iiH.i. piitfii^
m

"iher eby

I"

h er
■ ,

conffii^.
of. tJiat wilT

construcHon

TKey jvCTajBatJilfiiJft.
Simi^XJff.WPA\mM
tfta" ^"•^ ^^i^P"dftviHRd tn fhPm hv
^^P '^'fMfi
George A. Kraiq er. and denied" the
me will
plaintigs'~authority to sell the real estate according to the authority given ^1T th^ win" Br
Geo rge A. Kram er.
The answer of those claiming tmder the
will of Matthi as .Kramer jUJe^ecLjnat^g^ge
A'. Kramer died leaving"no~ia wful issu llviSa-JSijliJ.^W-fiat . they,' were _ejiJH,flid Jo
the "residue^ and remaindeE -a£^ the estate Jjf
r, the* son,.^S2Eg£- ■*••Kraias Krame
" "'
Mjatth
~
"""
jhal
ie:
mer having taken It sub.iect to
the event afhiCdyrrig wTl Lout lawful issue

nat
J"

in

ural life,
half a montfl

of MattJilas Kramer,

ea that DT-the. tru

e

seised, and"Xo"^®cE

ea'TiTtte^U

a

and

IJ

and

,f

residue

q

r^t,

,

or exor my^said sdn,

augiorize the executor

ecS m'^ acnn'g-'ffl3grthis''vf^

S'purcjjase annur flg§|^for'*t'ge'''SBo'v°MQentioned
lilf
payments at tlie'Mas'sac;luS'aW''H8S||iVLair
mufance''U'oiWpagy , Oi;;'|r?5ffle~oTSarp-gBre
office, in "favof W my saiJ'wIfiJan^d my said
Ulster, at any nm'fe'tif 'times. andlSy^and n ^n
•such pur chases th e saiqjinarges u pon ihe estate and property given to my said son shall

'*'

'
*'
""'--"cease and ''Be dTscharg ed.
"It is my will, "anil hereby direct the executor or executors actmg unae r '{Ms will to
expend, In a ddittonjtg^

I

"It
hould^o to them respeq tnTHT <" ^'"'
shares provided in the will.
The other aeienaants admitted the allegations of the bill.
The case was heard and reserved by Ames,
^., on the bill and answers.
s

the

eslate'and^peftyiTSairfSm

'

"All
my"

e

et al. v.

f

is
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B. H. Atobot & Ij. A. Jones, for those claiming under the will of Matthias Kramer. D.
Foster and G. W. Baldwin & J. P. Colby,
for those claiming under the wiU of George
A. Kramer.

J.

a

r

b

y

a

GRAY, O.
settled doctrine of
It Is
courts of chancery that a devise or bequest
words exto, one pe son. accompanied
pr essing*
wi^h, entreaty or MUUiu m ^datio flthat he will apply it to the henent or oESe rs,
the subjec
mfyTSail ^^nEoCTeate aLfcu st.
eyTCT1meaKa~'atteHaaH'eg^''medicines., nursip^
oFother. jLecassaCT., QC-Pr oper attentions to her
nd the ctbjects are sufflciently^ ggetajn. Some
tendor for ^ftj:. TO.TUfP'^ ^" sickness; It belnp mv . . oFtnle eaiflier iimgiish decisions had
of
weight
provide
ency
give
for
t
he
to
to
this
doctrine
the
jo
sultable_a
fld-£flm__iiitention
fortable support, care and' fnain tenMice of my an arbitrary rule of construction. But by the
vWie '^wEo is subject to mental (ierang^aQl)
later cases, In this, as tn aU other questions
during '^Jier natural iifeT "an3" fE"e _ provision
of the interpretation of wUls, the intention of
which
have . thus made for her is Intende d
the testator, as gathered from the whole wUT,
by me'to be in lieu of and in fu ll and in t he
trust
controls the court; In order to create
stead of any"'lowCT~or "HgHCElo
a'6Wei:~or
must appear tnat ne wordsjaterajntrnded
fi H r as ^ ErEgfesCrTffTHy-mMe^ jir ui iS Eyr'
SyThe'testator
and wh en
to" belm pCTa5ve;
•"T-nffTSliv gigni'l^y fn my "aa^ ann mv d(V
^^ergjis given •ffBsoIutely and without "re lightly imposed;
sire and hpp.a^^aL"!® ''^iU ?° provide, by will
"^^IfflBU-a trust Is'noE to be
or oUierwlse, that in caiSTie' shall die Tga;^^
upon mere words of recommendation. iuid_conno lawful issue living, the^property whldi he
Sence . "^"Warner v. Bates,
Mass. 274, 277;
wiUT take under this yyill" shall go Tn"'e '(jua l
Spooner
v. Lovejoy, 108 Mass. 529; In re
Pennoek's Estate, 20 Pa. 268; Van Duyne v.
sE^s,-^to"'t£e chUdreh oT my lata brotlSer
Van Duyne, 14 N. J. Eq. 397; Knight v.
ofmy said sister, Genevieve S iflgler, includ- Knight,
Beav. 148, 172, s. c. nom. Knight
ig any she may have after the date of
T. Boughton, 11 Clark & F. 513; Lantbe v.
- this
^liiclL Hl?X, ^?^_necess2£Us-JWffl«£^
tfB'out the^J)roper nursing and iaking care of
f^T ivlffi In ii'^T ,M"i^"°°p or sic]£nesses"wr*

a

a

t

Jf

^

3
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f
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.

^.

-v

t™...^

,

a

I

BXPRBSS TRUSTS— PRBXJATORY WORDS.

0^

t

o

a

e

r

ly

By the further clause of the will, the_testa for me
Blgmfle ar'Br"Bi8~B(mTgjs '"desire'
"
nd hope That he wnTso provide, by will or
shall die leaving
otherwSe^jmat35r3;ggr^
no'lawful issiie livi ng, the property which _he
will takg under~S5"s wiflT shall go in equal
lJertaln^^pS ewii^ nieces, ah3"cousshares"
to

if

construed
the , testator. /fhisclSiuse,
the
ttust, leavesTno thing
cjiicretlon
the son, ibut ai^ounts to an executory devise over, in case of Ms death
leaving no ijssue, to the persons »aime^, in
definite amounts.
Tg^jjve it.,Biit;,,(EDnstnic-!
Son would be inconsistent with tiie^principal
maniintention of the testatOTiasnreviously
es tea,^t o^ye the son an^absolnte title, as
weU as "with the dSc3ption of tte estate in
this veyclause as '"t^e projp^er&
wh^^;h
""
Will tak unAer this wtH^*'
It rSH^wT'tSSt'tb e" son had uU Eower to
dispose or tne
'py wii hnlettered by
estiit'^
tWsupposed trust!, and t£at: tDere must 'Be

ins

f

o

"as_ mea]^!g.,ft

e

li
i

-

Ha.

(i

'"

aBV

i

a'

r

a

lj

f

e

16rtllS m

e'

dec

re

e

g

s,

■

r J

f

df

e"

^
t

in

pffiThra tn
^
the wife's expenses
rnai^^^^^^^'case of sicimeasBia.flfiiuiLfefiLi!i^Li2_3.ower
Subject to these
(rf^ffi^^^^ja^JJa—egJatPagrges during the liv es of th IfeSt tOyB' Wife
tiSa'^sfCT; tlie sori'Ti giveit, by Ulti lUlle st,
tiai-tair aH U° moii W iiiai""wata
ah ftpsaiut
" ' "~
■"
estate in tee.

h

r

t

e

b

y

e

a

b

y

l \

s

:""'

Eames, L. R. 10 Eq. 267, s. c. L. R. 6 Oh.
SdT; 1 Spence, Bq. Jur. 439, 499; 2 Spence,
Eq. Jur. Gir-70.
In_the_case at ba^the testator d^Tisea an d
bequeaths the "resldne 'of his estate to his
^^n^__^'to have and to hold the same to him .
hiaheira and assi ggsjorev er, to his and their
gwn use, but subject hgyfever to the follo w-"
These diarggs.jsa:gA§£JMJQaging charges
n^ent of"specifle(fsum3 yearly to the testator'
^e and sister for their respecave lives, nne"ss""3ificharged
the purc nase .oF nniutjes
in tneir favor fey the" xecutors (of w hom the
ppLliy e^y &o. them
soiris~M'eT"nn^^ffiy al^j^jl^
will; "secondj
th
he further paym ent,
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o'f

u

John' F. Dillon, lor appeUanta.
for respondents.

Bishop,

Ie

a

a a

James L.

is

a

a

e

is

l

^e d

g

It is

veCT_ eaTnestly an

d

pera;dvg4ftjtgi3a±Hre.

ablv arpied in behalf oTtheappellants that
to orce of tM last -clansfi m the fifth para e

legal estate in fep. It was subject, as to th
to a trust, or to
realaad. personaLpropert
power in trust, in favor ofthepersoiis and the
Wein; and hey
classes of persons named

a

"raSe the "argume d[jaP°° ^^ "?"f'?fi'UiP"r h'"^gCBHany^ that 'the provision Is couched In such
premtory words as to tuMl'i all the condiOons
rpniiisite to creri^eff^ the anthnriti^ ps
ate'lT'trust, in that the w or ds used exclude
anf option or' di^fgtlo n'Tn the wife, and tE
■SBBJect of the request and th
objects of he
Thty argue,
totin^^3re^9^^^j^Sted_out.
t&6,' that the relations sustained
by the persons named to the testator are such, and are

shown by other parts of the will to be such,
as to indicate
strong Interest on his part to
make the gift. If, however,
conc lusion
th
must be reached tSat'the .'jjestetor lntended" an
'*bsel«te'girf"'ES"his wife of. iis_5^. and pwe

e

T

the testator, having^died, "ttibse persons ^ad
Kcome tenants" in common of the pr^erty,
or entitled tEefefo' under tiie tr^t allefed. It
appears that MipsT Cfiiy" died, leaving a will
^Tereby shfe' gave th prdiierergqTOlly'tcrJBS e""
p6ineT3rr~Wood and Lu cretia M. W ood.

^

e

sentenc'e™orjEErffij£. paragraph.
Ipje pJaintfffs, who are the nephews anJL nieces referred
tSTbereEJ clajLmJjyji^ complaint that a trust
was Thereby created in JavOT, of ttie persons
i^med, all that LucretialjrClay, the widow

pr ojiertv. or w1-^p,|J]g];, sa„the anosal^^gf,_to
eate with rgrellants claim,
trjgj, '^a
s^e^^TEgfe. property, xaLa power of trustlm

t

lo

I

y

o^

r

^

d

l

e

p
S'

educate Lucretia M. Wood,
for
oy
my safd^a&opfeS daughter,
tlffe' jfaugtife
Josephine "MTWxmd: And lt"ls""ffiy furthef"de:_
^re^andj^eqa^Ohftt my wife do make the
Sai3' Lucretia M. Wood, Jo^g'ffi^ M. Wobdl
gnd^'tdy^riephews aSg'niec es^The 'children "of
^brothers, (Jaieb^ S.jClaj^^Jnd, George Clay,
jotnTTieirs after 'her death In the said estate
have bequeathed to m
wMch by ijiis will
said wife;" The question in this case arises
Iharcoucraffiag
Bpon the efeecP^tU bfe glVeii
and

t

^JF^.ft"'^

His general scheme waii
pose of^the tesiktor.
t;^ Tiia wifo upon hia.'iipath,
to„g'vff.fiveryth]nfr
except the legacies which he ave by the thir
afar~fOin13r~elailses7'Thal wa s th^ sjmp
pI5n"wEicBTie' evidently BSSTin mind, and the
question Js^^_whether, the d^"osition wBKff^
mSde regjjltg4 in vesting n her the fullTrene"
J,^2. interest In, and in bsolute .right of aisd

:

,

SnS^

it

''

s

h

ynfft and"^to her eirs, execadminisEraEorsT "and "assigns,,^ forever,"
en sf^t eF^ follows "^nd
is_my_derequest .that my ,'s3i§Jwjte'^^^^

his estate to

mOTs','

the

r

ffl

Vf~m:mtE'c lS^rTi^~^l^iT^ resida£of

will

in question was^"
lawyer, or by
lay
Th lan gu ge
hand, we are not Informed.
yet It
inartificial, and MIlll
somewhat
" '
Mill so "plain
ll II
Tl•''- IMI.rii ^^^"
MlIIInil
and emphatic as to leave nttle room for doubt
in^the^mind as to what was_.tt©-P™isitoI^B^
wlfe^ .^WlSether

Srawn with the aid of

c

^

to nephews, and
tpBS~15rp!KersrTo^.a.,§jster,
to an adopted daughter,
provlSng^at thesame^
time jffiat none_ ofJho§g. regacies^bojild
be a
^Earg e upon the house and lot and household
goodsT etc., which he had given' to "Ws wite. "

ffia

t

In
firBso^gave^to he£jii;.SBjn-ij£JS2fl,fl00.
third and^four th clauses„h e gave )pgacies

(

"To "Hicbver

tne whole sch eme of the
consideration
will, and weigh the expressiuiis WllHiH llti Ms''
iflade use'of when deitimilg Tflg"ittt6t6St of hiT'
nto

e

house

the said

a

and lot to her, iny-said
to her ,h ,eirs ang
WlfeTXticre^TSir'Claj^and
^signsr lorever, and to have and to hold„ the
,s7TO~BmreTim'd-g tTOgr etc.,~un'£oTi"er^ my said
WiTeTEucreHaTS' Clay, and to her heirs-exeeiiTigsrga fflTBigtya»B!SZ-and..aa§igna..JM^
hold

J

and

a i

i^tiraed;„.andjjJgaJjisJuffl§d!flliL-gaoda.

s

This a,ct ion was brought fior the partition of
real' prppertyj" andn 't 'jP^^ptSaT the 2^M&cnon ofihe will of William W. Clay, deceased.
By that"will tfie 't'esTa|Q£,.,a,ff^r dirggtjngjEbe
debtf^aai. funeral^exgeDses,
5^^^]]of__his
and partici3 ari!y"an indebtedness secured by
mdrtgaige upon nis Bouse' a^^L lot, in tBe^s^^^
wife, Lu cretla, "and to^ her
dSus€rgave~toTiis
assigns,' forever," the house and-Jot
h_Sls-and

powtheir Interest; or he could have created
er of appointment in their favor, with
like
certainty; or he could take the course which
he did, namely, of desiring that his wife should
The mental conflict
make them "her heirs."
was not serious respecting the superior claims
of his wife, as we seem clearly to see from
provisions of his
the careful and elaborate
will; but appears when we read his expressions of desire and of request, addressed to his
wife, respecting a disposition of the estate
which he had given to her, and which she
might well have heeded. What wag_tlie dominant intention of Mr. Clay ^' m akinghis'wlll

yf

department.
Action by G eo rge S. Clay and others agains t
Lncretia M.- TWooa and other s for partition ,
and in'cidentally to construe tne will of T^_nam _W.. Clay, dece ased. A judgment cUsmissinig- Jtbfi. csfflpIalSLja ftp jcffeiislwiiuaffirmed by the general term (36 N..X».SaBP317), and ^jajnfijgCs. appealTAffirmed.

S

general tenn,

First

a

court,

8, 1897.

a

Appeal from supreme

June

e

Court of Appeals of New Tork.

134.)

a

N. T-

it

153

S
7

(4T N. B. 274,

f

'

GRAY, J. (after stating the facts). 'Dpon
reading this will, we can Infer some conflict
in the mind of the testator with respect to the
ultimate disposition which he should make of
It was as to how he might benehis property.
fit the persons named in the fifth clause, after
his widow's death. He could have created,
life estate in his wife, with
terms,
re
mainder over in their favor, in which case
certainty with respect to
there would be

I

\^

et al. v. WOOD et al.
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sonal pro BP'^Ti ''arr ylng with It an absolute
tight of disposal, then it will become unaecesimperative . That is a general rule, and can
sary for us to consider questions of trust or of
clause of this
it be said of the concluding
power in trus t; for the existence of an aBso We
fifth paragraph that it stands the test?
Intfi and beneficial estate in fee in the widow
cannot think so. jt undoubtedly contains the
would b e pqi^^ll^r des^ctlve of the claim ot""U
desire and request of the testator that his
w ife should make the P_ersons named her
tT2i;tj_jaL£!f ttift '^^''''?^■'0f-3Ji imperatiye trust
"joint heirs" ai:ter'"3S!E 5r"i)u t. In view of gie
jKjBefc- —
very emphatic and precise language which he
The testator, it must be admitted, was very
emphatic in the use of language when definJiad s ee n fit to empl pyTn"deflBing, .tbe'JEa^
ing the nature of the holding by his wife of
which^is_w^e should take in his p roperty, it
the estate devised and bequeathed,
^hen he ' would be going too far in The effort to give efit
gave to her the house and lot where he residgcT'TS'^mynestaffir^
domjnaled his brevjo
us e xpressigns jQf._i,nteneS. he MaeOSrw ofg§r'''aHd--tg'lia- Beirg' and
'
'
assigns? ^qr^ver."
n the same "paragr aph
tTonT'an'd" atfected their legal force and slghouse
n
her
tlie
give
y.,.,.
\there he had so
ancfiotr- nrgs^Zjrt^nBpTvTTOmipTTis-Tsr.
197, 19 N. B. 411,— a case upon which much
and 'Sso"lLiroriir ioqMi(na''igwar'aga: eff^S", E'e reiCfffettfethat §lle'"WS§- "to *!we"anti-to
reliance is placed by the appellants,— Judge
ESld ttHi said bouiae and lot to hor» a—*-^ »
Finch observed of the testator's will, In the
g[nd to her heirs and assigns, foreve r" ^ and
course of his opinion, "that in the gift to his
bg-states with reference to 13ie personal F" 'wife he does not add words that could seem
iects that she was to have and to hold th em
with a subsequent charge. upon
inconsistent
"untQ her._ " * * and to her neirs, exe cas for her own use and benefit, or to her
and her heirs, forever, but leaves the path to
qtors. administrators." 'and assigns, forever ."
This repetition of language, indicating coma trust or a charge unobstructed so far as
pleteness and perpetuity of ovynershjp, arres ts
That case differed from the prespossible."
it will De opservea. too ^that ent one in that the testator "wished" his wife,
l;he attent ion,
always
there was discrimination i^ the empljoym etft
who was his executrix, "if she finds
langu
of
brother
pay
and
convenient,"
a
defin
to
to
his
sister
^epse
uig„iJlj|f,
Holding._iq
,
ge
r.„
o^
during their lives the interest on $10,000. In
words ' w hich would be appropriate In spea king" of ^e_s nc(;g^^ioi\ to either class of pr opthat case there was no cutting down of his
being seen
sriy'. 'Be had been particular, in the nrst
life estate; but,
wife's fee to
gift was made, dependent only upon
that
"***
debts the mortgagejp on jjj.^
the fact of abihty to do so, a precatory trust
h°Sf.^„ ^^^
should b e disciiarg£d7^aijriiF'wal™equS^
was deemed to have been created with reThe very words of
ticulajtjn jhejrom6tion"5jtlig ^tCTegtgfbf Jis
spect to the annuities.
■frife, in directog^^Jn^^^Jourtli'ciaus^' that
distinction pointed out by Judge Finch are
tEiTegaclS given should noF Be" aTcHS!^' uppresent here.
In Re Gardner, 140 N. Y. 122,
on e"ither"ffie"Tioi5Be and" lot,' of 'lE^^ pergonal
35 N. E. 439, -the testator gave the residue of
e"tteMjiea^gd.~'" ^e° h e aisposes^f
his estate to his wife, to have and to hold the
residuary estate, in the_fi"fff'*c,laus"C. wfe,e
same, to her and her assigns, forever, providemphai j c '"in "Befinin g^ the estatej ;^Lich
ing that what should remain unexpended or
a]pin
'undisposed of at her death he gave to his son
bis wife shallTate&erelhrb y glroignttofi^
- "and to Wf'heirs, execufofs
and his heirs. The testator added this clause:
radministrator s,
expect and desire that my said wife
"And
atra-TEsi^dmSis^' '3Lgai1a.''in "pypressmg
aisposltionto
"liis desire and request as
will not dispose of my said estate by will in
way that the whole that might remain
such
be made by his 'wife in that clause, he refers
t o "i£e said estate wJleh by tnis will X ha v e
at her death shall go out of my own family
l t_is "hardl y and blood relation." It was held that "the
rnv sinywife."
h''pqnpafheiil""tn
of a testato r estate of the wife was not qualified by the
, j5nceiYameTHrW-ntfen!Ton
^hat his wife should' have the absolute title precatory words mentioned," and that they
were "merely the expression of an expectation
fi7^inrtl re-TCTpgtggr riglTt--n1"fli'snnsa1 of. the
giitatd ijU'fen <ii)ald be stated in more forcibl e
or desire." The construction of a trust was
— l^h e words which have bppn smrrfc. refused by us upon the ground that the words
igngn^c:
nntgslised. and which the counsel for the apof the will in the first instance clearly indicated a disposition in the testator to give the
pellants think would b e mgre aBBmByJatg lb
entire interest, use, and benefit to the donee.
e^fesB the intention to"^ake an absol ute
regitt 'tff'the wife, sueii"'as'"with full power of
In Re Hamilton [1895]
Oh. 370, which
SiSposaV^fi! _'^lo£_igr „§(5Il~Uf
lied upon in the prevailing opinion at the genwonifi"norbe anv strong:er, and. Indeed, would
eral term, the following language
used: "1
give, bequeath, and appoint to my dear nieces
seearCSlSemore appropriately use d when pr othe sum of £2,000 apiece, for their
sole and separate use, and to be independent
her agaitist her husband's act s.
to protect
' '
'^
° ^ -'°-^'^ "'^ '^'"te K^ft of reaLor -nerof their husbands, and
wish them to be■
!^^-f^
queath tie same equally between the families
sonal property , in order to q;^lif£jt,_jgr_to
of my nephew Silver Oliver and my dear
cuflt dowiirtESTaHeTpaHISrthewill should
niece Mrs. Packenham in such mode as they
sjiow~aB~egga3'ly- "clear^tfftentlon Jt»:JO^lby
J^„.meaning,
shall consider right" It was held that the
the "use of wMraS-delnite
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nieces took absolutely, and a construction ot
tlie WOTds was refused whicli should imply
that the ladles took for life only, instead ot
absolutely.
We are referred to many cases on the one
side and on the other, butprecedents in will
cases are not very satlSacto^ alds,iivreachTn'g a conclusion in the^work'qljyotCTpretotipn;
for each will wlU differ In Its scheme, as In
TEsTforms of expressioiii "Affflost; they.j Hi;-

'nTsHTnusfi'atl^ig.^

the aBglication,^f2^se
which have been

ge£e£SL'TSfi§J'£.£25?,t"^'^^'^<"''

fUr^wn In tte|3MHMis"'^3]|"the^ courts.
Whether the precatory words iSra v riJl shal l
be a.cc orded such force as to deprive the donee
"of the'"abs61ufe""flgffr6f disposaTTand thereby
gfiaiify the beneflcial Inter est in thegft^ust
wiffi what may
Bra^nflmea;;;ffiTSffi^^on"
fie^athered fromth£rMtj^^t^jfvin^ as an
inten iion which woulS' ie 'reconcilable with
tfie'ldSTorrTrasr^^^lTOP^CLifte. legal
WTSgre" to impose such a trust would
gsta^e."
_6e^^_MUifx3,??M9B§_e5Pressiona]£rthe , -y^i,
"andjio create j^_ repugnancy Jejtwee;n_ Its different parts, then the rules of construction
fgrbidJ:|Le attempt, and this■ Is not_dlsputed
Their 'contention
the apjellants' c'SiTriM.
in that respect is that that principle of construction has no application to the present
case, because of the absence of words showing that the wife was to have the whole beneficial Interest.
Thus we see that the pivotal
point of construction Is as to the significance
of the expressions used by the testator when
giving hifl estate to his wife, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.
In our view,
they are unmistakable,
and create an atmosphere about the instrument of an entire subjection of the claims of others upon his bounty
to the paramount claim of his wife, and ta
disposition. In
her ultimate testamentary
the present case we can only read the lan-

3j

WORDS.

guage, In which the testator expresses bis desire and request, in the light of the emphatic
language previously used In the will, and, as
so read, award to It the force of a suggestion
and of an expectation, which, however strongly phrased, were only morally binding upon
the widow. Within the .case of Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 8 Sup. Ct 1164, where the
testator gave to his wife all of the real and
personal estate of which he should die seised,
possessed, or entitled to, with a recommendation to her as to the care and protection of his
mother and sister, and with a request to her
to make such gift' and provision for them as
In her Judgment would be best, the present
case might be said to be within the exception
there recognized.
It was there held that the
language of the bequest was sufficient to convey to the testator's wife the whole estate
absolutely, if it stood alone, but that nevertheless, as it did not stand alone, and did not
"contain any expressions which necessarily
anticipate or limit any subsequent provisions
affecting It," the bequest was affected by the
Precisely that did occur In the will
request
under consideration, as we view it, and the
language of the devise and bequest to the wife
did contain such expressions as to anticipate
and limit the possible effect of the subsequent
provision. The cases of Dominick v. Sayre,
3 Sandf . 555, and Smith v. Floyd, 140 N. Y.
337, 35 N. B. 606, related to devises for life,
with a power, in the one case, and with a
"right and privilege," In the other case, of
disposal by will in favor of certain persons,
and we do not perceive how they affect the
conclusions we have reached.
We have sufficiently expressed our views upon the questions presented by this appeal, and they lead
to an affirmance of the judgment. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All conJudgment affirmed.
cur.
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take to be very clear,
upon this subject
and, with the exception of two cases which
(li. R. 18 Eq. 11.)
have been referred to (Richardson y. RichChancery Division. April 16, 1874.
ardson and Morgan y. Malleson), the decisions are all perfectly consistent with that
by
Ben
r. The bill filed
TgdiyaTd
^Demurre
rule. The one thing neaessary Jto. give .yalld;
ne tto Richards, gn infant, by his next friend,
ity
to a declaration of trust— the Jtodiapfiib.,
statea: That John Delbridgo- dpppa spri, was
thing— take to s^JiiaXJ^&j^SBSiS^Qt.
sable
possessed or a mill, with the plant machin■antnr
nr what.eyer ^^ may be_CaUed..
ery, and Stocl&in-tradR
tharetn holnnprinpr^ in
arted wi th that inShould ha ve absolutely
whic h he carried on the business ^>f a horn
"Ss up to the time
terest whic'E~h"a'd~B6e"n
manure irierc fiant. and whi ch was he ld un- j.^
have effectually
the declaratio^'sEould
3er a Tease^dated the 24t£"^^or'j une. lfi6?.
put
cEahged liis rlghL!iiBrf5aFrespect,ra^
That i8n ttejjh ;of ;Mareh, 1813, John Delof his EowCT;^„a]LiSSlL J^^
property
the
^ut^
brid ge ^dor sed upon ttie lease and signed
•
tBe"Rnoy^ni" mernorandiisa;^, " 7th March . lie way JC^ecesi?''™"'
cases are wholly
le two first mentioned
Jg73.' TEis '<iee3"°and aU thereto~belonging
That being so^
last
to
the
two
opposed
give t o Edward Bo metto Richards from
liberty to decide the case otherthis time forth wlffi. all the st_ock-in- ^pi.dp_ , am not at
wise than in accordance with the decision
TdEn Deltoidg e." That the B lajB^fEjaraathg
of the court of appeal. It Is true the judges
and t he. .
"p^OTJ halme^in the memorandum,
appear to have taken different views of the
jaffiT)elbrids
'grandson 5t
;e, apd had then
construction of certain expressions, but
him
in
the
business
assisted'
ing-;^£
am
not bound by another judge's view of
ThaT John Delbridge. shortly att/^r sif>ning
the construction of particular words; and
'
KaBatrt6~EItgab&tS''25n'Ri^>' «rfig, tho piaiyi- there is no case in which a different principle is stated from that laid down by the
nnssessinn
tifl's mother, who was still
were my
court of appeal Moreover, if
April,
Thai John Delbridge died In
thereo
duty
decide the matter for the first time,
to
1873," haying executed
several testamentai^
should lay down the law In the same way.
instruments whicn aia not rerer spermpji llv Tn
principle is a very simple one. A man_
The
the said mill and premises, but, he gave his
may transf er his nrogf rtv. withnnt vainfl,bi<=»
turnitur
and effects after his wife's death.
consideration, in one of tw
he may
"Wi^jw^ niyifipf^\flrnmig^_hfH
rt ^^ 'either do such acts ki ATSSSSStways: law to,
fa'^^^^^
testator's widow Eliza beth R ichards, took
conveyance
or assis;nment
i]he nypp^rty.
out a dministration "TS" His „egtataZlgS&rffie
hia3L§elfc of
testamentary paperi a nnexed. Th o Ml w*^ '''' ana tnu s^omgietely_jE[jxest^
person
Elizabeth legaTawnershijp, jBCsSi£S,=,case _the_
was" filed "against "{h e 1^^^
property
the
by
those
acts
yho
acquires
Delbridge, Elizabeth Ann J{,iph a rHa, anrl the
""tages It Denencially, or on trust, as the case
testator's two sons[ who claimed under the
nfty be; or the legal owner of the property"
said testamentary instruments, prayed a decm ay, py one or
tner oi the, modesjrecgg^
upon the le gge
TaratlOh tBat~tB5Tnd orsemen
amounting" to a valid declaration
as
IlMd
by Johil Delbridge and ne dfe'liVery or the
trust, constitute himseit a trustee, and,
Tea^g to "Efflza Path Ann'" Rjc Kards
'c^edt^ff^a
witho
ut an actual transfer of the legal titieT'
valiar trust in fayOT"of &e la ntiff of th
witB"imgT>wi()er ty' as-tty'Ttepn^
.Tnhn
TeaselaSa' of Ihe "es!afe°and interest"
^^IcTdea
Delbridge in the property therei n com^risedT ffiinself of its beneficiaJ awnersgipT ahd°%from that time
clare that he wUl hold
and in~ffie good will of the business carri^
person,
trust
for
the
other
forward
on
oB."tEefo,'°and""in TEe "implements and^^ck"I declare
'Is
need
the
he
not
use
true
words,
in-tnide Belonging 'fo' the business, _ Thg..4emyself a trustee." but he m ust do som&tggaghts'demurred^o
"Sill
for
wa
nt
of
the
thing wtiich is equivalent to'it'"a"nd"'iise°e^
T)re ss.lflB§L!-!E,bIcir ^^XS^ that meaningj _Jgf,
Pry, Q. C, and Mr. Phear, In support of "Eowever anxious "ffie^court^ may be^to carry
''
SSFa''mam^""'in"teniFion,'"r t''*is not at Tibgrty
the demurrer. W. R. Fisher (Mr. Southgate,
Bolton,
plainfor
to construe woras ottierwlse than "according
Q. C, with him), and T. D.
tiff. Gregory, Rowcliffes & Rawle, for de- TEoTEeir ^grbgCT meaning.
fendants.
"TSe cases in wHicE tEe question has arisen
are nearly all cases in which a man, by docJESSEIi, M. R. This bill is warranted by uments uisufiicient to pass a legal interest
the decisions in Rif hardson v- Rifharrlannr has said: "I give or grant certain property
to A. B." Thus, in Morgan v. Malleson, L.
L. R.
Jteq. 686, and Morgan v. Malleson,
L. R. 10 Eq. 475, but, on the other hand, R. 10 Eq. 475, the words were: "I hereby
De give and make over to Dr. Morris an India
we have the case of MUroy y. Lord,
bond"; and in Richardson v. Richardson,
Gex, P. & J. 264, before the court of appeals,
Bq. 686, the words were, "grant
and the more recent case of Warriner y. L. R.
and assign." In both cases the
Rogers, L. R. 16 Eq. 340, 348, In which Vice convey,
Chancellor Bacon said: "The rule of law judges held that the words were effectual
H.& B.BQ.(2d Ed.)^25
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made efCectual by being fonvertivil i-ntn a
""^^
r)6rlft<!t trust."
It appears to me that that sentence contains the whole law on the subject If the
decisions of Lord Romilly and of Vice-Chancellor Wood were right, there never could
be a case where an expression of a present
gift would not amount to an effectual declaration of trust, which would be carrying
the doctrine on that subject too far. It appears to me that these cases of volnntjirj
jfifts should not be confounded with a nother
"class o r cases In which wnrrts
iiyu^mtransier ror valuapie consideration are held
contract wMch the coiirF
■to be evidence of
win enforce . Applying that reasoning to
cases of this kind, you only make the imperfect instrument evidence of a contract of
voluntary nature whii;'^ rma mniT. will not
enforce: so thaC following out the principle
even of those cases, you come to the same
conclusion.
must, therefore, allow the demurrer; and,
though
feel some hesitation, owing to the
conflict of the authorities,
think
costs
must follow the result

^

I

I

declarations of trust. In the lormer case,
Lord Romllly considered that the words were
"I undertake to hold the
the same as these:
bond for you," which would undoubtedly
have amounted to a declaration of trust.
The true distinction appears to me to be
plain, and beyond dispute; for ma" t" mni^o
himself a trustee <'''?rf} """ gt be an expres sion ot intention_tp become a trustee, where as words of present gift shew an intention to
give over property to another, and not reany
tain it'Tif ffiF^aSnoVs' own hanas~'fgr,
"
ptrrpOSSTBguciaJ ^"^ dt herwfser'
•TnTJilfoFv. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264,
274, Lord Justice Turner, after referring to
the two modes of making a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, adds these words:
"The cases, I think, go further, to this extent: That if the settlement is intended to
be efCectuatea py one or tne moaes to whig h
I have referred, the court will not give effec t
aitnmng. anothe r of those modes .
^o it-bs_
If it is intended to take effect_bj, transfer,
the co urt will not"?old the intended ^aflp"
f er to' oper ate' as" aTaeclaratibnr of trust,_JOf
tlien every imperfect Instrument would be

I
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gift in

pTeesenti..ii£., an , Instrument securing
of moneV;^ reserYing to the
ffie^£ajment
(80
and if. so, by
donor the" accruingTnferest,
thig.caaJ be don e. The purpose
Court of Appeals of New York. 1880.
.w hat mean
gift may undoubtedly 'iDeJaceomof such
Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme court, in th e Third judici al lillgliea Vy ^"proper transfer "to'STfustee and
departm ent, reversing a dec ree of tne surro - j)'8t'l ia|iS"lB£; ;;a , written transf er ''jefivefed"'to
,tte donee, but ftg question now is. can it
gate of tne county" ofKlflliYan upon tn e acbe "Hone in the form of a gift, without any
kdluilliljLrator
or
tne'
ass
countlng^orjMlii'Uir,
written "transTefaelivered to" the'dbnee^ anS
estate of Joseptf'Youn'^', deCfi&Sfed.
can conceiv
witnont creating any trusfT
Upon "sncS" accou nting tEe' administrator
way in which this is possible, an
of
but
one
claimea mat certain United States a nd town
hat IB by an absolute delivery of the secuCOUl)on bogds bfelotiged lo lilmnuirgIigTo~Era
la tlip siTbiectnf fj}P. gift ^o the
jonn
nrvjarnu-h
jn.
surrogate
xoung.
The
di sp rotner,
the entire ^5al title and posyes|ing
Sorle^
^allowea tne claim, and charged him with
him,
session
in
on Ms undertaking to account
Donas.
saia
the donor for the jnfejrest wiuch-Iie.-may
These bon ria , Tinot^ tlio rlonth of thfl 1nlrfi_
collect fbgceon,-- But
the donor retains
tate, were found in two packages inclosed in
tHe instrument underTjts" wn "control tSou gh
enyelopes, upon wMch wct b indorsed memoje do so merely for the pnrgose of collect^
randa signed py nim,_ oSe^ated March 1 4
ing
the inter estj^^ljalaaj^l^^^arthe
y
Mnh
Ao.
nf
tSe other March 14. 18 74, pftch
comp xete''3envery whi ch is absol utely essenscribed tne bonos mcios ed by numbers, and
gift calSSSt
Bkl to the validity of a glfi
stated that certain of them aeionged to William H. Youn g, that the others belonged to" be made by creating a jc nt possession of
jonn JS. xoung. faien followed a statement donor and donee, even though the "intentio n
De tnat eacn snail ha ve an Interest
tfie
.ents. or wnicn tne toUoWlh g
Of^^" 'nflf"'''*'Tif)
pecially where, as n this case, th
is a cop y: " But the Inst, to become flU6 ^aattel,
line of ciiYision between these Interests
thereon is owned and reservea by me for so
The reservation of th
TS ng a s
Bliail llvt; rTB.t my dea Ui lie ji -tre^ not ascertainable"
long absolutely and enfarfely Ui llKJlll SSOT nterest on the bonds to the donor was for
an uncertain period; ttiat is, g urmg ms iirgtheir hei rs." Th e other, wasj , ^jmilar .
"time, ana"^Bgtll~lllB~ death
Was impossib le
The circumstances under which the memoto determine the precise proportion or ttfe
randa were made, and the further material
money secured py ~tBe pgMtlis.'to 'Which the
facts, are set forth in the opinion.
—'
'
^— — ,^onee was entitled.
Hezekiab Watson, for appellant.
Homer
If
therefore the donor* retained the cusA, Nelson, for respondent
tody of the bonds for the purpose of collecting the accruing interest, or even if they
were placed m the joint custody or possesBAPALiLO, J. The Intention of Jfigepll
Young, de ceased, to'give the bonds In con sion of himself and the donee, there was no
sufficient delivery to constitute a gift But
Tl'OVtfitiy on this appeal to his son. William
Jl. ioung, reservrng'to himself only the In- if an absolute delivery of the bonds to th
donee, with Intent to pas
the title, was
terest during ms me-time, , was so clea rly
mani fested, th at we have exam ine d tiie c3B6 made out, the donor reserving only tne rig iir
^n[o5g ~'tg_the jloa ee for the^jS^^[ggt;|||^g
with a strong aisposition to effectuate^ that
in
ma.y-Iift_«iiiRtjiiTie^^
susta
yia nn PYPfiitoiT"
er
f-TTOBSfm
transat^tlrtn
the_efftri
rStpgoB-aild
^
giR^D oty V. Willson, 47 N. Y. 580.
The ffaSsacHon is sou^t to be su stained
This brings us to an examination of the
In two aspects: First, as , an actual ek ecjuted
rift, an d seconc lly, as a decia.'ratiori'bf'Snst.^ evidenc e. The written memoranda attache
by the donor to the envelopes containing he
These posit ions are antagonistic to eacn otnbonds, evinced his intention to maKe
ei", fo r if a trust was created,
the possen^,;^sion of tEe bonds, and the legal t itle. tl^gretq ^ ent gift to the resD 9nd^n of_a.n interest
he "'bonds, and shows tbHT^e "3f^roalion
'reinaineS Tn the trustee. In that caao thprA
was not tnten'd&ETtonbe'of
testamentary
•^M no deliverf to the dgnee. ^nd consegift: whi^g
quently no_yalid executed
character. H declares tEat the bonds are
owned by William H. „YQi mg.-hnt-theL iqterTEere was
valid gift th ^ pnssARa|(^Ti a^t^ loest to become Jue pnjttLe.s8,me.is owned an
have been transfe rred to the
fal" title ipu
ftmoee, and no rust was create5r~A F^^ ^
resei^ by the donor for so long as he shall
live, and that aT'tiis~death' the Bonds^are
Sf these tneone^f TRWr Tiepessarilv oyfliidog
the other, they must be separately consid - ■"^MJLttif donee -"moTiitgJ y'nTid f-TltJ:"ia one case, and "wholly and entireered.
To esta blish a valid gift a delivery of the ly" Ifl Tflfe bther.' Til61^6 iil-e feome verM dif^renSesTothe two memoranaa. but tJ^^ urBuBje grof the gift to the donee nr to aome
ort or both is the same .
person lor mm, so as jo_ juVest the posses hey both express in tne same words that tTja-TnTproSf^- hv
BJon ana title gf lEF°donor. must be show n.
become due on the bonds
thtf
TSl (jnagti5S.wiM L-a£i§fia^J3^
a^nri
"ownerj
~
^lid
tegerved"
rved'* by the flflTlAl' Jjffilso- long as he
the peculiar'^circumstances of thig,, case is,
TWretttei'-4t-48- Bi H.'tlcatar to^ake
valid
sl^ live, and that the bonds are not to be-
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long "wholly" or "a bsolutely" to the
'
Tiir arter ni a eiit Hr

r

donees

"TEe exhibition of these memoranda to the
wife of the donee, and the declarations of
the donor, show that what he had thus done
was in pursuance of a settled purpose, and
that he believed that he had made a valid
disposition of the bonds according to the
memoranda,
but they do not satisfy the requirement of an actual delivery.
The evidence touching the point of delivery i s mat tne deceased tor several yea rs
betOTg his tieatn resided at the house of hi s
a;^~]WiliEn H. You.qe;,, whe re thwe was a
sarg_which had formerly belonged to tSe'de
c easedT but which heis said'to have""presentToiirig, a son
dd to his~graiidsOTVJamM_C.
"Dr^Wpliam^Hjj^TMerving^ to himself 'ffiejf^t
to _use Jthie-.ga?s> . and"ln fa ct usin g it as__a
pia.ce of dep osit tor his
v^^Pjje^ papers.
'
That William' . ioung also' kept jaJeersTn
nie~^me safe, "but rarely went to it . hJnigelfr
tbe deceasedjB^^^hothe habit jofdegositing
tEefem' for him such things as he d eslfeH.
and' reraoving them fgr Mm at his requMrt.

JJ

j5iie._deceased usuup
wayBj£ilii.'habit,
Bera.aiad
^~keprhisIm
to"ffieJi^7of tii^ transaction now in quescontroversy.
tTaa^ oi keying the„,J^on3s'Th
TBI loweiL' pgH- "f ttl fi. safe was divided Into
lar ger open co mpartments^ one o f which had
deen appriSpriatSl' a's'the irec^tacle
" " of fhe
into jSs&OfefiSfifi-^^^^^ECTe

0lpgrs"of wipMp;.^::3:oungT
••

over thn |innflR as agalnot ]^
OWnersl?in
fattOT^ And the testimony shows that they
were at all times under the control of the
deceased, although William H. Young and
his son, James C. Young, also had access to
the safe.
Those three however were the
only ^ergo ns "S aving access to the safe, and
it does noT appear tnat John N. Young, the
"other 3on ee nam ed in the memoranda, ever

Sad any contr ol over theTionds or acc"^
ijiereto. Jt was also shown that after the
^leged gift, when solicited for a loan, the
ne might
dec eased aaifl cnat he supposed
with the boys' consent take some of tfl eiT
bonds T"" Also that he called the attention"o?
his grandson, James C. Young, to the memohave done
randa and said, "you see what
with them." That he declared to a witness,
Benjamin Grant, that what he had left he
That in
had given to William and Newton.
1875, he took from one of the
September,
a bond of $1,000, bemg one of
envelopes
Indorsed
those stated In the memorandum
to belong to John N. Young, and gave it
to a third party, but It also appeared that
he had, before making the memorandum,
presented John N. Young with $1,000.
This is the substance of all the testimony
by which a delivery to the donee is sought
to be established.
Tf sh^wa that ^^ajip-^

j

I

si on or. .cnn^rni rvf t?)Q hfiniia, _but merel y
confirm s. the tntemaftn-py nrp ssp^ 1^ thp TllgUT he change of the position of th e
granda.
bofid^' m tEe~Ba f«> Vhera thpv ■^prpkpfit.
from the pigeon- hole to the compartment,

aHCT*'a'ffiiing to tlffl two PnviPlnTWH
in
which the bonds were contained, the memor anda, sho wing... thje .^sppsltiyns in favor of
H., Xoni^R. and" J^n N.
b een the onl y Jpne e., and hadthe Tniynded
fiTs sons^.S3ffiam.
a fter exhibiting., these memoun ac copipani pd, by -JWX j-eseiTaIfoungj^^and^
gjit _beejgL
^
raSSa to jS e..ig§p.gett£fi. wives, of ^the ..doaegSj.
"BonT But und er the existing circumstan ces
it cannot De cdSstrued into a delivery ot the
t he deceased renlac pd the two packasRa of
bonds.
bonds in this safe, and after his death t hey
In the first place, part of the b'onds
wher e
wer e found, not in the pigeon-hole
were stated in the memoranda to be givai
had for merly been kept, but in the
to William H., and part to John N. Young.
tfffey
coiniiai'tmeni wh ere William' H. Young's paThe intention of the donor toward each of
After the memor anda bad jis smM ^as the same . Yet no attempt appMs_wgjfi_kept.
'
been~made, the bondg Wtjl'fe generaij,y gept i n
pears to have been made tqf^'51fget-an T"8ort
but
the
deceased
had
been
Moreover, the form
thatTRmpartmentj
Evr-l giJiiam H. to put ItfejDa_;iR the of theTofended gift shows that no immedi^H
ate delivery could have been contemplated
BiiSon-h^es.,aB4..take thegD.,put wjth^ttsJn-^
by the deceased.
oorsements ^on^^^
The memorandimi on each
envelope says that the interest to become
"""On tEe occasion of exhibiting the packages
of bonds and the indorsements to Mrs. Wildue on the bonds is "owned and reserved"
by the donor.
liam H. Young, the deceased asked her to
This interest, up to the dates
take them in her hands and see what he
of the maturity of the bonds respectively,
had written on them.
But this was not In- was represented by coupons attached to the
tended as a delivery to her, for she asked
bonds.
It clearly could not have been inhim whether he wanted her to take them
tended to deliver them, for so many of them
and put them up, and he said, "No."
After as might become due during the life of the
having thus exhibited them he took them
donor were reserved from the gift, as the
back and placed them In the safe. The meminterest was expressly
declared to be
ora.nda were made on the 14th M arch, 1874.' "owned" by the donor, and not paited with.
fn The possession of these coupons was necesThe tesSTo r (HS.r >rKyprnKgy-T9r-Tg?R
t he meantim e installments of interest on the
sary to enable him to collect the interest,
bb nds became due,
'me deceased cut off
and he availed himself of it for that purtBe coupo ns. anS on som£gc casions W illiam" pose from time to time.
No intention was
5. Young ass isted hirn'ln so doing, but Wil- manifested to deliver up these vouchers and
uam"'ll. testiffed that lie" nevS^alsefJed" any
look to the donees for the interest
No divi^

,2315^
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c onld b e madg ; f or th e
fife" was uncertain ;
Imd furthCT, If a ll the couponB"wer e retained
^"the donor,~8i^ '^"S[^t' not "represent the
Blon of the cou pons
p'erioir~afl'ffi e

la^opB

TEeTJBHas
e2tITeJht^.§si^rgs^ye^Jb^ him."
matured in 1887 and 1888," and some were
redeemable earlier; and if he had lived until the maturity of the bonds, or until the
United States bonds were caUed In by the
government,
as they were liable to be, the
donees would not then have been entitled
to the possession of the bonds or their proceeds.
The reservation accompanying the
gift would entitle the donor to possession of
the fund.
The Intention of the donor, as
deducible from the memoranda and the evidence, was, not to part with his title to the
accruing in^ierest, but to keep the bonds and
collect the interest for his own "«» t'li i'"
should ..di g;..jmil_tbiatJten, and not_ bfit^e.
Sis SODS should have, p flgp^sion of th^m and
ffisolutSy,
lthough he
althoiugh
own "them
TEem
Tliat a
ab^Iutely.
in
meant" lEat their right to this
remam d oi* ''Cihm i'W ''Dti VSBted and Irrevocable
from the time oT tlte"S1g)'^osea"gift. yet that
SttEoT]^ fe durinTlislJI'g, dJc i' th donees have
excid^ive poss'^slonofthe fiondsor'STe legal rlgiit to such possession.
I'te declarations of the donor that he had
given the bonds to his sons must be understood as referring to the qualified gift which
T here is nothing to
he intended to make.
indicate that he ever reffiiquiShed his 'right
to the Tntcrestrand a!n'^Tie'circumstaaces't>f
tTi'e c as6"Shtfw"tKat
he' could not .^^ Inte ndeg"To" admit ~thath e^had . made an. ab solut e gijfir~f ree feom the qualification expressed in t^g ^nifiPiQrahaa. "~'The cases'^of
urangiac v. Arden, 10 Jolms. 295; Davis v.
Davis, 8 Nott & McC. 226, and kindred cases,
consequently have no application. The principle of those cases was applied In the late
case of Trow v. Shannon, 78 N. Y. 446, but
in that case the gift was intended to be absolute.
No qualification was attached to it,
and the bonds were placed where they were
accessible to the donee, and he had himself
collected the interest for his own use. There
was nothing Inconsistent with a full delivery,
but there was no direct evidence of such delivery, and the admissions of the donor that
she had given the bonds and they belonged
to the donee, were received, and weight given
to them, as some evidence from which the
jury might infer that the gift had been completed by an absolute delivery.
It is impoRgi ^le to sustain this as an exe^taa gift, w ithout abrogati ng the rule that
delivery is esggiinai to gitts or chaiteis mter
"
■vlvog;^ It Is an eltimaiilill'y f Ule lliiit guch a
,j;ift can n'St be mafle 1:6 take efRjCfttrpossHB'.^on jn fiatu'ry~SucF"ar f rgJ'sactiQo'amoM^
only to a pfomlse"to ma2e"a"glft, whlch'ls
'nu"3iim~p acturnr~Prttg rr Mangumv 2 Batley,
ThgFe mu st be a deli very of poseesslon
588.
with a'viewTo" pass a present rlt;t |t nf pro perty. •'Any gift" oT cEattels which expressly
reserves tBe"use of the propSty to' the "donor
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for a certain jperlod, or (as commonly appears
flPEEe cases wSchT the'coiirts Mv'e had occaston "to^BJss upon ) as ToWg as the donor
sEall live, [n i"'>ff°"?ii°l ^' '^ Sjfhnnlnr, V^fk
Prop. p. 118, and cases cited; Vass v. Hicks,
3 Murph. (N. C.) 494. This rule has been applied even where the gift was made by a
written instrument or deed purporting to
transfer the title, but containing the reserva<tion. Sutton's Ex'r v. Hallowell, 2 Dev. 186;
Lance v. Lance, 5 Jones Law, 413.
The only question remaining thereforeJ ia
\yhether a J jaUd declarat ion of SMaUa^JBafte

Jf

The "trust
contended
"
' " for, put tatjjjsi^Kds,
wouia be that the donor should hgld_ tiie
bon ds and their_^bceeas' for hisjownr benent'during his life anff to thejase^ thadasges
r£omjftgjimfi of JjjguSwii.iteaih.
Of course np tru st was ,£rea|:g^,,of the_lnterest for thg.^npr 's own lif e,„for ^g, was the
"
legal owner of "t he inc ome of the bonds, an d
never parte'iratr 'tlirnght^diflC-.cciiiiaJia.'bfi.
cestui, que trust.
i8i.th e.sajn&JJ,mfttcustee.ajidL
The trust then would be to hold to the use o f
fee donees an estate in remainder ;n the
bonds, which should vf>st in ppfiggPfJiOTH i" thp
d onees, at the time of his death !
The difficulty in establishing such a trust
is that the donor did not undertake or attempt to create it, but to vest the remainder
directly in the donees. Assuming, for the
purposes of the argument, that he might have
created such a trust in himself, for the benefit of his sons, and, further, that he might
have done so by simply signing a paper to
that effect and retaining It in his own possession, without ever having delivered It to the
donees, or any one for them, yet he did not do
so. He simply signed a paper certifying that
the bonds belonged to his sons. He did not
declare that he held them in trust for the
donees, but that they owned them subject to
the reservation, and were at his death to
have them absolutely. If this instrument had
been founded upon a valuable consideration,"
equity mignt have infertered' and effect'iiSfeS
TtrTfflstrrT5yTOTHpei»ngr'
the -executlBtr of a
'
ggSaraHon "of S-iifst.' of by ch"argiiig' the
bonds, while In his handspwith' a^-trustHa
favor oflEe'eauLtamrownfir. Day'vT'Soffi,
IS N. Y. 448. But it is well settied that equity wlU not interpose to perfect a defective
gift or voluntary settlement made without
consideration. If legally made. It will be upheld, but it must stand as made or not at
all. When therefore it is found that the gift
which the deceased attemx)ted to make failed to take efCect for want of delivery, or a
sufficient transfer, and it is -sought to supply
this defect and carry out the intent of the
donor by declaring a trust which he did not
himself declare, we are encountered by the
rule above referred to. Story, Eq. Jur. 706,
787, 793b-793d;
Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves.
39, 43; Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mylne & 0. 226;
7 Sim. 325; Price v. Price, 8 Eng. Law &
Eq. 281; Hughes v. Stubbs. 1 Hare, 476. It
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forming or supplementing the language used,
that a trust could be created, and this, as
has been shown, will not be done In case of
a voluntary settlement without consideration.
There are two English cases where indeed
the circumstances were much stronger in
favor of the donees than In the present case,
which tend to sustain the position that a settlement of this description may be enforced
In equity by constituting the donor trustee for
the donee. They are Morgan v. Malleson,
L. R. 10 Eq. Cas. 475, and Richardson v.
Richardson, L. E. 3 Eq. Cas. 686. In the first
of these cases, Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10
Eq. Cas. 475, the intestate signed and delivered to Dr. Morris a memorandum In writing:
"I hereby give and make over to Dr. Morris
one India bond," but did not deliver the
bond.
Sir John Romllly sustained this gift
as a declaration of trust. The case is referred to by Church, C. J., In Martin v. Punk as
an extreme case. In Richardson v. Richardson, an instrument purporting to be an assignment, unsupported by a valuable consideration, was upheld as a declaration of trust
In speaking of these cases in Richards v.
Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 11, Sir Geo. Jessel, M. R., says: "If the decisions of Lord
Romil^y
(In Morgan v. MaUeson), and of
Wood, v. C. (in Richardson v. Richardson)
were right, there neva- could be a case where
the expression of a present gift woxild not
amount to an effectual declaration of trust."
And it may be added that there never could
be a case where an intended gift, defective
for want of delivery, could not, if expressed
In writing, be sustained as a declaration of
trust. Both of the cases cited are now placed
among overruled cases. Fisher, Ann. Dig.
(1873 and 1874) 24, 25. In Moore v. Moore,
43 L. J. Ch. 623, Hall, V. C, says: "I think
It very important Indeed to keep a clear and
definite distinction between these cases of
Imperfect gifts and cases of declarations of
trust; and that we should not extend beyond
what the authorities have already established, the doctrine of declarations of trust, so as
to supplement what would otherwise be mere
imperfect gifts." If the settl^igBtig Jntmded t9..Iifi . ,Rffec tBajBd.-tey" glf t . the e oiat-glll
a
not give effe ct to It bv constr m'ng'
flfl
trust
It Is Intended to take effect
^p^j?
ansrerthe court will not hold the
'■B^gasrer to oaeiate as:, a:.<ly
?ara1ion of trus|
for then every mperfect nR|n]rq
'^"tf'^
•pymaas^ffectiial
iia-b^n g pnnvpr^ pfl intO_a
'
trust Milroy v. Lord, De Gex, P.

tI

law that a
as -unquestionable
court of equity cannot by its__authority
rengMjffiat gift perfect which the donor has
lefrifaperfect,'and cannot convert an' iitiperJ^fglfflhto a declaration 61 triistT merely
"Heara^yv.
on acconnt of tha,t imperfectioii."
NiSiSson, fi'L. J. Ch. 279. It has in some
cases been attempted to establish an exception In favor of a wife and children on the
ground that the moral obligation of the donor
to provide for them constituted what was
called a meritorious consideration for the
gift, but Judge Story (2 Eq. Jur. § 987, and 1
Eq. Jur. § 433) says that that doctrine seems
now to be overthrown, and that the general
principle is established that in no case whatever will courts of equity interfere in favor
of mere volunteers, whether it be upon a
voluntary contract, or a covenant, or a settlement, however meritorious may be the consideration, and although the beneficiaries
stand in the relation of a wife or child. Holloway V. Headington, 8 Sim. 325; Jeffreys v.
Jeffreys, 1 Oraig & P. 138, 141.
These positions are sustained by many authorities. To create a trust, the acts or words
relied upon must be unequivocal. Implying
that the person holds the property as trustee
for another. Martin v. Punk, 75 N. X, 134,
per Church, O. J. Though it is not necessary
that the declaration of trust be in terms explicit, the donor must have evinced by acts
which admit of no other Interpretation, that
such legal right as he retains is held by him
as trustee for the donee. Heartley v. Nicholson, 44 L. J. Ch. 277, per Bacon, V. C.
The settler must transfer the property to a
trustee, or declare that he holds it himself in
trust Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264,
per Lord Knight Bruce. In cases of voluntary settlements or gifts, the court will not
Impute a trust where a trust was not in fact
The distinction bethe thing contemplated.
tween words importing a gift and words creating a trust is pointed out by Sir Geo. Jessel
in Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas.
"The making a man trustee
11, as follows:
involves an intention to become a trustee,
whereas words of gift show an intention to
give over property to another, and not to retain it In the donor's hands for any purpose,
fiduciary or otherwise."
The words of the donorta the present case
are that the bonds are " owned bjr.thejdonees,
"But ffialftEelnlCTesf fo accrue thereon is
owned and reserved by the donor for so long
as he shall live, and at his death they belong
absolutely to the donees. ^No intention is here
to hold any le^fal title to ffle bon,da,
_^2Ee§sed
~^^^usijcfr the donees. Whatever Interest
"was inteadgjito beVested inthgaj!?asj^nSf erred to them directly ^^sublg;t jfej^ the reservation In JaxQE, of the. dfla&r_ during his life,
and free from that reservation at his death.
Nothing was reserved to the donor, to be held
In trust or otherwise, except his right to the
accruing interest which should become payable during his life. It could only be by reIs established

ir

390

The case of Martin v. Punk and kindred
cases cannot aid the respondent. In all those
cases there was an express declaration of
trust. In the one named the donor delivered
the money to the bank, taking back its obligation to herself in the character of trustee
for the donee; thus parting with all bene-

ficial interest In the fund, and having the legal title vested In her In the character of trustee only. No Interposition on the part of the
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expressed render It unnecessary to pursue
court was necessary to confer that character
that inquiry, '^e agg satisfied that it is imupon her; nor was It necessary, by construcBpsEdble to hold that .thejac|g„%s tJie3!.-apiEga.r
tion or otherwise, to change or supplement
estafallsb a
the actual transaction. None of the difficulT^iH^transfer of any intereatJa
the bon daTnjuestion to the donee, and that
ties encountered
in the present case stood
■Bit canr
in the way of carrying out her intention.
le. sustained as a
It was capable of being executed in the form declaration of trust ." It follows that the judgin which it was expressed.
ment o f ^iSegeng fal term 'must be reversed
The question whether a remainder In a api^ ^;t'p_ decree°^f''We'°'surroiat'e"' afflrtnLed.
chattel may be created and given by a. donor ^oste o f 'atl tSe p arties in ttus~cburt and In
by earring out a life estate for himself and
the suDiei^ B tyM"-* tn ho nniri nnf of the es■
transferring the remainder, without the interte.
vention of a trustee, is learnedly discussed in
. concur.
the appellant's brief; but the views we have
Judgment reversed.

_

EXPRESS TRTJSTS-VOLDNTART TRUSTS.
In:I re WEBB'S ESTATE.

Reversed.

The principal part of the property in th e
hands of the administrator was an pniTffwment life policy payable to hlmseir or personal representatives. Three years after the
iss uance of the policy decea sed died in testate,
navi ng m^t'l'iM in tne m eantim'e,
JBesides Hs" wife" 'lieleft surviving niin""Ers
Tne ratner and ais^ather a na three sistHr s,
ters claimea tnat tne policy was not the
property of the estate, introducing in evi dence to substantiate that theory two let ters, both written short l y after i^ppfxigQri'a
marriage . The first read:, " I have an insurance on my life of four thousand, which
I shall try and keep up for father and vou
Kirls , and shall have an extra amount for
Dude [meaning his wifel besides;" and th e
"By the way, tell fat her I hav e my
second:
insurance papers in Marsh, Pillsbury & Co.'s
safe for ^4.(XX). in the North America Life
Insurance Company, made out in my jaame,
Shortly
but intended tor you all at home."
after his marriage deceased had also nhtained a life policy payable to his wife, on
which sne receiveg tne money alter "Ei s

jj;

^i

is

peals.

trnnf

be carried into effect, althoug;h it was tyithfiiw
consideration,
and the possession of the property w^B B6t ChangeJ
Whether the tr ust
perfectly created or not 1b a nueatipTi
n each case, and the court in determining
the fact, will pive effect to the altnatlon and
relation of the parties, the nature and sitna tlon of the property, and the purposes or bo

1875.

^

Jan.,

'^Appeal from probate coiirt, city and county of san jBTancisc a
In the matter of the estate of M. S. Webb,
On ^Betitlm jDf_ Ed ward_i3L-.Stetdeceased.
son, admtniistrato r, flP'slTtff ^f^ *^'' distribution of the estate. From a deprp e of the
jrobate court, the widow of deceased ap-

l

SnpTeme Court of California.

e xnn pit daol ara tlnTi , flnly ptepitoH,
and Intended to be final and binding upon
Tiim, makes himself a trustee, courts of equity
wUl enforce the trust." Perry, IWsts, f 96.
"If the trust is perfectly created, so that the
donor or settler has nothing more t e do. and
tne person seeKin g to enforce li nas netia 6T~
&rtUlffKCT~(:onveyances
from the settler, and
pWfflBgTBrrtiquired of the court but to give
efCect to th e trust as bti p-rcnntpn
,

clear and

(49 OaJ. 541.)

'
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^

r

ei

'

is

y

II
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II
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jects wkidli' tne settler iiad in view makuS'
—~^,:^^^'*
__
_
_ iiii
._ ju J.. . . 11
ffiFgHnnarnQhT' -ranrssrss:
"In such cases the point to be determined
Is, whether the trust has been "perfectl
to say, whether the title hag
createa£ tnat
ga^d and ttie ^Just been declared, and tlie
triSriBSng" exe iEecrnothi nf;
m jilna fny ^e
^ourt Put to enforc it. In discussing this
question tlie court "say, in Stone v. Hackett,
12 Gray, 227:
"It is certainly true that
court of equity will lend no assistance toward
perfecting
voluntary contract or agreement
for the creation of
trust, nor regard
as
binding so long as
remains executory.
But
is equally true that if such an agreement
or contract be executed by
conveyance of
property In trust, so that nothing remains to
be done by the grantor or donor to complete
the transfer of title, the relation of trustee
and cestui que trust
deemed to be establish. death.
Lloyd Baldwin, for appellant. George W. ed, and the equitable rights and interests
arising out of the conveyance, though made
Tyler, for respondent.
without consideration, will be enforced in
CROCKETT, J. The claim of the father chancery." The same proposition is announced,
and the authorities' fully collated
and sisters of the deceased to the fund In controversy can be sustained, if at all, on no and examined, in Kederick v. Manning,
De
Gex, M. & G. 176.
To the same effect are
other ground than that, by the two letters i^
Ch. 25, and Wason y.
\be deceased to his sisters, he created and Jones V. Lock, L. R.
Colbum, 99 Mass. 342.
declared a present trust, to the eftect that "he
We think these cases announce the correct
held the policy of insurance in trust fot._h ia.
The f^nTipgftiATi oa-nnfft rule, and are decisive of the present controjCather and sisters^
versy.
The letters from the de ceased to his
be upheld merely as a donation inter vivos ,
.g-here was no asaip^nment
sisters did not purport and wS e'not iir n'ggy
or delivery of t.ha
t5~be ah assignihent^of ffie' policy,j5II.title
X cPolicy to the father and sisters, and treated
simply as a donation. It would fail for that
which remained in the decfi aaed.
was.
reason.
But a person intending to make a not an exe cuted trust, but at most nothing
more Ihah
voluSary executory agreement
don ation to another, and jwho e
lear^ declares
Els' purpose and transfers the Title, need not 3o_ create
trust in tuturo, and such agreeggcMgaf ny~ pa rt "witnhe " pog-sggSib'fir pro ^ ments cannot he enforced in equity.
This
vide d he declares himself, in proper f(gia.-£o
view of the case renders
unnecessary for us
"Ee"a fanistee, holding pos session f or the donee,
to decide whether the probate court had juf n sucha case.Tie'Wouia^hencefort'E'fioIdTEe
risdiction to enforce the trust, if
had been
property as a trustee and not "in" his own established.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded
That such a trnst,"when properly de^vlght.
clared,' even in favor of a volunteer. Is valid,
for new trial.
and will be enforced, is esitablished by nu"
merous authorities.
McKINSTRY, J., did not express an opinWhero there is nn val.
uable consideration,
ion.
If
yet^

Jhe_seUlfir_ta„a

®

MARTIN
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T.

FUNK.

(75 N. Y. 134.)
Court of Appeals of New York.

Not.

Nehemiah Millard, for appellants.
Diyine, for respondent.

12, 1878.

M. W.

'

A deposit of
s^e manner

the same amount and In t he
~
was mage in trust for iLS.XS
Willard. nnw iMi-s. Brown, 'j^his money belonged to the Intestate at the time of the deKy pwH arfi
posits.
'rtiK pl ainti ff HTIfl Mra
sisters, and were at the time of the age respectiveiy of eighteen and twenty, and were
distant relatives of the intestate, their moS er Deing a second cousin. The intestate retain ed possession of the pass-books until he r
dieath in l»7&, and the plaintiff and her
jister were ignorant of the deposlta unti l"
after that event . The money remained in
tne Dank with its accumulated interest until
^e aeatii or the intestate, except that she
grew out one vear's interes t. Mrs. Brow n
assi gned to the plaintiff her Interest in the
deposit purpo rting to have been made for
her penelit, and tflS action is brought against
the administrator or the Intestate and the
bank for the delivery of the pass-books and
the recovery or the iiifla£E._ The question
jnyolved has been very much litigated, an d
many rehnements may be found in the
Books m respect to it. Many cases have
been found difficult of solution, not so much
on account of the general principles which
should govern, as in applying those principles to a particular state of facts. It la
clear that a person sui Juris, acting freel y
and with full knowledg e , nas the power t o
make a voluntary ^ift of the whole or any
pan 01 nis property, white it Is well settle d
that a mere intention, whether expresse<i"or
not, Is not sti fflcieg^^J'A ,a ,;^luat arv prom ise to make aTglft Is nudum pactum, ft p^ o^
-1 bind i ng forq ,^ "l!e6ewich v. Manning, 50
Eng. Oh. 175, and cases cited. 'Hie act constrhrtrp g the transfer must be consuMMfttfifl ,
a"nd~niotl-ge main in(i6MP16t6, 6r rest in me re
intention, and this is tne ruie wnether th e
gift Is by delivery only, 61* Py the creatio n
of a trust in a thlfd Ilferson, or in creatin g
the donor himself a mistee. Enough must
be done to pass the title, although when a
trust is declared, whether in a third person
or the donor, f\'^ T.n| opaonHgl thnt thA.nrnrb
erty should be act ually possessed by the cea- I

J
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que tm % ""r 'g ** "^'^^ t>gqpr.tiQi fiiQt tha
latter should be informed of the trust. In
MUroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264, Lord
Chief Justice Turner, who adopted the most
rigid construction of trusts. In delivering an
opinion against the validity of the trust in
that case, laid down the general principles
as accurately perhaps as is practicable. He
said: "I take the law of this court to be
well settled, that In order to render a voluntary settlement valid and -effectual the settler must have done every thing which according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement was necessary to be
done in order to transfer the property, and
render the settlement binding upon him. He
may of course do this by actually transferring the property to the persons for whom
he Intended to provide, and the provision will
then be effectual, and it will be equally effectual if he transfer the property to a trustee for the purpose of the settlement,
or declare that he himself holds it in trust for
those purposes, and if the, p roppity Tr\Q poi;.
.sonal, the trust may I apprehend b e declared
either in wyit l ng or by par oL"
The contention of the defendant is that
the transaction did not transfer the p;roperti,_ and that there
was no "sufflcien fdec:
'
!faratic m "of trust and t"Ear*by retainin g th e
pass-books
the Jnt^gtS" neVer parted with
tne controj L pt the" jprgBgrty.
what she
gid was sufficient to constitute herselt a
trustee, it must "follow that whatever co ntrol she retained would be ex ercised as tru s"
tee," and ^e right ^to'exercise
it would not
be nece ssarily Inconsistent with th e_-Complete" ness_ of t he trust.. The question
involving substantially the same facts has been
several times before different courts of the
state, and in every instance the transaction
has been sustained as a good gift.
The Case of Wetzel before Surrogate, Bradford, and MUlspaugh v. Putnam, 16 Ab b.
feac. a»u. wCTg_deposits_in the same form.
ajid in t he former th e cestui _fl .ue_trust
lad no
and ip bo th
"n^^||]or~fSe^"^ gS5oslt,
In Smith
^seajme giff~w3S.Jbsi&,SSssiilgiV. Lee, 2 TTiomp. & C. 591, money was deposited with the defendant, and "a no te taken
pg yablB to Ihn dBpniJltort earan other pera bn.
a&nt-war liiBld 'tBaLf'the^lLep psitor con stltWedllfmself a trustee. The case of Kelly
vT 'Hanhattan Inst, for Savings (not reported) was a special term decision of the New
York common pleas before Robinson, J.,
where precisely such a deposit was made as
in this, and it was upheld as an absolute
gift.
These decisions although not controlling upon this court are entitled to respect,
and they show the tendency of the judicial
mind to give these transactions the effect
which on their face they import So in
Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512, a similar deposit was upheld as a declaration of trust
Park, J., noticed the point urged there as
here of the retention of the pass-book,
and
said: "She retained possession therefore be-

tui

CHURCH, O. J. The facts In this case
are substantially undisputed, as found by
the judge before whom the case was tried.
The intestate Mrs. Boone, in 1866. deposited
in the Citizens' Savings Bank $500, declar {^ at ttio^tinifi that she wanted the accoiint
to be in trust for LiUie WlUard. who is the
piaintift. Ui'lie-account was so entered, and
a pass-bo ok delivered to the intestate, which
flse entries: "The Citizens' Savcontaine(
ings Jiank in account with Susan Boone,, in
trust for LUlie Willard. 1866. March 23.
■SoOQJ
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cause the deposit was made in her name as
trustee, and not because she had not given
the beneficial interest of the deposit to the
plaintife," and in that case the depositor had
drawn out the deposit, and the action was
sustained against her administrator. So In
Ray V. Simmons, 11 K- I. 266; the facts
were precisely like the case at bar, except
that the cestui que trust was informed of
the gift, and the court held the trust valid.
But the supreme court of Massachusetts
in two cases (Brabrook v. Boston Five Cent
Sav. Bank, 104 Mass. 228, and Clark v.
Clark, 108 Mass. 522) seem to hold a different doctrine. In the first case the circumstances were deemed controlling, adverse to
an intent to create a trust, and in the last,
which was similar in its facts to this, the
court express the opinion that the trust was
not complete, but without giving any reasons for the opinion. The last decision, although
entitled to great respect, is exceptional to the general current of authority in

this country.
do not find any
In the English courts
case where these precise facts appeared, but
the cases are numerous where the general
principles have been elaborately discussed
and applied to particular facts. It is only
deemed necessary to refer to a few of them.
In Richardson v. RichardsoUj L. R. 3 Eq.
Cas. 684, it was held that an instrument
executed as a present and complete assignment (not being a mere contract to assign
at a future day) is equivalent to a declaration of trust. Morgan v. MaUeson, L. R. 10
Eq. Oas. 475, was decided upon this principle, and is an extreme case in support of
a declaration trust. It appeared that the
testator gave to his medical attendant the
following
memorandum: "I hereby give
and make over to Dr. Morris, an Indian
bond No. D 506, value £1,000, as some token
for all his very kind attention to me during
my illness." This was held to constitute the
testator a trustee for Dr. Morris of the bond
which was retained by him. These cases
upon, and the latter someare commented
what criticised in Warriner v. Rogers, L. R.
16 Eq. 340, but Sir James Bacon, in delivering the opinion, substantially adheres to the
general rule before stated.
He requires only "that the donor or grantor, or whatever
he may be called, should have absolutely
parted with that Interest which had been
his up to the time of the declaration— should
have effectually changed his right in that
respect, and put the property out of his power, at least in the way of interest." This
case was decided against the validity of the
trust, mainly upon the ground that the
memoranda
produced
were upon their face
testamentary
in character.
In Pye's Case,
18 Ves. 140, money was transmitted to an
agent In France to purchase an annuity for
a lady. Owing to circumstances which the
agent supposed prevented its purchase in
ner name, he purchased it in the name of

I
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the princijpal.
When the latter learned this
fact, he executed and transmitted to the
agent a power of attorney to transfer the
annuity, but before its arrival the principal
died. Lord Eldon held that a declaration of
trust was established.
Wheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen, 551, is quitu
analogous to the case at bar. A testatrix
directed her brokers to place £2,000, in thfe
joint name of the plaintiffs, and herself as a
trustee for the plaintiffs. The sum was
placed to the account of the testatrix alone,
as trustee of the plaintiffs, and a promissory note was given by them to her as such
The note remained in her possestrustee.
sion until her death, when her executor rethe money. It was held that the
ceived
transaction amounted to a complete declaration of trust.
Mr. Hill, in his work on Trustees, after
saying "that it is extremely diflScult, in the
present state of authorities, to define with
accuracy the law affecting this very intricate subject," lays down the following as
the result: "When the author of the voluntary trust is possessed of the legal interest in the property, a clear declaration
of
trust contained in or accompanying
a deed
or act which passes the legal estate will create a perfect executed trust, and so a declaration or direction by a party that the
property shall be held in trust for the object
of his bounty, though unaccompanied by a
deed or other act divesting himself of the
legal estate, is an executed trust." Hill,
Trustees, 130.
If there is a valid declaration of trust,
that is sufficient of itself, I apprehend, to
transfer the title, but the difficulty is In determining what constitutes such a declaration, and whether a mere formal transfer ot
the property, as In the case of the medical
attendant, Is sufficient, is a question upon
which there Is some difference of opinion.
No particular form of words is necessary to
constitute a trust, while the act or words
relied upon must be unequivocal, implying
that the person holds the property as trustee
for another.
Let us now consider the case In hand. Ja.
at least th p titip t n thf» mnTjpy wa s
^form
t"
changed from the intestat " <r|j|iY'"r'"''i'^
Bgg.aa-Jb3iistiee. She stated to the bank that
she desired the money to be th^g f|ppnsit^^d
itj^^sod one by her direction, and she tooli
a vo ucher to herself in tr^^Ht for tte plaintiff. Upon these facts what other Intent can
be Imputed to the intestate than such aa
her acts and declarations imported, and dia
they not import a trust? There was no contingency or uncertainty <" tho pj^t^i^mptances, and
am unable to spp -rohprplTi it wai<
incomplet e. The money was deposited unqualifiedl y an S absolutely In trust , and th e
tnistpp. Tt ynnlr l scarcR^'ri'teaj-ate was"the
lyhave been stronger If she had written in '
" 1 hereby declare that I have
^"e paaa-B'od'Ki
deposKed' ffiis~m?3iey
ror the benefit of the

I
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plalntia
ilalntlff and

I

hold the same as trustee for

This would have been a plain declaration
of trust, and accompanied as it was with a

formal transfer to herself in the capacity of
trustee, would have been deemed sufficient
under the most rigid rules to be found in
any of the authorities. It seems to me that
this was the necessarv legal intendment of
the transaction, and that it was sufficient to
pasa thf> titlp. T he retention of the passbook was not necessarily inconsistent with
fhiS- construction . S he must be deemed to
have retained it as trustee ,
^he booK was
not the property, but only th^Toucner tor
tB6 yi'Utial'ty, whicn aiter the deposit con sisxea ot t he dept
tne pa ng.
a^amst
many cases where the instru""TEere"are
ment creating the trust has been retained
by the author of it until his death, especially
when he made himself the trustee, and yet
the trust sustained. Exton v. Scott, 6 Sim.
31; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67; Souver^
bye V. Arden, 1 Johns. Chi 240; Bunn v.
Id.,
circumstance,
Wlnthrop,
329. This
upon the
among others, has been considered
question of Intent, but is never deemed decisive against the validity of the trust Id.
See, Hill, Trustees, supra.
Some confusion
has been created by judicial expression, that
the author of such a trust must do all in
his power to carry out his Intention, that the
nature of the property will admit of. This
general proposition requires some qualification. Tn this case t.ha Intestate might have
notified the obiecta of her bountv. but this
is, not regarded as Indispensable by any of
the authorities, and she might have mada
the deposits m tneir name, and aeiivereaTo
them the dooks. or delivered to them Se
The mie dnea not rennirft that thfl
mnnqv.
gifl:' shall be made In any particular way, it
only requires that enough shall be done to
transfer the title to the property, and one of
the modes of doing this is by an unequivocal
declaration of trust In Richardson v. Richardson, supra, the court, in noticing this
point, said: "Reliance is often placed on the
circumstance that the assignor has done all
he can, and that there is nothing remaining
for him to do, and it is contended that he
must In that case only be taken to have made
a complete and effectual assignment. But
that is not the sound doctrine on which the
case rests; for if there be an actual declara-

l
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tion of trust, although the assignor has not
aldone all that he could do, for example,
though he has not given notice to the assignee, yet the interest is held to have effectually passed as between the donor and
donee. The difference must be rested simply on this: aye or no, has he constituted
himself a trustee."
3lS notice to the cestui que trust was not
necessary, and as the retention of the passbooks was not inconsistent with the completeness of the act, the case is peculiarly
one to be determined by this test: ^^',0 tho —
intestate constitu te herself a trustee ? After
a careful considfifilTlAh
of the case In connection with the established rules applicable
to the subject, and the authorities, I think
this question must t^o J^nswoi-Pfl in thP aftiT^Mf^Ye. It was not done In express formal terms, but such Is the fair Ipgal irnnn rt
of the transaction.
have considered
the
case thus far up on what appe ars from the
See of the transactimr"wHEonF evidence a liunde, bearing up yd t^° mtaat. T t. ia not
gir
necessary
to decide tha t ""^'•"'inrliiig
cumstances may not be shown to vary or ay .
jiam tne apparent cnaracter of the acts, and
fjne Intent with wnicn they were done. The
facts developed may not be so unequivocal
as to be regarded as conclusive.
It la anfficient to say that there is no finding of an
intent contrary to the creation of a trust.
and the facts found tjp not qata]ijjgh_RiTPh HTi
adverse intent But looking at the evidence
It is fairly inferable that the Intestate designed that the plamt ia and her SlStfer should^
have the benent oi tnese deposits, and there
are some circumstances ffom~wEich ah in-^'
ference may
be drawn tnat sne regaj dedJie
'
_gLrfs ais fix ed and complete . The circumstance tfiaF'she did not intend ttiat the o bjeqta of her bounty should know of her gift
until afte r_he r death Is not mconslstent with
Tt," and t h
£most ttiat can~5e~said is that she
may have" believed that the dep^te_,mlgjit
Ke' wiffidifawn"during"her'TiIei"'and
the looney converte3^to hgy own T^gr-TfTsnot clear
that she entertained such a 'beliet. but l£~she
did._.it would not change t he legal effecLjQfJ^SE-acts. _«™
The judgment must be affirmed.

I

All

concur except MILLER
absent at argument
Judgment affirmed.

JJ.,

and

EARL,
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BEAVER

(22 N. B. 940, 117 N.

et al.i

Y.

421.)

madB in thP|appr>nnt.f^p the hank-hnnkij. Hoy
the interli neation name to he m ade in
thBTTrST^
appear
ins tance does not appear, nor does
stioii
or
under
what
circ'imatWEosesugge
stancesTBeerasures were made. Subsequent m Oef otyg-ariSbfi. another'"clennaif.~f
gl4b.96 W as ma'fle to the account, and creditea on tne pass-book.
There are no facts, except as above stated,
tending to show gift of the money deposited
to Asiel.
On the other hand, many circumstances were shown which are claimed to be
inconsistent with gift by the father to tho
The son mar son of the money deposited.
ripd a. fp.w -vpi^j;!}after the deposit was made .
and died in 1886. 20 years after the date~of
the depo sits, being then of the age otij/ years,
leaving a wife, bin no chi ii;i,ryi- aiii-viving'~
John O. Beaver, the father, died in 1888.
The fathe retain ed possession ot the passbwk at all tlHrea Ulitll his death ,
n April"
1867, he drew $27.29 from thiTaccount. and
signed a receipt therefor in the pass-book in~
sum was ever
jhis p>yn naiap. jfo othe
■m
drawn from the account.
paver pres ented the
;ne pass-Dook to
to
bayp the ii^terest credited, and
tlvF^Banj
th'e"'li)an'k
ofiicera had no dealings with any
other person in ^-pspent to the accoun
There
18 no evidence that Asiel G. Beaver ever had
knBW
t^lR pasR-Jbook in his posse aai"", fthe deposi ts. In May, 1870, Asielopened
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Reversing

J., {after stating the facts as
is found that the money with
which John 0. Beaver made hq deposit of
1866, elonged to him. The
$8 54.04, July
that the deposit of !m4.'iHK. rn3!t»—
interenc^
October
1»66, was also made bv him, from
his own mea ns, does not admit of reasonable
guestionr Th epass-b flck jiaa at all times nr
Concurrently with the laSt^
possession
deposit the amount was entered therein.
Andrews,
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depositor should subsiriDe
declaration of
ttiBhy^awHof.t.hfl pHtitiitinn.
Si^Bnt
and his promise to abide by tbem . wJohn O.
jjeaver, at the date or the first deposit. signe
m his""9yp n ame .a declaration presented to
Kim
the bank, commencthf'''t^-^aiirer
ing with the words "
Asiel G. Bea veTiOf
Esopus, Ulste co u i}t' ,„, hereby request uie
County bavings institu- "
otticers ot the
leister
t!On~tO" recei ve
om me . jpV.ii,^; ,.§Ba. open aiT
account wiHi rneT'*' 'etc. At the same time
the savin gs pang enterea on its books an ac'i>r.. Ulster County iSav gOnpt""BegililllH|^.
"
ilngs bank, in account witti" Asiel Beaver.
mu crediting said Aaip.l with the deposit of
sUbi. unaer the name of Asiel Beaver mer
tyai
originally
fltlBU LhH \V t)rnsr"'t^ayable
to
r^''~THe bafflTSfao at tlie
the same
J!oK^^n'PrBeaver
time issued and delivered to John U. Beaver
pass-book, with
similar entry as Utt th
account on the doo ks of the bank, co ntai.ni'ng
aTso, as oriiI5IIIgwJltte a,_the words, "Paya-.
" These words in ie
DlBToJohn^ Oi.gfias;ei'.
he
^ou^'and in the pass-'EoblS! Wefe
hanawriting otT EeTireaamrei: ot th6 bank."an
vFi^"wrrtlen at lEe sa me time and by he
same"hand as the other part ot the 6Wmies.
SuTBef ore he deliYefy'ortE r''paaH-BooR"T Be
^able' to::^En U.B eaver
WCTT
^raa'l'P
erased therefrom, and tlie~same^erasure was

^is

IJiH lia nK in PIS oTm
^nrliviflnal
~
name, which continued until March,
esb.
when ne grew out jHjl.HJB.St). in full ot tne accounL- It appears that John U. jjeaver naa
eight or nine passTbook in the bank,
representing deposits made in the names of other
left
his death real estat(>
■Ya]aa..flLMa,iJ 0iJ_tO Blh'Mii, and more
than $20.000 in personal property.
ne 61 1118"
Fules of the bank provides that "dratts may
be made personally, or by the order
writing of the depositor, (if tlie institution nave
the signature of the party.) or bv letters of
gtt orneyy duly authenticatedr but no person
.shall have the right to demand any part of
his principal or interest without prndmijng
"
the originarpooK that such payment may be
entereJ
!a thereon," "gBTl anothe declares that
"altfough" tTJeT^trtut n "will endeavorl:o
j)reventlra^!Miu3 uoalEGS hStjet all pay mentg
to persoiispresenting
the pass-books issued
stiait'WWlid ayments to discharge the
Ui^mtm"''^TBeT me°3 were printed onjUie
pasS;tegkg.£iJtSe:SanE~
A. T. Cleaitoater, for appellants. F. L.
Westbrook, for respondent.
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17 yuafi) or age, and resided witli pia fathp.r .
as one ot
fmWf nf 1K nhilrlrpn. (-John
leaver made the deposit of July
lij.^tj. in
the name
Asiei. x ne rules of the tiank re ft ^rs^. riapnsil: tho
quired that on inaking
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Sf^lE>T96^mak ing in the agg regate Sl.OQO .
aSffTlieir^u'iimUiaLmuiJ
lliHlWB'. LI IS undis putea that the deposit ot' !l6»&4.04~was mad e
in person ny .lohi^ {}. 'Reaver, and that tli e
money deposited belonff fifl lf(f liim.
'I'(ip nn}j
van
e vidence to sustain the clairp that
yyjfg
by him to As iel G. Beaver
ImsMaJhS-i^ations between them and th njrniinn jitq,np,^^a
Asiel ,G'. Beaver was
attending the deposi
the son of John U. Beaver, and m it

t'

•

S.

J

it

Eavnig'^jeen

'

.jdafiej^tihfl l)anK.i<'ihfl mopoy
broue;lit into court. The quesI'lon litigated was whether the money reprei<;ifftaaiTariitfiT»Tmis»!iiTi»jiiTi»!WHniiiiiRi m,
Bad been vested in Asiel (j-. Heaver.^ , a gi ft
iJ'Olll 6hll U. ii&Mei . Thn ai^rnnrif. y jt.h the
hank, consisted oTtwo deposits, — one July 5.

'jgfendant3Ja

by

6." SeaTyer

^is

Tne administra,-™™---»~
claiming the money

_

toFs of John

a

a

Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 26, 1888.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
The action was comme nced by the plainti ff,
as exBCTtmrprasisrTr. jjea^af, dgarnsTtiie
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If they 'established
quent circumstances.
either a trust in favor of Asiel as to the
6854.04, deposited July 5, 1866, or a gift of
the fund deposited, then, clearly, the subsequent deposit would, in the absence of explanation, be impressed with the same character, and be governed by tlie same rules.
On the other hand, if the first deposit was
not affected with any trust, and was not a
gift, neither is the last one. Both were the
property of John O . Bea vei-, or both the rop e rty ot the son, either by a beneticial or legal
seen to nave susiainea
.ilLut. The trial court seem
the transaction as a gift, but at the same
time refused to find that there was no trust.
.There is no warrant, under the dpcisiona
of this cnnrr. r,n nnhnlri t,h(} deposit of Ju'V 5 .
t>fti^, aa !^^.rl1g^ Thp r.MSRnf Mart.in v. Funic.
75 N. T. 134, established a trust in favor of
the claimant in that case, in respect to a fund
deposited by anotlier ill a savings bank to his
own credit, in trust for the former; the latter taking from the bank at the time a passbook in which the account was entered in the
same way. The court applied the doctrine
that the owner of a fund may, by an unequivocal declaration of trust, impress it
With a trust character, and thereby convert
his absolute legal title into a title as trustee
for the person in whose favor the trust is declared.
There wa" "" fift^i'jraf'"" "^ trnatii^
this case, in terms, when the deposit of Jul y
5. 1866. was ma fle, nor at. any t.ima afterWards, and none can be implied from a mere
deposi t by one person in the na me ot anmw.r.
Toconsmhte at ru^E th&K IHUal be
either an" explicit d^giafailUU 01 Lflist, or cir^
cumstances wnicn snow oeyona reasonable
doubt tha,t a trust' was" Inte^^dert to be creatM. It would introduce a aangerous instabiiity of titles if anything less was required,
or if a voluntary trust inter vivos could be
established in the absence of express words,
by circumstances capable of another construction, or consistent with a different intention.
See Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 438, and
cases cited.
The plaintiff's title to the fund must depend, therefore, upon the question of gift.
The elements necessary to constitute a valid
gift are well understood, and are not the subject of dispute.)*. There must be on the part^
of the donor an intent to give, and a delivery
of the thing given, to or for the donee, in
pursuance of such intent, and on the part of
the donee acceptance. The subject of the
gift may be chattels, choses in action, or any
form of personal property, and what constitutes a delivery may depend on the nature
The deand situation of the thing given.
livery may be symbolical or actual, by act-

ually transferring the manual custody of the
chattel to the donee, or giving to him the
symbol which represents possession. In case
of bonds, notes, or choses in action, the delivery of the instrument which represents
the debt is a gift of the debt, if that is the
intention; and so, also, where tlie debt is
that of the donee, it may be given, as has
been held, by the delivery of a receipt acknowledging payment. Westerlo v. De Witt,
36 N. Y. 340; Gray v. Barton, 55 ST. Y. 72;
The ac2 Schouler, Pers. Prop. § 66 et seq.
ceptance also may be implied whete the gift,
otherwise complete, is beneficial to the donee.
the donor, either actual or
But delivery
constructive, operating to divest the donor
of possession of and dominion over the thing,
is
constant and essential factor in every
transaction which takes effect as
complete
of the
gift. Anything short of this strips
which distinguishes
quality of completeness
an intention to give, which alone amounts to
nothing, from the consummated act, which
The intention to give is
changes the title.
often established by most satisfactory evidence, although the gift tails.
Instruments
may be even so formally executed by the
donor, purporting to transfer title to the
donee, or there may be the most explicit declaration of an intention to give, or of an actual present gift, yet, unless there is delivery,
the intention is defeated.
Several cases of
this kind have been recently considered by
this court. Young v. Young, supra; Jackson V. Eailway Co., 88 N. Y. 520; In re
Crawford. 113 N. Y. 560, 21 N. E. Eep. 692.
We are of opinion that there is lacking. n
ele ments to
this case two ot tne essentia
constitute
^ift Dyjonn u. j^eay 'fer ro his
so n of th emone.YdeTOsiied Jui^
TO
Itn intent tiTgivel an^' deliver of the sub;
"The only evidence
ject of the al eged'^jf
relied upon to establish an intent on the part
of the father to make
gift to his son is the
transaction at the bank on the day the deposit was made, in connection with the relano proof
tion between the parties. There
of any oral statement made by the father on
that occasion disclosing an intention to make
gift, and not a scintilla of evidence that
afterwards, during the 20 years whfch elapsed
before the son's death, the father made any
declaration or in any way recognized that the
money belonged to the son, or had been given
to him. Evidence offered on the part of the
defendant of declarations of John 0. Beaver,
made on the day of the deposit and afterwards, inconsistent with the theory of an intent to give the money to Asiel, were excluded, on the objection of the plaintiff.
The
acts of John O. Beaver after tlie account wag"
fclaim "
^gsga~leud aliroiiglji liJ"lTegatiYe~the
|bat the m oney was aepo sited with intBnt: t.n
TlJB Ttrawing out of the
^ive It to lilt) Mui
jnterest by John O. fieayer on' one occasion
ijis retBirttoff'of the jiass-T6oF^ir22"year3,
wTitteHTip" foiri "{Tine
and^bcuringj2To16e
Itrttnrarrtheiact that Tie'sbn, so far as'appears, never was mt6rmg(l~'of-1?hr''e3:tgtetree-

.

ia afflrnm^;ivfilY shown that. Asjel. who WaS
[Teii a minor, lived with his father, and had
go money ot nis own, an d the circumstances
are quite satisiactory to show that he never
at any time during his life knew of tfae DanK
the case turns
account . The question in"TEe
upon tEe legal effect of the deposit, made in
connection with the attendant and subse-
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of the account, — are strong indications that
oEnD . iJe aver did not make the depo sit in
a'pre st'be son's name, with intent WTnake
monev:' ~!rEe f allier "dea Tt
oQhe
with the accouriFas fiis own^^ and, if thecontfol lie exercised over it during -tlre'MTfroWty
o f Asiel could be reasonably expiainecro n the
t heory that he act M.8aJMaiatoal..eu3Fdian
Q£the-sQa^na.auc h expla nation is possihkas
of uie son after he
lo the 16 yea rs of the life
~

J

-gar^r

jl'paplip.fl

hia nilT^ioritv.

The' trial court iiaving found that there
was a consummated gift, which, of course,
includes a finding of an intent to give, this
court is concluded from reviewing the finding, if there was any competent and suflScient evidence to support it. The form of
the account is the essential fact upon which
the plaintiff relies. It may be justly said
that a deposit in a savings bank by one person, of his own money to the credit of another, is consistent with an intent on the
part of the depositor to give the money to
the other. But it does not, we think, of itself, without more, authorize an affirmative
finding that the deposit was made with that
intent, when the deposit was to a new account, unaccompanied by any declaration of
intention, and th^ depositor received at the
time a pass-book, the possession and presentation of which, by the rules of the bank,
known to the depositor, is made the evidence
of the right to draw the deposit. JTe cannot
close our eyes to the well-known practice o r
persons depositing in savings ban ks money
to the credit of real o r fictitious perso ns^itn
jyinTgnTKyrTof diveshTTigr thflmaRlves"ot ownershipi. It is attributable to various re asons,
—reasons" connected with taxation, rules of
t hp ba |pjs:„li mitinpf the amount which any one
individual may keep on^posit, thedesire to
o fetaTn~h'i g h T'aiBg'Of'fflra PgSt'Tytrgfe'th'ere is a
discriminaTioh based OH the' SlSo'ii nt^of deposTts, and JthA dBSira 0rl.JtI[e3art_WrQany
persons to veil or conceal from others knowlcases wTiere a deposit ornffiis^character is
made as a gift, tliere are contemporaneous
facts or subsequent declarations by which the
Intention can be established, independently
of the form of the deposit. We are inclined
to think that to infer a gift from the form of
the deposit alone would, in the great majority
of cases, and especially where the deposit
was of any considerable amount, impute an

intention which never existed, and defeat the
real purpose of the depositor. The relation
of lather and son does not in this case, we
think, strengthen the plaintiff's case.
It
may be true that, as between parent and
child, a presumption of a gift may be raised
from circumstances where it would not be
implied between strangers. Ridgway v. English, 22 ]SI. J. Law, 409. But wherte a deposit is made in the name of another, without any intention on the part of the depositor
to part with his title, he would be quite likely to select, a member of his own family to
represent the account, and in this case this

TRUSTS.

is the natural explanation of the transaction.
The circumstances of the erasure in the
declaration signed by John O. Beaver, and
also in the account on the books of the bank,
of the words, "Payable to John O. Beaver,"
throw no light upon the actual intention.
If they were originally inserted at the suggestion of John 0. Beaver, it would seem to
imply that when he came to make the deposit he did not intend to part with the control of the money, and it is scarcely presumable that he changed his intention at the very
If the words
time of making the deposit.
were inserted by the treasurer without authority, he may have erased them so as to
leave no evidence of an intent to evade the
law or the rules of the bank in respect to deposits, or he may have done it for some other
unexplained reason. Again, it is possible
that John O. Beaver desired that the fund
should be placed so that it could be drawn on
presentation of the pass-book, without the
necessity of a written order, and the erasure
In short, the reawas made for this reason.
son for the insertion of the words, and the
subsequent erasure, is matter of speculation
merely, and does not aid in the interpretation of the main transaction. There was not
only a failure to prove an intent on the part
of John O. Beaver to make a gift, but the
case is, we think, equally defective on the
The declaration and reproof of delivery.
quest drawn by the treasurer ran in the name
of Asiel, as did the promise recited to abide
by the rules of the bank. But it was signed
by John O. Beaver in his own name, and
not as agent for Asiel, and in law was his
request and his promise. John O. Beaver
took and retained possession of the passThe
book on which the rules were printed.
rules prescribed the undertaking of the bank,
and the conditions to be observed by depositors in requiring payment.
Under these
rules, John O. Beaver had the exclusive dominion over the account, and the exclusive
right to draw upon it so long as he retained
the pass-book.
It was his signature that the
bank had, and not that of Asiel, and the rule
authorizing drafts by the depositor only applies when the bank has his signature. But
the rule also prescribed that "no person shall
have the right to demand any part of his
principal or interest without producing the
original book, that such payments may he
entered thereon," and also that "all payments to persons producing the pass-books
shall be valid payments to discharge the institution." Under these rules, Asiel was
never in a situation to control the account,
while John O. Beaver had complete authority over the fund at all times. If John 0.
Beaver had delivered the pass-book to Asiel
with intent to give him the deposit, there
would have been a constructive delivery of
the subject of the gift.
In re Crawfordi
supra. But he never did this, orany equivar
lent act.
We think, for the reasons stated, that t he
plaintiff failed to establish a gift, or to' justily

■
"
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The question of gifts, in.
connection with deposits in sayings banks,
eo uentlv Considere d
Ws of J '^tfl Yfara hapr) -^^iThe preby the courts in various states.
ponderance ot authority seems to be in favor
See Robinof the views we have expressed.
son V. Ring, 72 Me. 140; Burton v. Bank, 52
Conn. 398; Marcy v. Amazeen, 61 N. H. 131;
Eq. 352, 7 Atl.
Scliick V. Grote, 42 N.
Sep. 852; Scott v. Bank, 140 Mass. 157, 2 N.
E. Rep. 925 ; 8 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, tit.
"Gifts," and notes. The cases of Howard v.

J.
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Bank, 40 Vt. 597; Blasdel v. Locke, 52 N.
H. 238; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78,— go
the furthest towards sustaining transactions, similar to the one in question, as
gifts, of any we have noticed, but they are
from
distinguishable in material respects
Our conclusion is that the cause of acthis.
tion in this case was not made out, and the
judgment should therefore be reversed, and
All concur, except
a new trial ordered.
Danfokth, J., dissenting, and FmoH,
not voting.

J.,
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BATH

SAV. INST.
(33

A-

Judicial

Supreme

836,

v.

TRUSTS— VOLUNTARY TRUSTS.

HATHORN

et al.

88 Me. 122.)

Court of Maine.

June

7,

1895.

Report from supreme judicial court, Sagadahoc county.
This was a bill of interpleader brought by
the ijat n savrngTlnsn'tunoB" agains t tne d efendant Hathnm— aa.. aamig lstratOT ofjthe
estate
of Henry Walker, deceased, _ and
the title
■SgaTnst Alice B. Fi les, toTdetermiae
"
g ' CeHam d6^6S lt in 'that Tnstitu aon:"'
W
"
The course of procedure adopted by agreement between all parties was this: Each
defendant filed an answer, and thenj__by
agreement, a ae'crefftirffi'fefpleader was filed,
and 'by'Tu xffief agre §geffl~it was'sH^
that" the~ answ ers sho uld" be taken as_J;6e
set down
plea^Sings' infBe case, anBTlEe'cause
for"Eearrrig on "bill, answ erirand jBSiSC. and

visit, who expressed her satisfaction thereat
family as hoii^e.
■rs^^ott. who was in the
keppor for nbnnt ai-y veara. go ing therp h a.
fore Mrs. Walker's de a.th, bmw t^^ i^ff^;.
three different occasions,
and Mr. Wniifp,^
exnlajped to her, also, whnn shp spnlfp
.gfjtfi^
gelng in trus t, that the book was for Alit^p;
and again, just a few months before h ia
"
geafBTIafter he TiaJ tSe July dividend add ed.
he was examining the book, spoke of It as
Alice's Dank book, and asked Mrs. Trott"~tQ
guess how m uch It had gained.
She tSfl
Mm sne''"sirppo sed It was between ten h uiidrea and "eleven hundred dollars, and liis "reply w5ill_::^flu are pretty gpog t9r guessing:
'You guessed pretty nearly gi ght; andl Eat
will be a great" Seip to Alicfi. won't it., Mrg
TO^t T*^' Cecree against estate.
Orvllle D. Baker and Lieslie 0. Cornish, for
Alice B. Files. Charles W. Larrabee^ for defendant Hathom.

that Miss Files be regarde d as" plaintiff in
, suit. It thus bethe_contInuaMeI2I3tTje
HASKELIi, J. Henry Walker, of WooL .
a suit in e2uit2_bj_Alice
came^ ^actically,
B. Files against~tE e' administrator o f Henry , wich. died, solvent and intestate, ucton er z/
Walker s^state. The facts in the casewere" 1S91, l eaving brothers and sisters and neph e ws and nieces, put neither wife nor childr en.
practically undisputed.
"
His
wife died January 1. 188ti.
She waS
IfeatSgBry
Walker
^0,ctober
died
It_aEp.ears
^
cousin to the father of plaintiff. Alice~^.
leaving neither wife no r_ childre n,
2, 1891,
his wife iravlng'_die3^earljj[ix years Jbefore.
Fil^s~of Wins low, who knew the old peop le
as uncle and_ aunt, and seems to have been
Tbelr_hoine was in Woolwich, opposite. Bath,
always .•ffifilcoiiafi-at their 55Sa£and_a "~~
favorite
and Ml^' Bjne^who^ was a second cousin
with them.
of MrsTWalker, frequeMly visited there, And
On July 1, 1882, Mr. Walker deposited In
"Mr. and" Mrs. Walker often visited the Files
the Bath Savings Institution $700 "in trust
family in Winslow, th^'two famittes^belng in
for Alice B. Files," saying, in substance, that
. <jlb"se and
intimate relation s. On July 1.
he wished it to go to her at his decease.
sum of $700
\ 1882. Mr. Walker deDosit"ea~TJie
That deposit remained Intact during Mr.
In th e Bath Savings Institution In his own
life, and at his death amounted to ,
ust
Tor" Alice B. Files?' and
Walker's
naraeTTSuT^'Wti'
foofc""ouF a depositor's book in that form^
something over $1.000. He always retained
At th e time of making the depo^it_he_had a the b ook, .and it wa s found among his paEpnver§atlBTr"Hittnl33ErB^giijr^_of the bank
pers"^ his administrator , the defendS t,
as to its form, and the treasurer told him
"wHcTnow claims the deposit as a_gartof his
ffiaFif 'Tie j)ut"jEhe booJF in any .ojae's name,
esEafe. 'The" evidence sho ws tSat Mr."!SraI K6T
Tnlended ^Ee'deSosit for Alice at his decease.
l5"trust Tor any one, it would_go to that perSoh at hisTd ecease; antif "Mr. Waiker said h e ■but-nave r,QQ,mmunlcated bls-intentipn to her.
yisfaedTrto.^ that he w ished it to go to Miss
The„aH.tborities all say that a gift inter
n accorda nce with his direction, the
EIoa_.miiat . be comBSeTllTEe donor^ must
^Files.
signature book, which all depositors _arej;edivest himself of all domjaipn, over the 'ffiing
glyenTand'the title^tp it must pass absolutely
qnlrea" to sign. wlS^igned by Mrs. Potter,
Northrop "v.
thea a clerk in the bank, ia the same form ,
anff irrevocably tof the ..dpnee.
' ^enry
'Walker, i'n'trust for^Alice B. Files,
Hale, 73 Me. 66; Dale t. Lincoln, 31 Me. 420;
or Woolwich."
Mr. Walker retained the
Robinson v. Ring, 72 Me. 140; Bank v. Fogg,
Bank book in his possesjiqn^ever
82 Me. 538, 20 Atl. 92.
aflJSPJ'TjTlt
ItBrar' drew ;afiy 'part^of ""the principal or JnA voluntary trust is an equitable gift, and,
iferest therefrom,, but took the book tD„the
like a legal gift inter vivos, must be combank occasionally to have the accrued diylplete.
A declaration of trust as effectually
Sends _added.
one occasion, ■"■vMy~soon
passes the equitable title of the fund to the
On_"
aHer the deposit "was made, .MJss Files', siscestui as a gift inter vivos passes the legal
te"r, now Mrs. White, was visiting
title to the donee. The distinction between
._at„ his
house, and saw .the book, among some other
them is of a technical nature. In a trust,
the real title vests in the donee, but the legal
papers that he happened to be examining.
'^ "
She tpoF~it jlEi/aHariooked af it," saw'The
title, perhaps, carrying control of the property, may be placed elsewhere; while in a
fcEKL_ftt entry, and he told her then, "Yes,
Mat is for Alice at my decease,
gift both the real and legal title instantly
and the next
'
fall to the donee. ItjsjaLnece c Baryi th a w*
^iiTbe for jou;^" and Mrs. WKftelcommBnt
cated this information .to. Alice, her sist».
fOESj. that h a who .^.ecIaEeS a tma^ should diImmediately on her return home from the
veBt.himself of tile legal title, Tf, perchance.
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may have been communicated to her
of
by others, but never at his request or with
his knowledge. What evidence, then, operates to pass the equitable title In the deposit
to her? He had consummated no contract
with her, 'liis int engons^were~E^r7n'"Eis
H couIdJgaTe"'wit£"drawn the
ow n breast
a new
^05§21-St-8iBS^ time, .a»d have~made
disposition of it, and she may not have been
Ww^lifljEaXjaiLhe knew. iris lust' as
essential, to establish the trust fought to
be set UP lier e..ia prjve .sa;©,e„act mlIM B^rt
of the dono that sh all oper^_to pass Jhe
equitable title to the done
as It is tojwve
delivery in
gif LJBlig?. .BYPS- "Botli 'fequire
the same essentials. In both, some titl
TTinst nns H from the dnnorj differing only in
A gift must be executed by delivdegree.
ery; a trust, by declaration.
In Bank v. Fogg, 82 Me. 538, 20 Atl. 92,
the donor deposited a sum of money in the
name of the donee, subject to his own order,
with intent that, at his death, it should go
No trust was claimed or
to the donee.
shown. It was an unexecuted purpose, an
Ineffectual attempt at testamentary disposition.
In Parcher v. Institution, 78 Me. 470,
Atl. 266, a depositor caused to be entered
upon the bank ledger words, In substance,
"Payable also to Mrs. Leavitt in case of my
death," and it was held no gift.
In Curtis v. Bank, 77 Me. 151, the entry
of "Subject also to" the donee was held to
constitute no gift, but that a subsequent delivery of the bank book completed the gift.
In Barker v. Frye, 75 Me. 29, a deposit in
the name of the donee, subject to the order of
the donor during life, afterwards changed by
erasing words giving the donor any control of
the fund, and after notice to the donee of the
change and that the bank book would be
delivered to him the first time they met, and
after his reply requesting that the book be
sent to him, which the court says "was an
acceptance of the gift"
was held that the
gift was complete.
The same doctrine Is held In Northrop v.
Hale, 73 Me. 66; Robinson v. Ring, 72 Me.
140; Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 231, 17 Atl.
63; Parkman v. Bank, 151 Mass. 218, 24 N.
E. 43.
All of our cases require something more
than a mere intention to give, a promise to
give, or an expectation to give.
Benevolence
alone will not do. There must be beneficence
also.
The mystery sometimes supposed to
exist about
trust cannot change the nature
of a transaction. A voluntary trust is a gift,
and requires all the essentials of
plain gift
to sustain it
In Dresser v. Dresser, supra, writing specifying the terms of
voluntary trust, and a
delivery of the trust property so that the
dominion of the donor over
was thereafter lost, la a good example of a trust of
this sort
In Alger v. Bank, 146 Mass. 418, 15 N. E.
916, the donor made
deposit similar to the
a
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he so does it as to transfer the real or equitable title to the cestui ; fo r th e n tie creates
an estate reaiiy no longer his own. He may~
retain" tne iegai 'TOI5r~aYing"'Eim^'e coB tfol,
but for the bene fit of the cestui, accord ing
to" iEe~tenns_flf_J:he trust . Mis contmCbe comes Bub.iect to the direction of courts of
equity, that always supervise the adinlmstratinn of trusts
T hey are the children of
and canno SVCregjjjty. They spring trom
vlve without its aid and control. The trustee is merely an agent to administer them,
and nothing more.
An express trust of lands can only be created by some writing signed by the party or
his attorney (Rev. St c. 73,
11), but gutoJSt^f per sonal prop erty may be created or eclared by parol .",
necessary, however, to
clearly establish the terms of
and sho w
an executed gift, so that th equitable title
nail have passed to the donee
elteCTPally
as a gift i'flipr Tri^"g
GeiTish v. Institution,
ias Jviass. 159; Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Me. 48.
Says Lord Cranworth: "If a man chooses
to give away anything which passes by delivery, he may do so, and there is no doubt
that. In the absence of fraud, a parol declaration of trust may be perfectly good, even
though it be voluntary. If
give any chattel, that of course passes by delivery; and if
expressly or impliedly say constitute myself trustee of such and such personal property for a person, that la a trust executed,
and this court will enforce It, in the absence
of fraud, even in favor of a volunteer.
•
The authorities all turn upon the
question whether what took place was a declaration of trust, or merely an Imperfect attempt to make a legal transfer of the propIn the latter case, the court will afei-ty.
ford no assistance to volunteers; but when
the court considers that there has been
declaration of trust, it is a trust executed,
and the court will enforce It, whether with
or without consideration." Jones v. Lock,
Oh, App. 25.
In this case, the deposit is Sg, tJnft 71" "t* of
Standin
the donor, "in trust for the donee."
alone, this entry does not work an afcsolu'te,
"a' dry trust,
form
Tn dispntable gi ft in
t^e
^hat is. a tnTst wftfeont limitation ofcondifi^.„.that-inay be terminated at the will
of_^e ce stui^ but extrinsic evide nce is comBrabrook y.
pete nt to contro l__ia,„£gect.
BanS, 104 Mass. 228; Clark v. Clark, 108
Mass. 522; Powers v. Institution, 124 Mass.
ClifC. 593, Fed. Gas.
377; Stone v. Bishop,
No. 13,482; Northrop v. Hale, 72 Me. 275.
The evide nce discloses that, at the time the
expressed
esire
donor made the deposit,
IWi the
(Jonee'sfa'oura'm^fFthe
morieTat his
"
SfcgPtgWly Shows iigintent'to art
S^at .
with Se legal title at an earlier da y. SJ,^
^id to have subsequently made talk of the
but he neither informed th
same purport
donee of the deposit, nor made any effort or
did any act to appris^ her ofjti.or of his inten tion concerning lt.'~TSe^ poslTon his par
was
both voluntary and sec ret. Information
■
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 26
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destroyed.
case of In re Smith's Estate, 144 Pa.
St 428, 22 Ati. 916, a lad of years went to
live with his uncle. When the lad was 12
the uncle placed $13,000 in bonds in an envelope, on which he had written and signed
a declaration that he held them for his
nephew.
The bonds remained in the uncle's
jKDssession until his death, and the court held
completed gift in trust for the nephew.
In Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt 571, 25 Atl. 487,
the court says: "A completed trust, although
voluntary, may be enforced In equity.
It
not essential that the beneficiary should have
had notice of its creation or have assented to
it. The owner or donor of personal property
may create a perfect or complete trust by
his unequivocal declaration In writing, or by
parol, that he himself holds such property in
The trust
trust for the purposes named.
equally valid whether he constitutes himself
been

3

In the

is
is
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it
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a

a
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it

a

a
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or another person the trustee."
In that case a father deposited money in
savings bank in the name of his son, naming
It appeared that one mohimself trustee.
tive of the father was to avoid taxation; but,
said the court, "that fact does not negative
the Idea that he also Intended to create
trust for the benefit of his son. It is perfectly consistent with it, and the retention of the
pass book is not Inconsistent with such
purHe must have retained
as trustee."
pose.
Ray V. Simmons, 11 R.
266, is in point.
One Bosworth deposited money In
savings
bank In his own name as trustee for
stepdaughter. He did not tell her what he had
done, nor show her the pass book.
He kept
that himself. After his death, the court held
that the stepdaughter was entitled to the
money,— that the transaction constituted
trust in her favor.
So Is Martin v. Funk, 75 N. T. 134.
Susan
savings bank "in
Boone deposited $500 in
trust for Lillie Willard." Susan kept the
pass book, and LIUIe bad no knowledge of
until after Susan's death.
Want of notice to
Lillie, and the retention of the pass book by
Susan, were urged in defense; but the court
gift In trust completa This
held
an exhaustive case, and contains a review of authorities by Chief Justice Church prior to
1878.
So Is

Minor ▼. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512. A
widow deposited $250 In her own name, "as
trustee of William A. Minor," the child of
neighbor. The child knew nothing of the
deposit until after the depositor's death, and
meantime did not have possession of the pass
book; and the court held the trust complete,
and allowed a recovery of the money from
the depositor's executor.
So is Re Gaffney's Estate, 146 Pa. St. 49, 23
Atl. 163. It appeared that Hugh GafEney deposited $560 In his own name, as trustee for
Polly Kim, and the court held the entry itself
prima facie evidence of the trust, and, unexplained, sufficient to uphold it.
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sistent, and squarely hold to the doctrine
that a trust in perso nal property may be
createTT By pai\)l, 'Sira tuat a deposit in ba^
THay~15e explained or
iB"IEe15am3~or*3Ht(tiraf
c5iltr 6U6d ^y avWe ncfe btitSfldg "tEe~wrfHen
terms ot the deposit. Iff this "caseTTire terms
of the~dep(5siFclegBy show an inten ded trust
in favor of the donee, but may be contro lled
This "evio f limited bv extrinsic evidenc e.
d ence confirms the trust, sho.'m ag.^at . it
s hould c ease.at-the dgatb .Qf the donor, and
ttaLthe legal titJe__shC!Uld__then "pais to the
cestui.
When the deposit was made, the
orTEg" bank- toM-irhe"-donor that,
treasurer
'
a01s~ 3"ec"ease, th e inbiiey would go to Jthe
the doii or replieJ ISaF^as his
donee, "an
A the' subsequent acts ~a5"d~"fle"clarawigJtL.
ttona of the donor stiow the sam intent. ~^^ha
gift cannot be upheld as a n ab solute gift
nter vivos, nor as a gift causa mortis, for
defivefy of the res,
these gifts require
c'SffipiStrtransfgr Dftltle. They "ffiffer" from
ar^FTTn^vstia that they purport to, and
must, pass' the whole title, so that the donor
can have uuj ggS'mi "on or control over them.
Bura~gift in 'trust with'EoIgs~ the l^aTtifle
from the donee . It may be transmitted to
third person, or iEffla£ he -retained, by the
in eiffier case ,the equitable title
donorj_^j3ut
has gone^irom him, and unless the declaratiopoftrust contains the jower of gsficg."tion, ~of~the 'wIde"giicretion of chancery atEq. 558;
tachgL.(Coutts V. Acworth, L. R.
Eq. 44; Everitt
Wollaston y. Tribe, L. R.
Ch. App. 244;
T. Everitt, L. R. 10 Eq. 405;
15 Ch. Div. 570; Lister v. Hodgson, L. R.
Eq. 30; Sharp v. Leach, 31 Beav. 491; AnGifC. 154; Toker v.
derson V. Elsworth,
Toker, 81 Bear. 629; Phillips v. MuUings,
Ch. App. 247; Smith v. IlifCe, L. R. 20 Eq.
666; Welman v. Welman, 15 Ch. Div. 570,
De Gex,
578, 579; Prideaux v. Lonsdale,
J. & S. 433), it leaves him powerless to extinguish the trust. Of course, the trust must
be established by proof, and the fact that
no evidence of
voluntary trust once created
remains, or can be shown, does not alter the
principle.
Many rights fail of enjoyment
from the lack of evidence that might once
be adduced.
So, a secret trust may be valid
when it can be proved; but if the donor conceals the evidence of it, and later appropriates the fund to his own use,
is simply
wrong on his part, that prevails because
of his perfidy, and goes unpunished and un-

noticed because unknown. The cestul's rights
are the same, although his remedy may have

a

one under consideration. It was in his own
name, as trustee for the donee, his housekeeper, who claimed the deposit as a payIt was shown that,
ment for her services.
shortly before his death, he told her, "I put
it in for you;" "that money is yours;" and
the court held that the judge, who tried the
case, was authorized to find a perfected gift,
if he chose to do so.
Some of the cases are in conflict concerning
the question now under consideration, more
in the application of the law to the evervarying facts in the numerous cases than
otherwise; but our own cases are all con-

a
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In Gerrish r. Institution, supra, the court
says: "No particular form of words Is required to create a trust in another, or to
make the party himself a trustee for the benefit of another; that it is enough for the latter purpose if it be unequivocally declared in
writing,— or orally, if the property be personal; that it is held in trust for the person
named; that when the. trust is thus created,
it is effectual to transfer the beneficial Interest, and operates as a gift perfected by delivery."
The same case holds that notjcsLtp JHfeeJtlfilleficiary l&. nnnecoggg'-y wi^'"''' t'ift transactio n
is clear; ^utW-hen ambiguous, or suscep tible
of different Intemretations, it removes the
4piiS;.

Some of the earlier Massachusetts
cases seem to hold notice to the beneficiary
essential to the validity of a trust, but, when

403

in the light of this case, rather
consider the notice a controlling than an essential element in the creation of a voluntary
trust. T he prevailing doctrin e now is that
notice is un necessary, Put, wnen shown, has
.-— — controlling, e ttect;
In this case, the entry "in trust for" Is o f
clear and unmistak able tingort^ an d ^uflSc ient
to cr e ate a prima"Tac ie_teBSt. It^__mlght_have
beeii "controlled by evidence that would have
gEown"y ^rityary7intentlQn.-- butlgSsEI evidence Is wholly _^aBting.
Mqrepyer. all t he
declarations^ acts, and conduct of the donor
are consistent with~the presumption _arlsing
from the entry Itself, and show that It expresses 'the true import of tie "tfansaction,
Mid creates,?!,
completed trust- in -fa«or..Qf.J^e
'
j^neSr
Decree accordingly.'Vith
costs against the
considered

estate.
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COX

et al.

compe tent, and in whom co nfidence can be
then said trustees_^UalL.flaIiflQalai
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is .Jthe__£allo.wing"'me_balaBce "of
my said estate, upon t{ig„jia.ppepins~(vF~5Trptr —
doSHHgiacsiijrtz., th death of my daughter
wittout issue^ wish divided equally between the 'House oTThe Good Shepherd,' "sit-Egtagr-st MeatEd-m- tue city of
Mi sOrphan Asylum.
souri, 'Balnt Joseph IZal
Washington City, Distric of Columbia, and
•Saint Ann's Infant A sylum,' of 'Washin gton"
Cfly,_District of ^Columbia.''
The Mary L. Walsh mentioned in th will
was the only chl la ana neir at law 6f MTied July 18. 187
cha;^^_Wa"Is^ ja"na __ she
leaving pl
iii
alntSs
her
at law and"nex
heirs
"
oTBn. Defendant is administrator de bom
non of the'Oharles 'X'. ij.o(;tges mentioned in
the wil and who alone- quaiiH ed as tr ustee!
TEe~coirHnsent beneficiaries. Tor whom de-"
fendaiit clalm^ to hold possession, ^fe duly
"

f

o

e

5,

e

s' t

^ianized^brpora1ioni~carrying'22Z^l2E-.

jects for which they were In corporated
J. P. Garesche and E. Lane, for apMUler.
pellant
James M. Truitt and Rice
for appellees.
&

""Alex.

SOHOLFIELD,

J.

tojaiifiLJacJa_o£_afila6a.

since._ the_naked~les»,ll tJt,liff.J^''"'t nnntrnl, wb
suflici enf to show that title is not in
^hink
appeiiees."~'ag irTE"e Judgment below cannot,

p

therefbreTbe sustained .
5^e'rule~is, undoubtedly, as claimed by
appellees' counsel, that trust ees must be resu med to ake an jes]l;a| :e onl comm en-sufirFe
with tfe charges or„f^^|;fes iniP <ig^^P them
but this, howeyer,,Jg,_giiblgcJt_ia_the_SEi.'^i^"
cation that such presumption shall be eon-
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dtgpssargr ^aia'Tstatr'ffrsE air in ffia judgmentDenetit~a'ngr increase "tSe^yalue' of said
estate; anT'especTany'do
design and direct
Cha rles Tr'So3ges,''one^f'''my'''sard"t rustees,
t'o Sel Tall the real es tate belon ging to me and
situated in the town of Pana, gtoisOan counfy," TlfinoisTlS' the 'town of Stanton, Macoupin
county, Illinois, and "Tn'the 'towns of Litchfield, Hillsboro and WaiarraiSTMoh^Smery
■ -—
*
,cOtoaJClHnflJs.„. •
desire and direct that said trus"Second.
tees '^igniTi gyrsr'ggmgr't g
nirTmarT^ of
sairestate"'to*my beloVieiil'Saughter an3~only
cm Id, Jviary .Liucy waisn, su cn installm ents
of jnoney "as in" theTudgment of_my said
trustees|shaH be deem ed^proper' andjuMclent
to meet her current expenses, and provide
heFanlimple and comfdfKble^^iupport.
"T hird. W he n my "said daughter," M ary
IjUc£jiVals"B, snail arrive " atthe full age of
thirty-flve"years,~and~ is then jiamarried,
de,sire 3fliC direct _-tKaXjny_said__estate shall
be transferred to her by^ my_ said trustees,
and ever thereafter said estate shall'vest in'
and be under iierjihsnlyte control.
^er
"Fourth,
provided that
Is, howeve
my ^id daughter should, on or^ before her
thirty-fifth birthday, become, married to
pereon who shall be deemed andjcoMldfired
by my said trustees as a person worthy and

vrhich
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"First. desire and direct my said trustees
jmy said
to ass ume anataKe entire control
estate aurlng the term
terms and under
expressed, to colthe con"3itions "fiereinafter
l^raTlJouSSSginj^ auel^.'^jei}ts, profits and
iWeres ts of whatever character, derived therefrom, nd tp govern and contro all such tnf^esTs^ai' may accrue "and" arise to said es*faEgrtnnintnie to'fiine," ahd~"Io~make"such

d

ever^

tate sEall vest absolutely in and be under
the control of said dau ghter, provide sFe
sffirribeof theage of tTriiTvlTye years. *~*~*!r
"Seventh. In_cas my said daughter shal
die without issue, it is m v wish and will,
and" hope it may meet with Jli^_aEEroBP
Hon^ that the wholejof Jmy_jaifl-.fi§tete shall
figjligcgggd. "f as follows, •gi'i-" Then foTIoW
certain specified
legacies
tp individuals,
amounting, in he ■aggr.egate.~Eo $^,<iUO, afte

e
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Mic h ael Wals h died on the 23d day of September, 186X,"leavffl|Ti -;wnr containing the
following' pro visions :
"
g'Tolny worldly^ estatp. all thft rpa l. .susshall
gular , persoqq l^and mixed, of which
dleseised and possesSCTr'Sr*f6''WKig g 'may
be eniitigq _aper_m£^aecea'se ,Jafter ''^^ payment of all just debts, demands and funeral
cTiarges, T''ESrgBy"grari f, devise, "convey and
confirm unfo" HoratToTI7~Van de'vee r, of "TayaSg^C
lorviIIe,T!TCTI§'tiatf'co1mWrTinnois,
aoages, oi \Vals hville, Montgomery cou nty" lllmoisr" and Andrew^ Sproule, of Saint
iioms" Missouri, reposing ia,„,^fij3j3£-sajd. pers'ons'ful
trust and confidence: in trust, howtor the to Howing purposes ^,!

I

—

t

"

"Fifth. In_case said daughter shall
birthday. ma.mei to
her thirty-fifth
yipv.
son" whorfr'sa'id Trustees shall consider
nj^
diem ncompetent and unworthy, and no
Suitable person w ho should have any carg^ nr
control of said estate as usbaad., the" «^i(
estate sEalT continue and remain vested In
said trustees n trust; and desire and direc
said trustees to continue to make paym ents
to said daughter, in such a mounts ana~at
"
such tinies^asln
the^ .ludg iiiient they mav
fEmkproper, and the circumstances and sta"HoSTof said daughter ma
demand: ana ~ig'
case of~the denth of su ch hu sband, said es -

I

Appeal from circuit court, Montgomery
county; Charles S. Zane, Judge.
Ejecitaent by GeorgeJTj^ Cox and^ others,
the''5"eirs 'at"law of 'Michael "Wal^sh, deceased,
agalnsF"Thomas 0. KiriilanSi "IfusTee" of "the
esmr of -^mr-dgceasedv •' THere'"^^f judgment for plaintiffs, and defeUd'Mt aHliyftls.
' '"
'
«—— ~«..^
'Ksrapseff.- '

that such_ erson is so
tneyJffeiBcSie~satisfied
worthy^ place Jbe-jg ^iole of said estate unde
the control of mv said daughter,
and ev pithereafter said estate hall be vested in her
name, and under jaer aTOOTtltg control for-

t
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operation of the statute is excluded, and the
wifif) ttiP intPTitinn of thfi party creflti ne; the trust as manifested by the words
trusts or uses remain mere equitable estates.
So, if the trustee is to exercise any discreemployed In the instrument by which it ~is
ahelley v. Ijidlin, 4 Adol. & El. 582created,
tion in the management of the estate, in the
investment of the proceeds or the principal,
1589, 31 E. C. L. 143; Cadogan v. Ewart, 7
or In the application of the income, or if the
Adol. & El. 636, 666; Da vies v. Da vies, 1
purpose of the trust is to protect the estate
Adol. & El. (N. S.) 430, 41 B. 0. L. 611.
for given time, or until the death of some
Under the statute of uses, which is in
*" And again,
hp.re. whsre an estate is conveyed
to
one, or until division.
f^e^ij
in regard to enlarging and extending estates
one person for the use of or upon a trust for
given to trustees, the same author, in secanot her, and nothing mr irp is Hairt,_thp stjit"So, if land is devised to
nteimmeffi atelv transfers the le^al estat e to
tion 315, says:
trustees without the word heirs, and a trust
fBe 'use. a nd no trust is created, altho ugh
Perry,
is declared which can not be fully executed
express words of trust are used.
'
^uSLb, S liSJS. And so we nave expressly
but by the trustees taking an inheritance,
the court will enlarge or extend their estate
held.
Witham v. Brooner, 63 111. 344; Lynch
into
fee simple to enable them to carry out
V. Swayne, 83 111. 336.
observed, has referen ce
Thus, if land is
the intention of the donors.
^ut this, it will be
conveyed to trustees without the word heirs,
what are som eonlytSTpa ssive trusts, or
"
in trust to sell, they must have the fee, othertimes~terme d simple or d r^ trusts; an"d in
legal
wise they could not sell. The construction
e state never vests "in the
^uch casesflSe
would be the same
the trust was to sell
leoltfee tor a moment, pm i s inst-nnt^neonsiT
the whole or part, for no purchasers would
transferred to the cestui que u se as soon as
be safe unless they could have the fee, and
2 Bl. Comm.
the use is decla red!
(Sharsa trust to convey or to lease at discretion
wood's Ed.) 331, 332; and Witham v. Broonwould be subject to the same rule. A forer, supra.
an estate is limited to trustees and
It is said in Perry on Trusts (section 300): tiori,
"Although it Is probable that it was the Intheir heirs, in trust to sell or mortgage or to
e., of uses) to convert
lease at discretion, or if they are to convey
tent of the statute
the property in fee, or to divide
equally
all uses or trusts into legal estates, yet the
among certain persons, for to do any or all
convenience
to the subject of being able to
legal fee." See, also,
of these acts requires
keep the legal title to an estate in one perto the same effect. Hill, Trustees (4th Am.
son, while the beneficial interest should be in
another, was too great to be given up altoMees. & W.
Ed.) 37G; Rees v. Williams,
749.
gether, and courts of equity were astute in
In thos cases where the legal fee is not
finding reasons to withdraw a conveyance
vested inlBFgUS tE
fw Trgf eoiiree, in"ffie
from the operation of the statute. Three
absence of "a""3evise prevailing to"!!!^ conprincipal reasons or rules of construction
'
were ,tfa3^,' vest Tn' the heir at'iaiW:" And-thCT.e..a!:e_
were laid down whereby conveyances
SLdnty
excepted from such operation: First, where "TaTsso casesjnjygsli, Jt, hasang.
gf
coP'^sy
a use was limited upon a use; second, where
to_the hi^r at law,
the^ustee to
a copyhold or leasehold estate, or personal jr[wiir"Ee*^resumed, "after the lapse of contime, that^sucB~conveyance has
sideraBre
property was limited to uses; third, where
Hill, Tfiisfees (4IE"SmrB3T401;
such powers or duties were imposed with the Feenmade.
Perry, Trusts,
350; Gibson v. Rees, 50 111.
was necestate upon
donee to uses that
essary that he should continue to hold tbe 383; Pollock v. Maison, 41 111. 516. But
be, that there is
legal title in order to perform his duty or Is not claimed, nor could
In all of these three in-\ any foundation for such presumption in the
execute the power.
""
stances courts, both of law and equity, held
inJD5Ts|^re'e(Jfar"
'
"Tactslfbund
use,
Cornell,
but
execute
the
67,
did
not
In
Hari-rs
80
111.
it was said,
that the statute
v.
was before the referring to Hardin v. Osborn, Sept. Term,
that such use remained as
statute, a mere equitable Interest to be adof
1875, that it had been held the purposes
ministered in
court of equity." And again, a trust having been accomplished, the owner
said: "The third rule of
in section 305, it
of the trust became, by operation of law, reinvested with the legal title and could sue
construction is less technical, and relates to
in ejectment. .This was unadvisedly said.
special or active trusts, which were never
A rehearing was granted in Hardin v. Oswithin the purview of the statute. Thereborn, and the opinion therein referred to was
fore, if any agency, duty or power be imlimitation to
In McNab v. Young, 81 111. 11,
withdrawn.
posed on the trustee, as, by
language of like import as that used in Hartrustee and his heirs to pay the rents, or
ris V. Cornell, supra, was used upon the auto convey the estate, or if any control is to
thority of the same case, although
be exercised or duty performed by the trusis therein erroneously referred to as being reported in
person's maintee In applying the rents to
60 111., at page 93.
The case there reported,
tenance, or in making repairs, or to preserve
sum of
of that name, does not discuss that or any
contingent remainders, or to raise
kindred question.
money, or to dispose of the estate by sale, in
The true doctrine in regard to active trusts.
all these and in other and like cases, the
*
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istees,._

tEe~&
—
TSejjrop^ y
BeirSad

is devised to the trustees to
conveyTlf they deem It advisable, o r

-control .until , it
tft 1i}e transfffl;
red as directe d: and In he contingency that
was "intended tha t-it- should
has arisen,
make-thg-egHalbe" thejd!]t;^_CTTEe]teusteesJ:a
division of the property between the corp oraSons "'designated and convey it accordingiv:
ifl

toJiol5.jflfl.

eralty,

is

^

in sev
to these corporations
not as tenants In common, an
fle must necessarily rest on the co ntheir
Veyaufce of jjy? ttMStefts—
"*
Whetherttie corporations can ho ld or not
T he wor(!^~^f~tfae-de Is not now material.
flseshow the ntention of the testator th at
fee, whether ~he
THa~TmBfR^;a-~^]l5uid
take
wailnlstaken In the" law as respects the obfOT'tlie'grant

d

and

orporations

diBefence "would

hp,^ if_the_(;
TiTff^ta'icp'.-l^tiirtriistee
s. instead

^an-

of holding the

legal title in^frust for them, hQldJtJa-tnist
the "hellrs^ at lawT-SIu; Trustees (4th Am.
Ed.) '^"§7 209.
^e le gal title, then, being In the trustees
the heirs"~at~fcrw- cuuld not maintain eje ctP erry, Trusts, §§ 17, 328, 520; Hffl; —
Bient.
Trustees (4th Am. Ed.) 422, 423, *2T4; Id.
482, *317;
Id. 672, •428; Id. 784, •503;
Bull. & T. Trusts & Trustees, p. 811.
The judgment of the circuit court
re-

for

,

Is

ring without their fault.
*^^ entire-contgol
T^J°. Y°n" "ippr'v f^a'gq
and managjmgBt.jQtJth£-§§tate to ,jthfi_taistees
uSHTTilary Lucy should_ arrive at the age of

—
payment of^theTSums-'diiiieeted-to-be-^aldr^o
Mary TCucy. The pdweFlmpilsaTirHell, is to
sell the whole title,— and_to~tHiiTs~essential
the "power to coii'v eyThar tiHSi"reqa aing, as
g-'COndltlon pi'ari^ Uent, a tee-simpie estate in

t

* ~*"~T' hereby grant, devise, con"•
sessed,
"vey and conflrm
unto" JBffgii|OKIWst6es),
"
^alimst," etc. He then directs his said
trustees to assume and talie entire control of
dues,
to collect all outstanding
his estate;
rents, profits and interests of whatever charand to govern and
acter, derived therefrom,
control all such interests as may accrue and
arise to said estate from time to time; to
malie such disposal of said estate as shall
in their judgment benefit and increase the
value of said estate; that said trustees "shall
pay, or cause to be paid, out of said estate,"
Mary Lucy, "such installto his daughter,
ments of money as in the judgment of said
trustees shall be deemed proper and sufficient
to meet her current expenses, and provide her
support;" that
an ample and comfortable
said trustees should transfer his estate to his
said daughter upon her reaching the age of
35 years, she being then unmarried, but if
then married, they are directed to" transfer
the estate to her only upon the contingency
that they should deem her husband a person
In whom confidence might be placed; but If
the trustees should deem the husband an Incompetent and unfit person to have the care
and control of the estate, they are directed to
continue to make payments to his daughter,
"in such amounts and at such times as In
their judgment they may thinli proper," and
and station of his
that the circumstances
that In the event of
daughter may demand;
the death of his daughter without Issue, certain specific legacies, amounting to some $2.600 In the aggregate, are given, and the balance of his estate is to be divided equally between the House of the Good Shepherd, Saint
Joseph's Male Orphan Asylum, and Saint
Ann's Infant Asylum; and he then exempts
his trustees from liability for all losses occur-

a

wiir Bisifresttmrai'ittfflggr direct
proof of the fact.
"'■"
The language of Walsh's will is: "As to
m y wor ldly estate, all the real^^^gerspnjil and"
mixed, of which' rshall^ie^eized and pos-

\

faao n veyau t'e

.35j:£S3Sr:^lSi- JSaaaadadr.
died before she reached that .agfi. the fpntriy)
*aifd "mkhagement of the" estate continued to
'TEe'' Jlanguag.e.effl .Blb'yed"
'■awolve__upptrth^nl.
so pla inly conveys this idea that it can ad'
mit "of no "conSoversj .
disposal
power
^'to make such
of ^he^
The
estate as shall," in th e judgment of the trna te es, "benefi t and~^ereage the value of said
estate,"— as als o the duty of paying Hafy
Lucy ""such.."lnitall ments of money as in the
trujlees sBall b e proper an d
■JuHgment^of^said
sufficient to meet her cun'ent.SBffi§es_and
"
provide an ample and comfortable support,
-^necessarily Imply'The power to seii th e
lands _a nd convert them into money or inte"r"est bearing securitie s; tor tnis migni w eilpln
"theHudgment'ortge tr ustees, penent ana ih pe essential to matte
crea'ge~tKe~Sgtate7'and

it

and that adhered to by this court, is expressed in Valletta v. Bennett, 69 111., at page
636, that where the leg al title i s vested in the
'
trustee, nothing "short of a reconveyance" can
Elace^ifie legal title TbaicF in the grantor or
his heirs, subject, of course, iol&e. qualiflcasuch
"tion "BSat, under certain circumstances,

I
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versed.

Judgment reversed.
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DELANEY t. McCORMAOK
(88 N.

Y.

Feb. 28, 1882.

Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme court, in the Second judicial
department,
entered upon an order made the
second Monday of December, 18S1, which
affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintifC, entered upon a decision of the coiui: on trial at
special term. Reported below, 25 Hun, 574.
This action was brought to obtain a construction "X tnt TTill nf il ph" Walsh, late of
The clau ses
the city of New York, deceased.
fit the will as to which therewas any conxfonrp as follows:
vOT^Y
"Thirdly. give, devise, an d bequeath unto
my said son James, duriHig' hia liaiural lift;,ail the rents, is sues, an d profits or my re al
estate, and in case he loarries and has lawf ul
issue, then and in the last-mentioned ev ent
give, devise, and oequeat h
and thereupon
to my said son James ali and singular m y
real estate, wnatsoever ana wneresoever, to
have and to hold, the same to my said son ,
his heirs and assigns forever.
"Fourthly. I desire my exec utors to keep ^
the buildLng5~on my fSill <iiiltlt(i msufed
against '""« tf rlgmflffp bv fire,ja.nia in repair,
and to n ^y «" tHYPg , ^gsiBf!j^ment s,~and dtnef
charges thereon, and al§o the interest orTinby" moi^gage tSigrggHT~'a'B gr If
(JumBtances
nece ssary, they are authorized to receive sut ^lent of the rents to enable them so to do ;
and in case of damage or loss by fire th ey
are to re cmvft the avails of the insurance ,
and to repair or rebuild; but this clause 6t
my~will is only to nave eHect until my sa id
son James shall have lawful issue; anT 1
also authorize my said executors, until tha t
event, to raise, by mortgage of my real estate, o r any part thereof, whenever and "as
often as shall "Be "ne^^sai'y, d'similki' amount
'
ffi y m ig-^State,
BM 18 llltiw ~bn "m ortgag'e "o
Ee'prgSSHngrortggg e
tgflerewltElo' aiicEarget
""""
if necessary.
'
"E'ifthlv. in case of the death of my son
James without ever having had any lawful
desire my executors who shall the n
issu e.
be s urviving, or the last survivor, to sen all
my real estate, and to distribute the proceeds
as personal
thereof amongst my next of kin
'
estate, according to the laws of "lEe~s~tat r"of
"New !^ork tor the distri bution "oT inteslat e
aupersona l estate; and tor th af purpose
^faonz e my said sufviving executdr^ or" the
last surviyiir ttr eTtkiUCti gbod, valid, ana~sufScient conveyances in the law to~ transfer
said estate, and vest the same in the pur gngSeF ^nd purchasers m i!ee simple.
appoint mv beloved wife, and
"J jasfly.
my beloved son James, and my friend Tig he
TJavey to OS tll6 executors of this myT ast
"'
ana tPstamPUT.
The testator died in 1836. leaving. Burv lyIpg him, his son James, one nephew, th e
jialntiff herein, and four niece s. 3^m
died In 1880. unmarriea, and having had no

I

I

r

I

I

I

^

Issue.

l}efore

1T4.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

^py ftTscntorB died
T^ie two ot
him, as did also the four nieces of
the testator: TEe~ai^^^SIai01ifi-jcEff
dren of said nieces.

lawful

et aL
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John W. Goff, for appellant McCormack.
Luke F. Cozans and J. Woolsey Shephard, for
appellants Walker et aL John R. Kuhn, for
respondent

FINCH, J. The testator gave to his son
James the whole of his real estate for life.
and absolutely and in fee, in case the so n~
married and had issue; but if he died without naving nag lawful issue, the testator directed his executors who should then be sur>iving, or the _last survivor of them, to sell
his real estate and distribu te 'tBg^proEfeEds
among the testator's "next of ki^'as per^dYiai estate, according "to~the laws of the
-State" of "New Tori"," for the disttibuflon of
" execu tors
"
~^^^lns~--^^rstmsl^e^'te.''_^Tbe
named
were the testator's wiie,Ziua_ son
James, and his friend Tighe Dave y; all of
~
whom'are dead. JamfC died .without ha ving had lawful issue.
At testator's death his
next of ki n were his^sdSTam^four nieces,
■and"a nephew,
who is the p resent plaintifC.
'rne rotLl- nieces died during 'tlie lifeti me of
James, but leaving childr en who are defendants here"' and c laim aifinterest'm the proceeds of the real esta tgi, or in the" real estate
TEsel f.
At_ the d ateofthe death o?~James
"
the plaintiff was th e sole nexFoFETof the
testator, and claiming the entire proceeds of
the real estate, br ought an a.ctio h for a" conStruction' of the wilTliiid the appointment
TJf a tl^tiStee to" cafry^^nts unexeculgd "provisions. 'TSe triar court' ^termined that it
"
EaH" j urisdicfion" to* appoint a trustee," and
maKii sncl^ flpp^fntrnpnt. and that. the plaintiff was entitled t o the entire proceeds of th e
real estate a fter'payment of the liens.Jhgr?Tha Qudgment was affirmed, and. the
on.
child ren of two of _ae nieces bring Jhis^ap"

peaT.

i-Tis contended in their beha lf that the deviseTo"james, before marriage and The birth
of Tssue, was but a life estate; that tfie remalind er in.fee vesteg~af"tEe""deatB' of testator in his heirs at l aw; that the four nieces
and plaintiff took svich remainder in fee as
!Kaiif8~ln"'common, siibject'to "be 'divested
"by "the marriage of James and. birth of lawful issue; that this co ntingency not havin g
occurred fETe f ee was hot" divested"; and that
IfcaM6t'"be~divested~by
a sale" of the"T'eal
estate And dlBpositlOH CTthg gTOgSear as_£ersonalty because the power' jofjag^ven to
was a mwe naked power, not
TEe~executors
coupled with any Interest; died with the do"l ^Bgto whom it w as given; jmd^ cannot be
^ecute'd' Dy a'^^irfjttE-eauity.
'It mlgEEprove to be the better opinion
that James took a base, or determinable fee,
subject to be dTvested upon his death withouf ''H aviHg"had- la-wful issire,- so that -during
his lirig"tB^e ^as no fragment of fhie estate
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p'e

Vision, reachihgjih'e'em'^ency ~gf~t
dtia Ui
B!r[^e_ grantees,, bec omes appiicap ie. it" is
enacted (section 162) that the provisions of
relating to exsections 66 to 71 of article
press trusts, shall apply to powers In trust,
and section 68 of that article confers up on
the coH rt. ..upon thejSJ^ST^^^e surviving
nd" permit
trustee, his power and duties^
them t<r be exercised by some person appointed for that pu rpose under the directio n
oT the court. The statu tes ther efore answer
"
the whole argum ent of the j!j)£dlaBts.
The
flower in trust confe rred upon the fiTceniitora
di
not ie with them, but surviv ed and^^^
vested In the courts of equity having rliU
ower to compel the execution or the trust
In Catton v. Taylor, 42 Barb. 578, there
Is any thing to the contrary, which seems to
be the fact.
was decided without reference
to the statutes and does not alter or modify
our conclusion. The power In this case was
It was not
general, In trust and Imperative.
of a character personal to the trustees as involving the exercise of their individual choice
and discretion, and might as well be executed
Probably
by persons other than themselves.
would have survived before the Revised
Statutes, but certainly remains and is enforceable since.
Assuming
hen the validity of the rust
power "anythe juris diction of equity to pny
vrag^for its "exercise." the appellants still CBBfend thaf_the "next of kin " to whom the
groceeds" of the real estate were to be distrlHuleiSC are the persons or their representa-""

other man the
of such power^ is desigBafed as enfitled'to'tbe proceeds,' or any portion oTtEe
proceeds, or other benefits tsLresuUfrgmThe
alienation of the lands according^to the pow-

grante

e

It

t

,

person'' or class of persons,

t

A_

'

f

i

if

It

/

WIt Mn this definition the general power conferred upon the exec utors to se ll the
lands and distribute the" proceeds to tf^^f^.
tor's nexf or¥iii was a po wer in trust, In the
'execution -Qf-wttlgHtKggrantees had no in^r rest, for, although Jame s was one of them,
the power, by its terms, w as to De exercis ed
upoh"ms~asatgra5g"Tn~an event which TeR
film witEoul any interest in its executionT
TBese" statutory definrtTons seem to us entirely accurate and clear and scarcely need, at
least for present purposes, the "authoritative
exposition" invoked. A power to be exercised by the grantee, not at an tor his o wn
beneflt bu t wholly and entirely for th e bene-"
some other person or class of perscms,
^necessa rily e xCTcise a by such granteeuf a
jifust capacity. "TfEe element or trust mheres
In its' substance and is its essential and vital
characteristic.
The statutes then provide
that every trust power shall be Imperative,
and Impose a duty upon the grantee, the
performance of which may be compelled in
equity, unless in a case where its execution
or non-execution Is made expressly to dep^d
upon the will of the grantee, and does not
cease to be such even though he may have
the right to select some and exclude others
from among the objects of the trust Sections 96, 97.
So far, it is determined for iib.
that the authority granted to the executom
of John Walsh is a general power In trust,
and imperativ e. Being such, a further pf6-~

JEJ!

d

,belra. at law,, but Ihe
character of_hls interest need not be particu"laMy discussed
the power _otf_salg. Jur vWed
the de ath of^the-gsecutors, and the re al-es.That
jateJsJa-be-dfet*ib«ted_aa_DgESfiaaltyis the vital point in th e cas^ . and the appellant's view of it Is sought to be sustained by
to the rule at common law,
a reference
which, it is said, the Revised Statutes have
not seriously changed, but have omitted any
provision, express or implied, which gives
the court authority to appoint a trustee to
execute a naked power. The argument turn s
in the end upon the single inquiry whe"ffier
tiie authority given to the executors to sell
is_a jnere naked poyVSl^tft & gWeV IBTfruSt
asijts^gxecution "" imperative. T^e statutory
the
pro YJ^ions must control and determine
'
Jesuit, and render unnecessary any "aiscussion or examination of the cases previously
decided, which were not always harmonious
and in some instances not easily reconciled.
They were very ably and patiently examined
in Dominick v. Sayre, 3 Sandf. 555, resulting
in a general conclusion that the statutory revision substantially followed and adopted the
rules of the common law, departing from
them only to remove doubts and secure greatBut in any event
er accuracy and precision.
the statutes must furnish the rule by which
we are to be guided to a conclusion, for they
provision abolbegin with a comprehensive
ishing all powers as then existing by law,
and making their creation, construction and
execution to be governed by the' succeeding
1 Bev. St. pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, art.
enactments.
A power ip there de fined to be "an
3, § 73.
author!to d6 B( iTTT* :rii • n*7a rj ! rrtTW771
or the creation of estates therein, or of charges thereon, which the owner granting orreserying su£lLJiQB:er.-icughtJii.mself .JaffifuUy
perform."
Section 74. The authority here
given to~the executors of John Walsh to sell
tSe lands and distribute the proceeds In th e
event of the death of James" without having
Bga'"lBgPe~wag -ggffriy ' a "p6^eT WTthin""tfie
sjatu torr defljiiflm^
general
and not a s pecial power, for the former exl8ts"w£efe the authority permits the alienafibii 'm ;Tgr T)y ffieasr'ot a cofl^^1tmr 6,~will
w'c ha.rge'of the' Ian5s' e mbraced in the powe r
to toy alien ee wnatever tsection Tt), gpd the
latter whe nth e anenatlon" m us t be to desig or interest
natedjjrsonSL.OT.of_aij£Ss_estate
'
A
78.
cnitlnction
is
Section
|SSa__a_Jee.
then drawn 'between cases In which no per^
son other than the grantee of the power has
any Interest In Its execution, in which case
the power, whether general or special, Is denominated beneficial (section 79), and cases
in which the grantee has no interest In its
execution, but holds it for the benefit of others.
generaL p ower is. in tmfit "yhon any
_to_descena_upon.^hls

d
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issue,- aoJJiaLtae..BeaMBS-SEaatlves who we re such at the date of the
in^ had lawful
plainly postponed and the gift wa s future.
title testator, ana not those
who
death
'
There is the further and ImportanTfact that
•were juch at the da'teanBe'aMtE"8rT5 mes.
at the death of James the la nd-was to be conThere is no question here of (.he sutiHtiliylou"
verted into personalt y and be distributed as
of the power of alienation, for the sale and
such, and the very subject of the gift^ was
distribution awaited only the termination of
a single life; but nevertheless the argument
not to corne mto existSce'Tffltn "ffie jpreof the appellants proceeds, and must necesscribed c ontingencv. _' Vincent v. NewHoiise,
sarily proceed, upon the idea that the next 83 N. Y. 511; Hoghton v. Whitgreave, 1 Jac.
of kin of the testator at his death took vest& W. 145.
The case therefore falls within
ed interests In a legacy, payable in the future,
the r ule that where the gift is money, and the
"
since otherwise the right of each would lapse
clirection T Of tM (!OMV(!r! j m h ifpgoimertire ~iegacy given to a cl ass of persons vest s m" those
and nothing would pass to their representaig
tives.
Who answer tne aescriptlon and are "capable
^ft frift tn thff nPYt ^ff
I^nt thorn
kin, and no language importing such gift, ex - flf taking at the~Hme~o f "cHstrLljution.
Teed
— arflding to these
cept in tne direction io convert the real esV. Morton, 6() N. Y. 50B:
tate Into TiiuuHj i aiig iiinh ma ke aismbntib n; considerat ions the incongruity of a construcMmself
ana m such case the rule Is settled th at time
tlon which" woTiTa*~IHBTnat-imHregamong the next of kin in the testator's mmd
IS annexed to the substance of the "gift and
Jthe vesting is postpone d. MUCH more lU Urn fr and intention, we"5re"enHreiy clear thaiT the
true where the girt is only to vest upon the i^ourts belo w correctly, daclded JMt.the next
happening of a future contingency, until th e of kin entitled were those who answered
occurrence of which It is uncertain whet hCT a that de scription at "tSe^date of TEe ~5istribugift will hp made at all. Warner v. JJurant, Jtion. We disco ver therefore no error in the'
,-™™— —
76 N. Y. 136; Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer.
d iBposl1J on_ of thq ase,","™^
387; SJmlth v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92. Here
with
The Judgment should ~^ affirmed,
'

,'f

il

to the suDstance of the gift . It was condltloned npop the death of James witiiout hav~

costs.

All

concur.

Judgment affirmed.
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JACKSON
(14

Supreme

Judicial
Suffolk.

V.

PHILLIPS

Allen,

of Henry Blackwell of New York,

et aL

539.)

Court of Massachusetts.
Jan. Term, 1867.

■

_BiIl in eqnity by the executor of the will
of. BofifoTl
for InHt.nKItlons a a ^o the validity ,and effect of the following beguests and devis^
""""Articleitli. T give and beaueath to Wil-

of Francis Jackson,

liam Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Edmund Quincy, Maria W. Chapman, L. Maria
Child, Edmund Jackson, William I. Bowditch, Samuel May, Jr., and Charles K. Whipple, their successors and assigns, ten thousand dollars; not for their own use, but in
trust, neyertheTess, for them to use and
p end at their discretion, without any respon•sibility to any o ne, in such sums, at such time s
a]5g~s uch places, as they deem best, for Ibe
prepftrapon and c ircula^on, of J^S^. newspapers, the delly^'ljf Spee t^hffS'i.le<?t,lirpg, and
such other means, ««, ^^ tlie ir judgment, will
create a public sentiment that wi ll. put_an
and
eaS tynegro sla yer:p| in t^ 'j' V"iTOtTyithem a board of trustees
SOT eSyconsti'flite
t6t that purpose, with power to fill all ya^
cancies tnat may occur trom time to time by
death or resignation of any memt ;iff or of
any omcer oi said board , A-nd
herebZ -flPpoi nt Wendell Phillips president, Edmun d
surer, gjid C harles K. Whipp le
acKson trea
"
Other
s ecretary ,^9^ said. .bo ard, "■f.tm^t.ftps.
bequests, hereinafter made, will sogn e£_sii
later revert to this tward of trus tees. jMy
^ire is that they ma y pecome a permanent
organization ; and hope and trust that they
sorvi ccs ano s ympathy. 1^
wijii rpr.ni'Yfi fir*
donations and bequests, of the friends of th e
' sjiaie^give and bequeath to the
"Article 5th.
board of trustees named in the fourth article
of this will, their successors and assigns, tmt,
thousand dollar s, not for their own use, ottt
in trust, nevertheless, to be expended by them
at their discretion, without any responsibility
to any one, for the benefit of fugitive slaves
who may escape from the slaveholding states
of this infamous Union from time to time.
"Disregarding the self-evident declaration
of 1776, repeated in her own constitution oif
1780, that 'all men are bom free and equal,'
Massachusetts has since, in the face of those
solemn declarations, deliberately entered into
a conspiracy with other states to aid them
in enslaving millions of innocent persons.
have long laborfed to help my native state out
of her deep iniquity and her barefaced hypocrisy in this matter. I now enter my last
protest against her inconsistency, her injustice, and her cruelty, towards an unoffending people. God save the fugitive slaves that
escape to her borders, whatever may become
of the commonwealth of Massachusetts!
give and bequeath to Wen"Article 6th.
dell Phillips of said Boston, Lucy Stone,
formerly of Brookfield, Mass., now the wife

^
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I
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I

I

I

I

and Susan

B. Anthony of Rochester, N. Y., their successors and assigns, five thousand dollars ,
not for their own use, but in trust, nevertiieless, to be expended by them, without any
responsibility to any one, at their discretion,
in such sums, at such times, and In such
places, as they may deem fit, tp seciire the
Dassage_^ laws granti ng women, ^whethe r
inarrled or tiniffamea, tne'risht to vote: tg
hold offic e; to noigj manage, and devise prop .
ferty; and all other ci vilriglitn rnj^Tffftjj]^
men ;^ and for the prggjfafion and_cijcu
tion of "ESbks, the aelivery or iectiu:es.. -And.
such other means as tney may judge best;
aSaThereBy cbniattlte-tBSmXBeaTa-snrustees for that intent and purpose, with power
to add two other persons to said board if they
hereby appoint
deem it expedient And
'
Wendell Phillips president and treasurer, and
Susan B. Anthony secretary, of said board.
direct the treasurer of said board not to
loan any part of said bequest, but to invest,
and, if need be, sell and re-invest, the same
in bank or railroad shares, at his discretion.
further authorize and request said board
of trustees, the survivors and survivor of
them, to fill any and all vacancies that may
occur from time to time by death or resignation of any member or of any officer of said
board. One other bequest, hereinafter made,
will, sooney or later, revert to this board of
trustees. My desire is that they may become
a permanent organization, until the rights
of women shall be established equal with
those of men; and hope and trust that said
board will receive the services and sympathy,
the donations and bequests, of the friends of
human rights. And being desirous that said
board should have the immediate benefit of
said bequest, without waiting for my exit,
have already paid it in advance and in full
to said Phillips, the treasurer of said board,
whose receipt therefor is on my files.
now give to my three chil"Article 8th.
dren equally the net Income of the residue of
my estat e, dur ing the term of their natural
l ives, in the follo wing manner, nam f^y: Af*'^'"'
the payment of my debts and the foregdng

I

I

I

I

I

I

srftsjSjr^tfteflis,

t fiia.;^£ui.e.at]r^r^

vise one undivid ed third part of the residue
of my esta fej^ real, person al a pd Ttijjjpfi, to
my broth er Edmund Jackson of said Boston,
his successors
and assigS, not for his or
their own use, but in trust, neverthele^
vjith Jul! , powe r to manag e, sell and convey,
invest _and re-invest, the same at his di soifi!:
■nSh, wltii a view to s afety and profit;" and
""the whole net Inco me thereof shall be paid
semi-annually to my daughter^llza F. iSgHy,
ailWag her naturaLl ife:" "and at hefTecease,
Mie-half ^ such lngflpie_trt b" .naj d semi-an Sually* ''iE~the boaird of tr ustees constituted
in'Jtse-SJsffi aJtT3e.WjQnOEiILiaJi)e_.^2^^"
§d by them to p romote the intent and puir^eJEfeein directed,— aBd.-tiaa-othe9:..baiLis^
Lizzie F. Bacon, ]ier da lighter, durlBg^jg'
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S. B. Sewall, for one of the trustees.
W. Phillips, for others of the trustees. S.
Bartlett and J. Q. King, for certain heirs at
law.

I

r

jsi

e

r

o
e

iof

t

t

it

c

I

i

g

I

'

I

e

JamegJackBon, during the term of his natural life; at his decease,
direct said trustee,
<h: whoever may then be duly qualified to execute this trust, to pay semi-annually onehalf part of the net income thereof to the
board of trustees constituted in the fourth
article of this will, and the other half-part
of said net income shall be paid semi-annually to his children equally, during their
natural lives; at the decease of all his children, if they survive him, I direct said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly authorized
to execute this trust, to pay and convey the
whole of said trust fund to said board of
trustees constituted in said fourth article in
this will, to be expended by them for the Intent and purpose directed in said fourth article; but, In case my said son James should
leave no child living at the time of his decease, then, at his decease,
direct said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly authorized to execute this trust, to pay and convey
the whole of said trust fund to said board
of trustees constituted in the fourth article
of this will, to be expended by them for the
intent and purpose therein directed."
By article 10th, t he testator made a similar
and devise of th ^ i-pTTigiTiT hg flntH -'
l^fiqBg gt
yidedThlfd part of said rj^ldue to his brotb erOeorge .Tg^frgnTl. ^'"° successors and assigns,
and in trust to p&y the whole net income
tha-eof semi-annually to the testator's daughter Harriette M. Palmer, diuing her natural
life, and at her decease, one half of such Income "to the board of trustees constituted In
the fourth article of this wUl, to be expended
by them in the manner and for the intent
and purpose therein directed;" and the other
half, in equal proportions, to all her children
that may survive her, during the term of their
natural lives; and, at their decease, to pay
and convey the whole of said trust fund to
said board of trustees; "but, in case my said
daughter Harriette M. Palmer should outlive
all her children, then, at her decease,
direct
said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly
authorized to execute this trust, to pay and
convey the whole of said trust fund to the
board of trustees constituted in said fourth
article in this will, to be expended by them
as aforesaid."

e

9th, the testator gave ano ther undivided third part of the said residue to hi s
brother Edmund, his success ors and assigns,
in trust. With likepowers of mahq ,KP"Tpi"t ~5Tifi
invesFtment. "and the whole net in c omp-thPToOf shall be paid Spmi-HnnnallY trwny son

e

^-

By article

6,

"

rected."

GRAY, J. This case presents for decision
many important and interesting questions,
which have been the subject of repeated discussion at the bar and of much deliberation
and reflection by the court
The able and
elaborate arguments of counsel have necessarily involved the consideration of the fundamental principles of the law of charities,
and of a great number of the precedents from
which they are to be derived; and have disclosed such diversity of opinion upon the extent and application of those principles, and
the just interpretation and effect of the adjudged cases, as to require the principles in
question to be f uUy stated, and supported by
a careful examination of authorities, in delivering judgment.
L By the law of this commonwealth, as by
the law of England, gifts to charitable uses
are highly favor ed, and_^U_ be__most liberally constmea m order to accomplfsh the in~
a nd trus ts
tent and purpose^ of the^donor;
which can not be upheld in ordinary cases, for
various r easons, will be es tablished and ca rried into
Lncre ated to support a gift
'to a cha jitpblp nsp.
The mos t ImportanFd istinction between charities and othe r truStglS
in the time of duration allowed a^^e JSe^
gfeeof^definrtgiess" 'required . The faw
__ _ does
"not allow property to be maSe imTienable, by"
means of a private trust, beyond the perioa
prescribe d by_ therule against perpet uities,
being a life or liYM'TnTiat(]g;"ajia~fwen'ty-one
ea rs attervyardsj "andif the perso ns to b e
enefited are uncertain anff^HfflKt oe ascerSined wi^EmtSar rieriod." thrgif t wTir Ti~
judg ed void, and
esulting tr ust declared for
?ut-a ..iail3lic
' ^he heirs at law or distri butees.
or char itabl trust" ma!y
perpetual in its du7ation,'aS g"may leave the mode of application
arid the~selectlon of parficu afoBjects'to'th
discretion of the trustees!
Sanderson"
v.
White, 18TTcE"3331-Daeirvr Odell, 10 Allen,
and authorities cited; Saltcnstall v. Sanders, 11 AUen, 446; Lewin, Trusts, c. 2.
Each of th bequests in the will of Francis
Jackson, whlcE^ co ur la a!jlfeain~tEis"case
to_ sustain^ as cEaTlt aEIe^ '"Ti'TQ^ a permj^nggt
boardof tru stees, fojr a pu rp.Qse.stated in gen eral "Cems" only.
The questira
tlie valid"ity
these trusts is not to be determined by
the opinions of individual judges or of the
whole court as to their wisdom or policy, but
by the established principles of law; and does
not depend merely upon their being permitted
by law, but upon their being of that peculiar
nature which the law deems entitled to extraordinary favor because
regards them as
charitable.
U has been strenuously contend er^' for tho
heirs at law that neither of jie purposes declared by .tlifiJeatatmcJla haritable ^ ithin tffe
fatent and purview, of St 43 Eliz.
c.^ which
^jLadmitjaJae mft.iaaffi.(^Ba5est'aaiC^I^Bge
of what ar in law charitable uses.
It becomes "^S^fefeary
tEerelore to consider the
spirit in which that statute has been consti-ued and applied by the courts.
of

nni]

5,

at tha dwpagp nf Ivith
p ay and conveT th e
wnoie or saig trust tund to said board of
ftustees constituted in the sixth article of thi s
^ill, to pe expendea oy them m the riiann er,
and for the Intent a nd purpose, therein "di~
natura I__Hfc:

Inother^d daughter, "to
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The pjeamble of the sta tute mentions thr ee
classes of charitabl e ^fja, namely, FirstTFor
the relief and assista n ce of the poor and
needy, specifying only "sick and m aimed sol"gdncatl on and p refer2^ra^^Mfijaaiiners,"
ment of orphans." "marri ages of poor maids,"
"supgortation, aid and hel£^f_joiiiig teadggand p.eysgjag" decayed."
men,_.^n3i(saJtaEBfin_,
"relief or redem pti on of prisoners and cap ^

tives,'^ and assistan ce of poor Inhabitants In
paying tax esT elthier"?br civil or "military objects!
gcond : b' gt the p fomotlHg ot educaS^
'Son, of which the only kln3s ^iiciBea'iri the
statute (beyond the "e3ucatlon"'an3r' preferment of orphans," which seems more appropriately to fall within the first class) are those
"for maintenance of schools of learning, free
schools, and scholars of universities." Third:

For the repair and maintenance of pub lic
building s and works, under which are enumerated "repair1)i: ports, havens," ana~"8eab5iiEs,"'lor promoting commerce and navigation and protecting the land against the encroachments of the sea; of "bridges," "causeways" and "highways," by which the people
may pass from one part of the country to another; of "churches," in which religion may
be publicly taught; and of "houses of correction."
It Is well settled^ that any purpose is charitable in the legal sense of the word, which is
within the principle .and reason of this_statand
ute, althou^_n^ exgressl^namedjn_it;
fBany 6fc|ectshave been upheld as charities,
which the statute neither mentions nor distinctly refers to. Thus a gift "to the poor"
generally, or to the poor of a particular town,
parish, age, sex, race, or condition, or to poor
emigrants, though not falling within any of
the descriptions of poor in the statute, is a
good charitable gift.
Saltonstall v. Sanders,
11 Allen, 455-461, and cases cited; MagUl v.
Brown, Brightly, N. P. 405, 406; Barclay v.
Maskelyne, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1294; Chambers v.
So gifts for the promoSt. Louis, 29 Mo. 543.
tion of science! learning and useful knowledge, though by different means and in different ways from those enumerated under the
second class; and gifts for bringing water into a town, for building a town-house, or otherwise improving a town or city, though not alluded to In the third class; have been held
to be charitable. American Academy v. Harvard 'College, 12 Gray, 594; Drury v. Natick,
By
10 Allen, 177-182, and authorities cited.
modem decisions in England, gifts towards
payment of the national debt, or "to the
queen's chancellor of the exchequer for the
time being, to be applied for the benefit and
advantage of Great Britain," are legal charities. Tudor, Char. Trusts (2d Ed.) 14, 15, and
Sergeant Maynard, long before,
cases cited.
gave an opinion that a bequest "to the public
use of the country of New England" was a
good disposition to a charitable use. 1 Hutch.
Hist. Mass. (2d Ed.) 101, note. And It may
be mentioned as evidence of the use of the
word "charitable" by the founders of Massa-

chusetts, that it was applied by the Massachusetts Company in 1628, before th^ crossed
the ocean, to "the common stock" to be
"raised from such as bear good affection to
the plantation and the propagation thereof,
and the same to be employed only in defrayment of public charges, as maintenance of
ministers, transportation of poor families,
building of churches and fortifications, and all
other public and necessary occasions of the
plantation."
1 Mass. Col. Rec. 68.
No kind of charitable trusts finds less support in the words of St. 43 Ellz. than the large
class of pious and religious uses, to which the
statute contains no more distinct reference
than in the words "repair of churches."
Such
uses had indeed been previously recognized
as charitable, and entitled to peculiar favor,
by many acts of parliament, as well as in the
courts of justice. St. 13 Edw. I. c. 41; 17
Edw. II. c. 2; 23 Hen. VIII. c. 10; 1 Edw.
VI. c. 14; Anon., And. 43, pi. 108; Pitts v.
James, Hob. 123; Cheney's Case, Co. Litt
342; Gibbons v. Maltyard, Poph. 6, Moore,
594; Coke's note to Porter's Case, 1 Coke, 26a;
Bruerton's Case, 6 Coke, lb, 2a; Barry v. Ley,
Dwight, Char. Cas. 92.
In the latest of those
acts, the "erecting of grammar schools for the
education of youth in virtue and godliness, the
further augmenting of the universities, and
better provision for the poor and needy,"
were classed with charities for the maintenance of preachers, and called "good and godly uses;" and grammar schools were considered in those times an effectual means of forwarding the progress of the Reformation. St.
1 Edw. VI. c. 14, §§ 1, 8, 9; Attorney General
v. Downing, Wllm. 15; Boyle, Char." 7, 8.
Sir Francis Moore, who drew St 43 EUz., indeed says that a gift to maintain a chaplain
or minister to celebrate divine seryice could
not be the subject of a commission under the
statute; but "was of purpose omitted in the
penning of the act," lesti in the changes of
opinion in matters of religion, such gifts
might be confiscated in a succeeding reign as
superstitious. Yet he also says that such a
gift might be enforced by "the chancellor by
his chancery authority;" and cites a case in
Duke, Char. Uses
which It was so decreed.
(Bridgman's Ed.) 125, 154. And from very
soon after the passage of tiie statute, gifts for
the support of a minister, the preaching of
an annual sermon, or other uses connected
with public worship and the advancement of
religion, have been constantly upheld and carried out as charities in the English courts of
chancery.
Anon., Gary, 39; Nash, Char.;
Dwight, Char. Cas. 114; Pember v. Inhabitants of Knighton, Heme, Char. Uses, 101,
Toth. (2d Ed.) 34; Duke, Char. Uses, 354,
356, 381, 570, 614; Boyle, Char. 39-41; Tudor, Char. Trasts, 10, 11.
So in this commonwealth, trusts for the support of public worship and religious instruction, or the spreading of religion at home or abroad, have always been deemed charitable uses. 4 Dane,
Abr. 237; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536; Go-
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the words of Sir Francis Moore, be "according to the laws, not against the law," and
"not given to do some act against the law."
Duke, Char. Uses, 126, 169. So Mr. Dane
defines, as undoubted charities, "such as are
calculated to relieve the poor, and to promote
such education and employment as the laws
of the land recognize as useful." 4 Dane,
Upon this principle, the English
Abr. 237.
courts have refused to sustain gifts for printing and publishing a book inculcating the
of the
absolute and inalienable supremacy
matters;
or for the suppope In ecclesiastical
port of the Roman Catholic or the Jewish
religion, before such gifts were countenanced
by act of parliament De Themmines v. De
Bonneval, 5 Russ. 288; Tudor, Char. Trusts,
21-25, and cases cited. And a bequest "towards the political restoration of the Jews
to Jerusalem and to their own land," has
been held void, as tending to create a political revolution in a friendly country. Habershon V. Vardon, 4 De Gex & S. 467. In a free
republic, it is the right of every citizen to
strive in a peaceable manner by vote, speech
or writing, to cause the laws, or even the
constitution, under which he lives, to be reformed or altered by the legislature or the
people. But it is the duty of the judicial department to expound and administer the laws
as they exist. And trustg.,,:ffikQ§e„»jexB«essed
to nring.atoaaLiaaaa£e§.iH,.]aeJim5
\Siywm
or the politlc^JBgtitutions
of the^.cpjjjito:
pe, n ^^ajitable in.aHCh-a.,sens&,^lJtp„l)e
entitted topeculiar^favor,^^^;^gtectio^^
BSJfipFiiafinfi~'ySytr'^^j^ ;T1jpi,ptpi;S_^j%fJ:hose „laws
Pgip-nprl t» mnrlify nr
siiT^tSey are
rl

ifl

Ing V. Emery, 16 Pick. 107; Sohler v. St
Paul's Church, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 250; Brown
V. Kelsey, 2 Cush. 243;
Barle v. Wood, 8
It is not necessary in this connecGush. 445.
tion to speculate whether the admission of
pious uses into the rank of legal charities In
modem times is to be attributed to the influence of the civil law; to their having been
mentioned in the earlier English statutes; to
a more liberal interpretation, after religion
had become settled In England, of the words
"repair of churches," or, possibly,
of the
clauses relating to gifts for the benefit of education, in St. 43 Eliz. ; or to the support giv•en by the court of chancery to public charitable trusts, independently of any statute.
It
is suflicient for our present purpose to observe
that pious and religious uses are clearly not
within the strict words of the statute, and can
■only be brought within its purview by the
largest extension of its spirit.
The civil law, from which the English law
of charities was manifestly derived, considered wills made for good an* pious uses as
privileged testaments,
which were not, like
other wills, void for uncertainty in the objects, and which must be carried into effect
even if their conditions could not be exactly
observed;
and included among such uses
(which it declared to be in their nature perpetual) bequests for the poor, orphans, widows, strangers, pilsoners, the redemption of
captives, the maintenance of clergymen, the
benefit of churches, hospitals, schools and colleges, the repairing of city walls and bridges,
the erection of public buildings, or other orPoth.
nament or improvement of a city.
Pand. lib. 30-32, Nos. 57-62; Code, lib. 1, tit.
2, cc. 15, 19; Id., tit. 3, cc. 24, 28, 42, 46, 49,
57; Godol. Leg. pt 1, c. 5, § 4; 2 Kent, Comm.
(6th Ed.) 257; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1137-1141;
McDonough v. Murdoch, 15 How. 405, 410,
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A precise and complete definition of a legal
charity is hardly to be found in the books.
The one most commonly used in modern
cases, originating in the judgment of Sir
William Grant, confirmed by that of Lord
Eldon, in Morice v. Bishop of Durham,
Ves. 405, 10 Ves. 541— that those purposes
are considered charitable which are enumerated in St. 43 Eliz. or which by analogies
are deemed within its spirit and Intendment
—leaves something to be desired in point of
certainty, and suggests no principle. Mr, Jimney, in his great argument_m_tttgJaliaaL^jll_
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Charities are not confined at the present day
to those which were permitted by law in EngA gift for the
land in the reign of Elizabeth.
advancement of religion or other charitable
purpose in a manner permitted by existing
laws Is not the less valid by reason of having
such an object as would not have been legal
at the time of the passage of the statute of
uses.
For example,
charitable "Case, 41, aeflneOISbadtebielflLBiaBa.^^
•charitable
trusts for dissenters from the established
tgjje iwhatever is given for the love of God,
or ttsr the love of your neighbor, In the cathchurch have been uniformly upheld In Engolic and universal
land since the toleration act of 1 Wm. & M.
fr"om"1ffiese
' ^ense^given
"
tliese ehdS— ree" troin the
c. 18, removed
the legal disabilities under "moHvSr and
Attorstain or tainto ?_every cSSSCTeiFaHi^i^EaY^s
which such sects previously labored.
And this definey General v. Hickman, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 193, jgerignal,..prlvaii or selfish,"
nition has been approved by the supreme
W. Kel. 34; Loyd v. Spillet, 3 P. Wms. 344,
court of Pennsylvania. Price v. Maxwell, 28
•2 Atk. 148; Attorney General v. Cock, 2 Ves.
Pa. St. 35. A more concise and practical
Sr. 273.
And in this country since the Revorule Is that of Lord Camden, adopted by
lution no distinction has been made between
Chancellor Kent, by Lord Lyndhurst, and by
charitable gifts for the benefit of different rethe supreme court of the United States— ;i^„.
ligious sects.
gift to a_genera.l public use, whlcj^.. extends
Gifts for purposes prohibited by or opposed
the poor as welTas^ the rich." Jones v.
to the existing laws cannot be upheld as char"Williams, Amb. 6^27 Coggeshall v. Peltort,
itable, even if for objects which would other•w'pe be deemed such.
Johns. Ch. 294: Mitford v. Reynolds,
The bounty must, In
Phil.
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held to be Impliedly prohibited by St. 9 Geo.
192; Perln v. Carey, 24 How. 506. A
II. Phllpott V. St. George's Hospital 6 H.
charity. In the legal sense, may be more fully
L. Cas. 338. The rule stated in Attorney Gendefined as a gift, to be applied consistently
eral V. Williams, 2 Cox, Ch. 388, and Tatham
with existing laws, for the benefit of an inV. Drummond, 11 L. T. (N. S.) 325, upon
definite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence
which the heirs at law rely, that "the court
will not alter Its conception of the purposes
of education or religion, by relieving their
of a testator, merely because those Intentions
bodies from disease, suffering or constraint,
happen to fall within the prohibition of the
by assisting them to establish themselves in
life, or by erecting or maintaining public
statute of mortmain," shows that no forced
buildings or works or otherwise lessening the
construction of the testator's language is ta
of government.
be adopted to avoid illegality, but does not
burdens
It^ is Imm aterial
whethfir-the-p umose is caSJed "cEantaBBCUr- "affect the principle that a bequest which acas to show
the_glft itself, if it is so described —
-— --^- cording to the fair meaning of the words may
include a legal as well as an Illegal applicathatjtls chSimwr Bntrs stureT
tfLe~wor3's''''or"a cjiai'iMle' bequest are
tion is to be held valid.
In the light of these general principles, we
^^®'^° be
S?W^KK^IS£!"^S^S5°^?^~'^y~
so construed
as to'support 'ffie "charltfl'Tf
come to the consideration
of the language of
p6ssJ5ir~TF~rs'^n~Statfllsiied inaxiHrgt Inthe different bequests In this will.
terpretation, that the cou rt is bound_to carry
II. The first bequest which Is drawn In quesin the fourth article
the_vyi ll into .effect. If iF can see a genera l Kllon is that contained
intention c onsistent with ,the rules of law ,
of the win, by. which the sum of ten thousand
e ven if the narticnlar mode or m anner point ed
dollars Is given In trust to be used and expended at the discretion of the trustees, "in
out by the testator is illega l. Bartlet v.
K.ing, is Mass. 543; Inglis v. Sailor's Snug
such sums, at such times and such places as
they deem best, for the preparation and cirHarbor, 3 Pet. 117, 118. Tf the testator nsa^a
a word whidi has two meanings, one of which
culation of books, newspapers, the delivery
will , effect and the other" defeat his ob.iect | of speeches, lectures and such other means
the firstTs to be^(iopte d. Saltonstall v. Sanas In their judgment will create a public senders. 11 Allen. 45h.
timent that will put an end to the negro
wn^n a charitahla Intenf:
appears on the face of ^the wilL but the terms
slavery in this country;"( and the testator
expresses a desire that they may become a
used are broad enough to ailqw of the fun d
organization, and a hope "that
being a pplied eittier ina.iawiul or an unla wpermanent
ful manner, the gift w ill be sufipoxted,.£nd they wUl receive the services and sympathy,
its appli caiion" restral necl "wTtfi in the^bounds
the donations and bequests, of the friends of
the slave."
Among the charitable objects speci ally desoSF^TBIS In the English courts have arisen
ig^'^'Tn'gtririEgizrTs 'tiie "refl aroTi fc
under St. 9 Geo. II. c. 36 (commonly
called
And;
r~ prisoners and _raj}tt ves."
the "Statute of Mortmain")', prohibiting dedem]^ fflnJo
tffls was not a'^raTiarity"o'f'"the
Ta^ of
vises of land, or bequests of money to be
England or of that age. The civil law relaid out In land, to charitable uses. In the
leading case, Lord Hardwicke held that a
garded the redemption of captives as the high<lirection to executors to "settle and secure,
est of all pious uses —in the words of Jusby purchase of lands of inheritance, or othertinian, causa plisslma— and not only declared,
that no heir, trustee or legatee should inwise, as they shall be advised, out of my perfringe or unjustly defeat the pious Intensonal estate," two annuities to be paid yearly
tions of the testator by asserting that a legforever for charitable objects, was valid, beacy or trust for the redemption of captives
cause it left the option to the executor to
make the investment in personal property,
was uncertain, and provided for the appointwhich was not prohibited by the statute;
ment of a trustee when none was named in
and said, "This bequest is not void, and there
the will, and for Informing him of the beis no authority to construe it to be void, if
quest, but even authorized churches to alienby law it can possibly be made good," or
ate their sacred vessel and vestments for this
(according to another and perhaps more acone purpose,
upon the ground that It was
curate report) "no authority to construe It
reasonable that the souls or lives of men
to be void by law. If It can possibly be made
should be preferred to any vessels or vestgood."
Sorresby v. Hollins, 9 Mod. 221, 1
ments whatsoever — "Quoniam non absurdnm
Coll. Jurid. 489. The doctrine of that case has
est animas homlnum quibuscunque
vasis vel
ever since been recognized
as sound law.
vestimentis preferii." Code, lib. 1, tit. 2, c.
Attorney General v. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 144;
22; Id., tit. 3, cc. 28, 49; Id., lib. 8, tit. 54,
Curtis V. Hutton, 14 Ves. 539; Dent v. Allc. 36; Nov. 7, c. 8; Id., p. 115, c, 3; Id., p.
croft, 30 Beav. 340; Mayor, etc., of Faver120, c. 10; Id., p. 131, c. 11; Godol. Leg. pt.
sham V. Ryder, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 353; Ed1, c. 5, § 4.
wards V. Hall, 11 Hare. 12, 6 De Gex, M. &
The captives principally contemplated in St.
G. 89. In a like spirit the house of lords
Englishmen taken
43 Eliz. were doubtless
recently decided that a bequest to erect buirdand held as slaves in Turkey and Barbary.
ings for charitable purposes if other lands
And the relief of our own citizens from such
should be given was valid, and could not be
captivity was always deemed charitable in
191,
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MassachTisetts,
an lllnstratlon of which Is
found in the records of the governor and
council In 1693, by whom a petition of the

relations of two inhabitants of the province,
"some time since taken by a Salley man of
war, and now under Turkish captivity and
slavery," for permission "to ask and receive
the charity and public contribution of well
disposed persons for redeeming them out of
their miserable suffering and slavery," was
granted;
"the money so collected to be employed for the end aforesaid, unless the said
persons happen to die before, make their escape, or be in any other way redeemed; then
the money so gathered to be improved for
the redemption of some others of this province, that are or may be in like circumstances,
as the governor and council shall direct."
Council Rec. 1693, fol. 323. But there is no
more reason for confining the words of the
statute of Elizabeth to such captives, than
for excluding from the class of religious charities gifts for preaching the ^gospel to the
heathen, which have uniformly been sustained
as charitable, here and in England. Boyle,
Char. 41; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536.
Indeed It appears by Sir Francis Moore's
reading upon the statute, that even In his
time the word "captives" might include ca.ptive enemies. Duke, Char. Uses, 158.
It was argued tliat the slave trade was fostered and rewaxded by the English government in the reign of Elizabeth, and therefore gifts for the relief of negro slaves could
not be deemed within the purview of the
statute of charitable uses. The fact is undoubted; but the conclusion does not follow.
The permission of slavery by law does not
prevent emancipation from bei'ngchantable.
^Lcommiisioh
of manumission, gramea by
Queen Elizabeth, twenty-seven years before
the statute, recites that in the beginning God
created all men free by na-ture, and afterwards the law of nations placed some under
the yoke of slavery, and that the ijueen believed it would be pious and acceptable to
God and according to Christiaji charity—
"pium fore credimus et Deo acceptabile
Christiansegue charitati consentaneum"— to
wholly enfranchise the villeins of the crown
on certain royal manors. 20 Howell, St Tr.
See, also, Bar. Ob. (5th Ed.) 305, 308.
1372.
The spirit of the Roman law upon this point
is manifested by an edict of Constantine,
which speaks of those who with a religious
sentiment in the bosom of the church grant
their slaves that liberty which is their due
—Qui religloea. mente In ecclesiae gremio servis suis meritam concesserint libertatem."
Code, lib. 1, tit 13, c. 2. That the words of
the statute of charitable uses may be extended to negro slaves of English masters Is
clearly shown by the decision of Lord Oottenham, when master of the rolls, applying for
the benefit of negroes in the British colonies
in the West Indies the accumulations of a
in 1670 "to redeem poor
made
bequest
slaves." Attorney General v. Gibson, 2 Beav.
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note; Id., cited Craig & P. 226.
In dealing with such a question, great regard is to
be had to the favor which the law gives to
liberty, so eloquently expressed by Chief Justice Fortescue:
"Crudells enlm necessario
judicabitur lex, quse servitutem augmentat et
minuit libertatem. Nam pro eft natura semper Implorat humana. Quia ab homine et
pro vltio introducta est servitus. Sed libertas a Deo homlrds est indita naturae. Quare
ipsa ab homine sublata semper redire gliscit,
ut facit omne quod libertati naturali privatur. Quo ipse et crudelis judicandus est,
qui libertati non favet. Hsec considerantia
Anglise jura in omni easu libertati dant favorem." Fortes. De Laud. c. 42.
But the question of the lawf ulness of this
If faiimg-witSiSlEe 'cl'as"s"of char itable
^Trt.
uses, de p ends no t upon the laws and the publicpolicy'of EnglancTaiTthe time oT the"pas"^^&f the" statute, 'IBut upon ^ur own at the
ttofii fit ^•^'' 'leyif-h of the testator. It was se-'
riously argued that before the recent amendment of the constitution of the United States,
"a trust to create a sentiment to put an end
to negro slavery, would, having regard to the
constitution and laws under which we live,
be against public policy and thus be void;"
but the court is unable to see any foundation
for this position in the constitution and laws,
either of the United States or of this commonwealth.
The law of Massachusetts has always been
peculiarly favorable to freedom, as may be
phown bv a brief o u tline of its history. The
"rights, liberties and privileges," established
by the general court of the colony in 1641, to
be "impartially and Inviolably enjoyed and
observed throughout our jurisdiction
forever," declared: "There shall never be any
bond slavery, villenage or captivity amongst
us, unless it be lawful captives taken in just
wars, and such strangers as willingly sell
themselves or are sold to us. And these
shall have all the liberties and Christian
usages which the law of God established in
Israel concerning such persons doth morally
require. This exempts none from servitude
who shall be judged thereto by authority."
The last proviso evidently referred to punishment for crime. Body of Liberties, art 91.
This article, leaving out the word "strangers"
in the clause as to slaves acquired by sale,
was included In each revision of the laws of
the colony. Mass. Col. Laws (Ed. 1660) 5; Id.
(Ed. 1672) 10; 4 Mass. Col. Bee. pt 2, p. 467.
It is worthy (rf observation, that the tenure
upon which the Massachusetts Company held
their charter, as declared in the charter itself,
was as of the manor of East Greenwich in
the county of Kent; that no one was ever bom
a villein in Kent (T. B. 30 Edw. I, p. 168 ; Fitzh.
Abr. "Villenage," 46; 3 Seld. Works, 1876);
and that the Body of Liberties contained articles upon each of the principal points distinctive of the Kentish tenure of gavelkind
—freedom from escheats on attainder and execution for felony, the power to devise, the
317,
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of alienation, and descent to all the sons Charter, during the period of which all acta
together—adopting some and modifying oth- ] of the general court were required to be
ers. Body of Liberties, arts. 10, 11, 53, 81; 2
transmitted to England for approval. Earlier
Bl. Comm. 84.
ordinances which had not been so approved
In the laws of Europe, at the time of the were hardly recognized by the English govfoundation of the colony, descent was namernment as of any force.
The policy of Enged first among the sources of slavery. The
land restrained the colonists from abolishing
common law, following the civil law, repeatthe African slave trade, and the number of
ed "Servi aut nascuntur aut fiunt," and difslaves (which had been very small under the
comparatively Independent government
fered only in tracing it through the father,
of
instead of the mother; and each system recthe colony) was much increased.
The ^fao.
ognized that a man might become a slave by fino ^f f, wt.r.io pfmpi q does not always cof ^.
capture in war, or by his own consent or con- ^form to Its laws . Thousands of negroes were
Just, Inst. lib. 1, tit. jield as slaves in England and commonly soi ii
fession in some fonn.
3; Bract 4b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 3; Eedes v. Holl5-RS5Mff ..^^ '^^'7 *^™^ when Lord Mans^
badge, Act. Can. 393; Swinb. Wills, pt. 2, §
field and otECT"J5ages decicieu SUCh hoMng
7; Co. Lltt 117b. And such was then the es- -to be up ia.wfni
Sommersett's (!Jase, 2U UoWell, St. Tr. 72, 79, LofTt, 17; Qulncy, 97, note;
tablished law of nations. Gro. De Jure B. lib.
2, c. 5, §§ 27, 29; Id. lib. 3, c. 7. In parts of
The Slave Grace, 2 Hagg. Adm. 1(», 106.
England, hereditary villenage would seem to
While negro slavery existed in Massachusetts, it was in a comparatively mild form.
have still existed in fact; and it was allowed
by law until since the American Revolution.
The marriages of slaves were protected by
Plgg V. Oaley, Noy, 27; Co. Litt. 116-140; 2 the legislature and the courts; according to
Inst. 28, 45; 2 RoUe, Abr. 732; Smith v.
the opinion of Hutchinson and of Dane,
Brown, 2 SaJk. 666, Holt, 495;
Smith v.
slaves might hold property; they were adGould, 2 Salk. 667, 2 Ld. Raym. 1275; Treblemitted as witnesses, even on capital trials
cock's Case, 1 Atk. 633; The King v. Ditton,
of white persons, and on suits of other slaves
4 Doug. 302. Lord Bacon, in explaining the
for freedom; they might sue their masters
maxim, "Jura sanguinis nulla Jure dvlU dlfor wounding or immoderately beating them;
rimi possunt," with a coolness which shows
and indeed hardly differed from apprentices
that in his day and country the illustration
or other servants except in being bound for
was neither unfamiliar nor shocking, says, life.
See authorities and records cited in
"If a villein be attainted, yet the lord shall Quincy, 30, 31, note; 2 Dane, Abr. 313. The
annual tax acts show that before the Declahave the issue of his villein born before or
ration of Indep ende nce they were usually
after his attainder; for the lord hath them
jure naturae but as the increase of a flock." J^MjM^^opert^^]]al^^S3E^^^r^_M|2^'
Bac. Max. reg. 11.
Mns.'''"The general court in September 1776
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties, as
forbade the sale of two negroes taken as
prize of war on the high seas and brought
Governor Winthrop tells us, was composed
by Nathaniel Ward, who had been "formerly
into this state, and resolved that any negroes
so taken and brought In should not be allowa student and practiser In the course of the
ed to be sold, but should be treated like othcommon law." 2 Winthrop's Hist. New England, 55. In view of the other laws of the er prisoners. Res. Sept 1776, c. 83.
time, the omission, in enumerating the legal ^^it was in Massachusetts, by the first article
'
sources of slavery, of birth, the first menof the declaration of rights prefixed to the
laws,
significant.
is
No In^ constitution adopted in 1780, as immediately
tioned In those
stanc e is known in which the lawfulness of afterwards interpreted by this court, that
heredrtary'"gia'Y^7' In Massa chusetts under the fundamental axioms of the Declaration of
fag chadtCTof tKe colony mntEe p rovince wa s Independence— "that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creair with certain inalienable rights;
and it has been denied In a series of jud gthat
thfiL-laaf among these are life, liberty, and the puraaits;jor^tmr^;^Sftri5^I5i5M
ciSluryV'ffi each of which it was e ssential to suit of happiness" —first took at once the form
£Ee' ^efMrnmati'Sn'^nie' figEt s of lEe parti es..
and the force of express law; slavery was
n«let6STrTuraBr*-1!i!raS8rT28rn6fe;
Lanesthus wholly abolished in Massachusetts; and
borough V. Westfleld, 16 Mass. 74; EdgarIt has never existed here since, except so far
town V. Tisbury, 10 Cush. 408. The case of as the constitution and laws of the state were
Perkins y. Emerson, 2 Dane, Abr. 412, did
held to be prevented by the constitution and
not touch this question; but simply deterlaws of the United States from operating upmined that a person received into a house as jy on fugitive slaves.
Caldwell v. Jennison,
a slave of the owner was not received "as an -^Rec. 1781, fol. 79, 80; Jennlson's Petition,
inmate, boarder or tenant," so that notice Jour. H. R. June 18, 1782, fol. 89; Com. v.
of the place whence such person last came
Jennison, Rec. 1783, fol. 85; Parsons, C. J.,
must be given to the selectmen under Prov.
In Wlnchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 128; 4
St. 10 Geo. II.; Anc. Chart. 508.
No doubt
Mass. Hist. Coll. 203, 204; Com. v. Aves, 18
many children of slaves were in fact held as
Pick. 208, 210, 215, 217; 2 Kent, Comm. (6th
slaves here, especially after the Province
Ed.) 252; Betty v. Horton, 5 Leigh, 628.
age
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The doctrine of our law, upon this subject,

as stated by Chief Justice Shaw in delivering the judgment of the court in Com. v.
Aves, just cited, is that slavery is a relatio n

founded In force, contrary to natural rigli t
principles of justice, humanity and
Jound policy: a nn pnni<i exist oniv Dv tne
e ffect of positive law, a s mnn^fegted dthe r
Sy direct legislation orsetttg4 usaeei
TEe
same principle has been recognized by Chief
Story,
Justice Marsha 1 and Mr. Justice
speaking for the supreme court of the United
The Antelope, 10 Wheat 120, 121;
States.
Prigg V. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 611.
The constitution of the United States uniformly speaks of those held in slavery, not
as property, but as persons; and never contained anything inconsistent with their peaceable and voluntary emancipation. As between master and slave, it would require the
most explicit prohibition by law to restrain
M'Cutchen v.
the right of manumission.
Marshall, 8 Pet. 238.
We cannot take judicial notice of the local laws of other states of
the Union except so far as they are In proof.
Knapp V. Abell, 10 Allen, 488. But it appears
by cases cited at the bar that bequests of
manumission were formerly favored in Virginia; and that it was more recently decided
in Mississippi that a trust created by will for
paying the expenses of transporting the testator's slaves to Africa and maintaining them
Charles v.
in freedom there was lawful.
Hunnicutt, 5 Call, 311; Wade v. American
.
Colonization Soc, 7 Smedes & M. 663.
etaif nf s1aTP''yi *" -yghiph manumission ys^s
has never be en known
whoUv m-ohibited.
among civUizfid-nations. E^ven when slavery
|trpvflj iipfi thronghoiSr ilie worl d, "the same
comm on law o f ^BaSSs, jus gentium, wjhic h
^tifloH jts exi sten ce. regftghi'Sga th e" Hgfit
.
of manumissio nas a necessary consequence
""'
Just. Inst. lib. 1, tit'Sr""' ■--;-'•'-"
> Wf ^""r """""'• with the' lpnrnpfl ony^TiRpl
/for the heirs at law that If this trust could
not be executed according to the intention
\ of the testator without tending to excite servile insurrections in other states of the
Union, It would have been unlawful; and
that a trust which looked solely to political
agitation and to attempts to alter existing
laws could not be recognized by this court
as charitable. But such does not appear to
us to be the necessary or the reasonable interpretation of this bequest.
T he manne r
s tated of nutting an end to slavery is not
by legislation or political a ction, but J^y,, creating a public sentiment, which rather point s
■n mpriji
JTiflppnce and voluntary manumisusual
_arg_
wflB. TTie
means of pnblTc instruction, bv books and
Other
hews paper s. speeches an d lectures.
meitUB ire I6tt TO lllli UiScretlon of "the trus tee a but th ere la nothing to Indicate tha t
they are .not designed to be of a kinSrg d
nature.
» ivingT(rthd! Bg?atlg§t"tiiat tav^^l e
"c bBS'ffuc tidn to which all charitable gifts are
anc^ tne

^
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entit led, the Just In ference ls_ that ...laatBi
means only are'to"15e"sele^g3t^ nd JfeSLlfefiX..
are to be' 'usecr^],ajajsJjit.jaaimeK>.
ii was further obiecte^ that "to crea te a
public sentiment" was too vague andTn'definite an object to be sustained as a charitable use. But "a public sentiment" on a
moral question Is but another name for pub- /
lie opinion, or a harmony of thought— idem [
sentire.6 The only case cited for the heirs af^
law in support of this objection was Browne
V. Yeall, 7 Ves. 50, note, in which Lord Thurlow held void a perpetual trust for the purchase and distribution in Great Britain and
its dominions of such books as might have a
tendency
to promote the interests of virtue
and religion and the happiness of mankind.
But the correctness of that decision was
by Sir William Grant and Lord
doubted
Eldon In Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9
Ves. 406, 10 Ves. 534, 539; and it is inconauthorities,
sistent with the more recent
here and In England. The bequest now before us is quite as definite as one "for the
improvement of Christian
increase
and
knowledge and promoting religion," and tne
purchase from time to time of such bibles
and other religious books, pamphlets and
tracts as the trustees should think fit for
that purpose, which was upheld by Lord
Eldon in Attorney General v. Stepney, 10
Ves. 22; or "to the cause of Christ, for the
benefit and promotion of true evangelical
piety and religion," through the agency of
trustees, to be by them "appropriated to the
cause of religion as above stated, to be distributed in such divisions and to such societies and religious charitable purposes as
they may think fit and proper," which was
sustained by this court in Going v. Emery,
16 Pick. 107; or "for the promotion of such
religious and charitable enterprises as shall
by a majority of the pastors
be designated
composing the Middlesex Union Association,"
as in Brown v. Kelsey, 2 Cush. 243; or to be
distributed, at the discretion of trustees, "in
aid of objects and purposes of benevolence
or charity, public or private," as in Saltonstall V. Sanders, 11 Allen, 446; or "for the
cause of peace," to be expended by an unincorporated society, whose object, as defined
in its constitution, was "to Illustrate the Inconsistency of war with Christianity,
to
show its baleful influence on all the great
interests of mankind, and to devise means
for insuring universal and permanent peace,"
as In Tappan v. Deblols, 45 Me. 122; or to
found "an establishment for the increase and
diffusion of knowledge among men;" or "for
the benefit and advancement
and propagation of education and learning in every part
of the world, as far as circumstances will
permit;" as In Whicker v. Hume, 7 H. L.
Cas. 124, 155, and President of U. S. v.
Drummond, there cited. See, also, McDonough v. Murdoch, 15 How. 405, 414.
The bequest itself manifests its Immediate
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f^f

y

peaceable
redemption or manuinlsslon
of
sTaves in an manner not prohibited by law
Is cnantapie object. It falls indeed within
the spirit, and almost within the letter, of
many clauses In the statute of Elizabeth.
It would be an anomaly in a system of law
wiiich eco gnized as cnaritable u ses the relief of the" poor, tne educaiAon ahd ureitjrment of orphans, marriages of poor maids,

,

r

purpose to be to educate the whole people
upon the sin of a man'.a. ■holding.-tuaJCellowman in bondage; and its ultimate object, to
piit an end to negrp"].^very JaJtheTTnited
Sta^nn^'either aspect, a lawfid charity,
"it is universally aBmitteS" that trusts for
the promotion of religion and education are
tho
charities. Gifts for the inst THptinn
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public In the cure of the di seases of quadfape'af or bifarOB efttl toman; ormr tnepr&- the ssi stan<;e of vaun^ . tradesmen,
handi^entrdmrof cr u elty "to amrifais (either by pu b^raft smen and pe raon decayed, the relief of
prisoners a nff"tEe fede inpiJon of captiveB, to'
iFshing newspapers on the' subject. fl£ jby
where^killing
xclude tne aeiiverance or an tndeilnlte num~
groviding 'tT'Ssta'Sliih'ments
er of human beings from
for the market '"£3SgBF~'"be ''attended
condition in
ttTem
hich hey were so poor as not even to own
with as little suffering as possible), have
themselves, in which their children could Tint
London
BSen* held charitable' in England.
iRlTUW, 26 ByaT.~T.59,
tfniversity
De
be ducated, in which marriages had no sanc'
Jur. (N. S.) ^lon'of law or security of duration. In which
Gex & J. 72; Marsh v. Means,
belonged
to
790; Tatham v. Drummond, 11 L. T. (N. S.)
another,
all th eirleamig gs
and
325.
To deliver men from a bondage whic
piey were subject^ against the law of naturi
the law regards as cohtrafytonaturai right
witnout any crime oi their own, to Hiir-h
^nd
fflgiaHp^fl Sttetraira^s'otM policy^ IS aure ly ah arbitrary dominion as the modem usages
of na,tI"ons will not countenance over capnoTTess cEantaBte thanlo^Iessen thft, sil^^''''ings of animals. The constitution of Mas- tives taken from the most barbarous enemy.
arises upon the be^
III. The next question
sachiisett'^^Eicfi" declares that all men ra
_^^___________^
bom free and equal, and have the naturalw guest &l' "ti'U«t fOF""the benefit of fugitive
essential and unalienable rights of enjoying
slaves ■wfro might fr om time to time escape
tates ot the bmoa~
and defending their lives and liberties, of acrom tfie slavehordm
quiring, possessing and protecting property,
iThe validity of"^ is bequ est must be de^
the mw aa
stood at
of seeking and obtaining their safety and termined according
frequent re- the time when the IBTgrarTHtiU
Uhd iivmr
happiness;
also declares that
is no part of
currence to the fundamental principles of
which as ^wltlJfiakr^ectr
tT5e"3uty of this court to maintain the con-~
constant adherence
the constitution, and
gtrtiitionality.
he justice, or the policy of
to those of piety and justice, are absolutely
necessary to preserve the advantages of lib— the—Iliiijsd
erty and to maintain a free government; that
the jeonstilaiti on
" edT^But
the testator's death, deof arts and sciences,
States, at the time
'•the encouragement
and all good literature, tends to the honor of
clared_jfiatjio person held to service or labor
be discharged therefrom_
God, the advantage of the Christian religion,
tn'one'state' lSon
may safel
Be
and the great benefit of this and the other By escaping; into another.
United States of America;" and that "wis- "assumed th at, under uch jL-C onstitution.
_
'Eequeat
dom and knowledge, as well as virtue, difo^assist fugitive slaves to^ j^ggje
fused generally among the body of the peo- from those to whom their service was thus
recognized
to be~dj5e~ could not have
ple, being necessary for the preservation of
lawful chariiy.
their rights and liberties, and as these de- iTTiiheld ^and ppforced as
pend on spreading the opportunities and adThe epithets with which the testator accomof education in the various parts
vantages
panied this bequest show that he set his
of the country, and among the different orown ideas of moral duty above his allegiance
ders of the people, it shall be the duty of legto his state or his country; and warrant the
in all future peconjecture that he would have been well
islatures and magistrates,
manriods of this commonwealth," besides cherpleased to have the fund applied in
ishing the interests of literature and the ner inconsistent with the constitution and
and inculcate the
sciences, "to countenance
laws of the United States. But he has used
principles of humanity and general benevono words to limit its use to illegal methods,
lence, public and private charity," "and all
and has left his trustees untrammelled as to
sentiments the mode of its application.
social affections and generous
"
among the people."
Declaration of Rights,
is or la not valid
^hether this begn^st
18; Const. Mass. c. 5. This bequest
arts.
to be ascertained from affair constmcu ffirof
directly tends to carry out the principles
m lUg-«gHf bTthe ma^ma^ of
!t§~Iaiiguagti,
thus declared in the fundamental law of the jnterpretatlon statea in tne earner part ot tEta
commonwealth. And certainly no kind of ^pninn -hv wliiph tVip miirt iff hnnnn to carry
education
could better accord with the reintoeffect any chflrHfl,hip hpgueat in which
ligion of Him who came to preach deliver- Tian be "See n
eneral intention conaiateHf"
ance to the captives,
and taught that you J^ith— the" law, even
the particular mode
should love your neighbor as yourself and Zriointed out .ia lTlegal; and there is no authordo unto others as you would that they should
to be void if it can be apity to construe
do unto you.
plied in a lawful manner consiatently with
The authorities already cited show that the the Intention of the testator as manlfeated is

TRTJST-PTTBLIC
the words by which It is expressed.
One Illustration of these maxims may be added in
this connection.

In Isaac v. Gompertz, Amb. (2d Ed.) 228,
note, the will contained one bequest for the
support and maintenance of a Jews' synagogue; and another bequest of an annuity

"to the gabas of the said synagogue," who
were fotmd, upon inquiry by a master, to be
treasurers of the synagogue, whose office it
was to collect and receive the annual subscriptions for the support of poor Jews belonging to the synagogue, and to apply the
same to the expenses of supporting the synagogue and to the maintenance of such poor
Jews. This last bequest was upheld, and referred to a master to report a scheme, although the support of the synagogue was adJudged to be an unlawful use; and thus a
bequest manifestly Intended for the benefit
of persons professing a religion not tolerated
by law, and which might, according to its
terms, be applied either in an unlawful or
a lawful manner, was sustained as charitable, and its application confined to the lawful
mode.

A bequest for the benefit of fugitlTe slaves
is not necessarily unlawful . The words "relief or redemption of prisoners and captives "
have always been held in England to include
those in prison under condemnation for crime,
as well as persons confined for debt; and
to supiwrt gifts for distributing bread and
meat among them annually, or for enabling
poor imprisoned debtors to comjwund with
their creditors. Duke, Char. Uses, 131, 156;
Attorney General v. Ironmongers' Co., Coop.
Prac. Cas. 285, 290; Attorney General v.
Painterstainers' Co., 2 Cox, Ch. 51; Attorney
General v. Drapers' Co., Tudor, Char. Trusts,
591, 592, 4 Beav. 67; 36th Report of Charity
Commissioners to Parliament, pt. 6, pp. 856868.
It would be hardly consistent with charity or justice to favor the relief of those undergoing punishment for crimes of their own
committing, or imprisonment for not paying
debts of their own contracting; and yet prohibit a like relief to those who were in equal
themneed, because they had withdrawn
selves from a service imposed upon them by
local laws without their fault or consent
It was indeed held In Thrupp v. Collett, 26
Beav. 125, that a bequest to be applied to purchasing and procuring the discharge of persons committed to prison for non-payment
of fines under the game laws was not a lawful charity. But such persons were convicted offenders against the law of England, who
would by such discharge be wholly released
A fugitive slasa^w as not_
from punishment
a criminal by the lawSoFthis commonwealth

"f 'ort h e unifeoassi:

'o

TTo supply sick or destitute
fugitiv e slaves
'
with food ami L'liMliUig, medicme or shelter,
or to extingtllSfl By pufc'Ea5e~IEe"cIaIms of
those asgei-tJ-tLgyT^ gErTo'tlrelr -servi ce -and
td "Imlabor , would m no~wise^a"ve'^temlWl
pair the claim oinEhe"Iatter of the "dperation
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nited,,
9f the constitntinn an d laws Of the U
states; and would clearly have been with in,
the terms of this bequest, if. lot example,
'the trustees named in the will had received
this fund from the executor without question,
and had seen fit to apply it for the benefit of
fugitive slaves In such a manner, they could
not have been held liable as for a breach of
trust.
T}^}" tlfin'MSt. thftBofnrq, flfl yrell as ^ft^ Previous one, beln^ ca paMp of being applied according to Its tprmg In a lawful manner at-the
time of the testator's death, must, upon the
settiea principles of construction. De held a
valid charity.
it Is hardly necessary to remark that tllF direction of the testator that his trustees
'sBall"n'ot"Bg"j[ec'gfliBaBle~fa> any one Is simpl y
voia. j>io testator can obtain for his bequests
that support and permanence which the law
gives to pubUc charities only, and at the same
time deprive the beneficiaries and the public
of the safeguards which the law provides for
their due and lawful administration.
. -^As the trustees named in the will are not a
corporation estaolished by law, and these two!
bequests are unlimited in duration, and by
their terms might cover an illegal as well as
a legal appropriation, it Is the duty of the
court, before ordering the funds to be paid
to the trustees, to refer the case to a master
to settle a scheme for their application In a
lawful manner. Isaac v. Gompertz, Amb.
10
228, note; Attorney General v. Stepney,
Ves. 22; Boyle, Char. 100, 217.
3
Trust to be expended "to secure the passage
of laws,, granting womep. yhether married of
unmarried, the right to vote, to hold office, to
h oiQ, manaCT and devjse j>rojpel[ty, and ^pT"
'Stiier civil r'lgHts enjoyed by me n, "'_^;naS
"""" '"
Be susta!in'ec{"a's"a cnanty7
rvo precedent has been cited in Its support.
This bequest differs from the ot hers in aimIng directly and exclusively 16 'cE5 n^ 'jE e"
iaws: i^d its object cannot be accomplished!
changing the constitution ,,also.
without
wiietiier such an alteration of the existing
laws and frame of government would be wise
and desirable is a question upon which we
cannot, sitting in a judicial capacity, properly express any opinion. Our duty is limited
to expounding the laws as they stand. And
those laws do not recognize the purpose of
overthrowing or changing them, in whole or
in part, as a charitable use. This bequest
therefore, not being for a charitaBrg'trnWiSSfe. '
nor for t he bene fit or any particul a r persons.
ana oeing unrestfictea in point of time, is
—
———
T38J!§raHte-Taiid- void-.—
For tEe-gamrfeasSn. the gift to thq sam e
'o^ect; o f one third of the resid ue of the tesStof's esSEe afEeFtHe^eSth .a£JUa.dausbter
atj^i —
THrs. Eddy and he ^-'fignf^^tfu.
»t— n
la also Invaiia, ana wi u go to his heirs
at™~™-'law
"
"as a r esuTOBg iTusfr"
It is proper to add" that the conclusion of
the court upon this point, as well as upon the

—

—
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gift to

create a public sentiment which would
put an end to negro slavery In the United
States, had the concurrence of the late Mr.
Justice Dewey, whose judicial experience and

r ""

"^""^

"""'iTlTl fTi the principal o f
sha ll be nni d and convRvPil
tne boar d of trustees named In thp f^TiAV^
''to
Article, to pe expennefi for the intent and pii]-.
p656 the rfti^ dJrgp^M'
As the first tenant for
"Xife in each bequest is living at the deagoT
[the testator, the event of such tenant's dyrng T
le aving no c MJd then living, must happen
'
within the "per iod of a life in b eing, ir at all;
'""rlTi

"E^or her share

large acquaintance with the law. of charitable
uses give great weight to his opinion, and
whose lamented death, while this case has
been under advisement, has deprived us of
his assistance in determining the other questions in controversy.
"•jmri; ff ft "ffnea ^?ip pen, the gift over to the
Jk V. The validity of the other residuaiy be- charity will be va M— M£ittiar_J a.mes Jack guesfe
depends u pon thelaw^
son nor Mrs. Palmer therefore is entidedTo
and_ devise s
"TT^pelultiei as applied to private trusts. The 'a'p'feient 'gci'mtablg' ggtatr-m"
"
principles of this branch of the law haVe TftmBsrtfiotifH' rw unmameaTTnay marry
been so fully considered by the court in recent
and have children who survive him, and as
cases as to require no extended statement
Mrs. Palmer's children may survive her, in
The general rule is that if any est^ tp, jBgal. either of which cases half of the income of
or equitabl e, is given by deed or will to any
the share would by the will go to such chilDerson'i n ffie first instance, 'an3~E£ en over'lb
dren during their lives and the bequest over
'l.naffier j)er sfln,_^r even to _a pjiblic charity ,
to the charity be too remote, the validity and
\ipon'to e happ^lng of a co ntingency wTiich. effect of that bequest over cannot be now deito'Sy by possibiixty no't''Tagr;p jaa&jd^^
termined. If the contingency upon which it
life trr'lives in hoinpTfrpatin'^ a ^j^jlrl -in..i±a:^ is valid should hereafter occur, namely, the
"Tmmterywomyaji utrssTn^ pnri Twpntv-nTie
death of the testator's son or daughter, revoid, as
spectively, leaving no children surviving, the
years afterwarda. the ^ft over is
lenaing to create a perpetui^:y bv ipa^ins^ the whole remainder of the share will then go
estate malienable; for the title of those takto the charity established by the fourth ar!SgT15F'pg?rogrTHteresfe' would not be perticle, and be paid, after the settlement of a
feetr"5hd until the happening of the corF" scheme for its lawful application, to the trustees therein named.
MlTO g ty^OMa-mrB ^i^ceminea] ^^
By the thirteenth amendment of the
JkVI.
^f^rl^; Odell V. Odell, 10 Allen, 5, 7. If constitution of the United States, adopted
therefore the gift over is limited upon a single
since the earlier arguments of this case, it is
event which may or may not happen within
declared that "neither slav ery nor involuntary servitude, ggcepf as a punishment for
the prescribed period, it is void, and cannot be
made good by the actual happening of the
<
mme whereof the party shall have been duly
event within that period.
convicted.
But if the testator distinctly makes his gift J3tates or anxj
over to depend upon what is sometimes calltion." Tffie.eggct of this amendment up on
ed an alternative contingency, or upon either
the charitable bequests of Francis Jackson ia
of two contingencies, one of which may be the '"rernaming~ qugtl8 g~tg~b(i dglgriuliili ,""
too remote and the other cannot be, its validand. .thtC requires' a consideration, of the nF
ity depends upon the event; or, in other
6ire and proper limit s of the doctrine of c y
words, if he gives the estate over on one
contingency which must happen, if at all,
It is contended for the heirs at law, that
within the limit of the rule, and that conthe power of the English chancellor, when a
tingency does happen, the validity of the dis- charitable trust cannot be administered actinct gift over in that event will not be afcording to its terms, to execute it so as to
fected by the consideration that upon a difcarry out the donor's intention as nearly as
ferent contingency, which might or might
possible—cy pres— is derived from the royal
not happen within the lawful limit, he makes
prerogative or St 43 Eliz. and is not an exthat, whether
a disposition of his estate, which would be
ercise of judicial authority;
The authorities upon
void for remoteness.
this power is prerogative or judicial, it canthis, point are conclusive. Longhead v.
not, or, if it can, should not, be exercised by
Phelps, 2 W. Bl. 704; Sugden and Preston,
this court; and that the doctrine of cy pres,
arguendo,
in Beard v. Westcott, 5 Barn. &
even as administered in the English chanAid. 809, 813, 814; Minter v. Wraith, 13 Sim.
cery, would not sustain these charitable be52; Evers v. Challis, 7 H. Li Gas. 531; Armquests since slavery has been abolished.
strong V. Armstrong, 14 B. Mon. 333; 1 Jarm.
Much confusion of ideas has arisen from
Wills, 244; Lewis, Perp. c. 21; 2 Spence,
the use of the term "cy pres" in the books to
Bq. Jur. 125, 126.
describe two distinct powers exercised by
^Bythe ninth and tenth articles of the will,
the English chancellor In charity cases, the
.t^gmcome of one thir d of the residue "f fbg
one under the sign manual of the crown, the
testator's estate, real and personal, is to be
other under the general jurisdiction in equity;
"
paid to his son James and to his gai igEter' as well as to designate the rule of construction which has sometimes been applied to
J^TS. Palmer, respectrvely73uffigTff£|^^"ach"
executory devises or powers of appointment
of these artic les. j;.Qntains..A distinct direcHon
thatjjn case, such son or daughter sh^Jjaie_ to Individuals, in order to avoid the objec-
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It was of this last, and
tlon of remoteness.
not of any doctrine peculiar to cliarities, that
Lord Kenyon said, "The doctrine of cy pres
goes to the utmost verge of the law, and we
must take care tliat it does not run wild;"
and Lord Eldon, "It is not proper to go one
Brudenell v. Elwes, 1 Bast,
step farther."
7 Ves. 390;
1 Jarm. Wills, 261-263;
451,
Sugd. Powers, c. 9, § 9; Coster v. Lorillard,
14 Wend. 309, 348.
The principal, if not the only, cases in
which the disposition of a charity is held to
be in the crown by sign manual, are of two
classes;
the first, of bequests to particular
uses charitable in their nature, but illegal, as
for a form of religion not tolerated by law;
and the second, of gifts of property to charity generally, without any trust interposed,
and in which either no appointment is provided for, or the power of appointment is
delegated to persons who die without exercising it
It is by the sign manual and in cases of
the first class, that the arbitrary dispositions
have been made, which were so justly condemned by Lord Thurlow in Moggridge v.
ThackweU, 1 Ves. Jr. 469, and Sir William
Grant in Gary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. 494, 495; and
which, through want of due discrimination,
have brought so much discredit upon the
whole doctrine of cy pres.
Such was the
case of Attorney General v. Baxter, in which
a bequest to Mr. Baxter to be distributed by
him among sixty pious ejected ministers, (not,
as the testator declared, for the sake of their
nonconformity, but because he knew many of
them to be pious and good men and in great
want,) was held to be void, and given under
the sign manual to Chelsea CoU^e; but the
upon the
decree was afterwards reversed,
ground that this was really a legacy to sixty
1 Vern. 248;
2
individuals to be named.
Vem. 105; 1 Bq. Cas. Abr. 96; 7 Ves. 76.
Such also was the case of Da Costa v. De
Pas, in which a gift for establishing a jesuba
or assembly for reading the Jewish law was
applied to the support of a Christian chapel
at a foundling hospital. Amb. 228; 2 Swanst.
489, note; 1 Dickens, 258; 7 Ves. 76, 81.
This power of disposal by the sign manual
of the crown In direct opposition to the declared intention of the testator, whether it is
to be deemed to have belonged to the king as
head of the church as well as of the state,
"intrusted and empowered to see that nothing be done to the disherison of the crown or
the propagation of a false religion" (Rex v.
Portington, 1 Salk. 162, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 96);
or to have been derived from the power exercised by the Roman emperor, who was sovereign legislator as well as supreme interpreter of the laws (Dig. 33, 2, 17; 50, 8, 4; Code,
Mb. 1, tit 2, a 19; Id., tit 14, c. 12); Is dearly a prerogative and not a Judicial power, and
could not be exercised by this court; and it
is difficult to see how it could be held to exist at all in a republic, in which charitable
bequests
have never been forfeited to the
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use or submitted to the disposition of the government, because superstitious or illegal. 4
Dane, Abr. 239; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana,
176;
Methodist Church v. Remington, 1
Watts, 226.
The second class of bequests which are disposed of by the king's sign manual is of gifts
to charity generally, with no uses specified,
no trust interposed,
and either no provision
made for an appointment, or the power of
appointment delegated to particular persons
who die without exercising it. Boyle, Char.
238, 239;
Attorney General v. Syderfen, 1
Vern. 224, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 96; Attorney General V. Fletcher, 5 Law J. Ch. (N. S.) 75.
This too is not a judicial iwwer of expound-

ing and carrying out the testator's Intention,
but a prerogative power of ordaining what
the testator has failed to express.
No instance is reported, or has been discovered in
the thorough investigations of the subject,
of an exercise of this power In England before the reign of Charles n. Moggridge v.
Thackwell, 7 Ves. 69-81; Dwlght's Argument
in the Rose Will Case, 272.
It has never, so
far as we know, been introduced into the
practice of any court in this country; and, if
it exists anywhere here, it is in the legislature of the commonwealth as succeeding to
the powers of the king as parens patriae.
4
Kent, Comm. 508, note; Fontaln v. Ravenel,
17 How. 369, 384; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana,
365, 366; Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 93;
Attorney General v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 108;
Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 348; Lepage V. Macnamara, 5 Iowa, 146; Bartlet v.
King, 12 Mass. 545; Sohier v. Massachusetts
General Hospital, 3 Cush. 496, 497.
It certainly cannot be exercised by the judiciary of
a state whose constitution declares that "the
judicial department shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of
them: to the end it may be a government of
laws and not of men." Declaration of Rights,
art. 30.
The jurisdiction of the court of chancery to
superintend the administration and decree
the performance of gifts to trustees for charitable uses of a kind stated in the gift stands
upon different grounds; and is part of Its
equity jurisdiction
over trusts, which is
shown by abundant evidence to have existed
before the passage of the statute of charitable uses.
Sir Francis Moore records a case
In which a man sold land to another upon
confidence to perform a charitable use, which
the grantor declared by his last will that the
grantee should perform; "the bargain was
never enrolled, and yet the lord chancellor
decreed that the heir should sell the land to
be disposed according to the limitation of the
use; and this decree was made the 24th of
Queen Elizabeth, before the statute of charitable uses, and this decree was made upon
ordinary and judicial equity in chancery."
Symon's Case, Duke, Char. Uses, 163.
About
the same time the court of chancery entertained a suit between two parties, each claim-
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Ing to be. trustee, to determine how bequests
tor the weekly relief of the poor of certain
towns, for the yearly preferment of poor children to be apprentices, and for the curing of
divers diseased people lying by the highway's side, should be "employed and bestowReade v.
ed according to the said will."
A decree in 16
Sllles (27 Eliz.) Act Can. 559.
Eliz., confirming a report of the master of
the rolls and others to whom a suit for enforcing a charitable trust founded by will
had been referred, is cited in 1 Spence, Eq.
Jur. 588, note. For years before St 43 Eliz.,
or the similar act of 39 Eliz., suits in equity
by some in behalf of all of the inhabitants of
a parish were maintained to establish and
enforce bequests for schools, alms or oth&r
charitable purposes for the benefit of the parish, which would hare been too indefinite to
as priyate trusts.
be enforced
Parker v.
Browne (12 Eliz.) 1 Cal. Pro. Oh. 81, 1 Mylne
& K. 389, 390; Dwight Char. Oas. 33, 34; in
which the devise was in trust to a corporation incapable at law of taking. Parrot v.
Pawlet (21 Eliz.) Cary, 47; Elmer v. Scot (24
Eliz.) Cho. Cas. Ch. 155; Matthew v. Marow
(32-34 Eliz.); and Hensman v. Hackney (88
Eliz.) Dwight Char. Cas. 65, 77; in which the
decrees approved schemes settled by masters
Many other examples are colin chancery.
lected in the able and learned arguments, as
separately printed in full, of Mr. Blnney in
the Case of Girard's Will, and of Mr. Dwight
in the Rose Will Case. And the existence of
such a jurisdiction anterior to and independent of the statute is now generally admitted.
Vidal V. Girard, 2 How. 194^-196, and cases
cited; Perin T. Carey, 24 How. 501; MagUl
V. Brown, Brightly, N. P. 346; 2 Kent, Comm.
286-288, and note; Burbank v. Whitney, 24
Pick. 152, 153; Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich,
45 Me. 559; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. L 436;
Urmey v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160; Chambers
V. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur.
588; Tudor, Char. Trusts, 102, 103.
The theory that St. 43 Eliz. enlarged the
discretion of the chancellor to depart from
the expressed intention of the founder of a
charity is refuted by the words of the statute itself. After reciting that many gifts
and appointments for the charitable purposes
therein named "have not been employed according to the charitable intent of the givers
and founders thereof, by reason of frauds,
breaches
of trust, and negligence in those
that should pay, deliver and employ the
same;" It then, for redress and remedy thereof, authorizes the lord chancellor or lord
keeper to make such decrees that the property "may be duly and faithfully employed
to and for such of the charitable uses and Intents before rehearsed respectively for which
they were given, limited, assigned or appointed by the donors and founders thereof;"
which decrees, "not being contrary or repugnant to the orders, statutes or decrees of the
donors or founders," shall "stand firm and
good, according to the tenor and purpos.e

thereof, and shall be executed accordingly,"
until altered by the lord chancellor or lord
keeper upon complaint by any party aggrieved; and upon such complaint the chancellor
or keeper may "by such course as to their
wisdoms shall seem meetest the circumstances of the case considered, proceed to the examination, hearing and determining thereof;
and upon hearing thereof shall and may annul, diminish, alter or enlarge" the decrees
of the commissioners as "shall be thought to
stand with equity and good conscience, according to the true intent and meaning of
the donors and founders thereof." These
last qualifications are specially marked by
Lord Coke, who was attorney general at the
passage of the statute and for some time before and after, and who adds, by way of
note to the final clause, "This is the lapis
ductitius, whereby the commissioners
and
chancellors must institute their course." 2
Inst 712. See, also, Duke, Char. Uses, 11,
372, 619.
cases of bequests to trustees for charilable uses, the nature of which Is described
in the will, the chancellor acts In his equity
jurisdiction over trusts; and the prerogative
of the king finds its appropriate exercise
through his attorney general in bringing the
case before the court of chancery for a judiThis has been well excial determination.
"It is the duty of
plained by Lord Eldon.

156,

In

169,

a court of equity, a main part, originally
almost the whole, of its jurisdiction, to administer trusts; to protect not the visible
owner, who alone can proceed at law, but the
Individual equitably, though not legally, entitled. From this principle has arisen the
practice of administering the trust of a public charity: persons possessed of funds appropriated to such purposes are within the
general rule; but, no one being entitled to
an Immediate and peculiar Interest to prefer
a complaint who is to compel the performance of these obligations, and to enforce
It is the duty of the
their responsibility?
king, as parens patriae, to protect property
devoted to charitable uses; and that duty
is executed by the officer who represents
On this
the crown for all forensic purposes.
foundation rests the right of the attorney
general 'in such cases to obtain by information the interposition of a court of equity."
Attorney General v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 291,
1 Wils. 354. To the like effect are the opinions of Lord Redesdale in Attorney General
V. Mayor, etc., of Dublin, 1 BUgh (N. S.) 347,
348, and Coriwration of Ludlow v. Greenhouse, Id. 48, 62; of Lord Keeper Bridgman
in Attorney General v. Newman, 1 Ch. Cas.
158; of Su- Joseph Jekyll in Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 119; and of Lord Hardwlcke in Attorney General v. Middleton, 2
Ves. Sr. 328; which also state that the jurisdiction of the court of chancery over charities was exercised on such informations before St 43 Eliz. See, also. Attorney General v. Carroll, Act Can. 729; Dwight's Ar-
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Will Case, 259-268. This
duty of maintaining the rights of the public,
and of a number of persons too indefinite
to vindicate their own, has vested in the
commonwealth, and is exercised here, as In
England, through the attorney general. Going V. Emery, 16 Pick. 119; County Attorney V. May, 5 Cush. 338-340;
Gen. St. c. 14,
It is upon this ground that, in a suit
§ 20.
instituted by the trustees of a charity to obtain the instructions of the court, the attorney general should be made a party defendant, as he has been by order of the court in
this case. Harvard College v. Society for
Promoting Theological Education, 3 Gray,
280; Tudor,
Char. Trusts, 161, 162. The
power of the king or commonwealth, thus
exercised, is simply to present the question
to a court of justice, not to control or direct
its judicial action.
A charity, being a trust in the support and
execution of which the whole public is concerned, and which is therefore allowed by
the law to be perpetual, deserves and often
requires the exercise of a larger discretion
by the court of chancery than a mere private trust; for without a large discretionary
power, in carrying out the general intent of
the donor, to vary the details of administration, and even the mode of application, many
charities would fail by change of circumstances and the happening of contingencies
which no human foresight could provide
against; and the probabilities of such failure would increase with the lapse of time
and the remoteness of the heirs from the
original donor who had In a clear and lawful
manner manifested his will to divert his estate from his heirs for the benefit of public
charities.
It is accordingly well settled by decisions
of the highest authority, that when a gift is
made to trustees for a charitable purpose,
the general nature of which is pointed out,
and which is lawful and valid at the time of
the death of the testator, and no intention
is expressed to limit It to a particular institution or mode of application, and afterwards, either by diange of circumstances
the scheme of the testator becomes impracticable, or by change of law becomes Illegal,
the fund, having once vested m the charity,
. does not go to the heirs at law as a resulting
trust, but is to be applied by the court . of
chancery, in the exercise of its jurisdiction
in equity, as near the testator's particular
directions as possible, to carry out his general charitable intent. In all the cases of
charities which have been administered in
the English courts of chancery without the
aid of the sign manual, the prerogative of
the king acting through the chancellor has
not been alluded to, except for the purpose
of distinguishing it from the power exercised by the court in its inherent equitable
jurisdiction with the assistance of its masters in chancery.
At the time of the settlement of the Massgument in the Rose
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achusetts Colony, this power was most freely exercised by the court of chancery, either
on information by the attorney general, or
under the
on proceedings by commission
statute of charitable uses. Attorney General V. Warwick (1615, 1638) Dwight, Char.
Cas. 140, 141, West, Ch. 60, 62; Bloomfield
V. Stowemarket (1619) Duke, Char. Uses,
644.
In the last case, lands had been given
before the Reformation to be sold, and the
proceeds applied, one half to the making of
a highway from the town in which the lands
were, one fourth to the repair of a church
in that town, and the other fourth to the
priest of the church to say prayers for the
souls of the donor and others; and Lord
Bacon decreed the establishment of the uses
for making the highway and repairing the
church, and directed the remaining fourth
(which could not, by reason of the change in
religion, be applied as directed by the donor)
to be divided between the poor of the same
town, and the poor of the town where the
donor inhabited.
In the Case of Baliol College, this doctrine
was enforced by successive decrees of the
greatest English chancellors between the
English Revolution and our own, which have
been recently confirmed by the unanimous
decision of the house of lords. Attorney General V. Guise, 2 Vern. 166; Attorney General V. Baliol College, 9 Mod. 407; Attorney
General v. Glasgow College, 2 Colly. 665, 1
H. L. Cas. 800. The case is of such importance and reported at different stages in
so many books and at such length, that it
may be well to state it. John Snell, an
Episcopalian, who made his last will and
died in 1679, while the form of religion established by law in Scotland as well as in
England was Episcopal, gave lands in trust
to apply the Income for the maintenance and
education at the university of Oxford of
Scotchmen to be designated by the vice chancellor of that university and the heads of
certain colleges therein, and who should, upon their admission, give security to enter
into holy orders and to be sent into Scotland
and there remain. After the Revolution of
Presbyterianism was reestablished in
1688,
Scotland by act of parliament; and in 1690
an information was filed by the attorney general, at the relation of the vice chancellor
and heads of colleges named in the will,
against the testator's heiress at law, suggesting a pretence by her that as Episcopacy and
Prelacy had been abolished In Scotland, and
the Presbyterian form of worship established
Instead, the testator's intentions could not be
carried into effect, the devise became void,
and the property reverted to her. But the
lords commissioners of the great seal, by a
decree passed

in

1692,

established

the devise

against her, ordered an account, and reserved all directions for the establishment of the
charity.
2 Vern. 267, note; 2 Colly. 665-670,
1 H. L. Cas. 802-804, 820, 822.
In 1693 the
cause came on for further directions before
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Lord Keeper Somers, who, acting upon the
doctrine that it was within the province of
a court of equity to administer the trust upon the principle of cy pres, ordered the estate to be conveyed to the six senior fellows
of Baliol College, one of the colleges named
in the will, to maintain a certain number of
Scotch scholars at that college, and, in consideration of the privileges enjoyed by such
.scholars, to apply the surplus income to its
library; and this decree was made subject to
such alteration and disposition as the court
should from time to time make, upon the application of any person concerned, for the
better and more effectual execution of the
trust, as near as could be to the testator's
will and intentions. 2 Vem. 267, note; 2
OoUy. 670, 671, 1 H. L. Oas. 804, 805, 824.
In 1744 Lord Hardwicke, in the execution of
the directions in the decree of Lord Somers,
referred the cause to a master to approve of

"for the better establishment and
regulation of the charity, and carrying the
same into effect for the future as near to the
will and Intention of the testator as the alteration of circumstances since the making
of the will would admit;" and upon his report, and against the exceptions of the heads
of colleges in Oxford, confirmed a scheme
which did not impose any condition of the
scholars taking holy orders— thus carrying
out the general intention of the trust so far
as to educate Scotch scholars at Oxford, although
the testator's ultimate object that
they should be educated In the Episcopal form
of church government to take part in the
established religion in Scotland could not, by
reason of the change of law since his death,
be effected.
9 Mod. 407; 1 H. L. Cas. 805,
806, 825-827. In 1759 Lord Keeper Henley
(afterward Lord Northington) varied the
scheme in other particulars, but declined to
vary It In this; and further orders were afterwards made in chancery as the revenues

a scheme

CoUy. 672-674, 1 H. L. Cas.
826; 3 Ves. 650, note. Upon a
new information filed at the relation of some
Scotch Episcopalians, the house of lords In
1848, reversing an order of Vice Chancellor
Knight Bruce, held that the charity must
continue to be administered according to the
1 H. L. Cas. 800.
earlier decrees.
increased.

806,

807,

2

825,

In another case. Queen Elizabeth, by letters patent, established a hospital for forty
lepers, and made the inmates a corporation.
After leprosy had become almost extinct In
England, and the members of the corporation
reduced to three, an Information was filed,
alleging that the corporation was dissolved,
and praying for a new application of the
revenues agreeably to the letters patent and
the donor's intention, or as near thereto as
circumstances would permit and the court
should direct. Lord Eldon held that neither
the donor's heirs at law nor the crown took
the land discharged of the charity; referred
the case to a master to report a scheme; and
confirmed the 1:eport of the master, approv-

ing a scheme for the application of the revenues to a general infirmary, reserving a
preference to all lepers who might offer
Attorney
themselves.
General v. Hicks,
Highm. Mortm. 336-354, 3 Brown, Ch. 166,
note.

Sir John Romllly, M. R., afterwards made
a like decision, holding that a gift made in
1687 of land (for which In 1774 other land
had been substituted by leave of parliament)
in trust out of the Income to keep it ready
for a hospital and burial place for patients
sick of the plague, was a present gift for
charitable purposes, and valid, although the
plague had not reappeared in England for
more than one hundred and eighty years;
and, after alluding to a class of cases, cited
for the heirs at law in that case, as they
have been in this, in which the charitable bequest could never have taken effect, added,
"But who can say, when this deed was executed or the act passed, that this was not a
charitable trust, capable of being performed;" "and if it were ever wholly devoted to
charity, those cases do not apply." Attorney
General v. Craven, 21 Beav. 392, 408.
The principle that a bequest to trustees for
charitable purposes
indicated in the will,
which are lawful and capable of being carried out at the time of the testator's death,
will not be allowed to fail and result to the
heirs at law upon a change of circumstances,
but will be applied by the court according tn
a scheme approved by a master to carry out
the intent of the testator as nearly as possible, has been affirmed and acted 0]\ in
many other English cases. Attorney General V. Pyle, 1 Atk. 435; Attorney General v.
Green, 2 Brown, Ch. 492; Attorney Genera!
v. Bishop of London, 3 Brown, Ch. 171; Moggridge v. Thackwell, Id. 517, 1 Ves. Jr. 464;
Attorney General v. Glyn, 12 Sim. 84; Attorney General v. Lawes, 8 Hare, 32; Attorney General v. Vint, 3 De Gex & S. 705.
The dicta of Lord Alvanley, upon which the
heirs at law much rely, do not, In the connection in which they were uttered, substantially differ from the general current of authority. Attorney General v. Boultbee, 2 Ves.
Jr. 387, 388; Attorney General v. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 143, 144; Attorney General v.
Minshull, 4 Ves. 14.
By the opinion of Lord Eldon, formed after
great doubt and hesitation, the principle has
been held to extend to the case of a bequest
of property to a person named. In trust for
such charitable purposes, not otherwise described, as he should appoint. Moggridge v.
Thackwell, 7 Ves. 96, 13 Ves. 416; Paice v.
Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364; Mills
V. Farmer, 19 Ves. 483, 1 Mer. 55. Such a
trust has been held valid in this commonwealth, so far as to vest a title in the trustee
as against the next of kin. Wells v. Doane,
8 Gray, 201. Whether, In case of his death,
it could properly be administered by a court
of chancery, without the aid of the prerogative power, need not be considered in this
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In Marsh v. Means, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 790, the
testator gave a legacy, after the death
his
wife, "for continuing the periodical published under the title of 'The Voice of Humanity,' according to the objects and principles
which are set forth in the prospectus contained in the third number of that publication." "The Voice of Humanity" had been
published quarterly by an association for the
protection of animals, but no number had
appeared for nearly a year before the date
of the will. Upon the death of the widow
twenty years later, Vice Chancellor Wood
held that the gift was not to support the
principles of the publication, but only the
publication itself, and, the publication having ceased and the association perished, that
the legacy lapsed.
But he added, "It would,
think, have faUen within the description of
charity, if this periodical had been subsisting
at the date of the will, and afterwards ceased. That would be simply a case where, the
particular intention having failed, the general
Intention must be carried out."
Two striking cases upon this subject have
arisen in England under charities for the redemption of captives.
In the Case of Betton's Charity, Thomas
Betton in 1723 bequeathed the residue of his
Company, in
to the Ironmongers'
estate
trust, "positively forbidf'ing them to diminish
the capital sum by giving away any part, or
that the Interest and profit arising be applied
to any other use or uses than hereinafter
and directed," namely, one half
mentioned
of the income yearly unto the redemption of
British slaves In Turkey or Barbary, one
fourth imto charity schools In the city and
suburbs of London where the education Is
according to the church of England, and one

it

123).

fourth "unto necessitated decayed freemen
of the company, their widows and children."
The first half of the income of the fund
greatly accumulated, few such slaves having
been found for a century. Lord Brougham,
reversing the decree of Sir John Leach, M.
R., held that the court had jurisdiction to
apply the surplus income of this moiety and
its accumulations as near as might be to the
intentions of the testator; having regard to
the bequest touching Biitish captives, and
also to the other charitable bequests in the
will; and that the case should be referred
proper
back to the master to approve
Attorney Genscheme for such application.
Mylne
K. 576.
eral V. Ironmongers' Co.,
Sir Christopher Pepys, M. R. (afterwards
Lord Cottenham,) accordingly ordered it to
be so referred. On the return of the master's
report, Lord Langdale, M. R., approved a
scheme to apply the whole fund to the second and third purposes declared In the will.
Beav. 313. Lord Chancellor Cottenham on
appeal reversed this decree; and upon the
ground that the testator had not limited the
first charity, like the others, to persons in
London, ordered the first moiety to be applied to supporting and assisting charity
schools in England and Wales, and referred
back to the master to settle a scheme for
Craig & P. 208. And this dethat purpose.
cree was affirmed In the house of lords with
the concurrence of Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, and Lords Brougham, Cottenham and
Campbell. 10 Clark & F. 908. In that case,
though there were differences of opinion as
to the details of the scheme, the jurisdiction
of the court of chancery to frame one in such
a case was thus affirmed by the deliberate
judgments of five law lords; and all agreed
that, for the purpose of ascertaining what
was cy pres to the particular object which
had failed, the court might look at all the
charitable bequests in the will; applying in
this respect the principle upon which Lord
Bacon had acted more than two centuries
before in the case of Bloomfield v. Stowemarket, above cited.
But the case most like that now before us
Is that of Lady Mice's Charity, Lady Mico,
by her will made in 1670, gave a thousand
pounds "to redeem poor slaves In what manner the executors should think most conThis charity was established by
venient."
Upon an indecree In chancery in 1686.
formation filed In 1827, after the fund had
accumulated a hundred fold,
was referred
master to approve of a scheme for the
to
application of the income according to the
will of the testatrix, or, if he should find that
could not be executed according to her will,
then as near the intent of the will as could
be, regard being had to the existing circumstances and to the amount of the fund. The
master, by his general report in 1835, stated
that the relators had laid before him a
scheme for applying the fund to the enfranchisement of slaves In the British Colonies

it

See Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 387,
case.
388; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana, 366.1
In most of the cases cited at the argument,
In which the heirs at law were held to be entitled to the property, the charitable gift never took effect at all; either because it could
not be carried out as directed, without violating the mortmain act of 9 Geo. II., as in
Jones T. WUllams, Amb. 651; Attorney General V. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 141, and Smith v.
Oliver, 11 Beav. 481; or because the testator
had in terms limited it to a special object
which could not be accomplished at the time
of his death; as in the case of a bequest to
build a church in Wheatley, which could not
be done without the consent of the bishop,
and he refused (Attorney General v. Bishop
of Oxford, 1 Brown, Oh. 444, note; Id., cited
2 Cox, Ch. 365; 2 Ves. Jr. 388; and 4 Ves.
431, 432); or of a direction to contract with
the governors of a hospital for the purchase
of a presentation of a boy to that charity, if
the residuary assets should prove sufficient
for that purpose, and they proved to be insufficient (Cherry v. Mott, 1 Mylne & O.
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who were too poor to purchase their own
freedom; which application, in consequence
of St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 73, abolishing slavery
(which took effect in 1834), had become impracticable; that he was of opinion that the
testatrix by her will contemplated the redemption of poor slaves In the Barbary
States, but that intention could not be carried into effect; and he approved a scheme
to apply the capital and income in purchasing
and building school-houses for the education
of the emancipated apprentices and their issue, qualifying teachers, paying the salaries
of masters and other expenses, and to apply
the surplus rents to the support of any other
schools, and generally in promoting educaSir Christopher
tion in the British Colonies.
Pepys, M. R., confirmed this scheme by a decree; and, after he had become lord chancellor, stated the reasons to have been that
"in this there was no restriction as to the
description of slaves, or the countries in
which the slaves were tQ be looked for;" that
upon the reference to the master "it appeared
that there were not within any part of the
British dominions any poor slaves to be redeemed, but that there were in the colonies
many thousands
of human beings from
whom the odious appellation of slaves had
been removed, but whose state was very far
short of that of freemen, from whose bodies
the chains of slavery had been struck, but
whose minds and morals were still in that
state of degradation which Is inseparable
from the unfortunate situation from which
they had recently been in part rescued;
it
was proposed to the master to apply, and he
approved of a scheme for the completion of
that holy work, by assisting In tiie education
If, before the slavery
of those poor beings.
abolition act, these funds could properly have
been applied to procuring the redemption of
slaves in the colonies, the proposed application for the benefit of the apprentices was
doubtless cy pres to the Intention of the
And his reason for not applying
donor."
Betton's Charity In the same manner was
that it was in terms limited to slaves in Turkey or Barbary. Attorney General v. Gibson,
2 Beav. 817, note; Attorney General v. Ironmongers' Co., Craig & P. 226, 227.
There is no adjudication of this question
by the supreme court of the United States.
The dicta of Chief Justice Marshall in Baptist Ass'n V. Hart's Bx'rs, 4 Wheat 1, were
based upon an Imperfect survey of the authorities, were not required by the decision,
and are bardly reconcilable with the more
recent judgments of the same court; and that
case, as well as Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 79,
arose under the law of Virginia.
VIdal v.
Ghrard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 192; Perin v. Carey,
24 How. 501; Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Mete. (Mass.)
380; American Academy of Arts & Sciences
V. President, etc., of Harvard
12
College,
<Jray, 593; 2 Kent, Comm. 287.
In Pontain
V. Ravenel, 17 How. 369, the testator authorized his executors or the survivor of them

to dispose of the residue of his estate "for
the use of such charitable Institutions in
Pennsylvania and South Carolina, as they or
he may deem most beneficial to mankind,"
and they died without appointing; and it was
held that the title did not vest in the executors as trustees, and that according to the
English law the disposition would have been
in the crown by sign manual. As Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the
court, said: "Nothing short of the prerogative power, it would seem, can reach this
case.
There Is not only uncertainty in the
beneficiaries of this charity, but behind that
Is a more formidable objection. There is no
expressed will of the testator.
He intended
to speak through his executors or the survivor of them, but by the acts of Providence
this has become impossible. It is then as
though he had not spoken.
Can any power
now speak for him, except the parens patriae?"
The further remarks about the power
of cy pres, if intended to cover a case in
which the charitable purposes were described
or Indicated' in the will, were upon a question
not before the court. The separate opinion
of Chief Justice Taney in Fontain v. Ravenel
was but his own, based mainly upon that of
Chief Justice Marshall in Baptist Ass'n v.
Hart's Ex'rs. And it is Impossible to avoid
the Inference that the impressions of both of
those eminent magistrates were derived from
the laws of Maryland and Virginia in which
they had be^n educated, and by which St 43
Eliz. has been expressly repealed, and charities are not recognized as entitled to any
favor, either In duration or construction, beyond other trusts. Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 Har. & J. 392; Gallego v. Attorney
General, 3 Leigh, 450.
In North Carolina,
the supreme coini; once declared that it had
all the powers exercised by the English chancellor, either in the equity jurisdiction or under the sign manual; and since, rebounding
from that extreme opinion, seems to have
adopted the view of Maryland and Virginia.
Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks, 96; McAuley v.
Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. 276; Holland v. Peck, 2
Ired. Eq. 255. There is a dictum to a like
effect In Carter v. Balfour, 19 Ala. 830. So
in New York, the court of appeals, after
some division and vacillation of opinion in
the course of the frequent changes in the
composition of the court, has recently adjudged that In that state the English law of
charitable uses has been wholly abrogated
by statute, and that charities are within the
rule against perpetuities, and have no privileges about private trusts.
Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584.
On the other hand, the court of appeals of
Kentucky, in an able judgment delivered by
Chief Justice Robertson, marked the distinction between the power exercised under the
sign manual, and that inherent in the equity
jurisdiction;
and, after speaking of the former as not Judicial, added: "The cy pres doctrfne of England is not, or should not be, a
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judicial doctrine, except in one kind of case;
and that is, where there is an available charity to an identified or ascertainable object,
and a particular mode. Inadequate, illegal or
inappropriate, or which happens to fall, has
been prescribed. In such case, a court of equity may substitute or sanction any other
mode that may be lawful and suitable and
will effectuate the declared intention of the
donor, and not arbitrarily and in the dark,
presuming on his weakness or wishes, declare an object for him. A court may act judicially as long as it effectuates the lawful
intention of the donor." Moore v. Moore, 4
Dana, 366. See, also, Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana,
177; Curling v. Curling, 8 Dana, 3a The
power of cy pres, which was declared by
the supreme court of Pennsylvania In Metho^st Church v. Remington, 1 Watts, 226, and
Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 93, not to exist in that state, was the power exercised under the sign manual in case of a gift to superstitious uses, or of an expression of general
intention to devote a sum to charitable purposes not designated. In a very recent case,
the same court said: "The rule of equity on
this subject seems to be clear, that when a
definite charity is created, the failure of the
particular mode in which it is to be ^ectuated does not destroy tlie charity; for equity
will substitute another mode, so that the substantial intention shall not depend ujon the
formal intention." "And this is the doctrine
of cy pres, so far as it has been expressly
adopted by ns" —"a reasonable doctrine, by
which a well defined chari^, or one where
the means of definition are given, may be
enforced In favor of the general intent, even
where the mode or means provided for by
the donor fail by reason of their inadequacy
or unlawfulness." Philadelphia v. Girard, 45
Pa. St. 27, 28. Like principles have been
maintained In South Carolina and Illinois.
Attorney General v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 99, 2
Strob. Eq. 395; Gllman v. Hamilton, 16 111.
231. The existence of a judici&l power to administer a charity cy pres where the expressed intention of the founder cannot be
exactly carried out has been either countenanced or left an open question in all the
England
New
states except Connecticut.
Burr T. Smith, 7 Vt 287, 288; Second Congregational Soc. T. First Congregational Soc,
14 N. H. 330; Brown v. Concord, 33 N. H.
296; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 439; Tappan v.
Deblois, 45 Me. 131; Howard v. American
Peace Soc, 49 Me. 302, 303; Treat's Appeal,
See, also, 2 Redf. Wills, 815,
30 Conn. 113.
note; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15;
Beall V. Pox, 4 Ga. 427; Chambers v. St.
Louis, 29 Mo. 590, 592; Lepage v. Macnamara,
5 Iowa, 146; Mclntyre v. Zones vUle, 17 Ohio

St

352.

The narrow doctrines which have prevailed
to some states upon this subject are inconsistent with the established law of this comOur ancestors brought with
monwealth.
them from England the elements of the law
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of charitable uses, and, although the form of
proceeding by commission under St. 43 Eliz.
has never prevailed in Massachusetts, that
statute, in substance and principle, has always been considered as part of our common
law. 4 Dane, Abr. 6, 239; Earle v. Wood, 8
Cush. 445. Under the Colony charter, charities wei-e regulated and administered, according to the Intent of the donors, under the direction of the general court, the court of assistants, and the county courts; and under
the Province charter, although no court was
vested with equity jurisdiction, charitable
bequests were not the less valid. Anc. Chart.
52; Drury v. Natlck, 10 Allen, 180, 181, and
authorities cited; Wlnslow v. Trowbridge,
The English
stated in 11 Allen, 459, 460.
mortmain act of 9 Geo. II. c. 36, did not ex«
tend to Massachusetts; and the similar provision in Prov. St. 28 Geo. II. c. 9, was repealed immediately after our Revolution by
St. 1785, c. 51. OdeU v. Odell, 10 Allen, 6.
Charities are held not to be within the common rule limiting perpetuities and. accumulations. Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen, 243; Odell
V. OdeU, 10 Allen, 1.
Charitable bequests to
an unincorporated society here, to a foreign,
coriwratlon or society, or to a particular religions denomination in a certain county,
have been carried into effect, even where no
trustees have been named in the will. Embank V. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146; Bartlett ^.
Nye, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 378; Washburn v. Sewall, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 280; Universalist Soc. v.
Pitch, 8 Gray, 421. See, also. Wells v. Doane,
3 Gray, 201; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen,
446.

The intention of the testator is the guide,
or, in the phrase of Lord Coke, the lodestone,
of the court; and therefore, whenever a char
itable gift can be administered according tc>
his express directions, this court, like the
court of chancery in England, is not at liberty to modify it upon considerations of policy or convenience. Harvard College v. Society for Promoting Theological Education,
3 Gray, 280; Baker v. Smith, 13 Mete. (Mass.)
34; Trustees of Smith Charities v. Inhabitants
of Northampton, 10 Allen, 498. But there are
several cases, where the charitable trust
could not be executed as directed in the will,
In which the testator's scheme has been varied by this court in such a way and to such
an extent as could not be done in the case
of a private trust Thus bequests to a particular bible society by name, whether a corporation established by law or a voluntary
association, which had ceased to exist before
the death of the testator, have been sustained, and applied to the distribution of bibles
through a trustee appointed by the court for
the purposa Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush.
358; Bliss v. American Bible Soc, 2 Allen,
334. At a time when the general chancery
jurisdiction of this court over trusts was
limited to those arising under deeds and wills,
the legislature by a special statute authorized it to hear and determine in equity any
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and all matters relating to a certain gift to a
scientific corporation, to be Invested in a certain manner, and paid in premiums for discoveries or improvements on heat or light
published in America within two years before each award. Upon a bill being filed, and
it appearing that it had become impracticablo
to carry out the intent of the donor in the
mode prescribed, Chief Justice Shaw authorized a different investment of the fund; and.
In accordance with a scheme reported by a
master, authorized the corporation to apply
the surplus income, after paying such premiums, to purchasing books, papers and philosophical apparatus, and malting such publications or rrocuring such lectures, experiments or investigations as should facilitate
and encourage the making of such discoveries
and improvements; and said: "Whenever it
appears that a general object of charity is
intended, and the purpose is not unlawful
and void, the right of the heir at law is divested." "It is now a settled rule in equity
that a liberal construction Is to be givMi to
charitable donations, with a view to promote
and accomplish the general charitable intent
of the donor, and that such intent ought to be
observed, and when this cannot be strictly
and literally done, this court will cause It to
be fulfilled as nearly in conformity with the
intent of the donor as practicable
Where
the property thus given is given to trustees
capable of taking, but the property cannot
be applied precisely In the mode directed,
the court of chancery interferes, and regulates the disposition of such property under
on the subject of
Its general Jurisdiction
trusts, and not as administering a branch of
the prerogative of the king as parens patriae."
"What is the nearest method of carrying Into effect the general intent of the
donor must of course depend upon the subject matter, the expressed intent, and the
other circumstances of each particular case,
upon all of which the court is to exercise its
discretion."
American Academy v. Harvard
College, 12 Gray, 582. The same principle
was also recognized or assumed In 4 Dane,
Abr. 242, 243, In Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick.
333, and other cases already cited. Baker t.
Smith, 1j3 Mete. (Mass.) 41; Harvard College
V. Society for Promoting Theological Education, 3 Gray, 282, 298; Trustees of Smith
Charities v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 10
Allen, 501, 502.
By, Gen. St. c. 113, § 2, this court may
hear and determine in equity all suits and
proceedings for enforcing and regulating the
execution of trusts, whether the trusts relate
to real or personal estate, "and shall have
fuU equity jurisdiction, according to the usage and practice of courts of equity, in all
other cases, where there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law." The
powers usually exercised by the court of chancery In the course of its jurisdiction In equity
have thus been expressly conferred upon this
court by the legislature. The authority of ad-

ministering

a charitable trust according to
expressed
intention of the donor, and,
when that cannot be exactly followed, then
as nearly as possible, is a part of .this jurisdiction, which the court is not at liberty to
The only question is, whether the
decline.
facts of the case show a proper occasion for
its exercise according to the settled practice
in chancery.
In all the cases cited at the argument, in
which a charitable bequest, which might have
been lawfully carried out under the circumstances existing at the death of the testator,
has been held, upon a change of circumstan-ces, to result to the heirs at law or residuary
legatees, the gift was distinctly limited to
particular persons or establishments.
Such
was Russell v. Kellett, 3 Smale & G. 264,
In which the gift was of five pounds outright to each poor person of a particular description in certain parishes, and Vice Chancellor Stuart held that the shares of those
who died before receiving them went to the
residuary legate.is. Such, also, was Clark v.
Taylor, 1 Drew. 642, in which it was held
that a legacy to a certain orphan school by
name, which ceased to exist after the death
of the testator, failed and fell into the residue of the estate; and which can hardly be
reconciled with the decisions in Incorporated
Soc. V. Price, 1 Jones & L. 498, 7 Ir. Eq.
260; In re Clergy Society, 2 Kay & J. 615;
Marsh v. Attorney General, 2 Johns. & H.
61; Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 358, and
Bliss V. American Bible Soc., 2 Allen, 384.
So in Easterbrooks v. Tillinghast, 5 Gray,
17, the trust was expressly limited,
not only
in object, but in duration, to the maintenance
of the pastor of a certain church of a specified faith and practice in a particular town,
"so long as they or their successors shall
maintain the visibility of a church in said
faith and order;" and could not have been'
held to have terminated, had it not been so
Attorney General v. Columbine,
limited.
Boyle, Char. '204, 205; Potter v. Thurston,7 R. I. 25; Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen, 243.
The charitable bequests of Francis Jackson
cannot, in the ojjinion of the court, be regarded as so restricted In their objects, or
so limited in point of time, as to have been
terminated and destroyed by the abolition of
slavery in the United States. They are to a
board of trustees for whose continuance careful provision is made In the will, and which
the testator expresses a wish may become a
permanent organization and may receive the
services and sympathy, the donations and bequests, of the friends of the slave. Their
duration is not in terms limited, like that
of the trust sought to be established In the
sixth article of the will, by the accomplishment of the end specified.
They take effect
from the time of the testator's death, and
might then have been lawfully applied in
exact conformity with his expressed Intentions. The retaining of the funds In the cus-
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cannot affect the question.
The gifts being lawful and charitable, and
having once vested, the subsequent change
of circumstances before the funds have been
actually paid over is of no more vreight than
if they had been paid to the trustees and
by them for a century bebeen administered
fore slavery was extinguished.
Neither the Immediate purpose of the testator—the moral education of the people; nor
his ultimate object—to better the condition of
the African race In this country; has been
fuUy accomplished by the abolition of slavery.
Negro slavery was recognized by our law as
an infraction of the rights inseparable from
human nature; and tended to promote idleness, selfishness and tyranny in one part of
the community, a destruction of the domestic
relations and utter debasement in the other
part. The sentiment which would put an end
of justice, humanity
to it is the sentiment
and charity, based upon moral duty, inspired
by the most familiar precepts of the Christian religion, and approved by the constituThe teaching and
tion of the commonwealth.
diffusion of such a sentiment are not of temporary benefit or necessity, but of perpetual
but
Slavery may be abolished;
obligation.
the sentiment
to strengthen
and confirm
which opposed it wiU continue to be useful
and desirable so long as selfishness, cruelty,
the lust of dominion, and indifference to the
rights of the weak, the poor and the ignorant,
ha^e a place in the hearts of men. Looking
at the trust established by the fourth article
of this will as one for the moral education
of the people only, the case Is within the
principle of those, already cited, in which
charities for the relief of leprosy and the
plague were held not to end with the disapand is not espearance of those diseases;
sentially different from that of Attorney General v. Baliol College, ia which a trust for the
education at Oxford of Scotch youths, to be
sent into Scotland to preach Episcopalianism
in the established church there, was applied
by Lords Somers and Hardwicke and their
successors to educate such youths, although,
by the change of faith and practice of the
Church of Scotland, the donor's ultimate object could no longer be accomplished.
The intention of Francis Jackson to benefit
the negro race appears not only in the leading clause of the fourth article, and in his
expression of a hope that his trustees might
receive the aid and the gifts of the friends
of the slave, but in the trust for the benefit
of fugitive slaves In the fifth article of the
will, to which, according to the principle established by the house of lords In the Case of
Betton's Charity, resort may be had to ascertain his Intent and the fittest mode of carrying it out The negroes, although emancipated, still stand in great need of assistance and
education.
Charities for the relief of the poor
have been often held to be well appliei! to
•educate
them and their children. Bishop of
under advisement
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Hereford v. Adams, 7 Ves. 324; Wilkinson
Malin, 2 Cromp. & J. 636, 2 Tyrw. 544;
Anderson v. Wrights of Glasgow, 12 Li T.
(N. S.) 807. The Case of Mico Charity is
directly to the point that a gift for the redemption of poor slaves may be appropriated,
after they have been emancipated by law, to
educate them; and the reasons given by Lord
for that decision apply with no
Cottenham
less force to those set free by the recent
amendment of the constitution in the United
States, than to those who were emancipated
by act of parliament in the West Indies.
The mode in which the funds bequeathed
by the fourtn and fifth articles of the will
may be best applied to carry out in a lawful
manner the charitable intents and purposes
of the testator as nearly as possible must
be settled by a scheme to be framed by a
master and confirmed by the court before
In
the funds are paid over to the trustees.
doing this, the court does not take the charity
out of the hands of the trustees, but only
declares the law which must be their guide
in its administration. Shelf. Mortm. 651-654;
Boyle, Char. 214-218. The case is therefore
to be referred to a master, with liberty to
the attorney general and the trustees to submit schemes for his approval; and all further
directions are reserved until the coming in
of his report.
Case referred to a master.
V.

The case was then referred to John Codman, Esquire, a master in chancery for this
county, who, after notice to the trustees and
the attorney general, and hearing the parties,
made his report, the results of which were
approved by the attorney genetal; and upon
exceptions to which the case was argued by
W. Phillips for himself and other excepting
trustees, and by J. A. Andrew in support
of the master's report, before Gray, J., with
the agreement
that he should consult the
whole court before entering a final decree.
No account was asked by any party of sums
already expended by the trustees.
As to the bequest in the fifth article, the
master reported that the unexpended balance
(amounting to $1049.90) was so small that it
was reasonable that it should be confined to a
limited territory; and that it should therefore be applied by the trustees, in accordance
with their unanimous recommendation, to the
use of necessitous persons of African descent
in the city of Boston and its vichiity.
This
scheme was approved and confirmed by the
court, with this addition: "Preference being
given to such as have escaped from slavery."
As to the sum bequeathed in the fourth article of the will, the master reported that a
portion had been expended by the trustees
before any question arose as to its validity;
and that but two schemes had been suggested to him for the appropriation of the residue,
namely, first, (which was approved by four
of the seven trustees who had accepted the
trust,) in part to the support of the Anti-
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Slavery Standard, and In part to the New
England Branch of the American Preedmen's
Union Commission; or, second, (which was
approved by the remaining trustees,) that the
whole should be applied to the last named object.

The master disapproved of the first of these
and reported that the Anti- Slavery
Standard was a weekly newspaper published
In the city of New York with a circulation of
not more than three thousand copies, which
was established nearly thirty years ago for
the purpose of acting upon public opinion In
tavor of the abolition of slavery; that in his
opinion, since the abolition of slavery, and
the passage of the reconstruction acts of congress, "the support of a paper of such limited circulation as hardly to be self-sustaining
would do very little for the benefit of the colored people in their present status, and its
direct influence would be almost imperceptible on the welfare of that class most nearly
corresponding to those whom the testator had
In view in making this bequest;" and that the
argument, that it was evidently the intention
of the testator to accomplish the object Indicated in the fourth article of his will by
means of which a newspaper like this might
be considered an example, was answered by
the fact that the object for which these means
were to be used had been already accomplished without them.
The master returned
with his report a few numbers of the AntiSlavery Standard, (taken without selection as
they were given to him by the chairman of
the trustees,) by which it appeared that it was
In large part devoted to urging the passage of
laws securing to the freedmen equal political
rights with the whites, the keeping of the
states under military government,
southern
the impeachment of the president, and other
political measures.
The master reported that he was unable to
any better plan than the second
devise
that this mode of approscheme suggested;
priation was in his opinion most in accordT v/-e with the intention of the testator as exschemes;

pressed In the fourth article of the will, hecause the intention nearest to that of emancipating the slaves was by educating the
emancipated slaves to render them capable of
self-government; and this could best be done
by an organized society, expressly intended
and exactly fitted for this function, and which,
if the whole or any part of this fund was to
be applied to the direct education and support of the freedmen, was admitted at the
hearing before him to be the fittest channel
for the appropriation. The master returned
with his report printed documents by which
it appeared that the object of the American
Freedmen's
Union Commission, as stated In
its constitution, was "the relief, education and
elevation of the freedmen of the United
States, and to aid and coSperate with the people of the South, without distinction of race
or color, in the improvement of their condition, upon the basis of Industry, education,
freedom and Christian morality;" and that
the New England and other branches of the
commission were now maintaining large numbers of teachers and schools for this purpose
throughout the southern states.
The master accordingly reported that what
by the
remained
of the fund bequeathed
fourth article of the will should be "ordered
to be paid over to the New England Branch
of the Freedmen's Union Commission, to be
employed and expended by them in promoting
the education, support and interests generally
of the freedmen (late Slaves) in the states of
this Union recently in rebellion." And this
scheme was by the opinion of the whole court
accepted and confirmed, modified only by directing the executor to pay the fund to the
trustees, to be by them paid over at such
times and in such sums as they in their discretion might think fit to the treasurer of the
branch commission; and by substituting for
the words "recently in rebellion" the words
"in which slavery has been abolished, either

by the proclamation of the late President Lincoln or the amendment of the constitution."
Final decree accordingly.
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ALLETN et al.
(55

N. E.

Court of Appeala

▼.

568,

STEVENS
161 N.

T.

of New York.

et al.
122.)
Dec. 5, 1899.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate diFourth department.
Action by Benjamin G. Allen and others
against Charles E. Stevens and others, as
executors and trustees under the will of
Nathan F. Graves, deceased, to obtain a construction of the will. From an order of the
appellate division (54 N. Y. Supp. 8) reversing a judgment in favor of defendants (49
N. Y. Supp. 431), they appeal. Reversed.
Tision,

This action was brought for the purpose
of obtaining a construction of the will of
Nathan F. Graves, deceased, and particularly the tenth clause thereof, devising and
bequeathing the residuary real and personal
estate in trust for the purpose of founding,
erecting, and maintaining Graves Home for
the Aged, to the effect that the said provisions of the tenth clause be adjudged void
and invalid, and also that It be adjudged and
determined that the said will is void and invalid so far as it devised and bequeathed
more than one-half of the real and personal
property of the testator to benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious, and missionary societies, associations,
or corporations, in trust or otherwise, and that the surplus of such one-half part be distributed and
conveyed to the plaintiffs, who are next of
kin of the testator. The special term decided that the will was in all respects valid, and
rendered judgment accordingly. The api)ellate division, by a divided court, held that
the tenth clause was invalid, and reversed
the judgment. From the order and judgment entered thereon, appeals have been
taken to this court.
The will read as follows:
"I Nathan F. Graves, of the city of Syracuse, in the state of New York, being of
sound mind and memory, do make, ordain,
publish, and declare this to be my last will
and testament; that is to say:
"First. After all my lawful debts are
paid and discharged, I give, devise, and bequeath unto Catharine H. Graves, my wife,
all of the furniture, beds, and bedding of
every kind. Including paintings, pictures,
vases, and statuary of every kind, with all
kitchen utensils, in the dwelling house where
we now live, the horses, harnesses, carriages,
wagons, sleighs, sleds, cows, chickens, and
everything appertaining thereto and connected therewith. Including feed of every
kind, to have and to hold the same to her
heirs and assigns, forever. I also give and
bequeath to the said Catharine H. Graves
the rents, issues, and profits of all of my
houses, tenements, and stores south of James
street. In Syracuse, to be paid to her monthly, subject only to the necessary repairs and
taxes for and during her natural life.
also trlve and bequeath to the said Cathar-
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ine H. Graves all dividends that may be declared by the New York State Banking Company on all the stock standing in my name,
to be paid to her when declared and due,
payable to her Immediately, for and during
her natural life.
"Second. I give and bequeath to the Oneida Cemetery Association, called 'Glenwood
Cemetery,'
situate In the town of Lenox,
near the village of Oneida, in Madison county, in the state of New York, the sum of
five hundred dollars, to be received and held
In trust by the trustees thereof, or other
representatives of said Cemetery Association, to be Invested on first bond and mortgage or mortgages, the Interest, or so much
thereof or so much of the same as may be
necessary, be expended in keeping the family burial lot In good order, grading, mowing, enriching, and all other things that may
be needed.
The lot is known as lot number one In section S in said cemetery, the
title of which is In Nathan F. Graves and
Catharine H. Graves, his wife. The said
money may be deposited in any savings
bank In Madison or Onondaga county when
not Invested In bond and mortgage.
Any
part of the Interest or principal may be used
to ■repair any injury to the monument or
headstones
caused by any casualty
or by
lapse of time.
"Third. I give and bequeath to the General Synod of the Reformed Church In America, also known as the General Synod of
Church In America, the sum of ten thousand
dollars, for the specific purpose of founding
and maintaining an annual course of lectures on missions (the choice of the lecturer
and the details of the lectureship to be under the direction of the professors in the
seminary at New Brunswick, New Jersey,
and the corresponding secretary of the board
of foreign missions of the Reformed Church
of America, or his successor), payable after
the death of my wife, Catharine H. Graves;
but the sum of five hundred dollars a year
Is to be paid by my executors, at such times
as the same may be needed to sustain the
lecture course, during the life of my wife.
"Fourth. I give and bequeath to the Syracuse University, situated in the city of Syracuse, in the state of New York, ten thousand
dollars, for the specific purpose of founding
and maintaining an annual course of lectures
on missions (the choice of the lecturer and
the details of the lectureship to be under the
direction of the chancellor of the University); payable after the death of my wife,
Catharine H. Graves; but the sum of five
hundred dollars a year Is to be paid by my
executors, at such times as the same may be
needed to sustain the lecture course, during
the life of my wife.
give and bequeath to Hope Col"Fifth.
lege, situated at Holland, In the state of
Michigan, ten thousand dollars for the specific purpose of erecting a fireproof building,
to be used as a library.
The sums that I
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have advanced or may hereafter advance
during my life will be deducted from the
and bequeath
I also give
above amount.
■
to said Hope College my miscellaneous library in the dwelling house in Syracuse
The library will not
where I now reside.
be delivered to said Hope College during the
life of Catharine H. Graves, my wife, unless
she consents to the removal in writing.
"Sixth. I give and bequeath to the Syracuse Home Association, situate at the corner
of Townsend and Hawley streets, in Syracuse, to the Onondaga County Orphan Asylum, in Syracuse, and the St. Joseph's Hospital, situate on Prospect avenue, corner Union street, in Syracuse, each one thousand
dollars, payable after the death of Catharine H. Graves, my wife.
"Seventh. I give and bequeath unto the consistory of the Reformed Church, situated on
James street, in Syracuse, in the state of
New York, the sum of two thousand dollars
in trust for the specific purpose hereinafter
named, which sum may be invested in first
mortgage or mortgages;
the interest to be
used in the payment of the rent of a pew in
said church, and the balance of interest, if
any, to be given to the board of foreign misThe pew designated -by
sions of said church.
the consistory may be used by the pastor of
the church and his family when needed for
that purpose, and, when not so needed, to be
used as the consistory shall from time to time
determine.

"Eighth. I give and bequeath to my executors the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, but
in trust to be used for the purpose of placing
In the Reformed Church in Syracuse a memorial window for wife, Catharine H. Graves,
and myself.
The sum may be used for that
purpose, or so much thereof as may be necessary.
The memorial window may be omitted, and a memorial tablet be placed on the
wall inside of the church.
In either case the
consent and approval of the consistory must
first be obtained.
give and bequeath to Francis H.
"Ninth.
Loomis, the son of my sister Achsah H.
Loomis, one thousand dollars.
give and
bequeath to Helen A. Graves, the daughter
of my brother Benjamin S. Graves, one thougive and bequeath to Benjasand dollars.
min 6. Allen, the son of my sister Maiy A.
give and beAllen, one thousand dollars.
queath to Helen M. Hiclss, Charles Sterling
Graves, William Shaw Graves, Nathan Francis Graves and Mary Elizabeth Graves, the
children of my brother Sterling P. Graves,
give and beeach one thousand dollars.
queath to Abial S. Graves, my brother, one
thousand dollars; to Mary B. Strong, Elizabeth and Benjamin S. Graves, his children,
one thousand dollars each.
1 give and bequeath to Helen Breese Graves, daughter of
Maurice A. Graves, one thousand dollars.
give and bequeath to Nathan B. Graves ten
thousand
dollars.
give and bequeath
to
Augustus G. Stevens, son of Charles B. Stevens, my law library and my mahogany book

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

give and bequeath to
paper case.
Maurice A. Graves my three black-walnut
book cases, now in my library room where I
now reside; also, my library table. I give
and bequeath to my brother the portrait of
myself, painted by Blliatt; unto Sterling P.
Graves. I give and bequeath unto Nathan
Francis Graves my watch and chains.
give, bequeath, and devise all
"Tenth.
the rest and residue of my property of every
kind, personal and real, wherever situate, to
my trustees hereinafter named, for the purpose of founding, erecting, and maintaining
Graves Home for the Aged, to be located in
the city of Syracuse, in the state of New
York. It Is Intended as a home for those
who by misfortune have become incapable of
providing for themselves, and those who have
The institution
slender means of support
to be known as the Graves Home for the
I hereby appoint Charles E. Stevens,
Aged.
Easselas A. Bonta, and Maurice A, Graves for
the trustees to execute the above trust I
hereby authorize and empower my executors,
or the survivor of them, to rent or sell any
may own
part or all of my real estate that
at the time of my death. They are authorized to employ a person or persons to have
charge of the real estate, to collect rents
and make repairs, and to pay such sums for
and

I

I

compensation
and proper.
cuted their

as they

may

deem reasonable

my executors have exetrust and paid all the legatees
provided for in this will, they are authorized
and directed to convey to the said trustees
above

named

After

the balance

and

remainder

of

my property of every kind, to be applied for
and the said
the purposes above provided;
trustees, or the survivor, are authorized to
rent or sell all or any part of my real or personal property, and to employ such agents aa
they may deem proper to take charge of the
same, and pay them such compensation as
they deem best
"Eleventh. My executors or my trustees
are authorized to retain my stock and shares
in the New York State Banking Company,
and continue the business of banldng for a
term of years, at their discretion, but may
sell the same or any part thereof at any time;
but the same is not to be continued, nor any
portion of my property held, longer than the
lives of Catharine Graves Roby, daughter of
and Helen
Sidney B. Roby, of Rochester,
A.
Graves, daughter of Maurice
Breese
make, conLikewise,
Graves, of Syracuse.
stitute, and appoint Charles E. Stevens, Ras-

I

selas A. Bonta, and Maurice A. Graves to be
executors of this, my last will and testament
hereby revoking all former wills by me made.
"In witness whereof, have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my seal the fifteenth day of September, In the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-

I

three.

Nathan

F.

Graves.

[Seal.]"

Augustus O. Stevens, for appellant execuCharles 0. Cook, for appellant Syracuse
Home Ass'n. Frank Hlscock, for appellant
tor.
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0. E. Steyens, for appellant
attorney generaL
First Reformed Churcti. Joseph "W. Sutphen,
for appellant General Synod. William G. TraO. Carscy, for respondents Allen and others.
kadden, for respondent Breese.

PARKER, 0. J. (after stating the facts).
Under the law of this state, prior to the enactment of chapter 701 of the Laws of 1893,
the tenth clause of the will in question would
First, behave been void upon two grounds:
of the beneficiaries
cause of the indefiniteness
(Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. T. 580; Tilden v.
Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. B. 880, 14 L. R. A.
33); and, second, because, although intending
charity, the testator
to found a permanent
did not direct the formation of a corporation
within two lives in being to take over the
trust property. Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N.
Y. 254; Cruikshank v. Home for the Friendless, 113 N. Y. 337, 21 N. E. 64, 4 L. R. A. 140;
People v. Simonson, 126 N. Y. 299, 27 N. E.
380.
The question now presented is whether
the act of 1893 has so far amended the law
relating to the subject of charitable bequests
as to make it possible for the charitable inBetentions of this testator to be executed.
fore examining the statute, which was concededly intended to affect in some wise the
law upon the general subject, it will not be
out of place to have in mind the situation of
such law. No one disputes that it was the
intention of the legislature to change in substantial respects the law as it had been settled by the courts of this state.
The controversy is as to the extent of the changes intended by the legislature,

and upon the ques-

tion of intent some light will be thrown by
a very brief reference to the early state of
the law in this state upon the subject of charitable uses, and the changes from time to time
which finally resulted in its overthrow. This
subject was exhaustively considered
in an
opinion written by Judge Denio in the case of
WiUiams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525. In that
case the opinion declared that according to
the law of England as it existed at the time
of the American Revolution, and as it still
exists, devises and bequests in support of
charity and religion, although defective for
want of such grantee or donee as the rules of
law require in other cases, would nevertheless
be supported in the courts of chancery;
that
such parts of the common law had become
Incorporated into our system of jurisprudence
prior to the adoption of the constitution, by
force of the provisions, of which it became a
part, of the common law of this state.
In
answer to the claim that the law of charitable
uses was created by the statute 43 Eliz. e. 4,
and hence was abrogated by the repeal in this
state of the statute of Elizabeth (Laws 1788,
c. 46, § 37), the court asserted that the doctrine of charitable uses was a creation of
chancery, and had been regarded as an Important part of its jurisdiction long prior to
the enactment of the statute of Elizabeth,
and such system having become ingrafted upon
the common law, and the practice thereof
H.& B.E<}.(2d Ed.)— 28
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navmg Deen undertaken and carried on by
the court of chancery in this state, that it
was not affected by the repeal of the statute
of Elizabeth; that the provisions of the Revised Statutes did not aSect property given in
perpetuity for religious or charitable purposes; and hence that the bequest of $6,000
to Zophar V. Oakley an^ other Individual
trustees, with power to perpetuate their successors, as a perpetual fund for the education
of children of the poor who should be educated in the academy in the village of Himtington, with directions to accumulate the fund
up to a certain point, and apply the Income
to the education of children whose parents'
names were not upon the tax list, was valid.
If that case had continued to be the law of
this state, there would have been no opportunity for questioning the validity of the
tenth clause of this testator's will.
That decision, it would seem, should have settled the
question in this state, but the struggle between the advocates of a liberal policy towards charities and the opponents of such a
policy did not stop with that decision.
In
Levy V. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97, Judge Wright challenged the position taken by the court in the
Williams Case, and discussed anew the question whether the English doctrine of trusts
for charitable uses was the law of this state.
The discussion was continued in Bascom v.
Albertson and Burrill v. Boardman, supra;
and In Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332, it was
finally decided that tlie system of charitable
uses, as recognized in England prior to the
Revolution, has no existence in this state, and
that such uses are not exempt from the provisions of the statute abolishing all uses and
trusts except such as are authorized thereby.
Efforts in the interest of upholding important
charitable bequests have from time to time
been made to persuade the courts to reopen
the subject to a limited extent, without other
result than an approval of the case of Holmes
V. Mead, as in Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y.
312, 16 N. E. 305, where the court felt called
upon to point out that "charity, as a great
interest of civilization and Christianity, has
suffered no loss or diminution in the change
which has been made. The law has been
simplified, and that is all."
So the fact seemed to be at the time of such writing, and so it
may have been, except as to that class of
charities which, for convenience, we may call
original charities, as where a person desires
to found an institution to carry on a charity
that will bear his name and be a monument
to his memory, or wishes to benefit a class of
unfortunate persons in his own community, in
Many a testawhom he may be interested.
tor has attempted to provide by his last will
and testament for such a charity, but, so far
as the decisions show, nearly every such attempt has come to naught, because the courts,
in applying the rules resulting from the final
overthrow of the Williams Case, have been
obliged to hold that the language employed by
the testator was either Indefinite as to beneficiaries, or in violation of the law against
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perpetuIUes.
Holmes V. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332;
Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76; Cottmaa
V. Grace, 112 N. Y. 299, 19 N. E. 839, 3 L. R.
A. 145; Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y. 560, 26
N. B. 730; Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead,
125 N. Y. 581, 26 N. B. 801, 11 L. R. A. 715;
Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880,
14 L. R. A. 33; Booth v. Church, 126 N. Y,
Our attention has not
215, 28 N. B. 238.
been called to, nor have we discovered, any
the decision
of
case in the books, since
Holmes v. Mead, where an attempt to create
an original charity has survived the test of an
application by the courts of the rules of law
to the language employed by the testator.
Among the last, if not the very last, of the
successful attempts in that direction, was in
respect to the will of James H. Roosevelt, deceased, which was before the court in Burrill
V. Boardman, 43 N. Y. 254.
In that case the
court declined to decide the question whether
the peculiar system of charitable uses as it
existed in England has ever had foothold in
this state. The decision of this court, holding that will to be valid, made Roosevelt
Hospital a possibility. As these statements
seem to make their own comment, we pass to
the position of the legislature in 1893, which
had its attention shgrply drawn to the subject by a comparatively recent decision of
this court, the effect of which was to deprive
the public of a great charity, in which Samuel'
J. Tilden sought to employ the bulk of his
fortune, aggregating
millions. Iiooking back
over the 20 years that had elapsed since the
decision of the court in Holmes v. Mead, the
legislature could discover nothing but wrecks
of original charities,— charities that were dear
to the hearts of their would-be founders, and
the execution of which would have been of
mesttmaDie value to the public.
Further back
of that period, however, it found that in Williams V. Williams, supra, the court had declared It to be the law of this state that charitable devises and bequests were not subject to
the statute against perpetuities, nor subject to
strangulation by the rule against indefinite
beneficiaries;
for the court, having equitable
jurisdiction, claimed the right to administer
the law of charitable uses.
Our legislature
not only saw that a great wrong had been and
was being done to the public by the loss of
many devises and bequests for the purpose of

founding original charities, but it further saw
that the remedy could alone be furnished by
It It perceived that its repeal of the statute
of Elizabeth furnished the foundation for the
decisions of the courts, and did away with
the law of England upon that subject, as well
as with the practice in this country in that
regard which had been founded upon such
law, so it set about making a change in the
law; and the statute which it enacted, together with the title, reads as follows:
"An act to regulate gjfts for charitable purposes.

"Section 1. No gift, grant, bequest or devise to religious,
educational,
charitable,
or
benevolent uses, which shall, in other respects

be valid under the laws of this state, shall or
be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated
as the beneficiaries
thereunder in the Instrument creating the same. If in the instrument
creating such a gift, grant, bequest or devise
there is a trustee named to execute the same,
the legal title to the lands or property given,
granted, devised or bequeathed for such purposes shall vest in such trustee.
If no person be named as trustee then the title to such
lands or property shall vest in the supreme
court.
"Sec. 2. The supreme court shall have control over gifts, grants, bequests and devises
in all cases provided for by section one of this
act.
The attorney-general shall represent the
beneficiaries in all such cases and it shall be
his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the court." Laws 1893, c. 701.
Reading^ the statute in the light of the
events to which reference has been made, it
seems to me very clear that the legislature intended to restore the law of charitable trusts
as declared in the Williams Case; that having discovered that legislative enactment had
operated to take away the power of the courts
of equity to administer trusts that were indefinite as to beneficiaries, and had declared a
permanent charity void unless the devise in
trust was to a corporation already formed,
or to one to be created, it sought to restore
that which had been taken away through anThis is markedly indicated,
other enactment.
not only by the absence of details in the statute, which is broadly entitled "An act to regulate gifts for charitable purposes," but also
in the brevity of the statute, which confers
all power over such trusts and trustees on
the supreme court, and directs the attorney
general to represent the beneficiaries in cases
within the purview of the statute, as was the
Practical effect can be
practice in England.
given to the provision that no devise or bequest shall be deemed invalid by reason of the
indefiniteness
or uncertainty of the persons
only by treating
designated as beneficiaries
it as a part of a general scheme to restore to
the courts of equity the power formerly exercised by chancery in the regulation of gifts
for charitable purposes; for, in order to ascertain the class of persons who were entitled to the benefits of the trust, the rule formerly in force must necessarily be invoked, by
which the court ascertained as nearly as possible the intention of the testator, by decree
adjudged who were intended to be the beneficiaries of the trust, and directed its admin-

istration accordingly.
Fowler, in his work on Charitable Uses, in
speaking of the act of 1893, says: "It must
be very obvious that the act of 1893 has seriously affected those decisions of the courts
of New York which require great certainty
or a vested interest in the beneficiaries of a
charitable trust.
The act, in this respect
only, is designed to restore the ancient law
touching charitable uses for uncertain persons, and to this extent to relieve charitable
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tmsts from the narrow boundaries prescribed
by the Revised Statutes for private uses in
While that learned author expresses
lands."
the opinion that the act does not relieve charitable or public uses from the application of the
rules relating to perpetuities, which, he says,
"have no reference to public trusts," he asserts
that, had that been done, the ancient law would
have been almost revived by the legislature.
That he is right in saying that the legislato restore the ancient law
ture "designed
touching charitable uses for uncertain per-

and it appears
sons" seems unquestionable,
to be reasonably clear, from a reading of the
entire act, that the legislature designed to restore the law governing the administration
of such trusts as well. And, if such was the
design of the legislature, then effect must be
given to it, though such a construction seems
Smith
contrary to the letter of the statute.
As this statute is
V. People, 47 N. Y. 330.
It should be libremedial in its character.
erally construed with a view to the beneficial
Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y.
end proposed.
The statute provides that, if there is a
446.
trustee named to execute the trust, the legal
title to the property shall vest in such trustee,
and, further, that, if no person be named as
trustee, the title shall vest in the supreme
court That there might be no opportunity
for questioning the authority of the supreme
court in such matters, the second section provides that the supreme court shall have control over all gifts, grants, bequests, and devises In all cases provided by section 1 of
this act. Under the provisions of the act a
testator may name a corporation as trustee, or
provide that a corporation to be founded shall
act as trustee, ot the trustee named may he
an individual; but, if he name none of these,
the statute provides, in effect, that the trust
shall not faU, but the title to the property
devised or bequeathed in trust shall vest in
the supreme court, which shall have control
over gifts, grants, bequests, and devises provided for by the act.
If the contention be

well founded that It was not the intention of
the legislature to revive the ancient law as
to the administration of such trusts by the
supreme court, and to do away with the rule
requiring the formation of a corporation for
such purpose, then no permanent charity can
be administered by the supreme court, notwithstanding the title to the trust property is
by the command of the statute vested In the
supreme court when no trustee is named by
the testator.
It is Insisted that it cannot be,
because the trust term is not measured by
Neither is a corporation, which may,
lives.
as a trustee, execute a permanent trust for
charity. But, it is answered,
the law has
created an exception to the general rule in favor of corporations. True, and the lawmaking power had the right to create other exand it
ceptions, or change the law altogether;
has changed the law as to all cases within
the scope of the act, "to regulate gifts for
charitable purposes," so that now the supreme court must execute such a trust, if the
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title to the trust property vests In It under
the statute, and shall have control over the
administration, if a trustee be named by the
testator.
A construction of this statute allowing the supreme court to execute a permanent charity when the title to the real estate
Is vested in it, and at the same time declaring that, where such property is devised to a
trustee named, the devise is void, would be
absurd.
The learned counsel for the respondent
points out that It is not all gifts and devises
charitable, or benevto religious, educational,
olent uses that shall not be deemed invalid
by reason of Indefiniteness as to beneficiaries,
but only such as "shall in other respects be
valid under the laws of this state," and, with
signal ability, seeks to persuade us that, in
order to give these words effect, it must be
held that a trust is not within the protection
of the statute If it contravenes
the law
against perpetuities, -and, as a necessary sequence, that if the devise in trust he not to
a corporation, or provision be not made for
the formation of a corporation, within a period measured by two lives in being, to take
over the trust estate, then the devise or bequest is invalid, and this statute is vvithout
effect in such case.
It will be observed that,
if this contention be well grounded, the authority attempted to be conferred upon the
supreme court to take title and execute a
trust of a permanent character when no trustee is named is practically of no effect, and
. the statute itself is limited in its application
to a ease of the type of Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76, which is the single case
brought to our attention where the only objection to the validity of the trust was that
In the light
the beneficiaries were indefinite.
of the destruction of so many original charities, as shown by the decisions, the thought
cannot for a moment be indulged In that the
legislature had in view this case only, and
sought to furnish a remedy for just such cases In the future, and for none other.
We are thus led to inquire whether this
clause In the statute may not have been intended to serve some other purpose than to
require the continuance of the practice of the
formation of corporations for the administration of permanent, charitable trusts, —a result apparently in conflict with the other provisions of the statute providing for the execution of trusts by trustees or by the supreme
court.
In the attempt to ascertain the Intention of the legislature. It Is a just rule,
always to be observed, that the court shall
assume that every provision of the statute
was intended to serve some useful purpose;
and, in obedience to that rule, we now inquire whether this clause of the statute does
not have a useful place therein, and yet is
not in conflict with the letter and spirit of
the rest of the statute.
It Is so obvious that
it has, that we need cite but one Instance
for the need of such a provision, and that la
suggested by one of the contentions
made in
this case. A., having a substantial estate.

TRUSTS— PUBLIC OR CHARITABLB.

I

I

I

I

a

it It

a

authorized to employ a person or persons to
have charge of the real estate, to collect rents
and to make repairs, and to pay such sum
for compensation as they may deem reasonable and proper.
After my executors have
executed their trust, and paid all the legatees
provided for In this will, they are authorized
and directed to convey to the said trustees
above named the balance and remainder
of
my property, of every kind, to be applied for

it

Is

the purposes above provided;
and the said
trustees, or the survivor, are authorized to
rent or sell all or any part of my real or personal property, and to employ such agents as
they may deem proper to take charge of the
same, and pay them such compensation as
they deem best"
While the place where "Graves Home for
the Aged" is to be located Is stated, and
the general object of the charity Is clearly
given, namely, to provide a home for the
aged who by misfortune have become Incapable of providing for themselves,
still indefinite as to the territory from which
such aged people may be accepted at the
But for the statute that we have
home.
been considering, this trust would fail because of the indeflnlteness of the beneflclarles; but the practice that
revives
makes It necessary for the supreme court,
when properly moved by the attorney general, representing the beneficiaries, to ascertain, as nearly as may be, the Intention of
the testator as to the method of selecting
those aged persons who are to be the beneficiaries of the home, and to make such intention efficacious by decree. It seems to
have been the opinion of the appellate division that the power of alienation of the
bank shares and the real estate south of
James street was, under the terms of the
will, suspended during three 'lives In being
after the death of the testator, but to us
seems that this Is not so. It Is true that
by the first clause of the will the trustees
were directed to pay to testator's wife, during life, the dividends on the bank stocks,
when declared, and the net income from the
real estate, after making payments for necessary repairs and taxes, while by the eleventh provision of the will the testator authorized his executors and trustees to retain his shares in the New York State Banking Company for a term of years, at their
discretion, "but may sell the same, or any
part thereof, at any time; but the same is
not to be continued, nor any portion of my
property held, longer than the lives of Catharine Graves Roby, daughter of Sidney B.
Roby, of Rochester, and Helen Breese
Graves, daughter of Maurice A. Graves, of
Sjrracuse." It will be observed, therefore,
that the will operated to vest the title of
the estate in the trustees, in trust for the
purposes outlined by the testator, as of the
date of the latter's death; and they were
directed to pay to the widow certain rents
and dividends for life, unless she survived

It
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and desiring to provide suitably for the support of his wife and two brothers during their
lifetime, for which he deemed the income
amply sufficient, devised his estate In trust
to a trustee during the lifetime of his wife
directing that the income be
and brothers,
apportioned between the cestuis que trustent
during their lives, and that after the death
of the last survivor of them the property be
vested In the supreme court as a permanent
trust, the income to be used towards the support and maintenance of the Syracuse Hospital. Such a trust would, of course, be in
direct violation of the statute of perpetuities
and void; for by It the testator would design to do what the statute aims to prevent
from being done, namely, to tie up the estate
for the benefit of his family for a period longe. three lives
er than two lives In being
in being), before the trust for charitable purThis clause
poses could go Into operation.
very useful
therefore seems to constitute
and, because
feature. Indeed, of the statute;
this Is BO, all excuse Is taken away for an argument that It was Intended to serve as such
an obstruction to a practical operation of the
of no substantial
statute as would render
eliminates all oi>value to the public, and
portunlty for questioning that It was the Intention of the legislature to restore the ancient law as to gifts for charitable purposes,
because experience has shown that, as to original charities, far better results were obtained under It, from the public point of view,
more decent regard for the wishes
and with
of testators, who do not always love their
distant relatives, — occasionally, perhaps, with
justification.
We are thus conducted to an examination
of the tenth clause of the will. It reads as
give, bequeath, and defollows:
'Tenth.
vise all the rest and residue of my property,
of every kind, personal and real, wherever
situate,
to my trustees hereinafter named,
for the purpose of founding, erecting, and
maintaining Graves Home for the Aged, to
be located In the city of Syracuse, In the state
of New York. It Is Intended for a home for
those who by misfortune have become Incapable of providing for themselves, and those
The inwho have slender means of support.
stitution to be known as the Graves Home
hereby appoint Charles C.
for the Aged.
Stevens, Rasselas A. Bonta, and Maurice A.
Graves for the trustees to execute the above
hereby authorize and empower my
trust.
executors, or the survivor of them, to rent or
sell any part or all of my real estate that
They are
may own at the time of my death.

It
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two persons upon whose lives the trust estate was expressly limited^
The next question Is whether this trust
Is to be executed by the trustees named in
the win, or by the supreme court. It Is
the next question because we have already
reached the conclusion that a corporation
Is not necessary for the execution of such
a trust, since the adoption of the statute, but
that the supreme court, in a proper case,
must take upon itself such execution, over
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which it shall have control where a trustee
Is not named for the purpose. In this case
trustees were named, and, as the eleventh
clause of the will expressly prohibits the
trustees from holding any portion of the
testator's property longer than the lives of
the two persons in being therein named. It
must be held that the trustees are charged
with the management and conduct of the
trust until the expiration of a period measured by the two lives in being, at which time
the title to the trust property will vest in
the supreme court under the statute.
The plaintiffs claim that the tenth provision of the will is void as to one-half of the
remainder of the testator's estate under section 1, c. 360, of the Laws of 1860, which
"Section 1. No person
reads as follows:
having a husband, vdfe, child or parent,
shall, by his or her last will and testament,
devise or bequeath to any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or missionary society, association or corporation,
more than one-half
in trust or otherwise,
part of his or her estate, after the payment
of his or her debts (and such devises or
bequests shall be valid to the extent of onehalf and no more)." The testator gives
of
about $25,000 or less than one-seventh
his estate, to organizations that are within
the description of the statute, and in addition to that the residuary devises and bequests are charitable, and therefore within the general description of the statute;
but as such devises and bequests are not
to a "society, association or corporation in
trust or otherwise," but, instead, to trustees,
they are not within its prohibition. The
maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,'~ Is applicable;
for it is a man's general
right, In this state, to do as he wishes with
his own. He may now, as in the past, disinherit his relatives for the benefit of strangers; and this statute was not designed to afIt was recfect that right, except indirectly.
ognized, perhaps, that, in the fear of death,
men who have never exhibited a charitable
Impulse suddenly awaken to the fact that
behind them are lost opportunities for usefulness that in some way ought to be made
good; and In order to balance the account
they look about for an opportunity to do
good with their money, and find at once a
man Interested In promoting the fortunes of
some religious or charitable Institution, who,
without hesitation, begins to play, and with a
skill acquired by long experience, upon their
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Given such a man and
fears and hopes.
situation,
was readily conceived
it
such a
that, in his thought of self, the just demands of wife or child or parent might be
temporarily lost sight of, and his all devoted to religious or charitable purposes,
through some of the many societies, associations, and corporations which are to be
found on every hand. Hence the design of
the framers of the statute was to place a
limitation upon the power of a person thus
moved, to dispose of more than one-half
of his property by will to such organizations,
to the end that he should have an opportunity to measure the claims of his kindred upon
him as to the remaining half, unembarrassed
by the importunities of those whose business
it is to get money for the societies, associations, or corporations they represent; and
this it was thought would be substantially
accomplished by an act prohibiting him from
giving more than one-half of his property to
the societies, associations, and corporations
But, except as
most likely to be considered.
thus restrained by the statute, he may still
disinherit his kindred by disposing of his
property in such manner and for such purpose as he may desire; and so this testator, in
devising his property to trustees in trust
for the uses and purposes described in the
will, was not within the prohibition of the
statute. The result thus reached In this
ease in no way thwarts the general purpose of the legislature, for the only person
who stood In such relation to the testator
as to benefit by the statute In any case was
the testator's wife, who was over 80 years
of age at the time of his death, was amply
provided for by the will, and has since died.
The amount of costs awarded seems to be
out of all proportion to the work done, and so
large that it is not at all surprising that several lawyers have appealed from nearly all
jillowances except their own; but the supreme court had the power In this suit.
Drought as it was on the equity side of the
court, to award costs to each of the parties;
and the question of amount, also, was in the
discretion of that court, and not subject to
review here, so long as the allowances did not
exceed the limitations provided by statute,
and this they did not do. The judgment of
the api)ellate division should be reversed, and
that of the special term affirmed, with costs
to the appellant trustees and to the attorney
general.

GRAY, J., dissents.
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the will additional parties defendant Subsequently a hearing was had upon pleadings
(12 N. E. 331, 17 N. E. 491, 121 111. 269.)
and proofs, and a decree was entered findJune 17, 1887.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
ing that the residuary clause of the codicil
was Ineffectual to dispose of the property,
Appeal from circuit court. La Salle counbut that it nevertheless revoked the residuty.
ary clause of the will, and declaring that
Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen., and Mayo & Widthe real estate of which the testatrix died
Duncan, O'Connor & seised belonged to the complainants as her
mer, for appellants.
Gilbert, for appellees Vineria Fowler and
heirs at law, and directing that the rest and
others.
residue of the personal estate should be distributed to the complaiQants as Intestate esSHELDON, J. This was a bill in chan - tate. From this decree the attorney gencery filed by the heirs, at lag at. Esther S.
eral, the executors, and a portion of the legatees specified in the residuary clause of the
\2ha£majQt_flfiegiififli_^gai]ist__tlifi_ attorney
will have prosecuted this appeal.
general of the state and the executors of jie
will of the. decectent.Ja-have-a- certain porThere is in American courts much diversition^f the ^estate, left by her_declared tobe_ ty of decision upon the subject of charitable
trusts.
In express private trusts there is
intestate^ and to belongjtoJhecomplaJMgfs,
not only a certain trustee who holds the le^_heirs_at law o|jEe„ decedent. The. will,
gal estate, but there is a certain specifled
executed March io, 1883, after making suncestui que trust clearly Identified, or made
315^' beqiiests' to" various perso ns ^offierTEan
capable of Identification, by the terms of the
the_com£lalnants,
concludef^wiffiTEisTi^
~"
All the residue of my^S;- instrument erecting the trust I£j§_,aa_es;_
^siduary clause^
bequeaffi 'unto lEe legatees
and
SleTdevlse
sentlal f eatureof_gubll£^ or charitable trusts
r
that tne ofil^Hciaries are uncer tain,— a cla ss
TSer^before naiaed.^ in equal jpr^iorjjflfig,
excepting said Oakwood seminary and said ^rj'6rs'0Hg'"flescHbea m ^me^jgneraljan:^
SiihseniiR ntfy, on
iBylVester MT Chapman."
guage, often fluctuaflng, changing in_their
^pril S^"jE8§Sr" the test a^s ex.ecuted_ a codicil individuaTnumbers, 'andpaHaldng_pf a guasi'
public character. 2 Pom. Eq."Jur. § 1018.
\yhi(i,.£jHiialned-this residuajsjslaHap:
•'the rest and residue of my _estate,_inclujjlng
In some of the states the equitable system
that whlcE'may'Tapse for any cause,. I direct
of distinctively charitable trusts is not recto be mvested or loaned upon ;^e best terms
ognized, and the courts apply only the rules
applicable to express private trusts. In othpos.sihlejir.siL^aji_Ja.pifldu£eJhOlllllDS'
Come, and saidLiafi&iii§-_tp_Jbe _;totribute(i
er states the "statute of charitable uses" of
of the j:ity^ of La
43 Eliz. c. 14, has been adopted or repealed,
amon£TEe~worthj[_joor
^alie, in such'miannerjLs'fffcourf of ehancerx. and thereby decisions have been influenced.
Executors _^_the will , w.ejg
s, may_ "fflrect."
And in other cases local legislation, or sup^Efliatfid. T he''lec edejit Jeit^both real aa^ posed local policy, to more or less extent
In ano ther, and ,
enters into adjudications.
£.ei:sonaL estate.
as beUevedj_ the largerj poriaSn of the sla
The bill alleges that the city of La Salle
is situated in the town of La Salle, and Inthe system oF charitable trus ts as adminis cludes but a small portion of the territory
Jered in theTEnglish .?.ourt of chancery,., in
of the town; and that there is not now, nor
the exercise _of_Jts^ ordinary judicial power,
has there ever been, in said city, any organ- ^^^^ilsf with variation in "regaf ff'toT'Se'
ization or association, voluntary or otherwise, "iTement of certainty in tEe'ffusEee anSTtte
for the distribution of charity to the poor of ^ject'of the ch'arlty.—a-glassIflcagcS fflfSie"
the city; and that the municipal authorities
aecIsIons~in the several states will be foimd
have no duties imposed upon them to pro- in 2 Perry, Trusts, § 748, in note, and 2 Pom.
Bq. Jut. § 1029, and note. The prerogative
vide for the poor; and claims thajLtke, rg:
siduary elause_of_the codicil Tsln.cagable_of_
power of the crown, exercised through the
eiecmHoSItoL-reason" of the "imcertainty oF lord chancellor as the representative of the
the beneficiaries Int ended by the testator ,
king, as where there is a gift to charity
aM~Yoia 7~ggrtBat, m consequence^all tSe generally, without appointment of a trustee,
rest an3 rem3ue~^ff^Ee estate._bothj:e al and
and the bounty is devoted to some particular
charity, or where there is a gift to a parpersonal, after the paym"ent~of the general
and specific legacies, was intestate estate.
ticular charitable purpose which cannot be
A demurrer' to the bill wasTnterposeS'by ithe effectuated, and it is applied to some other
attorney general and the executors, which
charitable use, cy-pres the original purpose,
was overruled by the court, whereupon the
Is regarded not as a judicial, but a minisexecutors
answered, denying the invalidity
terial, prerogative function.
This prerogaof the residuary clause of the codicil, or that
tive power courts in this country do not asIt was incapable of execution, and setting sume to exercise.
up that, even if such were the case, the rest
Were this subject of charitable trusts a
and residue of the estate must be distributed
new question vnth us, there would be opened
In accordance with ttie residuary clause of
up a wide and interesting field of discussion,
the will. Thereupon the bill was amended
in order for the establishment of the proper
by making the residuary legatees specified in
rule in this regard. But we are saved labor
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In this respect, from the ground having heretofore been gone over by this court, and the
rule applicable to charitable
trusts haying"
'
been

establlshed'totTe'that

wET^TTs" a Jmln-

litered in the courF ofchancery'in 'England,
in the exercise of "Hs^rdmary" jurisdiction as
a_ _cour t ■of eqin ty" This" 'waS' done ■WTBe
case of Heuser v. Harris, 42 111. 425, and
where it was recognized that the statute of
43 Bliz. c. 4, had been adopted in this state.
The entire contention in this case arise s
jiD on the construction, validity, and enlect CT~
It is
this^ ^esiduary clause of the codicil.
void for uncertainty"
jnsisted this clau se is ~""
as to the b en eficianes."
This is^^iE^ a bequest to charity generally,
or to the poor ge nerall y, but to the worthy
joor of the city of La ijal le" TheLeLalsSL-filfire
"Ts definite,— the worthy ^or of the city of
1/a Salle,— bul J2iaJMllidLaa,ls.^L.H££!ags"lip
whom th e bounty is to be distr ibuted are
uncertain. There is always this uncertainty'
as to individuals, in the case, of public charities, and it is this feature of uncertainty
which distinguishes public charities from
private charities; charitable trusts from
private trusts; and to hold charitable gifts
to be void because of such uncertainty is to
reject this whole distinctive doctrine of charitable trusts. 2 Redf. Wills, 544, (66.)
In the case of a charitable ,.h(MniP..st it Js
immaterial how vagu e, indefinite, and uncertein the objects of the testatoFs"T3 0unty may
Ee, provided there is~a discretionary power
vested in some on e over its" application to
fnose objects. luomesHc & F.'M." Soc.'s !Appeal, ao Fa. 425; Peny, Trusts, § 732.
It
is denied that there is any such discretionary power here given, and White v. Fisk, 22
Conn. 31, is cited in support of such denial.
The bequest In that case was: "Any surplus
income that may remain, to the extent of
$1,000 per annum, I direct to be expended
by my said trustees for the support of indigent, pious young men preparing for the
ministry in New Haven." The decision was
that the gift was void, as the objects of the
benefaction were indefinite, and that no power was conferred on the trustees to make
them definite by selection.
This case, though
meeting with seeming approval In Grimes'
Ex'rs V. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, has been disapproved by other high authorities.
See
Perry, Trusts, §§ 713, 720, 748, note 1; 2
Redf. Wills (2d Ed.) p. 541, note; Hesketh v.
Murphy, 36 N. J. Eq. 304. The latter case
especially speaks of White v. Fisk as a case
not likely to be followed.
In Hesketh v. Murphy the testator's will
empowered and directed the trustees to employ the annual Income of the fund "for the
relief of the most deserving poor of the city
of Paterson aforesaid, forever, without regard to color or sex; but no person who is
known to be intemperate, lazy, immoral, or
undeserving, to receive any benefit from the
said fund."
It was objected that the gift
could not be applied to its objects and was
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void, because the will did not confer upon
any one the power of ascertainment of the
individuals who should receive the benefit of
the bequest.
But the court held that the
power given the trustees by the -will to distribute the fund carried with it, by necessary implication, the power to select the
beneficiaries from the designated class, and
upheld the bequest.
We entirely agree with
the criticism there made by Chief Justice
Beasley upon the case of White v. Fisk, that
there was a mistaken assumption on the
part of the court in that case that there was
no power to select the objects of the charity
lodged by the testator in the trustee; that
when a power is conferred on the trustees to
distribute the fund to members of a class,
such members having certain qualifications
which can be ascertained only by the exercise of judgment and discretion, as the act
of distribution cannot be performed except
after such ascertainment of the particular
beneficiaries,
the principal power to distribute the moneys carries with it the incidental
and necessary power of selection; and this,
upon the ordinary doctrine that, when one
act is authorized to be done by a trustee or
other agent, every authority requisite to the
doing of such act is, by intendment of law,
comprised in such grant of power.
See
Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Pa. St. 23, that the
power in the trustee to act at its discretion
need not be expressly given, if it can be implied from the nature of the trust. In the
later case of Erskine v. Whitehead, 84 Ind.
357, the decision in Grimes v. Harmon does
not seem to be approved in its full extent-.
In Heuser v. Harris, supra, thfe bequest
of money was "to the poor of Madison county," the interest only to be used, with no
appointment of a trustee.
As the county
court of Madison county was charged by
law with the support of the paupers in the
county, it was held in that particular case
that the poor of the county were its paupers,
and that the fund should be held by the
county court to be applied for the latter's
support. It is not to be the inference from
that case that a charitable bequest to the
poor necessarily means to paupers, and that
the trust is only to be executed by somebody charged by law with the support of
paupers.
"A bequest in trust for the poor
inhabitants of a particular place, parish, or
town is a charitable trust for the poor not
receiving parochial or municipal aid and relief as paupers, on the ground that the charity is for the poor, and not for the rich, and,
if it was applied to the maintenance of those
supported by the parish, town, or county, It
would relieve wealthy tax-payers from their
taxes, and not materially
aid the poor."
Perry, Trusts, § 698.
It is said in Redf. Wills (2d Ed.) 805, that
some of the American cases have gone great
lengths in carrying into effect the Intention
of the testator when there was great indefinitenesa in the objects of the trust; "that
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Tndividuala nf the
of the city of T.a Salle.
jclass named., will ever be readily found to
jjrtiom the .fvmd,- may. be distributed. _Slie
Jrust is not difficult of execution according
to the intention~of the testatrix .. nstead or
^
herself n aming,
trustee to make th jUSzl,
Wbiitiaii-x)Uier_.bequfiat,._tlie
Jta§.tatoix_ jire^
?erred ttiat the_ distribution should be^ mad
"by
coufToF chancery, whose peciifl^provis to effect tix
administration of
jSce
rusts, and
especially charitable trusts.
i%ere can" be no doubt that the execution of
the trust by such court would be to effectuate the donor's intention, the aim which is
always sought to be accomplished.
Under the principles and the strong current of authoriiies which are properly appUcable, we qre fully satir.3ed that the bequest
n question is
valid charitable gi!i"and
thai it should be far-rloH \ntn offoft hV
court of cha.];>c^3x. as tbe-toatatrix-BTprpssly
wlile'd that
should be.
The residuary
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port them;" in Howard v. American Peace
Soc, 49 Me. 288, where the gift was to the
suffering poor of the town of Auburn.
legacy is given to trustees to disWhere
tribute in charity, and they all die in the
life-time of the testator, yet the legacy will
Story, Eq. Jur.
be enforced in equity.
An extended collection of cases on the
1166.
general subject may be found in note to
Heslieth v. Murphy, 35 N. J. Eq. 23, and in
JaiTn, Wills, 403, in note.
Mr. Perry sums up, as the rfesult of the
principles and authorities, that "a bequest
for charity generally,
or to the
poor generally, or to charity generally, with
no trustees appointed,
will not be carried
into effect by the courts in this country."
Perry, Trusts,
testator
729.
That "if
makes a general and indefinite bequest to
charity, or to the poor, or to religion, and
appoints no trustee, but plainly refers such
appointment to the court, there would seem
to be no impropriety in the court appointing
trustee according to the plain intent of the
donor, leaving such trustee to find his power
in the will of the donor.
But
testator
vague and indefinite gift to charity,
makes
and names no trustee, and gives no power
to the court to appoint one, there is no power in the American courts to administer such

2

of ^auarinaegnite-

ti

ci^^es

t

trust in

"ness as here as to the objects of the trust,
'
— SK -itr-M-ceOTd-r.-TmhiltreeT 8" Blackf . 15,
where the legacy was for the education of
the pious indigent youths; in Bull v. Bull,
Conn. 47, where the executors were to dispose of the residue of the estate "among our
brothers and sisters and their children as
they shall judge shall be most in need of the
same,— this to be done according to their
best discretion,—and the executors died never
having exercised the power, nor executed the
trust; in Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299,
where the beneficiaries named were "all the
paupers and poor children of two designated
'beats,' whosie parents were not able to sup-

i

_ec'iitpd^t.hB
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Washburn v. Sewall, 9 Mete. 280.
There can be no question of t llft ffptiprai
is said it does not apply iSLJ
But
rule!
case where there is such ind^.a3ieBfiss-^ts-to
as here.
Numerous are the in"beneficiaries
"stances which "miSht be cited where there

an inchoate and imperfect gift" Id.
731.
That "it is immaterial how uncertain the
beneficiaries or objects are, if the court, by
true construction of the instrument, has
power to appoint trustees to exercise the discretion or power of making the beneficiaries
as certain as the. nature of the trust requires
them to be."
Id.
732.
See, also,
Story,
Eq. Jur.
1169.
jn^the present case the te statrix appoints
no trustee to
distribute_the_fraidL but exjpressly refers "its "distribution
p"a~ i^^iiii^ nf
chancery. The power of distributionjjn our
^pihionj^ carries with ff'Tfie power to select
the indlviduais to "whom distribution shall be
appoMftgd' by the court
■^mage. The trustee
to make the distribution will have the incident al power to selec
he beneficiarieSj^ so
that
the
same as if the tescas6_stands_the
'
fafrTxISerself had app'om£ga"a" »ttgtgetcraiS- "
fabute the fund . The trustee to Ee appoinT
pd by the court wilC in "eSect, oe
trustee
of hCTlippoIHmenF'mad'e through ffie court
chancefj
Courts incline strongly in favor of charitable gifts, and take special care to enforce
them. As observed by Mr. Perry (section
687), charitable bequests are said to come
within that department of human affairs
where the maxim ut res magis vaKat quam
pereat has been, and should be, applied; and,
further (section 690), that untU the statute of
distributions (22 Car. II. c. 13) was enacted,
portion
the ordinary was obliged to apply
of every intestate estate to charity, on the
ground that there was
general principle of
piety and charity in every man. This shows
the favor in which charity is held in the
law. There is to be the most liberal construction of the donor's intention in support
of a charitable donation. Charities have always received
more liberal construction
than the law wiU allow in gifts to individuStory, Eq. Jur.
als.
1165.
§

the want of a trustee in such cases is never
any obstacle in the way of a court of equity
carrying into effect any trust, and more especially one of a charitable character." Mr.
Pomeroy, in speaking of the distinguishing
private
and
features between charitable
trusts, says that, in case of the former, "not
only may the beneficiaries be uncertain, but
that even when the gift is made to no certain trustee, so that the trust, if private,
would wholly fail, a court of equity will
carry the trust into effect either by appointing a trustee, or by acting itself in place of
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 1025, 1026.
a trustee.
243;
And see Brown v. Kelsey, 2 Cush.
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clause of t ^" pnittM^ hoipp; held valid, it folws tli at the complain ants take nothing as
eirs at la wJ and ar e llUl tjllUlltia t O mail i jnin qi qjr hi ll. T he decree of the circuTT
will he reversed, and the cause rePt^nrt
manded to that court with directions to dismiss the bill, liecree reversed.

I

SCHOLFIELD, J. (dissenting).
do not
hold that courts of
concur in this opinion.
equity in this state exercise no prerogative
therepowers, but, as contradistinguished
from, only judicial powers; that, not exer-

I
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cising prerogative powers, the court could
by the act of the individual, be, and
here is not, invested with a power not judicial, namely, that of selecting or designating the "worthy poor" to be the recipients of
the testatrix's bounty; and that, since it has
not been and could not be invested with such
power, it cannot appoint and invest a trustee with such power. I concede the testatrix
might have invested a trustee with such
power, leaving and directing the court to appoint the trustee; but that is a very different case.
not,

RESULTING TRUSTS.

SKELLENGER'S

BX'RS

GEIR'S EX'R.

(32 N.

J.

v.

SKELLEN-

Eq. 659.)

of New Jersey.
Term, 1880.

Court of Chancery

is given by will to
trustee, upon
certain trusts, and the purposes of the trust
do not exhaust the whole estate, or the trusts
fail, either in whole or in part, by lapse or
otherwise, the trustee shall not take the surplus for his own benefit, unless such appears
to have been the intention of the testator,
but a trust results in favor of those who are
entitled under the statute of distribution as
Hill, Trusthe next of kin of the testator.
Perry, Trusts, 152;
tees, 113, marg. note;
Wms. Ex'rs, 1475, marg. note. Where the
gift is made to the donee as trustee, or in
trust, without any words indicating an intenbeneficial interest upon him,
tion to confer
the form of the gift will be considered conclusive against his right to take for his own
Hill, Trustees, 114, marg. note;
benefit.
These authorities di».
Perry, Trusts,
158.
pose of the claim of the complainants.
Technically, the testator did not die intes Hp s-hvp
tate as to any part of his estate.
■the legal title of the whole to his executors.
anyhow, in virtue
They would have taken
the wiU had contained no
of their office,
Rut, he did die intqjjfatj
express gift to them.
tn
the
benefinial
in this fund. Nfl.
interest
^s
disposition was made of that Thlsjnt^tet
is an equitable estate, and,
tied, in "equi ty, to be considered, to all inlegal estate. Such"
as
tent's and purpose
ggfajEsT in" equity, are subject to the same
Incidents, properties and consequences that
similar legal estates are at law, and are transGushing v.
missible in the same manner.
Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 6»5. Tho Inprnnp nf thjs
fund passed by the will, but no beneficial inAg to^iat the
T:erest in the corpus itsel
and inope rative, an it therefore"
estate

May

1

a

^d. "within

after h er ,d ea.th.

SIX months

to

X ^pay f rom.jjid_Qnt„g^.1jie residu e so_ directed
io ^belpSsted .unffl^jist... sejyeral pecqnia^

it

a

^

s,

i

/

§

^Ve'allTiis

if

es tet&-tQ— Ifls ,,>ylfe ,. except -Jiii'
moneys and securities for the payment^-O f
money, and then gave all the r(^siflnf> fvf hi?;
'
"
estate to hi.«i fty fftint"''P- to ha.Te and to hold
upon and subject to the "f dllo wing , trustsT.^
wit: upon trust to invest th^ samp at jr^t erest,~on good security. aji )^,l;}ie, jnf;(?rest ajifl
income thCTiii9?lr ^^tf y^yment of taxesand
.

2

This is a bill
THE VICE CHANCE2LL0R.
as the ex- .
tor directio n. T he complainants,
eeutors oF* Daniel Skellenger, deceased, ask
3irecti'6n as to what they shall do with certain money s belonging to their testator, .n.ot
d of by his will,
his est^e con si sted
dispose
~
"
entirely oTpersonatt y. By' nis jwlll, he first

§

1

ilfred Mills, for complainants. George T.
Wert and George W. Forsyth, for next of
kin. Edward 0. Lyon, for executor of Hannab Skellenger, deceased.
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fpganiPH fit; ftxpfl aTnnimtH
nr f^^iv
T>^ ptTior
t her dispo sition of .the residue is made, ^lig
tes'tators widow surviv^'Kii fi'.'" i^ney never
h ad a.£b ild. The wicJow is now Jead .' She
eft a will. The complainants^' a'tter paying
all the legacies directed to be paid, have gflU.
m"hand QV6sr„,p..X0Q.
She will makes no dis position of the beneficial interest in this sum . ^iltlssi^t
_
_ _
s?oo3r'
Hi e lepal title to it w.aS -gMeB-tia-ttifcrecmB. ^f^j|^^"^?'"''°,^^";tSl"r'''-<?ff>1^'i"
^" exactly the
platnants to enable them to veif,mm.r<^rt,n}}},
sa"iP condition that it jeshM If t)s had Ifift
jtr usts, bu t, J:h e trusts having been f i,illy_,p.er-, hcTwitr
As to" iat_ it must be declared, as
arises,
the
uestion
h
at
matter
ot'""l
a^. lat he had no will.
fflm^Jwithbut
shall be done with it, 6r wno is ent JHegjteLil^
This being so, it would seem to follow,
■^ThCTe are uiree difterent claimants: first,
a necessary sequence, tHat he widow was
the executors, who claim the whole to the
enjHtig" jir^;gHc ipate m its aistrib'ti'ti on. as_
exclusion of all others; second, the next of 'a^enerai'riiie,
the right of the dis6ibutees
kin of the testator, who also claim the whole
vests immediately on the, death of the intes-~"
in exclusion of the executors, and likewise
tate.
But
is contended that our statute
to the exclusion of the representative of the
was _______
mrmma~To regulate distribution onl
widow, and, third, the representative of the
MgaseFpf total fattestacy and has o anpUwidow, who claims a moiety of the fund.
This
cationi to a~case of partial intestacy.
At common law, an executor, by yirtuejj
ffrgumeri'fr however, proves too much, for,
his appointment is entitled to the whole, of
sound, it will exclude the next of kin quite
the ersoSar'S BtateraiHnfr^ter the payment
The right ot
as effectually as the widow.
olj debts a:nd 'fee;gnS^r"any"giCTlus~reimai ns.
right but
distribution is not
common4aw
vests in him benefi cially.
Originally the ordiWms. Ex'rs,
depends upon statute.
1475, marg. note.
iJut tBia-Hl has ne vCT nary took the whole surplus for pious useS.
prevailed in the United ^tate sTon the~conh"
To cure this wrong, parliament took away
trary,
has uniformly oeen held in this counthe right of the ordinary, and gave it by
try that, if any part of the personal estat
statute, to the widow and next of kin. They
.happens to
tte" hold under the same grant and one cannot
tie~undl^osed_6f' by th wi
jgecutor takes'^T^~aT~&' ustee roi' ffiose who
take unless the other does also. In the words
.are entitled" un dCTth e'galute of distributicmt
case
of Chief Justice Shaw, uttered in
Perry, Trusts, §"155; Stdi-y, Eq. Jur.'J identical In all material points with the one
1208.
under consideration, "the same provision in
No doctrine of equity jurisprudence is more
the statute of distribution which gives propfirmly established than that where personal
erty not disposed of by will, where there

EESULTIKG TRUSTS.
a win, to the next of kin, gives a distributive
Nickerson v. Bowly,
share to the vridow."
8 Meta (Mass.) 430.
It is also insisted that the widow should
not be permitted to take any part of this
fund, because it Is apparent, upon the face
of the will, that the testator intended she
should not This Intention, it is said, must
be inferred from the fact that he gave her
the use of the whole during her life, ajid he
could not, therefore, have intended that she
take a part absolutely. In other
should
words, having given her a part by express
words, it must necessarily be inferred that he
did not intend she should have any more.
This argument it vrUl be observed, proceeds
upon the assumption that the right of distribution is to be regulated by the intention
But this, I think, is a misof the testator.
The Intention of the testator is to
take.
govern only so far as he has declared it by
his will. With regard to that part of his
property which his will did not pass, it must
be declared he had no will, and therefore
the court cannot know his intention concerning it The_ next of kin cannot take until
intestacy is found, and then they take, not
in pursuance of the testator's intention, but
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bv force of law, regardless of what his intentions were . Upon this point. Chief Justice Shaw, in the case already cited, says:
"If it were thought important to hiquire into
the intent of the deceased, when he has made
a will, but left property undisposed of, either
in terms or by implication, as every man is
presumed
to know the law, it may reasonably be inferred as his intention that the
residue should be disposed of according to

law."

JL.

The rule upon this subject is settled.
has recently been adjudged by this court that
'
where a testator dies intest ate is to par'f of
hla.,^tate,,Jn..e.Q4S,efluencfi
sii the l apsing of
a legacy, his widow is entitled "to a distributive share of it, tfiough sEe had accepted the provision made ior her In lieu of
jower, py tne will. Jianqy "yTTSKrcy, '^H N.
Eq. 59. The offier pertinent authorities
are Davers v. Dewes, 3 P. Wms. 40; Dicks
V. Lambert 4 Ves. 725; Oldham v. Carleton,
2 Cox, 399; Ex parte Kempton, 23 Pick. 163;
Dale V. Johnson, 3 Allen, 364.
The decree will direct_tt[e co mplainants to
pa y one m oiety of the fund to the representa -

J.

tive oflt liie. wiflow^ ,a^ fee othe r to the next
of kin of the testator
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^

of
Avery,

The trustee died In 1872, Intestate, and the
defendan gljffler th"" th a flpf snd ant M oorer
who is in poasession of the lot are his hpjrfT'
at law.
Tha ^off^Tirtant Miwrp plalma the lot by ^''•tnp nf H -fiidgmpnt iJp;ainH^; 1;pa
nnlTftrpp-y^ an
execution Issued thereon, n s ale and a ahev.

John M. Joneg. owning the lot of lan d la
the town of lEdenton describ ed in the complaint, anffffie recovery of possession of which
"S" the'oliject of this action, on February 9,

The relief demanded la a recovery of the
possessio n^ang aamages for detention against
Moore, ang'a ':|udf;merit agamst the other de^
rendantfl rennirlng a conveyance of the
fendants

BOND

et aL v.

MOORE

et al.

(90 N. C. 239.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. Term,

1884.

Civil action tried at fall

superior
Judge.

court,

Chowan

term,

county;

1883,

^6^ conveyed.

executed
Jt(fi,„garoeJtoX."dieed
by himself of the first.,Ba.nt,- Thomas. W.
Sudgins^oflEe second, and Martha A. Jones,
fil's
fcs

wif fejof^ the ttiirdjartito the said ^gmWrHudgins in fee upon the following de-

elargd jgusts:

^^

'TT'That the said trustee shall at any time
convey the said lot and improvements to such
person as the said party of the third part
shall direct in writing attested by one vsrltness.

\
^

^
4

2. That he wiU convey
said lot and Improvements to such person as the said party
of the third part shall give or devise the
same to, by last will an;d testament, or by
an appointment in the nature of one, which
power to make a will or appointment in the
nature of one is expressly conferred upon the
said party of the third part, notwithstanding
her coverture.
3. Upon the death of the party of the first
part, he will convey the said lot and improvements to the said party of the third
part.
4. Upon the death of the party of the third
part without having made a last will and
testament or appointment in the natiure of
one, he will convey the said lot and Improvements to the party or parties entitled by the
laws of North Carolina.
5. The party of the first part shall occupy
or rent out the lot and improvements for his
own use during the joint lives of himself
and the party of the third part, unless the
same shall be sooner sold by her order.
These declara'tions
of the trusts upon
whicdi the trustee was to hold are preceded
by recitals In the deed, which in substance
state that the said Martha A. had theretofore united with her said husband, in the
sale and conveyance
of certain lots owned
by her previous to her marriage, the purchase money whereof he had received, under an arrangement by which he agreed to
convey the lot herein described "to a trustee for the use of the party of the third part
and upon the trusts hereinafter declared."
The said Martha died before her husband ,
without heirs, having made no dlsBggrtton-of
Che estat e" under'BSe" forms "conferred in ^thg
"'
?§sCSr<3eea; wpr or .oifiefwTiting.
John M. Jones, her survivor, diedf In_1879,
leaving " a^^gjjl, ..^erein_the^aintiff_JBond. js
named Secu '"'*"'
tor and •'"""--'—
are
the_ other plalutifiB
■
ffiiriTevisees.

lpf>n1

titl e.

The defendants demur to the complaint,
and the demurrer being overruled and judgment rendered for the plaintiSs they appeaL
Fruden
Moore,

& Bunch,

for defendants.

for plaintiffs.

W. A.

SMITH, O. J. (after stating the case). The
qu estion to be decided arises from the con- ~
"
s truction of the,, .deed, a nd is . whether an
equitable estate in remainder vests In the ~
plaintijjEs_ett Otlin"g them to demand a cqn-"^
^ggpg of -the-Legal qsjtate <r"in <^hehpir!ii~a]F
^Cthe trustee and nosa ession from
thft
~ ~
defendant MooEeiIt is not important to consider the force
and effect of the terms used In the declaration of the trust in favor of the wife, and the
necessity of words of inheritance to enlarge
an estate for life Into a fee. This trust is,
as are the others, executory, and not an executed trust,— created by a direction to the
trustee to convey,— not itself a conveyance;
and the same technical rules of construction
do not prevail in interpreting both. When the
trustee is required to act in execution of the
trust. In. order to effectuate the expressed
purpose of the instrument, that purpose is
ascertained by employing the ordinary rules
of interpretation; and a direction to convey
the lot, in the absence of restriction or qualifying words, when applied to instructions
given to the trustee, is a direction to convey
the full estate vested in him, and the trust
consists in the right to have it performed.
In the latter case the intent is ascertained
by giving a fair and reasonable meaning to
the language in which it is expressed, and in
this sense the trust is enforced.
This is the
distinction taken In Levy v. Grlffls, 65 N. 0.
236, and Is warranted in Holmes v. Holmes,
86 N. C. 206.
But It Is a settled rule In the Interpretation of written instruments to look to other
provisions for light' to guide in arriving at
In apthe meaning of any doubtful clause.
p^ta g the rul e.-we thinly It plainly appeartt
Trrflrrfllvfppsi^to nTJly_jEg s intended to~be
secured to ^^^mUSl associ ated with a Do_weF_
^ disp osiFion of the w"E5[e"estate,.b y.a. written
The re^
prescrlbad.
InstrumeHt-iinfifcJEorm
cTEals in ffie'Seed show that it Is drawn in
pursuance of the agreement between Jones
and his wife, and in precise fulfillment of its-

^r

]

RESUliTING TRUSTS.
terms; for it declares the promise to have
been to convey tlie lot to a trustee for hfer
use "upon the trusts hereinafter declared." ,
Among the trusts enumerated, the third undertakes to provide for' the contingency of the
death of the wife without having exercised
the power conferred, clearly contemplating a
remainder and limiting her estate under a
preceding clause for the term of her life..
Nor is it material whether this final limitation of the trust estate is efEectual or inoperative by reason of an Insufficient description of th€ party to take under it. In either
case the clause subserves the same purpose
in showing the character and extent of the
estate secured to the wife.
.Her death, then, without her having exerci sed the dispositive power, he r husband sti lJ
being alive, and his estat e also becoming gsfinctwhic h_endured only during THeff~3ntnt
lives, presents the very coi^ngeS^__dpoii
whose ha ^BfiPtns-ttie.- trustee J[i„.r^aHired_to
Sonvey "to the pa rty. pr_aartles_ enti tled_^ by
Who'ls tEe
the laws oi North Carolina."
ipar{:k.i nSaSn^
'fEF] p!aTnt'il K"appropfiate J&is
<iesignation to the grantor, the defendants t o
the belrs or tnp wij;(>. and thprp being none,
fo the university substituted in" their—place im4gmie law fffpybpal '" ""
in our opinion, the words do not and were
out any .p articular "pct ^
nofjleHaca~ttrpoint
so ns~"to teke the inheritance remaining , but
1Eo~leave it to pass under the law as imdis posed of propert2;__They sliow sucE estate,
aepeSding on a contingencypto iiaTe be«i-inIhe'mind of the g rantor .as capa5Ig"am3[balsting beyond the life of the wife an d of his
own, and to place jtjander the controrof the

—

/

JawT

This being the proper construction of the
upon well established principles, Jbfi"
undispo sed of remainder .was freed from the
InterY^gg'T B?e^stjtt&JjnLlthe jvgi£E_J}ficame
uni^rSlffilifegJthen expiring life^ estate of
"the h usband,
and he bec ame the^equitable
ytrne F^ the entlr o ^■n^hm■'<taru^7
"Another form in which a resulting trust
may appear,"
says Mr. Justice Story, "is
where there are certain trusts, created either
by deed or wUl, which fail in whole or part,
•or which are of such an indefinite nature that
courts of equity will not carry them into
•effect, or which are illegal in their nature or
■clause
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character,
or which are fully executed and
yet leave an unexhausted residuum. In all
such cases there will arise a resulting trust
to the party creating the trust, or to his heirs
or legal representatives,
as the case may re■
quire." 2 Story, Bq. Jur. § 1106a; Lewiu,
Trusts, 175; Mosely v. Mosely, 87 N. O. 69;
Robinson v. McDiarmid, Id. 455.
But the defendants contend that inasmuch
as the husband was permitted to receive the
purchase money of the wife's land, under his
agreement to convey his lot in trust for her,
this money constitutes the consideration of
his deed and the trust arires to her. The
rule which raises a. trust In favor of one
whose money was used in payment for land
bought, has no application to the facts of the
present case.
The deed to which she consents in becoming a party contains all the
trusts, and, in the very form he agreed to
make and secure to her, the full fruits of his
contract. He stipulates to make precisely
such a conveyance, and with such declaration
of trusts as are found In the present deed.
This exhausts hsr equity in the premises.
Her tQoney is the consideration of, and given
for, tiie interests and benefits secured to her
in its ,provisions, and for no other portion of
the trust estate. The land was her husband'^ no t_ ^6?s; and whatever ^^estatg^^rg;;;.,
mffiis pftgr"aii.4he trusts in her'behaif have

This
teen^ executed£^mu&rT5e^esTea'in~Eiic^
does nSt b^ong to'the" class" of cases_Jn
moriey'orFne parjyjhas
wElcE~tHe~purchase
Been us^ and the title to iflb'e "land "con veyed
, ,_fo_anoih^.r._
"™~'The dbctrine," remarks the same author,
"is strictly limited to cases in which the purchase has been made in the name of one
person and the purchase money has been
paid by anbther." 2 Story, Bq. Jur. § 1201a.
The authorities cited in the argument sustain this view of the law. Unless the constructive trust was raised In such case, a
successful fpfiud would be perpetrated by the
King v. Weeks, 70 N. O. 372; Cungrantee.
ningham V. Bell, 83 N. O. 328; Kisler v. Kisler, 27 Am. Dec. 808.
We therefore affirm the Judgment overruling the demurrer, and remand the cause to
be proceeded with in the court below.
No error.
Affirmed.

EBSULTING TRUSTS.
GOULD

V.

LYNDE

et ai.

(114 Mass. 366.)
Supreme

Cknirt of Massachusetts.
1874.

Jan.

habendum tn fhP grantee, "his tiplrpj
^i^^jn^
signs, to his and their use and behoof for-ever." The deed giv en to plaintiff 'a -wifo y^n^
'
Term, to her "sole and separate use, free from control or interference of her present or any
future husband, and to her heirs," etc.~

Bill in equity by James H. Gould against
On demurrer
Alonzo V. Lynde and others.
'
Demurrer sustained.
to the bill.
Dpf ^ndanta wprp thfi heirs at law'of Plaintiff's deceased wife, and the bill alleged in
substance that plaintiff conveyed certain real
estate by deed to Adonlram Lynde in trust.
the said Adoniram paying to him 'no consid eration therefor, hut simply tak iiig the fee
'"^g" i'^ ppt^tp fii'"~thft,,iB11I'. P0se o^~conYe ylng
"the same to Hepzibah L. Gouldj the plain tiff's wife ; that the said Adonii;am conveyed the same to~saia aepzibah in trust, who
paid no consideration therefor, but took the
same, making promise at the time that she"
ust for nlaintiffn Tifl wmild
would hold It in
reconvey the same to him upon nis requestf
that he did not intend to give to"1Big~sai'd
wife anv beneficial interest In said real eT
tate, or any interest therein except that of
trustee for him; that for a period of more
than five years the title remained in his wife .;
that during said time said estate was alway s
treatert by them as his property, and not
the wife's; t hat afterwards he made a reques t to his wife that she would fuimi ner
"
saTd tru st, and, would regflny£y__tte_ f ee Ji?
him, and she undertook so to do. and sup;pnspfi ahe had done so; that for the purpose
of fulfilling said tru st and of transferring to
h er husba nd the lee, sBg executed a deed of
the premise3"t6~2umette"TC
Wil^'^"'^ ihai
Annette M. Wiley e xecuted a like deed to
him; that he. omitted to join in said deed.
from his wife to said Wilev or to giv e his ^
mista ke;
writL'j.n
^'i'S'^nt thereto, I through
nee-,
It
was
he
in
was
doubt
whether
that
essary to have ;ioined in that deed: that be
had since conveyed portions of the estate 's
that his wife had since' died, leavin g no isflue; that the defendants
were her heirs a t
"
faw; tha t they or some of them as such heirs
ciaimeci the reversion of the estate; that he
was unable to convey Ijcith a clear tit le, and
tEaTTEe-aetendillltS TTfgtgngga" he~had but a
The prayer was
that defendants assign and retea se rn p raintiff their titles as he^rs at law. The deeds
from plaintiff we re warranty deeds in the
usual for m, 'rnat tn;Af|nniram [ ,fnflp~rp"cited
a consideration of S5,200 and contained an

f

W.

P.

Sweetser

Harding, for defendants.
T.
& W. B. Stevens, for plaintiff.

ENDICOTT, J.

PnnPPflp/^
hy f^p
Tf- la

H.

IlliVlTl_

that there was no express tr^ist i^pfm
which the conveyances were
made; the al'
leged agre^enFbetw'een
the parties being
oral ;_ but it is claimed, that a resulting trust"
lo the Plain|i^ ariHPS niit nf the tranai^ftiffn,
The rule that_ on a voluntary cnnvi>ypnffo
withont
consideration a trust results to the
'
gran toi? WaB ' UUhflMyfl' ia ~eB!gffioQ"'law conveyances, and does not apply to modern convey ances in common form, with reci tills of
X
con^
sideration, to the use of the grantee and his
tifiC

heirs.
Suc h deeds tn a stranger, a^f^ ^ fnr.
.Hdrl when the purpose of the grant is to con"
Jvey to a wife, exciuae any resulting trust to

The distinction between such a conveyance
and a conveyance to a third party where another furnishes the money to whom a trust
results, he not being estopped by the recitals
and covenants of the deed, is too well established by our authorities to require illustration.
Walker v. Loc'ke, 5 Gush. 90; Whltten
v.Whltten,.3 Gush. 191; BarUett v. BarUett,
14 Gray, 277; Tltcomb v. Morrill, 10 Allen, 15;
Blodgett V. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484; Cairns
v. Colbum, 104 Mass. 274; Peirce v. Golcord,
113 Mass. 372; Perry, Trusts, 81 161, 162, and
cases cited.
The subsequent asreeme q t, "»• att ompt hy
the wife to convey, does no f aff ect the giif atlon, as a trust mu st rpgnu-, if nf gii, tho instant the deed passes. Barnard v. Jewett, 97

Mass. 87.
The wife therefore held the estate. suhlM t
to no trust for th e use and-h enefit of "fHe
plaintiff, .and the reanondenta cannnt h ^ called upon tn r^li>a,ae and asBlpn to him any titl e
they may have therein, as her heirs at law .
The statute Is peremptory that no conveyance of real estate b.v a m arried w pman shall
be valid vplthout the assent of her husband In
writing, o r his jolnin|E; with her In the con-

.revance.

TraTRt.

o. 108,

<; 3.

^

tha plain."

tiff's wife made the deed tp Wilev wttliout
such assent or joinder no tit
paaaed. .
Demurrer sustained; bill dismissed.
lff,
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the secu ritlBS-taS^eiir^er
a'nswpr
n dmitted
~?Ffr~gflfeTi ^antr in his
hat the plaintiff applied to him for a loan
ol apout »uo douars to pay ol^ the rnSPgage
on his farm, then 'adyerti &6 tOr s'a'lel "TSa
defendant refused to lend the money, bu
ottered to piu-chase tae rarm, and that if the
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1817.

y

of New York.

The MU filed March the 9th, 1815, stated,
that the plaintiff, on tho first ivf Mht. 1S1.S.
applied to the defendan frvr the loan of 900
dollars, to which thp flpfpnrlant ngrPPfl. nrn.
jided he was permitted to purchase in a
rm ol the Plaintiff, bought hv him of S.
snhippt to a mortgage given by
'Siddmore.
Skl dmore to J. Bogardus, and which was adaa
vertised for sale imder that mortgage,
That
secu rity for the payment of the loan.
purchased the"
tEe ~iCtefen3aht accordingly
lamT ^hat the plaintiff had made an agree'
lot
ment to purchase of Peter Elmendorf
lying
opposite
to th farm of the plainNo. 3.
""tiff,
for^SbOUU dollars; iSat jthede fenaant
assume this contra ct, and pe
consentei
come responsible to Elmendo ff ~?or the pur rnat tnis lot was according ly
cnasa money,
who executed
con veyed to the defendant,
tn SeCUTe the PU Tmnr^-frnpro tn TClTno ^dOTf.
phas
mnnpy.- T hat Part Of the Purchase
money, being 500 dollars, was to be pai
anm. t^e nlaintiff
ke UP whic
down.
dvanced to the defendant 90 dollars; tha
he also endorsed to the defendant a note "of
Edmund Bruyn, dated 10t of March. 1809.
as security for the plain fbr 1,150 dollar
titt's advances' and responsibilitie s; an(^ tTip
amount of whicn note the defendant after•trards
That the aetenaant ha
recovered .
since sold the property for 7,000 dollar s.
The bill prayed for an account and that the
defendant mi^ht be decreed to pay oyer to
qftoT rtcrn^^^Qpp;
^^;;2-^1iP Tralf ""°j
ma^flvaTices, &c. an that he assign over totoeplain-

b

Court of Chancery

hnrrnwpH nf the Plaintiff 90 dollars,
fer^dant
which was not understood to be any par or
the. purchase money, or to give the'plaEtiff
any Interest -in th
purchase,
which was
made solely for tKe'TlE FSgaaffrs~treneflt,- and
without any truit, expressed" or implied,
whatever. For the residue" of the purchase
money, Ee executed
mortgage" to Blmendorf w nicE~ had been, paid off.
TMF"thf
plaintiff was insolvent, and had coiriTnitted
waste on the premises; that in the fall of
1813, the plaintiff being desirous to have
gome par
of the" prnperrv.
tiieJTlereTinfliTfold him,"iFhe would pa ISi y'doilars mo nth'
~
ly, ne would convey to h'ETsome part of IE?
farm,
Bogardu's
in propo rt ion to the.m Qn.e;i
paid; but that if the plai n tiff ]^ailed. the defenaant would enter on the prem^eg.
That
on the 3Uth of Decemberri8T3. thp nlaintift,
Tormaiiy assigned to the_defendant, , th£,n,gte
"ot iii."Bruyn, as anlndem T^ity for thp wasjtt
committed, and for boards of the def end^(
sold
the pl ai ntiff, and agreed to pay 10(
monHi, and if he failed to do so.
"dollars
to be an end of the busine ss, ^t
there w
■defendant recovered the amount
of the note
Put tne plai nt iff never aid a single_sum^a^gorging to ffie agreement ^Tffe assignment
"of Ste note expressed tEe co nsiderati.oitjj£.6e
the am ount,.of the note paiff 1^ "the defendThat on the 31st of
the plaintiff.
ant
—
January.
contracTed 'to~gsll~tlre
1814,
whol property, on bot farms, for 7,000 dol^
lars. Put no"~eon.veyjniee naa Deen executed;
and hfe 'SSId ltTnTiis~crvTO 7igHr and3oE^Ss —
own use, without any reference to the plaintiff, or any agreement with him^
The material parts of the evidence are
stated in the judgment of the court
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R. Tillotson, for plaintiff,

Mr. Sudam,

for

respondent.

THE CHANCELLOR.

The bill proceed

a..

gn the assumed fact that the defe ndant purchased ine Bogardus farm, and the Elmen_ _
and took
dorf lo as trustee .^_. the Plaintiff,
the deeds in his own najme, by agreement
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plaintiff repaid the money and interest, and
the costs and charges, m one month thereafter, tae defendant "woma reconvey to n im
Mgv|en„"themj^Jpr JUs, bette"'r ..geeimte-«Tid
indeM.ityj_as he wasjDWiged to_ advance, or_
the farm", put on no other condition w"Sat "° thp i^ifvth nf i\|fay, 813. he pur- bec^e bojgSBTTojjaearly tEe whole of _jffie
fj^ri T''"^money.
The de fendant™ Ts,
cliased the propert
consiideratipn
(tl^^. goga rdus farm) at
highest bidde r, for 930
therefore, "called
called on,
lauction,
on. as truste e, to account
bein^ the
dollars. wHich hp pairl to the mnrtgaggg^ aiid
sale of
fov the proceeds^f the subsequent
received _his deed.
He admitted the verbal "Oie lands, ..s3ttg.r.Jbei ng cred ited for the ad^agreement between the plaintiff and Elmen ^ vances which he has been obliged to make,
dorf, bu the pl aintiff being embarrassed ElF together w ltii^ a~reasoSaHg_allowapce
for hia—
menrtorf npiinpfi
n thp defe ndant to purchase^
services as' the .plaintitC a. agent
^>ip
'""But' as the defend nt purcha ed, at public
nnd-he accordingly nia5e~th
inf- Tfn
auction .. .jvhat is~c5IIeg"Tn e^Belfl f(lus t^x ^^T^
pPTghase, for S.eoo dollars, with
view
and took the deed Kn his ownnaTnarand paid
secure
himself certain advantages for pine
his own money, and as he purchased,
fiinber attar g~iBlIl am, src. essential to tne
at
private sale, the lijimenaorr mf. and pfli^
Bogardiia farm, and for no other object or
part of the purchase money, principally with
benefit, nnd ^yithont any understanding, ex^
his own funds, and'gave his bond and m ortThe
press or Implied, with the plaintiff .
deed was dated 1st of May, isi;^. but ^ e^ gage" for the resid ue; and aS both these purghases were" ma^[e~wItB~fae "tno'wledge and
cuted the 28th of June; that to make up
assent'of the plalnti^,
will be somewhat
detbe
paid
dollars
be
to
Elmendorf.
to
4*>

yf

RESULTING

difficul t to raise a trust to favo ur of th e
plaintiff T^tntlioar violating the stat ute of
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tion of law."
It well settled that such a resulting trust
may be estaPiis tied by parol proof.
Tms
WSS^toTiy (ionsidered in Boyd v. Mc'■■'ttoltlt
Lean,
Johns. Ch. 582. The only real dnnht
or con troversy, in this c^, is, whether ,the_
tacislroake out
resultlnp trust under die
If A. purchases an estate .with his
.statute.
own money, and takes the deed in the name
of B.,
trust results to A., because he paid
The whole foundation of the
the money.
trust is the payment of the money,- and that
must be clearly proved.
"Willis v. Willis,
the party who sets
AtU. 71. Jf, therefore,
resulting trust made no payment— he
up
pegmi ttea-tO L.s nQSK.-bv parol proof
"cannot
</ Th at the purchase was majflja for hia ^i][t>fit,-mi.
gP ^is accountT™ This 'would be. to overturn
tJUfi. fJtaihnte nffrariffs. an3 so it^was ryrted by
Lord Keeper Henley, in the "case of Bartlett
East, 577, note; Hughes v.
V. Pickersgill,
Cranch, 176.
Moore,
y The plaintifE does not jajetOTg^JS, this case,
'^to
aid anj^ part of ie onsider ation.
have_^
for the purchase by the defendant, at auction.
The-3Sendan.Pnnr».
.of the Bogi^rdus farm
hased th at farm for 930 dQ llara_and-paid the
money Mmself.—without any advance from
he plaitt tiff.. Ther is then iio retext for jetting up a esulting trust here, "and aU parol
N^Q3^IJ^E-S^i£-£^^SS£JlJSaSmksMe. The
conveyance by Bogardus, the mortgagee, and
the payment of the purchase money by the
defendant, completed the contract; and no
parol proof of parol declarations, inconsistent
To admit it,
with the deed, can be received.
would be repealing the statute -of frauds, and
would endanger the security of real property
resting on title by deed. Nor would
subsequent advance of money to the purchaser,
after the purchase is thus complete and ended, alter the case. It might be evidence of
new loan, or be the ground of some new
agreement, but
would not attach, by relation,
trust to the original purchase; for the
"trust arises out of the circumstance
that the
moneys of the real, and not of the nominal
purchaser, formed, at the time, the consideration of that purchase, and became converted
'
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Mod. 233.
will now examine the proof of the payments charged to have been made by the
plaintiff.
The defendant, in his answer, admits the
loan of the 90 dollars, to make up the nrsi
Tnimendofl^.
payment
of the 500
'jfflars
He "says,
was simrty " i?ap, anil "fl^ '"^"
vanced as a ay ment by the plaintiff of any
part of the consideration.
witnesses,
The plaintiff's
Hixson and
Couch, say, that these 80 dollars, or 90 dolllars, were advanced by the plaintiff, on aeof the purchase under the mortgage
Jcoimt
Into the land.
/sale;
one of them says, he was present at
Tbe-onl y. money t^aJt-tbe^plaintiff all eges he (the sale under the mortgage, and that the
advanSeTwas gD-doiiarsr-at-the-thile of tE5" defendant then told him that the plaintiff bad.
purcha se of the "Elmgndprf-lqtr"and~t
Ion that day, advanced him the 80 dollars on
Ss7
of the purchase.
It will be recollectsays^'was pafrof fEeTSHT dpRars-^ir^thj
[account
delraSaht onreceiving the con veyance.
\ed, that this sale, under the mortgage of tbi*
It
74,

\ff
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A

is.

I jy^-so me writing signed by the party, who
or shall be, hy law, enabled to declare, sucS"
trust, _or else they Jih]
The statute, however, except the case where
"any conveyance snail oe made of any lands,
trust, or confidence, shall
&c., by which
arise, or result, by Implication or construc-

■

that any further payment was
inaae oy tne piamoff at the time of the'tt
the' m'-^
cEase. thougn it is alleged, that some tlnig
flm? —afterwards, he assip;ned over to the dpf^
nfli^pi
Bruyn, In f^rtl^ ^;r«Tipf.
he not of Edmund Bruyn.
the same object
A doubt has been suggested In the hnnT/^
whether
resulting trust can hp ia{ainprt,
part ...of the consideration wa
w here only
pa id by the party claiming to be cestuv niw ~
Lord Hardwicke held that
could not;
according to the case of Crop v. Norton,
Mod. 233. He there said, that
Atk. 74,
where the purchase money was paid by one,
and the conveyance taken In the name of another, there was
resulting trust for the person who paid the money, but that this was
where "the whole purchase money" was paid
by one person, and that he never knew
to
be so, where the consideration moved from
He, accordingly, held, that
several persons.
as only part of the consideration, in that case,
moved from N., there was no resulting trust
in him.
doubt whether this case
to be
understood to apply; and
cannot be received as correct, where only
single individual claims the benefit of the trust; for the
cases recognize the trust where the money
of A. formed only a part of the consideration
of the land purchased in the name of B. The
to be charged pro tanto.
land, In such case,
This seems to be the langiJage of the case of
Ryal V. Ryal,
Atk. 59, Amb. 413, and of
Bartlett .v. Pickersgill, already referred to.
So, also, in Lane v. Dighton, Amb. 409, only
part of the consideration
of the purchase
arose from trust moneys, and yet the decree
followed the money into the land. This
the
most reasonable application of the rule; and,
in the late case of "Wray v. Steele,- Ves.
B. 388, the vice chancellor held, that there
joint advance,
might be a resulting trust by
by two or more, upon
purchase In the name
of one, and that there was no reason for confining the advance to a single Individual, to
resulting trust. He did not beconstitute
lieve that Lord Hardwicke, ever used the dicAtk.
tum imputed to him in Crop v. Norton,
not pretended,

TrauSsT^cEgliiaHte.' (session T<T,'"c. 44, §§
'12,"'i§r declares. "That all declarations, or
creation s of trusTa, or contLdenees of any
llg nds, &c^ sha llow mani fested and prove d

I
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he was speaking on a
"The witness swears to no
similar point
fact or circumstance, capable of being investigated or contradicted, but merely to a naked
declaration
of the purchaser, admitting that
the purchase was made with the trust money.
That is, in all cases, most unsatisfactory evidence, on account of the facility with which
it may be fabricated, and the impossibility
Besides,
of contradicting it.
the slightest
m^y totally
mistake or failure of recollection,
alter the effect of the declaration."
The situation of the parties, at the time,
is sufficient to throw doubt on the suggestion,
that the 90 dollars were advanced by the
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case, and
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Sir Wm. Grant,
ble to this

"It
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plaintiff, as part payment of a purchase actually made on his account He was, at the
time,, absolutely insolvent, and could not pay
a debt of 50 dollars, which he owed to another person.
He had not been able, a few
weeks before that purchase,
to redeem a
farm, with its mills, for 930 dollars, but suffered the same to be purchased by the defendant without any payment on his part
The Elmendorf lot was then purchased for
3,600 dollars, and of which sum 500 dollars
were to be paid immediately. The plaintiff
was utterly unable to engage in this purchase.
Is it then probable that, under all these circumstances, 90 dollars would be seriously considered, by either party, as paid by the plaintiff on his own account, or that the purchase ,
was made for his benefit?
<•
JBut the plaiintiff, on the 30th of December,
rapnths after thje_puriS13.™!KiJfit.wa,g.ji5.
chase of the Elmendorf lot, assigned ,tft.the
defendant a note against^ Edmund Bruyn;
ana tnis is "put 'forward as"a" payment of
"S«tF of "the purchase money, from which the
resulting trust was to arise,,
,„
"'
!KS£_£ili charges, _ilia,ijthe^ note was endorsed to the defendant, "as_ a security for
TSie'advances and iespongibilitles entered into by the defendant for the plaintiff;"
and
"for
i^ says,' afterwards, tha t
ff-as
purpose of procuringareconveyance or assignmrat_j2f_the__Mid__farm^ jo bid off at
puHic auction by the defendant,' and of the
loTNo. Sjjurchased of .Elmendorf."
is not easy to reconcile these distinct
reasons,
stated in the bill, for the assignment of the note; but if we adopt either of
them as the true reason, it does not appear
that the note was assigned, truly and dlstinctly, as a part payment, by the plaintiff,
of the purchase money belonging to the vendor, upon either of the sales.
The note affords no grnnnd fl r--ja-j!egn1tiTii> t^^iat gnrino-.
ing_^ut of the purchase of either farm by
trust arises
the "dSendant. because such
Mily from the payment, originally, of tE
Purchase money jor, at leasi, a part or it)
by theL-PaEtv— aettiag-uD-the-tmsj:.
The as
nf t^is nntP y^s an after thnng]^t
Signmep
jind tra nsaction; and, according to the latter
was malTB
i^asaS" mentioned in the in,
reconveyance,
tot tne purpose of procuring
matter entirely disti ngrtfOHr'th
trostire
uaid eiiug. — Hie answer of the defsnfl;
le
ant puts tne assignment of the note, on ot^ py
groun d. If^was made "as an ndemnity for
th waste committed on the property'^ TEEe"
ijiai ntilt, an dfor the boards t)elongm£ _to ie
aerenaaifr "(whi"cE"~^gri5eerLraa[5!3£lihB
pl aintiff), and in order JtcuindiicethQ def qpd antto give
the plain tiff the only opportunity fe'requ'ired OI'maEiSg'"somgTTt [?iTi"SfiT^
so as to induce the defendant voluntarily to
gpnvey to him some part of the tract nnr hased under the mortgage sale."
The Plaintiff's witnesses wEb speak of this
Upte, give
„ dlfferent reason for the asaism ment and one not exactl conaistpnt with

c

BogarduB (arm, was on the 12th of May, and
the purchase from Elmendorf, on the 2Sth of
June, and that the plaintiff charges, and the
defendant admits, that the advance of the 80
dollars, or 90 dollars, was at the latter purNone is pretended to have been made
, chase.
and yet these wltat the former purchase,
fix, with so much precision,
the adnesses
I
This is a remarkahle Invance at that time.
stance of the inaccura cy andTallacy of parol
great Sanger there"
jestimoH'^^gd"^ht>'<v-S'the
I
is o t~glvlng mucn 'lafatud eZ to these implie d
$usts, tounaed on naked declarations, in op of~
position to tne solemnity "an d CCTtatnty
"
written documents .
Another witness (Wm. Doll) says, he heard
acknowledge
the receipt
of
the defendant
from 80 to 100 dollars from the plaintiff, "on
account of their contracts." This is too loose
and general to be of much weight.
Henry
lUy sup
sup-Upham is the only witness who director
ports the allegation in the bill . He says "the
of 1803 ,
defendant told him, in the~autapm
that "he had received 80 dollars of th e
plaintiff, towards purchasing the Elmendor f
jgLIL H ere
is an inaccuracy In this witnes s:
"
for both pa rties admit, that the sum adva nced In aid of that purchas e, was_ 90 dollars ;
buF the queslj^ at.iiL-arlsfis,. was thfi-jngney
advanced as a loan to the defendant or a s
"a paymen t, pro tanto. by the plaintiff to thfe
have stated
The testimony which
"vi^ftor.
as to this point (and it is all there is) Is exThere was, no doubt, an
tremely imperfect.
advance by the plaintiff of 90 dollars, at the
time of the purchase of the Elmendorf lot,
but whether It was advanced to accommodate
the defendant, or as payment of so much by
the plaintiff to the vendor, through the agency of the defendant, is a point not clearly ascertained.
All the proof seems to consist of
confessions of the defendant; yet those confessions will, most of them, apply as well to
the pretence on one side as on the other.
He
received 90 dollars of the plaintifiC towards
paying for the Elmendorf lot; but It is still
uncertain whether it was considered as an
advance by the plaintiff towards the purchase, on his own, or on the defendant's
account
It is dangerous to trust to such inaccurate witnesses, as those who testify conThe observation of
this payment.
cerning
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proof.

"We must take the
statedT 5~be
the ass ignment, except so far "as greyer
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surpris e,

defendapt is. therefore, boimd to account for the 90 dollars, with interest and
tor the amou nt of tB6 n ote assigned to him.
gRETlffCiBr^ tr" I'Ms i^"WK'at he ottered to
by bls^answer
But he claims likewis
the benefi of the onsideration, for which
^ipp" i^saigned.
Ifee admlts"th"iS~T nrtti 16 have
antrWES ir'ffiaajEffl waste committed on the
go hv
nrnds be ween th time of t^fi pnrpyif
the
^alp^TiTnent ^f
jJl''_1,1li!CT'^^"t -a nd the
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the
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i Johns. Ch. p.
fraud^istake. or ground
*^- On no other
can a deed be con-

afli m
tniRtpp. <" <-'T' rvfTinfif "^' pithpr
of the tracts of lapd m^n ^npfifi in tll° ''"'
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as th e Inst rument
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^jgaL. and,
stated, "in consideration
of money now_dja,fi.4}B-..salfl
"^siun
note, arid" to" him""!n" banfl paid by the de^'^^^^e'said
fendant."" TO'e~pa'rties"werR
pnTif1nflpr| hy
t^^eed from setting up a different con upon the allegation of
gideratjonr* except
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shown without writing, is when the purT
chase is made vfrith the proper moneys of
ffie" cestuy que trust, and tiie deed not taken
in* his name . The trust results from the
original transaction, at the time it takes
place, and at no other time; and it is founded on the actual payment of money, and on
no other ground.
It cannot be mingled or
dealings
confounded with any subsequent
whatever. They are to be governed by different principles, and the doctrine of a resulting trust would be mischievous and dangerous, if we once departed from the sim'plicity of this rule. It is a very questionable
doctrine, in the view of policy, even under
this limitation;
and it has been admitted
with great caution, as is manifest from the
cases which were reviewed in Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582.
But there is an obiectinn tn thp, nnrnl
proof, in respect to the assignment of the
"Li was. assi^nea_to the defendant-to^
B5|e.

^

'

even r eimbursement, may be evidence
of
some o^her contract, or the ground for some
other reiiet. Put it cannot, by any retro^
spective ettect. produce the trust of whi^
There never was an in,we are saeaJdng.
stance of such a trust so created, and there
never ought to be, for it would destroy all
the certainty and security of conveyances of
real estate. The resulting; trust, not within
the statute oF~f rands, and which may be

this case, pven if wp inin win^ H the ad .
mission of the plaintiff , is of no iisp^atn
~~
the charge of a resulting trus t
We are, then, brought to this conclusion,
that
defendant was not, in any respect.
a trustee to the plaintiff in the purchase 6}
tne Bogardus farm; and that he was not a"
trustee in tne purcnase or tne !kimendorf
lot, unless in a very small dep-ee, or in the
ratio that 9 dollars bear to 3,600.
If t^ip
payment of part of the consideration raises
a trust. it. ,,.C^rtimiLv.
PaHTlnj- raisq it hpynn,1
the proportif m_flf. the, money paid. It can
only be a charge, as one of the cases expresses it pro tanto; and in t^ja n^sp |-ho
^
Sust, even if admi tte d, is to so inconsiderable an amountTas not to he worth contend ing for . The difference between the flO (Tnllars with interest, considered as a loan, ani^
a rateab le prop ortion of the price fnr whinij
wag gnlH hy tho
1n|;
'^"fpTlfj _
thoJRIlTnPTirlnrf
ant, is ve r y immateria l. But if the plain'^
\.tJ.tJI,lra\J.LLl AJ±l,\J l,"V
fj \J.t.t3\ji\j tliaFmmTnto
tiff IS '-'■*-^*
*^-'" to
entitled
'-^'-t-*^ pursue
land, the smallness 'ojfttte_ demand will not
be an obstacl
The proof of the paymen
par
of the 90 dollars by the plaintiff, as
or the purcnase money, is not, however, satisjaciorv: ana
it was, there is ev idence
the
ha,t ttie plalnttff^,§,|j;ei; y .rda-dis
trust. T^TS^weli'spttlPfl th t-Parol evidence
is admissible to rebut a resulting trust If
he plaintiff, by his bill, sets up an equ ity
founaea on parol proof, it may pe rebutted,
put aowni'or discii arged. hv narnl prnn"
Walker v. Walker,
Atk. 98; Lake v. Lake,
Amb. 126; Roe v. Popham, Doiig. 24. There
may be a parol waiver even of
written
agreement.
Price v. Dyer, 17 Ves. 356.
Now, in this, case. It is in proof that after
the sale of the Elm ndorf lot by the defendant, the plaintm aisc iaimecl any right or
title to "ft Wp'T ^prTS^i'^rr tn MiTm Trompor,
" that the"defenda "<- ^afi "n^fl thP
l^nfl Ja
sntneHendrickson and others, ^pd ms\
thm
py it. Tbat the whole was the de^
fga'dawg' and &e~ad nothing to do with.
That
had failed in every one of his
contra'cEs witJi the defendant; and thjj| he
Had no interest in either of the said tracts
as
.of lan d. T hat the defendant did with
he pleased," ana tna.t he had no claim on"
the defendant. "Tin Ipsa the defendant chose
give him something."
am, accordingly, of opinion, that the
jilaintiff has failed in charging the defend-

^o

the allegati ons of either party. Hixson says,
it was assigned "on account of moneys advanced by the defendant for the plaintiff,
It does
on the purchase of both the farms."
not appear how the witness came to the
knowledge of this fact; and considering his
great inaccuracy on another point, as I have
already shown, we cannot place much reliance upon the correctness of this assertion,
unaccompanied with any reason or authority
for making it. But assuming the fact as
stated (and we may do it with the more
safety, since Upham, another witness, testifles to the same fact, as coming to him
from the repeated acknowledgments of the
defendant) the assignment of the note, even
for such a purpose, cannot raise a trust out
of either of the conveyances to the defendThe trust must have been coeval with
ant.
the deeds, or it cannSf exist at ajl. Atfer
a" partyTiaOaggg a purcnase vyit'n Majxwr"

'
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It appears, also,
which the plaintiff sold.
by the testimony of two of the witnesses
(Hixson and Upham), that after the purphBRP nf tho
TBirftPTKirirf int t)y the defen dant, and before the sale by him, the plain tiff had made bene ficial Improvements upo n
it ; and as ii appears tnat the plaintiff w as
under
^ffered to contmue in possession,
sn me Indistinct encouragement;
held out by
tSedef endant. tha t he might eventually become interested in" the lands, if la_eguitabie,
under al l the pircumstances of this m^?, t^a*'
tKejlaintJ^ sjhonld hay^ a reasonableaUowan ce made him, for such beneficial and pe rmanent improvements as be may have made
on the lands, between the time of"&e pur chase and sale of the defendant, as stated

I

shall, accordingly, direct a reference to

a master, to take and state an account between the parties upon the following prin-
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That he compute the amount of
the loan of 90 dollars, and of the note assigned, witn intere st: t nat h6 ascertiim. by'
liroof, the damages . If any, arising from
waste, commTtted~Ty the plainQffl, or by 'h is
JIrecti611, o n any naf Toftb eJands, Jietssceen
Ihe time of the pur chase s and the sale thereof by the defenda nt; also the a fflaHBt.. o?
boards belonging to the defendant upon the
said lands, and sold, or otherwise conv CTted
by the plaintiff ; a nd tha tJlfi-j&iMSliieKr
tain the value of the ben eficial a nd lasting
improvements, if any, mad e by the plaintiff
on eith er of the tracts of fand , during th e
period a fnrpsaifl; a lso, what would be a
reasonable allowance to the defendant for '
flie use and oc cupation pt-tk&.aa.td..1aTirlR by
{he platntiff,~during the sa me period. C^U
ciples^j giz.

RESULTING

DYER.
Nov. 27, 1788.
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granted by the lord, accor ding to the custom of that man "v, tn SwftJ
i>yer (tne pxaintig's father)^ flnd }iaiv. his
wife, and the defendant William (his other
son), to take in succession for their liTes^
and to the l ongest lly er of t hem. The purcnase m oney was paid by Si mon'Pyer, the
father. ~He~siurYiveyiniSr"Wlf6, and lived un^
til 1785. and t hen„„diea , navinsy maae nlF
2viUi.aBd_thereby deyised all his intere st in
these copyhold premises (amongst^j!i@rgJJo
t£s3i?^M^rr®,y«ingeFj^ The present
hill stat ed these circumstan ces , and inaiatpfl
that the whole purchas e mon ey being paid
by the f ather^ although, py the form of th e
gantjjthB_ wife an d tEe defendant had The
]egS3Sfirest.in the ,2remjseg.for.thelr^Iives
In succession, yet I n a court of equity they"
were but trn'stees rciTtHg father ,""an3~the"Bil)
0? Wi[lis,"w"ere'

a

It

holdeq,

2

Court of Chancery.

In 1737 certain copyhold nramisfi^
oi the mg-Por of Hey tesbur ^ ,

then Indeed entertained very little doubt
upon the rule of a court of equity, as applied to this subject; but as so many cases
have been cited, some of which are not hi
print, we thought
convenient to take an
ipportunity of looking more fully Into them,
In order that the ground of our decision may
be put In as clear a light as possible, especially In a case in which so great a difference of opinion seems to have prevailed at
the bar. And
have met with
case in addition to those cited, which is that of RumEden, 15, on the 20th
boll V. RumboU,
April, 1761. The clear result of all the cases,
single exception, is that the trust
without
of a legal estate. y^p|hp][ frpphnii^, opynoid
br leasenold: whether ^^fe^n '"" *^? nampa"
of-^. pu rchasers and others jointly, or in
tjie name of others w ithout that of the purch'aserr ~whether"" Tn~one name or sevj -rai;
whether 3o iPtly or successive,— results to the
money.
m an who advances the purchase
•
^his is X^eneral proposition, supported by
the cases, and there is notiiing to con-~
'^11
tratllct It: and it go.ea-on.4t-J8tiact.anaiogy"
<i" \H "''«^ of ^^^ commoaJaw that, where
feoffment is made without consideration, the
It Is the estabuse results to the feoffer.
lished doctrine of a court of equity that this
resulting trust may be rebutted by circumThe cases go one step
stances in evidence.
further, and prove the circumstance of one or
child or chilmore of the nominees, being
dren of the purchaser, is to operate by rehas been
butting the resulting trust; and
determined in so many cases that the nominee, being a child, shall have such operation
as a circumstance of evidence, that we
should be disturbing landmarks if we suffered either of these propositions to be called
In question, namely, that such circumstance
shall rebut the resulting trust, and that
shall do so as a circumstance of evidence.
think
would have been a more simple
doctrine if the children had been considered
as purchasers for a valuable consideration.
Natural lov and affection raise a use at
common law. Surely, then, it T^lll"retrp t-ft
trust resu lghg to the father . Thls~way~^f
considering
Woum nave shut out all the
circumstances of evidence which have found
their way into many of the cases, and would
have prevented some very nice dIstincTiions,
Conand not very easy to be understood.
sidering it as a circumstance of evidence,
there must be, of course, evidence admitted
was resolved Into
on the other side. Thus
a question of Intent, which was getting into
a very wide sea, without very certain guides.
In -the most simple case of all, which Is that
of a father purchasing In the name of his
son,
is said that this shews the father Intended an advancement, and therefore the
resulting trust is rebutted; but then a ch-cumstance Is added to this, namely, that
the son happened to be provided for. Then
the question is, did the father Intend to advance son already provided for? Lord Not-
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2 Cox, Ch. 92.
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LORD CHIEF BARON, after directing the
for a few days, delivered
:he judgment of the court.

cause to stand over
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The_guestio n between the partigs_ ln. this
muse is whether the de nda
be
considered .as a trustee for his atEer rn_respect of his succession to the legal_intigreS
of the~ ^pp"y hold premises" In qu estion, ang
w hether he pTamtifC, as.., rep,resehta.tlx.e„af
ffie fatiler, is now entltled_tpjthe.Jteafiflt.Of
Ihtiinfited my opinion of the
jftiaf trust.
qneSQiJn on the hearing of the cause, and
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Ch. Cas. 27;
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v. Scroope,
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it
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1

1

Scroope

Elliot,
Ch. Cas. 231; Ebrand v. Dancer, Jd.
26; Klngdon v. Bridges,
Vern. 67; Back
V. Andrew, Id. 120; Rundle v. Bundle, Id.
P. Wms.
264; Lamplugh v. Lamplugh,
Atk. 480; Pole v.
Stileman v. Ashdown,
Pole,
Ves. Sr. 76.

d
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And this was the whole question In
This pggg was vpry fnlly arpfnpri
by Mr. Solicitor General and Alnge for plaintiff, and by Burton & Morris, for defendant The following cases were cited, and
very particularly commented on: Smith v.
Baker,
Atk. 385; Taylor v. Taylor, Id. 386;
Mumma v. Mumma,
Vern. 19; Howe v.
Howe,
Vern. 415; Anon., IFreem. Ch. 123;
Benger v. Drew,
P. Wms. 781; Dickinson
V. Shaw, before the lords commissioners in
1770; Bedwell v. Froome, before Sir T.
Sewell, on the 10th May, 1778; Bow v. Bowden before Sir L. -Kenyon, siting for the lord
chancellor; Crisp v. Pratt, Cro. Car. 549;
l^ip

JjlP

it

a

of the father, might be ^uie1;^d .iB.-t^te_J>OB^
sessioTi of thp nrpmispT^yrmngtlie lif e.i}|Llbe
defendant
TTit> ilpfpnilant insistpd that the Insertion
of his name in the grant operated as an advkncement to him from his father to the ex-
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tingham could not get over this, and he
ruled that In such a case the resulting ti'ust
was not rebutted; and In Pole v. Pole, 1
Ves. Sr. 76, Lord Hardwicke thought so too;
and yet the rule in a cqurt of equity as recognized in other cases is that the father Is
the only judge as to the question of a son's
That distinction, therefore, of
provision.
the son being provided for or not, Is not
very solidly taken or uniformly adhered to.
It is then said that a purchase in the name
of a son is a prima facie advancement, and,
indeed, it seems difficult to put it in any
way. In some of the cases some circumstances have appeared which go pretty much
against that presumption, as where the father
has entered and kept possession, and taken
the rents; or where he has surrendered or
or where the son has
devised the estate;
given receipts in the name of the father.
The answer given is that the father took the
rents as guardian of his son. Now, would
the court sustain a biU by the son against
the father for these rents? I should think it
pretty difficult to succeed in such a bill. As
to the surrender and devise, it is answered
that these are subsequent acts; whereas the
intention of the father in taking the purchase in the son's name must be proved by
acts; yet these are pretty
concomitant
strong acts of ownership, and assert the
right, and coincide with the possession and
enjoyment As to the son's giving receipts
in the name of the father, it is said that, the
son being under age, he could not give receipts in any other manner; but 1 own this
reasoning does not satisfy me. In the more
complicated cases, where the life of the son
is one of the lives to take in succession, other
the custom of the
distinctions are taken.
manor be that the first taker might surrender the whole lease, that shall make the
other lessees trustees for him; but this custom operates
on the legal estate, not on
the equitable interest; and therefore this Is
When the lesnot a very solid argument
sees are to take successive, it is said that,
as the father cannot take the whole in his
own name, but must insert other names in
the lease, then the children shall be trustees
for the father; and to be sure, if the circumstance of a child being the nominee is
not decisive the other way,' there is a great
deal of weight In this observation. There
may be many prudential reasons for putting
in the life of a child in preference to that
of any other person; and if In that case it
is to be collected from circumstances whether an advancement was meant, it will be
difficult to find such as will support that
idea. To be sure, taking the estate in the
name of the child, which the father might
have taken In his own, affords a strong argijment of such an intent; but where the
estate must necessarily be taken to him in
succession,
the Inference is very different.
These are the difficulties which occur from
considering the purchase in the eon's name

If
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as a circumstance of evidence only. Now,
if it were once laid down that the son was
to be taken as a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, all these matter of presumption would be avoided.
It must be admitted that the case of Dickinson V. Shaw is a case very strong to support the present plaintiff's claim. That came
"A copyon in chancery, on 22d May, 1770.
hold was granted to three lives to take in
succession,
the father, son, and daughter.
The father paid the fine.
There was no
custom stated. The question was whether
the daughter and her husband were trustees
during the life of the son, who survived
the father. At the time of the purchase the
son was nine and the daughter seven years
old. It appeared that the father had leased
the premises from three years to three years
to the extent of nine years. On this case
Lords Commissioners Smythe and Aston
were of opinion that, as the father had paid
the purchase money, the children were trustees for him." To the note I have of this
case it is added that this determination was
contrary to the general opinion of the bar,
and also to a case of Taylor v. Alston, in
this court In Dickinson v. Shaw there was
some little evidence to assist the Idea of its
being a trust, namely, that of the leases
made by the father. If that made an ingredient in the determination, then that case^
is not quite in point to the present; but l'
rather think that the meaning of the cov^ft
was that the burthen of proof laid on the
child; and that the cases which went the^
other way were only those in which the
estate was entirely purchased in the name
of the children. If so, they certainly were
not quite correct in that idea, for there bad
been cases in which the estates had been
taken In the names of the father and son.
I have been favoured with a note of Rumboll V. RumboU, before Lord Keeper Henley
on the 20th April, 1761, where a copyhold
was taken for three lives In succession, the
father and two sons. The father paid the
fine, and the custom was that the first taker
might dispose of the whole estate (and his
lordship then stated that case fully). Now,
this case does not amount to more than an
opinion of Lord Keeper Henley, but he
agreed with me In considering a child as
a purchaser for good consideration of an
estate bought by the father in his name,
though a trust would result as against a
stranger. It has been supposed that the
case of Taylor v. Alston in this court denied
the authority of Dickinson v. Shaw. That
cause was heard before Lord Chief Baron
Smythe^ myself, and Mr. Baron Burland,
and was the case of an uncle purchasing
In the names of himself and a nephew and
It was decided in favour of the nephniece.
ew and niece, not on any general idea of
their taking as relations, but on the result
of much parol evidence, which was admitted on both sides, and the equity on the
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side of the nominees
was thought to pre- case turned on the question whether the Inponderate.
Lord Kenyon was in that cause, terest was well devised.
Therefore, as far
and his argument went solely on the weight as respects this particular case, Dickinson
of the parol evidence. Indeed, as far as the V. Shaw is the only case quite In point; and
circumstance of the custom of the first tak- then the question Is whether that case is
er's right to surrender, it was a strong case to be abided by. With great reverence to
In favour of a trust However, the court the memory of those two judges who decided
determined
the other way on the parol evi- it, we think that case cannot be followed;
dence. That case, therefore, is not material. that it has not stood the test of time, or the
Another case has been mentioned,' which is opinion of learned men; and Lord Kenyon
not in print, and which was thought to be has certainly intimated his opinion against
materially applicable to this (Bedwell v.
On examination of Its principles, they
Froome, before Sir T. Sewell) ; but that was seem to rest on too narrow a foundation,
materially distinguishable from the present. namely, that the inference of a provision
As far as the general doctrine went, it went b^ing Intended did not arise, because the
against the opinion of the lords commis- purchase could not have been taken wholly
His honour there held that the copy- in the name of the purchaser.
sioners.
This, we
holds were part of the testator's personal think, is not sufficient to turn the presumpestate, for that was not a purchase' in the tion against the child. If It is meant to
name of the daughter.
She was not to have be a trust the purchaser must shew that
the legal estate.
It was only a contract to intention by a declaration of trust; and we
add the daughter's life in a new lease to do not th ink it rip;!)^ tff ilnnht whothar an

it

be granted to the father himself. There could
be no question
about her being a trustee,
for it was as a freehold in him for his
daughter's life. But in the course of the
argument his honour stated the common
principles as applied to the present case,
and ended by saying that, as between father
and chUd. the natural presumption was that
a .nm Y i slon was mean
The anonymous
very
case in 1 Freem. Ch. 123, corresponds
much with the doctrine laid down by Sir
T. Sewell, and it observes that an advanceas done for
ment to a child is considered
valuable consideration, not only against the
father,
but against creditors. Kingdon v.
Bridges, 2 Vem. 67, is a strong case to this
point— that is, the valuable nature of the
consideration arising on a provision made
for a wife or for a child; for there the question arose as against creditors.
I do not find that there are in print more
than three cases which respect copyholds
where the grant is to take successive,— Rundie V. Rundle, 2 Vern. 264i, which was a case
perfectly clear; Benger v. Drew, 1 P. Wms.
781, where the purchase was made partly
with the wife's money; and Smith v. Baker,
1 Atk. 385, where the general
doctrine as
applied to strangers was recognized; but the

t

estate in succession Is to t)f ^nngmp^ori nyan advancement,
when a moiety of an escertainly would be so,
tate in possession

if

we were to enter into all the reasons that
might possibly influence the mind of the
purchaser, many might perhaps occur in
every case upon which It might be argued
that an advancement was not intended. And
I own it Is not a very prudent conduct of
a man just married to tie up his property
for one child, and preclude himself from
providing for the rest of his family. But
this applies equally In case of a purchase
in the name of the child only, yet that case
is admitted to be an advancement;
indeed.
If anything, the latter case Is rather the
strongest,
for there It must be confided to
one child only. We think, therefore, that
these reasons partake of too great a degree
of refinement, and should not prevail against
a rule of property which Is so well established as to become a landmark, and which,
whether right or wrong, should be carried
throughout
This bill must therefore be dismissed; but
after stating that the only case^in potot on
the subject Is against our present opinion,
it certainly will be proper to dismiss it without costs.
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1891.

Errorto circuit court, McDonough
; Charles J. Sohofield, Judge.

?"' '?T..??'°°"j^

^-

^^^H^

"" '^

coun-

others.

herrs of William L. Stinson. (alius Steven^
1 flpoaaaen- ap->,insil Charles
ir'tttM^'g:
gqr,

nBorffptta, Patrick: htkI oth ers, to eSTatl*
lieh tit1^;|-" nt.^•^Hin raalaiirl pprKonfll jtwrpr

i;om»lainantB bring error.

HTtv-

Smith & Helmer and Prentiss & BaiJy,
for plaintiffs in error. TannicliB <& Tannicliff and C. ^. WTieat, for defendants in error.
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Supreme Court of Illinois.

Wisfi Indebted to-htm-ln- vftrloiia.Anioi3iats^_^
and fnrsnnh Inania aiirl other InflehterinPHa
nrnmiBsnry niitps. Some oUafias.
}\fi tnoK
nnfl
Tj"tfiH "'^r" "\"i^P piLy.MhlA.-ta-,hiitiHo1f,
HnppJHl flirpptij>n-.marif>
pay!
nth(^rH. hv his
Stile to Georgetta Patrick ; an d many of
xnese latter notes w^^-p, applT^rl hxcmAr^l
ages on real estate, and the mo rtga ges.
§ yhis dtrection.'maflP to Raid ftpm^pTty:
y.'^r^.enotesandjnortgagesw^^^
r to saiQ Stevenson, andretained in his poBjession. ang lie conectea all tlie accrued
Tn teres
hereon w h ich was paid prior'To
Said Stevenson dica intestate
mOfiaJOo^
at Colc heBtefon April
iS&, being some
yeai uf a^. - aua lESTjngsuTvrv^ —
^
"r fip«ppnri>r^Tf^
nini no wjm
iVoty
m
mfc
X/tiar les Patrick was appointed a dminisTral..!' HI iiij bit.la £r4%e-tkedti cT Bara" a.rlpH
Patrii-I^ anfl tO Martha (J. PaLTtCfeaenlaj id G o
Patrick were
placed upon record byf^etta
them, and they
tnereupon severaily claimea tlTe absol'iatte'

o

COOK et al. v. PATRICK et al.
(26 N. B. 658, 135 111. 499.)
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Baker, J. In 1820. a ronns; man, whq
was known in the crnniriiinitv aa^viniaf^
L! Irjtev ^WCfti. Was livin g and keeping hoplace called UaWMI Il u 'HVi l lH. Ir rttm
liTaTa
'
He Bubscquentl.y reX.exington in tnaL sLaL<i, Uird
moved
mo
ved to Lexingtc
was there engaged in the boot and shoe
Hp
business for a number of years.
wa^
i,' 1834,
lossesslon ot the same, and collecte anoT
Lexington,
May
at
on
jpfaT-ripri
k, arfd four chilappiUDl'lated
renta, n.nH maf le HalBB'
Patric
th<
B.
Catherine
"
^o-one
Ifl conve.yancesto
and
other persons of
dl-en were Dorn of the marriage. A few
years after the birth of these children he
failed in business, and became insolvent;
^'lie pres ent bill in chancery was ex hibiteg m ine mcijuunugu rin; im, Ki
and then his wife and two of the children
frfrr. ny
In 1856 he removed, taking his two the plainti ns in error. Hannah r.nnu fljid
died.
remaining children with him, to Colchesothers, against (iiiarles P a^ riek and-hia
ter, in the state of Illinois, where several
Two Sisters and the purchaser^ of real
estate fromjnem.
iLi a. claimea in the bill
brothers of his deceased wife were living,
—it the _aian commc
imo nly called WTflYa S
and were engaged in merchandising.
He nrarr
was at first a clerk in the store of John
liester on the fith fiay r»f April ISj;;], nraa
Patrick, then a clerk in the store of Will- "^le
in trutn and in fact on William L Stiniam Patrick, and then took charge of the
store of the latter. Subsequently he was
ha m.Tn'the state of MaJneZand'^T^Eir^
engaged in a partnership business with
piatrrpTtg in errfls.) are thaiiaLEa.atIa5rot
Charles Patrick, one of the defendants
herein, who was son of another brother
thB saig WilTiam Li[^Sfansoji,..deceaaed.
is'a'Sa Tiaimed "in the bill that the deeds~"
of his deceased wife. His other two
he PAUlcKfe were h6t atillvernd^ Jx c=.
o
daughters, Ellen and Mary, died without
Tn
lIiBiu lu lUti hl'6- lime fit thfe iflteBtStgTand
issue, in 1856 and 18.57, respectively.
ip" it'gv if,pi:
the years •■gfrft if^fl"
infT^ fliatTire-l'a-t+e23jnen_hedied^as ihe real_
]»ri9. anc jfi^, iia.id-.-Jgau)Mw— i;.^s.t.flgf.nfirin.
purchased variq us
eam m^aS; and 'thatjOS no tes and ~in or t'^T'
T^gi^ini^L.^^^''
py the intestate "rem ainedln
land and town iot.b^ ann na^ri tnf
agTa
osgession._an^oiitCoUlJiixma^Jii£.lifer
at t.ha
mewTtlr^lB own money ifprl
t\mv uf the uurchase'ot each of saidsevera
^me. an were his p.roperty at thetim£,of
his ueatfiT' TW^rayer "m the'TOiirrsne!'lll'eih iBes the deeds tneret6<^ WPf&~Dy nis
aiiHi'^Hl
flirectiftn made^to
made iio Martha P. PatP
MnctiXgtat^SjtlEJfipttte^ real estatfe" anti
aiin i^Hl /lirecti6n
personal^^property in (Ji]^s]tenTe*3eciree(l
Hck. (now Klff^eh.l I'h a'-'pa h'MtT -ick, and
""Georgetta Patricia, tlie defendani;p in
to be thtj property ol 'tHeplaiBLtiflsriglefc..
rt»
that an_£Qnveyances^,made.iiy Jjia..
^PatricEiT'of ,BaAdj:eallE!siate.he ..Bet,asida;.J
uf saidlElit'ft^ fini
and"'that the Patricks account for. all
^^s. . 'liese co nvevanq£s
wer delivered to iStevenson. were not reJlroiTeyB"_ColJgc.l^ from joutea, -bonds, accorgeaiin til after nis aegth.anfi were held
An- '
troa'B^s. and Bales, of flal(£.prrfperJ:y.
kna
swers were .'jSJed jauj. issues formed, and
n^iW the hearing,j2l_tha. caus&Jtbe_couft
eliveryi
TOTHtrd" tKaf the nrnmiHHfjry "OtfiB, WhV^
trmrtmfl^n^v^Wp
iq-wrTT^t^:?^^^
H&'fcooirTJUBBcaBiUU 01 Ult) Ul'BtllllJttB m ea<ih
flPliPA nntlriunn hTi -H airt StgyCTPon in hfa
aged descnoea, and used and controlled
tTin uaiiiti. and I'HceivtJil
nte-time to Geor getta Pa trick so. jaa-taia-.
thu reirts. Ibsug s.
and
na repaired an
roB ts thereot,
vest ner with Ifie title tcrTBSm "or the probuiit UUHUM [jjyrgOll. Witli_ hiHown money . Ceear Wefeorrana-^at sald-Georgetta
jt-tauaisy tyii^'eived from re n ts, and
or
TJOTTjnder cltrimcOCcwnerghipr and since
ffig-^eath of said Stevenson, cqllected
'u&m ali taxes thereon ont ot hlH own
moneys. uL laKlBg I'titeipts or su ch taxe
$^^LAlQn saia notes and that said !B6407
feVgrai granTgeS men and the unpaid notes which
ii^the hames of tha
•^jinni-rt in eatili of uaid rnu|JWLive geeas
4!«tie pay able TO saia ateve nson, belonged
severally ,
^aid St evenson ai«0 "luauiid
— tlr-traF' ^rdereff~imd~(Tp (irpp^
various sum sbf fllauwii muiie,y ludiffopon
"BSTT
Said G eofgStta pay_.Jaia
nej^Hni^a, ang otner persons became other-
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with all domi nion over them when they
tneUi Co Stevenson, al ias STttn-— .son, ana, as tne laLier waTnot
raii^:^--^
m an.y ori Bs HeefU it wa.» r,^t ■^g^pTni—
a
g

^gnVerea

rn^

he Should

de^j y^^r theTn

^£S. talhfi-g-rfi'" *"pps, nrtha
Dea^j^elivery of the
'
gTElsTife-time . T'

ug" g'eecils to~ Stevenson, and the accen iT
anee
oi tnem D.y mm. ana tne snBBp--

t

jil

by her, and deliver the residue of the
tn Stevenson. witnin tA)^
notes RO
paya.hle^—
_____^—
days'to the aaroinistrato r. and t hat the
"aaiBiniStr^tnr account to the es tate for
Ra id^monev and notes.
The CQar.t fnrFmTT
mpnd Hint plH'"""° '"'"'•rnr •^'"'° ""^^ ""titled to any other or furt her relief in the
premises than that above mentioned, and
to all other and turtiier matters me
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i'laintiffs in error are dissatisfied with
b.v 'ihu
<!(M114,«e8=:afe^
^KntnatIfi^catioff=
siich nets nf fieppnlnnre ig n- imply nnf.
the limited measure of relief that was defieient
to
invest
snch
complaint,
their
bill
of
upon
creed to them
P-rai^tfi fS with title
vve do not regard the cases cited by plainand brins the record to this court. We
tiffs In error, where the deeds were not
deem it unnecessary to consider in detail
delivered by the grantors, and did not pass
the various assignments of error. There
from their control and dominion in their
are several matters in controversy which
life-times, and where it was held thatthere
We are
may be disposed of quite briefly.
was no divestiture of the titles of such
inclined to think that the evidence sufficiently shows the identity of the ma: iwjjgrantors, as here in point.
^We think the material questions in the
commonly called William L. Stevenson,
case whether or not there were resulting
who died at Colchester, in. this state, in
trusts in favor of Stevenson, alius. Stin1R81 with the William L. Stinson of Boso, in respect to the nature,
son, and,
denbam, in the state of Maine, who left
that state early in the present century for character, and extent of such trusts. It
is suggested by counsel that
the purpose of avoiding the vengeance of
Stinson
bought the lands, and paid for them with
he had
the brother of a girl whom
his own mone.y, then he was the equitable
wronged.
We will also assume for the
owner of such lands, although the deeds
purposes of the decision that the allegawere made to third persons. It is printions of the bill and the proofs introduced
ciple ot the law that where one buys properat the hearing make it manifest that
ty and pays the purchase money with his
plaintiffs in error are heirs at law of said
L. Stinson, deceased. ,^t is own funds, and has the title placed in the
William
name of another person, a resulting trust
claimed that by plaintiffs in error
Waij no such deIiver.Y ot the aeecl^ to' tne
arises in favor of him who has so paid
regarded
the purchase money, and he
gT5TftSErnl"rae3~tIierlTn as'wo'urd
to "nie laTidB.
wHui g-t as the equitable owner of the property
THem tug tme
bought. But to this doctrine of implied
seem tnatj in oroer to dLve^jt the severn.l
e;raiat or51ji'Bp(i deeoFof tlieir titles, it is
^rusts there are various exceptions, qiiali'
bcatious, and limitations. Such a trust
essentiaT" to tKe'claimlm^ e'bv said plama mere creature of equity, founded upon
feeds should be represumptive intention, and designed to carivered." "i^nt, waivgarded as pro^erl
ry that intention into effect, not to defeat
ffig""EEis, and waiviffg~miy"Consideration
it. If it is not the intention that the estate
of the testimony tending to show an actual
shall vest in him who pavs he nr cnase
delivery of the conveyance by Stevenson,
hen nn resnltimr trnal in hiH tavf~
Rljas Stinson, to Georgetta Patrick for
RT-ice,
said grantees, ^'p •'•'''"'' •'•*'nt
fanfflpient.
al¥achesto theprojertv and there may
-part of tne
BSa _i:e sulting t;riiHt as tn
^eliverv nf the deeds ap ^r'^eptnnpe nf tEL
same by the several P-ranteear^arnerl Hieryiropjerty, or a part of the in^^st tuerem,
jc ordingtothe
[mSotaBTothe.reRldi]p,j£pordingto
tht
th rRSidnp
Stevenson
n appeay g trtirn tllfi "•^i'^^"""
'**
intent existing in such particular case.
"'TIrlinPi *'''° pnrpVinBoa anrl talringr the
Story, Eq. Jur.
1202, It is said:
■assumed to be acting as agent o
Til
'here are other exceptions to the docnominal purchasers mentioned in the
trine of a resulting or implied trust, even
res pective deeds, aitftougn ne was in ^acf
ffcting wltti oiiT'tBeir knowledge. "Xt "the
where the principal has paid the purchase
money or, perhaps, more properly speaknmes ot the various purcTia-sse'sttie graning, as the resulting or implied trust is, in
tors in theseveral deeds delivered the same
to Stevenson, the supposed agent, absosuch cases, a mere matter of presumption,
lutely and unconditionally, and for the it maybe rebutted by other circumstances
express purpose of divesting themselves of
in evidence, and even by
established
parol proofs, which satisfactorily contratheir respective titles and vesting such titles in the grantees named in said several
dict it. And resulting and implied trusts
conveyances.
Subsequently said grantees
in such cases may, in like manner, be reaccepted and approved the acts of the selfbutted, as well to part of the land as to
part ot the interest in the land purchased
constituted agent, and fully ratified and
Thus, where A.
confirmed
the same by accepting the
in the name ot another.
deeds, and having the same recorded, and
took a mortgage in the name ot B., declar.claiming title under them. If deed is deing that he intended the mortgage to be
livered to one who has no authority from
for B.'s benefit, and that the principal,
ihe grantee to receive it, yet the grantee
after his own death, should be B.'s, and
may ratify the act of acceptance, and the
A. received the interest therefor during
delivery will be good, even in cases where
his life-time, it was held that the mortgage
" In
the deed is msde without the grantee's
belonged to B. after the death of A.
knowledge.
Lewin, Trusts, p. 169,
15, it is said ./As
Morrison v. Kelly, 22 111. 610;
Bawson v. Fox, 65 111. 200; Crocker v.
real pur chaser by
esu lts tt)
the trust
Lio wen thai, 83 111. 579; Bryan v. Wash,
presumptltnr't» t-la'»^.'"h^''H "F~!rg;^»'^
Gilman. 557; Byars v. Spencer, 101 111. 429.
9xbitFai: yL.jii!UlllUiitlou lu th g-gbflwice^
The grantors in the several deeds parted reaflun able proo to tllS3[ontrarjf,'f5i^
p
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RESULTING TRUSTS.

the home of his Doyuooa, ana lett behind
fiiHi l UB raatfyies-mnt-tTre-'ffii&yrqr^r-BTs
y 5uTir."He went to a-nnthwa-ea^a: dlStatrt
StaTe '.:jebanged his nft me.and formed other

^iacluwenta^-Jtau-Biarried ,
aM.aiafflilX,of children were Jt!flm»tO WmThea..Q Jie-Jby onei.his wife andTilLfmwijjl,
antil TOa'sniS,.

his cni dren died. It Ja. manifeat fi;nm t;^iP!
SWdfenceHiat afterj:he,iast otiAsLQWflJBimegfale" f a lii ilyli e w a s more intimate with
thfe relabre ^ of t lW~T"jOTBasiJd Wifn Ihaia
\±ha ,t he was
tiMilariyattached to the nephew s and tjie
niet:es~ ar~his ..agfieaseiL wile^-wbiOlSSIffie—
herein.
.Shprtly. after the
agMdants
iTe'a'fK"of MsTtaffTsurviving chilij be commCTTCred Euyin"gT'e'HTt' Hl« Le . u avi n g Wt egeter
<vitn nis own mone.y, and taking c onve.v-"
j-_ _
_.^..
ances of the pro perty boug tht^rtfe-tirtiie
e nepHS^, afi'd
spmeTn th e n'aiiie ot Mmm':^^
"
myW^RffllgHX^^ gne~^rth e^]]]nieces .
sistetf" Tor m ore t han^ lO years i n'm'ak'rrig "
iucfi purcliases an'5 takmg suc'n dieeds. He
aTsoTfpMS'ttmrttrttet
e lTi airti ed'-H 'rene y Ee^
'
I6ngin^ jp hiroselt . aha t Offk nuto Hff&

—

r

'^nogfg agJaLjJifiEetd grany^ aT r'tlTr"^^
^made jjayable. to the ofl ier T)f saig nieceg~~
^eorgef 3Mr'"SSj i£k!.!Iajid' "had'^The^ moFF
^ages executed to him^as nioS^^^e.

jJe

UUMeSr-'

.jased, andreceiyed the rents of the same.
built houses tiiereon, and
iBini«iiii««ii.y3i»ra!«J»WjTilitiia
smmr
was alwa ys particular, however, t o have
'■the'tax re<!61t>tlj HiadrtTOTrff'tliFnam^'or
resnective grantees to wh om the par \\l\nr M "'•*'•"••* "^ _landJiaaji£Sfl..^eaHe also collected and used, as he
__^__
'
tlgTTn
a'nd repaired and

fe

sawfltHBe

interest m ^B' eyatiU'img^ia
and mortgages , ide eSpreBgl .y
directed the aeeds to be made as they were
gade. He n-tuseg to accept conveyan ceg
madeto h lmselt a ^ grantefe, dilld iJUiJlslje ct'
that the deeds shouldnameone or another
th.3 notes

or the Patrick girls ; Me ot ten spoke, ,
the propert.Y as Mactie's, Charley's^ or
_Jeorge's.
He irequenti.y s poke of having
ncHltflU t)roi7erL.y, dfl U Of having Lause d
Bi e -' deaag lU UH maUB m toid Children:
arid safd that when he got tnrougii w itii
tB a pfUtl ril' t y TKarlerSn a-the girl^ sHailTt r
HUve lt'.""TH!S^iten""said that he intended.
>erty should go to the Patrick
chii-|
dren ; that Charley and the girls should/
have it ; that no one else had any right to|
it, or should touch it; that be had it fixed
— had it all arranged; and that no one
do anything with it, From
else could
these facts, and from numerous other circumstances that appear in the record. |^ is
stin jon;—
evident that when w^]iinm
{If- en,

J

imL-Hliifl'Bli'Tti

•

Mfi'n' ■To ft'erAir th rregBi
"
See,
tenant to enjoy bene tiGially for fi'ie.
U'rustS,
Eq.
Perry,
T39T-2-i^m.
aKtf.l
§
Jur. § 1040. and note 1; and Bisp. Eq. §
Benbow v.Townsend,! Mylne &
63, p. 94.
K. 506, was in many respects like the case
at bar. It was there held that, where land
was purchased with the money of A. in the
name of B., the resulting trust to A. may
be rebutted as to part of the land or part
of the interest in the land ; and also
held that, where A. took a mortage in the
name of B., declaring that the principal
sum should be for the benefit of B., and
received the interest during his life, it was
held that the property, after the death of
A., will belong to B. by force of the parol
The master of the rolls
declaration.
there said: "In the case of Lloyd v. Spillet, 2 Atk. 148, and also in the case of
Lane v. Dighton, 1 Amb. 409. it^is expressly decided that a resulting trust maybe
rebutted as to part of the land comprised
in a deed, and prevail as to the remainder; and if it can be rebutted as to a
part of the land, there can be no reason
why it may not be rebutted as to a part
of the interest in the land. But in this
case, the trust being of personal estate,
the case is not within the statute of
frauds or the doctrine of resulting trusts
under that statute, but the property will
belong to the brother after the testator's
death, by force of the testator's declaration that the two thousand pounds
should, after his death, be the property
of his brother Job. " It appears from the
report of the case that the brother. Job,
knew nothing of the transaction of the
taking of the mortgage, etc. It also appears therefrom that the same point was
there made in argument that seems to be
made in the case at bar, — that the equitable title raised by the parol evidencp must
be exactly commensurate with the legal
title on the face of the instrument.
From the conclusion reached it is manifest tt-jat it was considered that it was
competent for A., who loaned the money,
to reserve a portion of the equitable interest in the mortgage to himself, giving
the remainder of it, as well as the legal
title, to his brother. See, also, Maddison
v. Andrew, 1 Ves. Sr. 58.
In Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves.«360, while the case was the reverse in respect to the interests retained
and donated, the principle was the same;
and Lord Chancellor Eldon said: "Upon
the evidence, the utmost intended was to
secure to her [meaning the nominal purchaser] an income ; and, if that only was
intended, it by no means destroys the existence of trust, for, if the intention was to
give to her an estate for life, not dependent upon his will, still the capital would
"
be his.
Emmons y. Moore, 85 111. 304, is
an authority in this state which fully recognizes the principle that, where a person
buys land and pays the consideration
money, and takes the deed in the name of
another, parol evidence is admissible to
show that the real purchaser is not inmrrpTrgsgtsrmi-.p.

tenaea to be the beneficiary of the resulting trusts, and to indicate who is the
donee of the beneficial interest under such
trust.
It only remains to apply the rules of equity above recited to the facts of the present case. VVilliam L. Stinson abaudoped

j.^

nominal purcliaser is at liberty to rebut
the nreBnniDtion
by the nroduetion of
parol eviden ce showing the intention of
nonterripg UW UWUt^lHilal
llllBWHl.
AlHf
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flppil'i in tha TiHTTiB nf nnp
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nr a nother ot th e ly, tho romain^loi. f^j^^ >a^i.1.,^ ^f tl^p
^^„^
defendants in err oi*! ^gr ^P wel} as the sev-" table interest, estate, and titls in hhi.^ fo.i
fgtaxe,uafll eB. and laortgageR.
ves t in saia
eral venjfa Ea.JuilIy35ifiMed.-tp
rear
rjsa
§everal defendant s in error the'legai titles JS-, Such was the manifeat TrrF5nHf.ri ^ "
To Burli "feg;,e^a3B: Bma mat wnen ne' the inteatatfl. There la no rule of la wqr
"
nf pniiitv ttiat wi ff operate to prevent Biit^
notes
Karie
.^ d money
_. and too
iptHnHriTi jmmg eing carried into effect.'
5^',mi3j£Aame orTSfeorgetta yat'ricrk
.TLe means that "we re adopHiU by tWeiir^^ffljenled to vest i o-ber the legal title to
said money and mortgages; ana mac n^ testaTe"lQr^tTir:Du1yoseqr-s:Egg MDlishin^
'
fflaO"t tt1T.V i rumJe tr™ t o WH&^-v'e and ret^m
tflig.<Jig.EPSl,tJoa he desiredto make ot his
to his o wn Hs e a lire- f Btato ia the BUUll-ii bl e own property weresuch as viblnte norule
goi;!"
rpaH^v
y
"It^
n rtttjli). auU Tirorl
sTTgwr and such' 'as' fgrrffrgr'
irt^-a^oc»
gages, and to give to dCTenoarits in error ,
recognize' and eg&jcel^ 'TFe"decree o? the
reBPfetUveiy, and to vest in them, several■Hrciiit "court is amrmrd,
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Appeal from district eourt. Union county;
W. H. Teaford, Judge.
Plaintiff states as his cnnso nf nptinn that
in"" December, 1873, he nnrnhased from Joseph
^haw a certain quart er section of land in '
^gair cTTUnlj, tvHli ,„pili pyn property anB
fimAs, anjTatised the same to he conveyed to
Rje t jio.T iiiirn ,
vn\r\} u\ l-l.i p;tiT. , y^y r eason o f
gho thoi-pnftpr hpiri the title as trusteo
^hif->^
for plaintifC; that she received said trust, and
agreed to sateiy hoia saia iann ^nr n|ainr.itt a
t at the purchase the land was un^efitl'lJia
faaproved: mat plainti ff imnrnved it. apd ha'a

f

Supreme Court of Iowa.

not always prudent in the managem ent
of his nnan cla^ affai rs, cau sed the deed for
lapil tn Tip-maflP^fn hi.*! wife, without" her
jTii'a
kn^-ygipdj;e. intending; that sh should hold It in
trust for him: and thereafter wh£n.:informed
thp fa ct. Mrs.
acqmesced fax it, an
Hainan
said
repeatedly
nd unifor m
felirougSgut
the
:^ars ac£nbwled^d'"tEa't fee^ iand"'was'
Appellant states
Toperty
husband.
he
^
is contentioii'as follows '^The matters necessary to be proven In order to create the resulting trust claimed by appellee (neither fraud
nor mistalie being claimed) are: (1) Payment^
by appellee with his own money; (2) intention on the part of appellee at time of convey,
ance to create a trust; (3) conveyance to deceased; (4) Imowledge on the part of deceased i''^
of appellee's intention to create a trust, and
assent or failure to dissent after that knowledge."
The claim of the plaintiff that he paid
for said land with his own money is denied.
and the detendant contends that after the contract of purchase from Shaw, and prior to the
execution of the deed or payment of the purand

o

V.

(72 N. W. 771, 103 Iowa, 593.)

yf

HAGAN
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iaintin' and his wife PStf'e^'
yMrg~tTip|
upon an adjacent farm in union co initVr and
controlled, and usedlh
the plainti
iTnnrnvP(
""
J^nd In quest ion as his own. Plai ntiff, being
the usd 'grsgong drmEl
l^ggwnai flUdlc'ted

e

T

i.

io

ff

p

Tnp.gp
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It

transactions
and communications,
as
sonal
contemplated by the statute, are communications between the parties of which both must
have had personal knowledge."
This rule
approved in the later cases of Cole v. Marsh,
92 Iowa, 379, 60 N. W. 659, and Martin v.
Shannon, 92 Iowa, 375, 60 N. W. 645.
The
payment,
purchase,
and conveyance
of the
land were exclusively transactions
between

is

t

e,,

thp
coppii|i-nhggprl
lanr^ iti
1;haithp_p1aintifr
ttoVfersy In 1S73. It being then unimproved ;
that he caused the title to De conveyed to his
Vjfe-.wim, continued to hold the same unti l
ffe-r dPflt h nrt"'^"
she died .
"""i ""SiH - when
intestat
aBdr- ^llli OTi Issue, leaving the dfr
jjuring
fendant her~'mly sumving parent,

•

J. 1. A consideration of the quesinvolved renders it necessary that we
first determine the facts. There is no dispute
GIVEN,

tions

2. It
contended on behalf of the defendant
that much of the evidence from which these
reIncompetent, because
facts are foimd
between
husband
lates to communications
and transacand wife, and communications
tions with the deceased Mrs. Hagan. In Dysart V. Furrow, 90 Iowa, 59, 57 N. W. 644,
Is said: "If the transaction or communication
must be known alike to both,
was personal,
Perand therefore either may deny.

*

&

en.

•

MaxweU

iLwas mostly before thi land was contracted
for, and without y^ferpnc^ thereto . It fairly
appears that in every instance that money or
property was received from appellant it, Is accounted for as having been a gift without condition, or as being settled for otherwise than
on account of the purchase of this land. That
appellee paid for the land, and caused the conveyance to be made to deceased, with the
intention to thereby create a trust, and that,
after knowledge of these facts, deceased assented thereto, we think. Is abundantiy prov-

Is

D. W. Higbee, for appellant
Winter, for appellee.

^ibrses

it

aali^

.since ue^ '^T^pr ''"'^^ nnil ^'"'^ ^""^ r'"°°"°'ji')T'__
ahd claim of ownership -lyprp f^vpfse to the
^^"^ "'"'"i "*
paim or ine plaintiff, and tTf°^
He prays for decree
^the "plamtirr is barred.
awarding him the ow nership of an undivided
one-hall Ihltii'yKL lil aaiU land. I'h e action was
BffSUglit lii Adair county; Where the land is
situated, but, by stipulation of parties, was
transferred to and heard in the district court
of Union county, by which a decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff as prayed, from
which the defendant apjiealed.
Affirmed.

chase price, appellant promised appellee that,
in consideration of a promise on the part of
the appellee that he would place the title in
the name of Mrs. Hagan, appellant would furnish him help in various ways, to the amount
of the cost of the land, and that appellant did
so furnish such help by contributing horses
Upon
and other property at various times.
this issue of fact, we think, the appellant has
H is true,
failed to support his contention.
he did fur nish tn thp plaintiff. a.ndh)g_wjfe
and other nrapiertyat various times, but

Is

ever sin ce controlled itj that Mrs. Hagan died,
intestatii,
10.
1894.
WlUiout issue, October
leaving the flftfenrlant ^p hpr nnlv gnrvivincr
parent ;" that defendant
cl3 |iTnR ap undivided
one-half "<* '^fllr' '"""^ '^t '"hpritfl""*^ through
said Mary B. Hasan, but that in truth and
in fact, said Mary E. Hasan did hot own said
land at the time of her dea th, hut held it aa
Plaintiff prays that he
.trustee, as aforesaid .
m ay be decreed X^)\>^ tha nwr^pr in ree simpR
m said premises. MTirl that hP t^P hnlPtwI-in
tiuieted In
hiH title as ap;qipat- the flaims nf thp i\^fpn(\.
ant. The defendant a.nswp.re fl. admitting thai)
the title was in Mary E. Hagan, but denying
that the plaintiff paid for the la ^fi with hia
jwn money or property, ana denying that Mr s.
Kagan held the same in tr^iat for t ]ip piointifp^
or ever recognized
such trust; admits the
death of Mrs. Hagan, and that he is her only
surviving
parent.
He avers that Mary E.
Hagan had o wned and pontrollp d
land

j
fa

It

ry on Trusts (siection 124)
is said:
"The
general foundation of this kind of trusts is the
natural equity that arises when parties do
Thus, If one pays the purcertain things.
chase money of an estate, and takes the title
deed in the. name of another, In the absence of
all evidence of intention the law presumes a
trust from the natural equity that he who pays

ii

o

acnon will be regfarded prima facie as an kAVancement, arid the burden will rest on the ne"'
Who seefc -g fa pnti|f^ffg» -nif* tt'ist ffif ^^? tirnrT^^
gt of the payg ejs£_the mnsillfirnlinn tojiver-Wima thft-JSmanninMnn
In favnr nf f^p ],.gpi

e

a

It

In the absence
j;)tlP hy miffininat itvMiesce."
of the obligation to provide,
could not be
questioned that the law would raise
trust
In favor of appellee from the facts established.
We think appellee haa- <^'"r flTPrrnmr tlm
presumptio n of adva n cement, by his own
fn^-_
'3ence"'as "to his intention, by evidence of reHagan
arlmissirniH
of Mrs.
that tt
jieatefl
land was his, and his continued occup atinn
"and imtiipoT uiiniul
This being
tru st
ol~^ .
raised bv operation oflaw. and not by TeaSdfT
et any declaration or creation of the parties,
section i»S5 or tne (jode of 1873 does not apply.
The facts In this case are In many respects the same as those alleged In Cotton v.
Wood, supra, and the rulings In that case
support our conclusion In this.
We think the
decree of tbe district court Is correct
Affirmed.
a

t

l

a

tif

I

the money for property ought to enjoy the
beneficial interest."
The parties to this transaction being husband and wife, another rule
requires consideration.
In Cotton v. Wood
is further said: "But if ths nprs^n t» ■o.h^^
the convevance is tnade be nnc fnr
i° t.^^.^, "Ml" ,
party paying the ffn°^'i«-°tifi^
gatlon, natural or moral, to provide, thp tranfj .
c

it
tue piaintiit and tne yenttor, Mr. snaw.
was not until after the transaction was completed by the making of the conveyance that
Mrs. Hagan learned that the conveyance was
to her, and assented thereto, as shown by a
number of witnesses other than appellee. The
only evidence appearing in the record that
comes within the objection is the statement of
the plaintiff, as follows: "I then told her
had deeded to her, to take care of it for me,
" This statem«it
and she said, 'I can do it.'
Is clearly incompetent, and must therefore be
disregarded.
3. We now inquire whether, under the facts
as we tind' them, tiie Jaw raises a resulting.
or, as it Is sometimes called, a pregHUHpPVer
in favor or appeuee . in Cotton v. Wood,
frust
"
rule is thus an2E) Iowa, 44, the fainifiar
nounced: " Where, upon the purchase of propOHg.' iffl'the
erty, the con sifler aiton is paid
^^"trtfe con vgTOd to aaoth er, a resulting
bTist,la_:^gpgbj;^raised^^|^& tie .pe£.8?ir named
In the deed will hold the property as rustee of
1° f^^the party pavin th^ j;ppsid ,fira,ti(}fV"
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FERRIS

T.

VAN VEOHTEN.

(73 N. Y.. 113.)
Court of Appeals

of New York. 187a
Ac tion by Eliff Ferris against Jo hn Van
JBTom a judgment of tne Ueilfel'ai
Vecnten.
Term afflfming a judgment for plaintiff, deReversed,
fendant appeals.
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tion by defendant. The lower court made
the following conclusion of law:
"That the
application of the proceeds of the real estate sold by the executors to the payment of
taxes and repairs upon said homestead farm,
'
and of the principal and interest upon the
■said mortgage,
was in violation of the rights
of the plaintiff as a creditor, and that said
proceeds were the primary fund out of which
■the executors
should have paid the plaintiff;
that her lien thereon is superior to any right
of the defendants Elmendorf, or either of
them, to retain the same;
that to the extent necessary to pay the debt due the plaintiff, together with the costs awarded to his
by the Surrogate's Court and the
counsel
General Term of this court, the plaintiff has
the right to resort to the said homestead
farm, and have the same, or so much thereof
as may be necessary,
sold, and out of the
proceeds of such sale to be paid, with the
costs and expenses of said sale."
Charles A. Fowler, for appellants. J. Newton Fiero, for respondent.

T he substantial allegations of the complaint are that plaintiff, during the lifetime
of Eliza Elmendorf, commenced an actio n
against h er which was pending at ner neatn;
tnat sne nied ii^ 1S.5S. leaving a will, by
which defendant .V an Vechten and one Brodhead were appointed executors;
that by the
will a~power of sale was given to the exec^
nt ors tn s(^ll sufficient of her real estate fo
pay her debts, reserving. If possible,
the
homestead farm; all of her real estate wa's
devised to said executors in tr us t to receive
the rents and profits and apply them for pur poses specified, during the lives of two persons namea, ana upon tn^: deat^ the samS.
to go to the grandchiid ren of the testator;
Xh&t plaintllt's action was continued after the
ALLEN, J. This is, I think, a case of the
a:
y testator's death against said executors, aritt
first impression, but it is sought to be brought
plaintiff recovered a juggmeni ior .lii.t^-ii.?ML
within the principle of equity by which, at
thai; snips of rpfi j estate were made by the
the instance of a cestui que tcust, trust
executors under the power contained In the
funds which have been misapptopriated by
will m ore than sufficient to pay a ll of the
the trustee may be followed and reclaimed,
testators aebi^sl
that upon tne faflkl "ac^
so long as they can be traced and identified,
counting of de feud aiit Van Vecnten. as exand any property or choses in action into
ecutor, he file d.- an account by which it apwhich they have been converted impressed
geared that ^aI^e sales of real estate were
with the same trusts as those upon which the
made by th e execu tors, fi^^ larp;e sums real-.
original funds were held.
Ized therefrom, which were used and apThe claim of the plaintiff briefiy stated is,
plied i n kee ping In repair the homestead farm
that moneys realized from real estate sold
meutioTnecrm the will, and for principal and
under a power of sale for the payment of
interest on a mortgage, and for taxes on s aid
debts, and held by Van Vechten, the surfarm, am nuntinp; in all to ii;B..548.93. which
viving executor, in trust for the plaintiff, a
said sum '''°" YflJiJltPftntiliffij/'"'^ '^'"I Sf! ^^with;
creditor, have been wrongfully and in violathat the surrogate disallowed these credits as
against c reditors ,^^nd adjudged and decr^pd
tion of the trust applied to the payment of
lSarthe re"iemained-ln. theli^ds of the .ex^ charges and incumbrances upon the lands
of the testator described in the complaint,
ecntors the sum of $5,523.02 properly apand which were devised to the executors in
plicable, among o ther things, to the paymen t
^ of piaintm's
trust, to receive the rents, issues and profits"
lu dgmeiiLL-jMid . directing pa ythereof, and pay the same to the wife of a
ment oi the same; . that executions were isson of the testator, to be applied by her to
sued upon said judgment and returned unsatthe siipport of the fajnily of such son, and
isfied, and that said Van Vechten wa s insolupon her death to convey the same to the
that pe n ding the proceedings before
~vent;
children of said son. The relief demanded by
the surrogatesaid Brodhead died, ana tB&
the plaintiff is in substance, although not so
we r e continued in the
proceedings thereafter
*
stated, that she be subrogated
name of Tan Vechten.'
The other defendto the rights
of the creditors and Uenors, whose incumants "were tlie cestuis que trustent and the
brances have been pro tanto discharged as
remaindermen. Jjie nrayer was that the
against the lands to the amount paid thereon
amount of the judgment with costs be ad from the trust funds. The funds can hardly
judged to be_ a lien a,ffit11,„charge upon th e
farm, and for judffl ient accord be said to have been invested in the lands, or
•homestearl
"
in the mortgages, or other charges paid by
The facts were found substantlafly
■ine;ly .
the executor.
There was no purchase of
as alleged.
Also that the executors had exeither, but the incumbrances were partially
pended for repairs, taxes, and interest on
satisfied.
The lands were relieved from certhe homestead $1,784.47, and within ten years
tain, charges by the diversion to that purpose
they had expended $3,258.23 of the $5,123.07
of funds held in trust for creditors, as alThe judgment of the surreceived by them.
before him were of- leged, and it is sought to revive the liens by
rogate and proceedings
subrogating the plaintiff to the rights of the
fered in evidence for plaintiff under objec-
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original creditors. Whether a cestui que
trust can be subrogated to the claims of creditors, to the payment of whose debts the
trust fund has been misapplied, need not be
determined.
See Winder v. Diffenderffer, 2
Bland, 198.
Regarding the payments by Van Vechten
as investments in the lands, in relief of
which they were made, the primary question is "whether in that view a case was
made upon the evidence for the relief demanded.
It must be conceded that trust
moneys may be followed into lands to the
purchase of whiph they have been applied,
and the cestui que trust may elect whether
to hold the unfaithful trustee personally responsible,
or claim the lands, the fruits of
the misappropriation of the funds, or cause
the lands to be sold for his indemnity, and
Lane
look to the trustee for any deficiency.
V. Dighton, 1 Amb. 409, per Lord EUenborough; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562;
Thornton v. Stokill, 19 Jur. 751; Oliver v.
Piatt, 3 How. 383, per Story, J.; Story, Eq.
Jur. § 1258 et seq.; Shepherd v. McEvers,
4 Johns. Ch. 136, 8 Am. Dec. 561; Dodge v.
Manning, 1 N. Y. 298.
To follow money into lands, and impress
the latter with the trust, the money must be
distinctly traced and clearly proved to have
been invested in the lands. WhUe money,
as such, has no ear-mark by which, when
once mingled in mass, it can be traced, it is,
nevertheless, capable under some circumstances of being followed to, and identified with,
the property into which it has been converted;
but the conversion of the trust money specifically, as distinguished from other money
of the trustee into the property sought to be
subjected to the trust, must be clearly shown.
It does not suffice to show the possession of
the trust funds by the trustee, and the purchase by him of property— that is, payment
for property generally by the trustee does
not authorize the presumption that the purchase was made with trust funds.
The product of, or substitute for, the original trust
fund follows the nature of the fund as long
as it can be ascertained to be such; and if
a trustee purchase lands with trust money.
fTcourt of equity will charge them vrith a re- ,
suKing ffiist 'fbElSe-PeJS on b,enefl cially Inter■Sited.
But it must .be . ple ar that the Iflfl^^
^ave been .paid fo,r_o ut of the trust money. ""
This is illustrated by Perry v. I'Jiiiips, 4 Ves.
108.
There a trustee for the purchase of
land died without personal assets, but having
purchased lands, the estates purchased were
held not liable to the trust, the circumstances afCording no presumption that they were
purchased in execution of the trust.
If the purchase of land with the trust
moneys could not be presumed when such
purchase would be in execution of the trust,
a fortiori it should not be presumed
when
it would be a violation of the trust ^he
rightof following the trust proprerty, in the
idew form which~£as been given"tolt,~or in
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the propert y substitutofl for it npaaoc, ,,|,iy
yrhea
the
means
of ascertainmftn^ f^ij
"which of course is the case when the suV
ject-matter is turned into money and mixed
and confounded in a general mass of property of the same description." 2 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 1259, and note 4. When the purchasepaid by a trustee for lands purmoney,
chased, corresponds very nearly with that of
the trust fund to be invested, that with other
circumstances, as the coincidence
of the
time of the receipt and disbursement, may
suffice to show that the property was actually purchased with trust funds. Lowden v.
Lowden, 2 Browne, Ch. 583; Price v. Blakemore, 6 Beav. 507.
The money paid by the
trustee for lands or omer property, or for
choses in action sought to be subjected to"
the original frusCTnust be identified as trust
monejs; and this is clearly recognized in all
the cases, and in very many of them this has
been the difficult question of fact upon which
they have hinged, and the principle to be deduced from them is, that when the trust
fund has consisted of money, and been mingled with other moneys of the trustee in one
mass, undivided and undistinguishable, and
the trustee has made investments generally
from moneys in his possession, the cestui que
trust cannot claim a specific lien upon the
property or funds constituting the investHill, Trustees, m. p. 522. This is
ments.
consistent with the cases cited and relied
upon by the counsel for the plaintiff, and
the doctrine is recognized and appUed in each
case, and as the facts were proved to exist
in them respectively. In Moses v. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns. Ch. 119, 7 Am. Dec. 478, the
property held in trust was readily and certainly traced.
In Kip v. Bank, 10 Johns. 63,
the money, the subject-matter of the trust,
was kept separate and distinct, and deposited
as such.
The court say the only check to
the operation of the rule now under consideration is when the property is converted
into cash, and has been absorbed in the general mass of the estate so that it cannot he
followed or distinguished. It is the difficulty of tracing the trust money, which has
no ear-mark, that prevents the application of
the rule.
See,
also, Hutchinson v. Reed,
Hoff. 316, and cases by Asst. V. Ch., 2 Kent
623,
624; Trecothick v. Austin, 4
Comm.
Mason, 29, Fed. Cas. No. 14,164.
There can be no presumption as against
the defendants whose property is sought to
be affected by the trust, which attached to
the moneys realized by Van Vechten from
So far
the sale of lands imder the power.
as appears they are innocent of all wrong-

r

/

and have not colluded or combined
with the executors to violate the trust, and
it is not found that they assented to or had
any knowledge of any misappropriation of
the fund, and if made trustees in virtue of
Ithelr ownership' ot the lands they are maae
BO. no t- by reason of an y apt of theirs, but aaT"
|he_ legal result of the fact that trust mone;^
doing,

C0NSTRUCTIVB3 TRUSTS.

_prlncipa!_and interest upon mort gages up on "_
"angTrepaira of th e-farm ,f:9 fhe am punt
thg
agg£gg.at&jtated,^l,thg„ifflftfis aniLammiaJa.
of the various receipts, or of the several pay'meriti^, ftt-e not tamifl, iior is II tound that tlie*
payment were made'''&om. the^"money3 receive
or "that the 'mone ys were misap plied
to these "p^^n tg. "if "reference is had to
the accounteand schedules filed by the executors with the surrogate as the basis of the
accounting, which is the only evidence of the
dates and amounts of the several receipts
and disbursements, there is nothing by which
the moneys received for lands sold can be
traced and identified as the moneys paid for
the Improvement of the homestead farm, or
in discharge of Incumbrances upon it There
it)

j

s

J

Proof of payment to or for the use of the
of the lands was no discharge of
the liability to the plaintiff, and the fact that
payments to or for the devisees were set up
In discharge of the plaintifTs claim was
wholly unimportant. It was unimportant
upon that accounting whether Van Vechten,
the siurviving executor, had the money In his
own pocket, or had disposed of It to some
third person.
His liability to the plaintiff
upon that accounting was the same, and the
decree was necessarily the same in either
event. _In no aspe ct of the case was the sur^rogate called u^611 tt) trace and Identify th e^
money yMfelVgtr Py the ffdcottiTH^ executor
Ml the Sij,iE^of"!ands: The ggarges ag'g'iBgrgie
jSecutoi^ yconslsteg' of Ihe gross receipts," and"
the cfi'sciJarges" of "the grosT' amount or~tne
severaT^^nigfi'ts" and" disbursements 'as' alloweg By'"th6'surftifg ate, arid the decree was
for the p ayment,pf.a gross* amonntr arid' was
_a general judgment a gainst a surviving" exgeneral balance^due.
_ecutor rqr a
__hot 'f or a
s urrender or 'paying over of spec ific moneys
_(ir securiti'es, and as betw een the plainBH," a
^creditor, and the appetlanfi^evrsee s it "19^
"adjud ged that pSL'ym'ent claimed to have been
inade'liy'lSe' executor'To or fo r tti'eTatterdid
riot disch arge the obligation" to TEe"former,
as
aSS5S.Baynieiitsjv.gs^&eK.dlSaJ10"Vred
It was riot '
S^'^IJ'iR.i.C^aJi^'ed Ij;^ Ijhe executOT.
found upon the trial of the present action by
the court, as a fact, that the specific moneys
received by the executors for lands sold, and
which were trust moneys for the payment
of debts, were in any way paid to or applied
for the use of the devisees in payment of the
incumbrances upon the homestead farm, although the general forms of expression, to a
limited extent, seem to imply the fact. The
learned judge did not Intend to so find and
does not seem to have regarded it as important.
He merely speaks of the moneys
which the executor used as, or in place of,
the trust moneys and in discharge of his obligation, as trust moneys; but that does not
make them the specific trust funds received.
It is found in general terms that moneys to
an amount stated w ere received f rom the
sale of real estate u nder the power^ and tjiff
devisees

d,

been misapplied by a trustee ot- tha.
fimd to relleye ot a burden their lands, held
in trust frfr another nurpnap by the same
jp jstee. The fact, Should be cleayly. at le^st
satisfactorily proved.
This ^n^al_fact,
upon which the right of the tf IamHg"to''any
relief in this action aepena s, is "oSSf alleged
argumentatlvely In the complaint by the
statement that it appeared in the account of
the executors filed with the surrogate that
large gale s of real estate of the testator had
£gf;L-I^ACbL2!X- *P "^.f^ftf.mt.nrs. _ on ! accoun t of
which they had realiz ed large sums of
money, "and thaFtt^aTso appeared that large
5mOtmtmg"Bi8n^'gfrmag~t haeIFom ~were
ISSjlfefl aud tippllHJ in KeeplH fThe ho mestead
farm in repair7^nd_ l arge_sums were paid
out f or_ p'^fgt_aj?J". ^^^P^ on^^ld farmi
'!rhere wTs'no^proof "that one dollar of~Sie
moneys received ^or lands, and whi ch con^^^ ^^''^ ^""""^ ^"^^ naid or appli ed
^^^itll
to any of the purposes mentioned, nor isffie
fact of such misapp ropriatidn of the tiH?'^^
mon eys rovmd. nor was" any Tact proved or
tound irom wniph such d1y(? a i pn and n^^
appropriat ioH~o£-SPecific trust moneys^can^be
legitimately inferred. The only proof given
upon tnis branch of the case consisted of the
proceedings before and the decree of the surrogate lipon the settlement of the accounts
of the executor.
If these proceedings were
competent evidence for any purpose, or to
establish any fact as against the defendants,
the present appellants, they were only competent in respect of the matters then in issue, and which were determined by the surrogate.
The questions before that tribunal
related solely to the accounts of the executors and their liability to the creditors, and
those entitled under the will of the testator.
The executors were charged with the amount
of the inventory of the personal estate of the
deceased, together with the amounts received
upon the sale of real estate,
yho rppngyq
TeaHzeA'-^oni the sale of lands were |.he nri7a^^' fun d "fOT~ ffie payment of debts, and
"credltorsTiad th"e nrst claim to be paid from
tB0S e"'moheyg;"afid't5FlLrst"r^irf^ of the
^^gffEOTg" in' respect of sucn monefg"WgS"T3
'cfe fljtorSf
Such liabilit y was discharged by
proof, of paymen.t.taja:eiiitaia_^whether made
ftom the identical moneys received by the
executors, or from other moneys of their own,
or subject to their control. The moneys realized from lands sold in excess of the debts
of the testator belonged to the present appellants, as devisees of the land subject to
the power of sale, and the liability of the
executors to them was discharged by like
proof of payment to them or for their use,
from any moneys of the executors, whether
received for lands sold under the power or
from other sources.
Upon proof of the plaint iffs debt she w as
of~cgu^e~SHHed to a decree for its paym'ent on .j^^ggmissjon b y the execuFors in
ffieir^^filed account of the moneys received
by them properly applicaBTe~f3"TO "payment
have
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favor of one class of creditors, but would be
an unauthorized extension of the equitable
doctrine invoked by the plaintiff, which demands for Its application that the trust fund
or money shall be traced and identified as
has
existing in the new form into which
In no other way can the
been converted.
equitable title of
cestui que trust to specific property be established.
This question, which
decisive- of this appeal, is fairly raised by the exception to the
admission, as evidence generally in the case,
of the proceedings before the siu-rogate over
the objection of the appellants that they were
immaterial and incompetent, and also by the
exceptions to the conclusions of law and the
judgment of the court upon the trial. It Is
proper to say that in passing only upon this
one question we do not Intend to Intimate an
opinion upon any of the other questions made
and ably argued by the learned counsel for
the respective parties.
The case bristles with
interesting and difficult questions, but as the
one considered is decisive of this appeal, and
the other questions may not re-appear or be
obviated by evidence upon another trial, we
do not deem
necessary to consider them.

a

,

lands in aid and relief of which payments
were made by the executor for the benefit of
the plaintiff as a cestui que trust, there would
be no difficulty in giving every cestui que
trust, as creditor having a debt of a fiduciary
character, a preference in respect to the general assets and creditors at large of the trustee or debtor, a lien upon property which the
trustee or debtor might have purchased dur-

jUpoii another trial It may be shown by com/petent evidence that the moneys received
lupon the sale of lands were kept separate
Ifrom all other moneys, and specifically ap/plled to the payment of the charges and InIcumbrances upon the homestead farm, and If
ISO the difficulty which the plaintiff now enfcounters will be obviated. The eaultlee ar a
clearly with the plaintiff, b n^ thi>y fBn^py
override the legal rutes of evJlPTifp, nr [^ gprorcea_by an unauthorlzeamlarp:ement and
extension of the equitable doctrme wiiicti liaj^
at tke..loundatiOTi of the action . There la
truth no competent proof as against the apnthpr
pellants
^^]Hn Vnn Vechten^ that the
payments claimed to a yg^ en made bv hi m
'
m relief of, JJiie- homestea
were ever madgL
The proofconsists of the accounts unverified
filed with the surrogate by the executors;
in which they credit themselves with these
payments, and the decree of the surrogate
disallowing them, and adjudghig an amount
stated to be due the estate from the said
executors,
and in their hands properly applicable to the payment of the plaintiff's
claim,
which was less than one-half in
amount of the sum decreed to be in the
The surrogate merehands of the executors.
ly held and decided that if the payments had
been made as claimed, they could not be allowed to the executors upon that accounting.
This is the extent of the decree.
possible, although we do not intend
..-^t
to intimate an opinion upon the subject for
reason that iiarties have not been heard,
and the question is not before us, that the
plaintiff may have relief In the presjgnt ac^on without tracin and idfjatifying the trtst
V moneys as now being invested in the homestead farm, and by treating this complaint
as a creditor's bill, filed upon the return of
against Van Vechten unsatisan execution
Upon proof that Van Vechten had
fied.
alleged, under circummade the payments
stances which would give him as a trustee
lien upon the trust estate for the benefit of
which they were made, it may be that the
a proper case to enforce
court vould deem
the lien for the benefit of the plaintiff— that
is, apply
debt due the judgment debtor to
the satisfaction of the judgment. Such
judgment debtor would
claim In favor of
not be beyond the reach of
creditor's bill.
As Van Vechten's account as trustee of
the homestead farm has not been settled,
there would arise none of the questions made
upon the last trial as to the effect of the
statute of limitations as affecting the claim
of the plaintiff, upon the theory upon which
the case was tried. But without considering
this suggestion farther, the judgment must
for reasons stated be reversed, and
new
trial had. All concur.
Judgment reversed.

Ithe

Is neither coincidence in the times or amount
the receipts and disbursements of moneys
upon the account, and for the purposes mentioned, to connect the one with the other. and
lead to a presumption that the money received from the one source was the same
money that was paid out.
The inference
would rather he that the moneys, when received, were mingled with other moneys of
the executors and used as occasion required,
either for purposes connected with the administration of the estate or the Individual
purposes
of the executor. Whatever presumptions might be indulged in favor of the
equities of the plaintiff as a creditor against
the defaulting trustee or his representatives,
were he or they the holders smd claimants of
the property sought to be xeaJized, none can
be Indulged as against the present appellanta
who are Innocent of any participation In the
If, upon the
wrongful acts of the executor.
statement of the accounts by and before the
surrogate, the evidence in this case and the
findings of fact by the judge, the principle
for by the plaintiff could be so
contended
far extended as to authorize a lien upon the

of

I

464

Sufieolk.

TO

Feb. 26, 1890.

e

3

'

ii

§§

case, there is no such thing
J[n the pre sen
as tracing the jiO.OOO into any a rticular
pieces ot property covered bTTfffi' aSSifefttg
lUB Uuiren
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n6fat by w ilnams o
reditors. Tbe inoBt~T;hat can pg'TOW-^s "
tnac n e*^ad this money, and aisp _._otner
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^^B together, as his own, for several years,
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and that,
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trust money,
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LeBretony.Peirce,2Allen,8,13; John11 Pick. 173, 181, 182; Trecothick V. Austin, Mason, 16, 29;' Ferris
V. Van Vechten, 73 N. Y. 113; Frith v. Cartland,
Hem. & M. 417; Holland v. Holland, L. R. Ch. 449 Isaacson v. Harwood,
345,836L. R.3Ch..225; Perry, Trusts,
842; Story, Eq. Jur.
1258, 1259; Lewin,
Trusts, (8th Ed.) 241, 857, 892. Thereis nothing to the contrary in Bank v. Insurance
Co., 104 U. S. 54, 66-71, and In re Hallett's
Estate, 13 Ch. Div. 696, 708-721, which are
chiefly relied on by the annuitants^
In
Wisconsin a majori ty ot the court ha s^flft'^to trace the
ciared tJia"tTns"not'necessary
truBt-fiindrlitmy-any epeclfirprai^m'tyin orit can
TliBr to enforce the trust, and that,
"be traced into the estate of the^faultlng
sent ortrustee,'ffiisissufflcientr THoCeod
28 N W. Rep.
401, 409,
■ETaOT7^~Wis.
"WTsT'lOir
173, 214.
But this seems to us to be stated
313;

"son v. Ames,

p

_

T

^

^

;'t,

ariiTgliTHiikiRtitiStVMaaiasnM .yso f.nnvfiVPrl yfaa
charpfed with anysuch trust. aq,d thiis findmg appears to De the only one tha t the
eVlueffl'TB WOUlU Wgffa'Htr-Ther^'ishSthin g
to Hno-w-mMT: mer e was ev^er any d isfrmnr
Trnat fnnrl in thp bands ot W llhamHrttlg'
executor and trustee, whicn was represented bv-arLv amecific property ,
ae was also
'the resid uary leg g
f-imsistPfl nf a
Srthe a^ets or"ffe^estflte
t
d.ePt an e froTTi himseii . The rest waschiefl;
a, 4Br
no tes secured by mnj
no real estate. 'Jjie moneys received by
gilliams from -theestate were mixed with
his OYm .
d^t^Aid the d6btS fand other legand rendered an ftfiftbunt, caliea
acies,
"
wmiih he uhkl Hd lilmHtiir wU rr
^Inal
"j^alanceot this aficount retaiuea to nay
a nnuity of S6Q0 r.er annum to Charles Riiy "
"TSlO.OOO.
was his duty to set apa-rt
his sum', and to keep it separa tely mvegT
M settlement
ed". but he did not do BO.
of the account merely an we in at ne was
be "
T|ai(^ rpgpnuaihio t.^y'that'amtrr;ahd,
Tia.ri a^tlLap art, as be ou ght to ha ve done,
the trust w ouigTraveattacBBa lu th<i{>roi>.
rty thus'BB auaTt But, since tnis was
neyenSCTJgZ!£Ee.triist w as never impresseg"
jipqa 'aTiyMer-ifig property or money neia
There was merely an indebthy wiiiTaTnc^
edness or liability on his part to account
for that sum. This indebtedness or liability might itself be the subject of a trust,
just as
it has been the indebtedness of
another person. The trust, however, in
such case, attaches merely to the indebtedness, and to whatever may be realized from
it, and not to anyparticnlarpropertyheld
by the debtor.
The view most favorable "
to the ann ultantg;;:$a 3.t ^piild he ta^enia
!Bi.».uOu in
Jnigr^TTnamB'"IiaiLSesttm.of
money in
hande. whicb waa retainea
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 30
h^
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ranrrthe
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0. Allen, J. The executor and trustee
nnder the will ofivirH. winmrns. fi^.v|Tio-^
Bignea nis properhT in trnat tnr fflg h^na^^^
m His cre li^f'-fir^h'^ iinnjnt.gr.+a ^.-nflp^ tl ^a t,
STiil seeK CO esTaplish a trust in tha.t nrnr
e rty, ana -to oDtain a decr ee tnat asin.onn
■
Be set aiiart Py me assignees, and approT

;

Roxbury Institution for Savings.

^

When! trust
thon^TTW::
mixed up with th trustee's individual funds tnat it isimpPSBtbiB to tra ce
-Shd identify
a B"entefiBt~nrCS-BOTH
6"BireMHc iaQa£Ety.tffrtraBt"ceaigeB:"-Th^-eTTg!-ti
will go as far as it can in tb'ui'Tracing ang
following trust money; but when, as a
matter of fact, it cannot be traced, the eqluitable right of the cestui qne trustto follt
low it falls. Under such circumstances, if'
the trustee has become bankrupt, tbe
court cannot say that the trust money is
to be found somewhere in the general estate of the trustee that still remains. He
may have lost it with property of his own.
And in such case the cestui que trust can
only come in and share with the general
creditors. The Attorney General v. Brigham, 142 Mass. 248,7 N. E.Rep. 831; Howard V. Fay, 138 Mass. 104; White v. Chapin, 134 Mass. 230; Bresnihan v. Sheehan,
125 Mass. 11; Harlow v. Dehon, 111 Mass.
195, 198, 199; Andrews v. Bank,
Allen,

t

^

wiclj^tfie
ficlijtthe RoxbHrylnstitutiop'torSavingH.
and othe*®^
George. E. Smith, for defendants.
Hor^
ace G. Alien and Wm. B. Bowlaad, for
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substantial equivalent remains, we concede
its force; but, where it is dissipated and
gene, the appropriation of some other prop12,
erty in its stead simply takes from creditors
1893..
that which clearly belongs to them. In the
'
Bill in equity by WiUiam A. Slater and anformer case, as In PenneU v. DetCell,
De
otaier against the Oriental Mills and others^
Gex, M. & G. 372, and In re Hallett's Estate,
charge
in
favor
o
f
the
a
Forest-"
to establish
(Knatchbull v. Hallett,) 13 Ch. Div. 696, the
acturing Oom pahy^" oT^EM^nSC'
"^^le Mamif
illustration may be used of a debtor min""pffinaS^ are'stockh omlSZfflaj
gling trust funds witlh his ovm in
chest or
""fefate of the Orie ntal Mi lls. Defendant filed
bag. Though the particular money cannot
mmirrgr'ttrtE e'biUr'TDeiQurrer sustauied.
"^
be identified, the amount is swelled just so
Jos^h O. Ely and James M. Ripley, for much, and the amount added belongs to the
complainants. James TiUinghast and Wilque trust. But in the latter ease
cestui
liam Gr. RoeUier, for respondents.
there is no swelling of the estate, for the
money is spent and gone; or, as respondent's
STINBSS, J. The question raised bv jfe
counsel pertinenUy suggests, "Knight Bruce's
bag— is empty."
demurrer to the biU. is whe^er the F oresfShall
chest^— Jessel's
we
therefore order a like amount to be taken
^Jdale Manufacturing Company, of which the
out of .some other chest or bag, or out of
"cbmgfflEMt|~a!f5^ockhoiders,' £aF"a prefefred claim upo fTKe respoHd^f assip aee tif~ the debtor's general estate? Suppose the
general estate consists only of miUs and
Jgie Orleiital ^ffls, an lnsolYenl: corporation'
machinery acquired long before the com^oX-ftj^K^rongCuUy;'''^^!^^
plainants' money was appropriated.
Upon
^omgMix ,anS"used tojgaj_ liabilities of ^the
latter company, and~omerwise,""By™peraons
what principle could that property be taken
lUMiontf ol of bOTB eoa i|raF" to reimburse tihem? But the complainants
w'^o "wery o
cieai: THaTr'WS" "Jiaa "am" " say: "Our money has been misappropriated
T he rote'
. nies.
equitable right to foUo-w and reclaim his
by the debtor without our consent and withproperty, whi ch has bee n wro ngfully apout our fault Why should we not be reimpropriaied by aSoMer, olongl^ he can E3
bursed out of his estate?" Undoubtedly,
ne should tiave Tiis mm:
is right that everv
ffie properti^,~""oF'iB"lubsta.htiar'eqmvaIen^
jjut, when
upon
''"Pftrty "Jfl"""! he
if
form
been cnange
the
claimant's
its
has
'
found, his sa m principle prev ents the takground that such property, in wnatever
lonB)
& impressed with a trust in favor of the "ing of property which equitably belongs
" to
if up, The
creilit6r3"of "th'e"''^gugtegT5'"5i8ifce
owner. If the trustee flas mingled it vrith
his own, he wi be ^emed^Ja. have used
^creditors have dnTie no wrong^ fn act. "ana~~
Tip Pflllpd
and so
Els own, ratlier- than" another's,
jipon, JTi any yf^j^_tn_
should n "t
to leaytT the remaln(^er under~jthe_ taisT;
atone for the misconduct of their debtor .
is an ordinary case of misfortune on the
part
BuFln
this^se
we
areasked..
of claimants, whose confidence in
aie__owaer.
trustee or agent has been abused.
In examining the question upon author.one's pro pg fjtv. l(q.^ been w ron^ffitUg ,aiml|ed
mdLdig.giB.atedLby_J5ome&.
ity we think it is equally dear that there
a chatge^^^as
upon the est ate of the latter for ttie amount
can be no equitable relief except In cases
ffiaT
where the fund clsjmed is in some way ap^tus_^TOn^SIOSKeS!!TO^I<S"^°^^
larger,
parent
much"
in the debtor's estate. Of the cases
isJBheg^^^
"anS"
^^g ^e
only fom: go to
cited by the complainants,
mat^ffie^ffust
property is"reaT]y and'cledrly
"EEiere. in_a su
tuted forffi -'alt houigST ir!^^-^ the extent of holding that a cestui que trust
is entitled to a lien for reimbursement on
not
diref jtliLJtra eed. This view is pressed
the general estate of the trustee where the
with much skiU and some authority, but we
are unable to adopt it. While one who has
trust fund does not. In some form, so appear. These are Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa,
been wronged may follow and take his own
722, 45 N. W. Rep. 1049; McLeod v. Evans,
property, or its visible product, it is quite
66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. Rep. 173, 214; Fi-ancis
a different thing to say that he may take
V. Evans, 69 Wis. 115, 33 N. W. Rep. 93;
the property of somebody
else. The general property of an insolvent debtor belongs
Bowers v. Evans, 71 Wis. 133, 36 N. W.
Rep. 629. In the
to his creditors, as much as particular trust
rst of these cases the
property belongs to a cestui que trust. Credcourt lost sight oftEe'd'lg'^ctron. which wg
maSCr.clear,.,. bet ween, funds reitors have no right to share in that which
'5esir6~~t'o
Is shown not to belong to -the debtor, and, "maining in the estate, whicdi g to swell the
conversely,
claimant has n o ri^ht to tak
lissets^ an d~funds which, havmg_begn_d^s^
from creditors that whichhe cannot shw ~pd.te3r or" used IM the""payme nt of debts,
To~~be
~Aot remain in the estate,
g~
eqmfaBry""liIs "''own . But right^^^ire^
and so do
j^eU the esfater^ TTpSn'TBrlonmer facf Css.
"comes the argume nt" that itj^ suitably. his
because the debtor has taken the claimconcede~ffiFnigjL
^'wgJiaxe^sffi.tejSboj^we
^own
vyitti "fiis esaSS^'money "and^mingled
to rel^T Tiut the court iS"Me lowaM^e
seems to ignore this very important distincfafeT'wKereliy
is"sw5Ied jusF'sq much.
"^fDS, applicable fa.allxaifi&. the aigumai tion, and in so doing overthrows the foundation on which Its decision ia based, for
not sound. Where the property or Its
et al. v.

et al.
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CONSTRUCTIVE
"The creditors, If permitted to enforce
tb^r claims as against the trust, wotild secure the payment of their claims out of
Now, how can this be so if
trust moneys."
the trust mongys, or their substantial equivalent, are not there? The court assumes that
the payment of debts is the same thing as
an increase of assets, or perhaps that it
works the same result to a creditor by increasing his dividends. But this la not so.
How the satisfaction of a debt by Incurring
another of equal amount either decreases
one's liabilities or Increases his assets can
only be comprehended by the philosophic
mind of a Micawber. If a debtor is solvent,
it is all right either way, because he wlU
have enough to pay everything he owes;
but, if he is Insolvent, the Injustice of the
doctrine of the Iowa court is made almost
painfully plain by the following illustration
from the dlssenttng opinion of Taylor and
JX, in Francis v. Evans, supra:
Cassoday,
"Suppose that an insolvent debtor, D., has
only $1,000 of property, but is' indebted to
the amount of $2,000, one-half of which is
due to A., and the other half to B. In this
Condition of things D.'s property can only
pay fifty per cent, of his debts. By such distribution A. and B. would each be equitably
entitled to $500. Now, suppose D., while In
that condition, collects $1,000 for F., but Instead of remitting the money, as he should,
be uses it in paying his debt in full to A.
By so doing, D. has not increased his assets a penny, nor diminished his aggregate
Indebtedness
a penny.
The only difference
is that he now owes $1,000 each to B. and
F., whereas he previously owed $1,000 each
to A. and B. Now if F. is to have preference
over B., then his claim will absorb the entire amount of D.'s property, leaving nothing whatever for B. In other words, the
$500 to wlhich B.- was equitably entitled from
his insolvent debtor, upon a fair distribution
of the estate, has, without any fault of hla,
been paid to another, merely in consequence
of the wrongful act of the debtor." It is
impossible to state the case more clearly.
The Illustration demonstrates that the mere
fact that a trustee has used the money does
not show that it has gone Into his estate.
If used to pay debts, he has simply turned
It over to a creditor, thereby giving him a
preference, while his own estate and indebtSuppose
edness remains exactly as before.
he had stolen the money, and turned it over
to somebody from whom it could not be reclaimed.
Can any one say the owner should
have an equitable lien upon the thief's insolvent estate in preference to his creditors?
They and the owner are equally Innocent,
and each must bear his own misfortune.
There seems to be some confusion, also, upon the ground that, because there might be
an equitable lien upon the trustee's property
says:

TRUSTS.

4G7

In his own hands, tiie same Hen must follow
it into the hands of the assignee, because
he has no greater rights than the assignor.
The assignee is primarily a trustee for creditors; yet it is indeed true that he has
no greater right than the assignor to specific
property. But suppose, after a creditor had
attached property In possession of a debtor,
a complainant should seek an equitable lien
upon It for the reason that the debtor had
misappropriated property which belonged to
the complainant, and of which the attached
property was in no way a part. We see no
ground upon which he could succeed. When
the creditor seeks to establish his lien for
his debt he stands equal in equitable right
with a claimant who can show no peculiar
equitable claim to the property in question.
The fact that the cestui que trust has not
entered into the relation of debtor and creditor with the trustee does not affect the
question.
So long as he seeks to recover
what he can show to be his own, he is in
the position of an owner; but when he cannot do this, and seeks to recover payment
out of the trustee's general estate, he is in
the position of a creditor. Substantially the
same criticisms are applicable to the Wisconsin cases, with the additional remarks
that they are deci^ons of a court nearly
evenly divided, and that, in our opinion, the
better reason and weight of authority are
with the dissentient judges.
In support of the views we have expressed.
It is sufficient to select the following cases:
Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass. 109, 23 N. E.
Kep. 1005; National Bank v. Insurance Co.,
104 U. S. 54; Cavln v. Gleason,
105 N. Y.
256, 11 N. E. Rep. 504; Englar v. Offutt, 70
Md. 78, 16 Atl. Rep. 497; Thompson's Ap-,
peal, 22 Pa. St 16; Bank v. Armstrong, 39
Fed. Rep. 684. The question whether any
of the property of the Porestdale Company
has gone into the hands of the assignee in
original or substituted form, whereby the
assets are so much larger, is a question of
fact. As to the sum of $149.39 on deposit
in the Columbian National Bank of Boston,
no question being made that it was a part
of the funds of the Forestdale Company,
it may, according to National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, be claimed by the
owner; but that question cannot be determined In this suit, as the money is not in
the hands of the assignee, land the bank is
not a party to the suit. As to the $3,103.33
invested in cotton, and made into manufactured goods, following the doctrine of the
cases cited, the court will attribute ownership in such goods. If any such came to the
assignee, to be in the cestui que trust to
the amount or value disclosed.
This being
a question of fact. It must stand for hearing, and the demurrer to the bill, upon the
points argued, must be overruled.
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CASSODAY, J. (aftCT stating the facts).
The amount involved is small, but the case
is important by reason of others dependent
upon it, and tiie nature of the question involved. It appears that A. C. Probert
sole owner of the Ba rifc nf Washhnrn;
1893, he failed, and his bank
at June
closed its doors; that June 26, 1893, he made
a voluntary assignmait of all his property
to the defendant for the benefit of his creditors. There is some force in the suggestion
that the receiving of Lemke's check in payment of the plaintiff's draft on him, held by
Probert's bank for collection, and the sending to the plaintiff of a draft made by Probert's bank on the Chicago bank for the
amount of such collection, four days prior
to such failure, was nothing more than the
substitution on the books of Probert's bank
of a credit to the plaintiff, or to the Chicago
bank, for the amount. In lieu of the former
credit for the same amount to Lemke. But
appears that, at the time of giving the
check, Lemke had funds in Probert's bank
to the amount of the check, and hence the
transaction would seem to be substantially
the same as though Lemke had actually
drawn the money on the check, and then Immediately handed the same back in payment
of the draft »n him in favor of the plaintiff,
and then held by Probert's bank for collet
tion; and that Probert's bank then retained
the money so paid in by Lemke, and in lieu
thereof sent to the plaintiff its draft on the
Chicago bank, as mentioned in the foregoing
As therein IniUPPtf^. the W""^^
statement.
by he check vras. with otho:
Hn_rqprp«PTTf:fi(i
moneya-Jiaed up in paying the debts of Probst. so.ihaj. no pa rt of that money or the
jCMiefids .Qg_.th at c^Iection. iiather In the
shape of money or Of pfoperty oi any 'khiil;
t

1,

ll

consisted of
^o$^^^2;3rj;^at-;Bu^aggetS
comm ercial paper, secu red and unsecured^
stocks, real estate, etc.; that ^^ money what^ver^^ SZlnto'the hands of said assigneg,
a few pennies and a $2_.50' gold piece;
jxcept
"
that a money'in' the Bank of" W ashburn on
and affer June
ISSST was useJ in, paying
che<S*'3rawn 'ag£inst""deposits, and in paymf^clerk hire or employes "of the Btank of
i^shburn^ that none of the moneys of Probprt,"aDd 'none of the proceeds of Jhe colleo^ra maQe~f6r~the"plaIniiifl', was iiseSrE~aJF
^ffmg" other property or invested in other
property of any Eind",""but that all money lii
robert at ahd after reQossesalori of
aving„said_ch,eck
of Lemke for the plai ntiff
wgS5sed_in_ga5fing tiie debts ojMProbOTt,_so
"thaFno money, of the "pf oceeiai of the mon-
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jj'rom tnat order th
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Appeal from circuit court, Bayfield county;
Parish, Judge.
The Nonotuck Silk Company filed a claim
against the estaTe of A. O. Probert, an InBoivent, and procured an order to show cause
Why said claim should not be declared pre lerreSn On the hearing the clai m was so de clareBy and tne assignee api)6aiS. Jt gyersed .
r The othttr facts imly appear in the following statement by CASSODAY, J.:
It appears from the record that _fOT e'^'^'^^ai years prior to June^ 1893. the defendant's
assignor. A. 0. Probert, conducted a bankin g
"business at Washpum imder tn e name of tfie
5a.nk of Wasbbijm; tflat Mkv Si4. Itjtta, the
laintiff, a corporation at Chica go , sent "a
g raft for $99.t>7. on one Lem EiTto-llie-Banko f Washburn for collection: tliat Jun e 2. i
1893, the draft
Ti^ ^presmted to_Lemke. and
paid by his check''on"t he"Baiik of W ash b urn
on the same day;
June~3,"l893, the
_t hat
Bank ofWashburn lssuedr" its '''a?atr'o 5Pffie
Union National Bank, ite (Dhicago corre'
spondent,
for the proper amotat, a'nd"'f 6r^
"plaintiffj
he" same to the
^ardedf
^hat" t he
pla.i ntitf~ fligi5orTeceif'e the dfafTjaSSISBS
1^93^ and depoiited the same immediately
In th e First National Bank of Chicago; thai
"tliat bank presented the draft to the Union
^ationaTBafflr-jmrng. 1893. but payinrnt
13i,erppf,.was-xgCliaed ; that the Union National Bank then hacl~o money to the credit of
t&e Bank o'f''Wasb jbu Tn, but did have' coltat^
protecf'oyereirals. lei:t mere expressly
enough to protect the draft
^afts. more than
in question, as well as all other drafts issuea
upon that bd-lik Oy the Batik at WashbttrnT
jnat June 7. 189^J'ttie l^anF^r washburn
SLdOflrs, Probert having faile d; that
closed
June 26. 1893. Probert perfected an assignment for the benefit of is creditors, and on
Ihat day the defen dant, ~Eis assignee, XSo
T>ossessi ^m 'H' M:iirlfis . proper ty, including tfie
Bank of Washburn and its effects"; that Prohfeert's assets atjhe time of "such assignment
amounted to $261,716.31, and "his^liabilities

J. K.

,

;

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

ey. in the Bank of Washburn, or the pl aintiff's collection ■fvr tne nrnceecls of said colltf c.
tion. ever came into the hands of sai &a~
_signee in the shape of property of any gmT
S?hatsoever
that Sep tember 18 liSi'i. liq~
l)laintlH: tiled ife claim against said estate;
that October 17, 1893, the plaintiff prociired
aji orda- to snow cause why its said cla im
should not be declared preferred; . hat Im
^
tne nnal hearing or rnar annn catloil. Dpfw
n^^^^
1893, it was ordered by the co urt that
per
said claim be, and the sam was tliCTeP fle - '
^
Glar ed
referred claim, and the money anil
effects upon whicn tne sdiUU was founded —
^s
Unirti by' Tle flai-nd"tu-bB
Uiit fimdS, and —
"
the said/assi gnee was tnereny ordered to pay
said claim of $9i^.4;i, in tuii, out of any mon^~
eys in his handF belonging to said estate, in'
^^CT^ce "ST all "cK!H§"agMnsr saicrestate'
f(5getlr er--wtar'eggtg~a5ar"gis"not pr eferred,
d
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ever came into the hands of the defendant. | title of his own to trust property.
he deSuch being the facts, it is
stroys a trust fund by dissipating it^altoas such assignee.
manifest tnat tn^ piaiTitifp Va nf>t y|prp^j.p.
gether, tEererr^ajns nothing to be"lhe"suV
ject of the trusT Buti_§9jSSg" as. the trust .
claimin g his own property intrusted to Profaert's oSn k, nor the ^vailg or the nroceeda
property~can be traced and followed into
^
thereof
but is here claiming « nrpfcy^ncp
i■6pefty^nto" whictCit 1M§I£S?° ^°^'
^thfe^'-p
oYCT othar creditors out of other assets and
verted, that remains subject to the trust"
as"&v6raDie"to"t'he
That case
^TOperty of i:'robert received by the defend- "id. p. "71^.
ant by Yirtue of such assignmen
Cartainly,
claim of the plaintiff as any In the English
courts; and yet It nowhere sanctions the
there Is no statute in this state giTlng a^"
such preterence, nor any authorizing an in - proposition
hat tne ow ner of the pro^er^
soivSt debtor, by war of a voluntary assign- or money Jntrusted 13 entitled to a prefer-"
ment, to give such preference.
Laws 1S83. c.
sence over other crecKIors of "anTpsolTeht
349; liaws 1885, c. 48; sections 1693a, 1693c,
tate out of property or assets to "which no
part of the trust fund. rJ:hejpr5 egggrtBereSanb. & B. Ann. St. It follows that, if the
plaintiff Is entitled to such preference at ■W,
All such (SsesTiirn "upon
traceable.
all, it must be by virtue of some established
the question of fact whether the trust property or fund, or the proceeds thereof, are
principle of equity or the common law.
traceable into any specific property or fund.
The early English cases only went to the
Ex parte Hardcastle (In Re Mawson), 44
extent of holding, in effect, that the owner of
Law T. 524. Thus, in Re Cavin v. Gleason,
property Intrusted to an agent, factor, bailee,
105 N. Y. 256, 11 N. E. 504,
was held that,
or other trustee could follow and retake his
"to entitle the trust creditor to such a prefproperty from the possession of such truserence, it must, at least, be made to appear
tee, or others in privity with him, and not a
that the fund or property of the insolvent,
bona fide purchaser for value, whether such
remaining for distribution, includes proceeds
property remained in its original form, or in
of the trust estate."
To the same effect, Atsome different or substituted form, so long
kinson v. Printing Co., 114 N. Y. 168, 21 N.
as
could be ascertained to be the same
E. 178; Holmes v. Oilman, 138 N. Y. 376, 34
property, or the product or proceeds thereof,
In Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass.
N. E. 205.
but that such right ceased when the means
110, 23 N. E. 1005, the court said:
"When
of ascertainment failed, as when the subject
trust money becomes so mixed up with the
of the trust was money, or had been contrustee's individual funds that it is imposverted into money, and then mixed and consible to trace and identify it as entering into
founded in a general mass of money of the
same description, so as to be no longer disome specific property, the trust ceases. The
court will go as far as it can in thus tracing
visible or distinguishable. This is apparent
and following trust money; but when, as a
from the opinion of Lord EUenborough, C.
J., written nearly 80 years ago, reviewing
matter of fact, it cannot be traced, the equitable right of the cestui que trust to follow
the adjudications prior to that date. Taylor
But the more
it fails." To the same effect are Goodell v.
Maule & S. 575.
V. Plumer,
Buck, 67 Me. 514; Steamboat Co. v. Locke,
recent rule in England as to following trust
73 Me. 370; Englar v. Offutt, 70 Md. 78, 16
moneys is broader, and goes to the extent of
Atl. 497; Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. St 16;
holding, in effect, that "If money held by a
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Columbian Bank's Estate, 147 Pa. St 440,
person in a fiduciary character, though not
23 Atl. 625, 626, 628; Appeal of Hopkins
as trustee, has been paid by him to his acAtl. 867; Bank v. Goetz, 138 lU. 127.
count at his banker's, the person for whom
(Pa.)
27 N. E. 907; Neely v. Rood, 54 Mich. 134.
he held the money can follow it, and has a
inker's
charge
on the balance in the
19 N. W. 920; Sherwood v. Bank, 94 Mich.
78, 53 N. W. 923; Elevator Co. v. Clark (N.
hands;" that "if a person who holds money
as a trustee, or in a fiduciary character,
D.) 53 N. W. 175; National Bank v. Insuranc€ Co., 104 U. S. 54, 68; Peters v. Baio*
to his account at his banker's, and
pays
133 IT. S. 670, 693, 10 Sup. Ct. 354;
Story,
mixes it with his own money, and afterEq. Jur.
1259;
1258,
Pom. Eq. Jur.
wards draws out sums by checks in the ordi1058;
Lewin, Trusts (1st Am. Ed.) 241.
nary manner,
the drawer must be
In speaking of followins trust moneys intaken to have drawn out his own money,
to other property, it is stated in one of the
in preference to the trust money." In re
New York cases cited that "the right has its
Hallett's Estate (Knatchbull v. Hallett), 13
basis in the right of property."
It never
Ch. Div. 696, overruling some former Enwas based upon the theory of preference by
gli^ cases. In that case there was no disreason of an unlawful conversion.
pute but what the money received by the
This is
made clear by
conrecent and well-considered
trustee 'for ttie property wrongfully
opinion by the supreme court of Rhode
verted was deposited
with his bankers to
Island.
Slater v. Oriental Mills (R. I.) 27
the credit of his account, and that the same
Atl. 443. It oUows that th mere fact that
"remained at his banker's, mixed with his
Proberfs bank used the plaintiff's money_
own money, at the time of his death." But
in the leading opinion, by Jessel, M. R., In
tggaSJLCayiPgjts indebtedness, bejfore Tna,kthat case, and by way of quoting Mr. Justice
JSSJt^ assignment,"^? not authorize a pref-"
Fry approvingly, it is said: "The guiding i-«rence to^the plaiHttff,_^^oVeifrProber"PFofer
principle is that a trustee cannot assert a ^©•editors, out" of his other^jrpperty and as-
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'fia's tieen traced._
*~TBir IS iaot~a mere

question of practice,
nor the construction of a lociil statute long
acquiesced in, but is a" question of general
and It Is very Imequity Jurisprudence;
portant to the people of the state that this

v.'

coint Bhoijld, at least on such questions, adhere to the principles of the common law so
as to become elementary.
weU established
It is especially essential that the state and
federal courts, on such questions, should be
in harmony. In so far as McLeod v. Evans
66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173, 214; Francis
Evans, 69 Wis. 115, 33 N. W. 93; and Bowers V. Evans, 71 Wis. 133, 36 N. W. 629,—
are in conflict with the rules above indicated,
as overruled.
they must be regarded
The
order of the circuit court is reversed, and the
cause -is remanded
for further proceedings
in accordance with this opinion.

is

ORTON, O. . (dissenting).
This case
ruled by McLeo<i v. iSvans, 66 Wis. 401, 28
N. W. 173, 214; Francis v.' Evans, 69 Wis.
115, 33 N. W. 93; and Bowers v. Evans, 71
Wis. 133, 36 N. W. 629.
It was a case of
special deposit or trust or agency. It was
the employment of the bank to collect
draft. It ought not to make any difference
that the bank embezzled the proceeds. The
plaintiff was clearly entitled to be a preferred
creditor.
this was the first case of the
kind,
might not dissent
respectfully
dissent on the ground that the decision in
this case overrules three well-considered and
reconsidered
decisions of this court
In the
long history of this court, there have been
very few overruled cases. The interests of
by the stathe public are best subserved
bility of decisions.
If former cases are to
be overruled by every change of the personality of the bench, we may soon hp.ve no
line of decisions on important questions, to
which the business of the country has been
long adapted and adjusted, and everything

a

a

J

If

will

become

I

This is made plaia by an illustration
having judicial sanction In the case last
cited: "Suppose that an Insolvent debtor, D.,
has only $1,000 of property, but is indebted
to the amoimt of $2,000, one-half of which Is
In this
due to A., and the other half to B.
condition of things, D.'s property can only
By such
pay fifty per cent of his debts.
distribution, A. and B. would each be equiNow, suppose T>.,
tably entitled to $500.
while in that condition, collects $1,000 for P.,
but instead of remitting the money, as he
should, he uses it in paying his debt in full
By so doing, D. has not increased his
to A.
assets a penny, nor diminished his aggregate
a penny.
The only difference
indebtedness
is that he now owes $1,000 each to B. and
F., whereas he previously owed $1,000 each
Now, if F. Is to have preferto A. and B.
■ence over B., then his claim will absorb the
entire amount of D.'s property, leaving noth.ing whatever for B. In other words, the
$500 to which B. was equitably entitled from
his insolvent debtor, upon a fair distribution
of the estate, has, without any, fault of his,
been paid to another, merely in consequence
of the wrongful act of the debtor." Id., and
See, also,
dissenting opinion in 69 Wis. 123.
McClure v. Board (Colo. Sup.) 34 Pac. 763.
We must hold that the plaintiff hjjp nn igp-ai
nght__to .a , pref ereniie.JM: £r. Probert's oth er
cfSaitors 111'the distoibution o f hia estate in
ffieTSanSs of .the defendant, -a&-aasigaS£uiS^
inio'"^^h.np partjot the^'laintifflg.jnoney
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made . On the trial the parties by stlpplatlon
"fixed the amount of the claims for sugari
sold which had come to the hands of th«
(40 N. E. 206. 145 N. T. 552.)
assignee, and which had bee n collected by
Court of Appeals of New York. April 9, 1805.
Elm. The fra ud of Burkhalter & Co. waa
II. was shuwu"-tligt~tEa~
not controverted.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
sales were induce'd by a gross misrepresentaFirst department.
Hon in writing made by one of the members"
Action by the American Susrj^'-^'Rffl"''"-''
of the firm to tha nlaintiff as to the solvency
Cdmpany against Charles H. Fancher. asof the firm, mad on or abo ut Se tember 20,
pi». From a .judgment
"f
ypnprai
t;>"*
_sip;t^
indp-rAToi-ginP'
1892, within 30 'days before the" assignment,
a
term (30 N. Y. Supp 4ftav
Ro- and when the firm wasl)wing several hua:
nlaintif f Mpj^^gla
ment for ylaintiff.
gred thousand dollars mo re than the value of
versea.
"~""
its whole assg ts.
Hughes,
appellant.
for
James
Charles E.
TThe case presented is singularly free from
any uncertainty in respect to the facts upon
B. Dill, for respondent
which the equitable jurisdiction to follow the
ANDREWS, 0. J. This case presents a proceeds of the sugars is claimed. They are
but it is insisted
question of considei'able practical importance. ^definite and ascertained,
It relates to the equitaoie junsaiction oi the that the court is impotent to give relief by
way of subjecting the choses in action or their
court, un der special circumstances, to toiio w
prumjtjdij of personal property in the hand s
proceeds, representing the sugars, to a lieu
df a fraudulent vendee or his^ general a~s- in favor of the defrauded vendor, or to adsignee r^y tne penent or creditors at the suit
judge that they shall be applied In partial
of a de frauded vendor, who by false pr fr
recompense and restitution for the property
because,
wrongfully
tenses w ag mapcea to part with the proper^
as
it)
obtained,
so
claimed, such relief is not in any such case
upon_ CTedti, the proc eeds sought to be
"f 6aeJlie3"bemg tiie sums'ttne irom subvendeed'
within the scope of the powers of courts of
>rRWi535Ti(ffRnCBiin39
equity as heretofore defined and exercised,
sales by bim made before the d iscovery by
and for the further reason that new rights
'
the plamtifC of the fraud.
The LMIS UUUh
have intervened by reason of the assignment.
which the question arises are substantially
The fraud of Burkhalter & Co. was, as we
—conceded and are free from complication.
Bav9~5gtar aamitted.'" 7r Sey' are hftgeiessiy
they
anri
■nrofeTsit
isaa
af, tic time
tOQfc
rngnivfint
Between the 20th dav of Septemb);^,
and the 20th day of October following, th«
the plaintifE's goo ds. ,_ TOey dis" posed of
plaintiff sold and deliver ed t,i} the mercantile' large part of the s"ugars~b6f ore
smtnr
Arm of C. Burkhalter & Qn.. doing business Wcame coff nizant of he fraud.
The praiiitiff
wa'soniy apprised "of It after'tEie"asslgnment
in the city of New York, sugars of vario"^
qualities on credit f<; the nrice in the aggrewas made . Tirgreaedy atTaWTipC the conof $19.121.41. no "art nf whifh Una hf^prT ''faap_ag^BgLJ;M_f!aiJUiuleftt,_and21n§5If^^
^te
nndpi- ^)ip ircumstances. Inef
paid, the last sale ]ifiv'ng bgPTi Tn?^d(» Oiy
^■chaser
pursuit
TJfe
the property, except
firm,
fectual.
da
the
On
the
next
to5er~^1892^
"
the small pari ol 11 WLluh was nnsoWr-and
^elng insolvent and owina debtij jtinaUV In"
^passed to the assignee, is m practrM!BIer""lf
excess of Its assets, made a general assignit _could vet be. found nnconsimi^ a^ capment to the defendant for the benefit of its
ble of identification, the multipUci^ of suits"
creriif^rH- Among tne assignect assets w ere
"WHWh AV0ai(l^yjreMefed^8v^!sssa^"'to
VS^
portion of~the sugars som py tne plainflg
expensive,
firamn'm. which 'he replevieg- gsartByas- claim It would m ake the remedy^
"
The identifiancCTiaadequate
signee; but tSe flrm^ prior to the assignment, JJujaensQTn^.
cation of the proceeds sought to be reached
had sof to niimero us perso ns, ustomers~ o?
Is not _
tnen nSHn Tfce oirdTnarv ovirse of trade, yo r- is complete and unquestioned.
fions
jhe sugars on credit, and claims held claimed hat -the -credits or the money Into""
whic they have been converted are not the
_5y lie firm against the subvendees arismg
VCTy^ roceeffs.ot..sugargJof 'wER 5^the plaint
out' of sucn sales, exceeamg m the aggrewg.S flefrauded.
rthe sum of $10.000. were among the as"
of
court of equity to folgtitS whic
^^f^
nment!
These
ftpsig
"a'ne'Jurlsdictioii
bT
passed
low the proceeds of property taken from the
cTaittts we ce-.coHeeted' by the aBsi|mee Jtfter
small sumj" true owner by felony, or misapplied by an
the assiCTUMentTand (ex cep ting
agent or trustee, and converted into propertyafter n^jice had been BerVBfl by the piamtm
of another description, and to permit the true
~7igTEe assignee that It escinded the original
owner to take the property in its altered state
saIeTDrt ]^rar' 'tf5i^nollce was accompanied
demangifor the sugars then in tte_gosas his own, or to hold
as security for the
by
value of the property wrongfully taken or misccounfapplied, or. In case the original property or
outstan ding clai ms against the cust omers of its proceeds have been mingled with that of
ands for he the wrongdoers In the purchase of other prop& Uo. In the ir
^urkhaTtgT
charge declared In favor of the
sugars sold by the nrm as aoove stated.
j.'Ee' erty, to have
person Injured to the extent necessary for his
assignee declined to accede to The demand
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indemnity, so long as the rights of bona fide
has been fredo not intervene,
purchasers
quently exerted, and is a jurisdiction founded
upon the plainest principles of reason and justice. The case of Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y.
133, Is an illustration of the application of this
principle in a case of the larceny of negotiable
bonds, sold by the thieves, in which the court
subjected securities in which they invested
the money, and which they had transferred
with notice to third persons as security for
services to be rendered, to a charge in favor
of the owner of the stolen bonds. The cases
where
upon this head are very numerous,
there has been a misapplication of trust funds
by trustees, or persons standing In a fiduciary
relation, and the money or property misapplied has been laid out in land or converted into other species of property.
The court in
such cases lays hold of the substituted property and follows the original fund, through all
the changes it has undergone, until the power of identification is lost or the rights of
stop the pursuit, and
bona fide purchasers
hclds it in its grasp to indemnify the innocent
victim of the fraud. And even in case of
money, which is said to have no earmark, its
Identity will not be deemed lost, though it is
mingled with other money of the wrongdoer,
if it can be shown that it forms a part of the
general mass.
Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex,
M. & G. 372; In re Hallett's Estate, 13 Oh.
Div. 696; Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369,
In the cases of stolen property,
34 N. E. 205.
or of misapplication by a trustee or agent of
the funds of the principal or cestui que trust,
the title of the real owner of the property
has been in most cases lost, without his consent, and the court, by a species of equitable
substitution, repairs, as far as practicable,
the wrong, and prevents the wrongdoer from
profiting by his fraud.
And, indeed, courts of law, borrowing the
equitable principle, in cases of misappropriation by agents, vest in the principal at his
election the legal title to a chattel or security
In the hands of the agent, purchased exclusively by the application of the embezzled
or misappropriated fund. Taylor v. Plumer,
3 Maule & S. 562.
It is at this point that
the controversy in the present case commences, and the divergence
arises which has led
if! rlflimPfl,
nn hphalf
to this litigation.

are peculiarly cognizable In equity, and have
been so cognizable from the earliest period of
equitable jurisprudence. But it is to be said
that these are but branches of the larger jurisdiction over frauds, which equity abhors
and of which It has cognizance admittedly in
many cases not connected with technical
trusts or agency.
It cannot be denied that
the protection of cestuis que trustent against
frauds of the trustee is an object of peculiar
solicitude in the courts of equity. They, in
many cases, are incapable, by reason of age,
inexperience, or other incapacity, from looking
out for themselves, and the court stands in
the attitude of guardian of theu: mterests.
But, as has been said, a court of equity does
not restrict its remedial processes to the aid
of the helpless or the ignorant. It embraces
within its view the general claims included
within what are called quasi trusts, and intervenes to prevent violations of equitable duty
by whomsoever committed or whoever may
suffer from the violation. It goes altogether
outside of trust relations in many cases to
prevent fraud, or to compel a restoration of
property obtained by fraud.
The exercise
of the jurisdiction to set aside fraudulent
transfers of real or personal property made
in fraud of creditors is familiar. And the jurisdiction is most beneficially invoked in cases
of private fraud to rescind transfers of real
estate procured by fraudulent representations,
and to restore to the defrauded vendor the
title of "which he has been defrauded. It often
happens in cases of transfers of real estate
procured by fraud that, before the action is
brought or the plaintiff is apprised of the
fraud, the fraudulent vendee has disposed of
the land In whole or in part, ,or has created
liens thereon in favor of the bona fide purIn such cases the court
chasers for value.
will mold the relief to suit the circumstances,
and will, at the election of the plaintiff, rescind the contract and compel a reconveyance
of the part of the land still remaining In the
hands of the vendor, and compel the wrongdoer to account for the proceeds of the land
in damages.
sold, or award compensation
The court In many cases resorts to the fiction
of a trust, and, by construction, adjudges that
the proceeds in the hands of the wrongdoer
are held by him as trustee of the plaintiff.
This was the exact nature of the relief grant^^
ed in the case of Trevelyan v. White, 1 Beav.
, that caur.ts-o£_ eauity.Jln.j::Qm^e_de£endant
claim of the plaintiff
589, as appears by the recital of the decree
mercial^M£^j_whereJthe
originates , la. a fi:anf| jn ttiesjale of ^J^onal
In the opinion of the master of the rolls, where
propart of the estate had been sold by the fraudjTi'f.perty, do nat,jgidertake_tofollow
In Cheney v. Gleason, 117
ulent vendee.
c^ds in the, hands o^f'th e ^fdng'floey'yw that
the defraudedjBartj,
557, a bill was filed by the defrauded
Mass.
l^^v^^^c^^en^]to|^^wi
with his title,.,is. remitted exc lusively to such
vendor of real estate to reach a mortgage taklegal remedies as aregrven for the rearessToI
en by the vendee on the land on a resale by
Ihe wjioag.'^'TEe' jurisdiction of c6urts~61f equihim, and the court sustained the bill and
ty in cases of trust or agency, or cases of like
granted the relief. In Hammond v. Pennock,
character, it is insisted, is founded upon the
61 N. Y. 145, the court rescinded, at the Inancient jurisdiction of these courts over trusts - stance of the plaintiff, a contract for the exand fiduciary relations, and has not been and
change of real and personal property, owned
ought not to be extended beyond these cases.
by the plaintiff, for a farm of the defendant
It is very true that trusts and trust relations in Michigan, which had been consummated

Jt
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on the plaintiff's part by a conveyance and
transfer, the contract and conveyance having
been obtained by the defendant by fraudulent
and the defendant having,
representations;
after the conveyance to him, contracted to sell
to him by the
part of the land conveyed
plaintiff, the court adapted the relief to the
circumstances, and rescinded the conveyance
so far as practicable, and adjudged that the
defendant acfcount for the proceeds of the personal property included in the sale.
If the jurisdiction exercised by courts of
equity in respect to undoing fraudulent con]
/ veyances of real estate, and following the
/ proceeds in the hands of the fraudulent
grantee, appertains in like manner and degree to sales of personalty, It would seem
tha t the plaintiff In the presenFcase wgS~eiF
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E. 1078; BenJ. Sales (6th Ed.)
Fassett v. Smith, 23 N. Y. 252; Benedict V. Williams, 48 Hun, 124.
But a purchase procured by fraud is In no sense, as
between the vendor and vendee, rightful.
It
was wrongful, and, while a transfer so Induced vests a right of property in the. vendee
until the sale is rescinded, the means and
act by which it was procured was a violatiou
of an elemental principle of justice. But tha
rule is that a sale of personal property Induced by fraud is not void, but is only voidable on the part of the party defrauded.
"This does not mean that the contract is
void until ratified; it means that the contract
is valid until rescinded." When a contract
of sale infected by fraud of the vendee is
consummated,
and the property delivered,
^
the vendor on discovering the fraud may purbuea to_ r^^'«'T^ The fact that, before the
sue one of several courses.
action was hmnyht Ttnrfr halter ifc Co. ha d
He may affirm
"
the contract, and an omission to disaffirm
aade a g rnprwl fi'i^i,7npip"t f"** the benefi t
within a reasonable time after notice of the
of creditors to the defendant Is no obstacle
fraud will be deemed a ratification. He may
to the belief, if, except tor the assignme ntj'
tne court wou ia lia ve Interposed,
on tBg~ - elect to rescind it, and thereby his title to
prayer pnEg"
the property is reinstated as against the pur- chaser and all persons deriving
other remedies,
title from
"
him, not being bona fide purchasers for value,
to reach the unpaid claims aga inst "ffie subIg not a
-An BiyiiP- pfiR f or "(;redit(>fs
and a purchaser is not such who takes the
s"
^endee
property for an antecedent debt, or who purpurchaser for value, and stands in no othe r
chased the property on credit, and has not
or better positaon than his assignor as re proceeds of the
paid
the purchase money or been placed in a
Ireack
tiie
gfTO
^sgCg-a-i^g
position where payment to a transferee of
samrtrrBu rkhalter & On- OnodwiTi y. Wertthe claim cannot be resisted.
iieimer, »a N. Y. 149, 1 N. E. 404; Barnard
Barnard v.
Campbell, supra; Dows v. Kidder, 84 N. Y.
V. CampbeU, 58 N. Y. 76; Ratcliffe v. Sang121; Matson v. Melchor, 42 Mich. 477, 4 N.
ton, 18 Md. 383; Bussing v. Rice, 2 Gush. 48.
It is claimed that the general creditors of W. 200; 1 Benj. Sales, p. 570, note.
Upon rescission the vendor may follow and
the firm will be prejudiced if the plaintiff is
allowed to prevail, and that he will thereby
retake the property wherever he can find
It, except in the case mentioned, or he may
acquire a preference over the other creditors of the insolvent firm. Ttiit g"""'^^ nra^.
sUe for conversion.
When these legal remedies are available and adequate,
clearly
jtors ha X£
eqn iyy n'; Hg-Vit tn y,a-^a gpprri.
there is no ground for going to a court of
~PHated~Jort ne pavment nf thpjr rip.hts t hA
plaintiff, or propertv to which
equity. The legal remedies in such case are
C^rtv of the
IS equita .hiv~e ntitled as between
it and and ought to be held exclusive. But in a
ijurkfialter &
case like the, present, sfegre there is na_adCo^
They, ■S(5TraFas appears, advanced nothing,
equate legal remedy, either on the contract
and gave no credit on the faith of the firm's
oT sale or for the recovery of the property In
possession of the sugars, assuming that that
specie, or by an action of tort, is the power
element would have had any bearing on the
of a court of equity so fettered that where it
case. If the sugars had existed In specie
is shown that the property has been conin the hands of the assignee, it cannot be
verted by the vendee, and the proceeds, in
doubted that the plaintiff on rescinding the
the form of notes or credits, are identified
beyond question in his hands, or in possessale would have been entitled to retake them,
and the -general creditors are in no worse
sion of his volimtary assignee, it cannot impound such proceeds for the benefit of the
position, if the plaintiff is awarded the prothan they would haye been if the defrauded vendor? The only reason urged
ceeds,
sugars had remained unsold. Much was said
in denial of this power which to our minds
on the argument upon the difference behas any force is based on the assumption
that it would be contrary to public policy to
tween a trespasser taking and disposing of
admit such an equita ble principle into com the property of another and the case of a
mercial transactions, kut with the two
sale of personal property to a vendee induced
by fraud.
It is the law of this state, as in Itations adverted to, and which ought strictly
England, that title passes on such a sale to
to be observed, (1) that it must appear that
the fraudulent vendee, notwithstanding that
the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law,
the crime of false pretenses is included in
either in consequence of Insolvency, the dispersion of the property, or other cause, and
the statute definition of a felony, but which
was not such
at common law. Barnard
(2) that nothing will be adjudged as proceeds except what can be specifically IdentlT. Campbell, supra; Wise v. Grant, 140 N. T.

^

J0

593,

35 N.

473

§ 433;

474

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

fled as suchj_ftssliiess-lateMSl3 .saiLftavB adIndeed, the disturbance
equateTJTO^ctioo.
I would be much less than is now permitted
In foltowing the property from hand to hand
until a bona fide purchaser Is found.
The case of Small v. Attwood, Younge, 507,
is a, \&ry instructive case, which iuTolTod a
large amount, was argued by eminent counsel, and received great consideration. It suppoi-ts, we think, the equitable jurisdiction
invoked in the present case. It was an action by the purchaser to rescind a contract
for the sale of mines and mining property
and
induced by fraudulent representations,
•
to recover the purchase money paid to the
amount of about £200,000. , The court found
the fraud and rescinded the contract, and
On a supmade a decree for an accounting.
plemental bill being filed, showing that the
purchase money paid had been invested by
the seller in public securities in his name,
which he afterwards caused to be put in the
name of his mother, and that the purchaser
had no other means adequate to repay the purchase money, the chancellor, on an application
for an Injunction restraining the transfer of
the securities, held that the money paid could
and
be followed Into the stock purchased,

granted the Injunction.
The case of Cavin
V. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256, 11 N. B. 504, wag
an attempt to fasten upon the estate of an
insolvent a. preferential lien for money put
into his hands by the plaintiff for the purchase of a mortgage for her, and which he
applied, without authority, to the payment of
his debts before the assignment, with the
exception of a small sum ($30), which went
Into the hands of the assignee.
The court
held that the money, which the Insolvent had
used to pay debts prior to the assignment,
was not a perferred debt, but susta,ined her
right to be paid the small sum which the
belonging to the trust
assignee
received
This case points the distinction. - The character of the debt gave it no priority. The
fund had been dissipated, and could not he
traced among the assigned assets. There
was no equitable ground of preference except for the small sum mentioned.
Upon the whole case, we are of the opinion
that the judgment on the report of the referee
was correct, and the order granting a new
trial should the.'«fore be reversed, and the
judgment on the report of the referee affirmJudgment accordingly.
ed, with costs.
All
concxir.

CONSTRUCTIVE
GLEASON.i
ai N. B. 504, 105 N. Y. 256.)
Court of Appeals of New York. April 19, 1887.
J. B. Gleason, for appellant. W. H. JohnV.
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J. It

ceded bv the petitioners that the assigned estate was insufficient to pay In full
-—
— the debta
_ ^
of the a.fiHJgnnr.
The specittl term granted the prayer of the
petitioner, and made an order directing the
assignee to pay the claim of the petitioners
out of the money in his hands, and this order
was affirmed by the general term. The ordeij
"In-^efCect appropriates out of the assigned e^
tate the sum of $877.27 to the payment of
claim of the petitioners, in preference to
claims of the general creditors.
The petitioners, to maintain the order in
question, rely upon the rule in equity that, as
between cestui que trust and trustee, and all
parties claiming under the trustee otherwise
than by purchase for valuable consideration,
without notice, all property belonging to a
trust, however much
may be changed or
altered in its nature or character, and all the
fruit of such property, whether in its original or altered state, continues to be subject
to or affected by the trust. Pennell v. Deffell,
De Gex, M. &*G. 387, Turner, L. J. This
settled doctrine of equity has its basis In the
right of property. The owner of personal
"IJroperty which, by the wrongful act of his
agent or trustee, has been changed and converted into chattels of another description,
may elect to treat the property into which the
conversion has been made as his own.
Upon
such election the title to the substituted property is vested in him as fully as if he had
originally authorized the wrongful act, which
title he may assert in a legal action to the
same extent as he could have asserted title
In respect to the original property. The reason of the doctrine is stated by Lord Ellenborough in the leading case of Taylor v.
Plumer,
Maule & S. 562, in language often
"For," he says, "the product or subquoted:
stitute for the original thing still follows the
nature of the thing itself, so long as
can be
ascertained to be such, and the right only
ceases when the means
of ascertainment
fail." The question in that case involved the
legal title to certain stock and bullion which
an agent of the defendant, intrusted by his
■principal with money to invest in exchequer
bills, had wrongfully misapplied to the purchase of the stock and bullion, intending to
abscond with it and go to America, and the
court sustained the defendants' title.
Courts go very far to protect rights of property as against a wrong-doer. They follow
through whatever changes and transmutations it may undergo in his hands, and as
against him, transferred to the changed and
altered product the original title, however
much the original property has been increased in value by his labor or expenditure,
provided only that the product
still a chattel, and is composed of the original materials.
Silsbury v. McCoon,
N. Y. 379.
But
court
of law, as a general rule, deals only with the
legal title; and when the legal identity of the
property is destroyed, or the property cannot
be traced specifically into another thing,
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po'werless to give relief, except by action for
The landamages against tbe wrong-doer.
guage of Lord EUenborough, already quoted,
that the right to follow property only ceases
when the means of ascertainment fail. Is illustrated by what follows, "which," he adds,
"is the case when the subject is turned into
money and mixed and compounded in a general mass of the same description."
It is not important to Inquire whether later
decisions have not established,
even in respect to strictly legal actions, a somewhat less
stringent limitation upon the right of pursuit
than that indicated in the language just quoted.
But It is unnecessary to pursue this inquiry here. It is clear that in t hia case tha
trust frnid hns been dissipated and lost by
, the act of the trustee .
It is neither speciflcally in tne nands o^ 'the trustee or of his assignee, nor it is represented by other property Into which it has been converted. JEhe
fund, acc ording to the finding, ^with tha encr!n-r\i-ir^,. ,,V
lll ll ijum 01
Ji ll IL'tlAl SZL ^
A
ceniion
ol lllH
i|)!{0,) was paid out on
tho rjphts of White Detore the assignment."
Plainly, there is no room for any coiilttllLlUll
that the petitioners have legal title to any of
the assigned property. The sole inquiry is
whether a case is made for equitable intervention in favor of the petitioners In the administration of the Insolvent estate.
It is
clear, we think, that, upon an accounting in
bankruptcy or insolvency, a trust credltorjs
not entitled to a preference over general creditors of the insolvent, merely on the ground
of the nature of his cdaim; that is, that he is
a trust creditor as distinguished from a general creditor.
We know of no authority for
such a contention.
The equitable doctrine
that, as between creditors, equality is equity,- admits, so far as we know, of no exception founded on the greater supposed- sacredness of one debt, or that it arose out of a violation of duty, or that its loss involves greater apparent hardship in one case than another, unless it appears. In addition, that there
is some specific recognized equity founded on
some agreement, or the relation of the debt
to the assigned property, which entitles the

iJ

claimant, according to equitable principles, to
preferential payment If it appears that trust
property specifically belonging to the trust is
Included in the assets, the court doubtless
may order it to be restored to the trust
So,
also, if it appears that trust property has been
wrongfully converted by the trustee, and constitutes, although in a changed form, a part
of the assets, it would seem to be equitable,
and in accordance with equitable principles,
that the things into which the trust property
has been changed,

should,

if

required,

be set

apart for the trust, or, if separation Is impossible, that priority of lien should be adjudged
In favor of the trust-estate for the value of
the trust property or funds, or proceeds of the
trust property, entering into and constituting
a part of the assets. This rule simply asserts
the right of the true owner to his own property.
But it is the general rule, as well in a court

of equity as in a court of law, that, in order
to follow trust funds, and subject them to the
operation of the trust, they must be identiA court of equity, in pursuing the infied.
quiry and' in administering relief, is less hampered by technical difficulties than a court
of law; and it may be sufficient, to entitle a
party to equitable preference In the distribution of a fund In Insolvency, that it appears
that the fund or property of the insolvent remaining for distribution includes the proceeds
of the trust-estate, although it may be impossible to point out the precise thing in which
the trust fund has been Invested, or the precise time when the conversion
took place.
The authorities require at least this degree of
distinctness in the proof before preference can
be awarded.
See Van Alen v. American Nat
Bank, 52 N. Y. 1; Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y.
133; Ferris v. Van Vechten, 73 N. Y. 113;
Pen nell v. Deffell, supra; Frith v. Cartland,
"THfem. & M. 417.
The facts In this case fall short of the proof
■required within any case which has come to
"W», notice.
The trust fund, with the single
exception mentioned, was misappropriated by
White to the payment of his private debts
prior to the assignment
It cannot be traced
into the property in the hands of the assignee, for the plain reason that it is shown
to have gone to the creditors of White in satisfaction of their debts.
The courts below
seem to have proceeded upon a supposed equity springing from the circumstance that, by
the application of the fund to the payment of
White's creditors, the assigned estate was relieved pro tanto from debts which otherwise
would have been charged upon it, and that
thereby the remaining creditors. If entitled
to distribution without regard to the petitioner's claim, will be benefited. We think this is
quite too vague an equity for judicial cognizance, and we find, no case justifying relief
upon such a circumstance.
In a very general
sense, all creditors of an insolvent may be
supposed to have contributed to the assets
which constitute the residuum of his estate.
The case of People v. City Bank of Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32, seems to have been misunderstood.
The question considered in this
case was not raised there, and it was not
claimed in that case that the proceeds of the
checks of Sartwell, Hough & Co., the petitioners, had not gone into the general fund of the
bank, or that they had not passed in some
form to the receiver.
The court did not decide that the petitioners would have been entitled to a preference In case the proceeds of
the checks had been used by the bank, and
in its assets in the
were not represented
hands of the receiver.
For the reasons stated, we are of opinion
that the orders of the special and general
terms should be modified by reducing the sum
directed to be paid by the assignee to the
sum of $30, with interest from April 19, 1883,
but without costs to either party.

All

concur.

Ordered accordingly.
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Action to recover proceeds of stolen bonda
There was a judgment for plaintiff, from
which defendants appealed.
M. Goodrich, for appellants.

M. M. Wa-

ters, for respondent.

ANDREWS, J. This Is an equitable action
brought to establish the right of the plaintiff
to certain securities, the proceeds of stolen
bonds, and to compel the defendants to account therefor.
In March, 1869, the plaintiff was the owner
of $13,000 of government bonds, and of a railroad bond for $1,000, negotiable by delivery,
which, on the 12th of March, 1869, were stolen from her, and soon afterward $11,500 of
the bonds were sold by the thief and his confederates, and the proceeds divided between
William Warner loaned a part of his
them.
share in separate loans and took the promisGeorge
sory notes of the borrower therefor.
Warner invested $2,000 of his share in the
purchase of a bond and mortgage, which was
assigned to his wife Cordelia without consideration.
In January,

1870,

William Warner, George

Warner, Cordelia Warner and one Lusk were
arrested upon the charge of stealing the
bonds, or as accessories to the larceny, and
were severally indicted in the county of Cortland. The Warners employed the defendants,
who are attorneys, to defend them in the
criminal proceedings, and in any civil suits
which might be Instituted against them in respect to the bonds, and to secure them for
their services and expenses, and for any liabilities they might Incur in their behalf; William Warner transferred to the defendants
Miner and Warren promissory notes taken on
loans made by him out of the proceeds of the
stolen bonds, amounting to $2,250 or thereabouts, and Cordelia Warner, for the same
purpose, assigned to the defendant Porter the
bond and mortgage above mentioned.
The learned judge at special term found
that the defendants had notice at the time
they received the transfer of the securities,
that they were the avails and proceeds of the
stolen bonds, and directed judgment against
them for the value of the securities, it appearing on the trial that they had collected or disposed of them and received the proceeds.
The doctrine upon which the judgment In
this case proceeded, viz.: that the owner of
negotiable
securities stolen and afterward
sold by the thief may pursue the proceeds of
the sale in the hands of the felonious taker
or his assignee with notice, through whatever
changes the proceeds may have gone, so long
as the proceeds or the substitute therefor can
be distinguished or identified, and have the
proceeds or the property in which they were
invested subjected, by the aid of a court of
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equity, to a lien and trust in his favor for
the purposes of recompense and restitution, is
founded upon the plainest principles of justice and morality, and is consistent with the
rule In analogous cases acted upon In courts
of law and equity. It Is a general principlf
of the law of personal property that the title
of the owner cannot be divested without his
consent.
The purchaser from a thief, however honest and bona fide the purchase may
have been, cannot hold the stolen chattel
against the true proprietor, but the latter may
follow and reclaim It wherever or In whosesoThe right of
ever hands It may be found.
pursuit and reclamation only ceases when its
Identity is lost and further pursuit is hopeless; but the law still protects the interest of
the true owner by giving him an action as for
the conversion of the chattel against any one
who has interfered with his dominion over
It, although such interference may have been
Innocent in Intention and under a claim of
right, and in reliance upon the title of the felonious taker. The extent to which the common law goes to protect the title of the true
owner has a striking illustration In those
cases in which it is held that where a wlUfu!
trespasser converts a chattel into a different
species, as for example, timber Into shingles,
wood Into coal, or corn into whisky, the product In Its improved and changed condition belongs to the owner of the original material.
Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 380, and cases
cited.
The rule that a thief cannot convey a
good title to stolen property has an exception
In case of money or negotiable
securities
transferable by delivery, which have been put
Into circulation and have come to the hands
of bona fide holders. The right of the owner
to pursue and reclaim the money and securities there ends, and the holder is protected in
his title. The plaintiff was in this position.
The bonds, with the exception stated, had, as
the evidence tends to show, been sold to bona
fide purchasers, and she was precluded from
following and reclaiming them.
The right of the plaintiff in equity to have
the notes and mortgage while they remained
In the possession of the felons or of their assignees with notice, subjected to a lien and
trust in her favor, and to compel their transfer to her as the equitable owner, does not,
we think, admit of serious doubt The plaintiff, by the sale of the bonds to bona fide
purchasers, lost her title to the securities.
She
She could not further follow them.
could maintain an action as for a conversion
of the property against the felons.
But this
remedy in this case would be fruitless, as
they are wholly insolvent. Unless she can
elect to regard the securities in which the
bonds were invested as a substitute, pro
tanto, for the bonds, she has no effectual
remedy.
The thieves certainly have no
claim to the securities In which the proceeds
of the bonds were invested as against the
They, without her consent, have
plaintiff.
disposed of her property, and put It beyond
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If the avails remained In their
her reach.
hands, In money, the direct proceeds of the
sale, can It be doubted that she could reach
It? It Is not necessary to decide that In the
case supposed she would have the legal title
to the money, but if that question was involved In the case I should have great hesitation in denying the proposition. That she
could assert an equitable claim to the money
I have no doubt. And this equitable right
to follow the proceeds would continue and
attach to any securities or property in which
the proceeds were invested, so long as they
could be traced and Identified, and the rights
of bona fide purchasers had not intervened.
In Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562, an
agent, intrusted with a draft for money to
buy exchequer bills for his principal, received the money and misapplied it by purchasing American stocks and bullion, intending to abscond and go to America, and absconded, but was arrested before he quitted
England, and surrendered the securities and
bullion to his principal, who sold them and
It was held that the
received the proceeds.
principal was entitled to withhold the proceeds from the assignee in bankruptcy of the
agent, who became bankrupt on the day he
Lord
and misapplied the money.
received
Ellenborough, in pronouncing the opinion in
that case, said: "I makes no difference, in
reason or law, into .what other form different from the original the change may have
been made, whether it be into that of promissory notes for the security of money produced on the sale of the goods of the principal, as in Scott v. Surman, Willes, 400, or into
other merchandise, as in Whitecomb v. Jacob, Salk. 160, for the product or substitute
for the original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself so long as it can be
to be such, and the right only
ascertained
the means of ascertainment
ceases when
fails."
If, in the case now under consideration,
the plaintiff had intrusted the Warners with
of the bonds, and they had
the possession
sold them in violation of their duty, for the
puipose of embezzling the proceeds, and Invested them in the notes and mortgage In
question, the plaintiff could, within the authority of Taylor v. Plumer, have claimed
them while in their hands, or in the hands
of their assignees with notice, and would be
adjudged to have the legal title.
In courts of equity the doctrine is well
settled and is uniformly applied that when
a person, standing in a fiduciary relation,
misapplies or converts a trust fund into another species of property, the beneficiary will
be entitled to the property thus acquired.
The jurisdiction exercised for the protection
of a party defrauded by the misappropriation of property, in violation of a duty, owing by the party making the misappropriation, is exceedingly
broad and comprehensive.
The doctrine is illustrated and applied
most frequently in cases of trusts, where

trust moneys have been, by the fraud or
violation of duty of the trustee, diverted
from the purposes of the trust and converted
into other property. In such case a court
of equity will follow the trust fund into the
property into which it has been converted,
and appropriate it for the indemnity of the
beneficiary. It is immaterial in what way

the change has been made, whether money
has been laid out In land, or land has been
turned Into money, or how the legal title to
the converted property may be placed. Equity only stops the pursuit when the means

of ascertainment fail, or the rights of hoiu»
fide purchasers for value without notice of
the trust, have Intervened.
The relief will
be moulded and adapted to the drcumstances of the case, so as to protect the interests and rights of the true owner.
Lane v.
Dighton, Amb. 409; Mansell v. Mansell, 2
P. Wms. 679; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511;
Lewis V. Madocks, 17 Ves. 56; Perry, Trusts,
§ 829; Story, Eq. Jur. § 1258.
It is insisted by the counsel for the defendants that the doctrine which subjects property acquired by the fraudulent misusfi of
trust moneys by a trustee to the influence of
the trust, and converts it Into trust property
and the wrong-doer into a trustee at the election of the beneficiary, has no application to
a case where money or property acquired by
felony has been converted into other property. There is, it is said, in such cases, no
trust relation between the owner of- the stolen property and the thief, and the law will
not imply one for the purpose of subjectiD?
the avails of tlie stolen property to the claim
of the owner. It would seem to be an anomaly in the law If the owner who has been deprived of his property by a larceny should
be less favorably situated In a court of equity, in respect to his remedy to recover it,
or the property into which it had been converted, than one who by an abuse of trust
has been injured by the wrongful act of a
trustee to whom the possession of trust property has been confided. The law In such a
case wiU raise a trust in invitum out of the
transaction, for the very purpose of subjecting the substituted property to the purposes
of indemnity and recompense. "One of the
most common cases," remarks Judge Story,
"In which a court of equity acts upon the
grour.J of Implied trusts in invitum, is when
a party receives money which he cannot conscientiously withhold from another party."
Story, Bq. Jur. § 1255. And he states it to
the
be a general principle that "whenever
property of a party has been wrongfully
misapplied, or a trust fund has been wrongfully converted Into another species of property, if Its identity can be traced, it will he
held In its new form liable to the rights of
the original owner, or the cestui que trust."
Id. § 1258. See, also. Hill, Trustees, p. 222.
We are of opinion that the absence of the
conventional relation of trustee and cestui
que trust between the plaintiff and the War-
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ners Is no obstacle to giving the plaintiff the
or the
benefit of the notes and mortgage,
See
proceeds In part of the stolen bonds.
Bank of America v. Pollock, 4 Bdw. Oh. 215.
It is however strenuously Insisted that the
defendants had no notice when they received
that they were the avails or
the securities
That if they had noproceeds of the bonds.
tice they would stand in the position of their
and that the property In their
assignors,
hands would be affected by the same equities as tf no transfer had been made, Is not
Murray v. Ballon, 1 Johns. Ch. 566;
denied.
Hill, Trustees, p. 259. The learned judge at
spedal term found as has been stated, that
had notice of the larceny of
the defendants
the bonds, and the use made of the money
arising from their sale, at the time they reThe duty of
ceived the notes and mortgage.
this court upon the question of notice is
limited to the examination of the case, with

a view of ascertaining whether there was
evidence to support the finding of fact
such evidence exists, the finding of the trial
judge is conclusive.
We have examined with much care the
voluminous record before us, and are of opinion that the finding is sustained by the evidence. The testimony was confilctlng. The
under which the defendants
circumstances
took the transfer of the securities were certainly unusual, and the facts then known by
were calculated to create a
the defendants
strong presumption that the notes and mortgage came from investments of the stolen
property.
It was for the trial court to weigh
and In the light of all the
the testimony,

If

on the trial, to determine
facts developed
It would be a usetile question of notice.
less labor to coUate the testimony on this
subject, and we content ourselves with stating our conclusion, that the finding was warranted by the evidence.
The objection to the evidence, under a com-

mission issued to William Jessup of Montrose, Pennsylvania, and which was executed by William H. Jessup as commissioner
In supwas, we think, properly overruled.
port of the objection, one of the defendants
testified that he resided at Montrose In 1858,

and that at that time two attorneys resided
there, named respectively William and William H. Jessup, and an offer was made to
prove that the judge who granted the order
for the commission consulted a register of at-

479

torneys in which both names appeared, and
selected the name of William Jessup, and inserted It in the order.
The commission was
executed two years and a half before the
trial. It does not appear at what time it
was returned to the clerk, but the presumption is that it was returned within a reasonable time after its execution.
The objection
that the commission was not executed by
the person intended was not made until the
evidence taken under it was offered on the
trial.
That the defendants were apprised of
the facts upon which
the objection was
founded before the trial Is quite evident
Prima facie a commission directed to a
omitting any mention of a middle
person,
name, and returned executed by a person of
the same name, with the addition of a middle name, Is executed by the person named
in the order. Franklin v. Talmadge, 5 Johns.
84.
The ruling of the judge, in respect to
was
the objection made to the commission,
clearly in furtherance of justice. The defendant had ample opportunity to raise the
objection to the commission before the trial
by a motion to suppress, and it should not
be permitted that a party may lie by, and
spring an objection of this kind on the trial
for the first time, when the other party may
be unable to meet It by proof, and when
there Is no opportunity to issue a new com
mission, or send it back to be executed by
It Is we think a wholethe proper person.
some rule that objections to the execution
of a commission where the party has an opportunity to make them before the trial,
should be raised by motion, and If not raised
in that way when such opportunity exists,
they should be deemed to have been waived.
Whether such objection is to formal defects
merely, or as in this case goes to the right
of the person who executed the commission
makes, we think,
to act as commissioner,
no difference In the application of the rule,
if the fact of disqualification is known to
the party who seeks to exclude the evidence
a sufiicient time before the trial, to enable
him to make his motion. See Kimball v.
Davis, 19 Wend. 438; Sturm v. Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 77; Drury v. Foster, 2
Wall. 33; Sheldon v. Wood, 2 Bosw. 267;
Zellweger v. Gaffe, 5 Duer, 100.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.

CONSTEUCTIVE TRUSTS.

480

MITCHELL
(61

T.

N. Y.

READ.

123.)

Court of Appeals of New York. May 21, 1874.
Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme court In the First judicial department, affirming a judgment in favor of
defendant, entered upon decision of the court
at special term. Reported below, 61 Barb.
310.

This action was brought to have certain
leases, obtained by the defendant during the
of a copartnership between him
existence
and plaintiff, for terms to commence at its
termination, of premises leased and occupied
by the firm, declared to have been taken for

tbe partnership, and to have It adjudged that
the defendant held them as trustee for the
partnership. The facts found were substantially as follows:
The plaintiffs were copartners, conducting
and carrying on the HofCman House, in the
city of New York.
The copartnership, by its
terms, expired May 1, 1871; it owned various leases of premises which were used for
the partnership business. All of the leases
expired at the same time with the copartnership. The firm had spent large sums of
money in making valuable improvements and
in fitting up the leasehold premises bo that
they could be beneficially used in connecfion,
and also in fixtures and furnishing, and by
their joint efforts had built up a profitable
business, and largely enhanced the rental valIn 1869 the defendant,
us of the premises.
without any notice of his intent to apply
therefor, and without the knowledge of plaintiff, procured renewal leases, in his own name,
of the premises, for terms commencing at the
termination of the partnership leases and of
the partnership, which, upon discovery thereof having been made by plaintiff, defendant
claimed were his property exclusively, and
refused to recognize or acknowledge that the
partnership or plaintiff had any right or interest therein.
Other facts appear in the
opinion.
The court found as conclusions of law that
the defendant Read was the sole owner of
the leases executed to him as aforesaid, and
that the plaintiff had no right, title, nor interest in or to them, or either of them, and
that the defendants have Judgment accordduly excepted.
ingly, to which plaintiff
Judgment was rendered accordingly.
The plaintiff commenced this action soon
after he ascertained that the defendant had
taken the new leases, to wit, in March, 1870,
and the cause was brought to trial in February, 1871.
A. J. Vanderpoel and J. B. Burrill, for appellant. John K. Porter and Willard O. Bartlett, for respondents.

EARL,

O. The relation of partners with
other is one of trust and confidence.
Each is the general agent of the firm, and is

each

bound to act in entire good faith to the othThe functions, rights and duties of partners in a great measure comprehend those
both of trustees and agents, and the general
rules of law applicable to such characters
are applicable to them.
Neither partner can,
in the business and affairs of the firm, clandestinely stipulate for a private advantage
to himself; he can neither sell to nor buy
from the firm at a concealed profit to himself. Every advantage which he can obtain
in the business of the firm must Inure to the
benefit of the firm.
These principles are elementary, and are not contested.
Story,
Partn. §§ 174, 175; Colly. Partn. 181, 182.
It has been frequently held that when one
partner obtains the renewal of a partnership lease secretly, in his own name, he will
be held a trustee for the firm as to the renewed lease. It is conceded that this is the
rule where the partnership is for a limited
term, and either partner takes a lease commencing within the term; but the contention is that the rule does not apply where
the lease thus taken is for a term to commence after the expiration of the partnership by its own limitation, and whether this
contention is well founded is one of the
grave questions to be determined upon this
er.

appeal.

It is not necessary, in maintaining the right
of the plaintiff in this case to hold that In
all cases a lease thus taken shall inure to the
benefit of the firm, but whether, upon the
facts of this case, these leases ought to inure to the benefit of this firm
will briefly
allude to some of the prominent features of
this case. These parties had been partners
for some years; they were equal in dignity,
although their interests differed. The plaintiff
was not a mere subordinate m the firm, but
so far as appears, just as important and efficient in Its affairs as the defendant They
procured the exclusive control of the leases of
the property, to terminate May 1, 1871, and
their partnership was to terminate on the
They expended many thousand
same day.
dollars In fitting up the premises, a portion
thereof after the new leases were obtained,
and they expended a very large sum In furnishing them.
By their joint skill and influence they built up a very large and profitable business, which largely enhanced the
rental value of the premises.
More than
two years before the expiration of their
leases and of their partnership, the defendant secretly procured, at an increased rent,
In his own name, the new leases, which are
Although the plaintiff was
of great value.
in dally intercourse with the defendant, he
knew nothing of these leases for about a
year after they had been obtained.
There
is no proof that the lessors would not have
leased to the firm as readily as to the defendant alone.
The permanent fixtures, by
the terms of the leases at their expiration,
belonged
to the lessors.
But the movable

I
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fixtures and furniture -were worth vastly
more to be kept and used in the hotel than
Upon thesa facts
to be removed elsewhere.
1 can entertain no doubt, both upon principle and authority, that these - leases should
be held to inure to the benefit of the firm.
If the defendant can hold these leases, he
could have held them if he had secretly obtained them immediately after the partnership commenced, and had concealed the fact
from the plalntiS during the whole term.
There would thus have been, during the
whole term, in making permanent improvements and in furnishing the hotel, a conflict
between his duty to the firm and to his selfinterest Large Investments and extensive
furnishing would add to the value of his lease,
and defendant
would be under constant
temptation to make them.
While he might
not yield to the temptation, and while proof
might show that he had not yielded, the law
will not allow a trustee thus situated to be
and therefore disables him
thus tempted,
from making a contract for his own benefit.
Terwilllger v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 237, and cases
cited. It matters not that the court at special term found upon the evidence that the
improvements were judicious and prudent for
The plaintifC
the purposes of the old term.
was entitled to the unbiased judgment of the
as to such improvements, unindefendant
fluenced by his private and separate interest.
But, further,
the parties owned together a
large amount of hotel property in the form of
furniture and supplies, considerably exceeding, as I infer, $100,000 in value. Assuming
that the partnership was not to be continued
after the 1st day of May, 1871, this property
was to be sold, or in some way disposed of
for the benefit of the firm, and each partner
owed a duty to the firm to dispose of it to the
Neither could, without the
best advantage.
violation of his duty to the firm, place the
property in such a situation that it would be
it for
sacrificed, or that he could purchase
his separate benefit, at a great profit. Much
of this property, such as mirrors, carpets, etc.,
was fitted for use in this hotel, and it is quite
manifest that all of it would sell better with
a lease of the hotel, than it would to be removed therefrom. It is clear that one or both
of these parties could obtain advantageous
leases of the hotel for a term of years, and
to dishence, if the parties had determined
solve their partnership, it would have been a
to have obmeasure of ordinary prudence
tained the leases and transferred the property with the leases as the only mode of realThis was defeated by the act
izing its value.
of the defendant, if he is allowed to hold these
leases, and thus place himself in a position
where the proprty must be largely sacrificed
or purchased by himself at a great advantage.
The language
This the law will not tolerate.
of Lord Eldon. in Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. 311, a case in many respects
He says:
resembling this, is quite in point.
"If they [the defendants] can hold this lease
H.& B.EQ.(2r Ed.)— 31
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and the partnership stock is not brought to
sale, they are by no means on equal terms.
The stock cannot be of equal value to the
plaintiff, who was to carry it away and seek
some place in which to put it, as to the defendants who were to continue it in the
place where the trade was already establlsh'ed, and if the stock was sold the same construction would give them an advantage over
the bidders.
In effect they would have secured the good-will of the trade to themselves
For these reain exclusion of their partner."
sons, independently of the consideration that
had a value to which
the leases themselves
the firm was entitled upon other grounds and
upon authorities to be hereafter cited, the
plaintiff, who commenced his suit about one
year before the term of the partnership expired, was upon undisputed principles and authorities applicable to all trustees and persons holding a fiduciary relation to' others,
entitled to the relief he prayed for.
It has long been settled by adjudications,
that generally when one partner obtains the
renewal of a partnership lease secretly, in
his own name, he will be held a trustee for
the firm, in the renewed lease, and when the
rule is otherwise applicable, it matters not
that the new lease is upon different terms
from the old one, or for a larger rent, or that
the lessor would not have leased to the firm.
The law recognizes the renewal of a lease as
a reasonable expectancy of the tenants in possession, and in many cases protects this exwill briefly
-pectancy as a thing of value.
notice a few of the cases upon this subject.
In Holridge v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 30,
Chancellor Kent says: "It is a general principle pervading the cases, that if a mortgagee,
executor, trustee, tenant for life, etc., who
has a limited interest, gets an advantage by
being in possession, 'or behind the back' of
the party interested in the subject, or by
or fraud, he shall not resome contrivance
tain the same for his own benefit, but hold
it in trust." That was a case where a lease
was assigned as security, and the assignees
It to the lessor and took a now
surrendered
In
lease for an extended term of years.

I

Phyfe V. Warden, 5 Paige, 268, Chancellor
Walworth lays down the general rule: "That
if a person who has a particular or special Interest In a lease obtains a renewal thereof
from the circumstance of his being In possession as tenant, or from having such particular interest, the renewed lease is In equity
considered as a mere continuance of the original lease, subject to the additional charges
upon the renewal, for the purpose of protecting the equitable rights of all parties who had
any Interest, either legal or equitable, in the
That case was followed in Gibbes
old lease."
v. Jenkins, 3 Sandf. Ch. 131, where It was
held that one purchasing a leasehold which
was subject to a mortgage and contained no
covenant of renewal, could not escape the lien
of the mortgage by suffering the lease to expire and afterward obtaining a new lease of
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the premises; that the new lease In such case,
though not a renewal, was a continuance of
the original lease for the purpose of protecting
the rights of the parties interested in the origIn these
inal lease, both legal and equitable.
two cases church leases were Involved, and
some stress was laid upon that fact, as the
continuance of such leases was expected as a
matter of course, without any covenant of
renewal.
But the fact that they were church
leases could malse no real difference in the
principle upon which the decisions were based.
The fact that a renewal or continuance of a
lease is more or less certain can make no difference with the principle; tliat springs from
the fact that the party obtained a new lease
from the position he occupied, being in possession and having the good-will which accompanies that, or being connected with the
old lease in some way, and thus enabled to
take an inequitable advantage of other parties also interested, to whom he owed some
duty.
In Struthers v. Pearce, 51 N. Y. 357, it was
held that when during the existence of a
continuing copartnership of undetermined duration, three or lour copartners, without the
knowledge of the other, obtained a new lease
in their own names, of premises leased and
used by the firm, the same became partnership property, and upon dissolution the other
partner was entitled to his proportion of the
value.
In that case the defendants Intended
to dissolve the copartnership as early as August, and gave written notice on the 18th day
of September, 1865, for the dissolution on the
31st day of December following.
On the 11th
day of September, the defendants secretly obtained a new lease, in their own names, of
the same premises, for a term of five years,
think that case
to commence May 1, 1866.
It is true that a
is fairly decisive of this.
period for a dissolution of the partnership had
not been fixed when the new lease was taken,
but negotiations were pending for its dissolution, and a few days after the new lease was
taken, a time for its dissolution was fixed by
But it can make no differa written notice.
ence that the partnership might have been
continued by the parties until after the new
So It might here, if the
term commenced.
parties had so willed. There they had the
right to dissolve it at any time. The principle
which lies at the foundation of the decision
of that and all similar cases must be the one
above stated, that the defendants in possession took advantage of their position to procure the new lease, and thus deprived the
plaintiff of a benefit to which he, with them,
was equally entitled.
In a note to Moody v.
Matthews, 17 Ves. (Sumn. Ed.) 185, the learned editor says, as a deduction from adjudged
eases, that "with a possible exception in fa,vor
of a bona fide purchaser, it seems to be an

I

universal rule that no one who is in possession of a lease or a particular interest In a
lease, which lease is affected with any sort of
equity in behalf of third persons, can renew

the same for his own use only; but such renewal must be construed as a graft upon the
old stock." In Clements v. Hall, 2 De Gex
& J. 173, where one partner in a mining partnership died in 1847, and the surviving partner thereafter worked the mine without a
new lease thereof, claiming to do so for his
own benefit, until 1850, when the lessor gave
him notice to quit in March, 1851, when he
entered into new negotiations with the lessor
for a new lease, and obtained one of the
greater part of the mine, on terms much more
burdensome than those of the old tenancy, it
was held that those who claimed under the
will of the deceased partner were entitled to
a share of the benefit of the new lease.
In
Clegg V. Fishwiek, 1 Macn. & G. 294, one of
partners working a mine under a
several
lease died, and the firm business was thereafter carried on for several years between the
surviving partners and the plaintiff, widow of
Finally the old lease
the deceased partner.
expired, and some of the partners took a new
lease of the mine without the privity of the
plaintiff.
It was held that the estate of the
deceased partner was Interested in the new
The lord chancellor says:
lease.
"The old
lease was the foundation of tie new lease,
and the tenant's right of renewal arising out
of the old lease giving the partners the benefit
of this new lease; at least, the law assumes
it to be so. Without saying at all what circumstances
there may be to Interfere with
that ordinary right, we know that the rule of
equity is that parties interested jointly with
others in a lease cannot take to themselves
the benefit of a renewal to the exclusion of
the other parties Interested with them." In
Clegg V. Edmondson, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 787,
the managing partners of a mining partnership at will gave notice of dissolution to tjie
rest, and intimated their intention, after the
dissolution, to apply for a new lease for their
own exclusive benefit, and did so and obtatoed a lease, and It was held to inure to the
benefit of the partnership. See, also, the leading cases of Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17

Ves. 298, and Keech v. Sandford, 2 Eq. Gas.
Abr. 741, and notes to the latter case in 1
Lead. Cas. Eq. 32, where the whole doctrine
is discussed, and conclusion reached in harmony with the views above expressed. I
therefore conclude that It makes no difference
that these leases were obtained for a term to
by its own
commence after the partnership,
limitation, was to terminate. I can find no
authority holding that it does, and there is no
principle sustaining the distinction claimed.
The defendant was in possession as a member
of the firm, and the firm held the good-will
for a renewal, which ordinarily attaches to
By his occupancy, and the
the possession.
payment of the rent, he was brought Into Intimate relations with the lessors;
he became
well acquainted with the value of the premises, and he took advantage of his position,
during the partnership, secretly to obtain the
new leases.
He must hold them for the firm.
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I am therefore of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
DWIGHT,

The question at issue in this
C.
is, whether a member of a commercial
partnership, during its continuance, and without the consent or knowledge of his associate,
can take a renewal of a lease of property
used in the business. In his own name and
for his own benefit, the partnership having a
definite termination, and the renewal lease
commencing at its expiration.
The general power of a partner to take a
lease of such property for his own benefit
must be considered as settled in this court
by the decision in Struthers v. Pearce, 51 N.
T. 357. In that case the lease was taken
during the existence of the partnership, which
No notice had been
was of indefinite diuation.
given of Its termination when this lease was
the case of a
The facts presented
taken.
lease taken during the existence of the partnership, and to begin in enjoyment during
The court expressely distinguished
that time.
it from the present case, which had then
Page 362.
been decided in the supreme court.
The only point now open for discussion is,
whether the fact that when Read took the
renewal of the lease the partnership had a
precise limit, and was to terminate before
Before
is material.
the lease commenced,
considering that point, it may fairly be claimed that this case comes within the precise
decision in Struthers v. Pearce, on a ground
in the argument. Read,
not mentioned
though his lease was not to commence in possession until after the expiration of the original lease, acquired an immediate interest by
This precise
way of an interesse termini.
point was decided in Smith v. Day, 2 Mees.
& W. 684, 699 ; 2 Piatt, Leas. 60. This, it is true,
is not an estate, but a right.
Still it is the
subject
of grant before entry. 1 Steph.
Comm. 268; Burt. Real Prop. 18, pi. 61; 2
Crabb, Real Prop. 227.
the partnership
had acquired 'this interesse termini, it might,
as the facts of the case show, have been disthe
posed of for a large sum of money.
doctrine of Struthers v. Pearce establishes
that the partner cannot acquire a lease in his
own behalf, to commence while the partnership lasts, by parity of reasoning he cannot
obtain an interesse termini under the same
circumstances.
If however this view is not correct, the
Can a
main question must be disposed of.
partner take a lease for himself, to commence
In possession after the partnership has expired?
In order to settle this point It Is
essential to give the subject a more full examination than was requisite In Struthers v.
Pearce, and to consider more at large the principles on which this branch of the law rests.
It grows out of the relation of trust and confidence between partners, and is a branch of
the rule that a trustee cannot profit from the
It largely baa Its
estate for which he acts.
case

If

If
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roots In a principle of public policy, as shown
Keech v. SandIn one of the early decisions.
ford, Sel. Cas. Ch. 61; Griffln v. Griffin, 1
The
Schoales & L. 352, per Lord Redesdale.
general rule Is so well settled that It would
be a waste of time to refer to authorities.
The text-writers on the law of partnership,
without exception, assert the applicability of
this rule of law to partnership transactions.
Lindl. Partn. 495; Story, Partn. §§ 174, 175;
Parsons, Partn. §§ 224-226; Colly, Partn. §§
281, 282.
The special rule that a trustee cannot take,
for his own benefit, a renewal of a lease
which he holds In trust, is enforced in a great
number of cases.
The principle on which it
rests is nowhere more fully or clearly stated

than in the argument of Sir Francis Hargrave in Lee v. Vernon, 5 Brown, Pari. Cas.
Although the passage Is
(10th Bng. Ed.) 1803.
somewhat long, it is quoted aS shedding much
light on a subject, the principle of which has
in course of time, become somewhat obscure.
He said: "It has long been an established
practice to consider those who are in possession of lands under leases for lives or years
as having an interest beyond the subsisting
term, and this interest is usually termed the
tenant right of renewal, which though according to language and ideas strictly legal, is
not any certain or even contingent estate;
but only a chance, there being no means of
compelling a renewal, yet is so adverted to in
all transactions relative to leasehold property, that it influences the price in sales, and
Is often an inducement to accept of it in
mortgages and settlements.
This observation
is more especially applicable to leases from
the crown, the church, colleges or other corporations, and indeed from private persons,
where the tenure is of ancient date. * * •
This 'tenant right' of renewal as it is termed,
however imperfect or contingent in its nature, being still a thing of value, ought to
by the courts of justice, and
be protected
when those who are entitled to its incidental
advantages, whether by purchase or other derivation, are di^ppointed of them by fraud,
Imposition, misrepresentation, or unfair practice of any kind, it is fit and reasonable that
Accordingly
this injury should have redress.
courts of equity have so far recognized the
tenant right of renewal as frequently to Interpose in its favor by decreeing that new or
reversionary leases gained by means or supposition of the tenant right of renewal should
be for the benefit of the same persons as
were interested in the ancient lease, and those
who procured such new leases and were legally possessed of them, should be trustees
There is a great variety of
for that purpose.
authorities on this head, but the cases which
have hitherto occurred have been principally
of two kinds, some being cases of persons
not haying any beneficial Interest In the old
lease, as guardians and executors, and others
being cases of persons having only partial
and limited interests, as tenants for life, mort-

i84

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

gagees and mortgagors, and In cases of both
descriptions those who have procured a new
lease in such situations have been uniformly
declared trustees for the persons beneficially
interested in the ancient lease, either wholly
or in part, according to the particular circumstances, the court ever presuming that the
new lease was obtained by means of a connection with and a reference to the interest
in the ancient one, without in the least regarding whether the persons renewing intended to act as trustees, or for their own emolu-

ment."
From this exposition so luminous and Judicial In its tone, which is fully sustained by
the authorities, it is clear that the rule under consideration is not confined to crown,
church or college leases, but embraces those
of every kind. The same principle appertains to all. The cestui que trust has a right
Though this is
to the chance of renewal.
termed a "tenant right" as between the lessee and the landlord, that Is a mere phrase.
It is a hope, an expectation, rather than a
right. Such as it is the trustee shall not
take it to himself, but if it results in any
substantial benefit he shall hold it for his
beneficiary. Phyfe v. Wardell, 5 Paige, 268;
Bennett v. Van Syckel, 4 Duer, 162; Glbbes
V. Jenkins,
3 Sandf. Ch. 130; Davoue v.
Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Armour v. Alexander, 10 Paige, 572; Dickinson v. Codwise,
1 Sandf. Ch. 226.
Some of these were Instances of church or other corporation leases,
and others were not
In no case has it been
held that the rule is confined to these, as it
certainly cannot be on principle.
The whole doctrine is extended to the case
of partnera in Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick,
17 Ves. 298; Clegg v. Edmondson, 8 De
Gex, M. & G. 787; Clements v. Hall, 2 De
Gex & J. 173; Clegg v. Fishwick, 1 Macn.
& G. 294; Struthers v. Pearce, supra.
The principle cannot depend on the fact
whether the lease is made to begin during
the continuance of the partnership or at its
close.
Once admit the general principle,
and it must result in this.
While the relation lasts, one partner cannot clandestinely
a,nd exclusively profit by the trust relation.
There may perhaps be cases where the act
is openly done by the trustee and acquiesced
In by the beneficiary that would admit of
different considerations. It is not now necessary to decide that in no case can a partner take a lease for his own benefit.
What
Is now to be decided is, whether he can do
so behind the back of his associate and without his consent.
The bad consequences of
making any such distinction as the defendant seeks to maintain in the present case is
easily shown by a reference to the relation
of a guardian and his ward. A guardian,
we may suppose, holds a lease In his oflacial
character which is to expire at his ward's
majority.
WhUe the relation of guardian
and ward exists, he takes a lease to himself
to commence at the termination of the ex-

isting lease.
Could that be sustained?
Has
he not profited by the trust relation?
When
he takes a lease to himself, can a tenable
distinction be taken between one commencing immediately and one begmning at a
future day, even though that day be postponed until the trust relation expires? The
sound rule Is that he cannot make any profit
to himself from a secret transaction initiated while the relation of trustee and cestui
que trust exists, no matter when It springs
into active operation.
It must never be forgotten that on general principles of the law
of contracts his right to the lease, as between
him and his landlord, commences as scoi
as he has made his agreement for it Thl&
is an immediate subject of sale, and if the
trustee can hold It he will be allowed to
profit by the trust relation which, as has
been shown, he cannot da The cestui que
trust may accordingly say: "All the value
of this lease you hold in trust for me. Grant
that It is not yet an estate but only a rightmake it over to me in the condition in which
you hold it." While no case has been found
presenting the precise facts in the case at
bar, the principles which should govern It
may be derived from the result In Featherstonhaugh V. Fenwick, supra, Clegg t. Edmondson, and Clegg v. Fishwick, supra.
In the first of these cases the partnership
was for an indefinite period, and might be
dissolved at the pleasure of either parly, on
It was dissolved November 22, 1804,
notice.
the day on which the lease expired.
Two of
the partners, without communication with
the plaintiff, had applied for a renewal of the
lease, and obtained it before giving notice of
the dissolution of the partnership. The new
lease was to run for eight years from the
expiration of the old one. On October 19
they gave notice to dissolve the partnership.
The court held that the new lease belonged
to the partnership and was assets of the
firm. Much stress was laid on the fact that
the transaction was a clandestine one, and
the court thought if notice ha& been given
the case might have admitted of different
consideration. The case is not in aU respects
parallel In . its facts with the case at bar,
for at the time the lease was taken the period for the termination of the partnership
had not been fixed, and only became subsequently ascertained by notice.
In the case of Clegg v. Edmondson, which
was also an instance of a partnership to be
dissolved at the pleasure of the parties, the,
effect of a notice to dissolve, preceding the
execution of the renewal lease, came before
the court In that case "five managing partners had determined to dissolve their partnership, and had communicated their intent
to
In June, 1846, and their determination
To this two
take a renewal to themselves.
other partners objected, claiming that the
renewal should be for the benefit of all. Formal notice of dissolution was given in July,
to take effect on September 30. On the sue-
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ceedlng 11th of December a new lease was
executed for twenty-one years to the managing partners, to take effect from SeptemThe defendants endeavored to
ber 29, 1846.
distinguish this case from that of Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, on the ground of the
openness and fairness of the transaction.
The court however held that the mere com-

munication of an intent on the part of the
managing partners to apply for a lease for
their own benefit was not sufficient to give
This case, on
them an exclusive right to It.
the point of time, is stronger than the case
at bar, for the new lease was taken after the
partnership was dissolved, though some
stress was laid upon a point which does not
appear here, that the act was that of managing partners.
On principle, In many cases, it is of but litwhether the partnership is
tle consequence
dissolved or not before the renewal, since, if
the former partners become tenants in common, the result Is the same.
Clements v.
Hall, 2 De Gex & J. 173; Van Home v.
Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388; Baker v. Whiting,
The case of
3 Sumn. 475, Fed. Cas. Na 787.
Clegg V. Fishwick is still nearer to the one
In this instance, the
under consideration.
renewal lease was obtained during the existence of the partnership, and the lease comThis lease was demenced at its expiration.
clared to be held in trust for the firm.
Without further collation of authorities,
the fair deductions from the principles on
which they rest may be summed up as follows:
1. A trustee holding a lease, whether corporate or individual, holds the renewal as a
trustee, and as he held the original lease.
upon any right
2. This does not depend
which the cestui que trust has to the renewal, but upon the theory that the new
lease is, in technical terms, a ''graft" upon
the old one; and that the trustee "had a facility," by means of his relation to the estate,
for obtaining the renewal, from which he
shall not personally profit.
3. This doctrine extends to commercial
partnerships, and one of several partners
cannot, while a partnership continues, take
a renetwal lease clandestinely, or "behind the
backs" of his associates, for his own benefit.
It Is not material that the landlord would not
have granted the new lease to the other partners, or to the firm.
the
4. It is of no consequence whether
partnership is for a definite or an indefinite
period.
The disability to taJfee the lease for
individual profit grows out of the partnership relation. While that lasts, the renewal
cannot be taken for individual purposes, even
though the lease does not commence until
after the expiration of the partnership.
5. It cannot necessarily be assumed that
the renewal can be taken by an Individual
member of the firm, even after dissolution.
The former partners may stlU be tenants In
common;
or there may be other reasons, of
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a fiduciary nature, why the transaction cannot be entered into.
The authorities cited on behalf of the defendant do not disprove these conclusions.
In Lee v. Vernon, supra, there was no
trust. The question arose between a stranThe point
ger to the lease and the claimant.
made by the plaintiff was that the "tenant
right" of renewal had become strictly a right,
so that even a stranger could not take a reIt
newal and hold it for his own benefit.
claim, having no
was an extraordinary
foundation In principle, and was rejected.
In Van Dyke v. Jackson, 1 B. D. Smith,
419, the party had made a special contract
with his partner to abandon the place where
the business was carried on. The case turned on the special contract to leave the busl^
ness in the hands of the other party.
Musselman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 81, does not
raise the question. It was not sought there
to charge a partner with the value of a renewal lease which he had taken to himself
during the existence of the partnership, but
rather with that of the good-will as it esxistIn
ed after the partnership was dissolved.
fact the place where the business was carried on was sold for the benefit of the firm,
and it was held, in substance, that the goodwill had been realized in the enhanced value
of the property sold.
It is said, in the present case, that Read
was not authorized, by the articles of partnership, to contract for Mitchell after the expiration of the firm; and that therefore
Mitchell cannot take advantage from the renewal lease.
The answer is that he made
the contract while the firm was in existence,
and Mitchell may adopt and ratify it. The
objection also proves too much, as it applies
to all the cases in which the partner, acting
clandestinely, has been declared a trustee.
In Phillips V. Reeder, 18 N. J. Bq. 95, one
of the partners, R., prior to the partnership,
owned the lease, exclusively, of certain stone
quarries. He entered into a partnership with
P. for three years, and so much longer as R.
should continue lessee of the quarries.
In
the lease, there was a covenant of renewal
at the option of R. He having declined to
renew, it was held that the partnership expired; or, in other words, that R. was under no obligation to renew, and thus to conThere could be no
tinue the partnership.
pretense in this case that the doctrine under
the review applied, since the ori^nal lease
did not itself belong to the firm. It was the
private property of one of the partners,
which he was under no obligation to preserve
for the firm's benefit.
In Achenson v. Fair, 3 Dm. & War. 512,
the point decided was, that the doctrine was
not to be extended to additional lauds purchased by trustee; in other words, the rule
was fully recognized, but nothing was to be
governed by it except that which could be
fairly regarded as a graft on the former
leasee
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whether the view in Anderson v. Lemon,
that one partner may even in good faith buy
the reversion for himself, is correct There
is a great cogency in the remarks of Sir William Grant, that the partner may in this way
intercept and cut off the chance of future renewals and consequently make use of his
situation to prejudice the interests of his associates.
Randall v. Russell,
Mer. 190, 197.
There appears to be no direct decision allowing the partner thus to purchase, and the
right to do so is treated as doubtful by approved text-writers.
Lead. Gas. Eq. (3il.
Am. Ed.) 43, 44, marg. paging.
The application of the principles discussed
in this opinion to the case at bar is obvious.
The plaintiff and defendant were owners,
as partners, of a lease of premises in the city
of New York, on which
hotel business was
These
carried on, yielding a large profit
consisted of Nos. 1111, 1113, 1115 Broadway
and Nos.
and West Twenty-fourth street
The leases of the Twenty-fourth street property were made directly to them, November
17, 1866.
The Broadway property, through
a series of transactions not necessary to be
detailed, becames vested, according to the
fair construction of the various agreements
respecting it, in the partnership. The leases
1871, when
expired on the same day, May
the partnership terminated. While the partnership continued, both parties thought
necessary to provide a place for a bar-room,
West
and with this view the premises No.
Twenty-Fourth
street were connected with
the rear of the premises fronting on Broadway, known as the "Hoffman House," and
the first story fitted up and used for that
purpose. A considerable expenditure was
made with this view, and large profits were
realized, as the course taken was judicious.
While all of the leases owned by the firm
were still in existence, viz. April 20, 1869,
and on January 21, 1869, the owners of the
hotel property made leases to the defendant,
1871, and to conto commence from May
tinue as to part of the property for five
years, and as to another portion for ten years
from that date, at specified rents. The leases
1,

I

(j.

a

and hold, for his own use, the reversion of
real estate occupied by the copartnership, under a lease for years, with the qualification
that if he secretly makes such purchase In
his own name while the other partner with
his concurrence is negotiating with the owner to obtain the property for the use of the
firm, the purchaser will be declared
trustee.
This decision carefully admits the general
doctrine, but considers
hot applicable to
the case where one of the partners purchases
in good faith the landlord's interest as distinguished from taking
new lease. It
simply a case of an exception to
general
rule. It can scarcely be considered as decision in favor of a partner's right to purchase, since he was, under the circumstances,
a trustee.
Should the question be distinctly

it

v. Tredeimick, 1 Ball & B. 29,
a mortgagee, not in possession, otrtamed
a renewal, the original lease having heen forfeited, both in law aiid equity, for nonpayHere there was no violatio^n
ment of rent.
of trust The rule under discussion was fully recognized, but its application to the exThe court said: "'In all
isting case denied.
the cases upon this subject, either the party,
by being in possession, obtained the renewal,
or it was done behind the back, or by some
contrivance in fraud of those who were interested in the old lease; and there was either a remnant of the old lease, or a tenant
right of renewal, on which a new lease could
There could be no plainer
be engrafted."
recognition of the general principle maintained by the plaintiff.
In Munsell v. O'Brien, 1 Jones, Ir. 184, the
facts were, that there was an under-tenant
who took a new lease from the original landlord without advising his own immediate
landlord.
The court held that there was no
fiduciary relation between these parties.
The principle was fully admitted, but the
facts did not raise a case for its application.
B., said: "It is admitted that there
Joy,
is no authority which can be produced where
such a lease as the present has been declared
to be a trust; and that we are now called
upon to go further than any decision has
ever gone before, and to make an authority
for future decisions. We are called upon to
do this on what are called the principles of a
court of equity; namely, that where a person is clothed' with a fiduciary character, and
in that character becomes possessed of an interest in land, held under a determinable
lease, any acquisition by him of a new interest in those lands is a continuation of the old
This however
lease, and a 'graft' upon it.
have heard it asserted
is the first time that
that If an under-tenant obtains a lease of his
lands from the head landlord without consulting his own immediate landlord that
trust for his immediate landlord,
lease is
because that person had a tenant right of
renewal. But there is no fiduciary character
imposed on an under-tenant, in reference to
his landlord, by the creation of the relation
of landlord and tenant, which would entitle
the plaintiff to the relief he seeks, on the
ground of his having a tenant right of renewal. A cestui que trust is entitled to the
benefit o^-a new lease, obtained by a trustee
by means of a tenant right of renewal, which
the latter became entitled to as trustee, but
there is no such person in the present case."
This language plainly shows that the court
was but following In the wake of Lee v.
Vernon; and holding that the doctrine of
tenant right of renewal, and that the new
lease is a graft on the old stock, are not to
be extended to strangers, but confined to persons acting in a fiduciary character.
The only other ease that will be noticed is
Anderson v. Lemon,
N. Y. 236, which holds,
that one partner may in good faith purchase

In Nesbitt
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were obtained by Read without notice to tlie
plaintiff, and he now claims tliat they are
They are of great
his exclusive property.
value, and the hotel at the commencement
of the action, March, 1870, was still in operafixtures, stock, etc.,
The furniture,
tion.
were valuable, and the business carried on
was profitable.
Th^case has in it every element of the
equity which has been already considered.
The partnership is undisputed; the leases
were in existence when the renewal was
The act of renewal was clandestine,
made.
or occurred "behind the back" of the plaintiff. It took place while the partnership was
The right to renewal was Immein force.
diate and vested in Read during the partnership's continuance. The property belonging
to the firm, and which will be prejudiced by
the prospect of disposing of it at a sacrifice
at the close of the existing lease. Is large and
valuable.
Common Justice and a due regard to rules
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of public policy demand that the renewal
should be declared to belong to the
firm, and that the defendant should be required to account to the plaintiff for his portion of its value. The clauses in the leases
to Read that there shall be no assignment
without the consent of the landlord do not
stand in the way of the plaintiff's relief.
This does not consist in an assignment in
the ordinary sense of that term.
On the contrary, the ground of relief is that the defendant acted Inequitably when he entered into
the contract; that he must therefore be considered as a trustee, while the assignment to
the firm simply follows as an incident to the
giving complete effect to the trust relation
declared by the court to exist between the
parties. Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, supra.
The Judgment must be reversed, and a new
trial ordered.
All concur; REYNOLDS, C, not sitting.
Judgment reversed.
lease
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DA VIES, C. J. This action was tried by
a referee who held as matter of law, that
unless the agreement set out in the complaint
In relation to the purchase by the defendant
at the master's sale of the premises in question, or some note or memorandum thereof,
expressing the consideration be in writing,
the same was void, and created no interest
in the plaintiffs In said premises, and could
not be enforced against said defendant in
law or equity. And he further reported, as
matter of fact, that no proof was made or
offered on said trial by or In behalf of the
plaintiff of any such agreement in writing,
or of any note or memorandum in writing
of such an agreement, or of any deed, con-

veyance or instrument in writing subscribed
by the defendant or his lawful agent, creating or declaring any trust or interest in said
premises in favor of said plaintiffs, and that
no proof was made or testimony or evidence
offered on the part of the defendant.
The
judgment entered for the defendant upon
the report of the referee was affirmed at the
general term, and the plaintiffs now appeal
to this court
We are at liberty to assume from this finding, that the agreement set out In the complaint was proven on the trial before the
referee.
To ascertain what that agreement
was, we must have reference to the complaint and the offer made by the plaintiffs
on the trial.
The plaintiffs averred in the
complaint that the plaintiff Michael Ryan,
being seized of certain lands In the town
of Seneca, made and executed a mortgage
thereon In the year 1839, to secure the sum
thereof,
of $800, part of the purchase-money
and that In the month of October, 1841,
said plaintiff Ryan conveyed to the said Nev1ns, the other plaintiff, an equal undivided
half of the said premises;
that plaintiffs
being unable to pay the installments on said
mortgage as they became due, the said mortgage was foreclosed, and said plaintiffs procured of one Lewis the sum of $300, which
was paid on account of said judgment of
foreclosure, and a portion thereof, to the
extent of $300, was assigned to said Lewis
as his security for such advance; that said
Lewis becoming importunate for his money,
and the plaintlCs being unable to raise the
same for him, Lewis proceeded to advertise
said premises for sale on the 12th day of
October, 1843, for the purpose of raising said
sum of about $300, while said premises were
worth the sum of $4,000.
The complaint
further averred that while said premises
were thus advertised for sale, and before the
day of sale had arrived, the plaintiffs being
men of limited means, and unable to raise

the money which would be needed to stop
the said sale, and to pay up the amount due
on the said decree for the debt and the costs
which had accrued, applied to the defendant
Dux, reported to be a man of ready money,
and who had always professed to be interested in their behalf, and asked him to assist
them, and aid them to raise the money to
pay the amount due on said decree and save
premises from being sold away
the said
from them, and from being sacrificed for the
small amount, compared with their value,
which was claimed upon said decree. That
said Dox did then profess and declare a willingness to help said plaintiffs for such purpose, and did then and there agree with
the said plaintiffs that on the day of said
sale, he, the said Dox, would attend the
same and bid off and purchase the said
premises
at such sale, upon the express
agreement
and understanding, between the
plaintiffs and said Dox, that such bidding
and purchase,
if made by the said Dox,
should be for the benefit and advantage of
these plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs upon such
agreement
and understanding agreed that
they would not find any other one to go
their friend at the said sale, and to bid in
and purchase the said premises for them;
and that It was expressly understood and
agreed between the plaintiffs and said Dox,
that if he became the purchaser of said premises at said sale he should take the deed of
the same from the said master in his own
name, but only by way of and as security
to himself for what money he should have
to advance and pay on such purchase, and
with the agreement, promise and undertaking between said Dox and these plaintiffs,
that whenever these plaintiffs should repay
him the amount which he should pay to procure and effect such purchase and to get
the deed therefor, with the interest therefor his
on, and a reasonable compensation
services therein, he, the said Dox, should convey the said premises to these plaintiffs and
again vest the title thereto In them, and
should In the mean time hold the said premises in his own name as security only for
the said moneys, and always subject to the
That in
above agreement and defeasance.
pursuance of sai^ agreement said Dox attended said sale and bid off the same for
the sum of $100,. be being the only bidder at
said sale, and the same was strutk off to him
and he received the deed therefor. That at
said sale it was talked about and understood
by those present thereat, that said Dox was
bidding for the benefit of these plaintiffs,
and that said premises were struck off to
him only as security to him for the repayment to him by these plaintiffs of the moneys
he should advance and pay for the same
and interest thereon, and his reasonable
And the
charges for his attention thereto.
plaintiffs averred that such was the fact
and that In truth said Dox did bid off and
purchase the said premises for these plain-
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tiffs, and to save the same for them, and
took the deed In his own name, only as such
security as aforesaid, and that in consequence of such understanding other persons
from bidding on said premises,
abstained
and the same was strucli off to said Dox

without any opposing bid, although the plaintiffs aver that the same were then worth
And the plaintiffs also
$4,000 and upwards.
averred that if they had not relied upon said
agreement, promise and undertaking of said
Dox, they would not have allowed the said
premises to have been struck off for the
said sum of $100, but would have found
other persons to have purchased the said
premises, and saved the same from sacrifice,
but that as said agreement was made more
than a month before said sale, these plaintiffs relied upon it and made no other effort
to procure the money, or the assistance of
friends to save and buy said premises.
That at the time of said sale these plaintiffs were in the possession of said premises,
and continued in possession thereof and made
payments on account of the incumbrances
thereon until some time in the year 1849,
with the knowledge, privity and consent of
And that during all that time
said Dox.
said Dox never exercised any acts of own-_
ership over said premises, or interfered with
use, occupation or possession
the ownership,
thereof by the plaintiffs, and that during all
that time the assessments and taxes thereon were paid by the plaintiffs, with the
knowledge, privity and assent of said Dox.
That in the year 1849, the said plaintiffs
were induced by said Dox to surrender the
possession of said premises to him, and in
the year 1851 he refused to come to a settlement with the plaintiffs, and denied that
he held the said premises for their benefit,
or that they had any interest therein. The
referee excluded such evidence, and decided
that he would not receive any parol evidence to establish, or tending to establish,
the said agreement, and that upon the case
made by the pleadings, assuming there was
no agreement in writing as stated in the answer, there can be no recovery by the plaintiffs.
To this decision and ruling, the plaintiffs' counsel duly excepted.
This exception presents the main question
for consideration and decision upon this appeal, and the referee in his report states the
ground or reason of his decision to be that
mentioned, or some
unless the agreement
note or memorandum thereof expressing the
consideration be in writing the same was
void, and could not be enforced against the
defendant
If the referee was right in this
conclusion, then the plaintiffs were properly
nonsuited, and the judgment for the defendant should be affirmed. If in error then it
follows that there must be a reversal and a
new triaL The Revised Statutes declare that
no estate or interest In lands, nor any trust
or power over or concerning lands, or in
any manner relating thereto, shall be created.
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granted or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in
writing, subscribed by the party creating,
granting or declaring the same.
1 Rev. St.
p. 134, § 6.
It is manifest that the referee
had this provision before him, and that his
decision was based upon the assumption of
its applicability to the case in hand. In arriving at this conclusion he entirely ignored
aU consideration of fraud or of part performance, as elements of the transaction. Section
10 of the same title declares that "nothing
in this title contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of a court of equity to
compel the specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance of such
agreements." 1 Rev. St. p. 135, § 10. It is
well settled that courts of equity will enforce a specific performance of a contract
within the statute when the parol agreement
has been partly caiTied into execution.
2
Story, Eq. Jur. § 759.
And the distinct
ground upon which courts of equity interfere
in cases of this sort is, that otherwise one
party would be enabled to practice a fraud
upon the other, and it could never be the
intention of the statute to enable any party
to commit such a fraud with impunity. Indeed fraud in all cases constitutes an answer
to the most solemn acts and conveyances,
and the objects of the statutes are promoted
instead of being obstructed by such a jurisdiction for discovery and relief.
And
when one party has executed his part of the
agreement
in the confidence that the other
party would do the same, it is obvious that
if the latter should refuse it would be a
fraud upon the former to suffer his refusal
to work to his prejudice.
In Ponblanque's Equity it is said: "If the
contract be carried into execution by one of
the parties, as by delivering possession, and
such execution be accepted by the other, he
that accepts it must perform his part, for
when there is a performance the evidence
of the bargain does not lie merely upon the
words but the facts performed, and It is
unconscionable that the party that received
the advantage should be admitted to say that
such contract was never made." Fonbl. bk.
And the universal rule ia
1, p. 181, c. 338.
correctly enunciated by Brown on Frauds,
when he says: "The correct view appears
to be that equity will at all times lend its
aid to defeat a fraud, notwithstanding the
Brown, St Frauds, §
statute of frauds."
438. In the present case we are to assume
that the agreement was made as set out in
the complaint and performed on the part of
the plaintiffs as therein stated.
We then
have a distinct and unequivocal agreement
established, and performance by one party
of all that was to be done in pursuance of it
on his part.
We find the other party, by
reason of the acts and omissions of this party, obtaining the possession and title to a
large amount of real estate for a trifling sum
compared to its actual valu^ and refusing
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to fulfill the agreement on his part. He Interposes the statute of frauds as a shield,
thus using a statute designed to prevent
frauds as an instrument whereby one can be
perpetrated with impunity. This a court of
Wetmore y. White,
equity cannot tolerate.

Cas. 87, was an action brought In
chancery to compel the specific performance
of a contract by parol relating to lands. The
chancellor dismissed the bill, but the court
of errors unanimously reversed his decree.
Thompson, J., in delivering the opinion of the
court, says: "The appellant's claim resting
altogether upon parol contract, It becomes
necessary to examine whether any obstacle
to relief is Interposed by the statute for the
prevention of fraud.
think there is not.
It is an established rule In equity that a
parol agreement in part performed Is not
within the provisions of the statute. Citing
1 Fonbl. Eq. 182, and cases there noted.
To
allow a statute having for its object the prevention of frauds to be interposed In bar of
the performance of a parol agreement in
part performed, would evidently encourage
the mischief the legislature Intended to pre* * * Possession delivered in purvent.
suance of an agreement is such a decree of
performance as to take a contract out of the
statute." The same doctrine was reaffirmed
In Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 14 Johns. 15,
In Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch. 407,
35, 36.
413, the chancellor said the principle upon
which courts of equity hold that a part performance of a parol agreement Is sufficient
to take a case out of the statute of frauds is,
that a party who has permitted another to
perform acts on the faith of an agreement
shall not be allowed to Insist that the agreement is invalid, because it was not in writing, and that he is entitled to treat those acts
as if the agreement,
in compliance with
which they were performed, had not been
made.
In other words, upon the ground of
fraud in refusing to execute the parol agreement after a part performance thereof by
the other party, and when he cannot be placed in the same situation that he was before
See, also,
such part performance by him."
Phillips V. Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch. 131; Murray V. Jayne, 8 Barb. 612.
In Hodges v. Tennessee Marine & Fire Ins.
Co., 8 N. Y. 416, this court held that in equity parol evidence was admissible to show
that a deed absolute on Its face was In fact
a mortgage, and so Intended by the parties
thereto.
And in Despard v. Walbridge, 15
N. Y. 374, this court also held that an- assignment of a lease, absolute on Its face, was
in fact made for the purpose of securing a
debt, and that such debt had been fully paid;
and that under the Code of Procedure, parol
evidence is admissible to show that such assignment, though absolute In its terms, waa
intended as a mortgage.
The case of Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige, 147,
Is so like to that now under consideratioin
that it may be profitable to refer to It at
2 Caines,

I

A mortgage upon a farm was foreclosed In chancery and advertised
for sale
by a master.
Before the sale, Brown, the
defendant, made an arrangement with the

length.

plaintiffs, the Lynches, whereby he agreed
to purchase the farm In for theh: benefit,
for which he was t* receive a stipulated
compensation.'
The mortgagee. In order to
favor the Lynches, agreed with Brown that
he might bid oft the property for about half
the amount of the mortgage.
Brown, at the
sale, prevented others bidding by representing that he intended to buy for the Lynches,
and he purchased the farm at the master's
sale for $1,500, about $1,000 below its value.
Afterward Brown refused to convey the farm
to the Lynches, or to account to them for
the value, although they tendered to him
the amount of his bid, witli interest, and the
sum agreed for his services.
And it was
held by the court of chancery that Brown
was a trustee for the Lynches, and had no
other Interest in the farm than that of mortgagee to secure the repayment of the purchase-money, and of the payment of the sum
agreed to be allowed him for his services.
And that the court of chancery would relieve against a fraud by converting the person guilty of it Into a trustee for those who
have been Injiured thereby.
Bmott, vice
chancellor, decreed for the plaintiffs, holding
the defendant had committed a fraud upon
the plaintiffs by agreeing to purchase for
their benefit, when, in truth, he meant to
purchase for himself, and that he bad committed a fraud upon the plaintiffs, by his
acts and representations, in preventing bidding at the sale.
And he proceeds to show,
by the citation of numerous authorities, that
a court of equity can provide adequate relief by declaring the purchaser a trustee for
And he quotes with
the person defrauded.
approbation the remarks of Lord Eldon, In

Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 626, where he
says:
"Upon the statute of frauds, though declaring that Interest shall not be barred except by writing, cases in this court are perfectly familiar, deciding that a fraudulent
use shall not be made of that statute; when
this court has Interfered against a party
meaning to make It an instrument of fraud,
and said he should not take advantage of
his own fraud, even though the statute has
declared that in case these circumstances do
not exist, the Instrument shall be absolutely
void." The chancellor affirmed the decree,
and observed, that the Lynches had an interest In the premises which they had a right
to protect and preserve, and it would have
been a gross fraud for any one to hold out
that he
to them, under such circumstances,
was bidding oft the property for their benefit, when he In fact intended to appropriate
it to his own use.
If the appellant did In fact
bid It off for them, under the agreement,
he held it In trust for them, and had no
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-other Interest In It than that of a mortgagee, to secvire the repayment of the purchase-money and the $60 agreed to be paid
him for his trouble. But if he had no such
intention,
and did not in fact Bid off the
property in trust for them, he was guilty of

a fraud which the court will relieve against.
The cases referred to by the circuit judge
fully establish the principle
(vice-chancellor),
that this court has power to relieve against
such fraud, and the means to be employed
is to convert the person who has gained an
advantage by means of his fraudulent act,
into a trustee for those who have been inThis case was cited with
jured thareby."
approbation in Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y.
239, and the principle of it adopted by this
court in that case.
Its principle was also adopted and approved of in Sandford v. Norris, decided at
special term of supreme court in May, 1859,
and affirmed at general term in the First
4 Abb. Dec. 144. In
district in June, 1861.
that case, certain premises were owned by
the plaintiffs husband, and he made an assignment thereof, and his assignees adverThe plaintifC was
tised the same for sale.
anxious to purchase them in at the sale, and
made an arrangement with the defendant,
Norris, by which he agreed to attend tha
sale and bid them off in his name for the
plaintiff, and on payment of the sum bid
In conseconvey the same to the plaintiff.
quence of this arrangement, the plaintiff refrained from bidding at the sale, and the
premises were struck off to the defendant
for the sum of $20, subject to the prior incumbrances.
The defendant subsequently
sold the premises so 'purchased for the sum
of $2,000, of which the plaintiff had received
one-half, and the action was brought to reIt was held that the
cover the residue.
plaintiff was entitled to recover, and that the
defense of the statute of frauds, interposed
by the defendant, was no bar to the relief
that the agreement
sought by the plaintiff;
was established beyond controversy, and the
defendant was bound as well by sound
morals as established principles of law to
On the hearing of
the performance of It.
that case, the opinion of Mr. Justice Emott,
In the case of Bergen v. Nelson (not reported), was read, distinctly affirming the doctrine of Brown v. Lynch, supra. The case
of Osborn v. Mason, before the vice-chancellor of the first circuit (not reported), also
affirming the doctrine of that case, was also
cited.

Mason in that case agreed with Osbom to
of certain premises, Osbom being either owner or a subsequent incumMason also having a claim upon
brancer.
Mason
the premises as an incumbrancer.
agreed to bid in the premises at the sale,
and then to let Osborn have them for the
amoimt at which they stood him in, including his own incumbrance. Mason bid off the
premises and then refused to fulfill his agreeattend a sale
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The vice-chanment which was by parol.
cellor held that the statute of frauds was no
bar to the suit for a specific performance of
the agreement which was decreed, and on
appeal to the chancellor the same was affirmed.
Voorhies v. SL John was argued
and decided in this court in December, 1863.
It was an action brought to recover moneys
by the defendant on a sale of a
received
house and lot in the city of New Tork, and
a leasehold estate in two buildings on other
lots therein, and for an account of the rents
and profits received therefrom.
The property had formerly belonged to the husband
of the plaintiff, and consisted of three parcels, and upon a sale thereof by his assignees, the plaintiff requested two of her
friends to attend the sale and bid off two
They subseof said parcels for her benefit
quentiy, at her request, transferred their bids
to the defendant, St. John, and he took the
conveyance therefor to himself, .and paid the
assignee for the same, declaring at the time
that the plaintiff wished him to buy that
property for her.
At the sale of the other
parcel, St. John attended the assignee's sale
and bid off the same himself, and the assignments of the two bids and the titles to
aU the three pieces of property made out
AU these
to him together in his own name.
acts were done by St John for Mrs. Voorhies, at her request and for her benefit.
The referee reported in favor of the plaintiff,
and the judgment thereon was affirmed at
the general term of the First district on the
authority of Sandford v. Norris, supra.
On
appeal to this court that Judgment was affirmed in December, 1863, and distinctly on
the ground that the statute of frauds was no
bar to the performance of the agreement.
We must hold this case as decisive of that
The same docnow under consideration.
trine has frequently been affirmed in othercases.

In Cox V. C!ox, 5 Rich. Eq. 365, the owner
of land, in danger of being summarily dispossessed by a sheriff's sale, agreed with his
brother, the defendant that the latter should
bid off the land and pay the bid and make
This agreea reconveyance on repayment
ment was declared to the bystanders at the
sale, and competition being thus prevented,
the land was bought by the brother for onetenth of its actual value. The whole transaction was alleged to be "a fraudulent contrivance on the part of the defendant to
obtain his brother's land for one-tenth of its
The court enjoined the defendant
value."
from proceeding at law under the titie thus
fraudulenUy obtained, saying:
"This court
has often repeated that the statute of frauds
should never be perverted to an instrument
of fraud. Thus, in a case of an agreement
such as the statute plainly declares void, if
not reduced to writing, yet if this was omitted by fraud, the defendant would not be
permitted to avail himself of the statute.
In Whitchurch v. Bevis, 2 Brown Ch. 565,
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Lord Thurlow says, If yon Interpose the
medium of fraud, by -whicli the agreement
Is prevented from being put in writing,
See Keith
agree the statute is inapplicable.
V. Purvis, 4 Desaus. Eq. 114."
In the case cited of Keith t. Purvis, a
creditor induced his debtor's agent not to
bid at a sale of his debtor's land by promising to give the debtor time to pay the debt,
and then to reconvey the land. This agreement was disclosed at the sale, and pre-

I

vented other bids, whereby the creditor
bought the land at one-third of its value, but
afterward refusing to reconvey, the debtor
brought his bill for relief. To this it was
objected that the agreement was void by the
statute of frauds; but the com:t held, "that
If the agreement was void, the creditor must
surrender up his advantage under it and be
liable to make good the loss sustained by the
"Can It
adverse party from his conduct"
be tolerated," says the court at page 121,
"that a creditor shall, at a sale of his debtor's property, lull him to sleep and keep off
other purchasers by an agreement under
which he buys in the land for a small sum
much below the value, and then that he
should declare that the agreement was void
under the statute of frauds, and that the
other party should have no benefit from the
agreement, whilst he reaped all the fruits?
Surely not Courts of justice would be blind
indeed if they could permit such a state of
things."
In Peebles v. Reading, 8 Serg. & R. 492,
the supreme court of Pennsylvania said: "If
by the artifice of the purchaser declaring he
was to buy for the owner, others were prevented from bidding, and the land was sold
at a great undervalue, this would make him
a trustee."
And in Trapnall v. Brown, 19
Ark. 49, property of the value of $5,000 was,
by agreement similar to the one in the present case, bought in for $176, other persons
declining to bid on being informed of the object of the agreement.
"Under these circumstances," the court said, "we think It
would be a fraud in the purchaser to keep
the property In violation of the agreement.

That the statute which was designed to prevent fraud would be used as a shield and in
the commission of fraud, which the courts
of equity wiU not tolerate. We think therefore that the court below did not err in
treating the purchaser as a trustee."
These
observations, made in these cases, are as pertinent to that now under consideration, asthey were in them.
Many of these cases
are identical in all Important particulars
with this, and there is no good reason why
the same rules of law and morals enunciated'
In them should not govern and control the
decision
in this case. The fact that an
agreement
is void, imder the statute of
frauds, does not entitle ^ther party to relief in eqiiity, but other facts may; and
when they do. It Is no answer to the claim
for relief, that the void agreement was one
of the instrumentahties through which the
fraud was effected.
Ormond v. Anderson, 2
Ball & B. 369. Where one of the parties to
a contract, void by the statute of frauds,
avails himself of its invalidity but unconscientlously appropriates what he has acquired under it, equity will compel restitution; and it constitutes no objection to the
claim, that the opposite party may happen
to secure the same practical benefit, through
the process of restitution, which would have
resulted from the observance of the void
Floyd v. Buckland, 2 Freem.
agreement
Ch. 268; Oldham v. Litchford, Id. 284; Devenlsh y. Baines, Finch, Prec 3; Tbynn v.
Thynn, 1 Vern. 296; Reech v. Kennegal, 1
Ves. Sr. 125; Davis v. Walsh, 2 Har. & J.
329; Wilcox v. Morris, 1 Murph. 116; Stoddard V. Hart, 23 N. T. 560.
It is very clear to <my mind, both upon
principle and authority, that the referee
erred In excluding the evidence offered, and
that the judgment must be reversed and a
new trial ordered, with costs to abide the
event

PORTER,
MORGAN,

WRIGHT,

JJ.,

concurred.

LEONARD,
HUNT, J.,

and
dis-

sented.

Judgment reversed,

and new trial ordered.
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EDWAEDS V. CULBE3RTS0N.
ae S. B. 233, 111 N. C. 342.)
^Supreme

Court of North Carolina.

Nov.

22,

1892.

Appeal from superior court, Chatham county; Whltaker, Judge.
Action by Samson ESdwards against Jennie Culbertson for money paid and for a
lien on land purchased therewith.
Judgment
for plaintiff for amount paid without a lien.
Plaintiff appeals.
Modified.
T. B. Womack, for appellant.
ning, for appellee.

John Man-

SHEPHERD, C. J. According to the finding of the jury the defendant fraudulently
obtained of the plaintiff the sum of $275.26,
for the purpose of purchasing the land described in the complaint, and that the fraud
consisted in "falsely and fraudulently promising and pretending that, if the plaintiff
would let her have the said sum of money
for said purpose, she would marry him in a
very short time, and that the land to be purchased with the said money should be in
lieu of her right of dower which she would
acquire" by the said marriage. Upon this
verdict, his honor rendered
a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff for the recovery of the
obtained,
amount so fraudulently
but refused to declare it a charge upon the land
purchased by the defendant with the said
money, the land still remaining in her hands.
Were there nothing more than a mere promise to marry, it is plain that a violation of
it would not entitle the plaintiff to any equitable relief, but we must infer from the ver^ct that the defendant did not intend to perform the promise at the time it was made,
and that, she intended it, as well as the
additional agreement to hold the land in lieu
of dower, simply as a trick or contrivance
by which to cheat and defraud the plaintiff
of his money. By submitting to the verdict
and judgment, the defendant (even if she
could successfully do so) is precluded from
denying that she obtained the money under
which the law denounces as
circumstances
fraudulent, and, this being so, it cannot be
doubted that if the specific money had been
retained by her and could have been identified, the plaintiff. In a proper action, could
have recovered it If this be true, why may
not the money be traced into the land and declared to be a charge thereupon? This is a
somewhat novel question in this state, but
in view of well-settlea equitable principles,
as well as authoritieB in other jurisdictions,
it is believed to be unattended with any very
serious difficulty.
The only decision of this court to which
we have been referred as bearing upon the
question is that of Campbell v. Drake, 4
Ired. Eq. 94.
The plaintiff filed a bill in
■equity against the heirs at law of one Farrow, praying that they be declared trustees
•of certain land purchased by their ancestor
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with money stolen by him of the plaintiff
while in the employment of the latter as his
clerk. The court said that it was "not at all
like the cases of dealings vylth trust funds
by trustees,
executors,
guardians, factors,
and the like, in which the owner of the fund
may elect to take either the money or that
in which it was invested;" and it was accordingly held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the particular relief asked for. It
was strongly intimated, however, by RuflBn,
C. J., in delivering the opinion,
that the
plaintiff might "have the land declared liable
as a security for the money laid out for it."
It was not stated upon what principle this
could be done, but we apprehend that it was
upon the general proposition that,
based
whenever a person has obtained the property
of another by fraud, he is a trustee ex maleficio for the person so defrauded, for the purpose of recompense
or indemnity.
"One of
the most common cases," remarks Judge Story, "in which a court of equity acts upon the
ground of implied trusts in invitum, is when
a party receives money which he cannot conscientiously withhold from, another party."
Story, Eq. Jur. § 1255.
And he states it to
be a general principle that "whenever the
property of a party has been wrongfully misapplied, or a trust fund has been wrongfully converted into another species of property, if its identity can be traced, it will be
held in its new form liable to the rights of
the original owner, or cestui que trust."
Id.
§ 1258; Hill, Trustees, 222; Whitley v. Foy,
6 Jones, Eq. 34; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule
& S. 562; KnatchbuU v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div.
696; People v. City Bank, 96 N. Y. 32; National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54.
Mr. Pomeroy says: "In general, whenever
the legal title to property, real or personal,
has been obtained through actual fraud, or
through any other circumstances which render it unconscientious for the holder of the
legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial
interest, equity imposes a constructive trust
on the property thus acquired in favor of the
one who is truly and equitably entitled to the
same, although he may never, perhaps, have
had any legal estate therein, and a court of
equity has jurisdiction to reach the property
either in the hands of the original wrongdoer or in the hands of any subsequent holder, until a purchaser in good faith and vrithout notice acquires a higher right, and takes
the property relieved from the trust. The
forms and varieties of these trusts, which are
termed 'ex maleficlo' or 'ex delicto,' are practically vfithout limit. The prindi^e is applied whenever It is necessary for the obtaining
of complete justice, although the law may also give the remedy of damages against the
wrongdoer." Pom. Eq. Jur. 1053.
A confidential relation is not necessary to establish such trust, and there is no good reason
why the owner of property taken and converted by one who has no right to its possession should be less favorably situated in
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a court of equity, in respect to his remedy, (at least for the purpose of "recompense or indemnity,") than one who by an
abuse of trust has been injured by the wrongful act of a ti'ustee to whom the possession
"The
of trust property has been confided.
beautiful character—pervading excellence, if
one may say so— of equity jurisprudence,"
says Judge Story, "is that it varies its adjustments and proportions so as to meet the
very form and pressure of each particular
habitudes." The
case in all its complex
trusts of which we are speaking are not what
is known as "technical trusts," and the
ground of relief in such cases is, strictly
speaking, fraud, and not trust. Equity declares the trust in order that it may lay its
hand upon the thing and wrest it from the
This principle
possession of the wrongdoer.
is distinctly recognissed by our leading text
writers, and it Is said by Mr. Bispham (Bisp.
Eq. 92) that "equity makes use of the machinery of a trust for the purpose of affording redress in cases of fraud." The principles above stated are illustrated by many decisions to be found in the reports of other
states, and as our case may easily be assimilated to those in which money or other property has been stolen and converted, such
cases must be recognized as pertinent authority in the present investigation. In Nevrton
V. Porter, 69 N. X. 133, it was held that the
owner of negotiable securities, stolen and afterwards sold by the thief, may follow and
claim the proceeds in the hands of the felonious taker or of his assignee with notice;
and that this right continues and attaches to
any securities or property in which the proceeds are invested, so long as they can be
The law, it was said,
traced and identified.

"will raise a trust in Invltum out of thetransaction, in order that the substituted
property may be subjected to the purposesof indemnity and recompense."
Andrews, J.,
said that "equity only stops the pursuit when
the means of ascertainment fails, or the
rights of bona fide purchasers for value,,
without notice of the trust, have Intervened.
The relief will be molded and adapted to thecircumstances of the cases, so as to protect
the rights of the true owner." Lane v. Digbton, Amb. 409; Mansell v. ManseU, 2 P.
Wms. 679; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511;
Perry, Trusts, § 829; Story, Eq. Jur. § 1258.
In Bank v. Barry, 125 Mass. 20, it was held
that equity vrill charge land, paid for in part
with the proceeds of stolen property, vrith a
trust in favor of the owner of the property
for the amount so used. In Humphreys v.
Butler, 51 Ark. 351, 11 S. W. Rep. 479, the
defendant, in paying for a house and lot
purchased by him for $400, vrrongfuUy used
$149.52 belonging to the plaintiff, and of
which he had obtained possession without
her authority, knowledge,
or consent. The
court declared the defendant a trustee to
the extent of the money of the plaintiff used
byHiim, and charged the same upon the property, and in default of its payment by a certain time decreed that the same be sold to
satisfy the said lien. These and other authorities that could be cited abundantly sustain the intimation of Chief Justice Ruffln, towhich we have referred, and we are therefore of the opinion that the money fraudulently obtained of the plaintiff may be followed into the land described in the complaint, and that the judgment of his honor
should be so modified as to declare It to be
a charge upon the same. Hodlfled.
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Appeal from suiTogate court, Kings county.

The facts of the case
of the court.

are stated In the

opinion

Geo. H. Starr and Samuel D. Morris,
William N. Dykman, for
appellants.
spondents.

FINCH,

J.

The testatrix

for
re-

gave to three

persons, who were her lawyer, her doctor
and her priest, absolutely, but as Joint tenants, the bulk of her estate.
Practically
she disinherited her relatives in favor of
who had no claim upon her
strangers,
bounty, except such as originated in their

professional characters, and the confidence
For this
and friendship thus engendered.
reason probate of the will was resisted.
While the testatrix was shown to^have been
whimsical, blindly devoted to
superstitious,
her church and its ecclesiastics, habitually
under the influence of stimulants, and seriously dependent upon the advice of those
who became her residuary legatees,
it is
yet certain that there was no want of testamentary capacity.
But although the attack failed upon that ground, the charge of
undue influence was somewhat supported
by the evidence relating to her character
and surroundings,
which made possible
and tended to render probable the existence of an outside power capable of moulding her wishes to its own.
The exigency
of the proponents some adedemanded
quate
and
reasonable explanation
of a
diversion of the estate to strangers holding the power and influence derived from
relations, consistent with the
confidential
free action and untrammeled
exercise of
the testamentary intention.
The explanation came. A letter of instruction, addressed to the residuary legatees, contemporaneous with the will, and dictating the purpose as well as explaining the reason of the
absolute legacy,
was produced upon the
hearing.
These written instructions demonstrated that the residuary clause was not
by the testatrix to pass to the
intended
legatees any beneficial interest. The absolute devise, on its face difficult of explanation except upon a theory of undue influence, thereby lost its suspicious character
and put the legatees in more of a disinterested attitude.
It appeared that the testatrix did not at all desire or intend to bestow her estate upon those to whom she
gave it; that her real intention was to devote it to certain charitable purposes; that
these, she was advised, could not effectively
be accomplished by her will, except through
an absolute devise to individuals, in whose
action she could confide; and,
honorable
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therefore, and for that reason, and to effect that ulterior purpose, she gave her estate in form to the professional friends, not
meaning any beneficial legacy to them or
for their use. With this development of the
defense the attack took on a new phase.
The heirs at law and next of kin began an
action in equity to set aside and annul the
residuary devise and bequest, or to establish a trust, which, failing as to the intended beneficiaries, should result to those who
would otherwise have taken by descent or
distribution.
Both cases are now before us,
and it is convenient to consider them together, since our conclusion in one may
tend seriously to afCect the result in the
other.
The proof is uncontradicted that the testatrix made the residuary devise and bequest
in its absolute and unconditional form in
reliance upon a promise of the legatees to
apply the fund faithfully and honorably to
the charitable uses dictated in the letter of
instructions. It does
not disprove this
statement to assert that no express promise
to that effect was made, or that it was the
pledge of Judge McCue alone. One of the
legatees. Father McGuire, is dead, and the
title is in the two survivors, and it is with
them only that we need to deal. The trial
judge did, indeed, find as a fact that Dr.
Dudley did not know until after testatrix's
death that the unattested letter of instructions existed, but he certainly did know before the will was made the character of
the intended disposition; that he was selected as one of the executors;
that the
relatives by blood were to take but a trifle,
and that the bulk of the estate was to be
applied to charitable purposes by the executors; and with this knowledge he accepted the proposed trust. The trial judgefurther finds that Judge McCue "made no
promise to obtain the bequest or devise and
practiced no fraud." This finding is assailed, but unsuccessfully so far as It frees
the legatees from a charge of actual fraud.
In that respect we agree that there was no
evil or selfish intention on their part. But
the finding that Judge McCue "made no
promise to obtain the bequest or devise"
cannot be sustained. If anything is rendered certain by the evidence it is that the
testatrix made the absolute devise and bequest upon the suggestion of a necessity
therefor by Judge McCue, and upon the understanding that he and his associates
would faithfully and honorably carry out
her expressed Intentions. If we say that
McCue made no such promise, that he came
under no such honorable obligation, then we
must say that the testatrix was misled into
a false belief, upon which, as true, she unmistakably acted. For it is not possible to
doubt that If the legatees had said—we
will not promise; we will do as we please;
we will not be even honorably bound not to
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take this money for on. selves—the absolute
bequest would never have been made. It
matters little that McCue did not make in
and express promise.
words a formal
Everything
that he said and everything
that he did was full of that interpretation.
When the testatrix was told that the legal
effect of the will was such that the legatees could divert the fund to their own use,
which was a statement of their power, she
was told also that she would only have
their honor and conscience on which to rely,
and answered that she could trust them;
which was an assertion of their duty.
Where in such ease the legatee, even by
silent acquiescence,
encourages
the testatrix to make a bequest to him to be by him
applied for the benQfit of others, it has all
the force and effect of an express promise.
Wallgrave
v. Tebbs, 2 Kay & J. 321;
Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 405.
If he
does not mean to act in accord with the declared expectation which underlies and induces
the devise, he is bound to say so,
for his silent acquiescence
is otherwise a
fraud. Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 204.
So far then as McCue is concerned he
stands in the attitude of having procured
and induced the testatrix to make a devise
or bequest to himself and his associates, by
asserting its necessity and promising faithfully to carry out the charitable purposes
for which it wits made, and whether his associates
knew or promised, or did not,
makes no difference where the devise Is to
them as joint tenants, and all must get their
rights through the result accomplished by
one.
Kowbotham v. Dunnett, 8 Oh. Div.
430; Hooker v. Oxford, 33 Mich. 453; Russell V. Jackson, 10 Hare, 206. If, therefore,
in her letter of instructions, the testatrix
had named some certain and definite beneficiary, capable of taking the provision intended, the law would fasten upon the legatee a trust for such beneficiary and enforce
it. If needed, on the ground of fraud. Equity acts in such case not because of a
trust declared by the testator, but because
of the fraud of the legatee. For him not
to carry out the promise by which alone he
procured the devise and bequest, is to perpetrate a fraud upon the devisor which
equity will not endure. The authorities on
this point are numerous. Thynn v. Thynn,
1 Vem. 296; Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Freem.
284; Reech v. Kennegal, 1 Ves. Sr. 124;
Podmore v. Gunning, 5 Sim. 485; Muckleston V. Brown, 6 Ves. 52; Hoge v. Hoge, 1
Watts, 163; McKee v. Jones, 6 Pa. St. 425;
Dowd V. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197; Hooker v.
Oxford, 33 Mich. 454; Williams v. Vreeland,
32 N. J. Eq. 135.
The circumstances In
these cases were varied and sometimes peculiar, but all of them either recognize or
enforce the general doctrine. It has been
twice applied in our own state.
Brown v.
Lynch, 1 Paige, 147; WiUiams v. Fitch, 18

N. Y. 546. In the last of these cases the
making of a bequest to the plaintiff was prevented by an agreement of the father, who
was next of kin, to hold In trust for the
plaintiff; and the English cases were cited
with approval and the trust enforced. All
along the line of discussion it was steadily
claimed that a plain and unambiguous devise in a will could not be modified or cut
down by extrinsic matter lying in parol, or
unattested papers, and that the statute of
frauds and that of wills excluded the evidence; and all along the line It was steadily
answered that the devise was untouched,
that it was not at all modified, that the
property passed under It, but the law dealt
with the holder for his fraud, and out of
the facts raised a trust, ex malefldo, instead of resting upon one as created by the
testator. The character of the fraud which
justifies the equitable interference is well
described In Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass.
40.
It was said to consist "in the attempt to
take advantage of that which has been done
in performance or upon the faith of the
agreement
while repudiating its obligation
under cover of the statute."
Yet that is not the position of the defendants here. By their answer they deny any
promise, whatever, made by them; any
trust accompanying the request; any agreement to hold for the benefit of others; and
Insist that the property is theirs "for their
own use and disposal."
Yet this is evidently intended merely aa
an assertion of what they insist is their
legal position, and is not meant as a repudiation of their promise or its honorable
obligation, and no beneficiary claiming any
such violation of duty, or even as threatened or Intended, is before us.
But It may happen, as It does happen
here, that all of the charitable uses enjoined are for the benefit of those incapable of taking, or of a character in direct
violation of the law of the state. What
then becomes the duty of a court of equity?
A fraud remains, except that It takes on
graver proportions, and becomes more certain and inevitable. The agreement which
induced the absolute device, and the fraud
of a beneficial holding secured by a contrary promise, still confront us. And what
is worse. It does not need that the absolute legatees repudiate their promise, for It
ever so honorably willing to perform it, they
cannot do so without setting at defiance and
secretly evading the law and general policy
of the state.
The alternative is plain, and
If the legatees
offers no chance of escape.
repudiate their obligations, that is a fraud
upon the dead woman, who acted upon the
faith of their promise. If they are willing
to perform they cannot perform, except by
a fraud upon the law to which they and the
testatrix are equally parties.
In such a case the fraud remains and ex-
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In Its character as to the testatrix, but an injury to the lieir at law and
next of kin Instead of an identified and caAnd it becomes not only
pable beneficiary.
a fraud against them, but a fraud upon the
law, since it is a declared and admitted effort to accomplish by a secret trust what
could not on the face of the will be done at
If, on the ground of fraud, equity, as
all.
it has often done, and will always do, fastens a trust ex maleficio upon the fraudulent legatee or devisee for the protection of
a named and definite beneficiary, no reason
can be given why it should not do the same
tiling when the fraud attempted assumes a
more serious character, because aimed at an
evasion of the law, and seeking the shelter
In such event, if
of unauthorized purposes.
equity withholds Its power, one of two things
either the legatee holds the
is accomplished;
estate beneficially, which is a fraud upon
the testatrix and the Intended objects of her
bounty, or the fund Is devoted to unauthorized purposes. In fraud of the law, and of
If a trust ex
the heirs and next of kin.
maleficio may be fastened upon the property in the hands of the fraudulent legatee
in the one case, why not also in the other?
If in the one the fraud grows out of a refusal to perform, which would be the voluntary act of the legatee repudiating his promin the other it
ise, and so an actual fraud;
grows out of the impossibility of performance, except in defiance of the public law,
In neither event
which is legally a fraud.
can the legatee honestiy hold.
In both, either fraud triumphs, or equity defeats It
through the operation of a trust, and protects those justly entitled.
And so are the
In Jones v. Badley, L. R. 3 Bq. Cas.
cases.
635, the suit was by the co-heiresses
and
next of kin to make the defendants trustees
for them, on the ground that a devise made
to them of a residue absolute on Its face
was, in fact, for charitable purposes in violation of the mortmain act, and made on the
faith of an agreement by the legatees that
they would make such application.
One of
them was the confidential medical adviser
of the testatrix; the devise to the two was
In joint tenancy; no purposed or intentional
dishonesty
was charged against them; instead of wholly repudiating their duty, they
alleged In their answer a design to carry out
the charitable purposes; and yet the court
did not hesitate on the ground of fraud to
fasten a trust upon the property in their
hands for the benefit of the heir and next of
kin. WaUgrave v. Tebbs, 2 Kay & J. 313,
321, and Russell v. Jackson,
10 Hare, 207,
were cited with approval.
The latter case
was a bUl filed by the next of kin, alleging
that the absolute devise of a residue was
upon a secret trust either for charitable or
illegal purposes.
The court so held as to
the proceeds of the freehold and leasehold
estates, and because the dispositions "could
Ists, identical
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not by law take effect," declared the devisees trustees for the heir and next of kin.
In Muckleston v. Brown, 6 Ves. 63, 65, Lord
Eldon intimated that where the devisees
took under an agreement to hold upon such
trusts as the testator should declare, but he
omitted to declare any, there would be a
trust to the heir which equity would decree;
and added, as to a case of evasion of the
statute, the pointed inquiry: "Is the court
to feel for Individuals, and not to feel for
the whole of its own system, and compel a
discovery of frauds that go to the root of
its whole system?"
In Schultz's Appeal, 80
Pa. St 405, the plaintiff failed solely for
want of proof of an agreement by the legatee
Inducing the devise; and the same difficulty
existed In Rowbotham v. Dunnett, 8 Ch. Div.
430; and as to three of the four tenants in
common in Tee v. Ferris, 2 Kay & J. 367;
but all confirm the general doctrine asserted.
It Is needed now that we consider the character of the charitable uses upon which these
legatees agreed to hold the residuary estate.
The testatrix began her letter of Instructions
by saying: "I am desirous of accomplishing
certain purposes, some of which at least cannot be legally carried out by express provisions of my will; and, therefore, in order
more certainly to effect my purposes I have
constituted you such residuary devisees and
legatees." The first purpose indicated is to
"set apart" the Income of $20,000 to the
ecclesiastical education of poor young men
for the Roman Catholic priesthood. She directed that this provision be made "a permanent one" and that the legatees make
such arrangements that after their death
the income should continue so to be appropriated. This purpose contemplated and required that the principal of the fund should
be held inalienable and without an absolute
power of disposition during the three lives
of the legatees and for an indefinite period
beyond. During this period the legal title
to both the real and personal property would
remain in the trustees and they pay over
the income, and after the death of two the
survivor was directed In some undefined
manner to provide for the continuance of
The plan viosuch income In the future.
lated the statute against perpetuities both
as to real and personal estate, and the active
trust was unlimited in its duration.
Schettler V. Smith, 41 N. X. 334; Adams v. Perry,
43 N. Y. 497; Garvey v. McDevItt, 72 N. Y.
What the respondent replies is that
561.
"the legatees may hand over the designated
sum to an incorporated college" engaged in
educating that class of young men.
But the
testatrix neither authorized nor contemplatShe chose her trustees
ed any such thing.
for three lives, and no other was to be substituted till the death of the third, and then
there might be another will, with an absolute bequest of the $20,000 to three other
trustees, all honorable men, acting under a
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letter of Instructions, and so the process go
If,
on In evasion and defiance of the law.
Indeed, the testatrix Intended a gift to a
college corporation, that could have been
She could have made the
done by her -will.
devise or bequest without the risk of depending on some one's honor that the fund
would not be diverted to private use, so
that, in so far as this devise or bequest was
represented to require an absolute devise or
Dequest to Individuals, she was either misled or deceived, or else did not intend a gift
to
a college corporation. The legatees,
therefore, cannot perform their promise as
they made it and as the testatrix understood
't without violating the law of the state
igainst perpetuities.
The letter of instruction then proceeds:
'I desire $3,000 set apart, the Income whereat shall be applied to the purchase of shoes
for poor children attending the parochial
schools of St. Paul's K. C. Church, Brooklyn."
This provision offends in the same
way with the first as to the duration of the
trust with also the difficulty that the beneficiaries are Indeterminate. Levy v. Levy,
Again the respondent answers,
33 N. Y. 99.
1)oth as to this clause and the one following
which requires "$3,000 set apart for the St
Vincent de Paul Society connected with St
Paul's Church," that the church is incorporated, "and will receive $6,000 with a request from the residuary legatees to use
one-half the income to purchase shoes for
poor children attending the parochial school."
The request would bind nobody.
What the
testatrix directed waj» not a gift to the
church, but an application by her own chosen trustees of Income to the two specified
purposes.
And If she intended the disposition now suggested, once more it is true that
she could have given $6,000 to the church
corporation with a request as to the supply
05 shoes quite as well as her legatees can
do It, and there was no need of the absolute
devise and bequest represented to exist
Then follow these provisions, viz.: "The
sum of $3,000 for the benefit of the Home of
the Good Shepherd, and the sum of $5,000
for the Little Sisters of the Poor, both in
Brooklyn."
It is said that these two societies are incorporated, but they may not
be entitled to the principal. If the trustees
refuse it for the latter are authorized to
"limit the use of said bequests to the Income
thereof." And again the observation recurs
that a bequest to these corporations could
easily have been made in the wlU If that had
been understood to be the real intention.
Finally the letter prescribes that any residue of the fund remaining should be applied
"in aid" of the charities and purposes named
In the will or in the letter, "or in any other
charity which you or a majority of you may
prefer." The respondent says that just such
a provision as this in the body of a will has
been upheld.
Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y.

That is not true. On the contrary this
court has very jrecently declined to carry the
doctrine of that case beyond its own essential limits, and is not likely to agree that a
devise may become the mere equivalent of
a general power of attorney. Prlchard v.
Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76.
All through this letter the duty of the
legatees is denominated a "trust" the gifts
provided are sometimes called "bequests,"
and at its close, after charging the legatees
to impose upon her beneficiaries "as far as
you can" the "obligation" of "'the offering
of the holy sacrifice of the mass" in her own
behalf and that of certain named relatives,
she expresses
her own sense of the force
and character of her letter in the concluding
sentence, "I desire to give to these instructions all the force and solemnity of a last
will and testajnent."
This letter of instructions clearly and unmistakably shows the real nature of the
transaction. The writer leaves almost nothing to the discretion of the trustees.
She selects out her own objects of charity in the
main, describes them In detail, fixes the
amounts to be given and impresses upon her
directions the "solemnity of a last wiU and
testament." It Is not at all the case of a
devise to one absolutely to be expended at
his discretion, but a definite and distinct
trust having in view specific purposes and
contemplating their precise performance.
If we construed this document to mean
such dispositions as are now asserted, we
should be driven to the inevitable inferraiee
that every one of them could have been
easily, and safely, and perfectly made in the
will Itself, and that when told to the contrary by Judge McCue the testati-ix was told
what was utterly untrue, and what a jury
might easily believe was known to be untrue, and so that the testatrix was led, by
deception and fraud, to Incur the danger and'
peril of an absolute devise and bequest— a
conclusion which would destroy the will as
the product of fraud. We do not believe
that. Justice to two honorable men, of character and standing, forbids any such theory.
Nothing about the case calls upon us for a
conclusion so harsh and needless.
On the
contrary, we think Judge McCue told the
truth to the testatrix, and that truth was
that she could not tie up her estate in the
hands of individuals perpetually, they distributing only the Income, without violating
the law of the state, and that she must
either give up the purpose or depend for its
accomplishment upon an absolute devise accompanied by a secret trust.
We have thus an important question
squarely presented.
If equity will not touch
this devise by putting a trust for the heirs
at law and next of kin upon the fund in the
hands of these legatees, the road to an
evasion of our statutes, and to the temptations of necessity or greed, will be left wide
602.
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While In such cases it has been well transfers made in that manner are prohibited
open.
said that the court should act with caution and made void.
The principal legatee in
and only upon the clearest proof of the this case knew it, and it was distinctly planfraud (Collins v. Hope, 20 Ohio, 501), yet ned between him and the testatrix that her
when, as here, the facts are proved beyond understood and declared purpose, which
reasonable question, we ought not to hesi- could not be lawfully carried out by a devise
The testatrix did intend an absolute on the face of the will, should be effected
tate.
devise to these legatees on the face of the by an absolute devise coupled with his honwill; but she did not Intend that they should orable obligation to hold and appropriate the
An evasion of
have the resultant beneficial interest, and re- property to forbidden uses.
lied upon their promise to carry its fruits the law was the very occasion and object
They do not refuse to perform. of the absolute devise.
Without that it
elsewhere.
Although they deny the promise, it is quite could not have been suggested without a
possible that they mean to keep it.
We are fraud upon the testatrix, for if there was no
not authorized to say or suspect that they need of it, if no statute was to be avoided or
will not, but If they do, they must inevitably flanked, the very suggestion of an absolute
carry out a planned and purposed evasion devise was fraudulent

of our statutes against perpetuities.
It is said, however, and that brings us to
the decisive point in the case; that the English authorities turned upon the fact that because of the statutes of mortmain the lands
devised upon an honorable promise by the
absolute devisee to dispense them in charity,
could not by any process or In any mode be
carried to that destination without violating
the law, while in this case the charity Is
not prohibited, but only certain modes of its
operation.
Let us test this suggestion.
The statutes of mortmain were numerous,
and followed each other In a succession as
rapid as the devices and evasions of the ecclesiastics which they were framed to overthrow, until by the Act 9 Geo. n. c. 36, It
was ordained that no lands or tenements, or
money to be laid out thereon, should be given for or charged with any charitable uses
whatsoever,
unless by deed intended, executed in the presence of two witnesses and
maue at least one year before the death of
the party and registered in a prescribed manner.
While under this statute a devise of
land was forbidden to charitable uses, It
could be so devoted by a deed inter vivos,
and In each of the cases we have cited, the
absolute devisee, acting as owner, could by
indenture have transferred to charity the
land he had taken as devisee.
But that did
not serve to ward off 9, trust ex maleflcio in
any single instance. The result was plainly
apparent that the property of the testator,
by the artifice of an absolute devise coupled
with a secret agreement, had been carried
to a charity in defiance of the public law and
in fraud of the mortmain acts. These acts
did not, therefore, absolutely and totally forThey
bid gifts of land to charitable uses.
put their prohibition not on the gift, but on
They forbade it by will
the manner of It.
or devise.
It is a similar prohibition upon
the manner of gifts or transfers which our
law imposes.
While it is true, as was said
at special term In the very able opinion contained in the record, that our statute does
not forbid charitable devises and bequests,
it does forbid expressly and imperatively a
Gifts or
certain manner of making them.

The question here Is the character of the
agreement and precisely that and
They
nothing else must serve as a test.
agreed for three lives, tmder the pretense of
ownership, to dole out the income of this
fund to indeterminate persons of their selection; at the end of three lives in some manner to continue that process, making it permanent; and to dispense a possible surplus
That
to any charities they might choose.
precise agreement, the one which they made,
on the faith of which the testatrix acted,
they must honorably and explicitly carry out
or else they have defrauded her; and if
they do carry it out as they agreed and as
she understood it, they tie the property up
for three lives and an uncertain period beyond, and so violate and defy the law.
We are not ready to concede that our statute against . perpetuities is any the less
sacred than the English acts of mortmain,
It may
or may be evaded with impunity.
possibly be that the evils of such evasion
are greater In the one case than In the other,
but that will not justify us in shutting our
eyes to the process, or holding that equity
stands helpless in presence of the fraud.
The learned presiding judge at the general
term, while afQrmIng this judgment formally that it might more swiftly come to our
bar, sent with it a very wise and prudent
caution.
He said: "It seems clear to us
that the law ought not to encourage arrangements for the disposition of property by testators, such as this case discloses." In Wallgrave V. Tebbs, supra, the vice-chancellor
said that "the duty of a devisee under the
circumstances stated was to throw up the
Any devise or bequest of this
property."
character is dangerous and indefensible.
It
exposes testators to the suggestion of unnecessary difficulties as inducements to the artifice of an absolute devise concealing an illegal trust.
It exposes the devisee to temptation and even when he acts honestly, to
severe and unrelenting criticism.
It subserves no good or useful purpose. If we
sustain it we admit that any statute may
be thus evaded, and that equity cannot redress the wrong.
legatees'
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We are not satisfied that the will

special term, with frosts of both parties on
the appeal to this court, payable out of the
fund, and ordor a new trial.
All concur as to the first appeal. All concur as to the second, except RAPALLO,
But in the equity action we reverse the not voting.
judgment of the general term and of the
Judgments according!
was

made through undue influence and therefore
aflarm the judgment of the general term
which affirmed the decree of the surrogate,
with costs.

.r.

J,

OONSTHUCTIVE TRUSTS.
CURDY

v.

BERTON.

(21 Pac.

(Na

June 4, i880.

Appeal from superior
Department 2.
city and county of San Prancisco;

court,

John Htjnt, Judge.
Action by Frank Curdy against G. A. Berton, executor of Francis Berton, deceased, to
Judgdeclare a trust, and for an accounting.
ment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
D. W.
D. M. Delmas, for appellant.
Douthitt and Smith, Wright & Fomeroy, for
respondent.

J.

McFarland,
Madeline Curdy died
February 9, 1877, in Alameda county, Cal.
Slie left a will duly executed, in which, after
the
bequests to several persons, including
plaintiff herein, there occurs the following:
"I give in trust to Francis Berton, now Swiss
consul in San Francisco, all the moneys
possess in France, and principally my share
of the Italian rentes deposited in the bankinghouse of Messrs. Hentsch, Lutscber & Co.,
of Paris, to be distributed according to the
give him." Berton
private instructions
was present when the will was made, and
wrote it for the testatrix at her request; and
at tlie time of the making of the will she verbally instructed him to distribute said property or its proceeds to certain relations and
others in France, other than the plaintiff
lierein, and gave him an order for said propThe facts in proof show that he at
erty.
least impliedly agreed to accept the trust.
After her death, and before the commencement of this action, said Berton faithfully
distributed said property in accordance with
the said instructions of said testatrix.
Ttiis
action is brought by plaintiff, a brother of
the deceased, and one of her heirs-at-law, to
have it decreed that Berton held the legal
title to said property in trust for the heirs of
said deceased, for an accounting, and for the
payment to him of his proportionate share of
said property, with interest, profits, etc.
Francis Berton died during the pendency of
the action, and his executor, George A. Berton,
was substituted as defendant.
The court
gave judgment for defendant, and plaintiff
appeals from the judgment, and from an order denying a new trial.
Upon the main point in the case the position of appellant is, in brief, that, as the statute law of this state requires a will to be in
writing, therefore, "where a testator devises
property in trust to be applied to such uses
as the testator has verbally specified to the
devisee, the trust attempted to be created by
parol fails, and the devisee takes the property
in trust for the heirs of the testator."
The
contention of respondent is, in brief, that,
independent
of the statute of wills, where
a testator bequeaths property in trust to a
legatee witliout specifying in the will the
purposes of the trust, and at the same time
communicates
those purposes to the lega-

I

I

orally, or by unattested writings, and
the legatee, either expressly or by silent acquiescence,
promises to perform the trust,
and the trust itself is not unlawful, there a
court of equity will raise a constructive trust
in favor of the beneficiaries intended by the
testator, and will charge the legatee as a constructive trustee for them, upon the ground
that the legatee will not be countenanced in
perpetrating a fraud by encouraging the testator to make a bequest which would not
otiierwise have been made, and then refusing to execute his promise. We think that
respondent's view of the law, as above stated,
is correct. There are some cases which support the proposition of appellant, notably,
the case of Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221;
but the weight of authority and the better
reason are the other way.
Obviously, the clear intention of the testatrix, as expressed in the written will, was
that the property in question should not go
He, however, says, in effect:
to plaintiff.
"True, the property was not to come to me.
It was given to Berton upon the understanding, between him and the testatrix,' that it
was to go to the benefit of certain other persons; but, as they cannot establish their
rights as beneficiaries, according to the statute of wills, Berton must be held to be my
trustee, against the intention of the testatrix.
claim to be the dry law."
1 stand upon what
Evidently, in a doubtful case, no just impulse would move a court to lean towards a
proposition involving such consequences;
and, as the question is an open one in this
state, we are at liberty to follow those authorities, and that line of reasoning which
appear to us to be most in consonance with
the true principles of equity and justice.
We find in the Case of O'Hara, 95 N. T.
403, a very full statement of the considerations which, in our opinion ought to govern
In that case
the decision of the case at bar.
the testatrix, by her will, practically disinherited her relations in favor of strangers,
giving the bulk of her estate to three legatees, who were her lawyer, her doctor, and
The will was attacked by the
hei priest.
neirs, on tlie ground of want of testamentary
capacity and undue influence. As there
was considerable evidence to support these
charges, the legatees finally, to establish some
reasonable explanation of a diversion of the
estate to strangers having influence from
confidential relations, showed that they were
not to have any beneficial interest in the
estate, but were to devote it entirely to certain chai'itable uses, according to instructions
given them by the testatrix at the time the
will was made. It appeared, however, that
these charitable uses were in direct violation
of the statute law of the state. Tlie heirs at
law then began an action in equity to establish a trust, which, failing as to the intended
beneficiaries on account of illegality, should
result to them. The legatees then, although
intending to carry out the wishes of the testatrix, stood upon their rights under the
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terms of the will, which upon its face gave
the property absolutely; denied that
they had accepted any trust, or that any
could be proven by extrinsic matter lying
outside the will; and insisted that the property was theirs absolutely. The question
thus presented was, In substance, the one
The only difference is that
presented here.
in the O'Hara Case the instructions were in
writing, while in the case at bar they were
oral. But neither in the argument of counsel, nor in the opinion of the court, was there
any distinction made between written and
oral instructions or promises. The principles
announced applied equally to both. There
was no claim that the letter of instructions
came within the rule that an extraneous paper may be incorporated into a validly executed will by a direct reference to it in the
will itself. There was no reference whatever in the will. to the letter. The court in
the O'Hara Case, after stating that "the
proof is uncontradicted that the testatrix
made the residuary devise and bequest in its
absolute and unconditional form in reliance
upon a promise of the legatees to apply the
fund faithfully and honorably to the charitable uses dictated in the letter of instructions," proceeds to discuss the question
whether or not one of the legatees, McCue,
expressly promised to accept the trust. After
reviewing the evidence (which was somewliat contradictory) on that point, the court
"
says; Whei:e, in such case, the legatee, even
the tesby silent acquiescence, encourages
tatrix to make a bequest tohini, to be applied
by him to the benefit of others, it has all the
force and effect of an express promise. Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 Kay & J. 321; Schultz'
Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 405. It he does not mean
to act in accord with the declared expectation which underlies and induces the devise,
he is bound to say so, for his silent acquiesBussell v. Jackcence is otherwise a fraud.
" The court then proceeds
son , 10 Hare, 204.
to state the principles which should determine the main question under discussion, as
follows: "If, therefore, in her letter of instruction the testatrix had named some certain and definite beneficiary, capable of taking the provision intended, the law would
fasten upon the legatee a trust for such
beneficiary, and enforce it, if needed, on the
Equity acts, in such case,
ground of fraud.
not because of a trust declared by the testator, but because of the fraud of the legatee.
For him not to carry out the promise by
which alone he procured the devise and bequest is to perpetrate » fraud upon the devisor, which equity wUl not endure. The
authorities on this point are numerous."
(Here follows a long list of cases.) "The
circumstances in these cases were varied and
sometimes
peculiar, but all of them either
recognize or enforce the general doctrine. It
has been twice applied in our own state.
Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige, 147; Williams v.
Fitch, 18 N. Y. 546. In the last of these
cases the making of a bequest to the plaintiff
them

was prevented by an agreement of the father, who was next of kin, to hold in trust
for the plaintiff; and the English cases were
cited with approval, and the trust enforced.
All along the line of discussion it was steadily claimed that a plain and unambiguous
devise in a will could not be modified or cut
down by extrinsic matter lying in parol, or
unattested
papers, and that the statute of
frauds and that of wills excluded the evidence; and all along the line it was steadily
answered that the devise was untouched;
that it was not at all modified; that the property passed under it, but the law dealt with
the holder for his fraud, and out of the facts
raised a trust ex maleflcio, instead of resting
upon one as created by the testator. The
character of the fraud which justifies the
equitable interference is well described in
Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 40. It was said
to consist ' in the attempt to take advantage
of that which has been done in performance
or upon the faith of the agreement, while repudiating its obligation under cover of the
The other parts of the opinion
statute.'"
discuss the question whether, as the charitable uses could not be enforced, because forbidden by the statute, the legatees could be
held as trustees for the heirs, but that question does not arise in the case at bar.
We have thus referred at length to the
O'Hara Case because it contains a lucid
statement of the principles which apply to
the case at bar, and for the additional reason
that in the opinion of the court and the briefs
of counsel nearly all the authorities bearing
upon the question are cited. We also refer
especially to the case of Williams v. Vreeland, 32 N. J. Eq. 135, which declares the
doctrine above stated; and in the notes to
which are collated extracts from about 40
different cases, aU of whicli are confirmatory
of said doctrine. See, also. Hooker v. Axford, 33 Mich. 453; In re Fleetwood, L. E.
15 Ch. Div. 594; In re Boyes, L. B. 26 Ch.
Div. 531; and Riordan v. Banon, 10 Ir. Eq.
The cases cited will show that it is im469.
material whether the instructions given bya
testator are oral or in writing. Indeed, in
the opinion of the court in the O'Haia Case,
in
(above quoted,) where the phrase "lying
parol, or unattested papers" is employed, the
word "parol" is evidently used in its usual
meaning, as synonymous with "verbal" or
"oral," and not in its broader meaning of
The California cases of
•'not under seal."
De Laurencel v. De Boom, 48 Cal. 581; Estate of Shillaber, 74 Cal. 144. 15 Pac. Hep. 453;
and Estate of Brooks, 54 Cal. 475,— while in
—
harmony with the principles above stated,
the
in
are not directly to the point involved
case at bar. Our conclusion is that the court
below correctly decided that Francis Berton,
deceased, properly distributed the property in
France, in accordance with the instructions
given him by the testatrix when the will was
made, and which instructions he, at that time,
agreed to carry out. Of course, the case must
be distinguished from one where a testator.

CONSTRUCTIVE
Intending to give certain property directly to
person, for that person's sole benefit, fails to designate in the will either the
In such a case no
property or the person.
These views
question of trust could arise.
make it unnecessary to determine the other
two points made by respondent: (1) That
the order for the property in France, given
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by the testatrix to Berton at the time the
will was made, constituted a trahsfer of the
property in prcesenti; and (2) that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
The judgment and order are affirmed.

We concur

STEIN,

J.

;

Thornton,

J.;
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In

WBALL.

re

ANDREWS
(42 Ch.

V.

Div.

WEALD.
674.)

Supreme Court of Judicature.

July

12, 13, 20,

1S»9.

Weall, who died In 1868, beestate, inhis residuary personal
cluding leaseholds, to John Weall the elder,
William WeaU the elder, and William Lightto raise certain
foot, upon trust thereout
sums, and as to the ultimate residue upon
trust to pay the income thereof to Margaret
Andrews (therein called Margaret Weall) during her life and after her death upon the
And the testator
trusts therein mentioned.
devised the residue of his real estate to the
same trustees upon trust (siftject to certain
payments) to pay the residue of the rents and
profits to Margaret Andrews during her life,
and after her decease upon the trusts therein mentioned.
William Weall the elder died
in 1874, and John Weall the elder died in
1879; and the defendants William Weall and
John Weall were appointed trustees in their
The defendants William Weall and
places.
John Weall and William Lightfoot for several
years prior to 1884 employed Sydney F. Weall
as solicitor to the estate and to collect the
of 5 per
rents, allowing him a commission
cent, on the rents.
They also paid, or allowed him to retain out of the rents, certain
sums of money for costs, part of which, as
Margaret Andrews alleged, and as the court
held on the evidence were unnece'ssary, and
part ought to have "been charged to corpus
William Lightfoot died
and not to income.
Benjamin

queathed

in

1886.

Margaret

against

-John

Andrews

the

defendants
Weall and against

brought this action
William Weall and
the executors of W.

Lightfoot claiming that the defendants William Weall and John Weall and the estate of
William Lightfoot were jointly and severally
liable to make good to- her the losses she had
incurred as aforesaid; and claiming all necessary

accounts

as to the estate

of the tes-

tator and the costs of the action.
The principal defense was that the plaintiff
was aware of and assented to what was
done, and that some of the costs were incurred by her desire.
This was the trial of the action.

Warmlngton, Q. C, and MacSwinney, for
plaintiff. Barber, Q. C, and Bardswell, for
defendants.
Soames, Eidwards & Jones, for plaintiff.
E. W. Reeves, for defendant Sedguirck & Co.

KEKWICH, J. The only point argued on
the further consideration of the case and now
requiring decision is by whom the costs of
the action are to be borne.
The short result
of the proceedings is that none of the costs
which are mentioned in the statement of
claim and which gave rise to the litigation

are payable out of income aa dlstlngnished
from corpus, and that, almost precisely to the
extent contended for by the plaintiff, they are
not chargeable against the trust estate at all.
Therefore, speaking generally, the plahitifl
has succeeded, and the defendants, the present trustees and representatives
of a deceased trustee, have failed in the action, and the
questions occur, why is not the plaintiff entitled to her costs, and why should the defendants not be held liable to pay them?
On behalf of the 'defendants it was argued
by Mr. Barber with his accustomed force that
they had been proved to be in the wrong
only as regards matters of account, and that
trustees do not pay costs occasioned by errors in accounts, and. Indeed, are allowed
them out of the trust estate unless misconduct has been proved; and he relied on the
cases of Turner v. Hancock, 20 Ch. Div. 308,
and Stott v. Milne, 25 Ch. Div. 710.
Those
cases, of course, are binding on me and must
venture to add that In my
be followed; but
Judgment they express in apt language what
They
has ever been the rule of the court.
express what is termed the contract between
trustee and cestui que trust, and also that
tenderness which the court is anxious to exhibit towards trustees honestly exercising discretion in discharge of their duties, often difficult and still more often thankless.
This, however, does not dispose of the case
before me. There is another and somewhat
different question which must all the more
be considered because, as pointed out by Mr.
Warmington in reply, this is not really an action for administration of a trust, but it was
commenced and brought to trial for the purpose of challenging the claim of the trustees
particular items of expenditure
to charge
against the trust estate.
Consider for a moment the position of that
special agent called a trustee as regards the
He certainly has
employment
of subagents.
the right to appoint them, if and so far as
requires;
the work of the trust reasonably
for instance, he may appoint a broker to
or a solicitor
make or realize investments,
to do legal business, and the power of employment involves that of remuneration at
The limit of the
the cost of the trust estate.
power of employment is, as pointed out in
the well-known case of Speight v. Gaunt, 22
Ch. Div. 727, 9 App. Cas. 1, reasonableness,

I

and whether there happens to be a standard
to which appeal can be made by taxation or
must also,
otherwise or not, reasonableness
think, be the limit of the power of remuneration. A trustee is bound to exercise
discretion in the choice of his agents, but so
long as he selects persons properly qualified
he cannot be made responsible for their inHe does not in
telligence or their honesty.
any sense guaranty the performance of their
duties.
It does not. however, follow that he
can intrust his agents with any duties which
they are willing to undertake, or pay them
which
or agree to pay them any remuneration

I
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they see fit to demand.
The trustee must
consider these matters for himself, and the
court would be disposed to support any conclusion at which he arrives, howeva: erroneous, provided it really is his conclusion,— that
is, the outcome
of such consideration as
might reasonably be expected to be given to
a like matter by a man of ordinary prudence
guided by such rules and arguments as generally guide such a man in his own affairs.
If trustees fail to exercise their discretion, or
purporting to exercise it do so in such a manner that the court i§ bound to infer that they
have not done so honestly, their costs of any
are
proceedings challenging their accounts
taken out of the rules laid down in Turner v.
Hancock, 20 Ch. Div. 303, and Stott v. Milne,
25 Ch. Div. 710; and the court is at liberty,
may
be
and under certain circumstances
bound, for the protection of cestuis que trustcosts, or even
ent, to disallow the trustees'
make them pay those of others.
One other general remark before applying
particular
these principles
to
the
case.
Trustees deserve and receive the upmost conThey
sideration at the hands of the court.
gratuitously undertake duties for the benefit
of others, and as regards costs and otherwise
they are entitled to generous treatment
But
cestuis que trustent also have their rights,—
their claim to consideration. The trust property is theirs, managed for their benefit, and
on the trial of a question between them and
their trustees, by whom costs are to be borne,
they may fairly require something more to
They
be proved than absence of dishonesty.
must not complain of mistakes or errors in
judgment, but reasonable prudence is not too
much for them to require, and by reasonable
prudence
mean that which is defined in the
judgment in the case of Speight v. Gaunt, 22
Ch. Div. 727, 9 App. Cas. 1, already mentioned.
have intended throughout the above remarks to follow the principles of that case
and of subsequent
cases commenting on it.
A decision of the house of lords- requires no
sanction,
but the language used by other
judges in adopting and expounding that particular decision has assisted to make it a
most instructive and useful statement of the
extent and limit of trustees' authority and
Now, to apply these
consequent
liability.
principles to the case in hand. Of the three

I

I

of Benjamin Weall's will in oflBce
during the period of the transactions to
which this litigation relates John Weall was
He was the actundoubtedly
the foremost.
ing trustee, and by him William Weall, who,
as far as I can see, did nothing, was contentto be guided.
William Lightfoot, the third
trustee (now dead), also did little, but he
had views of his own, which, according to
with some
the correspondence,
he asserted
vigor.
They were peculiar views and open
to criticism, but he has not had an opportunity of explaining himself, and I therefore
Suffice It to
refrain from further comment
trustees
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say that, as regards the 'particular matter
which gave rise to this action, he certainly
did not differ from his colleague John Weall,
in the sense of urging the adoption of a
course more agreeable
to the plaintiff's requirements.
These trustees had employed
as their solicitor for trust purposes Mr. Sydney F. Weall, and, besides giving him ordinary legal business, they had allowed him
to receive the rents of the trust estate and
to retain a commission of 5 per cent, for his
trouble.
This does not commend itself to
me, but the plaintiff's claim to be reimbursed
this commission was abandoned at the trial,
and although it was stipulated that the proper influence, whatever that might be, on the
subject of costs should not thereby be lost,
yet, not having had an opportunity of fully
discussing the matter, I prefer to lay it aside.
Observe, however, that this receipt of rents
has really been the moving cause of the litigation, for it is clear that, if Sydney F. Weall
had not had the means of paying himself the
charges
objected to, he would never have
been paid at all, and this action would not
have been necessary.
Mr. Sydney F. Weall,
without Instructions or any sufficient reason,
prepared an abstract of the title to the testator's residuary estate, and charged for It
nearly £100. To this charge the plaintiff objected. Having read through the correspondence, the position taken by her is plain,
as is also the manner in which she was treatShe from first to last obed by the trustees.
jected to the charge on principle, and asserted
that it must be wholly disallowed. They, on
the other hand, never went further than a
suggestion that the bill should be taxed, and
though perhaps taxation might have solved
the difficulty, it would have been one under
special order and not such as was suggested
or was likely to be assented to by the solicitor. It is due to the defendant John WeaU
to say that he knew and admitted that the
charge was altogether wrong, and my conclusion from the correspondence, without further explanation, is that with but little enhe would have taken a bolder
couragement
course than, unfortunately for himself ai)d
his colleagues, he in fact did. I again call
attention to the fact that Sydney F. Weall's
receipt of rents had enabled him to pay himself, and this placed the trustees in a position
of great difficulty.
Failing to obtain redress, the plaintiff commenced this action, and, passing over the
statement of claim (in which the facts are
1
stated plainly and with due moderation),
The trusmust say a word on the defense.
tees had claimed to charge the particular
costs already mentioned against the plaintiff's
Income to the exoneration of the corpus of the
trust estate. For this there was no justification, but they pleaded the plaintiff's wish to
that effect, and that she had acquiesced In
At the trial
their dealings with the income.
they were forced to admit this view to be erroneous, and to account to the plaintiff for
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They further pleaded
accordingly.
that the particular costs had been incurred in
with the plaintiffs express decompliance
sire, of which they were unable to tender any
And, the plaintiff alleging that
evidence.
none of the costs were chargeable against income, but that some were chargeable against
corpus, and the rest not chargeable against
the trust estate at all, the trustees justified
all the costs, including those admitted by
John Weall to have been Improperly incurred,
as properly chargeable against corpus.
This
question has been investigated in a most complete and satisfactory manner, with the result
already noticed.
It has been determined that
out of £175. 4s. 8d., the total amount of costs,
£84. 7s. 8d., or less than 50 per cent., is properly chargeable against corpus, and that, as
regards the sum of £90. 17s., there is no
charge whatever, or, in other words, that sum
has been improperly paid to or allowed to be
retained by the solicitor.
I am not sure how
far the conclusion from this ought to be affected by any offer made on behalf of the
plaintiff, but It is worthy of notice that an
offer was made which would have given almost exactly this result without the pain and
Why it was declined
expense of litigation.
do not understand.
It would. I think, be an

income

I

unwarranted departure from the principles
which I have endeavored to expound not to
make the trustees pay the costs which have
been occasioned by tiieir disregard of those
principles and their unjustifiable defense.
To accede to the argument of counsel for the
ought not in any event to do
trustees that
more than deprive them of their costs would
be to cast on the trust estate an undue burden
by reason of litigation which is the direct
consequence of the trustees' default.
It is
right to add that, having gone carefully
through the pleadings and the other papers to
could relieve them of any part
see whether
of the costs as being in respect of matters
capable of being brought under the general
regret to say that
rules in favor of trustees,
The
can find no reason for distinction.
trustees seem .to me to have been wholly
VFTong from first to last.
The form of order may require consideration, but, as regards the only point argued,
my judgment is that the defendants, the trusof the deceased
tees, and the representatives
trustee must pay the costs of the action, including the costs of the remaindermen who
were added as defendants in order to try the
liability of the corpus on which the trustees

I

I

I

insisted.

I

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES.
HUN

T.

(82 N.

CART.
Y. 65.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

1880.

B. Ellery Anderson, for appellants.
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Fran-

J. This action was brought by the
of the Central Savings Bank of the
■city of New York against the defendants,
who were trustees of the bank, to recover
damages which, it is alleged, they caused the
hank by their misconduct as such trustees.
The first question to be considered is the
measure of fidelity, care and diligence which
such trustees owe to such a bank and its depositors. Thef relation existing between the
corporation and its trustees is mainly that of
principal and agent, and the relation between
the trustees and the depositors is similar to
that of trustee and cestui que trust. The
trustees are bound to observe the limits placed
upon their powers in the charter, and if they
transcend such limits and cause flamage, they
they act fraudulently or
incur liability.
do a willful wrong, it is not doubted that
they may be held for all the damage they
But if
cause to the bank or its depositors.
they act in good faith within the limits of
powers conferred, using proper prudence and
diligence, they are not responsible for mere
That the
mistakes or errors of judgment
trustees of such corporations are bound to
use some diligence in the discharge of their
All the authori■duties cannot be disputed.
ties hold so. What degree of care and diliNot the
gence are they bound to exercise?
highest degree, not such as a very vigilant
or extremely careful person would exercise.
If such were required, it would be difficult
to find trustees who would incur the responsibility of such trust positions. It would not
be proper to answer the question by saying
the lowest degree.
Few persons would be
willing to deposit money in savings banks,
«r to take stock In corporations, with the understanding that the trustees or directors
were bound only to exercise slight care, such
as inattentive persons would give to their
own business, in the management of the large
And important interests committed to their
hands.
When one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock in a corporation,
thus divesting himself of the immediate control of his property, he expects and has the
right to expect that the trustees or directors
who are chosen to take his place in the management and control of his property, will exercise ordinary care and prudence in the trusts
committed to them—the same degree of care
and prudence that men prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their own affairs.
When one voluntarily takes the position of
trustee or director of a corporation, good faith,
exact justice, and public policy unite in requiring of him such a degree of care and pru■dence, and It is a gross breach of duty— crassa
negligentla— not to bestow them.
EARL,

receiver

If
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It Is Impossible to give the measure of culpable negligence for all cases, as the degree
of care required depends upon the subjects to
which it is to be applied. First Nat Bank v.
Ocean Nat Bank, 60 N.Y. 278. What would be
slight neglect in the care of a quantity of iron
might be gross neglect in the care of a jewel.
What would be slight neglect in the care exercised in the affairs of a turnpike corporation or even of a manufacturing corporation,
might be gross neglect in the care exercised
In the management of a savings bank intrusted with the savings of a multitude of poor
people, depending for its life upon credit and
liable to be wrecked by the breath of suspicion.
There Is a classification of negligence
to be found in the books, not always of practical value and yet sometimes serviceable, into slight negligence, gross negligence,
and
that degree of negligence intermediate the
two, attributed to the absence of ordinary
care; and the claim on behalf of these trustees is that they can only be held responsible
in this action in consequence of gross negligence, according to this classification.
If
gross negligence be taken according to its ordinary meaning— as something nearly approaching fraud or bad faith— I cannot yield
to this claim; and if there are any authorities upholding the claim, I emphatically dissent from them.
It seems to me that it would be a monstrous proposition to hold that trustees, intrusted with the management of the property,
interests and business of other people who divest themselves of the management and confide in them, are bound to give only slight
care to the duties of their trust, and are liable only in case of gross Inattention and negligence; and I have found no authority fully
upholding such a proposition. It is true that
authorities are found which hold that trustees are liable only for crassa negligentia,
which literally means gross negligence; but
that phrase has been defined to mean the absence of ordinary care and diligence adequate
to the particular case.
In Scott v. De Peyster, 1 Bdw. 513, 543— a case much cited—
the learned vice-chancellor said: "I think the
question in all such cases should and must
necessarily be, whether they (directors) have
omitted that care which men of common prudence take of their own concerns.
To require more, would be adopting too rigid a
rule and rendering them liable for slight neglect; while to require less, would be relaxing
too much the obligation which binds them to
vigilance and attention in regard to the interests of those confided to their care, and expose them to liability for gross neglect only—
which is very little short of fraud itself." In
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, Judge Sharswood said: "They [directors] can only be regarded as mandataries— persons who have
gratuitously undertaken to perform certain
duties, and who are therefore bound to apply
ordinary skill and diligence, but no more."
In Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 B.
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312, Jenckes, J., said: "The sole question
is, whether the directors have or have not bestowed proper diligence. They are liable only for ordinary care; such care as prudent

I.

And in the
men take in their own affairs."
same case, Ames, J., said: "They should not
therefore be liable for innocent mistakes, unintentional negligence, honest errors of judgment, but only for willful fraud or neglect,

and want of ordinary knowledge and care."
The same case came again under consideration in 3 B. I. 9, and Green, C. J., said: "We
think a board of directors, acting in good
faith and with reasonable care and diligence,
who nevertheless fall into a mistake, either
as to law or fact, are not liable for the consequences of such mistake."
In the case of
Liquidators of Western Bank v. Douglas, 11
Sess. Cas. (Scot.) 112, It is said: "Whatever
the duties (of directors) are, they must be discharged
with fidelity and conscience,
and
with ordinary and reasonable care.
It is not
necessary
that I should attempt to define
remissness
ends and gross
where excusable
begins.
That must depend to a
negligence
large extent on the circumstances.
It is
in the
enough to say that gross negligence
performance of such a duty, the want of reasonable and ordinary fidelity and care, will
impose liability for loss thereby occasioned."
In Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 405,
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said, that a person who accepted the oifice of director of a
corporation "is obliged to execute it with
fidelity and reasonable diligence," although
he acts without compensation.
In Litchfield
T. White, 3 Sandf. 545, Sandford, J., said:
"In general a trustee is bound to manage
and employ the trust property for the benefit
of the cestui que trust with the care and diligence of a provident owner.
Consequently
be is liable for every loss sustained by reason
of his negligence, want of caution or mistake,
as well as positive misconduct."
In Spering's Appeal, Judge Sharswood said
that directors "are not liable for mistakes of
judgment, even though they may be so gross
as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they were honest, and provided they are
fairly wiUiin the scope of the pqwers and discretion confided to the managing body." As
I understand this language, I cannot assent
to it as properly defining to any extent the
nature of a director's responsibility,
tiike a
mandatary, to whom he has been likened, he
is bound not only to exercise proper care and
diligence, but ordinary skill and judgment
As he is bound to exercise ordinary skill and
judgment, he caimot set up that he did not
possess them.
When damage is caused by
his want of judgment, he cannot excuse himself by alleging his gross ignorance.
One
who voluntarily takes the position of director,
and Invites confidence in that relation, undertakes, like a mandatary, with those whom he
represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses at least ordinary knowledge and skill,
and that he will bring them to bear In the
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discharge of his duties.
Story, Ballm. S 182,
Such is the rule applicable to public officers,
to professional men and to mechanics, and
such is the rule which must be appUcabie to
every person who undertakes to act for another in a situation or employment requiring
skill and knowledge; and it matters not that
the service Is to be rendered gratuitously.
These defendants voluntarily took the position of trustees of the bank. They invited
depositors to confide to them their savings,
and to intrust the safe-keeping and management of them to their sldll and prudence.
They undertook not only that th^ would discharge their duties with proper care, but that
they would exercise the ordinary skill and
judgment requisite for the discharge of their
delicate trust.
Enough has now been said to show what
measure of diligence, skill, and prudence the
law exacts from managers and directors of
corporations; and we are now prepared to
examine the facts of tUs case, for the purpose of seeing if these trustees fell short of
this measure in the matters alleged in the

complaint.
This bank was incorporated by the act
chapter 467 of the Laws of 1867, and it commenced business in the spring of that year.
In a hired building on the east side of Third
avenue, in the city of New York.
It remainefl there for several years, and then removed to the west side of the avenue, between Forty-Fifth and Forty-Sixth streets,
where it occupied hired rooms until near the
time of its failure In the fall of 1875.
During the whole tune the deposits averaged only about $70,000. In 1867, the income of the
bani: was $942.12, and the expenses, including amounts paid for safe, fixtures, charter,
current expenses and Interest to depositors,
were $5,571.34. In 1868, the Income was
$5,471.43, and the expenses including interest

to depositors, $5,719.43.
In 1869, the income
was $3,918.27, and the expenses and interest
paid, $5,346.05.
In 1870 the income was $5,784.09, and expenses and interest, $7,040.22.
In 1871 the income was $13,551.14; which included a bonus' of $4,000, or $6,000 obtained
upon the purchase of a mortgage of $40,000,
which mortgage was again sold in 1874 at a
discount of $2,000, and the expenses, including interest paid, were $9,124.05. In 1872
the Income was $5,100.51, and the expenses,
including interest paid, were $7,212.49. Down
to the 1st day of January, 1873, therefore, the
total expenses, including interest paid, were
$5,046 more than the income.
To this sum
should be added $2,000, deducted on the sale
of the large mortgage in 1874, which was
purchased at the large discount In 1871, as
above mentioned, and yet entered in the assets at its face. From this apparent deficiency should be deducted the value of the safpand furniture of the bank, from which the re-

At theceiver subsequently realized $500.
same date the amount due to over one thousand depositors
was about $70,000, and tlu-
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assets of the bank consisted of about $131,000
in cash and the balance mostly of mortgages
upon real estate.
While the bank was in this condition, -with'
a lease of the rooms then occupied by it expiring May 1, 1874, the project of purchasing
a lot and erecting a banldng-house thereon
began to be talked of among the trustees.
The only reason put on record in the minutes
of the meetings held by the trustees for procuring a new banking-house was to better
the financial condition of the bank.
In February, 1873, at a meeting of the trustees a
committee was appointed "on site for new
building;" and in March the committee entered into contract for the purchase of a
plot of land, consisting of four lots, on the
•comer of Forty-Eighth street and Third avenue, for the sum of $74,500; of which $1,000
was to be paid down, $9,000 on the 1st day
of May then next, and $64,000 to be secured
by a mortgage, payable on or before May 1,
1875, with interest from May 1, 1873, at seven per cent; and there was an agreement
that payment of the principal sum secured
by the mortgage might be extended to May

].

1877,

provided a building should, without

delay, be erected upon the corunavoidable
ner lot, worth not less than $25,000. This
contract was reported by the committee to
the trustees, at a meeting held April 7. On
the 1st day of May, 1873, the real estate was
conveyed and the cash payment was made,
and four separate mortgages were executed
to secure the balance,
one upon each lot.
The mortgage upon the lot upon which the
bank building was afterward
erected was
for $30,500.
At the same time the bank became obligated to build upon that lot a bffllding covering its whole front, twenty-five feet,
and sixty feet deep, and not less than five
stories high, and have the same Inclosed by
the 1st day of November then next Upon
that lot the bank proceeded, in the spring of
1875, to erect a building covering the whole
front, and seventy-six feet deep, and five
stories high, at an expense of about $27,000.
And the bulding was nearly completed when
the receiver of the bank was appointed In
November of that year.
The three lots not
of,
needed for the building were disposed
as we may assume, without any loss, leaving the corner lot used for the building to cost
the bank $29,250; and we may assume that
that was then the fair value of the lot This
case may then be treated as if the trustees
had purchased the comer lot at $29,250, and
bound themselves to erect thereon a building
costing $27,000. When the receiver was appointed that lot and building, and other assets which produced less than $1,000, con-

stituted the whole property of the bank; and
subsequently the lot and building were swept
away by a mortgage foreclosure, and this action was brought to recover the damages

caused to the bank by the alleged improper
Investment of Its funds, as above stated. In
the lot upon which the building was erected.
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At the time of the purchase of the lot the
bank was substantially insolvent. If It had
gone Into liquidation. Its assets would have
fallen several thousand dollars short of discharging its liabilities, and this state of
things was known to the trustees.
It had
been in existence about six years, doing a
losing business.
The amount of its deposits,
which Its managers had not been able to
increase, shows that the enterprise was an
abortion from the' beginning, either because
it lacked public confidence, or was not needed In the place where it was located.
It
had changed its location once without any
benefit
It had on hand but about $13,000
in cash, of which $10,000 were taken to make
the hrst payments.
The balance of Its assets
was mostly In mortgages not readily convertible. One was a mortgage for $40,000,
which had been purchased at a large discount, and we may infer that it was not very
salable, as the trustees resolved to sell it as
early as May, 1873, and in August, 1873, authorized it to be sold at a discount of not
more than $2,500, and yet it was not sold
until 1874.
In this condition of things the
trustees made the purchase complained of,
under an obligation to place on the lot an
expensive banking-house. Whether
under
the circumstances the purchase was such as
the trustees, ]p the exercise of ordinary prudence, skill and care, could make; or whether the act of purchase was reckless, rash,
extravagant, showing a want of ordinary prudence, skill and care, were quif^ons for the
jury. It Is not disputed that, under the
charter of this bank, as amended in 1868
(chapter 294), it had the power to purchase a
lot for a banking-house • "requisite for the
transaction of its business." That was a
power, like every other possessed by the
bank, to be exercised
with prudence and
care.
Situated as this moribund institution
was, was It a prudent and reasonable thing
to do, to Invest nearly half of all the trust
funds in this expensive lot, with an obligation to take most of the balance to erect
thereon an extravagant building? The trustees were urged on by no real necessity,
They had hired rooms where they could have
remained; or if those rooms were not adequate for their small business, we may assume that others could have been hired.
They put forward the claim upon the trial
that the rooms they then occupied were not
That may have been a good reason
safe.
for making them more secure, or for getting other rooms, but not for the extravagance In which they indulged.
It is inferable however that the principal motive which
influenced the trustees to make the change
of location was to Improve the financial condition of the bank by increasing Its deposits. Their project was to buy this corner
lot and erect thereon an imposing edifice, to
inspire confidence, attract attention, and thus
draw deposits.
It was intended as a sort of
advertisement of the bank, a very expensive
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Savings banks are not organone Indeed.
They have no
ized as business enterprises.
stockholders, and are not to engage in speculations or money-making In a business sense.
They are simply to take the deposits, usually small, -which are offered, aggregate them,
and keep and Invest them safely, paying
such interest to the depositors as is thus
made, after deducting expenses, and paying
It is not legitithe principal upon demand.
mate for the trustees of such a bank to seek
deposits at the expense of present depositors.
It is their business to take deposits
It was not proper for these
when offered.
trustees— or at least the jury jnay have
found that it was not— to take the money
then on deposit and invest in a bankinghouse, merely for the purpose of drawing
other deposits.
In making this investment
the Interests of the depositors whose money
was taken, can scarcely be said to have been
consulted.
It matters not that the trustees purchased
this lot for no more than a fair value, and
that the loss was occasioned by the subsequent general decline in the value of real
They had no right to expose their
estate.
the
bank to the hazard of such a decline.
purchase was an Improper one when made,
it matters not that the loss came from the
unavoidable fall In the value of the real esThe jury may have found
tate purchased.
that it was grossly careless for the trustees
to lock up thejunds In their charge In such
an InvestmAs^ where they could not be
emergency which was likely
reached in
to arise in the affairs of the crippled bank.
We conclude therefore that the evidence
justified a finding by the Jury that this was
not a case of mere error or mistake of judgment on the part of the trustees, but that it
was a case of improvidence, of reckless, unin which the trusreasonable extravagance,
tees failed in that measure of reasonable prudence, care and skill which the law requires.
This case was moved for trial at a circuit

If

a^

court, and before the jury was impaneled the
defendants claimed that the case was improperly in the circuit, and that it should be
tried at special term; and the court ordered
that the trial proceed, and at the close of
the evidence the defendants moved that the
complaint be dismissed, on the ground that
the action was not a proper one to be tried
before a jury, and should be tried before the
equity branch of the court The motion was
denied, and these rulings are now alleged for
error.
The receiver in this case represents
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the bank, and may maintain any action the
bank could have maintained. The trustees
may be treated as agents of the bank. In
•re German Mln. Co., 27 Eng. Law & Bq. 158;
Belknap v. Davis, 19 Me. 455; Bedford R.
Co. V. Bowser, 48 Pa. St 29; Butts v.
Wood, 38 Barb. 181; Austen v. Daniels, 4
Denio, 299; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McPherson,
35 Mo. 13.
And for any misfeasance or nonfeasance, causing damage to the bank, they
were responsible to It, upon the same principle that any agent Is for like cause responsible to his principal. It has never been
doubted that a principal may sue his agent
In an action at law for any damages caused
6y culpable misfeasance or non-feasance In
the business of the agency.
The only relief
claimed In this complaint was a money judgment, and we think It was properly tried as
an action at law. No equitable rights were
to be adjusted, and there was no occasion to
appeal to an equitable forum.
Treating this therefore as an action at
law. It follows also that the objection taken
that other trustees should have been joined
In actions ex
as defendants cannot prevail.
delicto the plaintiff may sue one, some or all
of the wrong-doers. liquidators of Western
Bank v. Douglas, 22 Sess. Gas. (Scot) 475;
Barb. Parties, 203.
The defendants Hoffman and Gearty filed
petitions for their discharge In bankruptcy
after the commencement of this action, and
were discharged before judgment, and they
alleged such discharge as a defense to the
action.
The trial judge and the general term
held that the discharge furnished no defense,
This claim
and we are of the same opinion.
was purely for imliqiildated damages occasioned by a tort Such a claim was not provable In bankruptcy, and therefore was not
discharged. Rev. St. U. S. (2d Ed.) §§ 5115,
ZInn v. Ritterman, 2 Abb.
5119, 5067-5071;
Prac. (N. S.) 261; Kellogg v. Schuyler, 2 Denio, 73; Grouch v. Gridley, 6 Hill, 250; In
re Wiggers, 2 Biss. 71, Fed. Cas. No. 17,623;
In re Clough, 2 Ben. 508, Fed. Cas. No. 2,905; In re Sidle, 2 N. B. R. 77, Fed. Cas. No.
12,844.

I

conclude therefore that the judgment apfrom should be aflBrmed.
The appeal by the plaintiff from the order
of the general term, granting a new trial as
to defendant Smith, must, for reasons stated
on the argument, be dismissed, with costs.
pealed

All

concur.

Judgment affirmed,
dismissed.

and appeal from order
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KING

V.

TALBOT.

(40 N. Y. 76.)

1

Conrt of Appeals of New York. 1869.
This was an action for an accounting
against the defendants, as the surviving executors of the will of the father of the plainBy the will the executors were ditiffs.
rected to invest $15,000 for each of the plaintiffs, and the executors made these investments in certain railroad bonds and stock,
The value of these
and in some bank stock.
having depreciated, the investsecurities
ment was repudiated by the plaintiffs, and
The further facts apthis action brought.
pear in the opinion of the court.
Stephen
M. Titus,

P. Nash, for appellants.
for respondents.

George

WOODRUFF, J. It is conceded that in
England the rule is, and has long been settled, that a trustee, holding funds to invest
for the benefit of his cestui que trust, is
bound to make such Investment in the public debt, for the safety whereof the faith of
their government is pledged; or in loans, for
which real estate is pledged as security.
And that although the terms of the trust
commit the investment, in general terms, to
the discretion of the trustee, that discretion
is controlled by t}ie above rule, and is to be
within the very narrow limits,
exercised
which it prescribes.
As a purely arbitrary rule, resting upon
any special policy of that country, or on any
peculiarity in its condition, it has no appliIt is not of the comcation to this country.
It had no applicability to the conmon law.
dition of this country, while a colony of
Great Britain, and cannot be said to have
been Incorporated in our law.
So far, and so far only, as it can be said to
rest upon fundamental principles of equity,
commending
themselves to the conscience,
and suited to the condition of our affairs,
so far it Is true, that it has appropriate application and force, as a guide to the administration of a trust here, as well as in England.
do not therefore deem It material to Inof English
through the multitude
quire
cases, and the abundant texts of the law-
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formed their duty with the aid of rules for
the exercise of their discretion, which were
the utterance of equity and good conscience,
intelligible
to
their understanding,
and
otherwise,
available for their information;
trusts heretofore existing have been traps
and pitfalls to catch the faithful, prudent
and diligent trustee, without the power to
avoid them.
But It is not true that there is no underlying principle or rule of conduct in the administration of a trust, which calls for obedience.
Whether it has been declared by
the courts or not, whether it has been enacted in statutes or not, whether it is in
familiar recognition in the affairs of life,
there appertains to the relation of trustee
and cestui que trust, a duty to be faithful,
to be diligent, to be prudent in an administration intrpsted to the former, in confidence in his fidelity, diligence and prudence.
To this general statement of the duty of
trustees, there is no want of promulgation
or sanction, nor want of sources of information for their guidance. In the whole history of trusts, in decisions of courts for a
century in England, in all the utterances of
the courts of this and the other states of
this country, and not less in the conscious
good sense of all intelligent minds, its recognition is uniform..
The real inquiry therefore is, in my judgment, in the case before us, and in all like
cases:
Has the administration of the trust,
created by the will of Charles W. King, for
the benefit of the plaintiff, been governed
by fidelity, diligence and prudence? If it
has, the defendants are not liable for losses
which nevertheless have happened.
This however aids but little in the examination of the defendants' conduct, unless
the terms of definition are made more preWhat are fidelity, diligence and discise.
cretion? and what is the measure thereof,
which trustees are bound to possess and exercise?
It is hardly necessary to say that fidelity
imports sincere and single intention to administer the trust for the best interest of the
parties beneficially interested, and according
And
to the duty which the trust imposes.
this is but a paraphrase of "good faith."
The meaning and measure of the required
prudence and diligence has been repeatedly
discussed, and with a difference of opinion.
In extreme rigor, it has sometimes been
said that they must be such and as great as
that possessed and exercised by the court
And again, it has been
of chancery itself.
said that they are to be such as the trustee
exercises in the conduct of his own affairs,
of like nature, and between these is the declaration that they are to be the highest prudence and vigilance, or they will not exon-

writers, into the origin of the rule in Engor the date of its early promulgation.
Nor in this particular case do deem it necessary to determine whether It should, by
precise analogy, be deemed to prohibit here
investments in any other public debt than
that of the state of New York.
Neither, in my judgment, are we at liberty. In the decision of this case, to propound any new rule of conduct, by which
to judge of the liability of trustees, now subjected trt examination.
Under trusts here- erate.
My own judgment, after an examination
tofore «eated, the managers thereof perof the subject, and bearing In mind the na1 Irrelevant
ture of the office, its importance and the
i>artB omitted.
land,
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considerations which alone induce men of
capacity and responsisuitable experience,
bility to accept its usually thankless burden,
is that the just and true rule is that the
trustee is bound to employ such diligence
and such prudence in the care and management as in general prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters employ
in their own like afCairs.
This necessarily excludes all speculation,
all investments for an uncertain and doubtful rise in the market, and of course every
thing that does not take into view the nature and object of the trust, and the consequences of a mistake in the selection of the
investment to be made.
It therefore does not follow that because
prudent men may, and often do, conducv
their own aSairs with the hope of growing
rich, and therein take the hazard of adventures which they deem hopeful, trustees
may do the same; the preservation of the
fund and the procurement of a just income
therefrom are primary objects of the creation of the trust itself, and are to be primarily regarded.
If it be said that trustees are selected by
the testator or donor of the trust, from his
own knowledge of their capacity, and without any expectation that they will do more
than, in good faith, exercise the discretion
and judgment they possess, the answer is:
First, the rule properly assumes the capacity of trustees to exercise the prudence and
diligence of prudent men in general; and
second, it imposes the duty to observe and
know or learn what such prudence dictates
in the matter in hand.
And once more the terms of the trust, and
its particular object and purpose, are in no
case to be lost sight of in its administration.
Lewin, in his treatise on the law of Trusts,
etc., (page 332), states, as the result of the
several cases, and as the true rule, that "a
trustee is bound to exert precisely the same
care and solicitude in behalf of his cestui
que trust as he would do for himself; but
greater measure than this a court of equity
will not exact." In general this is true; but
If it imports that if he do what men of ordinary prudence would not do, in their own
affairs, of a like nature, he will be excused,
on showing that he dealt with his own property with like want of discretion, it cannot be
sustained as a safe or just rule toward cestuis que trust; nor is it required by reasonable indulgence to the trustee; it would be
laying the duty to be prudent out of view
entirely, and I cannot think the writer intended it should be so understood.
The Massachusetts cases (Harvard College
v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446; Lovell v. Minot, 20
Pick. 116) cited by the counsel for the defendants, are in better conformity with the
rule as
have stated it
To apply these general views to the case
before us, and with the deductions which
necessarily flow from their recognition: The
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testator gave to each of his children $15,000,
the interest on the same, so far as required,
to be applied to their maintenance and education, and the principal, with any accumulations thereon, to be paid to them severally
on their majority; appointed the defendant,
Talbot, and his partner, Mr. Olyphant, executors, "intrusting to their discretion the
settlement of my affairs and the investment
of my estate for the benefit of my heirs."
If X am correct in my views of the duty
of trustees, this last clause neither added to,
nor in any wise affected the duty or responsibility of these executors; without it they
were clothed with discretion; with it their
discretion was to be exercised with all the
care and prudence belonging to their trust
relation to the beneficiaries. Such is the
distinct doctrine of the cases very largely
cited by the counsel for the parties, and is,
think, the necessary conclusion from the
just rule of duty have stated.
What then was the office of the trustees,
as indicated by the terms and nature of the
trust? If its literal reading be followed, it
directed that "$15,000" in money be placed
at "interest."
The nature of the trust, according to the manifest intent of the testator, required that in order to the maintenance and support of infant children, whose
need, in that regard, would be constant and
unremitting, that interest should flow in
with regularity and without exposure to the
uncertainties or fluctuations of adventures
of any kind. And then the fund should continue, with any excess of such interest accumulated for their benefit, so as to be delivered at the expiration of their minority.
Palpably then the first and obvious duty
was to place that $15,000 in a state of security; second, to see to it that it was productive of interest; and third, so to keep the
fund that it should always be subject to
future recall for the benefit of the cestui que
trust.
do not attach controlling importance to
the word "interest" used by the testator, but
do regard it as some guide to the trustees,
that he
as an expression of the testator,
did hot contemplate any adventure with the
fund, with a view to profits as such.
But apart from the inference from the use
of that word,
think it should be said, that
whenever money is held upon a trust of this
description, it is not according to its nature,
nor within any just idea of prudence to place
the principal of the fund in a condition in
which it is necessarily exposed to the hazard
of loss or gain, according to the success or
failure of the enterprise in which it is embarked, and in which by the very terms of
the investment, the principal is not to be
returned at all.
It is not denied that the employment of
the fund, as capital in trade, would be a
clear departure from the duty of trustees.
If it cannot be so employed under the management of a copartnership,
see no reason
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for saying that the Incorporation of the partners tends, In any degree, to justify it
The moment the fund is inTested in bank,
or Insurance, or railroad stock, it has left
the control of the trustees; its safety and
the hazard, or risk of loss, is no longer de~
pendent upon their skill, care or discretion
in its custody or management, and the terms
of the investment do not contemplate that
it ever vyill be returned to the trustees.
If it be said that at any time the trustees
may sell the stock (which is but another
name for their interest in the property and
business of the corporation), and so re-posof the original capital,
sess themselves
reply tliat is necessarily contingent and uncertain; and BO the fund has been voluntarily placed in a condition of uncertainty, deFirst, the
pendent upon two contingencies:
practicability of making the business profitable; and, second, the judgment, skill and
fidelity of those who have the management
of it for that purpose.
If it be said that men of the highest prudence do in fact invest their funds in such
stocks, becoming subscribers and contributors thereto in the very formation thereof,
and before the business is developed,
and
in the exercise of their judgment on the
probability of its safety and productiveness,
the answer is, so do just such men, looking
to the hope of profitable returns, invest
money in trade and adventures of various
In their private affairs they do, and
kinds.
they lawfully may put their principal funds
at hazard; in the affairs of a trust they may
not.
The very nature of their relation to it
forbids it.
If it be said that this reasoning assumes
that it is certainly practicable so to keep the
fund that it shall be productive, and yet safe
against any contingency of loss; whereas
in fact if loaned upon bond and mortgage, or
upon securities of any description, losses
from Insolvency and depreciation may and
often do happen, nothwithstanding
due and
proper care and caution is observed in their
selection.
Not at all. It assumes and insists that the trustees shall not place the
fund where its safety and due return to their
hands will depend upon the success of the
business in which it is adventured, or the
skill and honesty of other parties intrusted
with its conduct; and it is In the selection
of the securities for its safety and actual return that there is scope for discretion and
prudence, which if exercised in good faith,
constitute due performance of the duty of
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was not bound to accept these stocks as and
for his legacy, or the investment thereof.
In regard to the bonds of the Hudson
River Railroad Company and of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, it appears by schedule B, given in evidence, that
the former were mortgage bonds; but what
was the extent or suflBciency of the security
afforded by such mortgage, or what property was embraced in it does not appear,
nor does it appear whether there was any
security whatever for the payment of the
canal company's bond.
It is not necessary for the decision of this
case; and
am not prepared to say that an
investment in the bonds of a railroad or
other corporation, the payment whereof Is
secured by a mortgage upon real estate, is
not suitable and proper under any circumstances.
If the real estate is ample to insure the
payment of the bonds,
do not at present
perceive that it is necessarily to be regarded
as inferior to the bond of an individual secured by mortgage; it would of course be
open to all the inquiries which prudence
would suggest if the bond and mortgage
were that of an individual.
The nature,
the location and the sufficiency of the security and the terms of the mortgage, and
its availability for the protection and ultimate realization of the fund, must of course
enter into the consideration.
But it is not necessary to pursue that subject The plaintiff in his complaint rejects
the entire investment.
The court below
held that it was equitable that the plaintiff
should be held to receive the whole or none
of the stocks and bonds, and to that ruling
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant have
excepted; and therefore the question whether the judgment below was correct in that
respect is not before us.
It is proper however to say that do not
clearly apprehend the propriety of that ruling, unless it be on the ground that the
plaintiff in his complaint did so elect
The rule is perfectly well settled that a
cestui que trust is at liberty to elect to approve an unauthorized investment and enjoy its profits, or to reject it at his option;
perceive no reason for saying that
and
where the trustee has divided the fund into
parts and made separate investments, the
cestui que trust is not at liberty, on equitable as well as legal grounds, to approve and
adopt such as he thinks it for his interest
to approve. The money invested is his
money; and in respect to each and every
the trustees.
My conclusion is therefore that the defend- dollar, it seems to me he has an unqualified
ants were not at liberty to invest the fund right to follow it, and claim the fruits of its
bequeathed to the plaintiff in stock of the investment and that the trustee cannot deny
Delaware and Hudson Canal Company; of it. The fact that the trustee has made
the New York and Harlem Railroad Com- other investments of other parts of the fund,
pany; of the New York and New Haven which the cestui que trust is not bound to
think,
Railroad Company; of the Bank of Com- approve, and disaffirms, cannot,
affect the power. For example, suppose in
merce; or of the Saratoga and Washington
Railroad Company; and that the plaintiff the present case the cestui que trust, on deH.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 33
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livery to him of all the securities and bonds Saratoga and Washington Railroad Com.
reject and return to you. Ig
in -which his legacy had appeared invested, pany. That
had declared: Although these inyestments It doubtful that his position must be susare Improperly made, not In accordance with tained?
The result Is, that the main features of the
the Intent of the testator, nor in the due perwaive all objection Judgment herein must be affirmed.
formance of your duty,
•
on that account, except as to the stock of the

I

I

•••••••a

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF
LAMAR

▼.

MICOU.

(5 Sup. Ot. 221, 112
Supreme

U. S. 452.)

Court of the United States.

Dec. 1,

1884.

Appeal from the circuit court of the UnitStates for the Southern district of New
York.
ed

B. N. Dickerson, for appellant
and Geo. C. Holt, tor appellee.

S.

P. Nash

GRAY, J. This is an appeal by the executor of a guardian from a decree against
him upon a bill in equity filed by the admin-

istratrix of his ward. The original bUl, filed
on July 1, 1875, by Ann C. Sims, a citizen
of Alabama, as administratrix of Martha M.
Sims, in the supreme court of the state of
New York, alleged that on December 11,
1855, the defendant's testator, Gazaway B.
Lamar, was duly appointed, by the surrogate of the county of Richmond, in that
state, guardian of the person and estate of
Martha M. Sims, an infant of six years of
age, then a resident of that county, and gave
bond as such, and took into his possession
all her property, being more
and control
than $5,000; that on October 5, 1874, he
died in New York, and on November 10,
1874, Ms wUl was there admitted to probate,
and the defendant, a citizen of New York,
was appointed his executor; and that he and
his executor had neglected to render any
account of his guardianship to the surrogate
of Richmond county, or to any court having
cognizance thereof, or to the ward or her
administratrix; and prayed for an account,
and for judgment for the amount found to
be

due.

The defendant removed the case into the
circuit court of the United States for the
Southern district of New York, and there
filed an answer, averring that in 1855, when
Lamar was appointed guardian of Martha
M. Sims, he was a citizen of Georgia, and
she was a citizen of Alabama, having a tem^porary residence in the city of New York;
that in the spring of 1861 the states of
Georgia and Alabama declared themselves
to have seceded from the United States, and
to constitute members of the so-called Conwhereupon a
federate
states of America,
state of war arose between the United States
and the Confederate states, which continued to be flagrant for more than four years
after; that Lamar and Martha M. Sims
were In the spring of 1861 citizens and residents of the states of Georgia and Alabama, respectively, and citizens of the Confederate states, and were engaged in aiding
and abetting the state of Georgia and the
so-called Confederate states in their rebellion against the United States, and she continued to aid and abet until the time of
her death, and he continued to aid and abet
till January, 1865; that the United States,
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by various public acts, declared all his and
her property, of any kind, to be liable to
seizure and confiscation by the United States,
and they both were, by the various acts of
congress of the United States, outlawed and
debarred of any access to any court of the
United States, whereby it was Impossible
for Lamar to appear in the surrogate's court
of Richmond county to settle and close his
accounts there, and to be discharged from
his liability as guardian, in consequence
whereof the relation of guardian and ward,
so far as it depended upon the orders of that
court, ceased and determined; that, for the
purpose of saving the ward's property from
seizure and confiscation by the United
States, Lamar, at the request of the ward
and of her natural guardians, all citizens of
the state of Alabama, withdrew the funds
belonging to her from the city of New York,
and invested them for her benefit and account in such securities as by the laws of
the states of Alabama and Georgia and of
the Confederate states he might lawfully
do; that in 1864, upon the death of Martha
M. Sims, all her property vested in her sister, Ann C. Sims, as her next of kin, and
any accounting of Lamar for that property
was to be made to her; that on March 15,
1867, at the written request of Ann C. Sims
and of her natural guardians, Benjamin H.
Micou was appointed her legal guardian by
the probate court of Montgomery county, in
the state of Alabama, which was at that time
her residence, and Lamar thereupon accounted for and paid over all property with which
he was chargeable as guardian of Martha
M. Sims, to Micou as her guardian, and received from him a full release therefor; and
that Ann C. Sims, when she became of age,
ratified and confirmed the same. To that
answer the plaintiff filed a general replication.
The case was set down for hearing In the
circuit court upon the bill, answer and replication, and a statement of facts agreed
by the parties. In substance as follows: On
November 23, 1850, WiUIam W. Sims, a citizen of Georgia, died at Savannah, In that
state, leaving a widow, who was appointed
his administratrix, and two Infant daughters, Martha M. Sims, born at Savannah on
September 8, 1849, and Ann C. Sims, born
In 1853 the
in Florida on June 1, 1851.
widow married the Rev. Richard M. Abercrombie, of Clifton, in the county of Richmond and state of New York.
On December
11, 1855, on the petition of Mrs. Abercrombie, Gazaway B. Lamar, an uncle of Mr.
Sims, and then residing at Brooklyn, in the
state of New York, was appointed by the
surrogate of Richmond county guardian of
the person and estate of each child "until
she shall arrive at the age of fourteen years,
and until another guardian shall be appointed;" and gave bond to her, vrith sureties,
"to faithfully In all things discharge the

516

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OP TRUSTEES.

duty of a guardian to the said minor according to law, and render a true and just
account of all moneys and other property
received by him, and of the application thereof, and of his guardianship in all respects,
to any court having cognizance thereof;" and
he immediately received from Mrs. Abercromble in money $5,166.89 belonging to
each ward, and invested part of it, in January and April, 1856, in stock of the Bank
of the Republic, at New York, and part of
it, in March and July, 1857, in stock of the
Bank of Commerce, at Savannah, each of
which was then paying, and continued to
pay until April, 1861, good dividends annually, the one of 10 and the other of 8 per
cent.

In 1856, several months after Lamar's appointment as guardian, Mr. and Mrs. Abercromble removed from Clifton, in the state
of New York, to Hartford, In the state of
Connecticut, and there resided till her death,
In the spring of 1859.
The children lived
with Mr. and Mrs. Abercrombie, Lamar as
guardian paying Mr. Abercrombie for their
board, at Clifton and at Hartford, from the
marriage until her death; and were then
removed to Augusta, in the state of Georgia,
and there lived with their paternal grandmother and her unmarried daughter and only
living child, their aunt; Lamar as guardian
continuing to pay their board.
After 1856
neither of the children ever resided In the
state of New York. On January 18, 1860, their
aunt was married to Benjamin H. MIcou,
of Montgomery, in the state of Alabama, and
the children and their grandmother thereafter lived with Mr. and Mrs. MIcou at
Montgomery, and the children were educated and supported at Mr. Micou's expense.
From 1855 to 1859 Lamar resided partly In
Georgia and partly in New York. In the
spring of 1861 he had a temporary residence
in the city of New York, and upon the breaking out of the war of the rebellion, and after
removing all his own property, left New
York, and passed through the lines to Savannah, and there resided, sympathizing with
the rebellion, and doing what he could to
accomplish Its success, until January, 1865,
and continued to have his residence In Savannah until 1872 or 1873, when he went to
New York again, and afterwards lived there.
Mr. and Mrs. MIcou also sympathized with
the rebellion and desired Its success, and
each of' them, as well as Lamar, failed during the rebellion to bear true allegiance to
the United States.
At the time of Lamar's appointment as
guardian, 10 shares in the stock of the
Mechanics' Bank of Augusta, in the state of
Georgia, which had belonged to William W.
Sims in his life-time, stood on the books of
the bank in the name of Mrs. Abercrombie
as his administratrix, of which one-third belonged to her as his widow, and one-third
to each of the infants. In January, 1856,

the bank refused a request of Lamar to
transfer one-third of that stock to him as
guardian of each infant, but afterwards paid
to him as guardian, from time to time, twothirds of the dividends during the life of
Mrs. Abercrombie, and all the dividends after her death until 1865.
During the period
last named, he also received as guardian the
dividends on some other bank stock in Savannah, which Mrs. Abercrombie owned, and
to which, on her death, her husband became
entitled.
Certain facts, relied on as showing
that he, immediately after his wife's death,
made a surrender of her interest in the bank
shares to Lamar, as guardian of her children,
are not material to the understanding of the
decision of this court, but are recapitulated
In the opinion of the circuit court. 7 Fed.
180-185.
In the winter of 1861-62, Lamar,
fearing that the stock in the Bank of the
Republic at New York, held by him as guardian, would be confiscated
by the United
States, had it sold by a friend in New York;
the proceeds of the sale, which were about
20 per cent, less than the par value of the
stock. Invested at New York in guarantied
bonds of the cities of New Orleans, Memphis,
and Mobile, and of the East Tennessee &
Georgia Railroad Company; and those bonds
Lamar from
deposited in a bank in Canada.
time to time invested the property of his
wards, that was within the so-called Confederate states, in whatever seemed to him
to be the most secure and safe— some in Confederate state bonds, some in the bonds of
the individual states which composed the
confederacy, and some In bonds of cities, and
of railroad corporations, and stock of banks
within those states. On the money of his
wards, accruing from dividends on hank
stock, and remaining in his hands, he charged himself with Interest until the summer
of 1862, when, with the advice and aid of
Mr. MIcou, he Invested $7,000 of such money
in bonds of the Confederate states and of the
state of Alabama; and in 1863, with the
like advice and aid, sold the Alabama bonds
for more than he had paid for them, and
invested the proceeds also In Confederate
states bonds; charged his wards with the
them with the
money paid, and credited
bonds; and placed the bonds in the hands
of their grandmother, who gave him a receipt for them and held them till the end
of the rebellion, when they, as well as the
stock in the banks at Savannah, became
worthless.
Martha M. Sims died on November 2, 1864,
at the age of 15 years, unmarried and Intestate, leaving her sister Ann C. Sims her next
of kin. On January 12, 1867, Lamar, in answer to letters of inquiry from Mr. and Mrs.
MIcou, wrote to Mrs. MIcou that he had
saved from the wreck of the property of his
niece, Ann O. Sims, surviving her sister,
three bonds of the city of Memphis, indorsed
by the state of Tennessee, one bond of the
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city of Mobile, and one bond

of the East

& Georgia Railroad Company,
Tennessee
each for $1,000, and with some coupons past
due and uncollected; and suggested that by
reason of his age and failing health, and of
the embarrassed state of his own affairs, ilr.
Micou should be appointed in Alabama guardUpon the receipt of this
ian in his stead.
letter, Mrs. Micou wrote to Lamar, thanking
him for the explicit statement of the niece's
affairs, and for the care and trouble he had
had with her property; and Ann C. Sims,
then nearly 16 years old, signed a request,
attested by her grandmother and by Mrs.
Micou, that her guardianship might be transferred to Mr. Micou, and that he might be apAnd on March 15,
pointed her guardian.
1867, he was appointed guardian of her property by the probate court of the county of
and state of Alabama, accordMontgomery
ing to the laws of that state, and gave bond
On May 14, 1867, Lamar sent to
as such.
Micou complete and correct statements of
his guardianship account with each of his
wards, as well as all the securities remaining in his hands as guardian of either, and
a check payable to Micou as guardian of Ann
0. Sims for a balance in money due her;
and Micou, as such guardian, signed and sent
to Lamar a schedule of and receipt for the
property, describing it specifically, by which
it appeared that the bonds of the cities of
New Orleans and Memphis, and of the East
Tennessee
& Georgia Railroad Company,
were issued, and the Memphis bonds, as w^I
as the railroad bonds, were indorsed by the
state of Tennessee,
some years before the
breaking out of the rebellion.
Micou thenceforth continued to act in all respects as the
only guardian of Ann C. Sims until she became of age on June 1, 1872.
No objection or complaint was ever made
by either of the wards or their relatives
against Lamar's transactions or investments
as guardian until July 28, 1874, when Micou
wrote to Lamar informing him that Ann C.
Sims desired a settlement of his accounts,
and that he had been advised that no credits
could be allowed for the investments in Confederate states bonds, and that Lamar was
responsible
for the security of the investments in other bonds and bank stock. Lamar was then sick in New York, and died
there on October 5, 1874, without having answered the letter.
Before the case was heard
in the circuit court, Ann C. Sims died, on

May 7, 1878, and on June 20, 1878, Mrs.
Micou was appointed, in New York, administratrix de bonis non of Martha M. Sims, and
as such filed a biU of revivor In this suit.
On October 3, 1878, the defendant filed a
cross-bill, repeating the allegations of his answer to the original bill, and further averring that Ann C. Sims left a will which had

been admitted to probate in Montgomery
county. In the state of Alabama, and after-

wards In the county and state of New York,
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by which she gave all her property to Mrs.
Micou, who was her next of kin, and that
Mrs. Micou was entitled to receive for her
own benefit whatever might be recovered in
the principal suit, and was estopped to deny
the lawfulness or propriety of Lamar's acts,
because whatever was done by him as guardian of Martha M. Sims in her life-time, or as
guardian of the Interests of Ann C. Sims as
her next of kin, was authorized and approved
by Mrs. Micou and her mother and husband
as the natural guardians of both children.
Mrs. Micou, as plaintiff in the bill of revivor,
answered the cross-bill, alleging that Ann
succeeded to Martha's property as her administratrix, and not as her next of kin, admitting Ann's will and the probate thereof,
denying that Mrs. Micou was a natural
guardian of the children, and denying that
she approved or ratified Lamar's acts as
guardian. A general replication was filed to
that answer.
Upon a hearing on the pleadings and the
agreed statement of facts, the circuit court
dismissed the cross-bill, held all Lamar's investments to have been breaches of trust,
and entered a decree referring the case to
a master to state an account.
The case was
afterwards heard on exceptions to the master's report, and a final decree entered for
the plaintiff for $18,705.19, including the value before 1861 of those bank stocks in Georgia of which Lamar had never had possession.
The opinion delivered upon the first
hearing is reported in 17 Blatchf. 378, and in
1 Fed. 14, and the opinion upon the second
hearing in 7 Fed. 180. The defendant appealed to this court.
The authority of the surrogate's court of
the county of Richmond and state of New
York to appoint Lamar guardian of the persons and property of infants at the time
within that county, and the authority of the
supreme court of the state of New York, In
which this suit was originally brought, being
a court of general equity jurisdiction, to take
cognizance thereof, are not disputed; and, upon the facts agreed, it is quite clear that
none of the defenses set up in the answer
afford any ground for dismissing the bill.
The war of the rebellion, and the residence
of both ward and guardian within the territory controlled by the Insurgents, did not
discharge the guardian from his responsibility to account, after the war, for property
of the wards which had at any time come
into his hands, or which he might, by the
exercise of due care, have obtained possession of. A state of war does not put an end
to pre-existing obligations, or transfer the
property of wards to their guardians, or release the latter from the duty to keep It safely, but suspends until the return of peace
the right of any one residing in the enemy's
country to sue in our courts. Ward v. Smith,
7 Wall. 447; Montgomery v. U. S., 15 Wall.
395, 400; Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S.

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES

518
425,

430;

Kershaw

563,

564,

570;

v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561,
3 Phillim. Int. Law (2d Ed.)
The appointment of Micou in 1867
§ 589.
by a court of Alabama to be guardian of the
surviving ward, then residing in that state,

did not terminate Lamar's liability for property of his wards which he previously had or
ought to have taken possession of. The receipt given by Micou was only for the securities and money actually handed over to him
by Lamar; and if Micou had any authority
to discharge Lamar from liability for past
mismanagement of either ward's property,
he never assumed to do so. The suggestion
in the answer, that the surviving ward, upon
coming of age, ratified and approved the
acts of Lamar as guardian, finds no support
in the facts of the case. The further grounds
of defense, set up in the cross-bill, that Micou participated in Lamar's investments, and
that Mrs. Micou approved them, are equally
unavailing. The acts of Micou, before his
own appointment as guardian, could not bind
the ward. And admissions in private letters
from Mrs. Micou to Lamar could not. affect
the rights of the ward, or Mrs. Micou's authority, upon being afterwards appointed administratrix of the ward, to maintain this
bill as such against Lamar's representative,
even if the amount recovered will inure to
her own benefit as the ward's next of kin.
1 Greenl. Bv. § 179.
The extent of Lamar's
liability presents more difficult questions of
law, now for the first time brought before
this court.
The general rule is everywhere
recognized, that a guardian or trustee, when
investing property in his hands, is bound to
act honestly and faithfully, and to exercise a
sound discretion, such as men of ordinary
prudence and Intelligence use in their own
affairs. In some jurisdictions no attempt has
been made to establish a more definite rule;
in others, the discretion has been confined,
by the legislature or the courts, within strict
limits.
The court of chancery, before the Declaration of Independence, appears to have allowed
some latitude to trustees in making Investments.
The best evidence of this is to be
found in the judgments of Lord Hardwicke.
He held, indeed, in accordance with the clear
weight of authority before and since, that
money lent on a mere personal obligation,
like a promissory note, without security, was
Ryder v. Bickerat the risk of the trustee.
ton, 3 Swanst.

80,

note,

1

Eden,

149,

note;

Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. 535, 545; Perry,
But, in so holding, he said:
Ti-usts, § 453.
"For It should have been on some such security as binds land, or something to be answerable
for it." 3 Swanst. 81, note. Although In one case he held that a trustee,
directed by the terms of his trust to invest
the trust money in government funds or other
good securities,
was responsible for a loss
caused by his investing it in South Sea stock,
and observed that neither South Sea stock nor
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bank stock was considered a good security
because it depended upon the management
of
the governor and directors, and the capital
might be wholly lost (Trafford v. Boehm, 3
Atk. 440, 444); yet, in another case, he declined to charge a trustee for a loss on South
Sea stock, which had fallen in value since
the trustee received it, and said that "to compel trustees to make up a deficiency, not owing to their willful default, is the harshest
demand that can be made in a court of
equity." Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Atk. 513, 514,
West, Ch. 31, 34. In a later case he said:
"Suppose a trustee, having in his hands a
considerable
sum of money, places it out in
the funds, which afterwards sink in their
value, or on a security at the time apparently
good, which afterwards turns out not to be
so, for the benefit of the cestui que trust;
was there ever an instance of the trustee's
being made to answer the actual sum so
placed out?
answer, 'No.'
If there is no
mala fides, nothing willful In the conduct
of the trustee, the court will always favor
him; for, as a trust is an office necessary in
the concerns between
man and man, and
which, if faithfully discharged, is attended
with no small degree of trouble and anxiety.
It is an act of great kindness in any one
to accept it. To add hazard or risk to that
trouble, and subject a trustee to losses which
he could not foresee, and, consequently, not
prevent, would be a manifest hardship, and
would be deterring every one from accepting
so necessary
an ofiice."
That this opinion
was not based upon the fact that in England
trustees usually receive no compensation is
clearly shown by the chancellor's adding that
the same doctrine held good in the case of
a receiver, an officer of the court, and paid
for his trouble; and the point decided was
that a receiver, who paid the amount of rents
of estates in his charge to a Bristol tradesman of good credit, taking his bills therefor
on Iiondon, was not responsible for the loss
of the money by his becoming bankrupt.

I

Knight

Plymouth, 1 Dick. 120, 126, 127, 3
And the decision was afterwards
cited by Lord Hardwicke himself as showing
that when trustees act by other hands, according to the usage of business, they are not
answerable for losses. Ex parte Belchier, 1
Amb. 218, 219, 1 Kenyon, 38, 47.
In later times, as the amount and variety
of English government securities increased,
the court of chancery limited trust investments to the public funds, disapproved investments either In bank stock or in mortgages
of real estate, and prescribed so strict a rule
that parliament Interposed; and by the statutes of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, and 23 & 24 Vict.
orders In chancery,
c. 38, and by general
pursuant to those statutes, trustees have been
authorized
to Invest in stock of the bank
of England or of Ireland, or upon mortgage
of freehold or copyhold estates, as well as in
the public funds. Lewln, Trusts (7th Ed.)

Atk.

V.

480.
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In a very recent case the covirt
of appeal and the house of lords, following
the decisions of Lord Hardwiclie in Knight
V. Plymouth and Ex parte BeleMer, a'bove
investing trust
cited, held that a trustee
funds, who employed a broker to procure securities authorized by the trust, and paid the
purchase money to the brolier, if such was
the usual and regular course of business of
persons acting with reasonable care and prudence on their own account, was not liable
for the loss of the money by fraud of the
Sir George Jessel, M. R., Lord Jusbroker.
and Lord Blackburn affirmed
tice Bowen,
the general rule that a trustee is only bound
to conduct the business of his trust in the
same manner that an ordinarily prudent man
his own; Lord
of business would conduct
Blackburn adding the qualification that "a
trustee must not choose investments other
than those which the terms of his trust perSpeight V. Gaunt, 22 Ch. Div. 727,
mit."
739, 762, 9 App. Cas. 1, 19.
In this country there has been a diversity
in the laws and usages of the several states
upon the subject of trust investments.
In New York^ under Chancellor Kent, the
rule seems to have been quite undefined.
See
Smith V. Smith, 4 Johns. Ch. 281, 285; Thompson v. Brown, Id. 619, 628, 629, where the
chancellor quoted the passage above cited
from Lord Hardwicke's opinion In Knight v.
Plymouth.
And In Brown v. Campbell, Hopk.
Ch. 283, where an executor In good faith made
an investment, considered at the time to be
advantageous, of the amount of two promissory notes, due to his testator from one manufacturing corporation, in the stock of another
manufacturing
corporation,
which afterwards
became insolvent. Chancellor Sanford held
that there was no reason to charge him with
the loss. But by the later decisions in that
state investments
in bank or railroad stock
have been held to be at the risk of the trustee, and It has been intimated that the only
investments that a trustee can safely make
without an express order of court are In govKing v.
ernment or real estate securities.
Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76, affirming 50 Barb. 453;
Ackerman v. Bmott, 4 Barb. 626; Mills v.
Hoffman, 26 Hun, 594; 2 Kent, Comm. 416,
note b. So the decisions in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania tend to disallow investments in
the stock of banks or other business corpora282, 283, 287.

tions, or otherwise than in the public funds or
in mortgages of real estate. Gray v. Fox, 1
N. J. Eq. 259, 268; Halsted v. Meeker's Ex'rs,
18 N. J. Eq. 136; Lathrop v. Smalley's Ex'rs,
Appeal, 9 Pa.
23 N. J. Eq. 192; Worrell's
508, and 23 Pa. 44; Hemphill's Appeal, 18 Pa.
303; Ihmsen's Appeal, 43 Pa. 431. And the
New York and Pennsylvania courts have
shown a strong disinclination to permit investments in real estate or securities out of
Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N.
their Jurisdiction.
Y. 339; Rush's Estate, 12 Pa. 375, 378.
In New England, and in the southern states.
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the rule has been less strict In Massachusetts, by a usage of more than half a century,
approved by a uniform course of Judicial decision, It has come to be regarded as too firmly settled to be changed, except by the legislature, that all that can be required of a
trustee to invest is that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion,
such as men of prudence and Intelligence exercise in the permanent disposition of their
own funds, having regard, not only to the
probable income, but also to the probable
safety, of the capital; and that a guardian or
trustee is not precluded from investing in the
manufacturing,
insurance,
stock of banking,
or railroad corporations within or without the
state.
Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick.
446, 461; Lovell v. Minot, 20 Pick. 116, 119;
Kinmonth v. Brigham, 5 Allen, 270, 277; Clark
V. Garfield,
8 Allen, 427; Brown v. French,
125 Mass. 410; Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass.
In New Hampshire and in Vermont, in262.
vestments, honestly and prudently made, In
securities of any kind that produce income,
Knowlton v. Bradley,
appear to be allowed.
17 N. H. 458; Kimball v. Reding, 11 Ftost. 352,
374; French v. Currier, 47 N. H. 88, 99; Barney V. Parsons, 54 Vt. 623.
In Maryland, good bank stock, as well as
government securities and mortgages on real
estate, has always been considered a proper
Hammond v. Hammond, 2
investment
Bland, 306, 413; Gray v. Lynch, 8 Gill, 403;
Murray v. Feinour, 2 Md. Ch. 418. So, in
Mississippi, investment in bank stock is allowed. Smyth V. Bums, 25 Miss. 422.
In South Carolina, before the war, no more
definite rule appears to have been laid down
than that guardians and trustees must manage the funds in their hands as prudent
men manage their own affairs. Boggs v.
Adger, 4 Rich. Eq. 408, 411; Spear v. Spear,
9 Rich. Eq. 184, 201; Snelling v. McCreary,

14 Rich. Eq. 291, 300.
In Georgia the English rule was never
adopted; a statute of 1845, which authorized
administrators, guardians,
and
executors,
trustees, holding any trust funds, to invest
them in securities of the state, was not con-

compulsory; and before January 1,
(when that statute was amended by
adding a provision that any other investment
of trust funds must be made under a Judicial order, or else be at the risk of the trustee,) those who lent the fund at interest on
what was at the time considered by prudent
men to be good security, were not held liaCobb,
ble for a loss without their faidt
Dig. 333; Code 1861, § 2308; Brown v.
sidered
1863

Wright

39 Ga. 96;

Moses

v. Moses,

50

Ga.

9, 33.

In Alabama the

supreme court In Bryant
Craig, 12 Ala. 354, 359, having intimated
that a guardian could not safely invest upon
either real or personal security without an
order of court the legislature,
from 1852,
authorized guardians and trustees to invest
V.
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on boud and mortgage, or on good personal
security,
with no other limit than fidelity
Code 1852, §
ana prudence might require.
2024; Code 1867, § 2426; Foscue v. Lyon,
65 Ala. 440, 452.
The rules of Investment varying so much in
the different states, it becomes necessary to
consider by -what law the management
and
investment of the ward's property should be
governed. • As a general rule (with some exceptions not material to the consideration of
this case) the law of the domicile governs the
status of a person, and the disposition and
management
of his movable property.
The
domicile of an infant is universally held to
be the fittest place for the appointment of a
guardian of his person and estate; although,
for the protection of either, a guardian may
In any state where the person
be appointed
or any property of an infant may be found.
On the continent of Europe, the guardian
appointed in the state of the domicile of the
ward Is generally recognized as entitled to
the control and dominion of the ward and
his movable property everywhere, and guardin other states are
ians specially appointed
responsible
to the principal guardian. By
the law of England and of this country, a
guardian appointed by the courts of one state
has no authority over the ward's person or
property in another state, except so far as
allowed by the comity of that state, as expressed through its legislature or its courts;
but the tendency of modem statutes and decisions is to defer to the law of the domicile,
and to support the authority of the guardian
Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.
appointed
there.
S. 613, 631, and authorities cited; Morrell
V. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 153; Woodworth v.
Spring, 4 Allen, 321; Milliken v. Pratt, 125
Mass. 374, 377, 378; Leonard v. Putnam, 51
N. H. 247; Com. v. Ehoads, 37 Pa. 60;
Sims V. Renwlck, 25 Ga. 58; Dicey, Dom.
172-176;
Westl. Int. Law (2d. Ed.) 48-50;
Whart. Confl. Laws (2d Ed.) §§ 259-268. An
As
infant cannot change his own domicile.
infants have the domicile of their father,
he may change their domicile by changing
his own; and after his death the mother,
while she remains a widow, may likewise,
by changing her domicile, change the domicile of the infants; the domicile of the children, in either case, following the independKennedy v.
ent domicile of their parent
By all, 67 N. Y. 379; Potinger v. Wightman,
3 Mer. 67;
Dedham v. Natick, 16 Mass. 135;

Dicey, Dom. 97-99. But when the widow,
by marrying again, acquires the domicile of
a second husband, she does not, by taking
lier children by the •first husband to live
with her there, make the domicile which she
derives from the second husband their domicile; and they retain the domicile which
they had, before her second marriage, acquired from her or from their father. Oumner v. Milton, 3 Salk. 259, Holt, 578; Freetown V. Taunton, 16 Mass. 52; School Direc-
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V. James, 2 Watts & S. 568; Johnson
v.
Copeland, 35 Ala. 521; Brown v. Lynch. 2
Bradf. 214; Mears v. Sinclair, 1 W. Va. 185;

tors

Pot Introduction
No. 19;

Int Law

1

Burge,

Generale aux Coutumesi
Col. Law, 39; 4 Phillim'

(2d Ed.) § 97.
The preference
due to the law of the
ward's domicile, and the importance of a
imiform administration of his whole estate,
require that, as a general rule, the management and investment of his projwrty should
be governed by the law of the state of his
domicile, especially when he actually resides
there, rather than by the law of any state
In which a guardian may have been appointed or may have received some property of
the ward.
If the duties of the guardian
were to be exclusively regulated by the law
of the state of his appointment, it would
follow that in any case in which the temporary residence of the ward was changed
from state to state, from considerations of

health, education,
pleasure, or convenience,
and guardians were appointed in each state,
the guardians appointed
in the different
states, even if the same persons, might be
held to diverse rules of accounting for different pares of tne ward's property. The
form of accounting, so far as concerns the
remedy only, must indeed, be according to
the law of the coint in which relief is sought;
but the general rule by which the guardian
is to be held responsible for the investment
of the ward's property is the law of the

place of the domicile of the ward. Bar, Int
Law, § 106 (Gillespie's translation) p. 438;
Whart Confl. Laws, § 259. It may be suggested that this would enable the guardian,
by changing the domicile of his ward, to
choose for himself the law by which he
should account
Not so. The father, and
after his death the widowed mother, being
the natural guardian, and the person from
whom the ward derives his domicile, may
change that domicile.
But the ward does
not derive a domicile from any other than a
natural guardian. A testamentary guardian
nominated by the father may have the same
control of the ward's domicile that the father
had.
Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596, 605.
And any guardian, appointed in the state of
the domicile of the ward, has been generally
held to have the power of changing the
ward's domicile from one county to another
within the same state and under the same
law. Cutts V. Haskins, 9 Mass. 543; Holyoke V. Haskins, 5 Pick. 20; Kirkland v.
Whately, 4 Allen, 462; Anderson v. Anderson, 42 Vt 350; Ex parte Bartiett, 4 Bradf.
221; Reg. v. Whitby, L. R. 5 Q. B. 325, 331.
But it is very doubtful, to say the least
whether even a guardian appointed In the
state of the domicile of the ward (not being the natural guardian or a testamentary
guardian) can remove the ward's domicile
beyond the limits of the state in which the
guardian is appointed, and to which his legal
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autbority is confined.
Douglas y. Douglas,
h. K. 12 Bq. 617, 625; Daniel v. Hill, 52
Ala. 430; Story, Confl. Laws, § 506, note;
Dicey, Dom. 100, 132.
And it is quite clear
tliat a guardian appointed in a state in which
residing, cannot
the ward is temporarily
change the ward's permanent domicile from
one state to another.
The case of such a
guardian differs from that of an executor of,
or a trustee under, a will. In the one case,
the title in the property is In the executor or
in the other, the title in the
the trustee;
property is in the ward, and the guardian
of it,
has only the custody and management
The
with power to change its investment
executor or trustee is appointed at the domicile of the testator; the guardian is most fitly
appointed at the domicile of the ward, and
may be appointed in any state in which the
person or any property of the ward is found.
The general rule which governs the administration of the property in the one case may
be the law of the domicile of the testator;
in the other case, it Is the law of the domicile of the ward.
As the law of the domicile of the ward has
no extraterritorial effect, except by the comity
of the state where the property is situated, or
where the guardian is appointed, it cannot,
of course, prevail against a statute of the
state in which the question is presented
for
adjudication, expresfely applicable to the estate of a ward domiciled elsewhere.
Hoyt
V. Spragiie, 103 U. S. 613.
Cases may also
arise with facts so peculiar or so complicated
as to modify the degree of influence that the
com't in which the guardian is called to account may allow to the law of the domicile
of the ward, consistently with doing justice
to the parties before it. And a guardian,
who had in good faith conformed to the law
of the state in which he was appointed, might,
perhaps, be excused for not having complied
with stricter rules prevailing at the domicile
of the ward. But in a case in which the
domicile of the ward has always been in a
state whose law leaves much to the discretion of the guardian in the matter of investments, and he has faithfully and prudently
exercised that discretion with a view to the
pecuniary interests of the ward, it would be
Inconsistent with the principles of equity to
charge him with the amount of the moneys
invested, merely because he has not complied
with the more rigid rules adopted by the
courts of the state in which he was appointed.
The domicile of William W. Sims, during his
life and at the time of his death in 1850, was
hi Georgia.
This domicile continued to be
the domicile of his widow and of their infant
In
children until they acquired new ones.
1853 the widow, by marrying the Rev. Mr.
acquired his domicile. But
Ambercrombie,
she did not, by taking the infants to the
home, at first In New Tork and afterwards
in Conneetieut, of her new husband, who was
of no kin to the children, was under no legal
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obligation to support them, and was, in fact,
paid for their board out of their property,
make his domicile, or the domicile derived by
her from him, the domicile of the children of
the first husband. Immediately upon her
death in Connecticut,
In 1859, these children,
both under 10 years of age, were taken back
to Georgia to the house of their father's
mother and unmarried sister, their own nearest surviving relatives; and they continued
to live with their grandmother and aunt in
Georgia until the marriage of the aunt in
January, 1860, to Mr. Micou, a citizen of Alabama, after which the grandmother and the
children resided with Mr. and Mrs. Micou at
their domicile in that state.
Ui)on these facts, the domicile of the children was always in Georgia from their birth
until January, 1860, and thenceforth was either in Georgia or in Alabama. As the rules
of investment prevailing before 1863 in Georgia and in Alabama did not substantially differ, the question in which of those two states
their domicile was is immaterial to the decision of this case; and it is therefore unnecessary
to consider whether their grandmother was their natural guardian, and as
such had the power to change their domicile
from one state to another.
See Hargrave's
note 66 to Co. Litt. 88b; Eeeve, Dom. Eel.
315; 2 Kent, Comm. 219; Code Ga. 1861, §§
1754,
2452; Darden v. Wyatt, 15 Ga. 414.
Whether the domicile of Lamar in December,
1855, when he was appointed in New York
guardian of the infants, was in New York or
In Georgia, does not distinctly appear, and is
not material; because, for the reasons already stated, wherever his domicile was, his
duties as guardian in the management and
investment of the property of his wards were
to be regulated by the law of their domicile.
It remains to apply the test of that law to
Lamar's acts or omissions with regard to the
various kinds of securities in which the property of the wards was invested.
1. The sum which Lamar received in New
York in money from Mrs. Abercrombie he invested to, 1856 and 1857 in stock of the Bank
of the Republic at New York, and of the
Bank of Commerce at Savannah, both of
which were then, and continued till the breaking out of the war, in sound condition, paying
There is nothing to raise a
good dividends.
suspicion that Lamar, in making these investments, did not use the highest degree of
and they were such as by the law
prudence;
of Georgia or of Alabama he might properly
make.
Nor is there any evidence that he
was guilty of neglect in not withdrawing the
investment in the stock of the Bank of Commerce at Savannah before it became worthless.
He should not, therefore, be charged
The investment
with the loss of that stock.
in the stock of the Bank of the Republic of
New York betag a proper investment by the
law Of the domicile of the wards, and there
being no evidence that the sale of that stock
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by Lamar's order In New York, in 1862, was
not judicious, or was for less than its fair
market price, lie was not responsible for the
decrease in its value between the times of its
purchase and of its sale.
He had the authority, as guardian, without any order of
court, to sell personal property of his ward
in his own possession, and to reinvest the
proceeds.
Field v. SchiefEelin, 7 Johns. Oh.
150; Ellis V. Essex Merrimack Bridge, 2 Pick.
243.
That his motive in selling it was to
avoid its being confiscated by the United
States, does not appear to us to have any
bearing on the rights of these parties.
And
no statute under which it could have been
confiscated has been brought to our notice.
The act of July 17, 1862, c. 195, § 6, cited by
the appellant, is limited to property of persons engaged in or abetting armed rebellion,
which could hardly be predicated of two girls
under 13 years of age. 12 St 591. Whatever liability, criminal or civil, Lamar may
have incurred or avoided as towards the United States, there was nothing in his selling
this stock, and turning it into money, of
which his wards had any right to complain.
As to the sum received from the sale of the
stock in the Bank of the Republic, we find
nothing in the facts agreed by the parties,
upon which the case was heard, to support
the argument that Lamar, under color of protecting his wards' interests,
allowed the
funds to be lent to cities and other corporations which were aiding in the rebellion. On
the contrary, it is agreed that that sum was
applied to the purchase in New York of guarantied bonds of the cities of New Orleans,
Memphis, and Mobile, and of the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad Company; and the
description of those bonds, in the receipt afterwards given by Micou to Lamar, shows
that the bonds of that railroad company, and
of the cities of New Orleans and Memphis, at
least, were issued some years before the
breaking out of the rebellion, and that the
bonds of the city of Memphis and of the railroad company were, at the time of their isThe
sue, indorsed by the state of Tennessee.
company had its charter from that state, and
its road was partly in Tennessee and partly
in Georgia.
Tenn. St 1848, c. 169. Under
the discretion allowed to a guardian or trustee by the law of Georgia and of Alabama, he
was not precluded from investing the funds
in his hands in bonds of a railroad corporation, indorsed by the state by which it was
chartered, or in bonds of a city. As lamar,
in making these investments, appears to have
used due care and prudence, having regard to
the best pecuniary interests of his wards, the
sum so invested should be credited to him
in this case, unless, as suggested at the argument, the requisite allowance has already
been made in the final decree of the circuit
court in the suit brought by the representative of the other ward, an appeal from which

OF TRUSTEES.

by this court for want of jurisdiction in 104 U. S. 465.
2. Other moneys of the wards in
Lamar's
hands, arising either from dividends which
he had received on their behalf, or from interest with which he charged himself upon
sums not invested, were used in the purchase
of bonds of the Confederate states, and of the
state of Alabama.
The investment in bonds
of the Confederate states was clearly unlawful, and no legislative act or judicial decree
or decision of any state could justify it The
so-called Confederate
government was in no
sense a lawful government, but was a mere
government
of force, having its origin and
foundation in rebellion against the United
States.
The notes and bonds issued in its
name and for its support had no legal value
was dismissed

as money or property, except by agreement
or acceptance of parties capable of contracting with each other, and can never be regarded by a court sitting tmder the authority
of the United States as securities in which
trust funds might be lawfully Invested.
Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Head v.
Starke, Chase, 312, Fed. Cas. No. 6,293; Horn
V. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570; Confederate Note
Case, 10 Wall. 548; Sprott v. U. S., 20 Wall.
459; Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall. 198; Alexander V. Bryan, 110 U. S. 414, 4 Sup. Ct 107.
An infant has no capacity, by contract with
his guardian, or by assent to his unlawful
acts, to affect his own rights. The case is
governed in this particular by the decision in
Horn V. Lockhart, in which it was held that
an executor was not discharged from his liability to legatees by having invested funds,
pursuant to a statute of the state, and with
the approval of the probate court by which
lie had been appointed, in bonds of the Confederate states, which became worthless in
his hands.
Neither the date nor the purpose
of the issue of the bonds of the state of Alabama is shown, and it is unnecessary to consider the lawfulness of the investment in
those bonds, because Lamar appears to have
sold them for as much as he had paid for
them, and to have invested the proceeds in
additional Confederate states bonds, and for
the amount thereby lost to the estate he was
accountable.
Bank of
3. The stock in the Mechanics'
Georgia, which had belonged to William W.
Sims in his life-time, and stood on the hooks
of the bank in the name of his administratrix,
and of which one-third belonged to her, as
his widow, and one-third to each of the infants, never came into Lamar's possession;
and upon a request made by him, the very
next month after his appointment, the bank
refused to transfer to him any part of it He
did receive and account for the dividends;
and he could not, under the law of Georgia
concerning foreign guardians, have obtained
possession of property of his wards within
that state without the consent of the ordinary. Code 18C1, §S 1834-1839. The at-
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tempt to charge Mm for the value of the
principal of the stock must fail for two reasons: First. This very stock had not only belonged to the father of the -wards in his lifetime, hut it was such stock as a guardian or
trustee might properly invest in by the law of
Second. No reason is shown why
Georgia.
this stock, being in Georgia, the domicile of
the wards, should have been transferred to a
In New
guardian who had been appointed
Tork during their temporary residence there.
are conclusive against
The same reasons
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charging him with the value of the bank
stock In Georgia, which was owned by Mrs.
Abercrombie in her own right, and to which
Mr. Abercrombie became entitled upon her
It is therefore unnecessary to condeath.
sider whether there is suflScient evidence of
an Immediate surrender by him of her interest to her children.
The result is that both the decrees of the
circuit court in this case must be reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
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SIMMONS
(43

N. W.

T.
561,

OLIVER
74

Wis.

Supreme Conrt of Wisconsin.

et al.
633.)

Nov. 5, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Fond du Lac
county; N. S. Gilson, Judge.
Accounting and petition to be discharged
by M. W. Simmons, trustee of the estate of
William Oliver, deceased. Elizabeth Oliver
and otheis, beneficiaries, objected to the acFrom a
count, and opposed the petition.
judgment holding the trustee liable for certain losses, he appeals.
Knowles & Phelps, for appellant. N. O.

Biffin, for

respondents.

Cole, C. J. M. W. Simmons, as trustee,
received the funds mentioned in his account
from the former trustee, Smith, to invest
and to keep invested for the benefit of the
The income was to be
beneficiaries named.
paid to the widow during her life, and $1,000
was to be paid the children in equal portions
when the youngest should arrive at age. No
directions were given in the order appointing
Simmons as to how the trust funds should be
invested. It appears that in 1883 the trustee
loaned to the McDonald Manufacturing Company a portion of the fund, taking its indorsed note, which note was taken up in
February, 1884, by a new note for the amount
of the loan unpaid, such note running one
year, which was indorsed by the president
The company
and secretary of the company.
at this time was in good financial standing,
and the indorsers w6re reputed to be perfectly responsible, and men of ample means. In
a few months, however, the company failed,
and turned over its property to a trustee, and
the piesident, who was supposed to have the
most property of either of the indorsers, beThe claims
came unable to pay his debts.
against the manufacturing company were
finally compromised at 50 cents on the dollar,
in cash and notes, and 50 cents in mining
Simmons at first destock at $5 a share.
clined to take the mining stock, not considering it of any value, but after a few
months, thinking it might turn out to be
worth something, decided to take it and pay
an assessment of $50 upon it, for which it
was advertised for sale. The testimony clearly shows that the compromise made by the
creditors of the manufacturing company was
the best that could be realized at the time;
and that the mining stock, which proved to.
be worthless, was considered of some value.
The trustee, in his account filed, wishes to
be credited and allowed for the mining stock
at its face value and interest thereon since
June 22, 1888, and the amount paid upon it
as an assessment,
together with another
small item of $11.
The beneficiaries object
to the allowance of these items, and the court
below decided that the estate of the trustee
must make good the loss resulting to the
trust-estate by reason of the loan to the manufacturing company.
We think the circuit court was clearly
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right in holding

the trustee liable for the loss
of the trust funds under the circumstances.
He made a loan to a manufacturing company
upon its note and the personal security of
two indorsers. It is true, when the note for
the amount of the loan unpaid was given in
February, 1884, in addition to the security
of the indorsers, the company had assigned
to the trustee as collateral for the payment
of the note a bond, which was supposed to
be a lien upon real estate, but which was afterwards held by this court to be invalid, and
not a lien upon its property. So it eventually turned out that the loan was made to a private business corporation upon personal seWhile there is no evidence
curity alone.
that the trustee did not act in good faith in
making the loan, doubtless deeming it entirely safe, and amply secured, yet he cannot
be protected against the loss.
We are disposed, on this subject, to follow the English
rule which has been adopted in some of our
sister states, and hold that the trustee cannot invest trust funds in personal securities,
and that it is not an exercise of sound discretion to so invest them.
Says Parker, V. C,
in Ackerman v. Emott, 4 Barb. 626-636:
"It is a well-settled rule of the English court
of chancery that the trustee can only protect
himself against risk by investing the trnst
fund in real estate, or governmental securities. He must either take security on veal
estate, or invest in a fund approved by the
court; and no other fund is there approved
" The
by the courts except the public funds.

learned counsel on behalf of the trustee candidly admits that it is the rule of the earlier
decisions, and the one which is laid down in
some of our elementary works on this subject, which say that the trustee is personally
liable in case of any loss from investments in
personal securities, no matter how safe they
The concesmay, al the time, seem to be.
sion is according to the fact, as an examination of the authorities will show. But he
insists that this well-established rule shall be
changed to meet the conditions and needs of
present business and methods of investment.
Investments, he says, in personal securities,
are deemed quite as safe and reliable, by
good business men, as loans upon real estate,
which is subject to great changes in value
This remark
froni one cause or another.
may be true when applied to new towns or
cities where there is more or less speculation
in real estate; but as a general rule the commercial world regards loans made upon adequate real estate security as more safe and
Of
desirable than upon personal security.
course it is not practicable for a trustee always to find government securities in which
to invest, but he can usually find opportunities to make loans upon safe and adequate real estate securities, and, in view of
the hazards of other investments, of which
this case furnishes a good illustration, we
are disposed to hold that the trustee should
not be protected against loss in investing
trust funds unless he loans on real estate
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security, or invests in some other security approved by the court to which he is achis
countable for tlie manner he executes
trust. If this rule shall be found inconvenient, or on the whole not best adapted to the
new condition of things, or to the necessities
of present business arrangements, the legislature can change it by authorizing the investment of trust funds in shares or stocks, or
on the credit of business corporations, or on
"VVe
the personal security of individuals.
prefer to adhere to the well-established rule
in relation to the investment of trust funds,
and if a change is to be made let the legisla-
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ture make it. "We do not enter upon a discussion of the doctrine which makes an investment on private or personal security at
the risk of the trustee, because the law is eleThe prevailing rule in the United
mentary.
States and in England is to prefer either public securities or real estate securities to personal security, and this, we think, is a wise
Hill, Trustees,
and salutary rule to follow.
368 et seq., and cases referred to in the notes;
2 Pom. Eq.
1 Perry, Trusts, § 453 etseq.;
Jur. § 1074; Clark v. Garfield, 8 Allen, 427.
n. follows from these views that the judgment of the circuit court must be afSrmed.
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HARVARD COLLEGE
(9

Supreme

et al. v.

AMORT.

Pick. 446.)

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Jan. 10, 1831.

S. Hubbard, for appellants.
Shaw, for appellee.

Sullivan

&

PUTNAM, J. The confidence which the
testator reposed in his executors, whom he
also constituted his trustees, was unbounded.
He directed that they, as trustees,
should not be required to give any other
security than their own bond, without sureties, and that each of them should be ac"simply for his own acts, doings
countable
and defaults as such trustee."
The general question is, whether the trustees have abused the trust.
The testator made provision for the support of his wife mainly from the proceeds of
the trust fund.
He speaks of the profits,
income, dividends, which were to come from
it through their hands, 'xhey were to loan
the 50,000 dollars upon ample and sufficient
security, or invest the same in safe and productive stock, either in the public funds,
bank shares or other stock, according to their
best judgment and discretion.
It is very clear that the testator did not
intend to limit the income to the simple interest of the fund; for if he had so intended,
he would not have spoken of dividends and
profits, but would have given an annuity of
three thousand dollars a year.
It has been argued that the testator gave
the sum of fifty thousand dollars as the trust
fund, and that the trustees could only have
demanded that sum of the executors.
But
we think that no important Inference can be
drawn from that fact It would not follow
from thence, that there should have been a
sale of the personal property or stocks of the
testator and a reinvestment. The trustees
and the executors were the same persons, and
instead of going through the useless formality of a sale and investment, it was clearly competent for them to select from the ample funds of the estate, those stocks which
should form the capital of the trust fund.
And in making that selection, it is very clear
to us, that they should have preferred that
stock which would probably give her the
most profit, and at the same time preserve
the value of the capital sum.
It would not
for example have been the exercise of a
sound discretion, to have appropriated the
trust fund in the stock of an incorporated
company which gave great dividends for the
time being, but whidi would, according to
the terms of its charter, expire as soon as
the death of the wife could be calculated to
happen.
In such a case nothing would be
left of the capital for those in remainder.
On the other hand, if the investment of the
trust fund were in stock which made large
dividends, and which had acquired its value
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by the prudent management of Its proprietors, and might be reasonably calculated upon as a safe and permanent capital, such an
investment would seem to be according to
the manifest intent of the testator.
It is somewhat remarkable that the testator did not himself appropriate the stock of
which the trust fund should consist, but that
he should have left the selection to his trustees. But as it would have been necessary
to

empower

them

to

change,

sell

out and

reinvest, perhaps it was wise in the testator
to leave the whole matter, the selection a»
well as the management, to them. Be that
as it may, he has given them that authority.
But It has happened that the value of the
capital stock in which the trust fund was
invested, has fallen, and those in remainder
call upon the trustees to make up the deficiency.

It was said by i^rd Hardwicke in Jackson V. Jackson, 1 Aik. 514, that "to compel
trustees to make up a aeficiency not owing
to their wilful default, is the harshest demand that can be made in a court of equity." The statute Of Geo. I, for the Indemnity
of guardians and trustees, provides that if
there be a diminution of tiie principal, witbout the default of the trustees, they shall not
If that were otherwise, who would
be liable.
undertake such hazardous responsibility?
It is argued for the appellants, that the
trustees have not loaned the money on good
security. The answer is found in the authority which the testator gave to them.
They were to loan, or to invest the fund in
They preferred the latter.
stocks.
But it is argued, that they did not invest
in the public funds, bank shares or other
stock, within the true intent and meaning of
the authority, out in trading companies, and
so exposed the capital to great loss. And we
are referred to TrafCord v. Boehm, 3 Atk.
444, to prove the position, that such an Investment will not have the support of a court
of chancery.
The chancellor seems to suppose that funds or other good securities,
must be such as have the engagement of the
government to pay off their capital. Bank
stock, as well as South-Sea stock, which were
in the management
of directors, &c. were
not considered by that court as good security. But no such rule has ever been recIn point of fact, there has
ognized here.
been as great fluctuation in the value of the
stock which was secured by the promise and
faith of the government, as of the stock of
banks.
And besides, the testator himself
considers that bank shares might be a safe
object of Investment—"safe and productive
stock." And yet bank shares may be subject to losses which may sweep away their
Lord Hardvricke considers
whole value.
that South-Sea annuities and bank annuities
stand upon different footing, because the directors have nothing to do with the principal, and are only to pay the interest, until
the govenmaent pay off the capital, and there-
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fore that
rities.

they only are properly good secu-

This reasoning has very little or no application here; for, in the first place, the stocks
depending upon the promise of the government, or, as they are called, the public funds,
are exceedingly limited in amount, compared
with the amount of trust funds to be invested; and, in the second place, it may well be
doubted, if more confidence should be reposed
of the public, than in
in the engagements
the promises and conduct of private corporations which are managed by substantial and
prudent directors. There is one consideration much in favour of investing in the stock
of private corporations. They are amenable
The holder may pursue his legal
to the law.
remedy and compel them or their officers to
But the government can only be
do justice.
supplicated.
It has been argued, that manufacturing
and insurance stocks are not safe, because
the principal is at hazard. But this objection applies to bank shares, as well as to
shares in Incorporated manufacturing and insurance companies.
To a certain extent,
or ineach may be considered as concerned
The bank deals in bills of
terested in trade.
exchange and notes, and the value of its capital depends upon the solvency of its debtors.
It may, for example, very properly discount upon the responsibility of merchants
of good credit at the time, but who, before
the maturity of their notes, become bankrupts from unavoidable and unforeseen merIn this way a bank becantile hazards.
comes

indirectly

interested

in navigation,

and merchandise, to an extent very
If any, short of the trade in which
manufacturing companies engage.
The capital in both cases may be lost by the conduct
of those who direct their affairs, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable prudence
and discretion.
In regard to insurance companies or incorporations, the capital seems, at first view, to
be exposed to greater risk, but It Is believed
that there has not been much If any more
fluctuation of the capital In those Investments,
than In incorporated companies for banking or
the insurance be
manufacturing
purposes.
so general as to embrace a fair proportion of
all the property at risk, it wiU generally yield
a reasonable profit, and preserve the capital
entire.
It wiU not do to reject those stocks as unsafe, which are In the management of directors, whose well or lU directed measures may
involve a total loss.
Do what you will, the
capital Is at hazard.
the public funds are
resorted to, what becomes of the capital when
the credit of the government shall be so much
impaired as It was at the close of the last
war?
Investments on mortgage of real estate are
not always safe.
Its value fluctuates more,
perhaps, than the capital of Insurance stock.
Again, the title to real estate, after the most
trade
little,

If

If
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may be Involved, ant«
careful investigation,
ultimately fail, and so the capital, which was
originally supposed to be as firm as the earth
Itself, wiU be dissolved.
All that can be required of a trustee to Invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faithHe is
fully and exercise a sound discretion.
to observe how men of prudence, discretion
and Intelligence manage their own affairs, not
in regard to speculation, but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the. probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be Invested.
But In the case at bar, the testator referred
of this trust especially to
the management
of the trustees
the judgment and discretion
whom he appointed;
one of whom Is the
brother, and the other was the cousin of his
wife, for whose support this provision was
made.
These trustees are not to be made
chargeable
but for gross neglect and wilful
mismanagement.

The testator expressly authorized the trusto invest in "other stock" than bank
shares or the public funds; so they might as
well select other stock as that which the testator named.
There can be no doubt but that shares in
manufacturing and insuring incorporations!
are and were commonly called and known by
the name of stock.
The investment would
therefore be clearly within the letter of the
authority.
It has been argued, "that the trustees
should have Invested In safe and productive
stock, at their own and a sound discretion,
without being governed by the known opinions of the testator;" "that he was at liberty
to speculate, but the trustees were not."
If
tees

these positions

should

be granted,

the desired

Inference would not follow. If the testator,
for example, had been In the habit of dealing
largely in lotteries and games of hazard, it
would undoubtedly not have justified the trusnotwithtees In making such investments,
standing the testator had been the favourite
of fortune. But If the testator had Invested
his funds to remain permanently In any stock,
that circumstance might well be taken into
consideration by the trustees when called to
exercise their own best skill and discretion.
They might reasonably and properly inquire
and consider what their testator would do in
the circumstances in which they were placed.
an Investment
that
Would he recommend
should give simple Interest on a loan, or In
stock that would probably give much more,
and- yet have the principal sum reasonably
safe?
The circumstance of the trustees' reposing
where the testator had. Is one
confidence
which Is always to be considered as tending
properly to their discharge.
Thompson v.
Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 628. The case of Rowth
V. Howell, 3 Ves. 565, has a strong bearing
upon this part of the case. There the testator,
having great confidence in his banker, recommended It to his executors not to be In a hur-
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ry to withdraw the funds from him.
But
after the death of the testator, the banker
them, and probably stung by remisapplied
morse on account of his fraud, he committed
suicida It was urged against the executors,
that they might have withdrawn the securities
from the banker; and they had time enough
to do so; but it was considered that the loss
arose from the confidence originally reposed
in the banker by the testator, and the executors were not subjected to the loss.
In the case at bar, the testator was a man
of extraordinary forecast and discretion, in
of his property.
regard to the management
His vast accumulation could not be ascribed
causes, but to calculation and
to accidental
reflection.
The fact that he had within three
or four years invested nearly half his property
in manufacturing stock, was entitled to great
and respect, and would, withconsideration
out any change of circumstances,
have a
strong tendency to justify the selection of the
manufacturing stock as part of the trust fund.
We cannot think with the counsel for the
appellants, that the dividend of fourteen per
cent arising from the recovery of the claim
against the Spanish government, can be considered as part of the capital.
It was received in the nature of salvage; which is always divided as profits, and not treated as
part of the capital stock.
And we do not think that the negotiations
between the Boston Manufacturing Company
and the Men-imaek Manufacturing Company,
in relation to making a large quantity of machinery, and the sale of patents and of patterns for castings, by the Boston Manufacturing Company to the Merrimack Manufacturing
Company, should be considered as part of the
capital stock. We have seen no evidence that
they were ever treated as such by the proWe think the sums arising from
prietors.
those causes were properly considered as the
fruits of their Industry, and placed to the account of profit and loss of the Boston Manufacturing Company.
It is proved or admitted, that the stock
which the trustees selected to constitute the
trust fund of 50,000 dollars, was of that value
when it was taken by them.
We are of opinion that they had a right to
select the stock which they did for that purpose, and that they acted in the premises acAnd
cording to their best skill and discretion.
we have not seen any evidence which would
satisfy us, that under all the circumstances
of the case, they did not act with a sound discretion in making the selection and investment.
But if we were less clear than we are upon
that point, we are of opinion that this whole
matter has been settled in the court of probate, where the appellants had notice to attend, and where all objections were raised and
considered.
The judge thereupon
made a
decree, from which there has not been any
appeal.
We say the whole matter, because the ex-
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ecutors and the trustees are the same persons.
On February 9, 1824, the executors, after due
notice to all persons interested, presented tbeir
account with the estate, and appropriated the
stock which should constitute the fund of
50,000 dollars selected by them as trustees

for Mrs. McLean.
The Massachusetts General Hospital was heard in fact, and (as has
been said and not denied) the objections were
made by the same able and learned counsel
who now appears in their behalf. And upon
the hearing, the judge of probate allowed the
accoimt There was no appeal from that set-

By the legal operation of that settlement.
tlement, the trustees became chargeable with
that selected trust fund, and it is not now
competent for the appellants to contend that
those stocks were not legally appropriated by
the executors and received by the trustees, as
the fund of 50,000 dollars given by the tesIf the college had any objections, they
tator.
should have made them.
Probably every objection to the account which could have been
made by the college was in fact made by thp
hospital.
It has been argued that the account which
was settled and acquiesced in, was rendered
by the executors and not by the trustees, and
ought not to bar this process, which is against
But It was a settlement
the surviving trustee.
of the very root and substance of this controversy.
The executors announced their selection and appropriation of the stock for the
The trustees (being the same persons)
fund.
became Instantly chargeable with the management of it. It is the original mis-appropriation and selection, which is the subject
Suppose the trustees had not
of complaint.
been the executors, and that the college and
the hospital had requested the executors to
deliver to the other persons as trustees the
particular stock to constitute the trust fund;

could those institutions object against the trustees, that those stocks did not constitute a
proper fund?
It would seem clear that the
They would say to the
trustees might justify.
"You acquiesced in the aptwo institutions,
propriation by the executors, and we also
thought it advisable,
safe and expedient"
We think that that matter having been settled by a court of competent jurisdiction,
without appeal, the decree is final and conclusive.

The college and the hospital were especially
put upon their guard; for the executors, in
their letter of December 27, 1823, Informed
their committee, that they should be duly notified when these accounts should be presented for allowance
at the probate office, that
they might object to any arrangements which
the executors might have made for the capital
of the 50,000 dollars.
As no appeal was made
from the decree of the probate court, all parties in interest must be presumed to have acwhich were
In the arrangements
quiesced
then made for the capital of the trust fund of
50,000 dollars.
If there had been an appeal,
It would probably have been heard and de-
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termlned before there was any depreciation
upon the whole Investment. Indeed It appears
from the CTldenee, that the stock of the MerCompany advanced
rimack Manufacturing
twenty per cent from the time when the stock
was selected in February, 1824, to December
1, 1825.

The claim now made upon the trustees, to
make up the subsequent depreciation,
would
only on the ground of
seem to be justtQed
gross abuse of their trust, even if It were not
barred by the decree in the probate court
from which no appeal was made.
But upon
examinhig all the documents and evidence, it
seeijis to us that there is no reason whereon
to ground that imputation.
Trustees are justly and uniformly considerand it is of great importance
ed favourably,
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 34
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to bereaved families and orphans, that they
should not be held to make good, losses in
the depreciation of stocks or the failure of the
capital itself, which they held in trust, provided they conduct themselves honestly and
discreetly and carefully, according to the existing circumstances, in the discharge of their
this were held otherwise, no prutrusts.
dent man would run the hazard of losses
which might happen without any neglect or
breach of good faith.
The judgment of this court is, that the decree of the probate court, from which the
appellants
appealed, be, and it is hereby affirmed; and that the record be remitted to
that court for further proceedings according
to law to be there had; and that the appellee recover his costs.

If
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BBNTLEX

CRAVEN.

V.

(18 Beav.

Court of Chancery.

75.)

Noy.

15, 16,

1853.

The plaintiff Bentley carried on business in
partnership with the defendants Craven, Prest
and Younge, as sugar refiners, at Southampton.
Craven was the managing partner, and
generally resided in London, where he did the
agency business of the firm, made all the
of sugar and kept the London
purchases
once a week for
books, visiting Southampton
of superintending
the affairs
the purpose
He was, however, at liberty to carry
there.
busion, and did carry on, an independent
ness as a sugar dealer, in which be had great
skill and knowledge, and was able to buy to
Accordingly, in 1851, he
great advantage.
bought a quantity of sugar, and afterwards
sold it to the firm at a profit, but at the fair
market price of the day. Bentley having
complained of this, on the ground that they
were sugar refiners and not speculators in
sugar, Craven took offense and canceled the
transaction, but he, nevertheless, continued to
speculate in sugars, and, vrithout acquainting
his partners with the fact, sold various quantities of his own sugars at various times to
the firm, at the market prices of the day,
but at a considerable profit in each case, the
sums so gained by him amounting in the
whole

to about
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be

cerned,

£853 17s. 3d.

Craven.

THE MASTER

This
founded on the first
principles of equity, and that it would be a
violation of them to allow this gentleman to
retain the profit which he has made upon
to

me to

cipal, and it is the plain duty of every agent
to do the best he can for his principal.
I
have no doubt that many persons act In ignorance of this riile of equity; for otherwise
these cases would not come so frequently into
court.
I have never seen a case which illustrated the principle more clearly than this.
The case is this: Four partners establish
a partnership for refining sugar; one of them
is a wholesale grocer, and, from his business,
is peculiarly cognizant with the variations in
the sugar market, and has great skUl In
buying sugar at a right and proper time for
Accordingly, the business of
the business.
selecting and purchasing the sugar for the
sugar refinery is intrusted to him.
He being
the person to buy. It is his duty and business
to employ his skill in buying for the sugar
refinery at the time he thinks most beneficial.
Having, according to his skill and knowledge, bought sugar at a time when he thought
it likely to rise, and it having risen, and
the firm being in want of some, be sells his
own sugars to the firm, without letting the
partners know that It was his sugar that was
sold, for that is expressly and clearly stated

in his own affidavit.
In fact, he himself says, not only that he
did not tell his copartners, but that he avoided
it. The only way in which a sale of that sort
could be made valid and effectual would he
by communication
of the fact The agent
should say to his principal "I have certain
sugars of my own which I do not choose to
sell to you, unless you give a particular price
for them; you have the option to do it or not,
as you think fit." If he had said that, the
relation of principal and agent between them
would, so far as this transaction was con-

R. Palmer and W. D. Lewis, for plaintiff.
Mr. Amphlett, for Prest. Mr. Cole, for
Tounge.
Mr. RoupeU and Mr. Selwyn, for

appears
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have

been determined.

If,

after re-

ceiving this statement, his partners had conmight
sented to his terms, the transaction
have stood good; but, in the absence of such
own goods for his principal cannot be sustained in this court, even though the sale
may have been made at the fair market price,
and at such a price as that at which he might
by
have sold to any other person; and
if,

a statement,

to the doctrine
of principal and agent have been recognized
One Is, that an
from the earliest times.
agent employed
to purchase cannot legally
buy his own goods for his principal; neither
can an agent employed to sell, himself purchase the goods of his principal. If he should
do so, and thereby make a profit, his principal
may either repudiate
the transaction altogether or, adopting It, may claim for himself
The same
the benefit made by his agent.
principle is applicable to a great many other
relations, as to that of trustee and cestui que
trust and others.
The court has repeatedly
applied this rule where the transaction was
perfectly bona fide; It Is founded on this principle, that an agent will not be allowed to
place himself in a situation which, under ordinary circumstances, would tempt a man to
do that which Is not the best for his prin-

a

transaction,
profit, the
he makes
Is entitled to take that profit to
•ilmself.
This accordingly puts an end to the
questions as to whether the partners are
bound to adopt or to repudiate the transaction; or if they adopt it, as to the price at
which the sugar should be charged and the
profit of
like. This gentleman has made
such

a

principal

a

Two principles with relation

the purchase

by an agent of his

these sugars.

£853 in the course of one year, by sales to
himself as agent of the firm, and in my opinion the firm is entitled to that benefit and
profit He is agent for the firm for buying
sugars; he has sold his own sugars to the
firm and made that profit and the firm are
entitled to it accordingly.
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MUNSON

et al. v.

(8

G. & C.

RY.

N. E. 355, 103 N. Y. 58.)

Court of Appeals

of New York.

Oct

5,

1886.

Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment upon
a decision of the general term of the Fifth
of the supreme court, affirming
department
a judgment entered upon the report of a referee

in favor of defendant.

The action was

to enforce specific performance of a contract
to deliver certain bonds of the Syracuse, GeThe isneva & Coming Railway Company.
sues were referred to J. L. Angle, of Rochester, who reported in favor of plaintiff, August 20, 1880, and judgment was entered directing specific performance of the contract,
from which judgment defendants appealed to
Fourth department, on
the general
term.
which appeal said judgment was reversed,
on the ground that the contract sought to be
was against public policy. The
enforced
case was again tried before A. J. Northrup,
as referee, who reported in favor of defendants, upon which report judgment was entered dismissing the complaint, from which
judgment plaintiffs appealed to the general
term, when the last-named judgment was
Plaintiff thereupon appealed to
affirmed.
the court of appeals.
Samuel Hand and B. W. Huntington, for
Geo.
appellants, Edgar Munson and others.
F. Comstock, for respondents, Syracuse, G. &
C. Ry. Co. and another.

ANDREWS, J. We think it would be difficult to affirm the judgment of the court below dismissing the complaint, if, in order to
do so, it was necessary to uphold the proposition that the original contract of August
13, 1875, between the plaintiffs and Magee,
was invalid either because Munson, one of
the plaintiffs, was, at the time of entering
into the contract, a director of the Sodus
Bay & Coming Railroad Company, or for the
reason that the contract violated the rule
which prohibits combinations to prevent competition at a judicial or other public sale.
The situation was briefly this:
The Sodus Bay & Corning Railroad Company was organized in 1871 to construct and
operate a railroad from Corning, in the county of Steuben, to Sodus Bay, in the county
of Wayne, a distance of about 86 miles, pass-

ing through the counties of Schuyler, Yates,

and Ontario, by way of Savona, Penn Yann,
and Geneva.
Of this road the plaintiff Munson was president and a director. In 1872
the corporation created a mortgage on Its
projected road, its franchises and property,
for $1,500,000, to secure a contemplated issue
of bonds to that amoimt, to be used in the
It proceeded to
constroction of the road.
secure rights of way over a portion of its
line, graded about 30 miles of its track, between Savona and Geneva, and expended in
the aggregate,

in securing titles and in the

531

prosecution of the work, the sum of $250,000.
It issued bonds under the mortgage to the
amount of $257,000, from the proceeds of
which the expenditures were made. At the
date of the contract between
the plaintiffs
and Magee, August 13, 1875, the plaintiffs
held and controlled,
of the bonds, $241,000
in amount; the remaining $16,000 being in
the hands of a former treasurer of the company, whose title thereto seems to have been
disputed, but who subsequently received a
dividend thereon from the proceeds of the
mortgage sale. The title of the plaintiffs to
the $241,000 of bonds was not questioned,
and there is no suggestion that they were
not bona flde holders for value, or that the
bonds did not represent a valid debt against
the company for their full amount.
In January, 1874, the company became inIt defaulted in the payment of the
solvent.
interest on its bonds at that date, and in the
spring of 1875 all operations on the road were
suspended, and the further prosecution of the
enterprise was practically abandoned.
In
short, when the contract of August 13, 1875,
was made, the company was hopelessly bankrupt, the work had stopped, the interest on
its bonds had been unpaid for 18 months,
and practically its whole property consisted
of disconnected rights of way over a portion
of its route, and a road-bed partially graded
between Savona and Geneva; and whatever
property it had of any value was acquired
through the means furnished by the holders
of the bonds.
Under these circumstances the parties entered into the contract of August 13, 1875.
It recites that the plaintiffs own and represent $241,000 of the bonds of the Sodus Bay
& Corning Railroad Company, and that Magee, the other party to the contract, represents the persons and interests proposing to
organize another railroad company for the
construction of a railroad from the vicinity
The parties of the
of Corning to Geneva.
first part (the plaintiffs) agree to proceed at
once to secure the foreclosure of the mortgage, and purchase, on the foreclosure sale,
the property, rights of way, franchises, and
interests covered thereby, and convey the
same to Magee, or to the railroad company
proposed

to be organized.

Magee,

the other

party to the contract, agrees to deliver, or
to Munson and his
cause to be delivered,
associates, in payment for the said property,
rights of way, and franchises— First, mortgage bonds of the proposed railway company
to the amount of 50 per cent, of the principal
and interest of the bonds of the Sodus Bay
& Corning Railroad Company held by them.
The contract contains other stipulations not
now necessary to mention.
In the view we take of another question In
the ease, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the contract of August 13,
1875, was valid as between the original parties thereto;
that is, whether the plaintiff
Munson, in entering into the contract, vio-
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lated any duty owing by him to the corpora/tion of which he was a director, or whether
the contract as a whole was, on the part of
Munson and his associates, anything more
than a legitimate arrangement to protect
their interests as bondholders, and to malse
the mortgage security available for the payThe
ment of a part of the mortgage debt.
contract was not by or with the Sodus Bay
& Corning Railroad Company; and, assuming that the question as to the validity of
the original contract can be raised in this
action, we are not prepared, without further
consideration,
to condemn the transaction on
Duncomb
either of the grounds suggested.
V. Railroad Co., 84 N. Y. 190; Marie v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14; Harpending v. Munson, 91
N. Y. 650. But this action is not brought
to enforce the contract of August 13, 1875,
against the defendant Magee.
It is an aoby
tion to compel the specific performance,
of the undertakthe defendant corporation,
ing of Magee in that contract to deliver the
bonds of the new company as therein provided, founded upon the assumption by the
new company of that obligation, by resolution of its board of directors passed August
con13, 1875, and also upon the subsequent
tract of September 14, 1875, made between
the company and the plaintiffs, which in its
primary provision substituted the Company
to the iklace of Magee as the party of the
second part in the contract of August 13,
1875.

The action in its entire scope is framed
to enforce the obligation of the defendant
corporation under its contract of assumption.
It was tried upon this theory. The exceptions point to this as the ground of the action, and Magee is joined as defendant, and
In the demand of relief, as the custodian of
bonds of the company which the plaintiffs
claimed he should be adjudged to deliver
to them by the judgment in the action.
Throughout the trial the action was treated
as an action against the defendant corporation upon its contract, and in no respect as
an action against Magee to enforce a liability against him under the contract of August 13, 1875.
The plaintiffs, therefore, are
compelled to meet the question whether, upon principles of equity, they are entitled to
the aid of the court to enforce an executpry
contract between themselves on the one side,
and the defendant coiT)oration on the other,
for the sale of the property of the former,
in a case where one of the plaintiffs, at the
time the contract was made, was a director
of the purchasing corporation, and took part
in making the contract upon which the action is brought.
For a proper imderstandlng of the situation a few additional facts need to be stated.
On the twenty-sixth of August, 1875, Magee
and his associates organized a railroad company to construct a railroad from Coming to
Geneva, as contemplated
by the contract ot
August 13, 1875.
The plaintiff Munson was
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one of the promoters, and became a director
and stockholder, and was the first president
of the corporation.
On the thirty-first of
August, 1875, Magee executed a written assignment to the new corporation,
the Syracuse, Geneva & Coming Railway Company,

of his rights under the contract with the
plaintiffs of August 13, 1875; and the board of
directors, at a meeting on the same day, in
which the plaintiff Munson participated,
passed a resolution assuming the contract
on the part of Magee, and agreeing to perform it, except in one particular not now
material to be mentioned.
On the fourteenth
of September, 1875, the contract before referred to of that date was entered into between the plaintiffs and the new corporation, and was executed individually by each
of the plaintiffs, and on the part of the corporation by the plaintiff Munson as president.
The proceedings of the board of directors indicate that when the resolution of August
13, 1875, was passed, and for two or three
months thereafter, the company contemplated building its road to Geneva on the same
line substantlallv as that of the Sodus Bay &
Corning Railroad Company, but in December,
1875, it located an entirely new line, not coincident in any part with the line originally
contemplated,
upon which new line its road
was subsequently built It is found, and the
evidence supports the finding, that the best
interests of the company were promoted by
The plaintiffs
adopting its present route.
procured a foreclosure of the mortgage, and
purchased the property, as they had agreed,
In 1877, .tendered a deed
and subsequently,
and
thereof to the defendant corporation,
demanded the delivery of the bonds, which
was refused.
In determining the legal question presented, It is proper to say that there is no evidence of any actual fraud or collusion on the
part of any of the parties to the original contract of August 13, 1875, or that the contract
of assumption was Induced by any improper
appliances or motives whatever.
It is plain
that Magee and his associates, when they
entered into the original contract, contemplated building the proposed road on the line of
the Sodus Bay & Coming Railroad Company, and that the contract was made with
a view of acquiring for the new road the
rights of way and other property of that
corporation. It is equally plain that the contract of assumption was entered into by the
new corporation with the same expectation,
and for the same purpose.
If the contract was otherwise tmobjectlonajle, it could not, we think, be assailed on
the gi-ound that it was a contract outside
of the power of the defendant corporation.
The statute authorizes a railroad corporation to acquire land for its track and other
necessary purposes, by voluntary purchase or
by condemnation (Laws 1850, c. 140, |§ 14,
15); and an agreement, made on the purchase
of rights of way, to pay therefor in bonds
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of the purchasing corporation, secured by a
mortgage on its property, is clearly, we think,
within the implied, if not within the express,
powers of a railroad corporation.
Section 28,
The contract made between the
subd. 10.
defendant corporation and the plaintiffs was
in substance a contract to purchase rights
of way; and although the defendant's line
was not formally located on the line proposed to be purchased, and was in fact sublocated on a different line, this
sequently
change of purpose does not, we think, affect
the question of corporate power.
But we are of opinion that the contract of
September 14, 1875, is repugnant to the great
rule of law which invalidates all contracts
made by a trustee or fiduciary, in which he
at the election of
is personally interested,
the party he represents.
There is no controversy as to the facts bringing the case as
to Munson within the operation of the rule.
He and his associates were dealing with
a corporation in which Munson was a director, in a matter where the Interests of
the contracting parties were or might be in
conflict The contract bound the corporation to piu-chase, and Munson, as one of the
directors, participated in the action of the
corporation in assuming the obligation, and in
binding
itself to pay the price primarily
agreed upon between the plaintiffs and MaHe stood in the attitude of selling as
gee.
owner, and purchasing as trustee.
The law
permits no one to act in such inconsistent
relations.
It does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or
unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction, or refuses to enforce it, at the instance
of the party whom the fiduciary undertook
to represent,
without undertaking to deal
with the question of abstract justice in the
particular case. It prevents frauds by making them, as far as may be, impossible, knowing that real motives often elude the most
searching inquiry;
and it leaves neither to
judge nor jury the right to determine, upon
a consideration of its advantages or disadvantages,
whether a contract made under
such circumstances shall stand or fall.
It can make no difference in the application of the rule in this case that Munson's
associates were not themselves disabled from
contracting with the corporation, or that
Munson was only one of ten directors who
The contract
voted in favor of the contract.
on its face notified Munson's associates
of
his relation to the corporation, and that the
contract was subject to be defeated on that
ground;
and, on the other hand, a corporation, in order to defeat a contract entered
into by directors, in which one or more of
them had a private interest, is not bound to
show that the influence of the director or directors having the private interest determinThe law cannot
ed the action of the board.
accurately measure the influence of a trustee
with his associates, nor will it enter into the
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inquiry, in an action by the trustee in his
private capacity to enforce the contract, in the
making of which he participated. The value
of the rule of equity to which we have adverted, lies, to a great extent, in its stubbornness and inflexibility.
Its rigidity gives
it one of its chief uses as a preventive or
discouraging influence,
because it weakens
the temptation to dishonesty or unfair dealing on the part of the trustees, vitiating,
without attempt at discrimination, all transactions in which they assume the dual characters of principal and representative.
The rule has been declared and enforced in
a great variety of cases; but in none, perhaps, with more vigor and completeness, both
upon principle and authority, than in the
leading case of Davoue v. Panning, 2 Johns.
Ch. 252.
But the case of Railway Co. v.
Blakle, 1 Macq. 461, decided by the house of
lords, is in many of its features similar to the
present one.
In that case it appeared that
the plaintiffs were a manufacturing firm, and
that one of them was also a manager of the
Aberdeen Railway Company, the defendant,
and the chairman of the board.
At a meeting of the managers, they by resolution authorized their engineer to contract for iron chairs
needed by the company.
The agent contracted with the plaintiffs' flrm. It did not appear
that the member of the firm, who was also a
manage:* and the chairman of the company. Intermeddled
with the dealing on either side,
further than that it may be assumed he was
at the meeting which authorized the engineer
to procure a supply of chairs.
The plaintiffs
brought their suit to enforce specifically the
performance
of the contract, or, in the alternative, to recover damages for its non-performance.
After a decision In their favor in
the lower court, the company appealed to the
house of lords, where the ruling was unanimously reversed, on the ground that the contract was condemned by the rules of equity
as having been made between the company of
which one of the plaintiffs was a manager,
and a private flrm of which he was a member.
The opinions of Lord Chancellor Cranworth,
and of Lord Brougham, vindicate, upon impregnable grounds, the general rule, and its
application to the particular case.
We have designedly omitted, up to this
special reference to a circumstance
time,
which it is claimed takes the case out of the
operation of the general equitable rule; that
is, that the contract with the defendant corporation was not, on the part of the plaintiffs,
a fresh dealing in respect to the sale of their
interest In the property of the Sodus Bay &
Corning Railroad Company, but was simpljj
a substitution, in the place of Magee, of the
corporation organized by him and his associates for the purpose of carrying out the
original arrangement.
But the promoters of
the corporation are not the corporation.
The
legal body is distinct from the individuals who
compose it. The statute confers no authority
upon the promoters of a corporation to enter
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Into preliminary contracts binding the corporation when it shall come into existence. Such
contracts may bind the individuals who make
them.
If adopted by the corporation, and
they are within the corporate powers, and
they
are not otherwise subject to objection,
may become the contract of the corporation,
and enforceable as such.
In respect to contracts of promoters. Judge
Redfield says:
"The promoters are in no
sense identical with the corporation,
nor do
they represent it in any relation of agency;
and their contracts could, of coursg, only bind
the company so far as they should be subsequently adopted by it as their successors."
1

Redf. Rys. 9.
But the corporation is at liberty to refuse
to sanction them; and, if its sanction is ob'
tained by the act or co-operation of directors
who have a private interest, we perceive no
reason why, under the general rule, the corporation may not resist an action for specific
performance;
at least, in a case where it has
not accepted the consideration and taken the
benefit.

It is claimed that the general policy of the
law In this state sanctions the contract in
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question,

and we are referred

to chapter 710,

Laws 1873, which authorizes the purchaser, or
the grantee of the purchaser, of the real estate, tracks, and fixtures of a railroad corporation gold under a mortgage or decree, to associate with him other persons, and form a
new corporation to maintain and oi)erate the
But the transaction in question was
road.
not in any proper sense an arrangement for
of an existing railroad. It
the reorganization
was contemplated that the new corporation
should operate or maintain the road of the old
corporation.
The line of the new corporation, by its articles, extended only from Coming to Geneva; whereas the route of the old
corporation was from Corning to Sodus Bay.
When the contract was made, the enterprise
of building the Sodus Bay & Corning road had
been commenced, but the road had not been
built. Its route had only in part been located,
and the great burden and expense of the undertaking was yet to be incurred.
The case
Is not in terms within the act of 1873; nor, as
we think, within its spirit and intent.
These views lead to an affirmance of the
judgment. All concur, except BAPALLO and
FINCH, JJ., not voting.
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(33

Aa.

T.

BLACK

et al.

880, 173 Pa. 92.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan.

6, 1896.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county; Thomas Ewing, Judge.
Bill by Martha K. Rich against Black &
Baird, Daniel H. Barr, and others, to have
said Barr declared trustee for plaintiff as to
certain land, and to obtain an accounting by
From a decree for plaintiff, dedefendants.
Affirmed.
fendants appeal.

J. S. & E. G. Ferguson, for appellants.
A. Woodward, for appellee.

M.

STEERBTT, O. J. The rule of public policy which avoids, at the instance of the cestui que trust, purchases made by agents for
sale, is practically absolute in its character.
Courts of equity view such transactions with
jealous eye; and It is only under special circumstances, amounting to a dissolution of the
trust relation, when the parties have dealt at
arm's length, that their validity is recognized.
Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Oh. 254. And
the reasons are obvious.
On the one hand,
the relation which such agents bear is confidential, and disarms the vigilance of their
It affords peculiar facilities for
principals.
obtaining exclusive information in respect of
the property intrusted to them for sale. Their
employment Implies that they have superior
advantages for making sales, and that they
will use every effort and means to obtain the
highest price for the benefit of their principals.
On the other hand, their individual Interest
is to purchase at the lowest price, and places
them tn a position which is inconsistent with
the faithful and proper discharge of the duties of the trust.
The opportunity will naturally lead to temptation, to abuse, and, as
was aptly said by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Davoue V. Fanning, supra, be poisonous in its
consequences.
The cestui que trust is not
bound to prove, nor is the court bound to
judge, that the trustee has made a bargain
advantageous to himself.
The fact may be
so, and yet the party not have It In his power
distinctly and clearly to show it. "There may
be fraud," as Lord Hardwicke observed, "and
the party not able to prove it."
Thus an
agent, by virtue of his trust relation, may
discover valuable minerals in the land, and,
locking the knowledge in his breast, take advantage of it in making a contract with his
cestui que trust
he deny It, how can the
"The probability is that
court find the fact?
a trustee who has once conceived such a purpose will never disclose It, and the cestui que

If

Ex partrust will be eflectuaUy defrauded."
te Lacey, 6 Ves. 627. So he may take advantage of his superior knowledge of the market
and skill In manipulation to obtain results
"It is to guard against
beneficial to himself.
this uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and to
remove the trustee from temptation, that the
rule does and will permit the cestui que trust
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to come, at his own option, and without showing actual injury, and insist upon having the
experiment of another sale" (Davoue v. Fanning, supra) ; or, as was held in our own case
of Swisshelm's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 475, treat
the purchase as inoperative in respect of the
land unsold by the trustee, and compel an account of the proceeds of sale made by him
"This is a
to innocent purchasers for value.
remedy that goes deep, and touches the very
root of the matter."
Davoue v. Fanning, supra; Leisenring v. Black, 5 Watts, 303; Parshall's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 224; Bice v. Davis,
136 Pa. St. 439, 20 Atl. 513; Murphy v.
O'Shea, 2 Jones & Lp T. 422.
The cestui
que trust must, it is true, move within a reasonable time; but what shall amount to a
reasonable time will depend on circumstances,
and lies in the discretion of the com:t. In the
absence of special circumstances which may
lengthen or shorten the time, the analogy of

the law is followed. Marshall's Estate, 138
Pa. St 285, 22 Atl. 90. These appellants misapprehend the rationale of this rule. They insist that because, as they Claim, the sale was
satisfactory to Mrs. Rich, the rule has no application. Conceding that in the first instance
It was satisfactory, that fact would not take
away her option to rescind; for these appellants then and for a long time afterwards ostensibly maintained towards her the character of agents for sale, and willfully concealed
They maintain
the fact of their own Interest.
their characters of inconsistency even now by
claiming not only title as purchasers, but comRoU, whom they
missions as agents for sale.
first reported as the purchaser, confessedly
knew nothing of it The alleged Interest of
Gillespie and ' Neeb is more than doubtful,
and, if.it ever existed, was soon parted with.
To all practical Intents and purposes, these
agents were the real purchasers, without the
knowledge of their cestui que trust RosenAppeal, 26 Pa. St 67.
berger's
However
Mrs. Rich may have felt In the first instance
in regard to the sale. It Is not likely that It
would have been satisfactory had she been
fully informed of the facts. When she gave
her agents a minimum price, it was manifestly intended as a guide to them in negotiating
sale, and Implied a just expectation on her
part and an engagement on theirs that they
would make an honest endeavor to obtain a
higher price.
If Roll, Gillespie, and Neeb
were really intending purchasers, the obvious
course was that these agents for sale should
take competitive bids. They did not occupy
the position of middlemen with equal duty to
both. Their primary duty was to Mrs. Rich.
But so far as appears, no bona fide effort
Inwas made by them to perform this duty.
stead, Mrs. Rich was asked to take less, and,
when this was refused, they hastened to avail
themselves of the minimum price in their
own interest, and had already made large
profits before Mrs. Rich's discovery of the
facts. If they could realize profits for themselves, they could and should have done so
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qne trust. That was their
employment, and that their undertaking; and
equity -will treat that as done which ought to
To sustain the purchase
have been done.
made In these circumstances would work "actual injury" to Mrs. Rich, tend to encourage
breaches of trust, and violate a wise rule of

for their cestui
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public policy. Having taken action In time,
the plaintife was entitled to the relief which
the decree of the court below Is intended to

secure.
Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed, with costs to be paid by appellants; and it
is ordered that the record be remitted to the
court below for further proceedings.
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BBOSTT

V.

PRIEST.

(86 Mo. 475.)
Supreme

Ciourt of Missouri.

Oct. Term, 1885.

A. J. P. Garesche and J. M. Holmes, for
appellant T. L. 6ant and J. M. Glover,
for respondent

BLACK, J. In 1873, the superintendent
of Insurance began proceedings to wind up
the St Louis Mutual Insurance Company,
which was not then in a satisfactory condition. Most of the directors regarded a reinsurance as the best way out of the diffiEfforts were made to that end, inculty.
cluding negotiations with the Mound City
Charles H. Peck,
Life Insurance Company.
who was a large stockholder in the St. Louis
Mutual, but not a director or officer, made
of the
proposals to some of the officers
Mound City to bring about such an arrangement, the result of which was a contract
between Peck and the president of that company, dated the 27th of November, 1873, by
which, after reciting the desire of that company to effect the reinsurance, and the deemof Peck's services to accomed necessity
plish that object, the company agreed to pay
him $155,000 within sixty days, for which
sum Peck was to "devote his services for the
procurement of such reinsurance and effecting a contract between said companies."
Peck thereupon approached the defendant,
a

director of the

St

Louis Mutual,

who at

first did not take much interest in the matPeck, then, in substance, stated that
ter.
he was largely interested in having the reinsurance effected;
that it was worth ten or
fifteen thousand dollars to the stockholders
of the St. Louis Mutual, and that he meant
business.
Priest and Wyman were partners in the
real estate business, and upon Peck's suggestion that his business was legitimately
within the partnership business. Priest referred Peck to Wyman, who was at a desk
in the same room or office.
The result of
the negotiation between Peck and Wyman
was that the former placed bonds of the

Leavenworth, Atchison & Northwestern Rail-

road Company of the par value of fifteen
thousand dollars in the hands of Mullikin
to be handed to Wyman, if the reinsurance
was effected,
otherwise they were to be
returned to Peck.
This agreement was in

writing,

but

was

subsequently

destroyed.

City Insurance

Company

The evidence, including a letter from Peck,
shows that he agreed within thirty days to
substitute money,
or bonds of the Vulcan
Iron Company, or St. Louis Gaslight Oorapany, for these railroad bonds, the latter, it
is said, then being worth but sixty cents
on the dollar.

As the Moimd

then stood, the superintendent of insurance
did not regard it strong enough to make the
reinsurance,
and It was required to add a
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half million dollars to its capital stock.
In
December,
1873,
a contract of reinsurance
was made by the St. Louis Mutual with the
Mound City, the latter also stipulating that
for a transfer of all of the assets of the St.

Louis Mutual it would assume all the liabilities of that company, increase its own
stock a half a million dollars, and out of
this increased stock exchange its own stock
for that of the St Louis Mutual. Of the
twenty directors of the St. Louis Mutual,
seventeen,
including the defendant, voted
for the measure.
The Moimd City increased
its stock as agreed, the reinsurance was approved by the superintendent of insurance
and by the court in which the proceedings
against the St. Louis Mutual were pending,
and those proceedings were dismissed. By
the 17th of January, 1874, the whole contract was substantially completed.
Peck
received his agreed compensation from the
Mound City Insurance Company in secured
notes which that company acquired by, the
assignment from the St. Louis Mutual. Peck
would not at least did not, substitute money
or bonds of the iron company,
or gas company, as he had agreed, for the railroad
bonds in the hands of Mullikin, and Wyman,
In
unable to do better, took those bonds.
August, 1874, Priest and Wyman dissolved
their partnership, at which time Wyman
handed over to Priest the one-half of the
railroad bonds.
The conclusion from all the evidence is
irresistible that defendant agreed to and did
and vote for the assignment and
advocate
reinsurance, in consideration of the arrangement between Peck and Wyman.
At all
events the bonds were given to secure defendant's active inlluence in favor of the
measure, though without this he might not
have been hostile to the transaction.
In 1877 the superintendent of insurance
against the St.
commenced new proceedings
Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, and
plaintiff was appointed receiver. By this
suit he seeks to charge the defendant as a
trustee of all the railroad bonds.
The circuit court so held and decreed as to the onehalf received by the defendant, and on his
refusal to produce the same, entered a money judgment for the estimated value. From
the
appealed.
this judgment
defendant
Plaintiff took a writ of error. In like manner both parties come to this court from
the court of appeals, where the judgment
of the circuit court was affirmed.
1. An agent or trustee cannot unite in
himself the opposite character of buyer and
seller, and if he does the profits may be
charged with a trust for the benefit of the
principal, unless the latter confirm the transaction with full knowledge of all the facts.
So, too, if the agent make gains from the
use of the trust funds or property he must
account therefor. We need not cite authorities from this and other courts to support
these plain propositions.
Again, if the agent
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accept any benefits In conducting the business of his principal he will hold them in

Story, Agency (8th
trust for the principal.
Ed.) § 211; Perry, Trusts, § 206; Jacobus v.
Munn, 37 N. J. Eq. 48.
The directors of a eorporatiori
occupy a
fiduciary position. They are trustees
and
agents of the corporation and stockholders.
In general they are governed by the same
rules as are applied to trustees and agents.
Parker v. Nlckerson, 112 Mass. 195; Railway
Co. V. Poor, 59 Me. 277; Railway Co. v. Hudson, 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 365.
In Perry on
Trusts, at section 207, It is said: "And so
all advantages, all purchases, all sales, and
all sums of money received by directors in
dealing with the property of the corporation
are made and received by them as trustees
of the corporation, and they must account for
all such moneys or advantages, received by
them by reason of their position as trustees."
Defendant does not seriously controvert these
general principles of equity jurisprudence, but
he insists they have no rightful application to
this case, because the bonds were never made
a part of the assets of the St. Louis Mutual,
did not constitute a part of the consideration,
avowed or concealed, paid by the Mound
City, and were not made by him in the legitimate business of the corporation.
He relies
with full confidence upon Tyrrell v. Bank, 10
H. L. Oas. 26. The substantial facts of that
case were these:
The bank had been recently
organized, and TjTrell was its solicitor. Mrs.
Campbell owned certain property,' upon a part
of which was situated a building known as
the Hall of Commerce.
Read had a "contract
with her for the purchase of the whole property at £49,200. TyrreU and Read formed a
combination to sfell the property to the bank
at an advanced price, and Tyrrell, for his influence, was to have a one-half interest In
the contract,
which Read had with Mrs.
Campbell. Tyrrell kept the agreement secret
from the bank, at the same time urged the
bank to purchase, professing to act for it as
solicitor. Eventually the bank purchased the
Hall of Commerce part of the property at
£65,000. Out of this Mrs. Campbell was paid,
some litigated claims were settled, and the
balance was paid to Read, who divided the
profits with Tyrrell, each making some £6,000,
and had left also the unsold portion of the
property, alleged to be of the value of £8,000.
The suit was brought by the bank against
Tyrrell and Read.
The master of the rolls
dismissed the bill as to Read, and decreed
Tyrrell a trustee for the bank of all interest
acquired in the property,
accounts were directed to be taken, and Tyrrell was ordered
to convey to the bank his share in the property not sold to the bank.
On appeal, prosecuted by Tyrrell, the decree was modified In
form. The Lords considered
that Tyrrell
could not be decreed a trustee of the unsold
portion of the property, and should not have
been directed to convey that to the bank, because, as was said, the limit of the agency of
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Tyrrell, the extent of his obligation, and the
relation of solicitor and client, were to be ascertained by the extent of the property sold
by Tyrrell to the bank. The lord chancellor
very clearly states that Tyrrell could only be

trustee as to that portion of the property
sold to the bank, and as to that he should
make no gain.
He proceeds to say the object
which the master of the rolls has in view
is to be accomplished in another way:
"Tyrrell must receive from his clients, in his character of vendor to his clients, only that sum
of money which, as between him and Read,
Tyrrell must be taken to have paid for the
property conveyed to his clients, but that sum
of money must be ascertained in the following way: by deducting from it the value of
the unsold property Included in the contract
between Read and Tyrrell, but not included
in the contract of sale to the clients."
The bank among other things contended
Tyrrell's agency as to the
that, assuming
bank was confined to the Hall of Commerce
part of the property, still the circumstances
showed that he received the share in the rest
as a bribe, and for that reason the bank was
entitled to a conveyance of it. As to this
Lord Chelmsford said: "No aucontention.
thority has been adduced in support of such
a proposition, and I do not think it can be
maintained. In order to simplify the question, let it be supposed that Tyrrell had acquired no interest in the property, but that
Read had offered him £5,000 to induce the
respondent to purchase, and that they had
been persuaded by TyrreU to buy at an excessive price. Of course, they might have
rescinded the conti-act, but could they in
any manner have obtained the £5,000 on the
ground that it belonged to them? If, by
reason of the agreement between Read and
TyrreU, the respondent had been prevailed
upon to give too large a sum for the property, they might have maintained an action
on the case against both the parties to the
imposition upon them, and have recovered
damages;
or they might have sued their
agent, TyrreU, for damages arising from the
breach of duty, and they would probably
have received an amount equal to the sum
which he had improperly received as a fair
measiu-e of the injury which they had sustained. But the £5,000 itself, as a specific
demand, they could in no manner have recovered.
The unsold part of the property
in the same manner cannot be directly reached by any proceeding of the respondent"
a

These remarks of Lord Chelmsford, if detached from the facts of that case and the
decree actually made, appear to give some
support to the defendant's position here.
The solicitor could be regarded as the
agent of the bank only so far as the bank
became the purchaser; beyond that he had
a right to deal for himself; yet the decree
as modified did not allow him to make any
gain out of the transaction taken as a
whole. He was aUowed to keep the unsold
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portion, but Its value was deducted from the
amount which he was allowed to receive
from the clients in the statement of the account. Practically, there was little, if any,
difference between the decree as made by
the master of the rolls and as modified, in
its effect upon the parties, and this seems
in terms by Lord
to have been conceded

The facts there in judgment
Cranworth.
and the decree even as modified do not furnish a precedent in defendant's favor.
Where a trustee retired from his office in
consideration that his successor paid him a
sum of money, it was held that the money
so paid should be treated as a part of the
trust estate, and be accounted for as such
by the retiring trustee, on the ground that
he could malse no profit directly or indirectly
from the trust property, or from his oflice of
Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Smale &
trustee.
G. 192. In Gasliell v. Chamhers, 26 Beav.
the Eagle Insurance Com360, it appears
pany desired to buy out the business of
the London Mutual Insurance Company, and
agreed to and did pay a specific consideraand, by a secret agreement
tion therefor,
with the directors, agreed to and did pay
to them the further sum of four thousand
pounds as a compensation for the loss of
their oflacers. These directors were held to
be trustees for the corporation, and it was
also ruled that they received that sum by
reason of their position as trustees, and must
account therefor.
These cases are all quite clear to the effect
that the trustee will not be allowed to make
gain to himself, beyond his allowed compensation, by reason of his office and influence as
By accepting the office the disuch trustee.
rector undertalses to .give his judgment and
influence to the interests of the corporation in
all matters in which he represents
or professes to represent it.
That judgment and inif right, belongs to the corporation,
fluence,
and so does that which it produces, and the
bonds received by the director are its property, as between it and the defendant.
The circumstance that they came from Peck, and not
directly from the Mound City Insurance Company, is wholly immaterial.
They came from
the agent of that company, and the extravagant amount paid Peck impresses
one vnth
the notion that more than fair commissions
was included in the $155,000.
However that
may be, what the director makes in his office
as such belongs to the corporation.
It will
not do to clog these principles of law applied
to priucipal and agent, trustee and cestui que
trust, with exceptions and modifications. They
must not be whittled away.
Whatever may
be the practice in such cases, the agreement
by which the bonds were acquired was an illegal contract, as well as a plain breach of
duty. No court, it is true, would aid the defendant or the receiver, or the corporation of
in recovering the
which he Is the receiver,
bonds from Peek, for that would be to execute
Neither would a court
the illegal contract
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assist Peck In recovering them back after the
So, too, an agent
transaction was completed.
may resist an accounting on the ground that
the subject of the agency was illegal, or
against public policy. Story, Agency, § 235.
But when the subject of the agency is entirely legal, and that was the case here, and profits are made by a violation of duty, it would
be obviously unjust to allow the agent to reap
the fruits of his own misconduct.
Id. § 207.
An agent is accountable to his principal for
moneys that come into his hands as such,
even if such amount be composed of usurious
Interest, and not collectible by the principal
himself. Chirm v. Chinn, 22 La. Ann. 599.
One party cannot hold back proceeds from
another, of whom he was representative,
on
the ground that there was illegality in the way
of getting the money.
Whart. Cont. § 354.
The defendant acquired the bonds while acting and prefessing to act in his capacity of
director, and must be held to have received
them in that capacity.
The plaintiff's case is
made out by the proof of these facts, and we
are not concerned in the execution of the illegal agreement.
2. As to the writ of error prosecuted by the
receiver we do not see that he has any right
to the bonds which never came to the defendant. Wyman, who acquired them, is no party
to this suit, and held no fiduciary relation to
the plaintiffs corporation.
The receiver has
elected to take the course here pursued and
must be content with such property hs it will
reach.

3. This suit was begun February 19, 1879,
five years and ten to fifteen days after Wyman received the bonds for himself and defendant The agreement by which the bonds
were acquired and the receipt of the same are
facts which were kept secret from all persons
save those directly connected therewith, until 1878, when rumors were afioat pointing to
They were then brought to the
these facts.
attention of the court and soon thereafter this
suit was begun. Defendant pleaded the fiveyear statute of limitations, and plaintiff replied that the fraud was not discovered until
within five years next before the commencement of the suit Section 3230, Rev. St., specifies five different classes of civil actions (other than those for the recovery of real estate)
which can only be commenced within five
years after the cause of action shall have acThe fifth is: "An action for relief on
crued.
the ground of fraud, the cause of action in
such case to be deemed not to have accrued
until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at
any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud."
Our statute of limitations applies to equitable, as well as legal, causes of action, and
we agree with counsel for the defendant that
this clause under consideration should be considered in the light of the former equity rules,
the place of which, in many respects, at least
It was designed to take. Beyond doubt the
statute
does not now and never did run
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against an express continuing trust .in favor ot
tiie trustee, certainly not until he openly repudiates the trust. Johnson v. Smith, 27 Mo.
591; Smith v. Ricords, 52 Mo. 581, 56 Mo.
553. Conceded it must he that by the equity
rules, the statute was not applied by way of
analogy, in cases of actual fraud, until the
discovery of the fraud. But is it true, as is
contended here, that by those rules the statute
was applied without regard to the time of discovery in case of constructive
frauds and
trusts? It was said by Scott, J., in Keeton's
Heirs v. Keeton's Adm'r, 20 Mo. 541: "In
cases of resulting, implied and constructive
trusts, where a party is to be constituted a
trustee by a decree Of a court of equity founded on fraud, it is well settled as a rule of equity, that the statute of limitations, and presumptions
from lapse of time, will operate.
With regard to the statute of limitations, it will
run from the time that the facts are brought
home to the knowledge of the party."
See,
also. Perry, Trusts, §§ 228, 230; 1 Daniell, Ch.
PI. 669; Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 445; Ang.
Lim. § 470. In the case last cited the defendants were the uncles and agents of the plaintiffs for the management and sale of the
lands; they purchased the lands, with the value of which plaintiffs were not familiar, at an
under value; they then sold the same at an
advanced price.
It was a suit to establish a
constructive trust for the profits arising from
the re-sale.
It was there said: "If a party
is in possession of, or has notice of, the main
facts constituting the fraud, the statute will
commence running from that time." The difference of opinion expressed in that case and
the subsequent one of Rogers v. Brown, 61
Mo. 187, is not pertinent to any inquiry here,
for this case in no way concerns real estate.
'
Many authorities do hold that, in cases of
constructive trusts and frauds, the statute
will begin to run without regard to the time
of the discovery. This appears to be due to
the fact that often In such cases the facts
are open and the law frequently draws its
conclusion without regard to the motives,
because of the confldeatial relation of the
parties. Much, we think, depends upon the
fact whether the fraud is a secret or open
If the substantial facts constituting
one.
the fraud, in cases like the one under consideration,
were open, it is believed, under
the equity rules, the statute of limitations
would have been applied at once, but if these
facts were in their nature secret and were
unknown, it is believed the statute would
not begin to run until they were discovered,
there being no want of diligence on the part
of the complainant. Here the fraud consists
in professing to act for and in the interest
of the corporation, as was defendant's duty,
when, in reality, he was acting for himself
and for his private gain.
The agreement uoder which this was done was in its very
nature a secret one, one which the corporation would not naturally suspect, and one
which would not be revealed by any act
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openly done. Of course, here, simple knowledge of the existence of the agreement
and
acquisition of the bonds thereunder, brought
home to the plaintiff, or the corporation of
which he is receiver, would start the statute
and from that thne it would continue to run
notwithstanding the subsequent appohitment
of the receiver.
This knowledge was not a<v
quired until much more than fifteen days after the receipt of the bonds, by Wyman.
The
by which the transaction was
circumstances
discovered show there were no laches on the
part of the plalntifE or his corporation. We
conclude the clause of the statute before noted applies to this case, and imder it the cause
of action is not barred.
4. A contract founded on a champertous
consideration is illegal, against public policy
and void. Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 55. In
that case the contract there in question was
held not to be champertous because the attorneys did not bind themselves to pay any
pqrtion of the expenses of the litigation.
Where the right of the plaintiff, which he
seeks to enforce, is derived under a title
founded on his champerty,
the suit must
fail. Courts are not organized for the purpose of enforcing such contracts.
Many of
the authorities cited by defendant go to this
extent and no farther. Some of them do appear to hold that where there is a champertous
contract, by which the suit is prosecuted, and
that fact comes to the knowledge ot the
court it should dismiss the suit. Barker v.
Barker, 14 Wis. 143; Webb v. Armstrong, 5
Humph. 379.
Others appear to give a qualified approval to the doctrine.
On the other
hand a number of cases hold that the fact
that the' suit is being prosecuted under a
champertous
contract is no defense, and that
the illegality of such a contract can only be
set up when it is sought to enforce the contract. Hilton V. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432;
Whitney v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 333; Allison V. Railway Co., 42 Iowa, 274; Courtright V. Bumes, 3 McCrary, 60, 13 Fed. 317.
Unless the plaintifCs title, by which he seeks
to enforce a right, is infected by a champertous contract, we see no reason why the suit
may not proceed, though such a contract exists as between the plaintiff and his attorney.
It is time enough to turn a party out
of court when he asks the aid of a court to
enforce such a contract. This is, in substance, the rule as to most illegal contracts,
and there is no good reason at this day for
making an exception in thi6 class of con-

tracts.
Certain policy holders brought to light the
facts upon which this suit is founded, and
were permitted by the court to prosecute the
same in the name of the receiver upon indemnifying him, and, as a consequence, the
funds in his hands, against the payment of
costs.
These policy holders were but protecting their own rights. They could not
well sue in their own names. -In such cases
it is not an uncommon thing for cautious

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES.
to require that the officer be made
costs of long and tedious suits.
Thus far there is no element of chami)erty
It would seem the defendant
in the defense.
offered to prove that the attorney by whom
the suit was Instituted and who represented
these policy holders gave the bond, and, further, that he had an agreement with the receiver by which he was to have a certain
portion of the avails of the suit for his servIn view of this offer let it be eonices.
of this case, without
ceded, for the purpose
deciding the question that the agreement becourts

safe against

tween the attorney and the receiver w»«
champertous, still, applying the principle be-
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fore announced, that constituted no defense
The receiver's accounts will
to this action.
come before the court for its approval and it
will be time enough then to examine into the
questions of the validity of the agreement.
The plaintiff is in no wise afEected by the
illegal agreement, even if any there was.
We do not think public policy requires the
courts to turn aside and investigate such
side issues.
The judgment in this case, from which ^
both parties come to this court, is affirmed.

HENRY,
concur.

O.

J.,

dissents.

The other judges
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COOK

V.

GILMORB

et al.

By this well-settled rule the services
of a trustee, in the absence of a provision
for compensation in advance, are to be
performed as a gratuity, without regard
to the advantage that may result from
his superior care, skill, and diligence in the
management of the trust-estate.
We are
aware that in many of the states of the
Union, and in the federal courts, a different rule prevails ; but the law, as established by the courts of equity in England
in respect of compensation of conventional
trustees, has been so long and firmly established in the jurisprudence of this state
that it ought not to be changed by judicial
As said by the appellate
determination.
court, the rule has been applied in all its
strictness in this state whenever the question has arisen. See Constant v. Matteson, 22 111.546; Hough v. Harvey, 71 111.72;

i 417.

(24 N. B. 524, 133 111. 139.)
Supreme

Court of Illinois.

May

14,
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1890.

Appeal from appellate court, first district.
LynD Helm, for appellant.
Charles S.
Miller, for appellees.
Shopb, C. J. The question presented by
this record is whether a trustee, who a(!cepts and performs the trust, without any
contract or stipulation of the parties, or
any provision in the order of court appointing him, for compensation for his
services, is entitled to compensation for
care bestowed, and for time expended in
executing the trust. The rule laid down
in the text-book is "that a trustee is not
entitled to compensation
for personal
trouble and loss of tinje. " Perry, Trusts,
889; 2 Lewin,
§§ 904-906; Hill, Trustees,
Trusts, 627. And such seems to be the rule
established by the English court of equity,
although in the later cases exceptions to
that general rule have been more frequent,
in cases where the court can find from the
attending circumstances that both parties
expected that compensation
would be
made. 2 Story, Eq. Jar. § 1268, and cases
cited ; authorities supra. The rule applied,
not only to trustees so cited, but also to all
who held a fiduciary relation, as executors
and administrators, mortgagees in possession, receivers and guardians, and to officers, directors, and trustees of corporations. The rule is based upon the well-recognized principle, upon vrhich courts of
equity invariably act, that the trustee
should execute the trust for the benefit of
the cestui que trust alone, and that he
shall desire no profit by reason of the
trust. And the rule -was adopted and enforced for the reason that, while in a particular case the allowance of compensation might be justly allowed, and the estate not be chai'ged with more than it
might otherwise have to bear, yet the
adoption of the contrary rule would have
the tendency to tempt the trustee to disregard the interest of the beneficiaries, and
lead, in general, totheconsequence of loading the estatefor the benefit of thetrustee,
by pretenses of care, trouble, and loss of
time; thus placing the trustee in a position, which equity forbids, where his personal interests would conflict with the performance of his duty. And it is held that
in this there was no hardship upon the
trustee, for he might choose whether he
will accept the trust or not. So a trustee
might refuse to accept appointment by a
court unless pro vision was m ade for proper
and, if he undertook the
compensation;
trust with the understanding that upon
application compensation
subsequent
would be allowed, the court may at the
proper time ascertain and allow the same.
Brocksopp V. Barnes, 5 Madd. 90; Morison V. Morison, 4 Mylne & C. 215; English
note to Robinson v, Pett. 2 Lead. Cas. Eq.

.

Huggins

V.

Rider,

77 111. 360.

In

some of

the states, the right of mere conventional
trustees to compensation has been fixed
by statute; whileperhaps in all, as in this
state, laws have been passed alio wing compensation of trustees required by law to
be appointed, such as executors and administrators, guardians, conservators, aad
assignees of insolvent estates. And it is
now universally held in this country that
a receiver, being the arm of the court to
execute its orders in respect of the property of which the court has taken control,
may be allowed com}iensation out of the
funds in his hands. In some, and perhaps
a majority, of the states, where remuneration has been provided by statute to those
to whom the law intrusts the care and
management of the estates of lunatics, infants, deceased persons, insolvents, and
the like, the courts by an equitable construction have extended the right to voluntary or conventional trustees, when the
agreement, deed, will, or order of appointmentis silent. See American note to Robinson V. Pett, supra. And this view is pressed
upon usin this case with great force. But
it must be answered, regardless of what
our views might be if the question was an
open one in this state, that the same statutes now in force, or others in every respect identical In effect, were in force when
each of the decisions of this court referred
to upon this question was rendered, and
manifestly were not regarded by the court
as controlling. Notwithstanding these
statutes, this court adopted and has since
adhered to the common-law rule. Appellant's trusteeship falls clearly within the
rule, and, while he would be entitled to
have allowed him all money actually expended in good faith for the preservation
of the trust fund, if any, he can recover
nothing for his personal or professional
services in respect of his trusteeship. His
claim for compensation as trustee, as well
as for attorney's fees for professional servof the
ices rendered duringthecontinuance
trust, were properly disallowed by the
court. Hill, Trustees, 890; Perry, Trusts,
§904, and cases supra.
Thejudgmentofthe
appellate court must be affirmed.
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SCHELL.

N. Y. 263.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Sept. 23, 1873.

Appeal from order on settlement of accounts of Edward Sch^l, trustee, etc., of the
estate of Jacob Appley, -which disallowed an
item of $2,500 charged for his services as
such trustee.

Jacob Appley died seized of a large real

By his last will and
and personal estate.
testament he devised and bequeathed all his
property, with certain exceptions, to his executors and the survivor of them, upon certain trusts therein named.
The will, after
reciting the trusts, contained this clause:
"And also that my said executors retain and
pay imto themselves out of said rents and
incomes all costs, charges and expenses that
they shall have to pay or be put unto In the
fulfillment of this my wUl, and a reasonable
compensation for their services."
By an order of the supreme court, Schell

was appointed trustee in place of those namIn his accounts he made a
ed in the will.
charge in gross of $2,500 for his services.
The referee reported m favor of Its allowance.

J. Parker, for appellant.
for respondent.

Amasa
Hand,

RAPALLO,

J.

Samuel

The order appealed from

shows upon its face that it was made upon
the ground that the compensation of the
trustee for his services should be limited to
commissions, at the rate allowed by statute
to executors and administrators, for receiving and paying out moneys.
This is the settled rule in cases where the
creator of the trust has made no provision
for compensation to the trustee. Under such
the courts have by analogy
circumstances
allowed the same commissions which are by
statute allowable to executors and administrators, and have restricted the allowances
to those rates.

But

where the

instrument

creating

the

trust provides that the trustee shall have a
compensation
for his services in executing
the trust, such provision will be enforced.
If the instrument declares the rate of comIt estabpensation, it must be followed.
lishes no rate, the value of the services
should be ascertained by judicial Investigation.
Meacham v. Stemes, 9 Paige, 398.
The provision of the will In question is
that the trustees (of whom the applicant is
the successor)
shall retain and pay unto
themselves, out of the rents and Income of
the testator's estate, aU costs, charges and
expenses that they shall have to pay or be

If

of his will, and
reasonable compensation for their services.
It would seem a sufficiently simple proposition that the question, what is a reasonable sum to be allowed to the trustee over
and above his proper disbursements for his
put unto In the fulfillment

a
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services, Is a question of fact determinable
upon the same principles which would regulate such an inquiry were the controversy
one arising upon an employment Inter vivos.
But It Is claimed on the part of the respondent that the statute which regulates
the commissions of executors, administrators
and guardians determines that the rate thereby allowed Is a reasonable compensation,
and that the subject of the amount of compensation is closed to further inquiry.
The
learned court at special term seems to have
adopted this view, and its decision has been
affirmed at general term. We cannot concur
in the soundness of these conclusions. In
the first place, the provisions of the statute
do not in terms apply to trustees.
The original trustees in this case were the same persons who were named in the will as executors, but their offices as trustees were additional to and distinct from their legal duties
as executors.
The applicant succeeds to the
office of trustee and not of executor.
The decisions which apply to trustees the same
rules as to compensation which the statute
applies to executors, etc., rest upon the principle of analogy and not upon the command
of the statute. They are confined to cases
where no provision is made by the creator of
the trust for the compensation of the truetees.
In such cases, there being no express
declaration of the creator of the trust that
his appointees should be compensated, yet it
being unreasonable under ordinary circumstances to require them to perform their responsible duties gratuitously, It is a fair presumption that the testator assumed that they
would be entitled to the commissions established by law for similar services when rendered by executors, etc.
Where however he
expressly provides that they shall have a reasonable compensation for their services, he
must be supposed to have intended that the
compensation should be reasonable with reference to the special circumstances of his estate and the services which he has required
them to perform.
The object of the statute is to furnish a
general and arbitrary rule for cases not otherwise provided for; but it should not govern where the testator has, by reason of peculiar circumstances existing In reference to
his estate, required extraordinary services
on the part of those to whose care he has
confided it, and has specially provided that
their compensation shall be reasonable, which
is equivalent to declaring that It shall be proportioned to the value of the services they
By such a direction the testamay render.
tor necessarily confides to the tribunals under whose jurisdiction the administration of
his estate may come, the adjustment of the
compensation of his trustees, and this Is a
duty which those tribunals must perform
conscientiously upon the evidence before
It was therefore the duty of the court
them.
below In the case to determine whether the
sum claimed by the trustee was or was not
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and to
reasonable under the circumstances,
allow or reduce It according to their judgment, without being controlled by the statute.
The case shows that the duties of the
trustee were onerous, and involved more
than the mere receipt and disbursement of
money.
He was intrusted with the management of forty houses and lots, the buildings
being old Jand requiring frequent repairs,
and the trustee swears that he has given
them his personal care and attention, besides
attending to the receipt and application Of
the funds.
Whether the sum of $2,500 allowed by the
referee is a reasonable amount is a question
for the court below. The report of the referee is not conclusive, but merely for the in-
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formation of the court.
The court, at special
term, should exercise its discretion whether
to confirm or modify it, and If the amount is
in Its judgment excessive, it should be reduced, but the amount should be determhied
with reference to the facts of the case and
not by the statute.
The orders of the special and general
terms should be reversed, and the proceedings remitted to the court below to rehear
at special term the motion to confirm the report of the referee.
The costs of the appellant should be allowed to him out of the fund.

All

concnr, except

GROVBB.

Ordered accordingly.

3^ not voting.
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VAN ALEN T.

AMERICAN NAT. BANK.
(52 N.

T.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan.

21,

1873.

Action to recover $1,625.13, deposited by
plaintiff with defendant in the name of Van
Alen & Rice.

Van Alen & Rice were merchants In the

Before Feb., 1867, the
city of New York.
plaintiff, a resident of Danville, Penn., had
indorsed a note for Van Alen & Rice, due
March 8, 1867.
On Feb. 4, 1867, plaintiff sent to Van Alen
& Rice bonds, with a letter to the effect that
they could be used "to protect the note on
which I (plaintiff) am Indorser. If you can
get along without using them you can let me
will give instructions as to fuknow, and
ture disposal of them."
On Feb. 15, 1867, plaintiff wrote another letter, giving Instructions to "collect the coupon
of the 7-30 bond, and retain all until you can
determine as to your ability to meet the note
maturing March 8. If you are al;le to meet
it advise me so soon as you can determine,
and I will then give further advice in regard
•
* •
you want to sell
to the bonds.

I

If

them and let the proceeds lay to your credit
in bank, so that it vrill be available 8th
March, do so. It would make your bank account look better, and perhaps do you good
Id that way."
The bonds were sold Feb. 20, 1867, for
$1,628.12.

A

check was

received therefor

which was used by Van Alen & Rice. On the
same day they deposited
with defendant
$1,711.66 "to cover the sale of the bonds."
It
was deposited for plaintiff.
On the following
day Van Alen & Rice wrote plaintiff, notifying Mm of the sale and deposit
Van Alen & Rice made no subsequent deposit in the defendant's bank, and never
drew any check against this deposit, or any
check upon the bank, except a check in plaintifPs favor for the amount due him, March 6.

Van Alen & Rice had made an accommoda-

tion note for McCombie & Child, which became due March 4, at defendant's bank, for
$15,000.
On the day It became due McCombie & Child sent their certified check to Van
Alen & Rice, and that check was deposited
with defendant to pay the note.
On March
6 plaintiff served upon defendant a notice of
his right to the money, and presented
the
Payment was refused.
check for payment.

Judgment for plaintiff.

J.

Charles H. Woodbury, for appellant
Vanderpoel, for respondent

Aaron

CHURCH, C. J. The learned counsel for
the appellant Is undoubtedly right in the position that if, as between the plaintiff and Van
Alen & Rice, there was no trust Impressed upon the deposit in the bank defendant to an
amount equal to the proceeds of the bonds

sold by Van Alen & Rice for the plaintiff, this
action cannot be maintained. It Is settled that
the holder, of a check cannot maintain an ac-

H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)-35
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tlon against the drawee, after a refusal to
for want of privity, and that a check
against a general bank account does not operate as an assignment
Mtaa. Nat Bank v.
Fourth Nat Bank, 46 N. Y. 82, 7 Am. Rep.
314; Bank v. Millard, 10 WaU. 152, and cases
there cited.
This action is based upon another principle equally well settled, viz., that
so long as money or property belonging to the
principal or the proceeds thereof may be
traced and distinguished in the hands of the
agent or his representatives
or assignees, the
principal is entitied to recover It unless it has
been transferred for value without notice.
2
Grat 544; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. &
G. 372; 6 Jones, Bq. 34; 2 Hem. & M: 417; 2
Kent Comm. 796, 801. It appears to me clear
that Van Alen & Bice were the agents of the
plaintiff to sell the bonds, and were bound to
keep the proceeds of the same for him. He
owned the bonds, directed their sale, and also
directed that the proceeds should be kept for
him In a particular manner, and he was notified by Van Alen & Rice that they had been
sold and the avails placed and would be kept
as directed.
These undisputed facts establish
the relation of trustee and cestui que trust between the plaintiff and Van Alen & Rice as to
the proceeds of these bonds.
It Is claimed however that this principle Is
not applicable because the identical money for
which the bonds were sold was not deposited.
This objection would be fatal If there had in
fact been no substitution of other money for
the proceeds of the bonds. It seems to have
been assumed on the trial that the check given upon the sale of the bonds was used by
Van Alen & Rice for their own benefit and if
the evidence had stopped there the trust fund
would have been gone and dissipated, and of
course beyond the reach of being traced.
But
the uncontradicted evidence is that on the
same day Van Alen & Rice substituted other
money for that obtained for the bonds, and
placed it in the bank defendant to their credit,
to be retained for the plaintiff as arranged between them, and notified the plaintiff thereof. The letter of the 21st of February to the
plaintiff in connection with the evidence of
G. R. Van Alen is conclusive that the money
referred to In the letter was that deposited In
the bank defendant The point made Is this:
A. having $100, the proceeds of a sale of property of B., intends to place It in a repository
and keep it for B., and instead of putting the
identical bank bills in the designated place
substitutes others of the same amount and
keeps them for B. as such proceeds, can there
be a doubt that the $100 thus substituted
would cfccupy the same position as the particular bills obtained for the property, and that
they would be impressed with the same trust?
Suppose Van Alen & Rice had got the check
cashed by a third person and deposited the
money, it would of course be regarded as the
proceeds of the check, and belong to the plaintiff as effectually as the check itself. Does It
make any difference whether the money was
pay,

1.)
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from a third person upon the check
or from the safe of Van Alen & Kice? In either case the money is the proceeds of the
check and stands in lieu of it. It is said that
the secret intention of Van Alen & Rice canBetween them and
not effect such a result.
the defendant as to the substitution it was not
They in substance notified the plainsecret.
tiff that they had placed on deposit the proceeds of his bonds and would keep it for him.
They did deposit the amount which they treatobtained

ed as the proceeds, and declared it to be such.
If
Can they deny it? Can any one for them?
SHid a note to an attorney to collect, and deposit the money in a bank in his own name
and keep it for me, is my title to the money
Impaired because he fails to deposit the identiMy agent collects $100 rent for
cal bills?
me and puts the bills in one pocket and takes
the same amount from another pocket and deposits it and notifies me. Are my rights gone
by the change of money?
think not. Stripped of unsubstantial forms, the case presented
is that of a person delivering stock or bonds
to an agent for sale with directions to deposit
the proceeds in a bank to the credit of the
agent, but to keep it in that way for him, and
the agent f oUows the directions.
Can there be
a doubt as to the ownership of the money as
between the agent and the principal? Clearly
Suppose the principal had directed the
not.
agent to loan the money on a note or mortgage, would not the security belong to the principal? The bank defendant upon receiving
the deposit became the debtor ostensibly to
the depositor, but equitably to the real owner.
The obligation incurred by the bank was to
pay the money on demand in the usual course
of business, and had a right to require a check
from the depositor. When this formality was
complied with and the bank was notified that
the money actually belonged to the plaintiff,
it did not lie in its mouth to set up a want of
Privity has nothing to do with the
privity.
question.
The bank had the plaintiff's money
and gave its obligation in form to another person, but the obligation was in fact owned by
the plaintiff and he can enforce it. There is
no mystery or sanctity respecting the obligations of a bank in such a case, different from
those of a private person, and if this money
had been loaned to the latter under an agreement to repay it upon the presentation of the
agent's check, he would not have been beard
to say when the plaintiff presented the check,
"I made no contract with you, and although
have no claim to the money you cannot maintain an action because there is no privity between us and the check does not operate as an
assignment."
The answer would be that the
plaintiff owned the obligation,
and had the
same right to recover it as he would if the
person had possession of his horse, and refused to deliver it on demand.
The only effect of
the direction to deposit in a particular manner
was to relieve the agent upon complying with
the direction from liability for loss without his
fault. In the absence of such a direction the

I

I

I

principal, while he might pursue and claim the
money, would not have been obliged to do so,

and could have also held the agent personally!
It is objected also that the money was so
mihgled with the agenf s own money as not
to be traceable in the hands of the defendant.
When Van Alen & Rice deposited this money
for the plaintiff they included with it a few
dollars of their own. But this does not affect
the plaintiff's right to it When a trustee deposits trust moneys in his own name in a
bank with his individual money, the character
of the trust money is not lost but it remams
the property of the cestui que trust.
If such
money can be traced into the bank, and it remains there, the owner can reclaim it When
deposited, the bank incurred an obligation to
repay it, which is not lessened or impaired hecause it incurred, at the same time, an obligation to pay other money belonging to the agent
Individually.
A. sells B.'s horse for $100,
and puts It In a box with $100 of his own, the
$100 of B. may be claimed by him although
the particular bills constituting it could not
be identified.
So if the same $200 were deposited in a bank to the credit of A., the title
of B. to $100 would not be affected by the association, and the bank would owe that money
to B. in equity, although it owed A. also for
his individual money.
These views are not
only consonant with integrity and justice, but
are fuUy sustained by authority.
The case of Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, ST.
& G. 372, Is a leading and very instructive ease
upon this whole subject.
It was a contest
between the successor of one Green, an of&cial
assignee in bankruptcy, and the personal representatives of Green for moneys standing to
his individual credit In the Bank of England
and another bank.
These moneys had been
deposited from time to time by Green, and
consisted of funds received by him in his official capacity as trustee and his own individual
funds. The account was kept in his individual name, without any discrimination between
the trust and private funds, and the question
was, whether the various persons interested
in the trust funds could claim the respective
amounts due them, or whether the defendants
were entitied to receive and administer upon
the money as a part of the estate of Green.
The master of the rolls held that the cestuls
que trustent could not hold the money because
It had no "earmark," and could not be traced
and distinguished vyithin the principle before
adverted to. This decision was reversed upon
appeal to the Court of Appeal in Chancery.
The Lord Justice Knight Bruce, after a clear
statement illustrating the doctrine upon which
the principle rests, proceeds to say: "When a
trustee pays trust money into a bank to his
credit, the account being a simple account
with himself, not marked or distinguished in
any other manner, the debt thus constituted
from the bank to him is one which, as long
as It remains due, belongs specifically to the

If

trust as much and as effectually as the money
so paid would have done had It specifically
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by the trustee in a particular retliat is to say, if
pository and so remained;
the specific debt shall be claimed on behalf of
the cestuis que trustent it must be deemed
* * • This state of things
specifically theirs.
been placed

would not, I apprehend, be varied by the circumstance of the bank holding also for the
trustee, or owing also to him money in every
The Lord Justice Turner
sense his own."
also deUvered an elaborate opinion sustaining
the same doctrine, in the course of which he
says: "Suppose a trustee pays into a bank
moneys belonging to his trust to an account not
marked or distinguished as a trust account,
and pays in no other moneys, could it for one
moment be denied that the moneys standing
to the account of the debt due from the bankers, arising from the moneys so paid in, would
belong to the trust and not to the private estate of the trustee? Then suppose the trustee
subsequently pays in moneys of his own, not
belonging to the trust, to the same account.
Would the character of the moneys which he
had before paid in, of the debt which had before accrued, be altered? Again, suppose the
paying monInstead of subsequently
trustee.
eys into the bank, draws out a part of the
trust moneys which he has before paid in,
would the remainder of those moneys and of
in respect of them lose
the debt contracted
their trust character? Then can the circumstance of the account consisting of a continued series of moneys paid in and drawn out
alter the principle? It may Indeed increase the
difficulty of ascertaining what belongs to the
trust, but
can see no possible ground on
which it can affect the principle."
In the case of Overseers of the Poor v. Bank
of Virginia, 2 Grat. 544, 44 Am. Dec. 399, an
attorney deposited a check for the amount of
a judgment in favor of his clients to his own
credit, having a small amount of other money to his credit, and died.
On the day of his
death a note fell due belonging to the bank
which it claimed to set ofC, but the coiu:t held
that the clients were entitled to the money.
Stanard, J., says:
"The credits to Langhome
with the bank are several, and the sources of
* • * They are
each distinctiy identified.
as distinct and distinguishable as they would
be were they in separate parcels In the hands
of Langhome, with labels on each designating
the sources from whence they were derived."
The same principle was decided in 6 Jones,
Eq. 34.
So also in Frith v. Cartland, 2 Hem.
& M. 417, where a person received from the
plaintiff certain acceptances to take up paper
owing to the plaintiff, and got them cashed
and ran away.
After mingling the money
with his own, and making various changes
and transformations, he was arrested, and the
plaintiff was decided to be entitied to the
money in preference to creditors; Vice-Ohancellor Wood saying that "the court attributes
the ownership of the trust property to the cestui que trust so long as it can be traced."
The same principle was decided in Veil v.
Mitchell, 4 Washb. 105, in respect to the avails

I
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of certain foreign bills collected by an agent.
In Merrill v. Bank of Norfolk, 19 Pick. 32,
involving the same principle, Morton, J., said:
"The defendants having the plaintiff's money
in their hands, for which a demand was made
before the action was' commenced, are liable
for the amount with interest from the time
These rules and adwhen it was demanded."
judications, which are decisive of this case,
accord with the equities.
The bank defendant
has no lien upon this money, and does not
claim to have, and no claim is set up in the
answer. Nor does it appear that any one else
has. If Van Alen & Rice had given a lien for
value upon this money, or had obtained a loan
upon the apparent ownership of it in any way,
the rights of the party holding the claim may
have been superior to those of the plaintiff.
No such claim Is set up or shown.
The note
falling due the 20th of February was not set
up in the answer, and if It had been, would
not have operated as a defense. This deposit
was demanded the 6th of February and could
have been assigned by Van Alen & Rice, and
the holder, if for value, could have enforced it.
The note due the 20th was not an off -set, and
could not be as against £my but Van Alen &
Rice. The question is therefore entirely between the plaintiff and Van Alen & Rice; the
former claims the money and the latter admits
the claim, and the facts sustain the justice
of it. The defendant occupies the position of
objecting to the titie of the plaintiff without
having or claiming any titie Itself. If Van
Alen & Rice had refused to give a check, the
plaintiff might have been obliged to resort to
an equitable action; but If a titie is established by the plaintiff, and he presented the evidence upon which the defendant agreed to
pay the money, I see no reason why an action
at law may not be maintained, but it is unnecessary to pass upon this point as It was not
made. Neither was the point made that a part
of the deposit could not be recovered.
It was suggested on the argument that notice to the bank by the depositor was necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff, but
this is not so. The title of the plaintiff does
not depend upon whether the bank knew he
had a titie or not. That rested upon other
facts. A notice to the bank might have prevented any transfer or the creation of a lien
by the depositor, or prevented the bank from
taking or acquiring such lien in good faith, but
could not otherwise be necessary or important.
The appellant also claims that the plaintiff's
money was in fact drawn out by the check for
$15,000 on the 4th of February.
The authorities before cited adopt the rule
that moneys first deposited apply upon checks
first drawn, and the accounts in the case of
PenneU v. Deffell were adjusted upon that
principle.
Without undertaking to determine when
this rule should, and when it should not, be
adopted, it is sufficient to say that the $15,000 credit and debit was a special transaction.
The check of a third person was put in to
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pay an accommodation
note of Van Alen &
Rice and used for that purpose, so that the
general rule would not apply to that item.
With that exception no money was drawn
after the deposit of $1,711, which included
The decision in
Hxe proceeds of the bonds.
iEtna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, supra,
There was no
has no bearing on this case.
question of title in the plaintiff in that case,
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and this court held that the obligation of the
bank defendant to the depositor was discharged by the payment of another note against
the depositor before the plaintiff's note became due, and that the plaintiff had no right
of action.
The judgment must be afiSrmed. AH concur
exept ALLEN and GROVER, JJ., dissenting.
Judgment affirmed.
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The testator died July 19, 1883, and on the
24th of the same month said will was duly
(32
admitted to probate in the county court of
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Jan. 19, 1893.
De Kalb county, whereupon said Alden and
Robinson were qualified, and took upon
appellate
Appeal from
court, second disthemselves the duties of executors and trustrict
Bill by Robert W., Charles, Albert H., and tees, as in and by the will provided. The
estate was very large, being inventoried at
James D. Waterman, Sarai J. and Kate D.
Moulton,
Ellen L. Thomas, Caroline W. about $531,000, consisting of farm lands and
other real estate to the value of $127,512.70,
Syme, and J. Frank Wells, legatees under the
and the balance In cash, notes and accounts,
will of James S. Waterman, deceased, for
stocks, etc.
The widow declined to take unthemselves, and all others similarly situated
der the will, and, her husband having left no
who may join therein, against Philander M.
child or children, or descendants
of such,
Alden, George S. Robinson, Sarah E., Mary
one half of the entire estate, real and perJ. Clayton, Charlotte and Caroline M. Watersonal, was partitioned and set oflE to her, as
man, Lizzie Chase, and Jennie Kinney, to obprovided by the statute in such case. The
tain an accounting from said Alden and Robadministration was still pending and undeinson, to have them removed as trustees under said wiU, and for other relief.
A decree termined in said county court at the filing of
this bill. Said Alden and Robinson had rewas rendered, from which the complainants
duced a part of the trust property to posappealed to the appellate court. That court
session, and made a partial distribution of
aflSrmed the decree, and complainants again
the proceeds thereof to the beneficiaries,
appeal. Reversed.
when on the 9th of June, 1887, Robert W.
W. R. Plum, for appellants. Carnes &
and Charles Waterman, surviving brothers
Dunton, for appellees.
of the testator, and certain children of deceased brothers and sisters, claiming under
WILKIN, J. On the 28th day of Novem- said residuary clause, began this action in
ber, 1870, J'ames S. Waterman executed
his
the circuit court of said De •Kalb county
by V7hich he gave against Alden and Robinson, to compel them
last will and testament,
bis wife one third of all his estate, and a
to render an account of their trusteeship, to
specific legacy of $5,000 in trust for the use
charge them with certain losses to the trust
of one Nellie Famhdoru
by reason of their negligent and
The rest of his esestate
wrongful conduct in and about the managetate was disposed of by the following re"I give, devise, and be- ment of the same, and to have them removsiduary
clause:
queath all the rest, residue, and remainder
ed as such trustees, and others appointed in
of my estate, both real and personal, to the
their stead. After protracted litigation a fisaid Philander M. Alden and George S. Rol>
nal decree was rendered in the cause by the
* • • the executors
inson,
of this, my
circuit court of Lee county, to which it had
last will and testament, hereinafter nomibeen removed.
The complainants carried the
nated and appointed,
in trust for the use
record to the appellate court of the second
and benefit of my brothers and sisters, to
district by appeal.
There both parties aswit, [naming them] to have and hold, mansigned errors, and an extended statement of
age and control, the same for such purpose,
the case, with a very carefully prepared opinfor and during the term of twenty one years
ion by Cartwright, J., was filed (42 111. App.
from and after the date of my decease, and
294), affirming the decree of the circuit court
during the continuance of said trust estate,
This appeal is from that
in all respects.
judgment of affirmance. The record is unas aforesaid, to receive, collect, and pay over
usually voluminous, and the argument of
to my said brothers and sisters above named
the net income and profits thereof, in equal
counsel on behalf of appellants has taken an
portions to each, annually, the child or chilIt would be imposalmost unlimited range.
dren of a deceased brother or sister to take
sible to even casually notice all the points
made, without extending this opinion to an
the same portion the father or mother would
unreasonable length. For a full statement
have taken if living; and, at the expiration
of said twenty one years after my decease,
of the facts of the case we refer to the opinI give, devise, and bequeath to my said ion of the appellate court. We also concur
in the conclusions reached by that court, as
brothers and sisters, their heirs and assigns,
set forth in said opinion, except as hereinforever, the said rest, residue, and remainder
after indicated.
of my estate, both real and personal, to be
The points more particularly pressed upon
equally divided between them, share and
our attention are— First, the circuit court
share alike, the child or children of any deerred in refusing to remove appellees as trusceased brother or sister to take the same
tees;
second, the circuit court erred in reshare the father or mother would have taken
if living, and, in case of the death of any of fusing to hold said trustees personally liable
for the loss of the "Marsh indebtedness;"
my said brothers or sisters leaving no issue,
third, the circuit court erred in its division
the share of such brother or sister would
of the costs and expenses of the litigation.
have taken if living to be equally divided
The parts of the final decree relating to these
among my surviving brothers and sisters."

WATERMAN

et al. v. AT.n mN et al.

N. B. 972, 144

111. 90.)
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assignments of error are as follows:
"It is
further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that
the motion of complainants, filed herein on
the 17th of July, 1890, for the removal of
Alden and Robinson as trustees, be overruled."
"And it is further ordered, adjudged,
and decreed that this court has no jmisdiction to investigate the charge against said
Alden and Robinson or either, on account of
any alleged loss growing out of the failure
of the Sycamore Marsh Harvester Man'fg
Co., the Marsh Binder Man'fg Co., C. W.
Marsh, and W. W. Marsh, or either, or two
or more, of them, or the alleged neglect of
the said Alden and Robinson to collect or
secure the payment of obligations owing by
them, or some of them, to the estate of James
S. Waterman, dec'd."
"It is further ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the expenses of
this litigation be paid up to October 15, 1889,
as found by said master's report, to wit:
$3,868.71, and the attorneys' fees and attorneys' expenses in this cause paid or incurred since October 15, 1889, as enumerated,
and shown by the testimony of D. J. Carnes
and William Lathrup, heard in open court,
up to July 19, 1890, to wit: $1,348.27 to be
allowed said trustees in their accounts when
they shall have actually paid the same, and
shall be charged to the principal fund, less
one-fourth part of the gross attorneys' fees
therein included, which one-fourth part is
found by the court to be $988.62, and which
one-fourth part said trustees are ordered to
bear personally, leaving $4,229.36 to be charged to the principal fund. This decree shall
not be construed as allowing or disallowing
any other expense of this litigation paid or
incurred by said trustees since October 15,
1889.
And it is further ordered and decreed
that the costs of this proceeding be taxed as
follows,— that is to say, that two thirds thereof be paid by the trustees, as such, out of
the principal fund in their hands, and one
third of said costs out of the distributable
income going to the complainants, and that
in taxing the costs the clerk allow $500 paid
by stipulation on file herein to Mason B.
Loomis, and $360 paid by said trustees to
Sherwood Dixon, as special masters; also
payment by them of $15.40 for witness fees,
and $312.80 for depositions;
which sums, so
far as paid by them, except that paid Master
Dixon, are shown by his report to have been
paid, and are embraced in the items of $3,869.71 costs of this litigation.
The clerk wiU
also tax, as part of the complainant's costs
herein, the sum of $392.86, paid by complainant for taking depositions; also $47.40 for
certified copies of record, $2.50 for service of
subpoenas, $8 witness fees paid by complainants' solicitor. The clerk will also tax the
usual taxable costs incurred by either party." We will consider the foregoing questions in the order named, referring to the
facts appearing in the record especially applicable thereto.
There is no difficulty in finding the legal
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measure of care and diligence required at
the hands of trustees in the management of
a trust estate.
Cases may be found holding
that, inasmuch as no compensation can be
allowed them when not expressly provided
for, they can only be held liable for losses
which result from their gross negligence or
willful misconduct; but the rule undoubtedly is that they must discharge the duties
of their trust to the best of their skill and
ability, "with such care and diligence as
men fit to be Intrusted with such matters
may fairly be expected to put forth in their
own business of equal importance."
2 Story,
Eq. Jur. § 1268b; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 1 1070. The
evidence in this case clearly shows, and in
fact it is admitted, that appellees were, prior
to the filing of this bill, guilty of some negligence in and about the management of the
trust property. First, they wholly failed to
keep proper "accounts of the trust funds, and
of their dealings with the same, as will more

fully

appear

hereafter.

In

the second place,

Robinson gave little or no attention to the
business, being much of the time absent
from the state. It will not do to say, as is
attempted,
that his personal attention was
not necessary to the proper management of
the business, in view of the fact that numerous letters were written him by Alden, complaining of his continued absence, and demanding his presence and attention to the
Finally,
estate.
general
negligence
was
shown in failing to promptly collect or secure claims due the estate, especially owing
by the Marsh Manufacturing Companies. It
does not follow necessarily that, because of
these acts of negligence, a court of chancery
should remove them. Courts of equity have
a very broad jurisdiction over trust estates
and trustees, and will remove the latter for
a failure, through neglect or from willfulness, to perform then: duties, or will compel
them to carry out the trust which they have
been appointed to and have accepted, as shall
appear, under all the circumstances of a given case, for the best interest of the estate
and all parties Interested in the same. In 2
Story, Bq. Jur. § 1289, it is said: "It is not,
indeed, every mistake or neglect of duty or
inaccuracy of conduct of trustees which will
induce
courts of equity to adopt such a
course, [remove the trustees,] but the act or
omission must be such as to endanger the
trust property, or to show a want of honesty, or a want of proper capacity to execute
the duties, or want of reasonable fidelity."
The dereliction of duty on the part of these
trustees seems to have resulted from mere
negligence
rather than willfulness, and we
are of the opinion that the chancellor was
justified, on the whole record. In refusing to
remove

them.

Whether or not the trustees should he
held personally liable for losses sustained
by the complainants on the Marsh indebtedness is attended
with much more difficulty. It is alleged in the bill that among
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the assets which came into their bands were
three judgment notes payable to said James
W. Waterman,— one for $5,000, dated April
27, 1883, due in 90 days, signed by the Syca-

more Marsh Harvester Company and C. W.
one for the sum of
and W. W. Marsh;
$3,000, dated June 13, 1883, due in 90 days,
by the same parties; and one for $5,350.40,
dated January 1, 1878, by G. W. and W. W.
Marsh alone. It is there alleged that after
said notes came into their hands, and were
due and payable to them, they knew the makfinancially, and likely
ers were embarrassed
to fail, but took no steps to collect or secure
the same until June 30, 1884; that said Alden, being cashier, one of the directors, and
a large stockholder in the Sycamore National
Bank, on October, 1883, the said Alden knowing the financial embarrassment of the said
makers of said notes, said bank loaned them
that thereafter said Alden
about $25,000;
pressed said parties for security for said bank
indebtedness, which was given, but that he
made no effort whatever to obtain security
for said indebtedness
due the estate, although security therefor could have been obtained;
that on said June 30, 1884, Alden
caused the notes due the estate to be put in
judgments In the circuit court of Lee county, although the circuit court of De Kalb
county was at the time in session, the makers of said notes having property in the lastnamed county subject to lien and levy of
judgments on said notes; that he employed
the same attorney who represented said
bank, and he at the same time took judgment in its favor for said $25,000 Indebtedness; that, through the wrongful and negligent conduct of said trusteej said property
In De Kalb county was allowed to be levied
upon and taken on executions in favor of said
bank and others, to the exclusion of those
In favor of the estate;
that, through the
negligence of the trustees, property attempted
to be levied upon In said county on executions in favor of the estate was wrongly described, and thereby priority of lien In favor
of said estate lost; that by reason of such
neglect and misftianagement on the part of
appellees the greater part of the said Indebtedness was wholly lost to said estate.
The first special master to whom the case

was referred foimd against the complainants
on these allegations as to negligence
and
omissions of duty on the part of the trustees,
and reported that they should not be held
liable for the loss; but the chancellor before whom the case was pending took a different view of the evidence, and on exceptions to the master's report found "that said
trustees, Alden and Robinson, should have
known that said Marsh Harvester Manufacturing Company and the Marshes were insolvent, and in failing condition, from the
time of the death of the said James S. Waterman until their actual failure, about July,
1884, and that said trustees did not exercise
due and proper diligence to collect or have
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said undisputed indebtedness to said
and it appearing, had said trustees
diligently pressed said undisputed indebtedness to said estate for payment or secm-Ity,
that security might have been obtained therefor, so it is ordered that trustees, Alden and
Robinson, be charged with the payment of
said undisputed indebtedness to said estate."
This order only includes the two notes signed
by the manufacturing companies
and the
Marshes, the other note being disputed, as
hereafter shown. On a re-reference of the
case the master was directed to report the
amount of loss on said two notes, which
he did, finding the amount to be $1,365.51;
but the circuit court of Lee county, as appears from the foregoing extract from its
decree, refused to allow the claim for want
of jurisdiction.
That a loss to the complainants has been sustained by reason of
the failure of appellees to collect the whole
amount of those notes is not denied.
That
they might have been collected by the use
of ordinary business management
and diligence, or secured; is clearly established by
the evidence.
We think it is equally clear
that the trustees knew that said parties
were heavily indebted, and liable to fail,
long before any effort was made by them
to secure or collect said indebtedness.
The
only finding of the court below on the facts
is to that effect
While Special Master
Loomis by his report excuses the conduct of
the trustees, he does not do so on the ground
that they were not negligent, but rather upon the theory that, from the relations existing between the testator and the Marshes,
it is fair to presume that he, if living, would
have used no more care and diligence in enforcing those claims than did appellees.
It
need scarcely be suggested that no such test
can 'properly be applied to the conduct of
trustees.
There may be abundant reason for
believing that Mr. Waterman, though a careful business man, would much rather have
than to have pressed
lose the Indebtedness
the collection of it, but that furnishes no
excuse for these trustees to neglect or fail
to use all reasonable diligence in the matter.
Mr. Waterman might do with his own as
he pleased, but the duties of these appellees
are fixed by law, and if they have violated
those duties they are personally liable.
The question, then, as to whether or not
the circuit court erred in refusing to hold
appellees liable to make good said loss, must
be decided upon the admission that, upon
the facts proved and found by that court in
a proper tribunal, they can be so held; the
only question now being, did said court properly hold that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter? That courts of
chancery have jurisdiction generally, on the
application of beneficiaries of a trust fund,
to charge trustees with losses
occurring
through their negligence or mismanagement
is too clear to call for the citation of auThe decree of the circuit court
thorities.
secured
estate;
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to have proceeded upon the theory
that, inasmuch as the trustees were also
of the will of James S. Waterexecutors
man, a court of chancery could not compel
them to make good the loss sustained by
complainants without interfering with the
jurisdiction of the county court before which
the administration of the estate was pendThis, we think, Is a misapprehension.
ing.
The negligence in failing to secure or collect
these claims, it is said, was the negligence
of the executors, over whom, in the administration of the estate, the county court has
exclusive jurisdiction.
The relief sought by
this bill is against the trustees, and not the
executors;
and, if the relief prayed cannot
be granted by a coiu^ of chancery.
It must
be because complainants have failed to prove
such dereliction of duty on the part of appellees,
in their capacity as trustees,
as
should make them liable, and not because
their bill seeks to remove any part of the
administration of the estate from the county court
It does not foUow, because Alden and Robinson were guilty of negligence
in not collecting said indebtedness
as executors, they are not also guilty of neglect of
duty in that regard as trustees.
Suppose
other persons had been executors, and they
had been guilty of the conduct charged in
this bill, causing the loss here complained of,
and these trustees, with full knowledge of
that misconduct, had not only consented, but
themselves contributed, thereto, would there
have been any doubt as to the power of a
court of chancery to charge the trustees, regardless of the liability of the executors in
their settlement of the estate In the county
court? The executors and trustees being the
same persons, it is impossible that there
should be an act of fraud or breach of duty
by the executors which is not consented to
and acquiesced
in by the trusteea
The
question is not in which capacity appellees
are liable, and hence cases cited by counsel
on either side, discussing the question as to
whether funds were held in the one capacity
or another, have no application.
On the allegations of the bUl, and the finding of the
facts by the circuit court, the debts in question have been absolutely lost to the estate,
and to that extent the complainants have
been injured;
and the only question which
can now or hereafter arise between these
parties is, have these trustees, by their negligent conduct, become liable for that loss?
Nothing which may be hereafter done in the
settlement of the estate in the county comrt:
can affect this question, and we are unable
to see why these complainants should be
sent to that court for the settlement of their
rights. We are therefore of the opinion that
the circuit court erred in refusing to take
jurisdiction of the question of the liability
of appellees for said loss, and that it should
have decreed that they make good the same
to the trust fund in their hands.
As to the note signed by the Marshes
seems
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the first master reported that the
makers claimed to have a defense against
it, and, when the case was again referred,
the master was directed to ascertain whether
or not a valid defense did exist to said note,
and report the same. He reported that a defense was insisted upon, and that on the
testimony of said C. W. and W. W. Marsh
it was established, the only question being
as to the competency
of those parties as
witnesses to prove the defense; and on that
question he found that in their favor. We
think his conclusion as to their competency
was correct Moreover, it does not appear
that appellees could have secured or collected
that note, however prompt and diligent they
might have been. The Marshes denied that
they owed it and do not say they would
have paid or secured it if applied to for that
purpose; whereas they admit that the other
two notes were undisputed, and could have
been secured if security had been asked for.
Appellees shoidd not therefore, be held liable on said personal note.
Both parties object to the apportionment
of the costs and expenses of the suit made
by the circuit court We think the order in
that regard is quite as favorable to appellees
as the facts of the cas^ would justify.
They
are responsible for the most expensive portion of this litigation, in falling to keep proper accounts of their trusteeship.
In the first
special master's report is the significant finding that they "made out and exhibited an
entirely new book of accounts as executors,
also one as trustees, since the filing of the
bill;" and that fact the master well says
"amounts to an admission that prior books
were not what they ought to be." There
is no claim on their part that they attempted to keep accurate separate accounts of the
trust estate. The only apology for failing
to do so is that they did not know how to
classify the two kinds of property.
But they
were entitled to counsel, at the expense of
the trust estate, to assist them, and, if necessary, to the directions of a court of equity
They certainly had no right
in that regard.
to omit a plain legal duty because they may
have been in doubt as to how It should be
performed.
On that theory they might have
neglected that duty during the entire period
of their trusteeship. At all events, on the
report of the first master the court found
it necessary to again refer the case to a second master to make a complete statement of
the account and this of necessity greatly
Increased the costs and expenses of the suit
Appellees
cannot therefore justly complahi
that they were required to pay a consideraOn the othble part of the whole expense.
er hand, owing to the large amount and
variety of assets belonging to the estate. It
was a matter of some diflaculty at least as
the result of this litigation shows, to determine just what property belonged to principal and what to Income.
As before said,
alone,

appellees

were

entitled

to the advice of coun-
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sel, and, If necessary, the aid of the court,
to properly settle that question. The statement of the account approved by the court
below Is therefore for the benefit of all parties Interested in the trust estate,— those who
take the income, and those who shall finally
and it cannot be said
take the principal;
that either should be entirely exempt from
liability for costs and expenses in making it.
It is conceded that taxing costs in a chancery proceeding is always within the sound
legal discretion of the chancellor, and that
his decree in that regard will only be reviewed where It is shown that there has been
We see no reaan abuse of that discretion.
in the present case on
son for interfering
It is Insisted with great eamthat ground.
estaess that the account stated by the last
special master, and approved by the court,
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is erroneous, in that It falls to charge the
trustees with interest on the small amounts
which had been charged wrongfully by Alden
for railroad fare and commissions on insurance.
It is perhaps true that the account is
Inaccurate in that respect, but the matter is
of so little importance that no court ought
to entertain the objection as reversible error.
We have examined the account, and compared it with the proofs in the case, and are
satisfied that it is substantially correct, and
does justice between the parties, except in
the matter of the Marsh indebtedness,
as
above stated.
For that error the decree of
the circuit court will be reversed, and the
cause will be remanded to the circuit court,
with directions to enter a decree in conformity with the views herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
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In

re

BARKER'S TRUSTS.
(1 Ch.

Chancery

LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES.

Div. 43.)

Division.

Nov.

6, 1875.

This was a petition under the trustee

act,

and the bankruptcy act, 1869, asking
for the removal of the sole trustee of a vyill
(who had also a beneficial interest under it),
on the ground that he had been adjudicated
bankrupt, and for the appointment of a
new trustee in his place, and for a vesting or1850,

der.

Part of the property subject to the trusts
of the will consisted of bonds transferable by
delivery with coupons. The trusts were to
receive the income, and pay it to one of the
petitioners during life.

Mr. Chitty, Q. 0., and Mr. Bush, in support
of petition. Chapman Barber, for trustee.
Solicitors: Tatham, Procter & Co.; Walter,
Moojen & Co. Mr. Chester, for other parties.

JESSEL, M. R. In my view. It is the duty
of the court to remove a bankrupt trustee
who has trust money to receive or deal with,
so that he can misappropriate it There may,
be exceptions, under special circumstances, to
that general rule; and it may also be that,
where a trustee has no money to receive, he
ought not to be removed merely because he
has become bankrupt; but I consider the general rule to be as I have stated. The reason
is obvious.
A necessitous man is more likely
to be tempted to misappropriate trust funds
than one who Is wealthy; and besides, a man
who has not shewn prudence in managing his
own affairs is not likely to be successful in
managing those of other people.
However, If special circumstances are required for the removal of a bankrupt trustee,
should in the present case find them in the
nature of the trust property. Part of the
property consists of bonds with coupons, which
could very easily be made away with. The
trustee must be removed, and I make an order accordingly.
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CHICK

et al. v.
(2

WILLBTTS.

Kan. 384.)

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. Term,

1864.

Error from district court, Shawnee county.
Nathan P. Case, for plaintiffs in error.
& D. Brockway, for defendant in error.

CROZIER, C.

J. Two

sented by the record:

J.

questions are pre-

First, which law, the

twentieth section of the Code, or the second section of the "amendatory act," preand, second, when an
scribes the limitation;
action upon a promissory note, secured by a
mortgage on real estate, is barred by the
statute of limitations, has the mortgagee any
remedy upon the mortgage? These are the

facts: On the sixth day of April, 1858, at
Kansas City, in the state of Missouri, the
his
defendant executed to the plaintiffs
promissory note, payable one day after
and on the 12th day of
date. Afterwards,
August of that year, the defendant, to secure the payment of the note, executed, in
this state, a mortgage Upon some lots in Topeka, which mortgage contained a stipulation that if default was made in the payment of the note for two years from the date
of the mortgage, that instrument might be
foreclosed, etc. On August 13, 1863, a suit
was Instituted upon the note and mortgage,
and the facts, as above stated, being admitted, judgment was rendered for the defendant To reverse that judgment this proceeding is instituted.
The note having been made In Missouri,
would, under the act of February 10, 1859,
have been barred in two years from the
passage of that act, if there were nothing
else to be considered. By a stipulation in
the mortgage, the time of payment was deferred two years from August 12, 1858.
The mortgage having been made in this
state, was the arrangement, with reference
to our statute of limitations, a Kansas or
Missouri contract? Although no change was
made upon the face of the note, yet the
clause of the mortgage referred to was effective to change its terms as if written
across Its face. The time of its payment,
with reference to the land, was extended
two years. Its payment, as against the land,
could not be enforced before that time; nor
would the limitation laws begin to run
against it until the expiration of that time.
These changes in the original contract were
effected by the paper which was executed
in this state. The contract evidenced by
the mortgage is essentially different from
that set out in the note, and'must control it.
Therefore, the contract, as It stood, after
the making of the mortgage, was a Kansas
contract, and would not be barred in two
years.

The statutes of limitation of this
wholly unlike the English statute,
fer materially from the limitation
those states which have adhered to

state are
and diflaws of
the com-
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mon law forms of action and modes of
procedure. Those statutes apply, in terms,
to the forms of the action at law and contain
no provisions concerning an equitable proceeding. If a party had concurrent remedies, one at law, the other in equity, courts
of equity applied the limitation prescribed
for the action at law. But in all other cases
they were said to act merely in analogy to
the statutes, and not in obedience to them.
In this state, the case is entirely different.
The distinction between actions at law and
suits in equity is abolished; and the statutes of limitation apply equally to both classThey were made to apply to the
es of cases.
subject matter, and not to the form of the action. In England and the states referred to,
a limitation different from that prescribed
for simple contracts in writing, was prescribed for specialties. Here, "an action upon a specialty, or any agreement, contract
or promise in writing," must be brought
within three years; and it matters not what
the relief demanded may be, whether such
as could formerly be obtained only in a
court of law, or such as might have been
afforded by a court of equity exclusively.
Mortgages here differ essentially from
.mortgages at common law, and in the
states referred to. At common law, a mortgage was a conveyance with a defeasance,
and gave the mortgagee a present right of
possession. Upon It, even before the conditions were broken, he might enter peaceably
or bring ejectment. If the condition was
broken, the conveyance became absolute. If
the money was paid when due, the estate
reverted to the mortgagor; if not so paid,
the estate was gone from him forever. After
a time, the law of mortgage was so modified
that the legal title was not considered as
having passed until the condition was Lioken. At a later day, another still more important innovation was made. While it was
considered that, upon the condition broken,
the mortgagee became invested with the legal title, and was entitled to possession, yet,
in that condition of things, his title was
subject to a defeasance.
The rents and profits operated as cancellation, pro tanto, of
his conveyance; and when they reached a
sum sufficient to reimburse his original investment, with such use as the law allowed,
the legal title reverted to the mortgagor, and
he would be entitled to the possession; and
he had a right to facilitate this operation
by payment of the money, and upon application to a court of equity, his title would
be disencumbered of the cloud the mortgage
cast upon It. This right of the mortgagor
was called "the equity of redemption," and,
considering the then prevalent theory of
mortgages, the phrase was peculiarly appropriate and expressive. The title had passed,
but he had a right to redeem; and It Is
among the highest glories of equitable jurisprudence, that at so early a day the means
of enfqfcing this right were supplied. Some
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*f the states still adhere to the common law

view, more or less modified by the real nature of the transaction; but In most of them,
practically, all that remains of the old theo'ry
Is their nomenclature. In this state, a clean
sweep has been made by statute. The common law attributes of mortgages have been
wholly set aside; the ancient theories have
been demolished; and if we could consign
to oblivion the terms and phrases—without
meaning except in reference to those theories
—with which our reflections are still embarrassed, the legal profession on the bench and
at the bar would more readily understand
and fully realize the new condition of things.
The statute gives the mortgagor the right to
the possession, even after the money is due,
and confines the remedy of the mortgagee to
an ordinary action and sale of the mortgaged
premises; thus negativing any idea of title
in the mortgagee.
It is a mere security, although in the form of a conditional conveyance; creating a lien upon the property, but
vesting no estate whatever, either before or
after condition broken. It gives no right of
and does not limit the mortgapossession,
gor's right to control it—except that the security shall not be impaired. He may sell
It, and the title would pass by his convey-

ance—subject, of course,
mortgagee.

to the Hen of the-

If we are right in these views as to our
statute of limitations, and the operation of a
mortgage under our law, the English cases
and cases in New York and Ohio, cited by
counsel for plaintiffs, have no application to
the case at bar. The statutes of limitationunder which they were made, make distinctions between notes and mortgages which
do not exist here; and the operations of
notes and mortgages there and here are totally different. The decisions are not authorities in this case, for the reason that they
are not applicable, and cannot be made sc.
If our limitation law omitted mortgages, and
our law of conveyances gave the right of possession to the mortgagee,
some of them
would be in point; but as neither of these
conditions exist here, they throw no light
upon the questions under consideration
lu
the case at bar.
Our conclusions are, that the twentieth
section of the Code prescribes the limitation
to an action on the note or mortgage, and as
the three years expired on the 12th day of
August, 1863, a suit commenced on the 13tk
was too late. Judgment affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
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BARRETT

et al. v.

a4 N. E.

HINCKLEY.

863, 124 lU. 32.)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan.

19, 1888.

from superior court, Cook county;
J. B. Gary, Judge.
Watson S. Hinckley, plaintiff, sued George
D. Barrett, Adalina S. Barrett, and William H. Whitehead, impleaded with others,
Judgment
in ejectment
for
defendants,
plaintiff, and the above-mentioned defendants appealed.
for appellants.
Whitehead & Packard,
Wilson & Moore, for appellee.
Appeal

MULKEY, J. Watson S. Hinckley, claiming to be the owner in fee of the land in controversy, on the twenty-sixth day of February, 1885, brought an action of ejectment in
the superior court of Cook county against the
George D. Barrett, Adalina S.
appellants,
Barrett, William H. Whitehead, and others,
There
to recover the possession thereof.
was a trial of the cause before the court
without a jury, resulting in a finding and
Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendThe evidence tends to show
ants appealed.
the following state of facts: In 1870, Thomas Kearns was in possession of the land,
claiming to own it in fee-simple. On August 3d of that year he sold and conveyed it
to William H. W. Cushman for the sum of
$80,000.
Cushman gave his four notes to
Kearns for the balance of the purchase money,— one for $12,500, maturing in 30 days;
three for $16,875 each, maturing, respectively, in two, three, and four years after date, —
and aU secured by a mortgage on the premises.
The notes seem to have all been paid
but the last one.
In 1878, Kearns died, and
his widow, Alice Kearns, administered on
his estate.
Previous to his death, however,
he had hypothecated
the mortgage and last
note to secure a loan from Greenebaum.
Subsequently,
and before the commencement
of the present suit, Greenebaum, in his own
right, and Mrs. Kearns, as administratrix
of her husband, for value, sold and assigned
by a separate
instrument in writing the
mortgage and note to the appellee, Watson
S. Hinckley.
This is in substance the case
The defendants showed
made by plaintiff.
no title in themselves or any one elsa The
conclusion to be reached, therefore, depends
upon whether the case made by the plaintiff
warranted the court below in rendering the
judgment it did.
It is claimed by appellants, in the first
place, that much of the evidence relied on
by appellee to sustain the Judgment below
was improperly admitted by the court, and
various errors have been assigned upon the
record questioning the correctness of the
They,
rulings of the court in this respect
however,
go further, and insist that, even
conceding the facts to be as claimed by appellee himself, -they are not sufficient in law
As the judgment beto sustain the action.
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low will have to be reversed on the ground
last suggested, it will not be necessary to
consider the other errors assigned. We propose to state as briefly as may be some of
the reasons which have led us to the conclusion reached.
In doing so, it is perhaps
proper to call attention at the outset to some
considerations that should be steadily kept
in mind as we proceed, and to which we attach not a little importance.
It is first to be specially noted that this is
a suit at law, as contradistinguished from a
suit in equity.
It is brought to enforce a
naked legal right, as distinguished from an
equitable right.
The plaintiff seeks to recover certain lands, the title whereof he
claims in fee-simple.
To do this he is bound
to show in himself a fee-simple title at law,
as contradistinguished from an equitable fee.
Fischer v. Bslaman, 68 111. 78; Wales v.
Bogue, 31 111. 464; Fleming v. Carter, 70
111. 286; Dawson v. Hayden, 67 111. 52.
Has
he done this?
He attempts to derive title
remotely through the mortgage from Cushman to Kearns, but upon what legal theory
is not very readily perceived. His immediate source of title, however, seems to be
Mrs. Kearns, as administratrix of her husband, and Greenebaum, as pledgee of the
note and mortgage. The Instrument through
which he claims is lost or destroyed, and aZX
we know concerning its character is what
the plaintiff himself says about it. As to its
contents, he does not pretend to state a
single sentence or word In it, but characterizes it as an assignment, and gives the conclusions which he draws from it in general
terms only. After stating his purchase of
the note and mortgage in January, 1880, he
says: "The assignment was from Mrs.
Kearns,
of Thomas
the administratrix
the
Kearns' estate, and Ellas Greenebaum,
banker. At the time of the purchase, a separate writing was given to me,— a full assignment. • * * It was a very explicit &a^
signment, or full assignment, of the note
and mortgage, and the land, the property,
and all the right and title to the land." It
will be observed, the instrument is throughout characterized as an assignment only,
which does not, like the term "deed" or
specialty, signify an instrument under seal.
A mere written assignment, founded upon a
valuable consideration, is just as available
for the purpose of passing to the assignee the
equitable title to land as an instrument under seal.
Such being the case, we would
clearly not be warranted in inferring that
the assignment was under seal, from the
simple fact that the witness gives It as his
opinion that the instrument was "a full assignment" of the land, which Is nothing
more than the witness' opinion upon a question of law. There not being sufficient evidence in the record to show that the assignment was under seal, it follows that, even
conceding the legal title to the property to
have been in Mrs. Kearns and Greenebaum,
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or either of them, it could not have passed to
the appellee by that instrument, and, if not
by it, not at all, because that Is the only
muniment of title relied on for that purpose.
This conclusion is of course based upon the
fundamental principle that an instrument
inter partes, in order to pass the legal title to
But this
real property, must be under seal.
is not all. Even conceding the sufficiency of
the assignment to pass the legal title, the
record, in our opinion, fails to show that the
assignors, or either of them, had such title;
hence there was nothing for the assignment
to operate upon, so far as the legal estate in
Having no such title,
the land is concerned.
they could not convey it. "Nemo plus juris
ad alienum transferre potest, quam ipse hav^ bet." That the legal estate in this property
or Mrs.
was not either in Greenebaum
Kearns at the time of the assignment to
plaintifC is demonstrable by the plainest principle of law. Let us see. Thomas Kearns
was the owner of this property in fee. He
conveyed it in fee to Gushman. The latter,
as a part of the same transaction, reconveyed it by way of mortgage to Kearns.
By reason of this last conveyance, Kearns
of the property, and
mortgagee
became
Gushman mortgagor. According to the English doctrine, and that of some of the states
of the Union, including our own, Kearns, at
least as between the parties, took the legal
Accord^_, estate, and Gushman the equitable.
ing to other authorities, Kearns, by virtue of
Cushman's mortgage to him, took merely a
lien upon the property to secure the mortgage^
Indebtedness,
and the legal title remained
in Gushman.
For the purposes of the present inquiry, it is not important to consider
just now. If at all, which is the better or
true theory. It is manifest, and must be
conceded, that the legal estate in the land,
was
after the execution of the mortgage,
either in the mortgagee or mortgagor, or in
Such being the case, it is
both combined.
equally clear appellee, to succeed, must have
deduced title through one or both of these
parties. This could only have been done by
showing that the legal title had, by means
of some of the legally recognized modes of
conveying real property, passed from one or
both of them to himself. This he did not
do, or attempt to do; indeed, he does not
claim through them, nor either of them. Not
only so; neither Mrs. Kearns nor Greenebaum, through whom appellee does claim,
derives title through any deed or conveyance executed by either the mortgagor or
mortgagee;
nor does either of them claim
as heir or devisee of the mortgagor or mortgagee.

As the assignment of the

note and mortdid not, as we hold, transfer or otherwise affect the legal title to the
land, it may be asked, what effect, then, did
it have? This^'question, like most others
pertaining to the law of mortgages, admits
of two answers, depending upon whether the
gage to appellee

rules and principles which prevail In courts
of equity or of law are to be applied. If the
latter, we would say none; because, as to
the note, that could not be assigned by a
separate instrument, as was done in this
case, so as to pass the legal title.
Ryan v.
May, 14 111. 49; Portier v. Darst, 31 HI. 213;
Chickering v. Raymond, 15 HI. 362. As to
the mortgage,
it is well settled that could
not be assigned like negotiable paper, so as
to pass the legal title in the instrument, or
clothe the assignee with the immunity of an
innocent holder, except under certain circumstances which do not apply here.
Railway
Co. V. Loewenthal, 93 lU. 433; Hamilton v.
Lubukee, 51 111. 415; Olds v. Oummlngs, 31
111. 188; Mclntire v. Yates, 104 111. 491; Fortier V. Darst, 31 HI. 212.
But that the mortgagee, or any one succeeding to his title,
might, by deed in the form of an assignment, pass to the assignee the legal as well
as the equitable interest of the mortgagee,
we have no doubt, though there is some conflict on this subject. 2 Washb. Real Prop.
115, and authorities there cited.
Yet the assignors, in the case in hand, not having the
legal title, as we have just seen, could not,
by any form of instrument, transmit it to
If, however, the rules and princianother.
ples which obtain in courts of equity are to
be applied, we would say that, by virtue of
assignment, the appellee became the
the
equitable owner of the note and mortgage,
and that it gave him such an interest or
equity respecting the land as entitled him to
have it sold in satisfaction of the debt.
There Is perhaps no species of ownership
known to the law which is more complex, or
which has given rise to more diversity of
opinion, and even conflict in decisions, than
that which has sprung from the mortgage of
real property. By the common law, if the
mortgagor paid the money at the time specifled in the mortgage, the estate of the mortgagee, by reason of the performance of the condition therein, at once determined, and was
forever gone, and the mortgagor, by mere operation of law, was remitted to his former estate. On the other hand, if the mortgagor
failed to pay on the day named, the title of
and the
absolute,
became
the mortgagee
mortgagor ceased to have any Interest whatBy the exever in the mortgaged premises.
ecution of the mortgage, the entire legal estate passed to the mortgagee, and, unless it
was expressly provided that the mortgagor
should retain possession tiU default in payment, the mortgagee might maintain ejectment as well before as after default This is
the view taken by the common-law courts of
England, and which has obtained, with certain limitations, in most of the states of the
Union, including our own, in which the common-law system prevails. In Carroll v. Ballance, 26 111. 9, which was ejectment by the
mortgagee against the assignee of the mortgagor, to recover the mortgaged premises, this
court thus states the English rule on the
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"In England, and In many of the
subject:
American states, it is understood that the ordinary mortgage deed conveys the fee in the
land to the mortgagee, and under it he may
oust the mortgagor immediately on the execuwithout
tion and delivery of the mortgage,
waiting for the period fixed for the performMortg.
ance of the condition, [citing Coote
339; Blaney v. Bearce, 2 Greenl. 132; Brown
V. Cram, 1 N. H. 169; Hobart v. Sanborn, 13
v. Ames, 8 Mete.
N. H. 226; Paper-Mills
(Mass.) 1]. And this right is fully recognized
by courts of equity, although liable to be defeated at any moment in those courts by the
payment of the debt." Again, in Nelson v.
30 111. 481, which was a bill by
Pinegar,
mortgagee to restrain waste, it is said: "The
as mortgagee of the laud, was
complainant,
the owner in fee, as against the mortgagor
and all claiming under him. He had the jus
in re, as well as ad rem, and being so is entitled to all the rights and remedies which the
law gives to such an owner." So, in Oldham
V. Pflegar, 84 111. 102, which was ejectment
by the heirs of the mortgagor against the
grantee of the mortgagor, this court, in holding the action could not be maintained, said:
"Under the rulings of this court, the mortgagee is held, as in England, in law the owner
of the fee, having the jus in re, as well as
the jus ad rem." In Finlon v. Clark, 118 111.
32, 7 N. E. 475, the same doctrine is announced, and the cases above cited are referred to with approval. Taylor v. Adams,
115 111. 570, 4 N. E. 837. Courts of equity,
however, from a very early i)eriod, took a
widely different view of the matter. Th^y
looked upon the forfeiture of the estate at
law, because of non-payment on the very day
fixed by the mortgage, as in the nature of a
penalty, and, as in other cases of penalties,
gave relief accordingly.
This was done by
allowing the mortgagor to redeem the land
on equitable terms at any time before the
right to do so was barred by foreclosure.
The right to thus redeem after the estate had
become absolute at law in the mortgagee was
called the "equity of redemption," and has
continued to be so called to the present time.
These courts, looking at the substance of the
transaction, rather than its form, and with a
view of giving effect to the real intentions of
the parties, held that the mortgage was a
mere security for the payment of the debt;
that the mortgagor was the real beneficial
owner of the land, subject to the incumbrance
of the mortgage; that the Interest of the mortgagee was simply a lien and incumbrance upon the land, rather than an estate in It. In
short, the positions of mortgagor and mortgagee were substantially reversed in the view
taken by courts of equi^.
These two systems grew up side by side,
and were maintained for centuries without
conflict or even friction between the law and
equity tribunals by which they were respecThe equity courts did
tively administered.
not attempt to control the law courts, or even
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question the legal doctrines which they announced.
On the contrary, their force and
validity were often recognized in the relief
granted. Thus, equity courts, in allowing a
redemption after a forfeiture of the legal estate, uniformly required the mortgagee to reconvey to the mortgagor, which was of course
necessary to make his title available in a
court of law. In maintaining these two systems and theories in England, there was none
of that confusion and conflict which we encounter in the decisions of the courts of this
country; resulting, chiefly, from a failure to
keep in mind the distinction between courts
of law and of equity, and the rules and principles applicable to them respectively. The
courts there, by observing these things, kept
the two systems intact, and in this condition
they were transplanted to this country, and
became a part of our own system of law.
But other causes have contributed to destroy
that certainty and uniformity which formerly
prevailed with us.
Chiefly among these
causes may be mentioned the statutory changes in the law in many of the states, and the
failure of the courts aud authors to note those
changes in their expositions of the law of
such states. Perhaps another fruitful source
of confusion on this subject is the fact that
in many of the states the common-law forms
of action have been abolished by statute, and
Instead of them a single statutory form of action has been adopted, in which legal and
equitable rights are administered at the same
time, and by the same tribimal.
Yet the distinction between legal and equitable rights is
still preserved, so that, although the action in
theory is one at law, it is nevertheless subject
to be defeated by a purely equitable defense.
Under the influence of these statutory enactments and radical changes in legal procedure,
by which legal and equitable rights are given
effect and enforced in the same suit, the
equitable theory of a mortgage has in many
of these states entirely superseded the legal
one. Thus, in New York it is said, in the case
of Trustees, etc., v. Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 88,
"that a mortgage is a mere chose in action.
It gives no legal estate in the land, but is
simply a lien thereon; the mortgagor remaining both the legal and equitable owner of the
fee." Following this doctrine to its logical
results, it is held by the courts of that state
that ejectment under the Code will not lie at
the suit of the mortgagee against the owner
of the equity of redemption. Murray v. Walker, 31 N. Y. 399. In strict conformity with
the theory that the mortgagee has no estate
in the land, but a mere lien as security for his
debt, the courts of New York, and others taking the same view, hold that a conveyance
by the mortgagee before foreclosure, without
an assignment of the debt, is in law a nullity.
Jackson t. Curtis, 19 Johns. 325; Wilson v.
Troup, 2 Cow. 231; Jackson v. Willard, 4
Johns. 41. And this court seems to have recognized the same rule as obtaining In this
state, in Delano v. Bennett, 80 IlL 633.
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against the equitable owner, or any one hav-^
ing an equitable interest therein, with presThis case, with
ent right of possession.
slight change of the circumstances, would afford an excellent Illustration of the principla
Suppose the present plaintiff had obtained
possession under his equitable title to the note
and mortgage, and the heirs of Keams, who
hold the legal title, had brought ejectment
from what we against him, the action clearly could not have
a
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(If
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maintained.
It must not

have said, that the dual system respecting
mortgages, as above explained, exists in this
state precisely as It did In England prior to
Its adoption In this country, for such
not
the case.
It
conceded fact that the equimortgage has, in process of
table theory of
time, made la this state, as in others, material
upon the legal theory w^ich
encroachments
is now fully recognized Jn courts of law.
Thus, it is now the settled law that the mortgagor or his assignee is the legal owner of
the mortgaged estate, as against all persons
except the mortgagee or his assigns, ^all y.~/
Lance, 25 111. 250, 277; Emory v. Keighan,
As a result of this doctrine,
88 111. 482.
follows that, in ejectment by the mortgagor
against
third party, the defendant cannot
defeat the action by showing an outstandhig
Hall v. Lance, supra.
title in the mortgagee.
So, too, courts of law now regard the title of
mortgagee in fee In the nature of
base
or determinable fee. The term of its existence is measured by that of the mortgage
debt.
When the latter Is paid off, or becomes
barred by the statute of limitations, the mort-y
gagee's title is extinguished by operation of
law. Pollock V. Maison, 41 111. 516; Harris
V. Mills, 28 III. 44; Gibson v. Rees, 50 111.
383.
Hence the rule is as well established
the
at law, as it is in equity, that the debt
principal thing, and the mortgage an incident.^
Is indispensable in all cases
So, also, while
to a recovery in ejectment that the plaintifC
show In himself the legal title to the property
as set forth in the declaration, except where
the defendant is estopped from denying
yet it does not follow that because one has
such title he may under all circumstances
maintain the action; and this is particularly
so in respect to a mortgage title. Such title
exists for the benefit of the holder of the mortcan only be engage indebtedness,
and
forced by an action in furtherance of his interests; that is, as a means of coercing payment.
the mortgagee, therefore, should,
for
valuable consideration, assign the mortgage Indebtedness to a third party, and the
latter, after default in payment, should take
possession of the mortgaged premises, ejectment would not lie against him at the suit
of the mortgagee, although the legal title
would
would be in the latter, for the reason
not be in the interest of the owner of the
In short,
well-settled "^
indebtedness.
Is
principle that one having a mere naked legal
title to land in which he has no beneficial interest, and in respect to which he has no
duty to perform, cannot maintain ejectment
a

The New York cases just cited, and all oththe same view, are clearly inconsistent with the whole current of our decisions
on the subject, as is abundantly shown by
the authorities already cited.
The doctrine
would seem to be fundamental that if one sui
juris, having the legal title to land, intentionally delivers to another a deed therefor, containing apt words of conveyance, the title at
law, at least, will pass to the grantee; but
for what purposes or uses the grantee wiU
hold It, or to what extent he will be able to
enforce It, will depend upon circumstances.
the mortgagee conveys the land without
assigning the debt to the grantee, the latter
would hold the legal title as trustee for the
holder of the mortgage debt.
Sanger v. Ban\croft, 12 Gray, 367; Barnard v. Eaton,
Gush. 304; Jackson v. Willard,
Johns. 40.
It is true, the Interest which passes is of no
appreciable
Thus, In
value to the grantee.
the case last cited, Chancellor Kent, in speaking of it, says: "The mortgage interest, as
distinct from the debt, is not a fit subject of
assignment.
It has no determinate value. If
should be assigned, the assignee must hold
the interest at the will and disposal of the
creditor who holds the bond." In Wait's Actions and Defenses (volume
p. 565) the rule
Is thus stated: "By the common law, a mortgagee In fee of land is considered as absolutely entitled to the estate, which he may devise
or transmit by descent to his heirs."
In conformity with this view, Pomeroy, in his work
on Equity Jurisprudence, (volume
p. 150,)
in treating of this subject, says: "In law, the
mortgagee
may convey the land itself by
deed, or devise
by will, and on his death Intestate
In equity,
WiU descend to his heirs.
his interest is a mere thing In action, assignable as such, and a deed by him would operate
merely as an assignment of the mortgage;
and in administering the estate of a deceased
mortgagee
court of equity treats the mortgage as personal assets, to be dealt with by
the executor or administrator."
We have already seen that under the decisions of this
court, and by the general cmrrent of authority,
mortgage Is not assignable at law by
mere indorsement,
as in the case of commerBut, on the other hand, the estate
cial paper.
and interest of the mortgagee may be conveyed to the holder of the Indebtedness,
or
even of a third party, by deed with apt words
of conveyance; and the fact that
is m form
an assignment will make no difference.
Washb. ReaJ Prop. 115, 116.
Such an assignee, if owner of the mortgage
Indebtedness, might, no doubt,, maintain ejectment In
his own name for Ms own use.
Or the action
might be brought In his name for the use of a
third party owning the Indebtedness.
Kilgour V. Gockley, 83 HI. 109.
So, in this case,
if the action had been brought In the name of
Keams' heirs for the use of Hinckley, no reason is perceived why the action might not be
ers taking
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been maintained, for the reasons we liave just and the court reached the same conclusion
See, also, Speer y. Hadduck, 31 IlL
But it does not follow, because such we have.
stated.
an action would not lie against him,^ that he 439.
could, upon a mere equitable title, malntahi - For the reasons stated, the judgment of the
Cottrell v. Adams, court below is reversed, and the cause rethe action against others.
manded for further proceedings not Inconsist2 Biss. 351-353, Fed. Gas. No. 3,272; 9 Myers,
The question in that case ent with this opinion.
Fed. Dec. 240.
Judgment reversed.
was almost identical' with the question in this,
"H.* B.BQ.(2d Ed.)— 36

^'

^-

MORTGAGES.

562

LADUB

V.

DETROIT
(13

& M. R. CO.

Mich. 380.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July

Term, 1865.

Appeal In chancery from Wayne circuit.
The facts, so far as they are necessary to
an understanding of the legal questions Involved in the case, will be found stated in
the opinion.
G. V. N. Lothrop, for complainant. H. H.
Emihons and A. Pond, for defendants.

CHRISTIANCfT, J. The mortgage, which
the bill in this case seeks to foreclose, was
executed by John Ladue to the complainant
and Francis E. Eldred, composing the firm
of Ladue & Eldred, on the 4th day of Aur
gust, 1852, to secure and indemnify the firm
against any indorsements which might be
made, or liabilities to be Incurred, by them
as sureties for John Ladue, as well as for
any moneys they might advance for him, according to the condition of a bond to which
the mortgage was collateral, and which was
of like effect There was nothing in the papers or in the arrangement between the parties which bound Ladue & Eldred to make
or to Indorse any paper for
an.y advances
John Ladue, or to incur any liability for him,
nor was the latter bound to accept any such
accommodation.
.The effect of the arrangement was that such advances and liabilities.
If made or incurred, would be purely optional
This morton the part of the mortgagees.
gage was duly recorded on the day of its
date.
On the 9th day of May, 1853, John
Ladue, the mortgagor, sold and conveyed the
premises
to Charles Howard
mortgaged
(through whom the railroad company derive
their title), by warranty deed, which was
duly recorded on the 9th day of July, 1853.
John Ladue, however, remained in possession, using the premises as before, until his
death, December 4, 1854.
No claim is made for any advances made
by Ladue & Eldred to John Ladue, but the
whole claim under the mortgage is based
upon indorsements made for him by the
mortgagees,
which have been paid by Andrew Ladue, one of the complainants, and
all these indorsements,
as shown by the
proofs, were made some time after the sale
to Howard and the recorduig of his deed.
Whatever indorsements were made prior to
that time seem to have been taken up by
John Ladue; and it does not satisfactorily
appear by the evidence that any of these indorsements,
made since the recording of
Howard's deed, were made in renewal of
paper indorsed
by them previous to that
time. No indorsements made prior to the recording of Howard's deed are in any way involved, and the case may therefore be considered in all respects in the same light as
if no such previous indorsements had ever
been made, especially as it does not appear
that at the time of the sale to Howard, or
the recording of his deed, there was any ex-

isting unsatisfled indorsement, or any subsisting liability, inchoate or otherwise, hicurred 1^ the mortgagees for the mortgagor.
The mortgagees, ^t the time of the indorse^
ments in question, had no notice of the deed
to Howard, unless the record of that deed is
to be considered such notice, the deed having been some months previously recorded.
The validity of the mortgage, as between the
parties, for any amount of advances which
might be made, or liabilities incurred under
it, after they should have been thus made or
incurred, is not questioned by the defendants; nor is it denied that the record of it
would be sufficient notice to subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers, of the amount
which the mortgagees might actually have
advanced or indorsed for the mortgagor; or,
in other words, the amount for which it had
become an actual and subsisting security, at
the time when the question of notice of the
mortgage
became material, which, for the
purposes of this case, is admitted to cover
the period from the purchase by Howard
down to the time of the recording of his
deed, the record of which is claimed to be
notice to the n;iortgagees as regards any advances made to, or liabilities incurred by,
them for the mortgagor after the recording
of the deed. Nor is it denied, that if the
mortgagees,
by the contracts or arrangements between them and the mortgagor (to
secure which, on the part of the latter, was
the object of the mortgage), had been bound
to make advances or to indorse for the mortgagor, the record of the mortgage would
have been full notice to Howard, and the
mortgage would have been good against him,
though the advances were not in fact made
or the paper indorsed until after the deed to
him and actual notice of that deed to the
mortgagees.
The defendants also admit that
the result would be the same under this
mortgage, as to any advances made or paper
indorsed by the mortgagees for the mortgagor, before they had actual or constructive
notice of the sale and deed to Howard. But
they insist that, as there was not at the time
of Howard's purchase or the recording of his
deed any Cebt of the mortgagor, or any liability incurred for him by the mortgagees,
absolute or inchoate, nor any obligation on
their part to incur such liability, the mortgage was not then an incumbrance
in fact
or in legal effect; that it could only become
such from the time when the advances or indorsements
were actually made; and It being optional with the mortgagees whether
they would make any such advances or Inbeing
dorsements,
and
the indorsements
made subsequent to the recording of Howard's deed, the mortgage is, in legal effect,
subsequent to the deed, and the record of
the deed was notice to the mortgagees of

Howard's rights.
The first question, therefore, for our determination Is, what was the legal effect of
the mortgage
(if any) upon the land, at

•)
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the time of the recording of the mortgagor's
deed to Howard?
That a mortgage in this state, both at law
and in equity, even when given to secure
a debt actually subsisting at its date, conveys no title of the land to the mortgagee

(especially since the statute of 1843, taking
that the
away ejectment by the mortgagee);
title remains in the mortgagor until foreclosure and sale, and that the mortgage is
but a security, in the nature of a specific
lien, for the debt, has been already settled
Dougherty
of this court
by the decisions
V. Randall, 3 Mich. 581; Oaruthers v. Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270; and Ciippen v. Morri^his Is in
son, to be reported in 13 Mich,

accordance with the well-settled law of the
state of New York, from which our system
of law in regard to mortgages has been, in
derived. Jackson v. Wila great measure,
lard, 4 Johns. 41; CoUins v. Torrey, 7 Johns.
277; Runyan v. Messerean, 11 Johns. 534;
Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Denio, 232; Eld wards v.
Co., 21 Wend. 4G7;
Waring v.
Insurance
Smyth, 2 Barb. Oh. 119; Bryan v. Butts, 27
Barb. 504; Bank v. Tallman, 31 Barb. 201;
Cortrlght v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 342.
This view of a mortgage is also sustained
by several of the English decisions, and substantially this is the more generally received
American doctrine, as will sufficiently appear
by reference to the decisions, most of which
have been carefully collected in the elaborate
brief of the defendant's counsel, but which
are too numerous
to be cited here.
There
are exceptions and peculiarities in particular
states, in some of which, as in some of the
New England states and Kentucky, the old
idea of an estate upon a condition continues
like a
to rankle in the law of mortgages,
foreign substance in the living organism,
but is rapidly being eliminated and thrown
off by the healthy action of the courts imder
a more vigorous application of plain common
sense.

But few of the incidents of this an-

tiquated doctrine are now recognized in most
of the states of this Union;
the title, for
nearly all practical purposes, being now recognized, both at law and in equity, as con-

tinuing in the mortgagor, and the mortgage
as a mere lien for the security of the debt
But wherever any vestige of this now nearly exploded Idea continues to prevail, iii connection with the more liberal doctrines of
modern times which the courts have been
compelled; from time to time, to adopt, it
seems . only to confuse and deform the law
of mortgages by various anomalies and inconsistencies, making it a chaos of arbitrafy
and discordant rules, resting upon no broad
or just principle; while, by recognizing the
mortgage as a mere lien for the security of
the debt, at law as well as in equity, and
thus giving it effect according to the real
understanding and intention of the parties,
at once a
the law of mortgages becomes
easily
system' of homogeneous principles,
understood
and applied, and just in their
operation.
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A mortgage, then, being a mere security
for the debt or liability secured by it, it
necessarily results:
(1) That the debt or liability secured is
the principal, and the mortgage but an incident or accessory. See cases above cited;
also, Richards v. Synes, Barnad. Oh. 90;
Roath V. Smith, 5 Conn. 133; Lucas v. Harris, 20 111. 165; Vansant v. AUman, 23 111.
31; Ord v. McKee, 5 Gal. 615; Ellison v.
Daniels, 11 N. H. 274; Hughes v. Edwards,
9 Wheat 489; Green v. Hart 1 Johns. 580;
McGan v. Marshall, 7 Humph. 121; 4 Kent
Comm. 193; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Oal.
365.
(2) That anything which transfers the debt
(though by parol or mere delivery), transfers the mortgage with it See cases above
cited, especially Vansant v. Allman, 23 111.
31; Ord v. McKee, 5 Cal. 615; Ellison v.
Daniels, 11 N. H. 274. See, also, Martin v.
Mowlin, 2 Burr. 978; Clark v. Beach, 6 Conn.
164;
Southern v. Mendane, 5 N. H. 420;
Wilson V. Kimball, 27 N. H. 300, 36 N. H.
39; Growl v. Vance, 4 Iowa, 434; 1 Blackf.
137; 5 Cow. 202; 9 Wend. 410; 1 Johns. 580.
(3) That an assignment of the mortgage
without the debt is a mere nullity.
Ellison
V. Daniels, 11 N. H. 274; Jackson v. Bronson, 19 Johns. 325;
Wilson v. Throop, 2
Cow. 195; Weeks v. Eaton, 15 N. H. 145;
Peters v. Jam'estown Bridge Co., 5 Cal. 324;
Webb V. Flanders, 32 Me. 175; 4 Kent
Gomm., ubi supra; Thayer v. Campbell, 9
Mo. 277.
release,
or anything
(4) That payment
which extinguishes the debt, ipso facto extinguishes the mortgage.
Lane v. Shears,
1 Wend. 433; Sherman v. Sherman, 3 Ind.
337; Ryan v. Dunlap, 17 111. 40; Armitage
Paxon v.
V. Wicklifee, 12 B. Mon. 496;
Paul, 3 Har. & McH. 399; Perkins v. Dibble, 10 Ohio, 433; Buckenridge v. Ormsby,
1 Marsh. 257; Cameron v. Irwin, 5 Hill, 272.
It will be seen from these authorities that
some, if not all, of these incidents or characteristics of a mortgage are recognized by
some of the courts which still hold the
mortgage to be a conveyance of the estate,—
an idea, however, with which they are utterly inconsistent, as such incidents can
only logically flow from the doctrine that
the estate still remains in the mortgagor,
and that the mortgage is but a lien for security of a debt.
These propositions being established, the
necessary result is that the mortgage in- 1
strument, without any debt, liability, or obli- \
gation secured by it can have no present
legal effect as a mortgage or an incumbrance
upon the land. It is but a shadow without
a substance,— an incident without a principal,— and it can make no difference In the
result whether there has once been a debt
or liability which has been satisfied,
or
whether the debt or liability to be secused
has not yet been created, and it requires,
as in this case, some future agreement of
the parties to give it existence.
At most.
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the difference Is only between the nonentity
which follows annihilation and that which
precedes

^^
1

existence.

The instrument can only take effect as a
from the time
mortgage
or incumibrance
<when some debt or liability shall be created, or some binding contract is made,
which is to be secured by it. Until this
takes place, neither the land nor the parties,
nor third persons, are bound by it. It constitutes, of itself, no binding contract. Either party may disregard or repudiate it at
his pleasure.
It is but a part of an arrangement, merely contemplated as probable,
and which can only be rendered effectual by
the future consent and further acts of the
parties. It is but a kind of conditional
proposition, neither binding nor intended to
bind either of the parties, till subsequently
assented to or adopted by both.
Though the question does not properly
arise here, we take it for granted, for the
purposes of this case, that the mortgage instrument may, if properly executed, go upon
the record, and become effectual between the
parties when the debt or liability contemplated shall have been created, imless the
mortgagor has, in the m:eantime,— as he had
a clear right to do,— parted with the title
and deprived himself of the power of creating an incumbrance upon it. But the mere
recording of the instrument would not make
it a mortgage or incumbrance in legal effect, if it were not so before, nor give it a
greater effect as to third persons than it had
between the parties. The record of such an
instrument might be an intimation that advances and indorsements were contemplated
as probable, and that they might, therefore,
have been already made; and for this reason
might, to this extent, properly put a purchaser or incumbrancer upon Inquiry. But
unless It is to have a greater effect than
the record of other mortgages, it could be
notice only of such facts as might have
been ascertained by inspection of the instrument and papers referred to, and by
inquiry;
in other words, by a knowledge
of the rights of the parties In respect to
the land at the time notice became material, which, for the purposes of this case,
as already explained, we shall assume to be
from the time of Howard's purchase down to
the time when he recorded his deed. The result must, therefore, be the same here as
if there had been no record. Had Howard
made the most diligent inquiry in connection
with the Inspection of the papers, what facts
could he have ascertained? Nothing material to the rights of the parties or to his
own rights beyond the facts already stated,
—nothing which, in any manner, interfered
with the mortgagor's absolute right of sale.
He would have learned, in facti that the
instrument recorded as a mortgage was not,
In legal effect, a mortgage, nor upon any
principle of justice or equity an incumbrance
upon the land; that either party had a per-

fect right to refuse to give that future assent, or to enter into that future contract
or arrangement, by which alone It could
acquire vitality or force.
He had, therefore, a just right to conclude that the record
of his deed would be fair notice to the persons mentioned

as mortgagees,

as the instru-

ment could only become a mortgage subsequent to that time, and then only by reason
of some future debt or liability which It
required the further assent and agreement
of the parties to create.
He had a right to
conclude that, upon every sound principle,
Ladue & Eldred would, as prudent men, be
as likely, and ought to be as much bound,
to look to the record before making any such
advances,
or indorsing paper for the mortgagor, as if a new mortgage for the purpose were to be taken at the time, since they
had the same option to make the advances
or not, as any new mortgagee would have
had, and ought, therefore, to be governed
by the same prudential considerations.
And
they must be presumed to have known that
John Ladue, until such advances or indorsements were made by them, had full power
to sell the land free from any incumbrance
of the mortgage instrument, which had not
as yet become a mortgage.
But it Is urged, on the part of the complainant, that it was the duty of Howard, on
making the purchase, to give actual notice
of the fact to the mortgagees, so that they
might not afterwards be led to Incur further liabilities on the faith of the mortgage.
In England, where there is no general registry law by which the record of deeds and
mortgages
is made notice to all the world,
and the state of the title cannot therefore
be always ascertained In this way as with
us, and where parties, therefore, can only
rely upon actual notice, there may be good
reason for requiring actual notice In such
a case.
But upon no principle which I have
been able to comprehend,
do I think such
actual notice should be required in a case
Nor have I been able to
like the present.
see any just or substantial reason why the
record of Howard's deed (which was long
before this mortgage instrument took effect
as an incumbrance, and therefore prior in
fact and law) should not be deemed notice
to the mortgagees in the same manner, and
to the same extent, as if their mortgage had
not been executed or recorded until the time
when it became effectual as a mortgage by
their indorsements. Within the very, spirit
and purpose of the registry law, it seems
to* me, the record of the deed must be held
notice in the one case as well as in the othview, it seems to me,
er. The opposite
rests upon the erroneous idea that the recording of a mortgage adds something to
its validity as between the parties, and that
even as between them, an instrument may
be made a mortgage by recording It, which
would not have that operation without the
record. This, certainly, is not the effect of
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Howard could not reour registry laws.
ly upon the record of his deed for giving
as to future
notice to these mortgagees,

which
advances or indorsements, without
their mortgage instrument could never beeven as between the parties,
come effectual,
then it is difficult to see why he should be
allowed to rely upon it as against any person who he might know had contemplated
or taking a mortgage upon the
purchasing
property, and whose efforts or conversations
had gone so far as to render it probable to

such person that bis preliminary negotiations or conversations might,
at some future period, have resulted in a
purchase or a mortgage; though at the time
of the record of Howard's deed they had not
resulted in any binding contract whatever,
and both parties were at liberty to disregard them, without any breach of faith.
As to all such persons, it has, I think, been
generally conceded that the record of a deed
In Craig v. Tappin, 1
is sufficient notice.
Sandf. Ch. 78, a case cited by complainant's
cotmsel, it was held that notice that a mortgage was about to be made, is not enough
to bind a party with notice of the mortgage.
And see Gushing v. Hurd, 4 Pick. 252; Warden V. Adams, 15 Mass. 232.
I have thus far endeavored to show that
upon principles resulting from the nature of
here, this morta mortgage, as recognized
in fact and in
gage should be considered,
legal effect, subsequent to the deed, and that
the registry of the deed should, therefore,
The
be considered notice to the mortgagees.
upon this question are not so
authorities
numerous as one would be led to exjiect;
but the few which are to be foimd are conI shall first notice those which are
flicting.
claimed to be opposed to the conclusion at
which
have arrived. The English authoriconsider of very litties upon this question
tle, if any, weight, for the reason already
stated, and for the further reason that, for
several purposes,
a mortgage is there still
held to be a conveyance
of the estate upon
condition, and the mortgagee
as having the
legal title— a doctrine upon which the right
of tacking (never recognized in this state)
to some extent depends, the legal title coupled
with an equity being held to prevail over
an equity.
4 Kent,
Comm. 117; Coote,
Mortg. 410 et seq.; opinion of Lord Cranworth in Hopkinson v. Halt, 7 Jur. (N. S.)
1209.
The latter remark applies also with
equal force to the decisions cited from Kentucky.
Nelson's Heirs v. Boyce, 7 J. J.
Marsh. 401, goes upon the express ground
the legal title,
conveys
that the mortgage
therefore, is not
and that the mortgagee,
bound to notice the record of a mortgage subsequently made by the mortgagor, who has
It cites Bank
only the equity of redemption.
V. Vance, 4 Litt 173, as supporting the doctrine of tacking upon this ground. Nelson
V. Boyce also assigns, as another reason,
why the record should not be notice, a prothe mind of
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vision of their statute allowing sixty days
in which to record a mortgage, and says an
examination of the record by the first mortNow it
gagee might therefore be of no use.
is clear that neither of these reasons for refusing to the record the effect of notice exists here. Of the case of Burdett v. Clay, 8
B. Mon. 287 (besides the fact that the moi-tgagee there holds the legal estate), it may
further be noticed that, though the previously
recorded mortgage was in part to secure
future liabilities, yet all the liabilities were
incurred before the subsequent mortgage.
There are some few cases in this country,
decided mainly, if not solely, upon the authority of Gordon v. Graham, 7 "Vin. Abr. p.
52, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 598, which can have little
influence here, not only for the reason above
stated,
but because the case itself is no
longer law, even in England. This case decided that a mortgagee holding a mortgage
to secure money lent, and future advances
(which he was not bound to make), was entitled to preference over a subsequent mortgagee, even for advances
made after notice of the second mortgage.
But so far as
relates to advances made after such notice,
this case was expressly overruled by the
house of lords in Hopkinson v. Halt, 7 Jur.
(N. S.) 1209, 5 Law Times (N. S.) 90.
Most of the cases cited by complainant's
coimsel against the proposition I have endeavored to establish have no bearing upon
the particular question we are now discussing.
Bank v. Finch, 3 Barb. Ch. 293, only
decides that when a mortgage is given to secure an existing debt, the mortgagee does not
lose his security by extending the time and
taking a renewal note for the same debt
In Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sandf. Ch. 78, the
question of notice did not arise, and so far
as the reasoning of the court has any bearing upon the present question, it is in favor
of the position I have endeavored to establish. In King v. McVickar, 3 Sandf. Ch.
208, Stuyvesant v. Hone, 1 Sandf. Ch. 419,
and Stuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 151, no
question of future advances
or liabilities
was involved; but the question relating to
the effect of the record was similar to that
decided in this court in James v. Brown, 11
Mich. 25, and decided the same way,— a question so entirely foreign to that we are now
discussing as to require no comment
Eyer v. Bank, 11 111. 381, only decides that
a mortgage subsequently executed is entitled
to preference over one previously executed
for future advances, after notice of the second mortgage to the first mortgagee.
The
notice in this case happened to be an actual
notice, but the question of the effect of the
record, as notice, was not involved nor deRowan V. Rifle Co., 29 Conn. 282, has
cided.
no bearing upon this question.
The title
had never been in the debtor, but was conveyed by a third person to, and held by,
the creditors, in security for future advances
for the debtor, which the creditors had agreed
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to make.
The decision stands well upon two
grounds: First The title being in the creditors and not in the debtor, the creditors were
not bound to notice the record of a mortgage
made by the debtor, who had no title. Second.
That the advances were not voluntary, the
creditors being bound to advance $40,000,
and the balance being advanced to save their
interest and to carry the contract into effect.
Hence the creditors were allowed priority for
all their advances, though part were made
after notice of the mortgage.
In Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 495, the deed
of trust, which was in the nature of a mortgage, recited that the mortgagees had agreed
to loan the mortgagors their notes, from time
to time, as might be desired, etc. The case
seems to have been decided mainly on the
authority of Gordon v. Graham,— the authority of which is recognized, though it was
not needed in that case. It does not appear
whether there was actual notice of the second mortgage, and no difference is intimated
between actual notice, and the record.
In
Taylor v. Man's Ex'rs, 5 Rawle, 51, the question, so far as regarded the effect of the
record,
was similar to that in James v.
Brown. The judgment was, in legal effect as
well as in date, a prior incumbrance, and
the mortgage, in legal effect as well as in
date, subsequent to it. There were no future
advances in question.
There are, however, two cases (and they
are the only ones cited, or which I have met
with) which are directly opposed to the conclusion at which I have arrived, and which
go to the point that the record of Howard's
deed would not be notice to Ladue & Eldred.
McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 300, and Truscott V. King, 6 Barb. 346; s. c. on appeal,
6 N. Y. 166.
McDaniels v. Colvin rests upon
the authority of English cases, among which
is that of Gordon v. Graham, which are
adopted by the court as authority.
The case
expressly holds that the record of the second
mortgage could not be held notice, even as
to subsequent advances, under the first mortJudge Redfield (afterwards chief jusgage.
See his remarks upon this
tice) dissented.
question (sustaining the views I have adopt12 Am. Law Reg. p. 191.
And in the
ed).
extent and character of the actual notice to
be given by the subsequent to the prior mortgagee, this case would not probably now be
recognized as law in any court in this country. Truscott V. King was the case of a
judgment to secure a sum due, as well as
future advances which might be made, and
a mortgage
was subsequently made by the
debtor.
Advances were made by the judgment debtor after the mortgage was recorded. As decided in 6 Barb, it was held that
the judgment took precedence
for all advances until actual notice of the mortgage,
on the ground that the record is only notice
to subsequent,
and not to prior, incumbrancers.
In the court of appeals (6 N. Y.),
where the judgment was reversed on other

Judge Jewett, who gives the leading opinion of the court, does not allude to
this point.
It is only alluded to by Edmonds, J., who says: "It is well settled that
a judgment for future advances is good, not
only against the debtor, but also against subsequent incumbrancers, at least up to the
time when a subsequent judgment or mortgage should intervene.
But when such subsequent incumbrance may be said to intervene is not so well settled, whether at the
time it is put upon the record, or at the time
the prior incumbrancer has actual notice of
it. The supreme court, in deciding the case,
held that It ought to be only from the time
of actual notice, because the docketing of a
judgment or recording of a mortgage was,
under the statute, notice only to subsequent,
In this, I
and not to prior. Incumbrancers.
am inclined to think, the court was right."
Now, It seems to me, the real question
which lay at the basis of the inquiry in the
above case, and to which that decided by the
court was only incidental and secondary,
was, which in legal effect was the prior,
and which the subsequent, incumbrance, and
this depended solely upon the fact when, as
regarded the advances in question, they respectively took effect. Did the judgment, in
legal effect, become an Incumbrance for such
advances before they were made and before
there was any agreement that they should
What were the relative rights of
be made?
the parties to the judgment at the time the
Could the judgment
mortgage was recorded?
be enforced as an incumbrance for these advances, by reason of any rights or obligations existing between the parties at that
time? If not, then, as to these advances,
there was no Incumbrance at the time the
mortgage was recorded and the incumbrance
of the judgment was, in legal effect, subseThis, which seems
quent to the mortgage.
to me to be the main question, is neither discussed nor alluded to either by the supreme
The court,
court or the court of appeals.
in simply saying that the record
therefore,
of the mortgage is notice only to subsequent
incumbrancers, assume, as it seems to me,
without an attempt to establish, the main
point in controversy. There may, perhaps,
in principle, between a
be some difference,
judgment given as security for future advances, and a mortgage given for a like purpose. But if there is not, and if the decision in Truscott v. King is to be considered
as equally applicable to a mortgage, then I
cannot resist the conviction that it is in direct conflict with the principles which necessarily result from the uniform course of decision in that state,— holding a mortgage to
be a mere security for, and incident of, the
debt, incapable of a separate and independent existence.
grounds.

Having examined the cases relied upon by
the complainant's counsel, as tending to conhave artrovert the conclusions at which
rived,

I

will now refer

I

to those of an op-
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some of which expressly
posite tendency,
hold the record to be notice of the Intervening conveyance or incumbrance.
In Collins v. Carlisle, 13 lU. 254, there
was a mortgage to secure future advances,
and a contract subsequent in date and time
of record for the sale of the land by the
mortgagor, both recorded.
It was held, the
mortgage was valid for those advances only
which were made prior to the recording of
The principle is not discussed,
the contract.
but it seems to be taken for granted that
the record of the contract was notice as to
advances afterwards made.
In Kramer v. Bank, 15 Ohio, 253, it was held
that a mortgage to indemnify against indorsements to be made for the mortgagor is valid
and constitutes a Hen, which takes precedence
of the lien of a judgment rendered after such
indorsements have been made.
But it is said
the lien of a judgment would probably be preferred to the lien of the mortgage
for advances made subsequent to the recovery of the
judgment The liability of the mortgagee had
attached before the subsequent judgment, and,
therefore, the point was not involved.
But
in the subsequent case of Spader v. Lawler,
17 Ohio, 371, which was also the case of a
mortgage to secure future advances, it was
held that the mortgage must be postponed to
a mortgage subsequently recorded, but before
the future advances were made, thus directly
holding the record notice as to advances thereafter made under the first recorded mortgage;
in other words, treating the first as a subsequent mortgage in reference to advances made
after the record of the second.
It is true that
one of the grounds
upon wliich the decision
seems to be placed is that the record of the
mortgage (for the advances) ought to give notice of the amount of the incumbrance.
The first case, so far as
have been able to
discover, which fully meets and discusses the
question upon principle, is that of Terhoven v.
Kerns, 2 Barb. 96. It was the case of a judgment to secure future advances, which were
optional;
and it was held that such judgment, as to advances made after the rendition
of a subsequent judgment, was not a lien as
against the latter. The judgments are treated by the court as standing upon the same
grounds as mortgages,
and the question Is
discussed generally.
It is held, that a mortgage to secure future advances, which are optional, does not take effect between the parties
as a mortgage or incumbrance until some advance has been made,— that, if not made until after another mortgage or Incumbrance has
been recorded, it is, in fact, as to such after
and not a prior inadvances, a subsequent
cumbrance;
and that the record of the subsequently recorded mortgage is notice, as to such
after advances, as much as if the mortgage
first recorded had not been executed until aftThe doctrines
er such advances were made.
of this case were fully as strongly reaffirmed
in Bank of Montgomery's Appeal, 36 Pa. 170.
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See, also, Parmenter v. Gillespie, 9 Barr. 86,
and note "a," as to distinction between cases
when the mortgagee is bound to make the advances, and when they are optional.
The doctrine of these cases is pronounced reasonable
by Sanford, J., deUvering the opinion of the
court in Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74, and
he pointedly asks why such mortgage should
not be treated "in all respects as If executed
at the time when the advances are made."
But one of the judges dissented as to this
point, and the case was decided upon other
grounds.
Judge Redfield, late chief justice of "Vermont, ably discusses this question in a note to
the case of Boswell v. Goodwin, 12 Am. Law
Reg. p. 92, arriving substantially at the same
conclusion as that at which
have arrived.

And Mr. Washburn in
p. 542,
rule.

I

Washb. Real Prop,
says it seems now to be the general
1

The counsel
for the complainant have
strongly urged the inconvenience which must
result, especially to banks and bankers (who
are accustomed to take such mortgages), by
requiruig an examination of the record every
time they are called upon to make such advances under such a mortgage.
Like Judge
Redfield (in the note above cited), I have not
"been able to comprehend"
this hardship. It
is, at most, but the same inconvenience
to
which all other parties are compelled to submit when they lend money on the security of
real estate,— the trouble of looking to the
value of the security.
But, in truth, the inconvenience is very slight. Under any rule of
decision they would be compelled to look to
the record title when the mortgage is originally taken. At the next advance they have only
to look back to this period, and for any future advance only back to the last, which
would generally be but the work of a few
minutes,
and much less inconvenience
than
they have to submit to in their ordinary daily
business in making inquiries as to the responsibility, the signatures and Identity of the parties to commercial paper.
But if there be any
hardship, it is one which they can readily
overcome, by agreeing to make the advances;
in other words, by entering into some contract,
for the performance of which, by the other
party, the mortgage may operate as a security. They can hardly be heard to complain
of it as a hardship that the courts refuse to
give them the benefits of a contract which,
from prudential or other considerations, they
were unwilling to make, and did not make until after the rights of other parties have InCourts can give effect only to the
tervened.
contracts the parties have made, and from
the time they took effect
The decree must be reversed, and the bill
dismissed,

and

the

appellants

must

their costs in both courts.

MARTIN,
red.

C.

J.,

and

CAMPBELL, J.,

COOLBY, J.,

recover

concur-

did not sit in this case.
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AETNA LIFE INS. CO. OF HARTPOKD
V. TOWN OF MIDDLBPORT. SAME v.
TOWN OP BELMONT.
OP MILPORD.
(8 Sup.

Ct

625,

SAME

v.

TOWN

124 U. S. 534.)

Supreme Court of the United States.
6,1888.

Feb.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Northern District of Illinois.
This was an appeal from a decree of the
circuit court of the United States for the
Northern district of Illinois, dismissing on demurrer the bill of the Aetna Life Insurance

The subthe present appellant.
Company,
stance of the bill is that the complainant is
the owner of 15 bonds, of $1,000 each, issued
by the township of Middleport, in the state
of Illinois, dated February 20, 1871, and delivered to the Chicago, DanvUle & Vincennes
These bonds were payRailroad Company.
able to bearer, and were bought of the railwho paid
road company by the complainant,
value for them. The, bill recited that this
in 1865
railroad company was incorporated
under the laws of the state of Illinois, with
power to construct a railroad from a point in
Lawrence county, by way of Danville, to
the city of Chicago; that an act of the legislatm-e of that state, passed March 7, 1867, authorized cities, towns, or townships, lying
within certain limits, to appropriate moneys
and levy a tax to aid the construction of said
road; and "that said act authorized all incorporated towns and cities, and towns acting
under township organization, lying wholly or
in part within 20 miles of the east line of the
state of Illinois, and also between the city of
Chicago and the southern boundary of Lawrence county, in said state, to appropriate
such sums of money as they should deem
proper to the said Chicago, Danville & Vinto aid it in the
Company,
cennes Raih:oad
construction of its road, to be paid as soon
as the track of said road should be laid and
through such cities, towns, or
constructed
townships: provided, however, that a proposition to make such appropriation should first
be submitted to a vote, of the legal voters of
such cities, towns, or townships at a regular,
annual, or special meeting, of which at least
ten days' previous notice should be given; and
also provided that a vote should be taken on
such proposition, by ballot, at the usual place
of election, and that a majority of the votes
cast should be in favor of the proposition.

collect a tax of $15,000 upon the taxable property of the inhabitants of the town to aid in
the construction of said
railroad, provided
Watseka, a city in the county of Iroquois, situated in or near the south line of said town,
should be made a point In said road; that it
appeared, on counting the votes, that 323 were
In favor of and 68 were against such tax, and
that thereupon the proposition was duly declared carried, the proceedings relating to the
meeting and vote duly attested by the town
clerk and the moderator of the meeting, and
by said clerk duly recorded in the town records. The bill further averred that the railroad company accepted this vote and appropriation of the township, and, relying upon
such vote and the good faith of said town, accepted the condition of the appropriation, and
constructed and completed its track through
said town; that on the tenth day of February, 1871, the board of town auditors adopted
a resolution of which the following is a copy:
"Whereas the township of Middleport did, on
the eighth day of June, 1867, vote aid to the
Chicago, Danville & Vincennes Railroad Company to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars, and it appearing that said township is
unable to pay such amount in money, therefore
resolved by the board of auditors of said
township that bonds issue to said Chicago,
Danville & Vincennes Railroad Company to
the amount of fifteen thousand dollars, together with a sufiicient amount to cover the
discount necessary on said bonds in negotiating the same, to-wit, one thousand five hundred dollars; said bonds to be dated February 20, A. D. 1871, and to bear interest at the
rate of ten per cent, from date per annum."
In pursuance of this resolution, it was alleged that on the twenty-fourth day of March,
1871, the supervisor and town clerk of Middleport executed the 15 bonds which are the
subject of this suit; that "the said bonds were
numbered one to fifteen, inclusive, and were
delivered to the said railroad company, upon
the fulfillment of the conditions of said vote,
in payment of ninety cents on the dollar of
the appropriation made to said company by
said vote; both parties believing that said
bonds were fully authorized by law, and were
legal, valid, and binding on said town, and
also believing them to be legal evidences of
the debt in favor of said company incurred
by said town in voting said appropriation."
It was then alleged that on or about the
twenty-sixth day of June, 1876, the town of
Middleport, which up to that time had paid
the interest upon the bonds, filed a bill in
equity in the circuit court for the county of
Iroquois against the complainant corporation
as the holder of said bonds, and certain other
persons, "alleging, in substance, the making
and issuing of said bonds, as herein stated,
that the same were delivered to your orator,
and that your orator was the holder thereof,

And your orator further avers that said act
authorized and required the authorities of such
cities, towns, and townships to levy and collect such taxes, and to make such other provisions as might be necessary and proper for
the prompt payment of such appropriations
so made."
It is then alleged that on the
eighth day of June, 1867, after due publication
of notice according to law, a meeting of
the legal voters of said town of Middle- and that the same were made and Issued with-'j
port was held, at which they cast their votes out authority of law, and were Invalid, and
J
by ballot upon the proposition to levy and praying the court so to decree, and to eanjoin

J
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your orator from collecting the same, and for
t other relief, as by the record in the cause,

thereto, will fully appear."
upon reference
It was averred that the circuit court dismissed
. the bill, but that upon appeal to the supreme
\ court of Illinois the decree dismissing it was
; reversed,— that court holding
that these bonds
jwere void, as issued without authority of law;
and the case was remanded to said circuit
court for further proceedings, whereupon it
passed a decree. In conformity with theopinion
of said supreme court, adjudging the bonds
void, and enjoined their collection.
The bill
then charged that said supreme court, while
holding the bonds to be void, did not deny,

569

spondent, and fails to state facts showing a
cause of action exists against respondent that
arose within five years last past before bring-

ing suit.
Fourth.

Fails to show any written agreement on which suit is brought binding on respondent on which has arisen a cause of action within the last ten years prior to bringing this suit.

Fifth. Fails to set forth facts showing an
for the great delay in bringing suit
which is shown on face of bill, and equity
will not relieve against laches.

excuse

Sixth. Bill contains many blanks of dates
and names and nothing on face of bill from
but impliedly admitted, the validity of the which facts can be obtained to fill same.
The court below sustained the demurrer,
appropriation by the town, and insisted that
by the issue and delivery of said bonds to the and dismissed the bill, from which judgment
railroad company, and their sale by that com- complainant appealed.
pany to the present complainant, it was thereO. J. Bailey, Jas. H. Sedgwick, and Francis
by subrogated to the rights of action which
Fellowes, for appellant. Robert Doyle, for
that company would have on the contract eviappellee.
denced by the vote of the town, and the acceptance and fulfillment of the contract by
Mr. Justice MILLER, after stating the case
It was also alleged
the railroad company.
that no part of the principal sum named in as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the argument of the demurrer before
the bonds, or any part of said appropriation,
had ever been paid, but that, on the con- the circuit court, several objections to the
trary, the town of Middleport denied all lia- bill were taken. The defendant In error,
however, relies here upon three principal
bilil7 therefor; that ever since the purchase
of said bonds the complainant had continued grounds of defense: First, it denies the right
to hold, and then held, the same, and had been of subrogation, upon which rests the whole
second, it relies
and then was the holder of all rights which case of the complainant;
the railroad company or its assigns had upon the statute of limitations of five years;
and, thitd, it asserts that the former decree
against said town by reason of the premises.
A decree was then prayed for that the town in the state court is a bar to the action here.
of Middleport should pay to complainant the The circuit court held that the statute of
amount found due, and should without delay limitations was a bar to the present suit,
levy and collect aU taxes necessary for such and dismissed the bill on that ground.
payment; also, that the court would enforce
But we regard the primary question,
the rights of complainant by writs of manda- whether the complainant is entitled to be/
mus, and such otner and further orders and substituted to the rights of the railroad comdecrees according to the course of equity as pany after buying the bonds of the town-l
should be necessary and proper; and also ship, a much more important question, andi
prayed that W. H. Leyford, in whose hands are unanimously of opinion that the transac-j
as receiver the Chicago, Danville
& Vin- tion does not authorize such subrogation.
cennes Railroad Company had been placed The bonds In question in this suit were delivby the court, it being insolvent, might be ered by the agents of the town of Middlemade a party defendant thereto. To this bill port to the railroad company, and by that
the defendant demurred, and assigned the company sold in open market as negotiable
instruments to the complainant in this acfollowing as causes for demurrer:
First. That said bill does not contain any tion. There was no indorsement, nor is there
matter of equity whereon this court can any allegation in the bill that there was any
ground any decree or give complainant any express agreement that the sale of these
bonds carried with them any obligation
relief as against this respondent
Second. Bill shows it Is exhibited against which the company might have had to en& force the appropriation voted by the towil.
respondent
and the Chicago, Danville
the averment in the bill
Vincennes Railroad Company and William Notwithstanding
Leyford, Its receiver, as respondents thereto, that the Intent of complainant in purchasing
and the facts set forth therein show the same said bonds, and paying its money therefor,
relief cannot be granted against all of said was to acquire such rights of subrogation,
respondents, and fails to state facts showing it cannot be received as any sufficient aljointly liable, but stated facts legation that there was a valid contract to
respondents
which show this respondent, if liable at aU, that effect. On the contrary, the bill fairly
presents the idea that by reason of the facts
is not jointly liable or in any manner connectof the sale the complainant was in equity
ed with the others, and the bill is multifarious.
subrogated to said rights, and entitled to enThird. Fails to show any written agreement
on which suit is brought that would bind re- force the same against the town of Middle-
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port. The .argument of the learned counsel
in the case is based entirely upon the right
of the complainant to be subrogated to the
rights of the railroad company by virtue of
the principles of equity and justice. He
does not set up any claim of an express contract for such subrogation. He says: "The.
equity alleged in the plaintiff's bill Is, as
I have said, the equity of subrogation. Before proceeding to call the attention of the
court to the facts from 'which this equity
arises, it may be useful to advert to the instances in which the right of subrogation exists, and to the principles on which it rests."
He founds his argument entirely upon the
proposition that when the complainant purchased these bonds he thereby paid the debt
of the town of Middleport to the railroad
company, as voted by it, and that, because it
paid this money to that company on bonds
which are void, it should be subrogated to
the right of the company against the town.
The authorities on which he relies are all
cases in which the party subrogated has
actually paid a debt of one party due to
another, and claims the right to any security which the payee in that transaction had
against the original debtor. But there is no
payment in the case before us of any debt
»f the town. The purpose of the purchase as
/well as the sale of these bonds, and what
the parties supposed they had effected by it,
was not the payment of that debt, but the
sale and transfer of a debt of the town from
one party to another, which debt was evi[ denced by the bonds that were thus trahs/f erred. Neither party had any idea of ex^ tlnguishing
by this transaction the debt
of the town. It was very clear that it was
a debt yet to be paid, and the discount and
interest on the bonds was the consideration
which induced the complainant to buy them.
The language of this court in Otis v. Cullum, 92 U. S. 447, is very apt, and expresses
precisely what was done in this case. In
that case Otis & Co. were the purchasers of
bonds of the city of Topeka from the First
National Bank of that place. These bonds
were afterwards held by this court to be
void for teant of authority, just as in the
case before us. A suit was brought against
the bank, which had failed and was in the
hands of a receiver, to recover back the
money paid to it for the bonds. After referring to the decision of Lambert v. Heath, 15
Mees. & W. 486, this court said: "Here, also,
the plaintifCs in error got exactly what they
intended to buy, and did buy. They took no
guaranty. They are seeking to recover, as
it were, upon one, while none exists. They
are not clothed with the rights which such
a stipulation would have given them.
Not
having taken it, they cannot have the benefit of it. The bank cannot be charged with a
liability which it did not assume. Such securities throng the channels of commerce,
which they are made to seek, and where
they find their market. They pass from

hand to hand like bank-notes.
The seller is (
liable ex delicto for bad faith; and ex con- I
tractu there is an implied warranty on his \
part that they belong to him, and that they I
are not forgeries. While there is no express '
stipulation, there is no liability beyond this.
If the buyer desires special protection, he
must take a guaranty. He can dictate its
terms, and refuse to buy unless it be given.
If not taken, he cannot occupy the vantage
ground upon which it would have placed
him." Page 449.
Nor can this case be sustained upon the
principle laid down in this court in Louisiana V. Wood, 102 U. S. 294. That was a case
in which the city of Louisiana, having a
right by its charter to- borrow money, had
issued bonds and placed them on the market
for that purpose. These bonds were negotiated by the agents of the city, and the
money received for their sale went directly
into its treasury. It was afterwards held
that they were invalid for want of being
registered. Afterwards the parties who had
bought these bonds brought suit against the
city for the sum they had paid, on the
ground that the city had received their money without any consideration, and was bound
ex aequo et bono to pay it back. The court
said: "The only contract actually entered
into is the one the law implies from what
was done, to wit, that the city would, on demand, return the money paid to it by mistake, and, as the money was got under a
form of obligation which was apparently
good, that interest should be paid at the legal rate from the time the obligation was
denied."
In the present case there was no borrowing of money. There was nothing which
pretended to take that form. No money of
the complainants ever went into the treasury
of the town of Middleport; that municipality never received any money in that transaction.
It did not sell the bonds, either to
complainant or anybody else. It simply de-i
livered bonds, which it had no authority \
to issue, to the railroad company, and that ]
corporation accepted them in satisfaction of I
the donation by way of taxation which had-^
been voted in aid of the construction of its
road. The whole transaction of the execution and delivery of these bonds was utterly
void, because there was no authority in the
town to borrow money or to execute bonds
for the payment of the sum voted to the
railroad company. They conferred no right
upon anybody, and of course the transaction
by which they were passed by that company
to complainant could create no obligation, legal or implied, on the part of the town to
pay that sum to any holder of these bonds.
City of Litchfield v. Ballou, U4 U. S. 190,
5 Sup. Ct 820, sustains this view of the subject. That town bad issued bonds for the
purpose of aiding in the construction of a
system of water-works. In that case, as in
I Louisiana v. Wood, the bonds were so far
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in excess of the authority of
create a debt that they were
court to be void, in the case of
Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278. After

the town to
held by this
Buchanan v.
this decision,
Ballou, another holder of the bonds, brought
a suit in equity upon the ground that, though
the bonds were void, the town was liable to
him for the money which he had paid in
their purchase. This court held that there
was no equity in the bill, on the ground that,
if the plaintiff had any right of action
against the city for money had and received,
it was an action at law, and equity had no
It was also attempted, In
jurisdiction.
that case, to establish the proposition that,
the money of the plaintiffs having been used
in the construction of the water-works, there
was an equitable lien in favor of the plaintiffs on those works for the sum advanced.
jThls was also denied by the court.
One of the principles lying at the foundajtion of subrogation in equity, in addition to
I the one already stated, that ttie person seekthis subrogation must have paid the
fing
'
debt, Is that he must have done this under
some necessity, to save himself from loss
which might arise or accrue to him by the
I
I enforcement of the debt in the hands of the
fc-original creditor; that, being forced under
SQch circumstances to pay off the debt of a
creditor who had some superior lien or right
to his own, he could, for that reason, be subrogated to such rights as the creditor, whose
debt he had paid, had against the original
debtor.
As we have already said, the plaintiff in this case paid no debt.
It bought certain bonds of the railroad company at such
discount as was agreed upon between the
parties, and took them for the money agreed
But, even if the case
to be paid therefor.
here could be supposed to come within the
rule which requires the payment of a debt in
order that a party may be subrogated to the
rights of a person to whom the debt was
paid, the payment in this case was a voluntary interference of the Aetna Company in
the transaction.
It had no claim against
It had no interest
the town of Middleport
at hazard which required it to pay this debt.
If It had stood off, and let the railroad company and the town work out their own relations to each other, it could have suffered
There was no obligano harm and no loss.
tion on account of which, or reason why, the
complainant should have connected itself in
any way with this transaction, or have paid
this money, except the ordinary desire to
make a profit in the purchase of bonds. The
fact that the bonds were void, whatever
right it may have given against the railroad company, gave it no right to proceed
upon another contract and another obligation of the towni to the railroad company.
These propositions are very clearly stated in
a useful monograph on the Law of Subrogation, by Henry N. Sheldon, and are well established by the authorities which he cites,
^'tie ri->r.trir>:; of subrogation is derived from
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the civil law, and "it is said to be a legal flotlon, by force of which an obligation extinguished by a payment made by a third person is treated as still subsisting for the benefit of this third person, so that by means of
It one creditor is substituted to the rights,
remedies, and securities of another. • • •
It takes place for the benefit of a person
who, being himself a creditor, pays another
creditor whose debt is preferred to his by
reason of privileges or mortgages, being
obliged to make the payment, either as
standing In the situation of a surety, or that
he may remove a prior incumbrance from
the property on which he relies to secure his
payment Subrogation, as a matter of rlght,\
independently of agreement, takes place only \
for the benefit of insurers; or of one who, \
being himself a creditor, has satisfied the j
lien of a prior creditor; or for the benefit of
[
a purchaser who has extinguished an In\
cumbrance upon the estate which he has pur- ',
chased; or of a co-obligor or surety who has
paid the debt which ought, In whole or In
part, to have been met by another." Sheld.
Subr. §§ 2, 3. In section 240 it Is said: "The/|
doctrine of subrogation is not applied for the
mere stranger or volunteer who has paid the
debt of another without any assignment or
agreement for subrogation, without being
under any legal obligation to make the payment, and without being compelled to do so
for the preservation of any rights or property of his own."
This is sustained by a
reference to the cases of Shinn v. Budd, 14
N. J. Eq. 234; Sandford v. McLean, 3 Paige,
117; Hoover v. Bpler, 52 Pa. St. 522.
In Gadsden v. Brown, Speer, Eq. 37, 41,
Chancellor Johnson says: "The doctrine of
subrogation is a pure, unmixed equity, having its foundation in the principles of natural justice, and from its very nature never
could have been intended for the relief of
those who were in any condition in which
they were at liberty to elect whether they
would or would not be bound; and, so far
as
have been able to learn its history, it
has never been so applied. If one with a
perfect knowledge of the facts will part
with his money, or bind himself by his contract in a sufficient consideration, any rule
of law which would restore him his money
or absolve him from his contract would subvert the rules of social order. It has been
directed in its application exclusively to the
relief of those that were already bound, who
could not but choose to abide the penalty."
This is perhaps as clear a statement of the
doctrine on this subject as is to be found
anywhere.
Chancellor Walworth, in the case of Sandford V. McLean, 3 Paig«j, 122, said: "It is
only in cases where the person advancing
money to pay the debt of a third party
stands In the situation of a surety, or is
compelled to pay it to protect his own rights,
that a court of equity substitutes him in
the place of the creditor, as a matter of
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cases the demand
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to that effect.

as

adopted and

applied In our system of

of a creditor, equity, has, it Is believed, been rigidly rewhich Is paid with the money of a third per- strained within these limits." The cases here

In other

son, and without any agreement that the security shall be assigned or kept on foot
for the benefit of such third person, is abso-

lutely extinguished."
In Railroad Co. v. Dow, 120 U. S. 287, 7
Sup. Ct. 482, this court said: "The right of
subrogation is not founded on contract. It
is a creation of equity; Is enforced solely
for the purpose of accomplishing the ends
of substantial justice, and is independent of
any contractual relations between the parties."
In the case of Shlnn v. Budd, 14 N. J.
Bq. 234, the New Jersey chancellor said
(pages 236, 237): "Subrogation as a matter
of right, as it exists In the civil law, from
has been borrowed and
I which the term
,A adopted in our own, is never applied in
■^ laid of a mere volunteer.
Legal substitution into the rights of a creditor, for the
benefit of a third person, takes place only
for his benefit who, being himself a creditor, satisfies the lien of a prior creditor, or
for the benefit of a purchaser who extinguishes the incumbrances upon his estate,
or of a co-obligor or surety who discharges
the debt, or of an heir who pays the debts
of the succession.
Code Nap. bk. 8, tit. 3,
art. 1251; Civil Code La. art. 2157; 1 Poth.
Obi. pt. 3, c. 1, art. 6, § 2. 'We are ignorant,'
say the supreme court of Louisiana, 'of any
law which gives to the party who furnishes
money for the payment of a debt the rights
of the creditor who is thus paid. The legal
claim alone belongs, not to all who pay a
debt, but only to him who, being bound for
it, discharges it' Nolte & Co. v. Their Creditors, 9 Mart (La.) 602; Curtis t. Kitchen,
8 Mart. (La.) 706; Cox v. Baldwin, 1 Miller,
(La.) 147. The principle of legal substitution.

referred to as having been decided in the
supreme court of Louisiana are especially
applicable, as the Code of that state is In the
main founded on the civil law from which
this right of subrogation has been adopted
by the chancery courts of this country. The
latest case upon this subject is one from
the appellate court of the state of Illinois,—
Suppiger v. Garrels, 20 Bradw. 625,—the substance of which Is thus stated in the sylla- ,
bus: "Subrogation in equity la confined
to)
the relation of principal and surety and!
guarantors; to cases where a person, to pro-/
tect his own junior lien, is compelled to remove one which is superior; and to cases ol
insurance. * • • Any one who is undei
no legal obligation or liability to pay the
debt is a stranger, and, if he pays the debt
a mere volunteer." No case to the contrarjK
has been shown by the researches of plain- j
tifC In error, nor have we been able to find J
anything contravening these principles In
our own investigation of the subject.
They
are conclusive against the claim of the complainant here, who In this instance is a
mere volunteer, who paid nobody's
debt,
who bought negotiable bonds in open market without anybody's Indorsement, and as
a matter of business. The complainant
company has therefore no right to the subrogation which it sets up in the present action.
Without considering the other questions,
which Is unnecessary, the 'decree of the circuit court is affirmed.
These principles require, also, the affirmance of the decrees in the cases of the same
appellant against the town of Belmont (No.
1,135,) and the town of Mllford, (No. 1436;)
and so it is order^

SPECIFIC PERFOKMANCB
PUSEY
(1

Michaelmas

V.

PUSBY.

Vera. 273.)
Term.

Nov. 20, 1684.

Bill was that a horn, which, time out of

mind, had gone along with the
estate, and was delivered to his
In ancient time to hold their land
be delivered to him; upon which

plaintiff's
ancestors
by, might
horn was
this inscription, viz. "Pecote this horn to
hold huy thy land."
The defendant answered as to part, and

OF CONTEACTS.

573

demurred as to the other part, and the demurrer was that the plaintiff did not by
his bill pretend to be entitled to this horn,
either as executor or devisee; nor had he in
his bill charged it to be an helr-loome.
The demurrer was overruled, because the
defendant had not fully answered all the
particular charges in the bill, and was ordered to pay costs.
And the lord keeper
was of opinion that if the land was held by
the tenure of a horn or cornage, the heir
would be well entitled
to the horn at law.
'
Vide 1 Inst 107a,
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Mollineux's Case.
(Latch,

172.)

a

a

it

1.

a

a

One promised Rutland Mollineux that In consideration of &c. he would
make assurance of certain lands, which he refused to do. And Mollineux
sued him In the court of requests for
special performance.
In order to
prohibition he alledged.
obtain
That the plaintiff has an action on the case at common law. To which
was answered that in it, he would only recover damages, but here the suit
is for
specific performance, to obtain which there is no action at common
law. And this is the ordinary course in Courts of Chancery.
JONES, J. Yet we will not suffer the Court of Requests to go on, though
the Chancery may.
recusant convict, who by
2. It appears by the bill that the plaintiff is
the statute, is an excommunicated person, and therefore cannot sue.
DODERIDGE, J. The defendant has admitted the plaintiff to be able to

The court refused the prohibition.
J. The court will do justice to

DODERIDGE,

a

sue.

recusant convict.
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HALL
(9

Chancery.

V.

WARREN.

to be ascertained by the actuary of an Insurance office, who was namied; and the value
of the other premises by other persons, to be
nominated. It does not appear, that these

Ves. 605.)

July

4, 1804.

The bill was filed to obtain a specific performance of an agreement, executed by the
defendant,
for the sale of an advowson
and estate to the plaintifC, Hall, in trust,
for the other plaintifC, Hanson, at such price
as the advowson should be valued at by
Mr. Morgan, and the other premises by perThe agreement was
sons to be nominated.
dated the 9th of March, 1802. On the 8th
of May following, under a commission of
lunacy, the defendant was found a lunatic
from the 1st of May, 1792, with lucid intervals.

Two grounds of defence were taken by

the answer of the lunatic, by his committee:
1st, that he was insane at the time of the
' execution
of the contract: 2dly, that the
plaintiffs knew his situation, and took advantage of it, to induce him to sell to Hall;
concealing
the circumstance, that Hanson
was the real purchaser; being aware, that
from a former quarrel the defendant would
not sell to hira. A great deal of evidence
was gone into, on both sides, as to his state
of mind.

/
^

'

Mr. Romilly, Mr. Stanley, and Sir Thomas
Turton, for plaintiffs, pressed for an Issue;
insisting upon their right to a decree, upon
the ground, either that the defendant was
not a lunatic, when he entered into the contract;
or, that it was executed in a lucid
Interval. They had not traversed the Inquisitlon.

Mr.

Plggott,

Mr. Fonblanque,. and
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Mr.

Cooke, for defendant.— The rule, as
laid
down by Lord Thurlow, in Attorney General
V. Pamther, 3 Brown, Ch. 441, 443, is, that
where a person seeks to avoid his own act,
by alleging incompetence at the time, the

proof is incumbent upon him. But where It
has been previously found, that the party to
be affected by the -transaction, was not competent at a previous date, those who seek
to bind him, must show his competence
at
the time.
It is difficult to determine the
degree of capacity necessary to characterize a lucid interval.
Lord Thurlow seems to
think It sufflcleht, that any man would suppose him capable of transacting for himself.
This plaintifC has had the opportunity of
In Owen v. Datraversing the Inquisition.
vies, 1 Ves. Sr. 82, Lord Hardwicke takes
the distinction between the case of an estate
vested in trustees, and In the lunatic himself; observing, that in the latter case that
circumstance may prevent the remedy In
equity, and leave It at law.
But, independent of the question of sanity,
at the date of this transaction, to obtain a
performance under such circumstances, the
terms of the contract ought to be clearly
proved,
fair, reasonable, and certain. In
this Instance, the value of the advowson was

valuers ever were named; and that cannot
be supplied by the court; who cannot give
the arbitrator the Information, which the
party could have given. How can this court
supply the want of judgment as to the value
of the timber? In Emery v. Wase, 5 Ves.
846, 8 Ves. 505, Lord Alvanley considered an
agreement to sell according to the valuation
of another person, not such as the court
Praying an
would be desirous to enforce.
issue, and undertaking to show a lucid Interval at the date of the agreement, they
must also show, that the plaintifC was bound
at that time. An Issue Is granted only in
aid of a legal right, as that of an heir at
law: not where the object. is the specific performance of an agreement.
In that case the
course required, that the plaintifC should
have previously ascertained his right at law;
that he should show, he had sustained damage, which was not repaired by the verdict;
and that the very essence of the relief was,
that he should have the thing In specie.
Mr. Romllly, In reply.— An agreement to
sell at the valuation of another person is not
unusual. The chance is perfectly equal.
In
Emery v. Wase the decision was not upon
that groimd. If the party refuses to name
a valuer, the court refers it to the master.
A plaintifC clearly has a right to a specific
performiance; even though a jury would
give twice the amount in damages.
Upon
the question of lunacy. It Is clear, a lunatic
Is bound by an act done in a lucid Interval;
and till the act of Geo.
(St. 15 Geo. II, p.
607, c. 30), even marriage, contracted in a
lucid Interval, was good. The person who has
a contract with the lunatic. Is perniltted to
traverse; as he may show, that the party
with whom he contracted never was a lunatic. But the question, whether the defendant was a lunatic at the date of the agreement, could not have been tried in a traverse.
In Ex parte Feme, 5 Ves. 450, 832,
Lord Rosslyn's opinion was, that the jury
could not find as to any Intervening period.
But certainly the question, whether he was
In a lucid interval, coidd not have been tried:
the Inquiry In such a proceeding as to that,
being, whether the party Is liable to lucid
Intervals; not as to the particular time. It
seems to be supposed, that. If the defendant
Is now a lunatic, the contract cannot be
executed;
by analogy to criminal cases, In
which a man who becomes a lunatic, at any
time before execution, is not punished. But
te that objection holds in civil cases. It will
apply equally to prevent a decree for a specific performance against the representatives;
for they cannot tell what the lunatic might
have said. In Owen v. Davies there happened to be trustees: but this party does not
object; but chooses to take the title with
the defect
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OF CONTRACTS.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS. The ob- material inquiry with reference to the execuject of this bill is to obtain the specific pertion of this contract; for though the plainSupposing
the
tiff wishes for an issue upon both points, he
formance of an agreement.
contract to have been entered into by a comseems from the general tenour of his statepetent party, and to be in the nature and
ment to confide more in establishing a lucid
circumstances of It unobjectionable, it Is as
Interval than in negativing the fact, that the
"J
much of course in this court to decree a defendant ever was deranged.
It was not
specific performance, as it is to give damages
therefore improper for the plaintiff, under
at law. See White v. Damon, 7 Ves. 30.
these circumstances,
to waive the opportunity
Upon
The contract is produced and proved.
of traversing, and to come here for an issue;
the face of it nothing appears to prevent
upon the supposition,
that the contract was
There is nothing imreasonable,
execution.
entered into, either by a person who was not
as between the parties, upon the face of it.
a lunatic;
or in a lucid interval. In the
It fixes no value upon the estate: but it latter case it would be equally binding; for
provides a mode, in which the value is to
the law upon this subject is, that all acta
be ascertained, that is perfectly fair and
done durijjg a lucid interval are to be conequal between them.
It must be supposed,
sidered done""by a person perrectly capable"
that if competent, they had taken the proper' "pf contra cting, manag mg, and disposing of,
means of getting at the real value, by em-' ;^lg_affaj ra, at that pfefiod^
xms has more
ploying persons of skill to value the advowfrequently occurred upon" wills. A multison and the farms.
The first objection
tude of questions has been raised upon the
against carrying this agreement into execuexecution of a will during a lucid interval;
tion is, that in consequence of some dispute and, that being proved, the will has been held
with Hanson, the defendant had an objec- valid and effectual, to all Intents and purposes,
tion to dealing with him. But the evidence
for the conveyance of real and personal estate, aa if the testator had never been dedoes not bring it up to that; showing, not
ranged.
that he made any declaration to that effect,
It must be the same as to contract, or any disposition of property.
but only, that some quarrel had taken place,
If he
totally unconnected with the subject of the had made an absolute conveyance It would
contract. The circumstance, therefore, that
have been good, if made in a lucid interval.
Hall is a nominal contractor, is immaterial;
The question, therefore, being reduced to
for it happens in a vast proportion of cases,
t o prevent
the fact, there is no circumstance
that the contract Is entered into in the name th e execution of the contract; supposmg the
of a trustee.
5arty to have been competent; and the fact
But the principal objection to the perform- of his competence ought to be put in a course
ance is, that the defendant was not compeof Inquiry. I should certainly refuse, upon
tent, having been insane at the time the conthe evidence before me, to determine that
tract bears date. That is matter of fact.
he was not a lunatic; and as to a lucid InIn support of that fact alleged, the inquisi- terval, upon this evidence, I should hesitate
considerably; not being suflBciently apprized
tion is produced; by which the defendant is
found a lunatic from a period long anteceof all the circumstances of his life at that
dent, biit with lucid intervals.
particular period.
The history of the conThat inquisition, having been taken in the absence of tract itself is not brought forward. The ci^
the plalntifE, Is not conclusive upon him.
cumstances of the negotiation do not appear.
But It is evidence prima facie of the lunacy. Something material to the competence might
It is however competent to third parties to arise or result from the very mode in which
dispute the fact; and to maiatain, that not- the negotiation was conducted.
In one case,
withstanding the inquisition, the object of it I remember, the manner, in which the will
was of soimd mind at any period of the time
was written and executed, went a great way
which it covers.
An opportunity, it is said,
towards showing, it was In a lucid interval:
has been already afforded of traversing the the mode of the act being part of the eviinquisition;
and undoubtedly, if it would
dence of the testator's sanity. See Temple v.
Temple, 1 Hen. & M. 476. There is some
have answered the plaintiff's purpose merely to have traversed and contradicted the general evidence with reference to his situafinding, by showing that the defendant was
tion for some considerable time previous to
not a lunatic, he ought to have embraced
the contract; and very littie negative evithat opportunity; and it was unnecessary dence: none applying exactly, or approaching
to come here In the first instance.
nearly, to the period, except the servant's;
But if,
as it is said, he may have been a lunatic,
and that not of a nature to be conclusive;
with reference to the general state and habit
supposing the evidence strong about the peof his mind, during a considerable space of riod. But it Is for a jury to determine, what
time, but with lucid intervals, and the conwas the degree of efficiency and competence
tract was executed during one of those lucid
of his mind at the time.
All the difficulties
intervals, I doubt very much whether that
the plaintiffs
suggested by the defendant,
could have been got at by a traverse; whethwill have to struggle with; for, if general
er, upon that proceeding, it could have been
limacy is established, they will be under the
ascertained,
that upon a given day he had a
necessity of showing, according to Attorney
lucid interval; which might come to be a
General v. Parnther, that there was, not
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merely a cessation of the violent symptoms
but a restorati on flf—tlie.
the disorder,
Tac uities of tn e mind,^uill crent to enablgjjia.
^"pg^
soundly "lolndge of the act. That is
■im. inquiry much more fit for examination
viva voce bef(«e a jury, than upon ■written
depositions.
There is notlung, therefore, to prevent my
sending it to that inquiry.
inDiflBiculties
supposing
deed are suggested,
even that it
should be found that the contract was made
in a lucid interval, as to the mode In which
it is te be carried Into execution; for it is
said, as to that, th^e are provisions in it,
I do not
which cannot now be executed.
see those difficulties so strong as to be convinced, that it is impossible to execute it;
that the previous Inquiry is not to be made,
and would be nugatory;
for If th ere was
a valid and bindi ng contract, the superv ening
"
'-! hcapac^'"or"M[e party cannot dep rive the
, Deneat"
m the
o tEer o r the
en5eneflt7_ ^ NotEmg~appear9
one, so purely personal, that they
rets to
cannot be supplied without the intervention
of the mind and the act of the party; for
they are to be done with reference to a given
mode; and with regard to ascertaining the
of

H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)-37
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value, a mode equivalent, and as effectual
So, as to the oband fair, may be found.

jection

the difficulty of making the
the difficulty that struck Lord
Hardwicke, in Owen v. Davies, was avoided
there;
as there were trustees.
But it does
not appear to me, that, if the plaintiff is satisfied with that which is in truth no title,
but only an enjoyment under this court, be
ought not to have all the court can give
him. It is disadvantage to him, of which
the other cannot complain, that he cannot
get a good title; but must rest an indefinite
period, without a title, having only the enjoyment. These difficulties are not so strong
as to preclude the previous inquiry, before
we can ascertain the precise mode, in which
the subsequent parts are to be carried Into
execution.
Therefore take an issue.
from

conveyance,

The issue directed was the same as in a
former case of Clerk v. Clerk, 2 Vern. 412,
whether the defendant was a lunatic at the
time of the execution of the contract; and
if so, whether he had lucid intervals; and
whether the contract was executed during a
lucid interval. Niell .v. Morley, 9 Ves. 47a
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Commission

v.

BAKER.

N. Y. 209.)

of Appeals

Cases.

1874.

Action to recover one-half the expense of
party-wall in Norwich, Chenango county.
The parties agreed by parol, in April, 1869,
or cellar-wall of
to construct a basement
stone eight feet high, one-half of the width
of which should stand upon the plaintiff's
land and the other half upon the defendant's
land, and to buUd upon the stone wall a partition of wood between their respective adjoining buildings.
This agreement as the
plaintiff testified, was before the commencement of the construction of the stone wall so
far modified that the partition above the
stone wall was to be constructed of brick
instead of wood. In pursuance of this agreement each party at his own expense built
one-half of the basement wall, and laid upon
sleepers upon
this wall, thus constructed,
which to rest the first floor of their respective buildings.
The plaintifC so constructed
the cellar or basement wall of his building
A

to the basement stone wall
parties, and procured his
building timber to be cut the proper length
for use in the brick wall. In the construction
of which the defendant had agreed to join
him. The defendant then refused to join the
plaintiff in the construction of the brick wall,
whereupon the plaintiff gave him notice to
join In its construction, and that in case of
his failure to do so, he should proceed and
construct it and compel him to pay one-half
of the expense of its construction. The defendant again refused to join the plaintiff
as to correspond
erected by the

in its construction, and forbade him from
constructing it on the defendant's premises.
The plaintiff then proceeded and constructed
the wall and brought this action to recover
one-half of the necessary expenses of its
construction. Judgment for plaintiff.
Charles Mason, for appellant.
for respondent

E. H. Prfai-

dle,

GRAY, C. The contract, under which the
parties commenced and proceeded in the construction of the party-wall, was for an interest in land, an easement which could not
have been acquired by parol; and the defendant's failure to perform it, however Injurious that failure, may have been to the
plaintiff, would not, had the contract remained wholly unexecuted,
have afforded him a
cause of action.
But the defendant having
proceeded with the plaintiff in its execution,
so far as to lead the plaintiff to believe that
the contract was made not only in good faith
but that it would be fully executed on the
part of the defendant. Insomuch, that fhe
plaintiff had contributed his share to the construction of that part of the wall which by
the contract was to be made of stone;
had,
at the same time, constructed the cellar or
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basement walls in his own apartment to conform to the party-wall thus constructed by
the equal contribution of the parties; and
had also procured his timber for use in the
construction of the residue of his building, to
be cut of the length requisite for use In the

brick wall, which by their agreement, the
defendant was, after the completion of the
stone waU, to join in constructing
upon It
His failure, at this stage of the performance
of the contract, by refusing to join in that
part of the party-wall which was to consist
of a brick wall above and to rest upon the
stone wall, operated under the circumstances, as a fraud upon the plaintiff; and hence
in an action for specific performance an equitable estoppel upon the defendant would
have been established, and with the right of
the plaintiff to a decree against the defendant for a specific performance of the contract; or, in other words, that he jom the
plaintiff in construeting the brick wall, as
the jury in answer not only to the Interrogatory submitted to. them, but in substance, by
their general verdict found he had agreed to
do. 2 Story, Eq. Jur., § 750; Will. Eq. Jur.
283; Malins v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 403, 407, 411.
But because the plaintiff had, and might
have pursued this remedy, it by no means
proves that he had no other remedy equitable in its character, which would produce
the same result in less time and at less expense, and under the circumstances,
better
adapted to the ends of justice in a case like
The time
the one under consideration.
which would necessarily have been consumed in the prosecution of an action for spedflc
performance, and the consequent delay in
the erection of the wall would, under the
exigency of the case in hand, and with all
by the plaintifC for
needful arrangements
completing his half of the wall, and using it
in the construction of other parts of his
building, result in damages to him nearly as
great if not greater, than the expense incurred in constructing the defendant's half.
Such a remedy was therefore so inexpedient
as to amount to a denial of justice, and if
the plaintiff has no other equitable remedy,
or Is not permitted to avail himself of one,
he must bear with conceded Injustice and
blame the law. Such a state of things ought
not to be tolerated, and need not be, where
If
established equitable principles prevail.
the wall had been constructed at the johit
as in good conexpense of both parties,
science it should have been, and repairs upon

it

had

become

necessary,

each

party

have been obliged to contribute to
them, and If either party, after notice by the
other to do so, had declined, the party giving
the notice (as the plaintiff did In this case),
might have proceeded, made the repairs, and
maintained his action for the amount of onehalf of the expense incurred in making them,
upon the ground that the benefit was equal,
and that even-handed justice would compel
would
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party to bear his share of the burden.
v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. 334, 338,
339, 8 Am. Dec. 570.
A decree for specific performance is nothing more or less than a means of compelling
a party to do precisely what he ought to
have done without being coerced by a court.
Such a decree might well go further, and provide that in case of delay by the defendant
beyond some reasonable time, to be fixed by
notice of' the decree, the
the court after
plaintiff might proceed and erect the wall,
one-half of the necessary expense of which
And now
should be paid by the defendant
that the plaintiff has, after due notice, borne
share of the burden, and
the defendant's
what would necessarily by a
done exactly
for specific performance have been
decree
adjudged that the defendant ought to have
done without suit, no good reason can be
'
assigned why, when the exigency of the case
has rendered the remedy by action for specific performance wholly inadequate to accomplish the ends of justice, the defendant
should not be held responsible for his share
of the burden when it is shown that in equity he ought to do so, upon the same principle
that a party who ought in equity to contribute one-half of the necessary expense of repairing a wall is bound, after notice and refusal, to pay the adjoining owner who has
repaired it one-half of the necessary expen.ses of the repairs; and notwithstanding
the facts which establish the equitable obligation to build may be widely different from
such as would establish an equitable obligation to repair, yet the principle upon which
contribution is enforced is the same in each
case.
Contribution was at one time enforced
only in a court of equity, and it was said by
Baron Parke (6 Mees. & W. 168) that Lord
Eldon regretted,
not without reason, that
courts of law had ever assumed jurisdiction
of the subject; they have nevertheless done
so, and as Justice Bronson said in. Norton v.
Coons, 3 Denio, 130, 132, "borrowed their jurisdiction on this subject from courts of equity, and along with it, taken the maxim that
equality is equity."
And Story, in his work
upon Contracts (second volume, | 885), referring to contribution by co-sureties or coguarantors, says, it was formerly questioned
whether at law contribution
could be enforced without some positive agreement to
that effect;
but it is now well established
that it may be enforced both in law and equity.
The right to maintain such an action
at law has not, in this state, been questioned
in modem times, and especially where the
remedy can be as conveniently administered
In an action at law as in equity, since both
are administered by the same judge.
The judgment should be aflBrmed.
each

Campbell

DWIGHT, C. This Is an action brought to
recover the one-half of the amount of the
expense incurred by the plaintiff in building

OF CONTRACTS.

579

party-wall between the premises of the
plaintiff and the defendant.
The plaintiff
bases his right of action on a parol agreement between
him and the defendant.
It
■appeared
at the trial, according to the testimony of both pai'ties, that there had been
such an agreement to build a stone wall,
which was suitable as a foundation for a
partition-wall to rest upon, and that was actually carried out by their mutual consent
and acts.
Whether there was an agreement
to go further, and to build a pai-ty-wall was
contested.
The plaintiff's claim was, that
there was an agreement to build at joint expense, a wooden partition between buildings
to be erected on the respective lots of the
parties, and that this was afterward so modified as to substitute a brick partition-wall in
its place.
The question was submitted to
"Did the
the jury in the following form:
defendant, E. D. Baker, agree with the
plaintiff, H. A. Rindge, that he would join
with said Rindge in the building of the brick
wall in question?" The jury found in the
affirmative.
The form in which the case is presented
for the consideration of this court is, assuming the existence of the pal-ol agreement, and
that the foundation-wall was actually built
by both parties, and that the defendant now
refuses to go on and complete the brick portion of the wall, can the plaintiff, upon due
notice, complete that portion of the wall at
his own expense, and recover from the defendant his proportion of the outlay? It is
to be observed that this is not the ordinary
case of an easement created by parol, but
that it is a more special inquiry, whether a
parol agreement to build a wall is enforceable in a court of justice, and if so, whether
it can be substantially enforced under the
facts of the present case by an action to recover the amount necessarily expended in
It will be proper to consider
construction.
at the outset whether a written agreement
to build a wall is capable of enforcement hi
equity.
If not, it would of coiu:se foUow
that a parol agreement partly executed cannot be. On the general question of enforcing
a covenant to build or to repair, there has
been great diversity of opinion, and the decisions are conflicting. The leading authorities in England are Mosely v. Virgin, 3 Ves.
Jr. 185; Wilkinson v. Clements, L. R. 8 Ch.
App. 96. Other cases are collated in Story,
Eq. Jur. §§ 725, 729 (11th Ed.). In Wilkinson v. Clements, supra, one of the latest decisions by the appellate court, it is said to
be the settled rule in England that the court
will not in general enforce a covenant to
The principal reason seems to
build houses.
combe that damages supply an adequate
pensation. Where, on the other hand, damages will not answer, the usual rule prevails,
and a remedy will be granted in equity, on
account of the Inadequacy of the relief at
law. This was the result in that case; and a
a
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party having performed his part of the conti-act, had his remedy in equity, against the
other party. The point in Mosely v. Virgin
was, that an agreement to build may be enforced if sufficiently certain and specific.
This Is the view of Mr. Justice Story. The
cases earlier than Wilkinson v. Clements are
collected in Becl£ v. Allison, 4 Daly, 421, in
which case the conclusion Is maintained. In
an elaborate opinion, that in a proper case,
the jui'isdictlon to decree specific performance of a covenant to repair exists, the case
being placed on the same general ground as
that of a covenant to build. The present
by
case falls within the rule established
these authorities.
It was not a general and
indefinite covenant.
The place on which the
wall was to be erected was fixed by the contract; its length, height and thickness were
prescribed, as well as the materials of which
This Is the test
It was to be constructed.
given in Mosely v. Virgin, supra, and in Story, Eq. § 727. The plaintiff could have had
no adequate remedy in damages, as he needed to have the wall stand on the defendant's
land, in order to carry out his building as it
The result is that if the agreewas planned.
ment had been in writing it would have been
enforced by a court of equity.
The next Inquiry is, whether the act of
building the stone foundation-wall was such
a part performance as to take the case out
of the statute of frauds. This is not an Instance of a mere parol license, executed in
part; it Is rather that of an agreement, from
which the defendant was to receive the same
The inducement on
benefit as the plaintiff.
the defendant's part to allow the plaintiff's
wall to stand on his land, and to aid in constructing it, was the fact that he was to receive a benefit from having the same support to his own part of the wall, from the
plaintiff's land and a corresponding service
If, then, the com-t will not
and expenditure.
entertain an action for specific performance
in the present case, it will be because there
are some parol agreements which have been
partly carried out that do not fall within the
general rule that part performance takes the
case out of the statute of frauds. No reason
can be given why an ordinary contract to
land In fee shall be withdrawn
purchase
from the statute by part performance, which
will not apply to the present case. Mr. Frye
states the rules as follows:
(1) The act of
parol performance must be referable to the
alleged agreement and no other.
(2) They
must be such as render it a fraud on the defendant, to take advantage of the contract
not being in writing.
to
(3) The agreement
which they refer must be such as in Its own
nature is enforceable by the court (4) There
must be proper evidence of the parol agreePry, Spec. Perf. (Am. Ed.) 251. All
ment.
of these exist in the present case. In commenting upon the third, he remarks that the
agreement must be of such a nature that the
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court would have had jurisdiction in respect
to it in case it had been in writing. It has
already been shown that the court would
have enforced
the contract
between the
plaintiff and defendant had it been written.
The next inquiry is, whether the plaintiff
was bound to resort to the remedy of specific
performance? It would seem not Specific
performance
is merely a remedy for an existing right; each of the parties, by force of
the contract, became a trustee for the other;
there was an equality of burdens as well as
of rights growing out of the contract relations of the parties.
Specific performance is
but a single mode of enforcing the equitable duties growing out of these relations.
The parties have voluntarily subjected themselves to the rule that "equality is equity;"
each of them having thus become equitably
bound to pay his share of the amount necessary to construct the wall, is liable in equity to an action for contribution. This has
been applied to cases of contribution between
Story, Eq. Jur. § 64, f; 1
co-contractors.
Pars. Cont. 31. The whole doctrine rests
upon principles of natural justice and equity. The plaintiff had his choice of remedies.
He might demand specific performance;
in
which case he would pay only one-half of
the expense, and insist upon the defendant's
rendering the other half; or, after demand
and refusal, he might build the entire wall
and bring his action for contribution.
He
has elected to take the latter course.
It is claimed that the present action is
not an equitable one. The fact that it ia
brought for money is not decisive upon that
point. The real test in such an action is
this: if It be brought for damages for breach
of contract It Is a case at law; If It be
brought for money, by way of performance
of the contract it is a case in equity. Thus
where a vendor, in a contract for the sale of
land, sues for the price, his action is equitable.
The mutuality of the contract gives
each of the parties the same remedy; and
yet the recovery by the vendor is simply In
money.
If this theory did not prevail in
respect to contracts partly performed, the
vendor would be utterly without remedy,
since it is well settled that there is no action at law on a parol contract in part performed. That the yendor can have an equitable action for money is established in
Crary v. Smith, 2 N. Y. 60; Brown v. Hafl!,
Will. Eq. Jur. 290. The ac5 Paige, 240;
tion in the present case was brought for relief, and the facts disclose an equitable
The fact that It was tried
cause of action.
by jury, with consent of parties, is immaterial, as the court might, of its own motion, have submitted the questions to a jury;
and any informality in the mode of proceNo
dure was waived by mutual consent
preliminary settlement of the issues is requisite.
Colman v. Dixon, 50 N. Y. 572.
This view Of the case is strengthened by
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the fact that the common-law courts hold
that If a tenant In common, or joint tenant, or other person who Is under a duty to
repair, fails to contribute after a demand
by a co-tenant or co-obligor, the latter, on
incurring the necessary expense, may bring
an action on the case to recover the proporLortionate share of the defaulting party.
Mumford v.
ing T. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575;
Brown, 6 Cow. 475, 16 Am. Dec. 440; Doane
This action is based
Y. Badger, 12 Mass. 65.
on a failure to discharge the equitable duty
imposed on the defendant which is derived
from the principle of natural justice lying at
It is
the root of the doctrine of contribution.
however urged that the defendant does not,
by this action, obtain an easement of permaThe answer is that if
nent value to himself.
he does not he sufEers only by his own neglect The correct view however is that the
judgment will establish his right and act as
an estoppel against the plaintiff and all claimof the ease. ing under him, as the existence
ment is the very proposition which it is necA
essary to establish in order to recover.
final suggestion
is that the parol contract
having been partly executed, the parties to
it are estopped from denying the existence
The authorities are quite
of the easement
distinct to this effect, and the proposition is
fully justified by the rules of estoppel as applied to the case of expenditures made upon
land on the faith of the representations of
an owner.
Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 541,
86 Am. Dec. 406; 3 Washb. Real Prop. 68,
In Campbell v. McCoy, 31
and cases cited.
Pa. 263, a parol executed agreement to erect
a dam was held to be irrevocable in equity,
and that it created a permanent right vrhich
would survive the erection itself.
Rerick v.
Kern, 14 Serg. & B. 267, 16 Am. Dec. 497.
The same rule was applied to the laying
down of water-pipes in Le Fevre v. Le
Fevre,,4 Serg. & R. 241, 8 Am. Dec. 696. In
McKellip V. Mcllhenny, 4 Watts, 317, 28 Am.
Dec. 711, the doctrine was applied to a license to flood land, on which money and labor had been expended, on the faith of the
Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Iowa, 114, 85
license.
Am. Dec. 546, is a case of a wall partly built
on a licensee's land.
There is, in some of the authorities, a confusion growing out of a want of accurate
discrimination between cases arising in law
and equity. At law a parol license, owing
to the statute of frauds, is revocable at the
pleasure of the licenser, notwithstanding the
expenditure of money on his land by the 11- .
censee. The cases on this subject are so numerous and so imiform that it would be a
In equity
waste of time to refer to them.
As a court of
the rule is quite different.
equity will take a parol contract for the sale
of lands out of the statute of frauds, when
it is partly performed, it will, on the same
principle,
treat an executed parol contract
for an easement as equivalent to a grant
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under seal, where the parties cannot be reto their original position. Under this
doctrine the acts of the parties in the present case have created a permanent easement
upon the land, of which all who may purchase of them are bound to take notice.
The
judgment for the plaintiff, in the present case,
simply recognizes the existence of that easement, and the added duty or obligation of
mutual contribution for its erection
and
maintenance.
The judgment of the court below should
stored

be affirmed.

REYNOLDS, 0.

It

appears

to be conced-

that the agreement to erect the partywall created, or was intended to create an
easement in land, and that to make it valid,
It should have been in writing. It was by
parol, and was doubtless void under the statute of frauds.
The parties however proceeded under it, so far, as that it is also agreed,
that in consequence of part performance the
plaintiff might, after the repudiation by the
defendant, have appealed to a court of equity to compel him to specifically perform; and
yet it is conceded that a resort to this remedy would have been, if successful, inadequate to redress the injury to the plaintiff.
In the earlier days of the law, a party having some claim to equitable relief was obliged to resort to a tribunal exercising that
sort of jurisdiction, invented, it is said, in
some of the old books, to do justice in cases
wherein the courts of common law were deficient, and of the common law it has been
said that by reason of its flexibility it was
capable of affording an adequate remedy in
most cases of wrong. It however did happen that separate courts of common law and
equity jurisdiction did exist for a long time,
and until within a comparatively recent period, existed in this state; and it may not
be denied that under this system, by reason
of the ignorance of counsel or the learning of
judges and chancellors, it occasionally happened that suitors were found in the wrong
forum and turned away without relief on
Of whatever magnitude
payment of costs.
such an evil may have been it seems very
clear to me, that it was attempted to be
remedied by our constitution of 1846 and the
Code of 1848, with its multitude of modifications.
It is suggested that the present action is
one at common law and cannot be maintained upon a void contract. This general
rule no judge or lawyer will dispute. It is
further said, the plaintiff's remedy was in
equity, where he should have succeeded, but
would have been of no practical
success
value; in other words, the remedy would
He came
have been worse than the disease.
into a court having general jurisdiction both
in law and equity, and stated the facts of
his case in his complaint, as he was authorized by law to do, and in the most essential
ed
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the result
Another objection is made against the propriety of the judgment of the supreme court
in this case that there is no precedent for
and that it is the very first of the kind
do not quite
known to the law. While
am yet willagree to the fact as alleged,
no case reported
ing to assume that there
in the boolis which affords an exact preceam prepared to give.
dent for the judgment
Where precedents are reasonable they fursafe guide to follow; and where they
nish
as is not uncommon,
are unreasonable,
delicate and difficult question is often preBut where there are no precedents
sented.
that appear to be binding upon the concourt, the demands of Justice rescience of

abide

it,

I

a

It is said that this is a pure and simple acfor the
tion at law, to recover damages
It must be conbreach of a void conti-act.
fessed that the complaint bears some of the
common-law
decmarks of an old-fashioned
laration, omitting its prolixity. But, as
understand,
it also states in a concise form
all the facts upon which the plaintiff relies
for relief, and these facts have, at least substantially, been found by the jury to be true.
Why may not this, under the present system, be called a bill in equity? It is quite
true that there is no prayer for specific performance of the partially performed contract, but that is not of the slightest consequence, as has been often held.
Marquat v.
Marquat, 12 N. Y. 336; Emery v. Pease, 20
N. Y. 62.
In the latter case, what was from
the prayer of the complaint, regarded by the
whole supreme court as an action- at law,
to recover money due upon an account stated, and the plaintiff nonsuited because
he
had not appealed to the equity ear of that
court was, in the court of appeals, disapproved, because the facts stated entitled the
plaintiff to an accounting as in the case of a

I I

both.

is

different and distinct forms of pleading and
proceeding were preserved, the two separate
jurisdictions might be longer continued, even
of
when the same court took cognizance

do and ought to have done.
It is quite true that the defendant forbade
the plaintiff from proceeding to complete the
party-wall according to the mutual parol
agreement, but if the matter had gone so far
as that equity would compel him to complete
it, his order to stop could be of no more force
or effect than that of an ancient monarch
who ordered the waves of the ocean to be
stayed.
It is further urged that even if the defendant pay the judgment against him, he has no
grant of an easement to continue the partywall on the land of the plaintiff. This in
one sense may be entirely true, but the same
law that, in effect, compels him to perform
his agreement with the plaintiff by paying
damages, will protect him in the enjoyment
of every right of property which he could
have had if he had not made it necessary to
appeal to the courts.
It does not appear
that he ever requested the plaintiff to grant
him any easement whatever; and we are
not to assume that if he had, and offered to
fulfill the conditions of his part of the agreeIndeed,
ment, it would have been refused.
if it appeared in his answer in this case
that he had offered to pay (which was at
least equal to performance) upon the condition that the plaintiff granted an easement
equal to what the contract demanded, I think
the court ought to and would have so oi^
dered, but the defendant put his right upon
an entirely different contingency and must

I

I

partnership, and the case thereafter proceeded upon that theory.
That case, in principle, does not appear to me to be unlike this,
so far as the form of proceeding and forum
is concerned.
It seems to be clear that the
defendant ought to have done as he verbally
agreed to do. He had got the plaintiff into
more or less difficulty, for the reason that
his promises had been not only relied upon,
but his fidelity evinced by acts tending to
the consummation of the common purpose.
He then repudiates, and the plaintiff must
suffer great injury if he stops the improvement contemplated, and incur extra cost and
expense if he perform the work and furnish
the material which the defendant agreed to

a

particular proved their truth, as is fouud by
the verdict of the jury, and had judgment.
If he may not have properly had judgment,
it being agreed that he was entitled to relief, where else should he go to obtain it?
The court to which he applied had the authority to do him justice In some form, and
it could turn him over to none other; for no
other court existed to which he could apply
for the remedy he was in some form entitled
to. Since the radical changes to which reference has been made, it has sometimes been
very difficult to distinguish by any thing
that appears in a pleading, between an action
at law or a suit in equity.
Before the
change in practice, the distinction between a
common-law declaration and a bill in chancery was very well understood.
Now both
jurisdictions are blended, and a party is permitted to state his case upon its facts, in his
own form, and to take such relief as he ought
to have, if he be entitled to any, and if he
makes any mistake in his allegations the
court may, in its discretion, conform the allegations to the facts proved, and give the
appropriate judgment which either law or
equity demands.
General jurisdiction, both
in law and equity, having been united in
the same court, with a form of procedure
common to all cases, it is difficult by the
mere inspection of a pleading, to determine
whether a given case is to be governed by
legal or equitable rules; and
am of the
opinion, that the inevitable result of such a
system will be the abolition of all substantial distinctions between law and equity. If

a
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quire
made..
the

In

In a proper case, one should be
the present case we all agree that

plaintiff

has sustained

an injury

for

which he should have redress, and there is
that the judgment below has
no complaint
awarded him more damages
than he was
fairly entitled to recover. It is possible that
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a ease precisely like this has never before
arisen, but if any shall hereafter arise, ,it
may as well be understood that a party thus
injured is not without an adequate remedy
in the courts.
The Judgment of the supreme court should
be afiSrmed,

with

costs.
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V'
ADDERLET

a

v.

DIXON,

Sim. & S. 607.)
Chancery.

The plaintiffs having purchased and taken
^assignments of certain debts which had been
Mproved under two commissions of bankrupt,
agreed to sell them to the defendant for 2s.
' 6d. in the pound.
The defendant's solicitor, accordingly, gave
C
notice of the sale to the assignees, and preof the debts, and the
pared sin assignment
plaintiffs, notwithstanding the purchase money had not teen paid, executed it, and signed
money, and
the receipt for the consideration
The bill was
left It in the solicitor's hands.
filed to compel the defendant specifically to
perform the agreement, and to pay the purchase money to the plaintiffs.
The defendant, by his answer, submitted
that the matter of the agreement was not the
proper subject of a bill In equity for a specific
performance; and claimed the same benefit
as if he had demurred to the bill.

J

Mr. Sugden and Mr. Garratt, for plaintiffs.
Mr. Hart and Mr. Treslove, for defendant

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR.
Courts of equity decree the specific performance of contracts, not upon any distinction between realty and personalty, but because damages at'law
may not. In the particular case, afford a comThus a court of equity decrees
plete remedy.
performance
of a contract for land, not because of the real nature of the land, but because damages at law, which must be calcuof the
lated upon the general money-value
land, may not be a complete remedy to the
purchaser, to whom the land may have a peSo a court of eqculiar and special value.
uity will not, generally, decree performance of
a contract for the sale of stock or goods, not
because of their personal nature, but because
damages at law, calculated upon the marketprice of the stock or goods, are as complete aT
remedy to the purchaser as the delivery of
the stock or goods contracted for; inasmuch
as, with the damages, he may purchase the
same quantity of the like stock or goods.
In Taylor v. Neville, cited in Buxton v.
Lister, 3 Atk. 383, specific performance was
decreed of a contract for the sale of 800 tons
of iron, to be delivered and paid for in a certain number of years and by instalments; and
the reason given by Lord Hardwicke, is that
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such sort of contracts differ from those
that
are Immediately to be executed. And they do
differ in this respect, that the profit upon the
contract being to depend upon future events,
cannot
be correctly estimated in damages
where the calculation must proceed upon conjecture.
In such a case to compel a party to
accept damages for the non-performance of
his conti'act, is to compel him to seU the actual
profit which may arise from it, at a conjectural price. In Ball v. Ooggs, 1 Brown, Pare
Cas. 140, specific performance was decreed in
the house of lords of a contract to pay the
plaintiff a certain annual sum for his life, and
also a certain other sum for every hundred
weight of brass wire manufactured by the defendant during the life of the plaintiff. The
same principle is to be applied to this case.
Damages might be no complete remedy, being
to be calculated merely by conjecture; and to
compel the plaintiff in such a case to take
damages would be to compel him to sell the
annual provision during his life for which he
had contracted,
at a conjectural price. In
Buxton V. Lister, Lord Hardwicke puts the
case of a ship carpenter purchasing
timber
which was peculiarly convenient to him by
reason of its vicinity; and also the case of an
owner of land covered with timber contracting to sell his timber In order to clear his
land; and assumes that as, in both those cases, damages would not, by reason of the special circumstances be a complete remedy, equity would decree a specific performance.
The present case being a contract for the
sale of the uncertain dividends which may become payable from the estates of the two
bankrupts,
it appears to me that, upon the
principle established by the cases of Ball v.
Coggs, and~Taylor v. Neville, a court of equity
will decree specific perfoi'mance, becailSe dam-"
ag es at lAw caBHgfag curately represeiir the'
-value ot lhelBta re dlYldendsfSia to compel
tins pufehas er "foT:ake'Buch"aamages would be
"to compel nimTa sell fh^ecffvlderids at a con-

"^turalTfrice:

It Ifftrue that the present bill is not filed by
the purchaser, but by the vendor, who seeks,
not the uncertain dividends, but the certain
sum to be paid tot them.
It has, however.
been settled, by repeated decisinna that fSe
T6fflei3yr in equity must belnutual; and that
when 'a"BiirwlU lie for the purchaser, it will
also lie for the vendor.
Vide Withy v. Cottle, 1 Sim. & S. 174.
Hamblhi v. Dhmeford,
2 Bdw. 531.
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HODGES

V.

ROWING

(18 Atl. 979, 58 Conn.
Supreme

Court of Errors

April

15,

et ux.
12.)

of Connecticut.

1889.

Appeal from superior court, Fairfield county; Fenn, Judge.
Suit by P. H. Hodges against B. W. Kowof a
Ing and wife for specific performance
for
contract for sale of land. Judgment
appeal.
defendants
plaintiff, and
for
D. B. Lockwood and E. W. Seymour,
T. W. Wheeler and H. J. Curtis,
appellants.
for appellee.

J. On the 17th day of Authe defendants entered into the
following contract with the plaintiff: "StratWe agree to purford, August 17th, 1887.
Stratford,
chase of P. H. Hodges his place in
Conn., containing tiiteen acres, more or less,
for the sum of nine thousand five hundred
dollars; to pay six thousand cash, and three
thousand five hundred on bond and mortgage
for one year; to take title immediately, and
possession on the first of January, 1888, and
have paid him one hundred dollars on acBHARDSLEY,

gust, 1887,

Edwin W. Kowinq. Eliza KowNo writing relating to the contract
The court besigned by the plaintiff.
upon the petition of the plaintiff, de-

count.

ING."

was
low,
creed that the defendants should specifically
perform the contract, from which decree they
They claim that under
appeal to this court.
the statute of frauds the plaintiff was not
bound by the contract, not having signed any
memorandum of it, and hence that it should
not, in equity at least, be enforced against
them, and make this claim the ground of one
The statute reof their reasons of appeal.
quires only that the written agreement shall
be "signed by the party to be charged therewith."
The defendants rely upon certain
cases

as

authority for their claim, and among

others upon the cases of Benedict v. Lynch,
IJohns. Ch. 370, and Lawrenson v. Butler,
1 Schoales & L. 13.
Both of these cases are
in accord with the claim of the defendants;
but the former case is opposed to the numerous decisions in the state of New York on the
same suSject, and the latter case to nearly all
In the case of Clason
the English decisions.
V. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484, Chancellor Kent,
after reviewing the New York decisions,
says that "it is sufficient if the agreement be
signed by the party to becliarged." In the
same opinion he reviews the English decis" There is
ions up to that time, and adds:
united
and
strong
nothing to disturb this
of
current of authority but the observation
Lord Redesdale In Lawrenson v. Butler, 1
Schoales & L. 13, who thought that the contract ought to be mutuali^and that if one
party could not enforce it the other ought
" The
not.
authority of Lawrenson v. Butler
seems not to liave been recognized in England.
Tlie more recent decisions in that
country are referred to in 1 Benj. Sales, §§ 254,
255. There is still some conflict in the de-

cisions in this country, but the weight of au-
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thority is that the statute of frauds is satisfled by the signature to the contract of the
party souglit to be charged only, whether the
suit to enforce it be at law or in equity, and
whether it relates to the sale of real or personal estate.
ClMson v. Bailey, 14 Jolins.
484;
Purmort, 16 Wend. 460;
McCrea
Richards v. Gr^en, 28 N. J. Eq. 536; Railroad
Corp. V. Evans, 6 Gray, 33; Sutherland v.
Briggs, 1 Hare, 34. We think that there is
not sufiicient ground for this reason of appeal.
Another reason of appeal is "that the specific execution of the contiact should not have
been decreed, because it is too uncertain to
be enforced, inasmuch as it could not be understood from the writing itself without the
necessity of resorting to parol proof. " No
objection seems to have been made to the contract when it was ofEered in evidence, and
therefore the objection now made, that it is
void upon its face, comes too late to be entitled to consideration.
But the claim, if
seasonably made, would have been unfounded.
The defendants do not specify in tlieir reasons
of appeal, or in their brief, the particulars
in which they claim that the contract is deficient in certainty.
We suppose their claim
to be that the statement of the location of the
land is too indefinite to satisfy the requirement of the statute of frauds.
If the only
description of the land had been "fifteen
acres, more or less, in the town of Stratford, "
there would have been force in this claim,
though according to the decisions of courts of
high authoritysuch adescription might have
been applied to the land intended by it by extrinsic evidence. In the case of Hurley v.
Brown, 98 Mass. 545, the only description in
the contract of the property agreed to be con"
veyed was "a house and lot on Amity stteet.
The court admitted evidence that there was
only one house and lot on Amity street which
the defendant had a right to convey, and that
the parties had been in treaty for the purchase and sale of it, and that the subjectmatter of the contract might be thus identiSee, also. Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass.
fied.
413; Robeson v. Hornbaker, 3 N.
Eq. 60.
In the present case the court finds that tlie
plaintiff owned no other real estate in Stratford, and that the same was occupied by him
as a homestead and residence. But we think
that the description of the land in this contract is so definite as not to require a resort
to extrinsic evidence to identify it, other
than such as is always necessary to apply a
description of real estate to the premises described. The language of the contract is:
"We agree to purchase of P. H. Hodges his
place at Stratford, containing fifteen acres,
The import of the word
more or less."
"place" in this connection is reasonably cerIts popular and correct meaning, as
tain.
thus used, is the place where one resides; his
Webst. Diet., in verbum. The
homestead.
court finds that the plaintiff told the defendants, before they signed the contract, that
the place contained about 15 acres, and that
The
this statement was made in good faith.

J.
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defendants assign as a reason of appeal that
"there was not about fifteen acres of land."
It Is enough to say that the court does not
find that there were not 15 acres in the place,
but evidently declined to makesuch a finding.
The defendants introduced the recitals in two
deeds as evidence of the quantity of land in
One was the deed to the plaintiff
tlie place.
of the land, in which was added to the description of the quantity of land the words
"more or less," and the other was a conveyance of a small strip of the land to a railroad
company, specifying the quantity eonveyed.
Except for the words "more or less" in the
deed to tlie plaintiff, it would have appeared
that there was a fraction of an acre less than
The court, referring
15 acres in the piece.
to this evidence, says: "There was no evidence as to tlie exact quantity of land except
It properly rethe recital in said deeds."
garded those recitals as inconclusive eviThe remaining reason of appeal is
dence.
that the plaintiff had adequate remedy at law.
Tlie defendants clai m that the equitable jurisdicliun of the courts in this state was restricted by the provision in the old statute
last found in Revision 1875, p. 413, § 5. that
courts of equity shall "take cognizance only
of matters in which adequate relief cannot be
had in the ordinary course of law," and that
that provision is still in force. It is unnecessary to inquire whether that provision has not,
as the plaintiff claims, been since repealed by
the practice act passed in 1879, because, in
our view, it did not have the restrictive effect claimed for it. A similar claim was
made by the defendant in the case of Munson
v, Munson, 30 Conn. 425, and the court say
the provision referred to "is simply an afiflrra" The
ance of a well-settled rule of equity.
rule of equity is thus stated by Judge Swift:
r "It is a leading principle that equity will not
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interpose where there is an adequate remedy
It is not sufiadent that there is a
at law.
remedy, but it must be as complete and beneficial as the relief in equity."
2 Swift, Dig.
c. 1, § 1. In the action at law for the breach
of the contract the plaintifiE could only recover the excess, if any, of the sum agreed to
be paid for the land above its market value
when the contract was to be performed. Such
a remedy is manifestly inadequate, and courts
of equity, therefore, hold, as a general rule,
that when a contract for the sale of real estate has been fairly entered into, the party
contracting to sell, as well as the party contracting to buy, is entitled to have it specifically performed. The cases on this question are all one way. It is true courts of
equity liave, in the exercise of their discretion, refused to apply the rule in certain
cases where it would be productive of hardship or inconvenience.
The court did so in
the case of Whitney v. City of New Haven,
23 Conn. 624. In that case the city had contracted to purchase from the plaintiff land
and water-rightsforthe
purpose of providing
a water supply, and afterwards voted to abandon the project contemplated by the purchase.
The court dismissed the bill for a
specific performance, but remark as follows
in their opinion: "As a general rule, where
the purchaser of real estate can come into a
court of equity, to obtain a deed of it, the
vendor can come there to get his money,
which WHS agreed to be paid; but the rule is
not universally true, and it should not be applied, we think, where it will do unnecessary
mischief to one of the parties." In the present case the contract appears to have been
fairly made, and is subject to the general rule
of equity. There is no error in the judgment complained of. The other judges concurred.
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D.

FRENCHMAN'S BAY
LAND & WATER CO.

(24 Atl. 814,
Supreme

Judicial

& MT.

84 Me. 195.)

Court of Mame.

Jan.

15,

1892.
Report from supreme judicial court, Hancock county.
BUI In equity by Margaretta B. Porter
against Frenchman's Bay & Mt. Desert Land
& Water Company, to which respondent deOn report
Demurrer sustained,
murred.
and bill dismissed.
Deasy & Higglns, for plaintiff.
Hamlin, for defendant.

Hitle

&

LIBBBY, J. BUI in equity, praying for
decree for a specific performance of a conmade by the defendant
tract In -writing,
with the plaintiff, for the purchase of a lot
of land in the village of Sorrento.
It comes before this court on a demm-rer
and the questo the bill by the defendant,
tion to be determined is whether, upon the

allegations in the bill, this court has jurisdiction in equity to decree a specific performance.
We think it clear that in a proper case
the court has jurisdiction to decree specific

performance or a contract in writing for the
conveyance of land, in a bill brought by the
Rev. St § 6, c. 77,
vendor cr by the vendee.
But the court in this state d9es not
cJ. 3.
take jurisdiction in equity when the plaintiff
has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at law. Milliken v. Dockray,
Id an action
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80 Me. 82, 13 Atl. 127; Bachelder v. Bean,
76 Me. 370; Alley v. Chase, 83 Me. 537, 22
Atl. 393.
And we think it must appear by the allegations in the bill, where an action at law
may be mamtained, that the remedy by
it is not plain, adequate, and complete; for
it is a well-established rule of equity pleading that the bill must contain allegations

showing that the court has equity jurisdiction. Story, Eq. ei. §§ 10, 34; Jones v.
Newhall, 115 Mass. 244, 252, 253.
In this case, we think it perfectly clear
that the plaintiff has a right to maintain an
action at law for a breach of the contract.
That being so, to show jurisdiction in equity,
there should be some allegations in the blll-\
showing that the remedy at law would not
}
be adequate and complete.
There Is nothing
of the kind in this bill. After setting out '
the contract, It alleges that the plaintiff was
in possession of the land, and has continued
to be in irossession of the land, to the time
of the filing of the bill; no allegation that
her action in regard to the land was in any
way changed by the making of the contract;
no allegation that anything had been done by
either party, in consequence of the making
of the contract, which could not be taken
into consideration In the assessment of the
plaintiff's damages.
Demurrer sustained. Bill dismissed, with

j

costs.

PETERS,

EMERY,
red.

C.
and

J., and WALTON, VIRGIN,
WHITEHOUSE, JJ., concur-
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SPEX3IFI0 PBEJPORMANOE OF CONTRACTS.
et aL v.
67,

LEAVITT

et al.

35 W. Va. 194.)

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
March 31, 1891.

Appeal and supersedeas from circuit court,
Wood county.
Barna
Loomis & Tavener, for appellants.
Powell and Okey Johnson, for appellees.

LUCAS, P. This suit originated by the
tiling of a bill In chancery by H. E. Bumgardner, a married woman, and H. F. Bumgardner, her husband, against C. P. Leavitt
and others, in the circuit court of Wood county.
The female plaintiff alleges that the defendant Leavitt induced her to invest $1,000
in the steam-boat General Dawes, the proposed cost of which was $7,500.
It was understood that the boat was to be put in a jointstock company, in which the plaintiff H. E.
Bumgardner was to have shares in proportion to the money she had advanced, as aforesaid.
The plaintiff exhibits with her bill an
agreement as follows:
"This article of agreement, made and entered into this the 14th day
of July, 1884, between 0. P. Leavitt, county
of Wood, and state of West Virginia, and H.
E. Bumgardner of Hockingport, Athens Co.,
Ohio, witnesseth, that the said O. P. Leavitt,
in case of misunderstanding,
or not being able
to agree, or in case of death of Herman Bumgardner, agent, said Lea vitt agrees to ta ke
the said stock ofTtilf s. ijjjtn^arctii^ at not 'ex"-"
'^x^eeding- cost.-Tsr, if iroat' depreciates in~va luer
aOalr-e'asn vama'B on7"""the said Mrs. H. "E.
Btmgardner agreesTo'give said C. P. Leavitt
the refusal over any other purchaser.
The
said stock referred to above is stock in the
steamer General Dawes. [Signed] C. P. Leavitt." And there is further exhibited the following notice:
"To Chas. P. Leavitt— Sir: 1
propose to sell you my stock in the Farmer's
Trans. Co. in accordance with your contract
of July 14, 1884, at cost, or, if the boat has
depreciated in value, at its fair cash valuation.
Your early attention is called to this matter,
having arisen under which
the contingency
you bound yourself to take said stock.
[Signed] H. B. Bumgardner, by H. F. Bumgardner, Ag't. March 31, 1887." The bUI supplesigned
ments the above-written agreement
by C. P. Leavitt, by stating that it was a part
of the consideration that the husband, H. F.
Bumgardner, was to have regular employment on said steam-boat, of which said C. P.
Leavitt was to be master. It is further alleged that all of the interests, including the stock
owned by Leavitt, (which was a large majority of it,) as well as that ovsmed by H. B.
Bumgardner,
was capitalized into a corporation known as the Farmer's Transportation
Company, or conveyed to said company.
The
steamer was valued at $7,600 at that time,
and 760 shares of capital stock of the par value of $10 per share were Issued, of which 100
shares were given to said H. E. Bumgardner,

and 1% shares to her husband, In order that
he might be represented in the company,
it
is further alleged that C. P. Leavitt took
charge af master, and pursuant to the agreement gave H. F. Bumgardner
employment,
but that they soon disagreed, and said H. P.
Bumgardner was discharged.
Plaintiffs proceed to aver that since such disagreement they
have at all times been ready to give said Leavitt the preference of purchasing said stock,
and have urged him to buy said stock according to his agreement, but he has steadily and
persistently refused to do so, until the 81st
day of March, 1887, when the above notice
They charge that
was written and served.
there has been no depreciation in the value of
the boat, but that it has been increased in
size and capacity at a large expense, and its
value enhanced in consequence.
It is further
alleged that one E. W. Petty, who is made a
defendant, had attached the 101% shares of
stock in the circuit court of Wood county in
an action at law against H. F. Bumgardner.
It is further alleged that the plaintiffs were
largely indebted to J. W. Arnold and L. H. Arnold, both of whom were made defendants,
and that the female plaintiff executed a lien
upon the said 100 shares of stock to secure
By an agreement and comsaid indebtedness.
promise between the plaintiffs and said E. W.
Petty his debt is reduced to $422, which it is
agreed shall be paid him out of the proceeds
arising from the sale of said 101% shares of
stock; and by like agreement with J. W. and
L. H. Arnold, they are to receive the residue
of the proceeds of said sale as a compromise,
and in full settlement of the indebtedness due
them from the plaintiffs.
Plaintiff H. B.
Bumgardner,
it is alleged, has always been
ready, and has offered, and now offers, to specifically perform the said agreement on her
part, by assigning and transferring said 101%
shares of the stock free and unincumbered, as
The prayer
of the 31st day of March, 1887.
of the bill is that the court will declare the
plaintiff to be entitled to a specific performance and execution of the said agreement,
with interest on the said amount from March
31, 1887; second, that the court will decree
that the amount ascertained to be due said H.

B. Bumgardner from said C. P. Leavitt may
be paid over to said E. W. Petty "and said J.
W. and L. H. Arnold, as above set out; and,
thirdly, for all proper accounts and general
relief. The bill was demurred to by Leavitt,
but the demurrer was overruled, whereupon C.
P. Leavitt filed his answer, in which he admits the agreement as set out in the bill, so

far as it goes, but he denies it was ever understood or contemplated that the said H. F.
Bumgardner should have the right, at any
time he might thereafter see fit, to require
respondent
to buy the stock of said H. Bl
Bumgardner, and to require respondent to pay
therefor the original cost, but in truth it was|
intended to give respondent rdusal and right
to buy said stock at any time, provided he'
paid therefor as much as any other bidder,
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and provided, furtliermore, that respondent so
desired. He alleges that the boat Is not worth
more than $2,500, about one-third of what she
and
cost at the time said stocli was issued;
that the present value of said 101% shares in
is not worth more than
the bill mentioned
He denies that the
?333.33% at the outside.
stock has ever been tendered him, or that either of the plaintiffs have ever proffered the
same at anything like a fair cash valuation.
day of
He admits tiat on or about the
July, 1887, he offered them $850 for the stock,
although he linew that they had immtJiately
before that offered it to another party at $800.
He alleges that it had been assigned by H. E.
Bumgardner to Mrs. J. W. Arnold, to secure
was
payment of a debt, and the certificate
then held by one L. N. Tavener, as attorney
for said Arnold, who had notified the secretary of the corporation, and requested a transsets out also
Respondent
fer on the boolis.
that the certificate was incumbered by a lien
of said E. W. Petty, and he pleads that the
plaintiffs had not title to said stock, and so
Respondcould not carry out the agreement.
ent further alleges that his said offer of $850
was made in good faith, and he was ever
ready from the time he offered in 1887 to buy
said stock to take the same, but his offer was
not accepted, nor was there ever tendered to

respondent the said stock at any time, nor
could it be, since they had parted with the
title. He denies that he ought in equity to be
compelled to pay for the stock, which cannot
and is incumbered to the full
be delivered,
J. W. Arnold and L. H.
amount of its value.
Arnold filed their joint arid separate answer,
in which they admit all that is said in the bill
about the mortgage or pledge of the stock to
them, and admit that they have agreed that
out of the proceeds arising from the sale E.

W. Petty should be first paid, and that they
would accept the residue of the proceeds In
full satisfaction of their lien, and that they

have accordingly authorized L. N. Tavener,
Esq., their attorney, to execute their release,
in order that said H. E. Bumgardner may execute to said defendant 0. P. Leavitt an unincumbered transfer of said 100 shares of stock
In fulfillment of said H. B. Bumgardner's contract on her part, as set out In Exhibit No. 1
of the bill. E. W. Petty likewise answers, and
admits all the averments of the bill as to his
lien upon the stock by attachment, and also
the agreement with reference
out of the proceeds of sale.

to his payment

A vast amount of testimony was taken,

little of which had anything to do
with the case, the bulk of it seeming to be
predicated upon some extraneous controversies as to the earnings of the boat, and
Leavitt's settlement vrtth the corporation
On the 10th of Decemand stockholders.
ber, 1888, the case came on to be finally
that H. E.
heard, and the court decreed
Bumgardner was entitled to specific execution of the contract; that demand was made
by her on the 31st day of March, 1887; and
very
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that the 101% shares of stock were then
worth 5!866.60; and the said C. P. Leavltt is
decreed to pay that amount, with interest
from 81st day of March, 1887, aggregating the sum of $954.76, which he is to pay,
with interest thereon from the date of deThe money is to be distributed to the
cree.
Arnolds and Petty in accordance with their
respective liens, and agreements with reference to the same.
The decree then proceeds
to direct "that L. N. Tavener, who Is authorized in a writing filed in the papers In
this cause to release the Hen of said J. W.
Arnold and L. H. Arnold upon 100 shares
of the stock aforesaid, to execute said release of said lien, and, in case said L. N.
Tavener shall fail or refuse to execute said
release within ten days from this date, then
Barna Powell, who Is hereby appointed a
special commissioner for the purpose, Is authorized and directed to execute a release
of the lien of said J. W. Arnold and L. H.
Arnold, as aforesaid, upon the 100 shares
of stock held In the name of H. E. Bumgardner and filed with the papers in this
cause, which certificate of 100 shares, as
well as the certificate of 101% shares now
also in the file in this cause, are to be delivered to said O. P. Leavltt upon payment
by him, or some one for him, to the defendants Petty and Arnolds and plaintiffs, the
sum hereinbefore decreed by him to be paid."
Leave was given the plaintiffs to sue out
execution. From this decree the defendant
Leavltt has appealed to this court.
The first and pivotal question to be decided In this case Is whether the court of
chancery had jurisdiction to decree specific
performance. If not, the bill should have
In the first
been dismissed on demurrer.
place, regarding the defendant Leavltt, as
having for a consideration obtained the refusal of, or, as we may call It, the option
on, this stock, could he have maintained a
bin for specific performance against Mrs. H.
E. Bumgardner in case she had refused to
let him have the stock, and had Insisted on
selling it to some one else? This is an imH sucE~relIef
portant question, because,
could be granted to the purchaser were
he to apply, the seller, who has given the
purchaser such preference or option. Is entitled to like relief by reason of the operation
of the principle of mutuality of right and
The general doctrine upon this subremedy.
"It is
ject Is thus stated by Mr. Pomeroy:
not then sufficient In general that a valid and
binding agreement exists, and that an action
at law for damages will lie In favor of either party for a breach by the other; the
peculiarly distinctive feature of the equitable doctrine Is that the remedial right to a
See
specific performance must be mutual."
Moore v. Fitz Randolph, 6 Leigh, 175. This
is a general rule, namely, that the right to a
specific execution of a contract, so far as the
question of mutuality is concerned, depends
itself Is obliupon whether the agreement
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gatory on both parties, so that upon the application of either against the other the
court would grant a specific performance.
Says Mr.
Duvall V. Myers, 2 Md. Ch. 401.
Pomeroy: "It is a familiar doctrine that if
the right to the specific performance of a
contract exists at all, it must, be mutual.
The remedy must be alike attainable by both
parties to the agreement." Pom. Spec. Perf.
In the present case it appears that
§ 165.
the defendant Leavitt, being the owner of
about three-fourths of the stock in a steamboat, entered into an agreement with a married woman with reference to $1,000 of the
same stock.
It is true that the contract was
signed by him alone.
The circumstance that
it was signed by him alone is not material,
since it is admitted by both parties that she
entered into the contract, and was to be
bound by it. Wat Spec. Perf. §§ 268, 270.
Neither is the fact that she was a married
Woman material in this state, since, by our
married woman's act, which went into operation in 1869, (see Code, c. 66,) a married
woman may not only take and hold personal property, such as stocks, but, being
such a stockholder, she may vote the same
in any organized company; consequently she
had the right of disposition and the power
to sell or contract to sell.
It is also true
personal
that, according to her statement,
services entered into a part of the consideration of the contract, and it is a rule almost
universal that a contract for personal servagainst the partj'
ices cannot be enforced
promising such services, and hence for the
want of the requisite mutuality specific execution will not be enforced against the opposite party, -unless the services have been
actually performed, and the contract to that
extent been executed, as was the case here.
Pom. Spec. Perf. § 310.
These obstacles being disposed of, we may
inquire, had Mrs. Bumgardner persisted in
selling this stock to a third party, contrary
to her agreement, could Leavitt have asked
the court of chancery to interfere by injunction, and to compel her to transfer the stock
to him upon payment of the price stipulated
in the agreement? The question of specific
performance of contracts for the delivery of
stock is frequently treated by the text-writers in an empirical and unsatisfactory manner, as If there were something peculiar In
this character of personal property, which
rendered
It Impossible to classify it under
any general rule. Mr. Fry, for example,
does not hesitate to say positively that a
contract for the sale of stock will not be
specifically enforced, although he afterwards
admits that railway shares form an exception. Fry, Spec. Perf. §§ 24, 27. Mr. Pomeroy's treatment of the subject Is equally
unsatisfactory.
See Pom. Spec. Perf. §§ 17p9. The true principle would seem to be
(that, as a general rule, courts of equity will
I not enforce specific performance of contracts
for the delivery of shares of stock, but when
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a purchaser has bargained for such shares, ^
or taken an option upon them, because they ;
have for him a unique and special value, the
loss of which could not be adequately com|
pensated by damages at law, the chancellor,
in the exercise of a sound discretion, may
decree specific execution.
This principle we
find laid down and Insisted upon in the more
recent work of Mr. Waterman, (1881.) "The
same principles," he says, "govern in conti'acts for the sale of stock as in the sale
of other property,— that Is, If a breach can
be fully compensated
in damages, equity
will not interfere; while it will do so when,
notwithstanding the payment of the money
value of the stock, the plaintifE will still lose
a substantial benefit, and thereby remain
uncompensated.
If a contract to convey
stock is clear and definite,) and the uncertain
value of the stock renders it difficult to do
justice by an award of damages, specific
performance will be decreed."
Wat Spec.
Perf. § 19. Among the many other cases
cited in support of this proposition is the
leading case of Ooloret v. Rothschild, decided by Sir John Leach, vice-chancellor,
in
1824, 1 Sim. & S. 590, in which It Is said that
a bill will lie for the specific performance
of a contract for the purchase of government stock, where It prays for the delivery
of certificates which give the legal title to
the stock.
There are many other cases,
however, both in England and America,
which sustain the correct principle as laid
down above, but which it is unnecessary to
In the present case the purchaser of
cite.
the refusal of or option upon the stock In
the steamboat was dealing for an article
which he could not go upon the market and
buy, and which no one could deliver to him
but the holder, with whom he bargained.
The shares of stock evidently had for him
a peculiar value, which could not be compensated by mere damages, such as would be
recovered
at law. Their possession would
enable him to control the company, and to
retain his position as master of the vessel.
For the same reason, therefore, that a con-

tract for railway shares will frequently be
specifically performed, viz., whenever such
shares are being purchased for the purposes
of organization and control, I think a court
of equity would have interfered in this case
In favor of O. P. Leavitt, had he filed a bill
praying for its intervention. It follows,
therefore, upon the ground of mutuality of
remedy and reciprocity of obligation, that
such a bill could be maintained by Mrs.
Bumgardner. There Is another ground quite
as apparent as that stated above, and that is
that the legal title to this stock had passed
into the hands of a third party, who is properly made a co-defendant
In the case cited
above of Doloret v. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & S.
590,
the vice-chancellor remarks: "I consider also that the plaintiff, not being the
original holder of the scrip, but merely the
bearer, may not be able to maintain anj"
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action at law upon the contract, and that,
if he has any title, it must be in equity."
\ So in the present case the plaintiffs are In a
i situation in which a court of equity sees its
I way clearly to administer complete and aderemedial justice to all parties interif they were remitted to a
ested, whereas,
iquate
; court of law, if relief could be afforded at
all, it could only be done by resorting to
actions, perhaps no less than three.
j several
Upon the general principle, therefore, of
'
circuity of action, and affording
avoiding

inadequate or Impracticable, specific performance will be decreed."
Wat. Spec. Perf.
For these reasons, therefore, we think
§ 17.
there w;as no error in overruling the demurUpon the merits, alrer to the plaintiffs' bill.
though there was, as we have said, a great
deal of unnecessary testimony taken, the
plaintiffs' case might have rested, and no
Qoubt did rest, upon the testimony of the
defendant O. P. Leavitt himself. Out of the
168 questions propounded to him, of which
some were frivolous, and nearly all impertinent, he is asked on the 103d question
whether he did not offer Mrs. Bumgardner
$850 for her stock, in order to get rid of
Bumgardner, to which he replies: "Yes; I
wanted to get rid of bim. Here is one of
the clerks right here who asked him what
he would take for it at different times."
"Did you not make a prop104th question:
osition to buy the stock on account of your
obligation under that contract? Answer.
I guess the clerk
Oh, yes; several times.
made offers at different
here knows that
times through Mr. Ritchie, and Mr. BarinThe deger can testify to the same thing."
fendant further testifies that these offers
were made lu March, 1887, or a little after
that time, and that the negotiations would
have been concluded, except for some trivial
and inconsequeutial dispute about matters
foreign to the subject-matter. To take the
defendant, therefore, at his own word, and
fix the value of the stock at a price only differing by a few dollars from what he himself offered, with interest from the time of
his offer, was a judgment of the circuit
court of which he has no right to complain,
and we think, therefore, that the decree
complained of should be in all respects affirmed.
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relief where the remedy at law Is inadequate,
it was proper for the com:t of equity to exercise its jurisdiction.
Whenever the remedy at law would be incomplete and inadequate because the court of law cannot give
judgment, and
a conditional or modified
would be imable to preserve the benefit of
the agreement to aU the parties interested,
equity has jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. In the case of Summers v. Bean, the
general principle is thus declared by Judge
Moucure, (13_Grat. 412:)
"Generally an adequate remedy may be had at law for the
breach of a contract concerning any other
personalty than slaves, and therefore, as a
general rule, a court of equity will not enforce the execution of such a contract.
But
sometimes an adequate remedy at law cannot be had for the breach of such a contract,
and then its specific execution will be enAs it was said In May v.
forced in equity."
Le Claire, 11 Wall. 218, in order to oust
the equity jurisdiction,
the remedy at law
must be "as effectual and complete as the
chancellor can make it." The same princiby all the text-writers.
ple is recognized
See Fry, Spec. Perf. § 18; Pom. Spec. Perf.
Mr. Waterman says tersely: "If,
§ 29.
however, the remedy at law would be wholly

I
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SPECIFIC PERFOEMANCB
WELTZ

r. JACOBS et al.

(40 N. E. 723, 171 111. 624.)
Supreme

/^

Court of Illinois.

Feb.

14/ 1898.

Appeal from appellate court, First district
Bill in equity by George M. Welty to restrain H. R. Jacobs from refusing to perform a contract for the use of a theater,
and to enjoin Ulysses D. Newell from the
use and occupation of the same.
From the
decree of the appellate court (64 111. App.
285), aflBrming the decree of the superior
court of Cook county, in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Bulkley,
Gray & More, for appellant.
James B. Purnell, for appellee H. R. Jacobs.
Partridge & Partridge, for appellee V, D.
Newell.

CARTER, J. This was a bill for an Injunction filed December 28, 1895, in the superior court of Cook county, by the appellant, in which he alleged that he was a theatrical manager and proprietor;
that on
April 9, 1895, he entered into a written contract with H. B. Jacobs, manager, and representing M. J. Jacobs, proprietor, of the AIhambra Theater, in Chicago, to play his company in the "Black Crook" at such theater
for seven consecutive nights, commencing
December 29, 1895; that Jacobs was to furnish the house, well cleaned, lighted, and
heated, together with the stock, scenery, and
equipments contained therein, stage hands,
stage carpenter, fly men, regular ushers, gas
man, property man. Janitor, ticket seller,
orchestra, house programmes,
doorkeepers,
licenses, billboards, bill posting, distribution

of printed matter, usual newspaper adver-

tisements, and the resources of the theater
in stage furniture and properties not perishable; that Welty was to furnish a company
of first-class artists, to the satisfaction of
Jacobs, together with special scenery, calcium lights, etc., and also, 10 days in advance,
certain printing, prepaid and free from all
charges, consisting of a variety of bills, etc.;
that appellant was to receive 60 per cent,
of the gross receipts up to $5,000, and 70
that if the
per cent, on all over $5,000;
company should not prove satisfactory to
Jacobs, whose judgment was to be conclusive, or if the company should prove not to
be as represented,
then Jacobs should have
the right to cancel the contract by giving appellant at least one week's notice, by mail
or otherwise; that appellant's company was
not to appear at any other house in the city
prior to the date of the performance specified;
that If, by any unforeseen accident,
fire, or for any reason
whatever, Jacobs
could not furnish the house for said performance the contract was to become null and
void.
The bill further alleged that appellant had kept and performed all his covenants; that he had tendered the printing as
required, and that he was ready to furnish
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a satisfactory company; that he had received
no notice from Jacobs that his company was
not satisfactory nor as represented, and had
been given no notice of the termination of
his contract as therein provided; that within the then last 30 days Jacobs had entered
Into a contract with U. D. Newell for the
Alhambra Theater for the same week that
appellant's contract provided for; that Newell claims to be the manager of another company, also engaged in producing the "Black
Crook"; that Jacobs and Newell were combining and confederating to Injure and defraud appellant, as Newell had agreed to
produce the play for a less percentage than
appellant; that appellant had 40 performers under contract, and would be obliged to
pay them their salaries whether they performed or not, and that he could procure no
other place for his performance during said
time, and would be compelled
to remain
idle, at great expense; that the money value
of his contract could not be determined, either actually or approximately. In any other
manner than by carrying out and fully performing it according to its conditions; that
Jacobs and Newell had announced their intention of keeping appellant out of the possession and use of said theater; that appellees were financially irresponsible. The bill
prays for an order enjoining appellees from
hindering appellant and his company from
taking possession of the Alhambra Theater,
its appurtenances and stage property, and
from hindering, delaying, interfering with,
or preventing appellant from producing said
play in accordance with said contract, and
also restraining appellees from using or occupying said theater, its stock, scenery, and
equipments,
during said period of seven
days, and from allowing any other person
or company to use or occupy the same; and
also restraining and enjoining appellees from
refusing to furnish to appellant, during such
period, the usual and necessary light, heat,
music, regular stage hands, stage carpenter,
etc., and for general relief.
The injunction
was granted, and served on appellees December 28, 1895.
On December 30, 1895, a
rule was entered on appellees to show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt of court In violating this Injunction.
The next day an order was entered modifying the injunction so as to permit Newell to
produce the play at the Alhambra, and Jacobs
was ordered to pay into court 60 per cent
of the entire receipts received by him at the
Alhambra for the week, and to pay to Newell 30 per cent of such receipts, and the
On
cause was continued to January 3, 1896.
that day both appellees answered, replication was filed, and Newell moved for a disAppellee Jacobs
solution of the injunction.
In his answer admitted the making of the
contract with appellant but denied that appellant's company was satisfactory or as
represented, and alleged that he had notified
appellant thereof, and had canceled the con-
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junction was Improvidently Issued; and the
bill was therefore dismissed, and the money
Appellant apordered returned to Jacobs.
pealed, and asked that the money be retained in the clerk's hands pending the appeal, which was allowed, and the money
ordered left with the clerk until the final deThe appellate court
termination on appeal.
affirmed the decree, and appellant has further appealed to this court.
There was no sufficient proof that Jacobs
canceled his contract with Welty on any of
the grounds stipulated in it, and the question is not whether Jacobs was justified in
violating the contract, but whether his bill
of complaint for equitable relief can be sustained or he should be remitted to his action
at law. Strictly speaking, the bill was not
H one for specific performance, but for injune"tion only. It is clear from its allegations
and the authorities bearing upon the question that specific performance of the conIt is not, and
tract could not be decreed.

J/

j

/ /

I

•.

'

/The

and negotiations between all the parties to
this suit from December 16th until the bill
was filed; that, becoming alarmed that Jacobs would close up the Alhambra entirely
during that week, he (Newell) had procured
an injunction from the circuit court on December 27, 1895, and had It served on Jacobs the same day, restraining Jacobs from
closing up the theater during said week and
excluding his company from presenting their
play; charges appellant with laches and bad
faith in suppressing all information in regard to such first injunction, and alleged
that appellant's contract was in violation of
the statutes, which forbid any amusement
or diversion on Sunday, so that specific performance could not be enforced.
cause was heard by the court, and a
decree entered finding that the injunction
and that
had been violated by appellees,
under the order modifying the injunction
there had been paid into court $1,134.75;
that the equities were with the appellees;
and that the appellant had a complete and
adequate remedy at law, and that the in-

3

the Alhambra a number of articles belonging
to his company and had taken possession of
the same; alleged various communications

5

the Tompkins Black Crook Company in the
Alhambra for seven successive nights, beginning December 29, 1895, the contract being in all particulars Uke appellant's, except
as to the percentage of receipts; that as
early as December 27th he had removed to

cannot be, contended that appellant could
have been compelled, by any writ the court
could have issued, to occupy the theater
with his company of actors and give the performances contracted for, any more than a
public singer or speaker can be compelled
specifically to perform his contract to sing
Negative covenants not to sing
or speak.
or perform elsewhere at a certain time than
a designated place have been enforced by
the injunctive process, but further than this
such contracts have not been specifically enforced by the courts, by injunction or othLumley v. Wagner,
erwise.
De Gex, M.
G. 604; Daly v. Smith, 38 N. Y. Super. Ct.
158.
In Lumley v. Wagner there was an express covenant not to sing elsewhere than
at the complainant's theater, and the Injunction was placed on that ground.
But it is urged that negative covenants
may be implied as well as expressed, and,
when necessarily implied from the terms of
the contract, they will be enforced In like
manner;
citing the following cases:
Montague V. Flockton, L. E. 16 Eq. 189; Great
Northern Ey. Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. Ey.
De Gex & S. 138; Chicago & A. Ey. Co.
Co..
V. New York, L. E.
W. E. Co., 24 Fed. 516;
Singer Sewlng-Mach.
B. Co.,
Co. v. Union B.
Holmes, 253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904;
High,
Inj. (2d Ed.) 1150; Fredricks v. Mayer, 13
How. Prac. 566.
While there was a negative covenant in the contract under consideration against Welty, it is not important to
consider whether or not appellant might
have been enjoined from performing elsewhere than at Jacobs' theater at the time in
question, for It is manifest he could not
have been compelled to perform at said theater. Before a contract will be specifically
enforced there must be mutuality in the contract, so that it may be enforced by either;! —!.-u-<'
and, as this contract was of such a nature!
_^
that it could not have been specifically en-\
-~^
forced by appellee Jacobs, It should not be
Lancaster v. Eobso enforced by appellant.
erts, 144 111. 223, 33 N. B. 27; Pry, Spec.'
196;
Perf. 11 440, 441; Wat Spec. Perf.
Cooper v. Pena, 21 Cal. 411.
But it is urged that courts of equity will
by injunction restrain the violation of contracts of this character in many cases where
they cannot decree specific performance,
and the following among other cases are referred to: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Union
Fed. 423-429; WeUs, Fargo
Pac. Ey. Co.,
Co. V. Oregon E. & Nav. Co., 15 Fed. 561,
and 18 Fed. 517; Wells, Fargo & Co. v.
WithNorthern Pac. E. Co., 23 Fed. 469.
out determining whether there may not be
exceptional cases not falling within the general rule, we think the rule is as stated in
Chicago M. G. L. & F. Co. v. Town of Lake,
130 ni. 42, 22 N. B. 616, and the authorities
there quoted.
It was there said (page 60,
130 m., and page 619, 2E N. E.): "The bill
of complaint In this case, though not strictly
a bill for the specific performance of a con-

&

tract; denied all combination to injure appellant; admitted that he had made a contract
with NeweU for the same week he had formerly contracted to appellant; denied that
appellant had furnished the printing as required; and that he was without remedy exAppellee Newell
cept in a court of equity.
in his answer alleged that he had been informed that appellant's contract had been
canceled;
that on November 29, 1895, he
had made a contract with Jacobs to play
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find without them the use of the theater
building would oeem to be of little use. It
is practically c-uuceded by counsel tor appellant that this part of the contract could not
be specifically enforced as prayed, or otherwise, in equity; but it Is con' nded tha,t
this part of the contract is merely incidental
to the more important part of It, which wag
the right to occupy and use the theater and
Its furnishings, and give therein the performances provided for, and to exclude from
a like occupation and use the other appellee,
Newell, and that the injunction was proper
for that purpose.
This would have been an/\
indirect method of enforcing a part perform/ \
ance of the contract, and courts will not
force specific performance of particular stipL
ulatlons separated from the rest of the con\
tract, where they do not clearly stand by
themselves,
unaffected by other provisions.
Baldwin v. Fletcher, 48 Mlci^. 604, 12 N. W.
873.
Even if such a decree might have been
-tained, we are satisfied the sound legal
discretion of the court was not violated In
refusing It, or in dissolving the injunctlou
Appellant's remedy.
after it was granted.
If any he had, was at law. The judgment
of the appellate court is affirmed, judgment

enf
I

\

affirmed.
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tract, Is In substance a bill of that kind.
In 3 Pom. Bq. Jur. § 1341, It. Is said: 'An
restraining the breach of a contract Is a negative specific enforcement of
that contract. The jurisdiction of equity
Iinjiinction
to grant such injunction is substantially coincident with Its jurisdiction to compel a
Both are governed by
specific performance.
It may be
the same doctrine and rules.
stated, as a general proposition, that whenever the contract Is one of a class which
will be affirmatively specifically enforced, a
court of equity will restrain its breach by
Injunction, if this is the only practical mode
of enforcement which its terms permit.' "
It Is plain that, as a general rule, to enjoin
one from doing something in violation of his
Is an indirect
contract
mode of enforcing
the affirmative provisions of such contract,
although such an injunction may often fall
short of accomplishing its object.
It is obvious from what has been said and from
the authorities that to enjoin appellee Jacobs, as prayed In the bill, from refusing to
furnish the usual and necessary light, heat,
music, regular stage hands, stage carpenter, ushers, equipments, etc., provided for
In the contract, would be the same, In substance, as to command him to furnish th"m.
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JONES

V.

XEWriALL.

(115 Mass.
Supreme Judicial
Suffolk.

Bill for

ANOB OF CONTRACXiS.

244.)

Court of Massachnsptts.
June 20, 1874.

specific performance by Leonard S.
against Benjamin B. Newliall.
From
a judgment overruling
a demurrer to the
complaint defendant appealed.
The case was
heard before Ames, J., who decided that
plaintiff was entitled to the decree prayed
for, from which decision defendant also apOn report to the full court.
pealed.
Demurrer sustained and bill dismissed.
The agreement,
the specific performance
of which was prayed, is as follows:
"This
indenture, made this fourth day of December, A. D. 1872, by and between Leonard S.
Jones, of Cambridge in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts,
and Benjamin B. Newhall, of Boston in said Commonwealth, witThat said Jones agrees to sell, and
Sijnesseth,
j^aid Newhall to purchase, first, all the rigljt,
I title, share and interest of the saiid Jones to
and in any and all property belonging to the
Worthington Land Associates, together wit*i
^j
I one promissory note for ten thousand doJilkrs, dated April 18, 1872, belonging to said
yones, and being one of five of even amount
and date given by Samuel A. Wheelock and
by mortgage on land conveyed by
(secured
said associates to T. A. Ballou and others:
second, all the right, title, share and interest of said Jones to and in any and all
property belonging to the Dorchester Land
Association,
the share of said Jones consisting of fourteen shares of the stock of said
Dorchester
Land Association, together with
two mortgage notes of $3,467.95 and $4,743.36, respectively, given by Samuel A. Wheelock to said Benjamin
B. Newhall.
For
which said property, said Newhall agrees to
pay to said Jones the amount of all moneys
invested by said Jones in said associations,
Interest on the same at seven per cent, per
annum from the time of investment to the
date hereof, and the additional sum of five
thousand dollars as bonus.
Said investments,
interest,
and bonus, amounting in all to
thirty-four thousand one hundred and ninetysix 33/100 dollars, payable as follows: viz.,
ten per cent, of said sum, viz., 3,419o3/i„5
dollars in cash, on the delivery of this agreement, and the balance in nine monthly payments, the first five of such payments to be
3,75534/100 dollars each, and to be made one
in each of the first months of the year A. D.
1873, and the remaining four of said nine
to be of 3,000 dollars each, and
payments
to be made one in each of the months of June^
July, August, and September of said year
1873, with interest on said payments at the
It is
rate of seven per cent, per annum.
that If said Newhall
agreed, nevertheless,
shall elect to anticipate any of said payJones
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ments,

said Jones shall receive the same
when ofEered. And it is further agreed, that
of said first payment of ten per cent, of said
whole amount, two thousand dollars shall he
applied to the payment of the property second above desci-ibed, and 1,419 os/i 00 dollars
shall be applied to the payment of said property first above described;
that the five of
said monthly payments next ensuing shall be
i applied to the payment of said property first
and, together with said
described,
above
1,41903/100 dollars, shall be deemed full pay-'
ment therefor; and when made, said Jones
agrees to transfer, convey, and deliver to
said Newhall or his heirs or assigns, all the
property first above described, and execute
and deliver to him or them all instruments of
conveyance necessary or proper for the conthat after said
j veyance of said property;
• transfer
or delivery, the property second
j above described shall be transferred, conveyNewhall or his
; ed, and delivered to said
i heirs or assigns, in amounts of one thousand
multiples thereof, as payments of
I dollars or
by said
i like amounts shall then be made
Newhall; an amount of said property equal
first payment of
j to said 2000 dollars of said
ten per cent, being retained by said Jones
until the final transfer; and that all proper
of the same shall
; instruments of conveyance
and delivered as is above proi be executed
I vided In the case of the property first deAll increase arising in the mean
I scribed.
i time from the sale of either of said properties above described or otherwise, whether
in cash, mortgages, notes, or other securities, shall be held in trust by said Jones for
said Newhall, and delivered, transferred, and
to said Newhall, his heirs or asconveyed
signs, at the times above provided for the
final transfer of either of said properties respectively. And it is further agreed, that
said Newhall shall hold said Jones harmless
from all taxes or assessments of whatever
kind or by whomsoever levied or assessed
upon said property above described, whether
Said
now existing or hereafter created.
Xewhall is hereby empowered to appear at
all meetings of the associations above named,
vote, and otherwise take part in the transaction of business at said meetings, in the
place and stead of said Jones, as fully as
said .Tones could do; and is hereby nomithe attorney of said
nated and appointed
Jones to that extent." The bill alleged the
execution of the agreement, the transfer of
the plaintiff's interest in the Worthington
Land Association, and payment therefor, and
that there remained due from defendant \
four of the monthly pavments specified inJXi.
that may /
and assessments
the agreement,
he made on the Dorchester Land Association.

R. D. Smith & A. B. Jones, for plaintiff.
A. C. Clark, for defendant
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WELLS, 3. Jurisdiction In equity is conferred upon ttiis court by Gen. St. c. 113, {
2, to hear and determine "suits for tlie specific performance of written contracts by
and against either party to the contract,
and his heirs, devisees, executors, administrators and assigns." The power extends alike
to written contracts of all descriptions, but
its exercise is restricted by the proviso,
"when the parties have not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at the common
This proviso has always been so conlaw."
strued and applied as to make it a test, in
each particular case, by which to determine
whether jurisdiction in equity shall be entertained. If the only relief to which the
plaintiff would be entitled in equity is the
same in measure and kind as that which he
might obtain in a suit at law, he can have
no standing upon the equity side of the
court, unless his remedy at law is doubtful,
circuitous, or complicated by multiplicity of
parties having different interests. Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 6 Pick. 376,
396; Sears v. Boston, 16 Pick. 357; Wilson
V. Leishman, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 316, 321; Hilliard v. Allen, 4 Cush. 532, 535; Pratt v.
Pond, 5 Allen, 59; Glass v. Hulbert, 102
Mass. 24, 27; Ward v. Peck, 114 Mass. 121.
In contracts for the sale of personal property jurisdiction In equity is rarely entertained, although the only remedy at law
may be the recovery of damages, the measure of which is the difference between the
market value of the property at the time of
the breach and the price as fixed by the
contract. The reason is that, in regard to
most articles of personal property, the commodity and its market value are supposed
to be substantially equivalent, each to the
other, so that they may be readily interThe seller may convert his rechanged.
jected goods into money; the purchaser,
with his money, may obtain similar goods;
each presumably at the market price; and
the difference between that and the contract
price, recoverable at law, will be full Indemnity. Jones V. Boston Mill Corp., 4 Pick.
507, 511; Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607;
Harnett , v. Yielding, 2 Schoales & L. 549,
553; Adams, Eq. 83; Fry, Spec. Perf. §§ 12,
29.

It Is otherwise with fixed property like
Compensation in damages,
real estate.
measured by the difference in price as ascertained by the market value and by the contract, has never been regarded In equity as
such adequate indemnity for nonfulfillment
of a contract for the sale or purchase of
land as to justify the refusal of relief In
equity. When that is the extent of the
right to recover at law, a bill in equity is
maintainable, even in favor of the vendor,
to enforce fulfillment of the contract, and
payment of the full amount of the price
agreed on.
Old Colony Railroad v. Evans, 6
Gray, 25.

OF CONTRACTS.

Although the general subject Is within the
chancery jurisdiction of the court, yet inadequacy of the damages recoverable at law
Is essential to the right to Invoke its action
as a court of chancery in any particular case.
The rule is the same whether applied to the
contracts for the sale of real or of personal
estate.
The difference In the application
arises from the difference In the character
of the subject-matter of the contracts in respect to the question whether damages at
law will afford full and adequate Indemnity
to the party seeking relief.
If the character
of the property be such that the loss of the
contract will not be fairly compensated In
damages based upon an estimate of its market value, relief may be had in equity,
whether it relates to real or to personal esAdderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607;
tate.
Duncuft V. Albrecht, 12 Sim. 189, 199; Clark
V. Flint, 22 Pick. 231; Story, Eq. Jur. § 717;
Adams, Eq. 83; Pry, Spec. Perf. §§ 11, 23,
30, 37.

The property in question In this case ap
pears to be of such a character. It is not
material, therefore, whether the interest of
the plaintiff Is In the nature of realty or of
personalty. But the relief he seeks is not
such as to require the aid of a court of
equity. At the time this bill was filed the
only obligation on the part of the defendant
to be enforced either at law or in equity
was his express promise to pay a definite
sum of money as an installment towards the
purchase of certain property from the plaintiff. That promise is supported by the executory agreement of the plaintiff to convey
the property, contained in the same instrument, as its consideration; but In respect of
performance the several promises of the defendant are separable from the entirety of
the contract, and each one may be enforced
by itself as an assumpsit.
The plaintiff is
not obliged to sue in damages upon his contract as for a general breach. He may recover at law the full amount of the installment due.
In equity he can have no decrgft
beyond that.
He can_ngt__cpme into equi^
what he can have at Bw:~
to_obtaln~breclsely
Howe v. Nickerson, 14 Allen, 4(
Jacobs v. Peterborough & S. R. Co., 8 Gush.
223; GIU V. Bicknell, 2 Cush. 355; Russell
V. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69.
The plaintiff has no occasion for any order
of the court in regard to performance by himself. At most, all that is necessary for him
to do In order to recover his judgment at
law, is to offer a conveyance of a portion of
his interest corresponding to the amount of
the installment due.
We do not regard the fact, stated in the
report, that the defendant "also refused to
pay an assessment then due, or about to become due," for which he was bound by the
contract to provide, and hold the plaintiff
harmless; because that Is immaterial upon
demurrer, there being no allegation In the
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bill In reference to It And besides, there
would be suflSclent remedy at law for such a
breach, if It were sufficiently alleged and
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could have no other relief than recovery oi
the same amount of money due or measure
of damages as would have been awarded by
judgment in the court of law. Hall v. Warproved.
If the plaintiff will be compelled to bring ren, 9 Ves. 605; Walker v. Eastern Counseveral actions for his full remedy at law, ties Ry. Co., 6 Hare, 594; Kenney v. WexIt is because he has a contract payable in ham, 6 Madd. 355.
Installments; that is, he may have several
In contracts respecting land there Is an
I'
But he may sue them sev- additional consideration for maintaining jucauses of action.
erally, or he may join them all in one suit, risdiction in equity in favor of the vendor
when all shall have fallen due, at his own as well as the vendee, which is doubtless
He is not driven into equity to much more influential with the English
election.
- escape the necessity of many suits at law.
courts than it can be here; and that is the
It is true, as the plaintiff insists, that doctrine of equitable conversion. It is rea different rule exists in the English courts ferred to as a reason for the exercise of juof chancery, and that in numerous cases, not risdiction at the suit of the vendor, in Cave
unlike the present, relief in equity has there V. Cave, 2 Eden, 139; Eastern Counties By.
been granted by decree for payment of a Co. V. Hawkes, 5 H. L. Cas. 331; Fry, Spec.
Perf. § 23.
due by contract, although
sum of money
In Massachusetts, instead of a distinct and
recoverable at law. The maxim,
equally
which, as we apply it, makes the want of independent court of chancery, with a jurisadequate remedy at law essential to the diction derived from and defined and fixed
right to have relief in equity in each case, by long usage, we have certain chancery
has always been attached to chancery Juris- powers conferred upon the court of common
But in the English courts it has law, whose jurisdiction and modes of remdiction.
been rather by way of indicating the nature edy as a court of law had already become exand defining tended much beyond those of English courts
and origin of the jurisdiction,
the class of rights or subjects to which it of common law, partly by statutes and partattaches, than as a constant limit upon its ly by its own adaptation of its remedies to
r exercise.
Courts of chancery were created the necessities which arose from the absence
I to supply defects in proceedings at common of the court of chancery. This difference in
\law. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 49, 54. Their juris- the relations of the two jurisdictions would
diction grew out of the exigencies of the alone give occasion for different rules govearlier periods in the judicial history of the erning their exercise. Black v. Black, 4 Pick.
country, and was from time to time enlarged 234, 238; Tirrell v. Merrill, 17 Mass. 117, 121;
to meet those exigencies. Its limits, having Baker v. Biddle, Baldw. 394, Fed. Cas. No.
become defined and fixed by usage, have not 764.
contracted as the jurisdiction of the comThe successive statutes by which the eqIt has al- uity powers of this court have been confermon-law courts was extended.
once ac- red or enlarged have always affixed to their
ways been held that jurisdiction
quired in chancery, over any subject or class exercise the condition that "the parties have
of rights, is not taken away by any subsenot a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
This has been conquent enlargement of the powers of the at the common law."
courts of common law, nor by reason of any strued as referring "to remedies at law as
new modes of remedy that may be afforded they exist under our statutes and accordby those courts. Story, Eq. Jur. § 64i; Snell, ing to our course of practice." Pratt v. Pond,
Eq. 335; Slim v. Croucher. 1 De Gex, F. & 5 Allen, 59. It has also been repeatedly held
that, in reference to the range of jurisdicJ. 518.
Hence arose a wide range of concurrent tion conferred, the several statutes were to
jurisdiction, within which chancery proceed- be construed strictly. Black v. Black, and
ed to administer appropriate remedies, with- ChCxies River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, ubi
out regard to the question whether a like supra. No reason or necessity remains for
remedy could be had in the courts of law. the maintenance of concurrent jurisdiction,
Colt V. WooUaston, 2 P. Wms. 154; Green v. except for the sake of a more perfect remBarrett, 1 Sim. 45; Blain v. Agar, 2 Sim. edy in equity when the plaintiff shall estab289;
Cridland v. De Mauley, 1 De Gex & S. lish his right to it And such we understand
459;
Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174; Bur- to be the purport and intent of our statMilkman v. Ordrowes V. Lock, 10 Ves. 470. One of its max- utes upon the subject.
ims was that there must be mutuality of way, 106 Mass. 232; Angell v. Stone, 110
Accord- Mass. 54.
right to avail of that jurisdiction.
A similar restriction upon the equity jurisingly, if the contract or cause of complaint
was such that one of the parties might re- diction of the federal courts is so construed
quire the peculiar relief which chancery with great strictness. Oelricks v. Spain, 15
alone could afford, it was frequently held Wall. 211, 228; Grand Chute v. Winegar,
that the principle of mutuality required that Id. 373; Phoenix Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey,
jurisdiction should be equally maintained in 13 Wall. 616; Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake
favor of the other party, who sought and Cotton & Woollen Co., 2 Black, 545; Baker
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Biddle, Baldw. 394, Fed. Cas. No. 7t54.
See, also, Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Me. 531;
Piscataquis F. & M. Ins. Go. v. Hill, 60 Me.
V.

178.

Even in courts of general chancery powers
and of independent organization, while the
power to entertain bills relating to all matters which in their nature are within their
is maintained, yet
concurrent jurisdiction
the usual course of practice is to remit parties to their remedy at law, provided that
be plain and adequate, unless for some reason of peculiar advantage which equity is
to possess, or some other cause
supposed
influencing the discretion of the court. Kerr,
Fraud & M. 45; Bisp. Eq. § 200; also, Id.
§ 37; Snell, Bq. 334; Clifford v. Brooke, 13
Ves. 131; Whitmore v. Mackeson. 16 Beav.
126;
Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327;
Hoare v. Bremridge, L. R. 14 Bq. 522, 8 Ch.
App. 22.
The doctrine of Colt y. WooUaston, 2 P.
Wms. 154, and Green v. Barrett, 1 Sim. 45,
tUougn not expressly overruled, has been
questioned
(Thompson v. Barclay, 9 Law J.
Ch. 215, 219), and does not seem to govern
the usual practice of the courts See cases

OF CONTRACTS.
above
749.

:^

1

>^

and Newham v. May,

13

Price

But, Independently of statute restrictions,
the objection that the plaintiff may have a
sufficient remedy or defense at law In the
particular case is a matter of equitable discretion, rather than of jurisdictional right;
and is therefore not always available on
demurrer. Colt v. Nettervill, 2 P. Wms. 304;
Kamshire v. Bolton, L. R. 8 Eq. 294; Hill v.
Lane, L. R. 11 Eq. 215; Barry v. Croskey, 2
Johns. & H. 1.
According to the practice In this commonwealth, on the other hand, under the statutes relating to the exercise of jurisdiction
In equity, a bill is demurrable, not only if4
it show that the plaintiff has a remedy at
law, equally sufficient and available, but also
If it fail to show that he is without such
remedy.
Pool v. Lloyd, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 525,529; Woodman v. Saltonstall, 7 Cush. 181,
Pratt V. Pond, 5 Allen, 59; Clark v. Jones,
Id. 379; Metcalf v. Cady, 8 Allen, 587; Mill
River Loan Fund Ass'n v. Claflin, 9 Allen,
101; Com. V. Smith, 10 Allen, 448; Bassett
v. Brown, 100 Mass. 355, 105 Mass. 551, 560.
The demurrer, therefore, must be sustained, and the bill dismissed.
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OF CONTRACTS.

,

Nov. 4, ISTa'^i^r^

Demurrer.
The, plaintiffs In this case, Richard FotherglU and Ernest Thomas Hankey, were ironmasters, carrying on the Aberdare Ironworks.
The defendant Richard Rowland
of the Newbridge Colliery.

was lessee

The bill alleged that the plaintiffs had for
accustomed to purchase coals
of the defendant Rowland, and that at the
hereinafter
time of making the agreement
mentioned there was a subsisting contract,
imder which Rowland was supplying the
plaintiffs from 1871 to the 4th of January,
1872, with a quantity of coal from the said
some time been

colliery.

That at the time of the making of the
agreement of the 6th of December,
1871,
the Newbridge Colliery was only opened upon one seam of coal, called "the No. 3 seam,"
and was only partially opened on that seam;
that Rowland was anxious to extend the
openings in the seam, and had made representations to that effect to the plaintiffs,
and that he (Rowland) was short of capital
for extending his works, and that, with a
comparatively small outlay, the colliery would
produce nearly 300 tons of coal a day, and
that if a siding could be had on the Taff
Vale Railway, near the Taff Vale Ironworks,
he (Rowland) would be able to deliver the
coal with greater facility and a considerable
reduction of cost.
That the plaintiffs were then in a position to consume at the ironworks a much
larger quantity of coal than they had previously taken, and were disposed to make an
arrangement
with Rowland to supply him
with capital to enable him to extend his colliery, and also to make an arrangement with
the Taff Vale Railway Company for the construction of a siding, provided that Rowland
would enter into a contract of sale to the
plaintiffs of aU the coal which the said colliery, would produce,
for a lease of five
years, provided that the quantity then supplied should not be less than a stated minimum.
That negotiations for an arrangement upon this footing resulted in an agreement,
come to at a meeting, between the plaintiffs
and Rowland on the 6th of December, 1871,
by which they agreed that Rowland should
sell to the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs
should buy the whole of the get of the coal
of the No. 3 seam of the said colliery for
five years, the quantity not to be less than
that then delivered to the Taff Vale Ironworks, unless the coal should fail, at 6s. per
ton, provided that the Taff Vale RailwayCompany would provide a siding to which
Rowland should forthwith m^ke a road, and
that the plaintiffs should lend to Rowland
£1,000 to aid him in opemng the colliery and
that this agreement was reduced to writing
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in the form of a pencil memorandum signed
by Rowland, and about the same time the
plaintiffs agreed with Rowland that, besides
the coal of the said No. 3 seam, another vein
should be included in the contract, and, at
any
the option of the plaintiff Fothergill,
other vein of coal within the colliery should
be included.
That the said agreements were reduced
to writing by a memorandum
in the form of
a letter of the 4th of January, 1872, addressed to Rowland and confirmed by him in writing, and another memorandum subscribed
thereto of the 5th of January, 1872, which
were as follows:

I

"Dear Sir:
have been excessively occupied since our interview last month, and have
not found time to sit down and write in detail
that which we mutually agreed upon beyond
the sunple sale of coal described in the pencil
memorandum we drew up together in the
following

" 'Sold

terms:

"

'6 Dec.

1871.

R. F., Esq., M. P., the whole of the
get of the No. 3 coal out of the Newbridge
Colliery property for five years, the quantity
not to be less than at present delivered to

his Taff Vale works, imless the coal should
fall, at 6s. per ton payment as usual.'

"To which I desire now to add that we
arranged, when so required, that you would
deliver the said coal into oiu* wagons on a
siding of the Taff Vale Railway at such a
reduction in price as you could obtain off the
cost in comparison with the delivery Into the
Taff Vale works, provided that the Taff Vale
Railway Company would provide such siding (which you had not been able to obtain),
and to which you w^ould forthwith make a
road; in reference to which I am glad to
Inform you that I have seen Mr. Fisher, and
obtained his consent to his company providing the needful siding, a most valuable conIn prospect of the possibly very
cession
large quantities of coal you talked of flooding
I also promised to lend you £1,0(X),
me with.
and developing the
to aid you in opening
said colliery at the rate of £5 per cent, per
annum interest, to be taken in such proportions monthly as you require in exchange for
at six months' date, all
your acceptances
which please confirm, and I remain,
"Yours faithfully,
"Rich. Fothergill."
"5th Jan.

1872.

"It

between us that besides
is understood
the No. 3 coal named herein that the Forest
Vach vein is included in the foregoing contract, and, further, that any other vein of coal
worked shall be Included at tie option of Mr.
FotherglU or representatives.

"Rich. Fothergill.
"Richd. Rowland."

That in part performance of the said agreement Rowland had commenced to deliver coal
from the said coUiery to the ironworks; that
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It is said, however, that, although yon can
ascertain the market price as regards all the
past nondelivery, you cannot ascertain exactly
To
the market price as to future deliveries.
say that you cannot ascertain the damage in
case of breach of contract for the sale of
extending
goods, say in monthly deliveries
over three years (which is the case here,
for there are three years unexpired of the
contract), is to limit the power of ascertaining damages in
way which would rather
astonish gentlemen who practice on what is
called the other side of Westminster Hall
There is never considered to be any difBthing, therefore
culty in ascertaining such
case in which damdo not think it Is
ages could not be ascertained at law.
That being so, what is there to distinguish this from any ordinary contract for
has
the sale of goods? We have been told
suppose
some connection with the colliery.
coals must necessarily have connection with
colliery, and it happens that the person
who sold the coal to be produced from givIt
a

I

I

I

a

I

feel no doubt
SIR G. JESSBL, M. R.
whatever on the question, therefore I think it
never did
Is my duty to give a decision.
do not apapprove, when at the bar, and
prove now, when on the bench, of the practice of not deciding a substantial question
when It is fairly raised between the parties
and argued, simply because it is raised by
It is a great benefit to all parties
demurrer.

I

a

a

Sharp & Ullithorne, agents for Simons &
Plews, Merthyr Tydvil, for plaintiffs. I. H.
Wrentmore, W. Kelly, and Mr. Goslhig, for
defendants.

to have the question in the case speedily and
cheaply determined,
and the practice of demurring ought, if possible, to be encouraged.
The question is one which
am sorry to
have to decide against the plaintiffs.
No honest man, whether on the bench or off
can
approve of the conduct of the defendants.
The first defendant, Rowland, has entered Inr
to a contract bona fide for valuable considerations to sell
quantity of coal to be raised
from his mine to the plaintiffs. He has received the advantages of the contract, and because coal has risen in value and he can get
better price elsewhere, he does not choose to
perform his contract.
Such conduct ought not
to meet with the approval of anybody.
Then
have to determine is, whether
the question
^he plaintiffs have come to the right court to
obtain that which the law will undoubtedly
compensation
give them, namely,
in some
shape or other for the loss they have sustained by this breach of contract.
It appears to
me, as the law now stand s, a conrt of egulty cannot give the m any relie
The first question is, what is the contract
for? In my view of the contract
one for
the sale of coals, that is, coals gotten, the get
of coa!, the severed chattel, and it_has_noj:fis.
lation yy hatever to
contract for re al estate.
That point rSrHy was noT'SfgnS315y"Mr.~i!'ry,~
although
Mr. Marten did touch upon it
think it must be assumed, therefore, to he
simple contract for the sale of
chattel of
very ord inarY fipijinriptinii^ji ot alleged to be
peculiar coal, or coal that 'cannot ie got elseread the hill,
where.
On the contrary, as
there is coal that can be got elsewhere of the
higher price. The
same description, only at
result is that the plaintiffs will incur an
amount of damage to be measured by the
market price which they may have to pay for
as the coal
the coal of the same description
agreed to be supplied by the defendant Row-

a

the plaintiffs had advanced to him the sum ot
£1,000,
which he had employed in extending
the colliery; and that the siding was constructed by the Taff Vale Railway Company
tmder the arrangement made with them hy
one of the plaintiffs.
That after January, 1872, coal of the description yielded by the colliery increased very
much in value, and that Rowland had appealed to the plaintiffs to make some modification in the contract, which they had refused,
though they had made an allowance by way
of gift to the amount of one-third of the contract price; but that no variations in the contract had been assented to by the plaintiffs.
That coal of the description yielded by the
colliery had advanced from Cs. to 13s. per ton.
That the plaintiffs had discovered that Rowland, in violation of the terms of his agreement, was selling coal from the said No. 3
seam to other persons than the plaintiffs; and
that the deliveries were greatly below the
minimum quantities specified in the contract.
That in August, 1873, the plaintiffs discovered that Rowland had entered into an agree-'
ment with the defendants Spickett, Price, Bassett, and Meyer, for the sale to them of the
colliery; and that such agreement was entered into for the purpose of evading the performance
on the part of Rowland of the
agreement between the plaintiffs and himself,
and of depriving the plaintiffs of their lights
in the premises.
The plaintiffs prayed, first, for an Injunction to restrain the defendants from selling,
assigning, or disposing of or interfering with
the colliery, except subject to the agreement
between the plaintiffs and Rowland; and from
selling, disposing of or interfering with anj\
coal gotten or to be gotten out of the said
colliery, except for the purpose of the performance
of the agreement;
and, secondly,
that it might be declared that the plaintiffs
were entitled to the whole of the get of the
seam of coal No. 3, and of the Forest Vach
vein of the coUiery, and also, at the option of
the plaintiffs, to the whole of the get. of any
other seam of coal worked at the colliery during the period of five years, upon the terms of
the said agreement embodied In the memoranda of the 6th of December, 1871, and the 4th
and 5th of January, 1872.
The defendants demurred to the bill.
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colliery was also at that time the owner
of the colliery. I apprehend there Is no difficulty about entering into a contract for
the sale of coal coming from a particular
colliery by persons not owners of that colliery; that is the common practice. The
coals not being delivered, and there being
no means of obtaining their delivery without compelling the defendant Rowland to
raise them, it has been admitted before me
that this is a contract of which you cannot obtain a specific performance in a court
of equity.
Therefore any relief to be obtained by the
plaintifCs in the shape of compensation must
be obtained at law, and I do not understand
that the plaintiffs, coming here for an injunction which they ask, are willing to abandon
their claim to compensation at law in the
shape of damages.
Then it is said, assuming this contract to
be one which the court cannot specifically
perform, it is yet a case in which the court
will restrain the defendants from breaking
But I have always felt, when
the contract.
at the bar, a very considerable
dlflftculty in
understanding
the court on the one hand
professing to refuse specific performance because it is difficult to enforce it, and yet
on the other hand attempting to do the same
If it is right
^thing by a roimdabout method.
to prevent the defendant Rowland from selling coal at all, he not having stipulated not
to sell coal, but having stipulated to sell all
the coal he can raise to somebody who has
promised valuable consideration, —why is it
not right to compel him to raise it and deliver it? It is difficult to follow the distinction, but I cannot find any distinct line laid
down, or any distinct limit which I could
seize upon and define as being the line dividing the two classes of cases— that is, the
class of cases in which the court, feeling
that it has not the power to compel specific
performance, grants an injunction to restrain
the breach by the contracting party of one
or more of the stipulations of the contract,
and the class of cases in which it refuses to
Interfere.
I have asked (and am sure I
should have obtained from one or more of
the learned counsel engaged in the case every
I have not only
assistance) for a definition.
not been able to obtain the answer, but I
en

I
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obtained that which altogether commands my assent, namely, that there is no
such distinct line to be fo'und in tht authorities.
I am referred to vague and general
propositions,— that the rule is that the court
is to find out what it considers convenient,
or what will be a case of sufficient importance to authorize
the interference of the
court at all, or something of that kind.
That being so, and not being able to discover any definite
principle on which the
court can act, I must follow what Lord St.
Leonards says, in Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De
Gex, M. & G. 604, is the proper conduct for
a judge, in not extending this jurisdiction.
am not, however, entirely without assistance from authority, because it appears to
me that this very case has been put, though
only by way of illustration, by a very great
judge. Lord Cottenham, in Heathcote v. Railway Co., 2 Macn. & G. 112, where he says:
"If A. contract with B. to deliver goods at a
ceitain time and place, will equity interfere
to prevent A. from doing anything which
may or can prevent him from so deUvering
the goods?" That is the exact case I have
to deal with, because I have decided that
the contract is a contract for the delivery of
Finding the dictum of Lord Cottengoods.
ham express on the subject, and the plaintiffs' counsel not having been able to produce to me any authority in which there has
been such an injunction granted on the sale
of goods or any chattel, in a case in which
specific performance could not be granted, I
think I shall do right in following that ausay, although I say it with
thority; and
much regret, that it is a case in which equity
can afford no relief.
With regard to the question of costs, I
think it is undesirable to take the technical
admission of the facts of the bill, when a
person files a demurrer, to be an admission
of the truth of the facts against him for the
If there is no remedy at
purpose of costs.
aU at law, I think the rule that the costs
should follow the result too valuable a one
with. On these grounds I
to be tampered
allow the demurrer, with the usual consehave

I

I

quences.

A petition of appeal was presented against
this decision, but the case was compromised
before it came to a hearing.
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PHILADBIiPHIA

et al. v.

CAPE MAY
(30

N.

S. L..

J.

Eq.
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Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct. Term,

1878.

Bill for specific performance. Heard on bill
and answer.

J.

W. Griggs,

House,

for

for complainants.

W. A.

defendants.

RUNYON, Ch. The bill Is filed to obtain
a decree for specific performance, by the defendants, of a contract entered into between
the complainants, partners in business, and
them, on the 19th of December,
by
1877,
which the former agreed to construct, equip
and finish, for the latter, a single-track, narrow-gauge railroad, and telegraph line in connection therewith, from the terminus of the
Camden, Gloucester & Mount Ephraim Railway to high-water mark in the city of Cape
May, with stations, engine and freight houses,
machine and repair-shops, turn-tables,
waterstations, &c., &c., and all necessary terminal
facUitles, for $2,000,000, payable in the capital
stock and first mortgage bonds of the company.
By the contract, the complainants were to
complete the work within five months after
the bonds were negotiated and sold at a price
not less than ninety cents on a doUar of the
par value thereof; and it was stipulated that
they should not be sold at less than that price
without the consent of both parties.
The bill states that the complainants entered
on the work, and proceeded with it from the
date of the contract to the 20th of February
following; that there was, at the latter date,
due to them, under the contract, the sum o'f
that they were then
$40,000, or thereabouts;
'
entitled to have an estimate made, but the
defendants refused to make it, or to pay them,
or to carry out the contract, which the complainants allege would be of great value to
them if performed; and, further, that the defendants cannot respond in damages for their
refusal to carry out the agreement; and that
the complainants could profitably dispose of
the bonds and stock stipulated for as payment
The bill prays that the defendants may be decreed to spedficaUy perform the contract generally, and, also, that they may be required to
make the estimate before mentioned, and deliver bonds and stock to the complainants for
the amount which may be found due them
thereon.

The defendants' answer admits the contract and declares their willingness to perform
it, but alleges their inability to do so by reason of the provisions of an act of the legislature of this state (a supplement to the general
railroad law), approved on the 19th of February, 1878. By one of those provisions the
provision of the original act requiring that the
articles of association should not be filed until
at least $2,000 of stock for every mile of the

OF CONTRACTS.

proposed railroad should have been subscribed
and ten per cent paid thereon, was altered
so as to require that the entire amount of
$2,000 per mile shall be paid to the treasurer
of this state, to be repaid by him to the directors or treasurer of the company in the
manner specified in the supplement, as the
work of constructing the railroad shall progress. By the other, the provision of the original act which authorized the mortgaging of
the road, &c., of the company, to secure the
payment of their bonds to an amount not exceeding the amount of the paid-up capital
stock, was altered by adding a provision that
if any person or persons shall issue such bonds
to any greater amount than the amount which
at the time of such issue shall have been
actually paid up on the capital stock of the
company, he, she or they shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction, be punished
by fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment at hard labor for not more than three
years, or both, at the discretion of the court
These provisions of the supplement were therein expressly made applicable to corporations
already organized under the original act The
defendants state that they have expended all
the money received by them on account of
their capital stock in the work on the road,
and that they are not able to comply with the
provisions of the supplement and that, by the
terms of the supplement, their charter is forfeited, by reason of their failure to comply

with the provisions of that act
There are several considerations which forbid the granting of the relief prayed for in
this suit If this court would undertake the
performance of such a contract as that stated
In the bill, a contract for building and equipping a long line of railroad, building station,
freight and engine houses, &c., &c. (and the
current and great weight of authority is decidedly against it— Story, Eq. Jur. § 726; Ross
T. Union Pac. R. Co., 1 Woolw. 26, Fed. Gas.
No. 12,080; Fallon v. Railroad Co., 1 DiU.
121, Fed. Gas. No. 4,629; South Wales R. Co.
V. Wythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880), the dlsability of the defendants would be a sufficient
reason for refusing. Courts of equity will
never undertake to enforce specific performance of an agreement where the decree would
be a vain or imperfect act Tobey v. County
of Bristol, 2 Story, 800, Fed. Gas. No. 14,065.
And the incapacity of the defendant to carry
the contract into execution affords a ground
of defence in a suit for specific performance.
Fry, Spec. Perf. § 658.
In this case the defendants are willing to
perform their part of the, contract if they can
lawfully do so. They have never refused to
issue their bonds and stock to the complainants in accordance with the terms of the contract, except because of the provisions of the
supplement
above referred to, under which
they apprehend they may have lost their corporate existence, and by which, if their corporate existence be not lost their directors
and officers who should act in the matter
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would be liable to severe and ignomlniouB I stances of the case, declare that the apprehensions, or doubts at least, of the defendants,
punishment for so doing.
P. L. 1878, p. 23.
They have not complied with the provisions
as to the validity of the supplement, are wholly groundless, and direct them to proceed, notof the supplement in reference to the amount
withstanding the penalties above mentioned,
to be paid in on their capital stock, and have
to issue bonds according to the contract and In
not been able and are not able to .do so. Only
violation of the prohibition of the supplement;
ten per cent, of the amount of their capital
to subject themselves to indictment for misstock has been paid in. Their corporate powextinct,
demeanor and the consequences of conviction.
ers are, according to the supplement,
It is enough that the legislature has forbidden f^
P. Ii. 1878,
and the corporation is dissolved.
them to issue the bonds to induce this court
p. 22. The complainants, however, insist that
to refuse to order them to issue them. But,
the supplement is an unconstitutional law; that
further, there Is at least doubt whether the
it destroys their contract, which existed when
company still has a corporate existence.
it was passed, and which was founded on the
Though the court might, if the case were
faith of the original act; that it deprives
free from these difficulties, direct the defendand
them of their vested rights thereunder,
ants to make the estimate of work already
that it should be declared to be unconstitudone prayed for In the bill CVVaring v. Railtional, and its provisions, so far as they are
subject to that objection, disregarded.
Bat it way Co., 7 Hare, 482), yet, for the considerations already presented, that relief must also
is in nowise necessary to consider that question; for, If there were no other valid objecbe denied.
, The bill wis be dismissed.
tion, this court would not, under the circum-
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the second part the necessary privileges and
requisite facilities for the transaction of all
the express business over the entire length of
(99 U. S. 191.)
their road, extending from Salisbury to MorOct
Supreme Court of the United States.
ganton, in North Carolina, arid furnish such
1878.
facihtles by all its passenger trains running
each way over its road as may be necessary
Appeal from the circuit court of the Unitto forward without delay all the express mated States for the Western district of North
ter that may be offered by said party of the
Carolina.
second part, and to do all in its power to
This is a bill in equity, filed June 18, 1875,
promote the convenience of said party of the
by the Southern Express Company, a corsecond part in the transaction of its express
poration of Georgia, against the Western
business, both at way and terminal stations.
North Carolina Railroad Company, a corpo"Said party of the second part agrees to
ration of North Carolina, W. A. Smith, and
Henry Clews, for the specific performance of load and unload said express matter by its
own agents, at its own proper costs and char2, 1865,
a contract entered into December
ges, and save harmless said party of the first
between the railroad company and the compart against all claims for loss and damage
plainant.
The bill alleges that the railroad company to the express matter of the party of the secwas organized for the purpose of construct- ond part, except that which occurs from the
ing a railroad from Salisbury, North Car- negligence and carelessness of said party of
olina, to a point on the Tennessee line; that the first part or its agents.
"The said party of the first part agrees to
it completed that portion of its line between
Salisbury and Morganton, and put it in run- carry free of charge the messengers in charge
of express matter and the officers and agents
ning order; that the road-bed, rolling-stock,
of the said party of the second part passing
&c., became dilapidated during the war, and
The
over the road upon express business.
that the company in 1865 was without the
said party of the second part agrees to pay to
means to repair the road and make it safe
the said party of the first part fifty cents
and
for the transportation of passengers
freight; that the company, having been un- per hundred pounds for all express matter carAn account of the
over the road.
ried
successful elsewhere, applied to the complainant for a loan or advance of $20,000; weights of all express matter shall be taken
that the complainant having agreed to loan by said party of the first part whenever they
shall see fit to do so, and delivered to the
or advance that sum in consideration of seagent of the party of the first part, weekly or
Jeurlng the exclusive privilege of transporting
monthly, as may be desired.
(freights over said road as far as Morganton,
to be
"The accounts for transportation
entered,
and of certain other advantages,
made up monthly, and the sum found to be
with the advice and consent of the stockdue to said railroad company for transportaholders of the railroad company, into the foltion, at the rate hereinafter specified, shall be
lowing contract with that company:
applied monthly toward the payment of sai(^
"This indenture of agreement, made and
twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars, until the
entered into this second daj of December,
A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-five, be- whole sum, with interest, is paid, after which
payments for transportation shall be made by
tween the Western North Carolina Railroad
said party of the second part monthly in cash.
Company, as party of the flf st part, and the
"This contract shall remain in force for the
Southern Express Company, as party of the
full term of one year, from the first day of
second part, witnesseth as follows:
January, eighteen hundred and sixty-six.
If
"Whereas the party of the second part has
the said sum of twenty thousand ($20,000)
agreed to loan and advance to \he party of
dollars, with interest thereon, shall not have
the first part the sum of twenflf thousand
been repaid to the said second party at the
($20,000) dollars upon the aotes of said railexpiration of said one year, this contract shall
road company, bearing interest at the rate
continue in force for a further period, and
of six per cent per annum, which sum 1^-to
until the whole of said twenty thousand ($20,be expended in repairs and equipments
far
said road.
And whereas the party of theSret
000) dollars, with interest thereon, shall have
part is desirous of securing the services of an been repaid.
And the said party of the first.
part hereby covenants and agrees that it willl
efficient and responsible agent for the transaction of all of the express business over its
not furnish express privileges over said road I
,to any other parties during the existence of I
road, and is willing to provide the requisite
facilities for the proper transaction of said
this contract on any more favorable tennsj
express business in the manner and upon the
thW those herein made with the said party
terms hereinafter specified:
of the second part, both as to rate of trans"Now, therefore, in consideration
portation paid, advance payments, and total
of said
loan and advance, and the rents, covenants,
amount paid per annum.
It is mutually coveand agreements hereinafter made and providnanted and agreed by the parties hereto that
ed, said party of the first part hereby agrees
any other contracts
that may now exist,
and binds itself to grant to the said party of
whether verbal or written, for express service

SOUTHBRJST EXP. CO.

v.

NORTH CAROLINA

R, CO.
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it

a

is

The charter of the railroad company granted in February, 1855,
annexed to the bill
and made
part thereof. Its twenty-fifth
and twenty-sixth sections are as follows:
"Sect. 25. Be
fui-ther enacted, that the
said company shall have the exclusive right
of conveyance,
transportation of persons,
goods, merchandise, and produce over the
said railroad, to be by them constructed, at
such charges as may be fixed on by the

it

a

it

it

board of directors.
"Sect 26. Be
further enacted, that said
company may, when they see fit, farm out
their right of transportation over said railroad, subject to the rules above mentioned;
and the said company and every one who
may have received from
the right of transportation of goods, wares, and merchandise
over the said railroad, shall be deemed and
taken to be
common carrier, as respects all
goods, wares, produce, and merchandise intrusted to them for transportation."
At rule-day in July, 1875, the writ of subpoena was returned executed, and the cause
continued until the October term, when
was ordered that the commissioners in possession of the road In the Western district of
North Carolina, and Howerton, president of
the company, be notified to appear and answer or demur to the bill of complaint at
rule-day in January, 1876. The commissioners appeared and demurred.
The demurrer
was sustained and the bill dismissed. The
express company then brought the case here.
Clarence A. Seward, for appellant
A. S.
Merrimon, for appellee.

a

8

''

SWAYNE, Justice. The bill avers that it\
was filed against the receiver appointed by
the court below, that he was in possession
of the railroad, and that the institution of the
suit was by the consent of the court. Without this latter fact the bill could not have
been filed or maintained.
The suit would
have been a contempt of the court which
had appointed the receiver,
and punishable
as such.
Davis v. Gtay, 16 Wall. 203.
The citizenship of the complainant corpoExpress Co. v.
ration is sufficiently averred.
Kountz,
complainant
Wall. 342.
Such
need not prove its existence, unless the fact
is directly put in issue by the defendant.
Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Town
Pet. 480.
of Pawlet,
To the objection that the requisite corporate power of the complainant
not shown,
there are two answers. The contract of
presumed to be infra vires, uncorporation
Waite,
til the contrary is made to appear,
Act. & Def. 334.
The charter is set out In the record, and
part of It. That leaves no room for
forms
doubt upon the subject.
2

is

a

Is

4

iwas

a

"Tod R. Caldwell,
"Pres't W. N. C. R. R. Co.
"H. B. Plant,
"Pres't Southern Express Company."
The bill then alleges that the $20,000 was
with the contract, and
paid tn compliance
that shortly thereafter the complainant entered upon the road, transported freight according to the terms of the contract,
kept
regular accounts and exhibited them to the
company, which were always approved, and
' it continued to act under said contract until
July, 1873; that in 1870 the railroad company conveyed to Tod R. Caldwell and Henry
Clews, as joint tenants, and to the survivor
of each,—the former of whom has since deceased,— all its real and personal property,
in\ eluding its franchises, in trust, to secure a
\ large number of its bonds then about to be
\issued;
that $1,400,000 of said bonds were
sold or hypothecated, aud came into the hands
of persons unknown to the complainant, but
for much less than their value and not by a
bona fide sale; that, notwithstanding, the alleged creditors of the company instituted foreclosure proceedings In the circuit court of the
United States for the Western district of
North Carolina, and in 1873 obtained a decree ordering the sale of all the property of
Smith,
that the defendant.
said company;
having in that suit been appointed receiver of
In
forbade the complainant.
Vthe company,
I July, 1873, from further using the cars of
/the company, unless upon conditions where/ by said contract was virtually surrendered or
ignored;
that thereupon the complainant
compelled to abandon said railroad, alportion
though the money so loaned, with
of the interest thereon, Is still due and unpaid. It then alleges that the suit is brought
with the consent of said court, and with the"
privilege of making such parties defendant
for that puras might be deemed necessary
pose;
that the trustees in the mortgage to
secure the bonds of the railroad company had
express notice of the contract when they accepted the trust, and that it was claimed by
the complainant
as an existing lien; that the
substance of said contract had been published
separately at the instance of the stockholders
of the railroad company, and was well known
to its creditors and to the purchasers of its
bonds at the time, and especially to the defendant Smith; and that the railroad company having conveyed away Its property, and
behig in part insolvent, the violation of the
contract cannot be compensated by any damat law. The
ages which would be recovered
decree compelling
bill therefore prays for
the railroad company to specifically perform
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Its contract, and for such other and further
relief as the nature and circumstances of the
case may require, and for process against the

a

between the parties hereto, shall terminate
and cease on the thirty-first day of December,
and sixty-five, at which
eighteen hundred
time this contract shall take effect.
"In witness whereof, the parties to these
presents have hereunto set their hands and
seals the day and year first above written.
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Davis

V.

Gray, supra;

Doggett v. Railroad

a

exactly shown, or that the pursuit of the
legal remedy would be attended otherwise
with doubt and difficulty.
Judge Story, after an elaborate examination of the subject, thus lays down the general rule: "The just conclusion in all such
cases would seem to be that courts of equity
ought not to decline the jurisdiction for
specific performance of contracts whenever
the remedy at law is doubtful in its nature,
extent,

operation,

or

adequacy."
Story,
also, Stuyvesant v.
11 Paige, 414; Barr v. Lapsley,'
Wheat 151; Storer v. Railway Co.,
Younge & C. 48; Wilson v. Railroad Co., L.

Eq. Jur.
Mayor, etc.,

728.

2

Adequate capacity on the part of the railroad company to mal^e the contract is to be
presumed in like manner.
No party defendant was necessary but the
He was In the possession of the
receiver.
property and effects of the railroad company, subject to the order of the court, and
could have specifically performed the contract, or paid back the money loaned if the
The presence of the
court had so directed.
other parties was immaterial, and the bill
might well have been dismissed as to them.
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1

Co., 99 U. S. 72.
The contract between the express company
Eq. 28.
R.
and the railroad company was that the latter should give to the former the necessary
But we need not pursue the subject further,
facilities for the transaction of all its busibecause there is one provision of the conness upon the road, forward without delay
tract in this case which is fatal to the relief
by the passenger trains both ways all the
sought.
A court of equity never interferes
express matter that should be offered, do all
where the power of revocation ex.iJLti.' Jj'rye.
in its power to promote the convenience of "yped-Ferf. BC'
The contract stipulates that after the first
the express company, both at the way and
shall c^ase upon the payment of the
terminal stations, and carry free of charge year
$20,000 and interest.
the messengers in charge of the express matThis might be made
immediately upon the rendition of the decree.
ter, and the officers and agents of the exThe action of the court would thus become
press company passing over the road on exnullity.
press business. The consideration for these
stipulations was a loan by the express comThere is another objection to the appellant's case which is no less conclusive.
pany to the railroad company of $20,000, to
The road is in the hands of the receiver
for
be expended in repairs and equipments
the road, the loan to bear interest at the rate appointed in a suit brought by the bondholdof six per cent per annum, and the payment ers to foreclose their mortgage.
The appellant has no lien.
The contract
of fifty cents per hundred pounds for all exneither
expressly nor by Implication touches that subpress matter carried over the road, to be apject. It is not
plied in discharge of the loan and Interest.
license as insisted by counThe contract was to continue for one year sel. It is simply
contract for the transfrom the first day of January, 1866, and un- portation of persons and property over the
til the principal and interest of the debt road. A specific performance by the receiver would" be a form of satisfaction or -pi^
The bill avers that
should be fully paid.
the receiver had refused to carry out the 'ment wiiicfT ie" ca nnot be required tt* ni!i'''f.
contract,
and that the principal of $20,000- "As well migEFhe be decreed to satisfy the
appellant's demand by money, as by the servaiid a part of the interest were unpaid.
ice sought to be enforced.
enforcement of contracts not relating
Both belong to
decree for specific performthe lien-holders, and neither can thus be dito realty by
ance la not an unusual exercise of equity
verted.
jurisdiction.
In
Such cases are numerous
The appellant can, therefore, have no locus
standi In a court of equity.
both English and American jurisprudence.
They proceed upon the ground that under
Both these objections appear by its own
showing. It was, therefore, competent and
the circumstances a judgment at law would
proper for. the court below, sua sponte, to
not meet the demands of Justice, that
would be less beneficial than relief In equity,
dismiss the bill for the want of equity upon
that the damages would not be an accurate Its face. Brown v. Piper, 91 D. S. 37.
satisfaction, that their extent could not be
Decree affirmed.
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V,

BRAHAM.

(16 Fed.
Circuit

Court,

In Equity.

S.

37.)

New York.

D.

for
A. J. Dittenhoefer,
& Hummel, for defendant.

J. This

BROWN,

March 20,

18S3.

plaintiff.

Howe

action was brought in

tlie state court to restrain the defendant,
Helen Braham, otherwise known as Lilian
Kussell, from violating her agreement with

the plaintiff by singing during the current
season in any other employment than at
which the complaint
the plaintiff's theater,
A preliminary
alleges she is about to do.
injunction having been obtained at the time
of the commencement of the action, the cause
was removed by the plaintiff to this court
answer; and the defendant now
before
moves upon affidavits to dissolve the injunction. By the agreement in writing between
the parties, the defendant agreed to sing in
comic opera in the employment of the plaintiff whenever required during the season of
1S82 to 1883, commencing on or about September 1, 1882, at a stipulated weekly salary.

the agreement provides that "the
artist is engaged exclusively for Mr. John McCaull, and during the continuance of this engagement wiU not perform, sing, dance, or
otherwise exercise her talent in theater, conchurches,
either
or elsewhere,
cert halls,
gratuitously or for her remuneration or advantage, or for that of any other person or
other theater or establishment (although not
thereby prevented from fulfilling her engagement with Mr. McCaull) without having first
obtained permission in writing of Mr. McCaull; and for each and every breach of this
rule the artist shall forfeit one week's salary,
or her engagement, at the option of Mr. McCaull; but such forfeiture of one week's salary shall not be held to debar Mr. McCaulI
from enforcing the fulfillment of this contract in such a manner as he may think fit."
By article 3 it is provided that "no salaries
wiU be paid for. any night or days on which
the artist may not be able to perform through
and the
Illness or other unavoidable cause;
artist absenting herself, except from illness
or other unavoidable cause, will forfeit one
week's salaiy, or her engagement, at the option of Mr. McCaull, and will also be held
liable for any loss that may be sustained by
Illness,
Mr. McCaull owing to such absence.
to be accepted as an excuse, must be attested
by a medical certificate, which must be delivered to Mr. McCaull or his representative
as early as possible, and before the comShould such
mencement of the performance.
absence exceed two weeks, the engagement
may be canceled at the option of Mr. McCaull."
The defendant entered upon the performance of her engagement at tlie Bijou Opera
1882, with
House in this city in September,
By article

1
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great success, which was continued until prevented from further performance by pro^
tracted illness.
Having partially recovered,
she attempted to renew her appearances, but
after three nights' performances, in December, she suffered a relapse from which she
did not recover until about the middle of
February, 1883.
By the written contract the plaintiff was to
furnish all costumes.
This was modified,
prior to September, by an oral agreement by
which the plaintiff was to pay a larger salary and the defendant to furnish her own
costumes.
Both parties agree as to the modification of the contract to this extent The
defendant contends that in addition to the
above the oral contract was further modified
by the plaintiff agreeing to pay her weekly
salary as at first fixed during the continuance
of any illness; that the sum of about $350,
paid to her by the plaintiff during her illness,
was paid in pursuance of this modification of
the contract; and that since the middle of
December the plaintiff has refused to continue such payment during that part of her
illness, in violation of the agreement as modified.

The plaintiff denies that the modification
of the contract included any agreement to
pay her during illness, and asserts that the
moneys actually paid her while ill were merely advances on account of future salary to be
earned, and so expressly stated at the time.
Each party sustains Its respective claims in
by several witnesses.
They
this respect
leave this branch of the subject in so much
doubt that I feel obliged to reject it from
consideration, without prejudice to either in
regard to their mutual claims in respect to it,
since neither party made it a ground of terminating the contract.
Up to the time this action was commenced
the defendant had given no notice to the
plaintiff terminating the agreement;
nor had
the plaintiff, as he might have done according
to the express provision of the agreement,
notified the defendant that it was canceled,
I
owing to her absence beyond two weeks.
must, therefore,
hold the agreement as still
in force. Contracts for the services of ar- \
tists or authors of special merit are personal \
and peculiar; and when they contain nega- \
tive covenants which are essential parts of
the agreement, as in this case, that the artists
will not perform elsewhere, and the damages, in case of violation, are incapable of
definite measurement, they are such as ought
to be observed in good faith and specifically
That violation of such
enforced In equity.
covenants will be restrained by injunction, is
Lumley v.
now the settled law of England.
Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 604; Montague
V. Flockton, L. R. 16 Bq. 189, 199.
The subject was exhaustively considered by
Preedman, J., in the case of Daly v. Smith,
in
49 How. Prac. 150, in whose conclusions,
accordance with the English cases above
fully concur. In the present case it
cited,

I
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is, however, virged that the remedy by Injunction should not be allowed, on the ground
that the plaintiff's damages have been hquidated by the first article of the contract
namely, that "for each and
above quoted;
every breach of this rule the artist shall forfeit one week's salary;" and the cases of
Barnes v. McAllister, 18 How. Prac. 534;
Nessle v. Reese, 29 How. Prac. 382; Mott v.
Mott, 11 Barb. 127, 134; and Trenor v. Jackson, 46 How. Prac. 389, are cited in support
of this view.
There is no doubt of the general principle
that where the damages for the violation of
a covenant are either liquidated by the
agreement, or may be easUy and definitely ascertained, the parties will be left to their
remedy at law. But it Is clear that In cases
of contract like the present, the damages are
not capable of being definitely ascertained
or measured;
and In the cases first above
cited, injunctions were for that reason alThe only question in this case, therelowed.
fore, which distinguishes the present agreement from those, is whether the provision
for the forfeiture of a weels's wages for
every violation of article 1 is such a liquidation of the damages as bars the remedy by
Injunction.
In Barnes v. McAlister and in
Nessle v. Reese and Mott v. Mott, supra,
there was a covenant to pay a specific sum
for failure to observe the covenant in these
cases;
and these sums were held by the
court to be strictly liquidated damages.
Where the provision of the contract is in
the nature of a penalty, and not liquidated
damages, it Is well settled that such a provision will not prevent the remedy by injunction to enforce the covenant specifically;
and the provision will be construed as a
penalty, and not as liquidated damages,
where its plain object is to secure a performance of the covenant, and not intended
as the price or equivalent to be paid for a
of It.
Howard v. Hopliyns,
nonobservance
2 Atk. 371; Bird v. Lake, 1 Hem. & M.
Fox V. Scard, 33 Beav. 327; Sloman v. Walter, 1 Brown, C. 0. 418; Jones v. Heavens, 4
Oh. Div. 636.
Whether the language of the contract is
to be construed as a penalty or as liquidated
damages is to be determined from' its language and Its presumed intent to be gathered from the circumstances of the parties
"A penand the .nature of the agreement.
alty," says Lord Loughborough, in Hardy v.
Martin, 1 Cox, Ch. 26, "is never considered
in this court as the price of doing a thing
which a man has expressly agreed not to do;
but if the real meaning and intent of the
contract is that a man should have the power, if he chooses, to do a particular act upon
the payment of a certain specified sum, the
power to do the act upon the payment of
the sum agreed on is part of the express
contract between the parties."
Vincent v.
King, 13 How. Prac. 234-238; Kerr, Inj. 409.
In Coles T. Sims, 5 De Gex, M. & G., Lord

Ill;
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Justice Turner says, upon this point, (p. 1:)
"The question In such cases, as I conceive,
is, whether the clause is inserted by way of
penalty or whether it amounts to a stipulation for liberty to do a certain act on the
payment of a certain sum."
That the clause providing for the forfeiture of one week's salary for each violation
of this contract was in tiie nature of a penalty, and designed solely to secure the observance of article 1, is manifest both from
the general nature of the employment and
the requirements of a manager of opera, as
well as the express language of this article;
because (1) the stipulation is not for the
payment of a certain sum as liquidated damages, but only for the forfeiture of a week's
salary; (2) it gives an option to the plaintiff,
instead of such forfeiture, to annul the engagement; (3) it declares that such forfeiture
shall not disbar the plaintiff from' enforcing
the fulfillment of this contract in such a
manner as he shall think fit, i. e., by any
available legal or equitable remedy.
As the
remedy by injunction is one of the remedies
available, this language Is equivalent to an
express declaration that the provision for the
forfeiture of a week's salary for each violation shall not affect his right to a remedy
by injunction.
This last stipulation would
not, indeed, influence the court, provided it
was clear that the ^damages were intended
to be liquidated at a specific sum, for which
the defendant was to have the option of singing at any other theater.
But these several
clauses taken together show conclusively that
no such thing was intended, and that the
sole object was to secure the specific observance of the contract that the defendant
should not sing elsewhere; and the plaintiff
is therefore entitled to restrain the violation
of it. As the season will close on May 15th
and the contract then terminate, there are
certain equitable conditions which should be
observed, and which It is competent for the
court, in continuing the Injunction, to Impose.
Russell V. Farley, 105 U. S. 433, 438.
The injunction of this court must not be
used directly or indirectly to -enforce the collection by the plaintiff of his alleged but
disputed claim' for previous advances, through
the nonpayment
of salary hereafter earned,
at least until his right is legally adjudicated.
(2) Considering the short period remaining,
the defendant must not be sent to California,
where by the contract she might have been
taken 'vnthout salary en route going and returning; nor, having respect to her precarious health, should she be sent to any very
distant point; (3) the plaintiff should furnish satisfactory security for the prompt
payment weekly for the defendant's services
at -the rate of $150 per week, the contract price,
from the time the defendant gives notice In
writing of her readiness to sing under the
contract, so long as she shall continue In
readiness to perform her duties.
In case of failure to pay any future salarv
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earned, the defendant may apply, on two
days' notice, to the plaintiff's attorneys for
the dissolution of this injunction.
An order may be entered continuing

the
injunction subject to the above provisions
and conditions.

NOTE.
Enjoining Employs from Serving Rival of
Employer. — ^The decisions upon the judicial enforcement of the stipulations common between
actors, artists, authors, lecturers, or other professional worliers and their employers, that the
shall not exercise his skill and talent
employs
for any other person, are not very numerous,
but they estaband are somewhat conflicting;
lish the modern general doctrine to be that the
employer is not obliged to submit to a breach of
the covenant, and content himself with an action for damages, but, in a proper case, may
an injunction restraining the employs
have
and this,
from engaging in any rival service;
whether compelling the latter to perform his
affirmative engagement to labor for his emTo reconcile the
ployer is practicable or not.
except upon the
would be difficult,
decisions
explanation that, when suits of this nature
were first brought, the inadequacy of the action for damages, as a remedy, wis not fully
perceived; but that, gradually, as one case after another was presented, it became better understood,
and equity judges grew more prompt
and willing to exercise their jurisdiction on the
ground that employers of public performers cannot well be compensated in damages for departures of artists from their establishments.
If an actor, continuing to perform for his general employer, according to his engagement,
plays on "off nights" for a rival theater, the
question how much the receipts of his employer
have been diminished by the opportunity given
the public of hearing the favorite elsewhere, is
too vague and uncertain to be shown by legal
proof.
And if, as is frequently the case, he
from his first engagement wholly,
withdraws
and devotes himself to the service of a competitor, the question of damages is rendered
still more perplexing by the difficulty of showT
ing what profits the deserted manager would
been conhave realized had the performances
tinued as agreed; and the latter needs, also, to
have some indenmity, difficult to be estimated
in money, for his liability to refund for tickets
or boxes sold in advance, and for his loss of
prestige tlirough failure of his announced enObviously courts of justice cantertainments.
not compel public performers or members of the
professions to perform
specific services they
have promised; there are no means at the command of a tribunal for compelling a person to
act, sing, speak, or write, nor is there any
standard for determining whether one has done
The
so in good faith and with his best skill.
result, therefore, is that a properly-framed
stipidation, in a contract for services of this description, forbidding the employs to serve elsewhere, may be enforced by injunction.
Such
injunctions
under the
are equally obtainable
in a civil
codes of procedure, upon complaint
action; or, in states adhering to the old pracor,
upon bill in equity;
in the United
tice,
States circuit court, sitting in equity, if the
parties are citizens of different states.
In what cases the fact that the contract of
the parties, by liquidating the damages or otherwise, gives the employer a better remedy by
action than usual, precludes his resort to injunction, is the question particularly discussed
in the text, and nothing need be added to Judge
Brown's able and lucid exposition of the principles governing that branch of the subject.
This note will indicate the development of the
general power of equity to enjoin in these cases.
Early English decisions went upon the theory
that although an independent, simple covenant
not to undertake specified services may be enH.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 39
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forced, when reasonable and consistent witli
public policy, yet in a contract between A. and
B. that B. shall act or sing, etc., for A., and
shall not perform for any one else, the negative
clause is merely incidental to the affirmative;
and unless the case is one in which the court
can enforce the affirmative stipulation it ought
not to enjoin a proposed breach of the negative.
These decisions, therefore, generally denied A.'s
prayer for an injunction to restrain B. from
performing
in the employment of C, unless
some special ground of equitable jurisdiction
over the case existed. The following are illustrative cases : Price agreed to prepare exchequer
reports for Clarke to publish, without, however,
engaging not to write for any one else. The
saying
lord chancellor refused an injunction,
that as he had no jurisdiction to compel Price,
directly, to write reports for Clarke, he ought
not to do so indirectly, by forbidding him to
write for any one else. Clarke v. Price (1819)
2 WUs. Ch. 157. A similar application was denied for the same reason, where the engagement of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful
Knowledge with Baldwin's publishing firm was
simply to furnish them with certain maps and
charts for publication, a thing which the court
had no means of compelling directly.
Baldwin
v. Society (1838) 9 Sim. 393. The actor Kean
was advertised to play at Drury Lane theater,
while there was yet 10 days unexpired of a
prior engagement at Covent Garden. The vicechancellor denied the application of the Covent
Garden proprietors to enjoin him, for the same
reason, viz., that there was no jurisdiction to
compel him to perform his 10 days' service,
Kemble v. Kean (1829) 6 Sim. 333. Upon examination of a special agreement for mercantile services of defendant, containing a stipulation forbidding his working for any other house,
the affirmative stipulations of the contract were
pronounced too vague and too onerous towards
the employs to allow of decreeing a specific
performance, and the court would not enjoin the
breach of the negative covenant alone. Kimberley V. Jennings (1836) 6 Sim. 340.
Upon the other hand, the case of Morris v. Colman (1812) 18 Ves. 437, illustrates the principle
that a covenant not to serve may be enforced
by injunction where other facts give equitable
jurisdiction of the controversy.
Colman, noted
as a dramatist, became manager of the Haymarket theater, under an agreement in the nature of a copartnership,
which contained a
clause restraining
him from writing dramatic
pieces for any other theater.
In a suit which
arose between the parties interested in the manvalidity
agement, the
of this clause was questioned before Lord Chancellor Eldon. He pronounced it valid and enforceable, it being be'
tween partners, and being neither contrary to
public policy nor unreasonable as between the
parties.
The decision has generally been explained in later cases on the ground that the
stipulation was one of several in an agreement
of copartnership, and that equity has jurisdiction of disputes among partners, though this explanation has been questioned. 2 Philli. 597.
Early American decisions ran in the wake of
the English; our courts did not deny the jurisdiction, but were loth to exercise It De Rivafinoli, while manager of the Italian theater in
New York, engaged Corsetti as first bass In
operas, the latter agreeing not to make use of
his talents in any other theater.
But before the
opening of the season Corsetti was announced
to sail for Cuba, to perform there under another
manager.
De Rivafinoli then sought an injunction, (and ne exeat,) which Chancellor Walworth refused, on the ground that under the
the application was premature,
circumstances
for before commencement of the actors engagement the manager could not have a right of
action. On the general question he said, in effect, that while it is theoretically proper that
"a bird that can sing and will not sing must
be made to sing," yet there is an obstacle to
making a vocalist sing by order of the court of
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comedian IngersoU agreed with Hamblin,
manager of the Bowery theater in New
York, to play for him for three years, also, not
to act except for Hamblin during the term; but
an injunction was refused because tiiere was
no ground of jurisdiction over the affirmative
part of the agreement, while the negative was
a mere matter between employer and employe.
Hamblin v. Dinneford (1835) 2 Edw. Ch. 529.
When Burton, the famous comedian of a generation ago, was manager of Front Street theater,
Baltimore,
he bargained with Burke to withdraw Mrs. Burke's services from the employManager
ment of
Marshall and bring her to
join Burton's company. Marshall then sued for
an injunction, which was issued below. On appeal the court held that either of three facts
shown, viz., there was no express restrictive
clause m the contract between the Burkes and
complainant;
complainant was prosecuting an
actiou at law; and Mrs. Burkei's engagement, if
any, would be void as that of a feme covert, —
was enough to defeat the suit. Burton v. Marshall (1846) 4 Gill, 4Sr. De Pol v. Sohlke
(1869) 7 Rob. Ecc. 280, was decided after Lumley V. Wagner (1 De Gex, M. & 6. 604), yet
does not mention it, but takes the older doctrine
for granted. The opinion assumes, however,
that irreparable damage to follow from a breach
of a negative covenant may be ground of equitable jurisdiction,
and the judge refused to enjoin the danseuse Sohlke from performing for
other employers, not for want of power, but because, as the plaintiffs had not a theater in operation in which they could use her services,
therefore they could not be irreparably damaged
by her dancing elsewhere for the time being.
Tflius American as well as English courts, down
to the middle of our century, we're unwilling to
enjoin an employe's breach of a collateral promise not to serve elsewhere, unless the affirmative
engagement were a propei subject-matter
of
equitable relief.
Development of the Modem Doctrine. — Since
about 1850 a broader and more liberal position
has been taken. An advance was distinctly
made in Dietrichsen v. Cabburn, 2 Philli. 52, and
Rolfe V. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88, (both 1846,) in
which the rule adverse to enforcing a negative
stipulation was distinctly questioned and limited; though these were not cases of professional services, but of contracts for exclusive
employment in mercantile duties. The circumstances of a controlling
decision, Lumley ▼.
Wagner, which soon followed them, were that
Manager Lumley engaged Mile. Johanna Wagner to siag at Her Majesty's Theater, London,
for three months, in certain specified operas, at
a weekly salary of £100. The agreement, as
originally signed, did not in so many words forbid her from singing for any other employer;
but a few days afterwards
the manager objected to the omission, and Mile. Wagner's
agent then added an article, saying:
"Mile.
Wagner engages herself not to use her talents
at any other theater, nor in any concert or
reunion, public or private, without the written
authorization
of Mr. Lumley." Notwithstanding this, she did accept (for a higher salar3\ it
was said) an engagement from Manager Gye
to sing at the Italian opera, Covent Garden,
and Lumley sued for an injunction.
It was
granted below. Lumley t, Wagner, 5 De Gex
the

a
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& S. 485.
On appeal the familiar objection
was urged that equity will not enjoin the
breach of a negative covenant where it cannot
decree performance of the affirmative one to
which it is incident.
6 Sim. 333; Id. 340; 3
Macn. & G. 393. But Lord Chancellor St.
Leonards said that when the reason why th«
court could not decree specific performance ii
not that the plaintiff is not entitled to
but
merely the want of means to compel the defendant to perform, he thought the court need
not on that account refrain from doing what
was within its power, viz., forbidding
performance which will violate the contract. To
the objection that there was
remedy at law
by action for damages, the lord chancellor replied that such remedy was no better than exists upon covenants not to practice as attorney,
surgeon, etc., within certam limits, which are
often enforced by injunction.
Another objection was that the promise not to sing elsewhere was not in the original agreement; but
the chancellor said that the two papers were
not independent, but were in effect one contract; and that evfen if the stipulation not to
sing elsewhere had never been made in writing, he thought it was implied in the original
contract; in other words, singing for Mr. Gye
was a breach of the spirit and meaning of the
contract to sing for Mr. Lumley.
Another objection was that the injunction would be mischievous, because
popular
would prevent
artist from singing at one theater, while the
court could not promote her performing at another; hence the tendency would be to prevent
the public from hearing her anywhere; but the
chancellor said that the artist had no right to
complain on this groimd; the injunction would
merely forbid her doing what she had engaged
not to do. "The temporary injunction was, thereLumley v. Wagner (1852)
fore, continued.
De Gex, M. & G. 604; 13 Eng. Law & Eq.
252. The opinion embodies an elaborate review
of the previous English cases on the extent to
which equity may go in enjoining breach of
negative covenants of various kinds; and the
decision has been generally followed in both
countries as establishing the jurisdiction to enforce contracts not to serve in public performances or intellectual work.
A firm of French photographists, Fredricks
& Co., employed Constant Mayer as "artist
painter" for three ^ears, at an annual salary,
to retouch proofs in oil at their New York
house, and he engaged not to work for any
with
one else; yet he left them and engaged
Gumey.
The question whether the court could
grant an injunction was decided in their favor,
not apthe judge saying that this remedy
plicable to aU restrictive covenants, for many
may be protected by action for damages; but
great actor, or
contracts for employrnent of
for services which involve exercise of nigh
powers of mind peculiar to the one person,
cannot be treated by ordinary rules, but reFredquire the special remedy of injunction.
ricks v. Mayer (1857) 13 How. Prac. 566. But,
on the merits of the application under the particular circumstances, the judge denied it; and
this was affirmed in Fredxicks y. Mayer,
Bosw. 227.
Anuetti Galletti agreed to dance at the
Broadway Music Hall, New York, for six
weekly salary, and to "exercise
months at
her utmost abilities for the promotion of the exhibition." But the agreement did not contain
her to perform
an express clause forbidding
elsewhere
and on accoiunt of this omission the
was denied.
injunction
employer's motion for an
Butler V. Galletti (1861) 21 How. Prac. 465. ,
Hayes, manager of the Olympic theater in
New York, engaged Willio to play at the Olympic for three months, and "not to perform at
After playing
etc.
any other establishment,"
two months, Willio accepted an offer of highAn injuncer salary from a Boston theater.
tion was granted, the court mentioning, wittt
a

chancery, In the fact that no officer of the court
has that perfect knowledge of the Italian language, or possesses that exquisite sensibility in
the auricular nerve, which is necessary to the
understanding and enjoyment of Italian opera;
and it would be difficult for a master to determine whether a defendant sang in faithful performance of his engagement, or ascertain what
effect the coercion might produce upon his singing, especially iu the livelier airs. De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti (1833) 4 Paige, 264. Similar
considerations led Edwards, J., to refuse a similar application in Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1
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Hare, 241;
reveal secrets of business
Eng. Law
Eq. 182), of a contract not to write
particular description of book
Sim. & S.
18 Ves. 437), of a contract not to practice
particular trade or calling (125 Mass. 258: 16
Vt. 176 22 Law Rep. 693
Jur. [N. S.] 976
15 Sim. 88), although in either case the injured
party could maintain an action for damages,
there is no good reason for refusing an injunction to forbid breaking a contract for exclusive
is is

professional
and sound.
services,
forcible
recounted in 26 Alb.
German case
Cases involving
claim of the artist
that the manager first broke the contract by
assigning the artist to a part or position less
desirable than that which the contract assured,
or by failing to give due opportunity for appearances, are: Daly v. Smith, 49 How. Prac.
150, Roserie v. Kiralfy, 12 Phila. 209, and De
Pol V. Sohlke,
Rob. Ecc. 280.
Must there be an Express Negative Contract?
— Several English cases support the view that
an engagement not to serve elsewhere is fairly to be implied from
contract, in general
terms, to perform under one manager or at one
establishment.
But American judges have
generally
refused to interfere
unless there
were an express stipulation forbidding the service sought to be enjoined.
In other words, in
this country a simple engagement to serve
leaves the employ^ at liberty to take other service, provided he faithfully performs the first
engagement.
Gill, 487;
Burton v. Marshall,
Butler V. Galletti, 21 How. Prae. 465; Wallace V. De Young, 98 111. 638.
But compare
Manufacturing Co. „v. Cook,, Bost, I^w Rep.
547, 549.- X'w*- ftA'i-O oUy^XCXj i..., I')0lj>
Form of a Restrictive Covenant. — ^The restrictive clause may well be drawn in the following form—making variations appropriate
to the circumstances of the particular case:
And
is further agreed, in consideration of
the premises, that the party of the second part
actor,
artist, or other employfi) will not,
(the
during the term of this agreement, exercise his
professional
skill and talents as an actor (or
artist, etc.) in public, (within the city of New
York, or otherwise state the limits to which the
restriction
intended to be confined; and the
courts are more willing to enforce these restriclimited), either for
tions when the locality
compensation or gratuitously,
and either upon
his own account or for another employer or
establishment,
without the consent in writing
of the party of the first part first obtained, under pain of injunction, action for damages, or
any other available judicial remedy: provided,
however, that the party of the second part may
at any time and as often as he thinks fit perform gratuitously at any entertainment
charitably given for the burial expenses and relief
of the family of a .deceased actor, (or otherwise state explicitly any right which the actor
desires to reserve.)
Procedure. — Several
of the cases indicate
is proper to join the second employer
that
as co-defendant, and to draw the injunction so
as in terms to forbid him to employ the chief
defendant, as well as prohibit the latter from
performing.
Clarke v. Price,
Wils. Oh. 157;
Lumley v. Wagner,
De Gex, M. & G. 604;
Gill, 487; Hamblin v.
Burton v. Marshall,
Dinneford,
Edw. Ch. 528.
Whether the
practitioner may have
ne exeat as well as
injunction, see De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti,
Paige, 264; banquirico v. Benedetti,
Barb.
315; Hayes v. Willio, 11 Abb. Prac. (N. S.)
167.
What action lies in behalf of an injured
manager or other employer against
rival or
eempetitor for inducing artists of his company
or employes in his establishment to leave his
service, see Bowen v. Hall, 20 Am. L. Ree
(N. S.) 578, and note. Id. 587.
1
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approval, the modern doctrine that a definite
contract by an actor not to perform at any other theater than his employer's may be enforced;
and saying that this remedy is not impaired
Hayes v. Willio
by the Code of Procedure.
(1871) 11 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 167.
Montague, manager
of the Globe theater,
London,- engaged Flockton to act at the Globe,
exacting
an
express
stipulation
without
that
not act elsewhere.
But the vicehe should
was
chancellor said that such a stipulation
implied. An engagement to perform for a definite term at one theater involves an engagement not to perform during the term at any othWhen a person agrees to act at a
er theater.
particular theater, he agrees not to act anywhere else as plainly as if a negative clause
Montague v. Flockton (1873)
were inserted.
L. R. 16 Eq. Cas. 189; 28 Law J. (N. S.) 581.
And the same opinion was expressed, obiter,
in Fechter v. Montgomery, 33 Beav. 22, where
and, ex
the suit was by Fechter as manager;
parte, in Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 432.
Manager Daly engaged Fanny Morant Smith
to play at his theater in New York city during the seasons of 1874, 1875, and 1876, the
contract containing a stipulation that she should
not act during the term of the contract
at
any other New York city theater without his
written consent; and that if she should attempt
to do so, the plaintiff might, "by legal process,
or otherwise, restrain her from so performing on
payment to her, during such restraint," of oneShe,
fonrth her salary under the contract.
however, allowed herself to be advertised to
play at a rival establishment, the Union-square
theater, and he brought suit for an injunction.
The New York superior court pronounced the
stipulation not to perform, valid, and proper
to be enforced by injunction;
saying that, although the clause as to plaintiffs restraining a
breach on paying a quarter salary could not give
jurisdiction, yet, as the court had jurisdiction
without
the clause might be regarded as a
guide in fixing the terms of the injunction.
Therefore, the actress was enjoined from playing within
the city, provided
the manager
punctually pay to her one-quarter
should
of
Daly v. Smith (1874) 49
her agreed salary.
How. Prac. 150. The opinion has been commended for its review of the authorities.
For other cases in which the modern doctrine
(of Lumley v. Wagner) has been incidentally
recognized
of discussed, and applied in a way
not aiding materially
to support it, see Mapleson V. Bentham,
20 Wkly. Rep. 176, where
the vice-chancellor
denied an application
by
Mapleson, lessee of the Royal Italian Opera,
enjoin
to
his first tenor from singing elsewhere;
Wolverhampton,
etc.. Ry. Co. v. London, etc.,
Ry. Co., L. R. 16 Eq. Oas. 433, involving an
agreement relative to use of
railroad; and
Manufacturing
Co. v. Cook, Bost. Law Rep.
547, in which an employe of
manufacturing
company was enjoined from breaking his covenant with his employers that he would not for
five years disclose their secrets or engage with
any other employer;
with which latter case
compare Estcourt v. Estcourt Hop Essence Co.,
32 Law T. (N. S.) 80;
reversing same case
31 Law T. (N. S.) 567; Gower v. Andrew, 14
Cent. Law J. 50; and Deming v. Chapman, 11
Judge Lowell's opinion in
How. Prac. 382.
Singer Sewing-machine
Co. v. Union Buttonhole, etc., Co.,
Holmes, 253, is an instructive
application
discussion of the
of the doctrine to
ordinary mercantile contracts, in which a promisor agrees not to deal with any other than
the promisee; with which case compare Bickford V. Davis, 11 Fed. 549, and Fothergill v.
See, also,
note
Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132.
by B. H. Bennett, to Bowen v. Hall, 20 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 578, 587. The suggestion
made at the close of this note, that, since modem equity enjoins a breach of
contract not to
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CLARKE

V.

(2 Wils. Ch.

PRICE.
157.)

July 21, 22, 1819.
Cases In Chancery.
The bill, filed the I5th of June, 1819, stated
that In 1814 the defendant George Price,
Esq., proposed to compose and write reports
of cases argued and determined in the court
of exchequer; and the plaintiffs entered into
a treaty with him as to the terms upon which
the same shooild be printed and published;
and that on the 27th of AprU, 1814, the foUowing agreement was signed by him: "Memo^
randum: It is agreed between George Price,
Esq., and William Clarke and Sons, as follows: Mr. Price undertakes to compose and
write the cases in the court of exchequer,
commencing
with Easter term, 1814, and to
periodically; the said William!
be published
Clarke and Sons to be at the charge of all expenses of paper, printing and advertising,
which expenses, when discharged, to divide
the profits of the said work equally (that is
to say), one moiety to the said George Price,
the other to the said William Clarke and
Sons; all accounts to be adjusted at Christmas in every year, at the customary trade
price and commission: And it is further
agreed that Messrs. Clarke shall be at liberty
to relinquish the undertaking should they think
it advisable."
The bill further stated that, in pursuance
of the agreement, Mr. Price composed and
wrote divers reports of cases argued and determined in the court of exchequer, and that
the plaintiffs printed and published them at
their owin costs and charges, periodically and
in pari:s; that the first volume consisted of
three parts, the first being published in August, 1814, the second In May, 1815, and the
third in March, 1816; that on the 2d of
March, 1816, a variation In the agreement
was made between the plaintiffs and Mr.
Price, and that a memorandum thereof waa
made in writing and signed by Mr. Price, in
"March 2d, 1816.
the
words following:
Memorandum of agreement between George
Price and William Clarke & Sons: Whereas,
by an agreement bearing date the 27th of April, 1814, between the above parties. It was
there stipulated that Mr. Price should take
the reports in the exchequer, and Messrs.
Clarke should print the same, and divide the
profits between the respective parties: And
whereas the first volume of the Reports in the
Court of Exchequer has been printed and
published by the said George Price and William Clarke & Sons: And whereas the' said
George Price Is desirous of selling all his
copyright and interest In the first volume:
In consideration of which, the said William
Clarke & Sons agree to give, and the said
George Price agrees to accept of the sum of
£166.
And the said George Price further
agrees to give any further assignment of the
copyright, if required from him by the said
William Clarke & Sons." That, in pursuance
of the second agreement, the plaintiff duly
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paid to Mr. Price the £166. That In further
pursuance
of the agreement of the 27th of
April, 1814, Mr. Price continued to write and
compose reports of cases argued and determined in the court of exchequer;
and that
before the publication of the first part of the
second volume, and on or about the 11th of
1816,
November,
a further agreement was
made between the plaintiffs and Mr. Price,
and a memorandum thereof made as follows:
"November 11th, 1816. Memorandum of agreement between George Price, Esq., and William Clarke & Sons:
Mr. Price agrees to the
following terms for writing and composing
the second volume of his Reports la the Exchequer, sale of his copyright, and interest In
the said volume; Messrs. Clarke, for the considerations above, to pay to Mr. Price, within
one month after the publication of each part,
the sum of £6 10s. for each sheet of sixteen
pages royal octavo, and in the same proportion for any less quantity than a sheet; Mr.
Price to be allowed the sum of £2 on each
part for corrections; all above that sum to he
paid by Mr. Price, and deducted out of the
payment for each part; Mr. Price to give a
if required, at Messrs.
further assignment,
Clarke's expense."
The bin further stated that, in piusuanee
of the agreements, Mr. Price composed and
wrote a second volume of reports of cases
argued and determined in the court of exchequer, and which the plaintiffs, at their expense, printed and published in four parts,
the first part on the 20th of January, 1817,
the second on the 23rd of April, 1817, the
third on the 1st of June, and the fourth on
the 13th of September, 1817; and that the
plaintiffs duly paid the sums of money due
to Mr. Price for the copyright of the second
volume, according to the three memorandums
That in June, 1817, the plainof agreement.
tiffs and Mr. Price agreed to make a further
variation in the terms of the agreement of
the 27th of April, 1814, and on the 19th of
Jime, 1817, the following memorandum was
signed: "London, June 19th, 1817. Memorandum:
Mr. Price agrees with M^srs
Clarke to receive for his Interest in the agree
ment for the exchequer reports, dated 27tb
of April, 1814, commencing at the third volume, the sum of £7 per sheet, and £3 per part
for corrections; all above that sum to be
paid by Mr. Price, and if under £3 the difference to be paid to Mr. Price until the sale
shall exceed a thousand, but not to apply to
any reprints above that number of the parts
already published or to be. Mr. Price agrees
to give any further assignment of the copyright and future Interest to Messrs. Clarke,
at their expense"
The bill further stated that In pursuance
of the agreements of the 27th of April, 1814,
and the 19th of June, 1817, Mr. Price wrote
and composed, and the plaintiffs printed and
published, at their expense, the third volume,
consisting of four parts, and also two parts
of the fourth volume, at the times specified
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in the bill, and that they had paid to Mr.
Price the sums which by tie agreements were
of the third volume,
due to him in respect
and also c'ivers sums on account of the fourth
Tolume.
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were not entitled to the assistance of the
court
An injunction having been obtained ex
parte, on the filing of the bill and on aflidavit, a motion was now made to dissolve it.

The bill further stated that Mr. Price had
Mr. Wetherell, J. Wilson, and Mr. Price,
made some contract with the other defendfor defendants Price and Sweet.
Mr. Heald
ants, Brooke and Sweet, by which he had
and Mr. Ching, for defendant Brooke.
Mr.
bound himself to write and compose new volShadwell, for plaintiffs.
lunes of reports of cases argued and determined in the court of exchequer, and In the
exchequer chamber, in order and to the inTHE LORD CHANCELLOR. The case of
Morris v. Colman is essentially different from
tent that the same might be printed and pubthe present.
and the plainlished by Brooke and Sweet;
In that case, Morris, Oolman,
and other persons were engaged in a partnertiffs insisted that they were entitled to have
ship in the Haymarket Theater, which was
an assignment duly made to them of all the
to have continuance for a very long period, as
copyright in such of the reports as he had
long Indeed as the theater should exist.
written and composed, and to be the printers
Ooland to have an assignment
man had entered into an agreement which
and publishers,
was very unwilling to enforce,— not that he
made to them, of the copyright of all such of
would vyrite for the Haymarket Theater, but
the said reports as he shall hereafter write
that he would not write for any other theater.
and compose, upon making to him such payIt appeared to me that the court could enments as he is entitled to by virtue of the
force that agreement by restraining him from
agreements of the 27th of April, 1814, and
writing for any other theater.
the 19th of June, 1817.
The court
could not compel him to write for the HayMr.
The bill prayed that the defendant,
Price, might be decreed specifically to permarket Theater, but it did the only thing in
expressed in the
its power,—it Induced him indirectly to do the
form the said agreements
by permitting the plain- one thing by prohibiting him from doing ansaid memorandum
other.
There was an express covenant on his
tiffs to print and publish the reports of cases
part contained in the articles of partnership.
so long as he
in the court of exchequer,
But the terms of the prayer of this bill do
should continue to compose and write the
not solve the diflBculty;
upon the terms agreed upon in the
same,
for. If this contract
respectively,
and deliveris one which the court will not carry into
said memorandums,
execution, the court cannot Indirectly enforce
ing to the plaintiffs the manuscripts of said
it by restraining Mr. Price from doing some
reports for that purpose, and by duly makother act This is an agreement which exing and executing to the plaintiffs an assignpressly provides that Mr. Price shall write
ment of the copyright of such parts of the
and compose reports of cases to be publlsbsaid work as had been published, and should
In Morris v. Colman,
composed,
and
the ed by the plaintiffs.
be written
thereafter
there was a decree directing the partnership
plaintiffs being ready to pay to him such
to be carried on. It could not be put ah end
sums of money as should be justly due to
to, and it was the duty of the parties to interhim; also praying an injimction to restrain
fere;
buU—havfi no Jurisdi ction t o compel
Mr. Price from printing or publishing, or emor any other Mr. Price to write reports for the plaintiffs.
ploying the other defendants,
cannot, as in the other case, say "thalT will
person or persons than the plaintiffs, to print
Induce him to write for the plaintiffs by preand publish the fifth or any subsequent volventing him from writing for any other perume or part of the same work which Mr.
son, for that ia no t the Tijitnre nf thp flp;rppPrice should thereafter compose and write,
Brooke,-l-J^fiBt- The on!^ means of enforcing the exeand to restrain the other defendants,
cution of this agreement would be to make
and Sweet, from printing and publishing the
or to
an order compelling Mr. Price to write resaid work so written and composed,
ports for the plaintiffs, which I have not the
be written and composed, or any part thereIf there be any remedy In
means of doing.
of.
The answers submitted that, on the true thls^ case It is at law._ If I cannot compel Mr7
Price to remain in the court of exchequer for
Mr. Price
of the agreements,
construction
can do nothing.
the purpose of taking notes,
was not bound to employ the plaintiffs as the
cannot indirectly, and for the purpose of
publishers of all future reports to be written
compelling him to perform the agreement
by him; that the plaintiffs were Informed in
compel him to do something which is merely
Mr.
October, 1818, of the contract between
It is also qultel
Price and the other defendants; that on the incidental to the agreement.
clear that there is no mutuality in this agree- 1
1st of April, 1819, the work was advertised,
ment
am of opinion that
have no juris- 1
as being about to be published, and that the
diction in this case.
defendants
had now printed a considerable
Injunction dissolved.
part of the fifth volume, and had thereby InThe bill was afterwards dismissed,
and that the plaintiffs,
with
curred great expense;
costs, for want of prosecution.
having suffered such expense to be incurred.

I

I

I

I

I

I

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

614

LTTMLBT r. WAGNER
(1 De Gex,

M. & G.

The Lord Chancellor,

May

604.)
22,

26,

1852.

The bill in this suit was filed on the 22d
1852, by Benjamin Lumley, the lessee
of her Majesty's Theatre, against Johanna
Wagner, Albert Wagner, her father, and
Frederick Gye, the lessee of Covent Garden
Theatre; it stated that In November, 1861,
Joseph Bacher, as the agent of the defendants
Albert Wagner and Johanna Wagner, came
to and concluded at Berlin an agreement in
writing in the French language, bearing date
1851, and which agreethe 9th November,
ment being translated into English was as
follows:

April,

"The

undersigned Mr. Benjamin

Lumley,

possessor of her Majesty's Theatre at London,
and of the Italian Opera at Paris, of the one
part, and Mademoiselle Johanna Wagner cantatrice of the Court of his Majesty the King
of Prussia, with the consent of her father,
Mr. A. Wagner, residing at Berlin of the
other part, have concerted and concluded the

following contract: First, Mademoiselle Johanna Wagner binds herself to sing three
months at the theatre of Mr. Lumley, her
Majesty's, at London, to date from lie 1st
of April, 1852 (the time necessary for the
jojirney comprised therein), and to give the
parts following: 1st. Romeo, Montecchi; 2nd.
Fides, ProphSte; 3rd. Valentine, Huguenots;
4th. Anna, Don Juan; 5th. Alice, Robert le
Diable; 6th. An opera chosen by common
accord.
Second. 'fheLtfiree first parts must
necessarily be, Istr^pmeo, 2nd, Fides, 3rd,
Valentine; these parti once sung, and then
only she will appear, if Mr. Lumley desires
it, in the three other operas mentioned aforeThird, These six parts belong exclusaid.
sively to Mademoiselle Wagner, and any other cantatrice shall not presume to sing them
during the three months of her engagement.
If Mr. Lumley happens to be prevented, by
any cause soever, from giving these operas,
he is nevertheless held to pay Mademoiselle
Johanna Wagner the salary stipulated lower
down for the number of her parts as if she
Fourth, In the case where
had sung them.
Mademoiselle Wagner should be prevented
by reason of illness from singing in the
course of a month as often as it has been
stipulated, Mr. Lumley is bound to pay the
Fifth, Madsalary only for the parts sung.
emoiselle Johanna Wagner binds herself to
sing twice a week during the run of the
three months; however if she herself was
hindered from singing twice in any week
whatever, she will have the right to give at
a later period the omitted representation.
Sixth, If Mademoiselle Wagner fulfilling the
wishes of the direction, consent to sing more
than twice a week in the course of three
months, this last will give to Mademoiselle
Wagner 50£ sterling for each representation
extra. Seventh, Mr. Lumley engages to pay
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Mademoiselle Wagner a salary of 400£ ster.
ling per month, and payment will take place
in such manner that she will receive lOftE
sterling each week.
Eighth, Mr. Lumley will
pay by letters of exchange to Mademoiselle
Wagner at BerUn, the 15th of March, 1852,
the sum of 300£ sterling, a sum which will
be deducted from her engagement in his retaining 100£ each month. Ninth, In all cases
except that where a verified illness would
place upon her a hindrance. If Mademoiselle
Wagner shall not arrive in London eight days
after that from whence dates her engagement, Mr. Lumley will have the right to regard the nonappearance
as a rupture of the
contract, and wiU be able to demand an inTenth, In the case where Mr.
demnification.
Lumley should cede his enterprise to another, he has the right to transfer this contract
to his successor, and in that case Mademoiselle Wagner has the same obligations and
the same rights towards the last as towards
Mr.'Xumley.
Johanna Wagner,
^Albert Wagner."
"Berl&,_the 9th November, 1851."
The biliyiien stated, that in November,
Joseph Bacher met the plaintiff in Paris,
when the plaintiff objected to the agreement
as not containing a usual and necessary
clause,
preventing the defendant Johanna
Wagner from exercising her professional abilities in England without the consent of the
plaintiff, whereupon Joseph Bacher,- as the
agent of the defendants Johanna WagnS?"'
and Albert Wagner, and being fully authorized by them for the purpose, added an article in writing in the French language to the
agreement, and which, being translated into
English, was as follows:
1851,

"Mademoiselle Wagner engages herself not
to use her talents at any other theatre, nor
in any concert, or reunion, public or private,
without the written authorization of Mr.
Lumley,
Dr. Joseph Bacher,
"For Mademoiselle Johanna Wagner, and
authorized by her."

The bill then stated that the defendants J.
and A. Wagner subsequently made another
engagement
with the defendant P. Gye, by
which it was agreed that the defendant J.
Wagner should, for a larger sum than that
stipulated by the agreement with the plainitiff, sing at the Royal Italian Opera, Covent
Garden, and abandon the agreement vrith the
plaintiff. The bill then stated that the de-

fendant F. Gye had full knowledge of the
previous agreement with the plaintiff, and
that the plaintiff had received a protest from
the defendants J. and A. Wagner, repudiating
the agreement on the allegation that the
plaintiff had failed to fulfill the pecuniary
portion of the agreement.
The bill prayed that the defendants Johanna Wagner and Albert Wagner might be
restrained from violating or committing any
breach of the last article of the agreement;
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that the defendant Johanna Wagner might
be restrained from singing and performing
or singing at the Royal Italian Opera, Cotent Garden, or at any other theatre or place
without the sanction or permission In writing of the plaintiff during the existence of
the agreement with the plaintiff ; and that
the defendant Albert Wagner might be restrained from permitting or sanctioning the
defendant Johanna Wagner singing and performing or singing as aforesaid; that the
defendant Frederick 6ye might be restrained from accepting the professional services
of the defendant Johanna Wagner as a singer and performer or singer at the said Royal
Italian Opera, Covent Garden, or at any
other theatre or place, and from permitting
her to sing and perform or to sing at the
Royal Italian Opera, Coyent Garden, during
of the agreement with the
the existence
plaintiff, without the permission or sanction
of the plaintiff.
The answer of the defendants A. and J.
Wagner attempted to show that Joseph Bacher was not their authorized agent, at least
for the purpose of adding the restrictive
clause, and that the plaintiff had failed to
make the stipulated payment by the time
mentioned in the agreement.
The plaintiff
having obtained an injunction from the vice
chancellor Sir James Parker on the 9th May,
1852, the defendants now moved by way of
appeal before the lord chancellor i to discharge his honor's order.
Mr. Bethell, Mr. Malins, and Mr. Martindale, in support of the appeal motion.
Mr.

Bacon and H. Clarke, contra, in support of

the injunction.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR.
The question which I have to decide in the present
case arises out of a very simple contract,
the effect of which Is, that the defendant
Johanna Wagner should sing at her Majesty's Theatre for a certain number of nights,
and that she should not sing elsewhere (for
that Is the true construction) during that
period.
As I understand the points taken
by the defendants' counsel in support of
this appeal they in effect come to this, namely, that a court of equity ought not to grant
an injunction except in cases connected with
specific performance, or where the injunction being to compel a party to forbear from
committing an act (and not to perform an
act), that injunction wiU complete the whole
of the agreement remaining unexecuted.
I have then to consider how the question
stands on principle and on authority, and in
so doing
shall observe upon some of the
cases which have been referred to and com-

I

1 The case was heard by the lord chancellor
on a representation that it was intended to confine the argument to the legal question alone,
which it was said involved an important point
of equity jurisdiction, on which the authorities
were conflicting.
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upon by the defendants in support
of their contention. The first was that of
Martin v. Nutkin, 2 P. Wms. 266, in which
the court Issued an injunction restraining an
act from being done where it clearly could
not have granted any specific performance;
but then it was said that that case fell within one of the exceptions which the defendants admit are proper cases for the interference of the court, because there the ringing of the bells, sought to be restrained, had
been agreed to be suspended by the defendant in consideration of the erection by the
plaintiffs of a cupola and clock, the agreement being in effect the price stipulated for
the defendant's relinquishing bell-ringing at
stated periods; the defendant having accepted the benefit, but rejected the corresponding obligation. Lord Macclesfield first granted the injunction which the lords commissioners,
at the hearing of the cause, continued for the lives of the plaintiffs.
That
case therefore, however it may be explained,
as one of the exceptional cases, is nevertheless a clear authority shovwng that this court
has granted an injunction prohibiting the
commission of an act in respect of which
the court could never have interfered by
way of specific performance.
The next case referred to was that of
Barret v. Blagrave, 5 Ves. 555, which came
first before Lord Loughborough, and afterwards before Lord Eldon, 6 Ves. 104. There
a lease had originally been granted by the
plaintiffs, the proprietors of Vauxhall Gardens, of an adjoining house, under an express covenant that the lessee would not
carry on the trade of a victualler or retailer
of vrines, or generally, any employment that
would be to the damage of the proprietors
of Vauxhall Gardens. An under-lease having been made to the defendants, who were
violating the covenant by the sale of liquors, the proprietors of Vauxhall Gardens
filed a bill for an injunction, which was
granted by Lord Loughborough. It has been
observed in the argument here, that in granting the injunction, Lord Loughborough said:
"It is in the nature of specific performance," j
and that therefore that case also falls under one of the exceptional cases. When that/
case came before Lord Eldon he dissolved
the injunction, but upon a different ground,
namely, on that of acquiescence for many
years, and in a sense he treated it as a
case of specific performance.
As far as the
words go, the observation of those two eminent judges would seem to justify the argument which has been addressed to me; In
effect, however, it was only specific performance, because a prohibition preventing the
commission of an act may as effectually perform an agreement as an order for the performance of the act agreed to be done. The
agreement in that case being that the house
should not be opened for the purposes of
entertainment to the detriment of Vauxhall
Gardens, the court granted the Injunction;
mented

j
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that was a performance of the agreement tn
substance, and the term' "specific performance" is aptly applied in such a case, but
not in the sense in which it has been used
before me.
It was also contended that the plaintiff's
remedy, if any, was at law; but it is no
objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction
by injunction that the plaintiff may have a
legal remedy.
The case of Robinson v. Lord
Byron, 1 Brown, Ch. 588, before Lord TJiurlow, so very often commented upon by succeeding judges, is a clear illustration of that
proposition, because in that case the defendant. Lord Byron, who had large pieces of
water in his park, which supplied the plaintiff's mills, was abusing his right by preventing a regular supply to the plaintiff's
mill, and although the plaintiff had a remedy at law, yet this comt felt no difficulty
in restraining Lord Byron by injunction from
preventing the regular flow of the water.
Undoubtedly there are cases such as that
cited for the defendants of Collins v. Plumb,
16 Ves. 454, before Lord Eldon, in which
this coml: has declined to exercise the powet
(which in that instance it was assumed to
have had) of preventing the commission of
an

act,

because

such

power

could

not

be

properly and beneficially exercised.
In that
case the negative covenant, not to sell water to the prejudice
of the plaintiffs, was
not enforced by Lord Eldon. not because he
had any doubt about the jurisdiction of the
court (for upon that point he had no doubt),
but because it was impossible to ascertain
every time the water was supplied by the
defendants, whether It was or not to the
damage of the plaintiffs; but whether right
or wrong, that learned judge, in refusing to
exercise the jurisdiction on very sufiBcient
grounds, meant in no respect to break in on
the general rules deducible from the previous authorities.
At an early stage of the argument
adverted to the familiar cases of attorneys'
clerks, and surgeons' and apothecaries'
apprentices, and the like, in which this court
has constantly interfered, simply to prevent
the violation of negative covenants;
but it
was said that in such cases the court only
acted on the principle that the clerk or apprentice had received all the benefit, and
that the prohibition operated upon a concluded contract, and that therefore the injunction fell within one of the exceptional cases.
do not, however, apprehend that the jurist
diction of the court depends upon any such
principle. It is obvious that in those cases
the negative covenant does not come into
operation
until the servitude is ended, and
therefore that the injunction cannot be required or applied for before that period.
The familiar case of a tenant covenanting
not to do a particular act was also put during
the argument; but it was said that in such
a case the jurisdiction springs out of the relation of landlord and tenant, and that the
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tenant having received the benefit of an executed lease, the injunction operates only
so as to give effect to the whole contract
That, however, cannot be the principle on
which this court interferes, for, beyond all
doubt, where a lease is executed containing

affirmative and negative covenants, this court
attempt to enforce the execution of
the affirmative covenants, either on the part
of the landlord or the tenant, but will leave
it entu-ely to a court of law to measure the
damages;
though with respect to the negative covenants, If the tenant for example
has stipulated not to cut or lop timber, or
any other given act of forbearance, the court
does not ask how many of the affirmative
covenants on either side remain to be performed under the lease, but acts at once by
giving effect to the negative covenant, specifically executing it by prohibiting the commission of acts which have been stipulated
not to be done. So far then each of the cases
to which I have referred appears to me to
be in direct contravention of the rules which
have been so elaborately pressed upon me
by the defendants' counsel.
The present is a mixed case, consisting not
of two correlative acts to be done, one by
the plaintiff and the other by the defendants,
which state of facts may have and in some
cases has introduced a very important difference,— but of an act to be done by J.
Wagner alone, to which is superadded a negative stipulation on her part to abstain from
the commission of any act which will break
In upon her affirmative covenant,— the one
being ancillary to, concurrent and operating
The agreement to
together with the other.
smg for the plaintiff during three months
at his theatre, and during that time not to
sing for anybody else, is not a correlative
and
contract, it is in effect one contract;
though beyond all doubt this court could not
interfere to enforce the specific performance
of the whole of this contract, yet in all sound
construction and according to the true spirit
of the agreement, the engagement to perform
for three months at one theatre must necessarily exclude the right to perform at the
It was clearsame time at another theatre.
ly intended that J. Wagner was to exert her
vocal abilities to the utmost to aid the theatre
I am
to which she agreed to attach herself.
of opim'on, that if she had attempted, even
in the absence of any negative stipulation,
to perform at another theatre, she would have
broken the spirit and true meaning of the contract as much as she would now do with reference to the contract into which she has actual-

will not

ly entered.
Wherever this court has not proper jurisIt
liction to enforce specific performance.
iperates to bind men's consciences, as far as
fhey can be bound, to a true and literal perand it will
lormance of their agreements;
from their conlot suffer them to depart
ftracts at their pleasure, leaving the party
to the
with whom they have contracted

SPEOIFIO PERFORMANCE
mere chance of any damages which a jury
The exercise of this Jurisdiction
may -give.
has, I believe, had a wholesome tendency towards the maintenance of that good faith
which exists In this country to a much greatand aler degree perhaps than In any other;
though the jurisdiction Is not to be extended, yet a judge would desert his duty who
did not act up to what his predecessors have
handed down as the rule for his guidance In

of such an equity.
was objected that the operation of the
injunction In the present case was mischievous, excluding the defendant J. Wagner from
at any other theatre while this
performing
court had no power to compel her to perform
at her Majesty's Theatre. £Tt Is true, that I
have not the means of compelling her to sing,
combut she has no cause of complaint, if
pel her to abstain from the commission of
an act which she has bound herself not to
her to fulfill
do, and thus possibly cause
which I
her engagement The jurisdiction
now exercise T^'whoUy within ttte power of
the court, and being of opinion that It is a
proper case for interfering, I shall leave nothing unsatisfied by the judgment I pronounce.
The effect too of the injunction, in restraining J. Wagner from slngmg elsewhere may.
In the event of an action being brought
against her by the plaintiff, prevent any such
amount of vindictive damages being given
against her as a jury might probably be inclined to give if she had carried her talents
and exercised them at the rival theatre; the
injunction may also, as I have said, tend to
the fulfillment of her engagement, though. In
continuing the injunction, I disclaim doing
indirectly what I cannot do directly.
Referring again to the authorities, I am
well aware that they have not been uniform,
and that there undoubtedly has been a difference of decision on the question now revived
before me. But, after the best consideration
which have been enabled to give to the subhave arrived
ject, the conclusion at which
by the greatest
supported
is, I conceive,
The earliest case most
weight of authority.
directly bearing on the point is that of Morris
There Mr. Oolman
V. Oolman, 18 Ves. 437.
was a part proprietor with Mr. Morris of the
Haymarket Theatre, and they were partners
in that concern, and by the deed of partnership Mr. Colman agreed that he would not
exercise his dramatic abilities for any other
He did not,
theatre than the Haymarket
however, covenant that he would write for
the Haymarket, but it was merely a negative
covenant that he would not write for any
Lord Elother theatre than the Haymarket
don granted an injunction against Mr. Colman writing for any other theatre than the
Haymarket; and the ground on which Lord
Eldon assumed that jurisdiction was the subject of some discussion at the bar. It was
truly said for the defendants that that was
and it was said, morea case of partnership;
over, that Lord Cottenham was mistaken in
the administration

It
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the case of Dieti'lchsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phil.
Gh. 52, when he said that Lord Eldon had not
decided Morris v. Colman on the ground of
there being a partnership.
agree that the

I

observations, which fell from Lord Eldon in
the subsequent case of Clarke v. Price, 2
Wils. 157, show that he did mainly decide it
on the ground of partnership; but he did not
decide it exclusively on that ground.
In the
argument of Morris v. Colman, 18 Ves. 437,
Sir Samuel Romllly suggested a case almost
Identical with the present.
He contended
that the clause restraining Mr. Oolman from
writing for any other theatre was no more
against public policy than a stipulation that
Mr. Garrlck should not perform at any other
theatre than that at which he was engaged
would have been. Lord Eldon, adverting in
his judgment to the case put at the bar, said:
"If Mr. Garrick was now living, would it be
unreasonable that he should contract with
Mr. Colman to perform only at the Haymarket Theatre, and Mr. Colman with him to
write for the theatre alone? Why should
they not thus engage for the talents of each
other?" He gives the clearest enunciation of
his opinion, that that would be an agreement
which this court would enforce by way of injunction.
The late Vice Chancellor Shadwell, of
whom I always wish to be understood to
speak with the greatest respect, decided In a
different way, in the cases of Kemble v.
Kean, 6 Sim. 333, and Kimberley v. Jennings,
Id. 340, on which I shaU presently make a
few observations. In the former case, he
observed that Lord Eldon must be understood
in the case of Morris v. Colman, 18 Ves. 437,
to have spoken according to the subject-matter before him, and must there be considered
to be addressing himself to a case in which
Colman and Garrick would both have had a
partnership Interest in the theatre. I must,
however, entirely dissent from that interpretation. Lord Eldon' s words are perfectly
plain, they want no comment upon them,
they speak for themselves.
He was alluding
to a case In which Garrick, as a performer,
would have had nothing to do with the
theatre beyond the Implied engagement that
he would not perform anywhere else; and
have come to a very clear conclusion that
Lord Eldon would have granted the injunction in that case, although there had been no
partnership.
The authority of Clarke v. Price, 2 Wils.
157, was much pressed upon me by the learned counsel for the defendants; but that is a
case which does not properly belong to their
argniment, because there there was no negative stipulation, and I quite admit that this
court cannot enforce the performance of such
an affirmative stipulation as is to be found in
There the defendant having
that case.
agreed to take notes of cases in the court of
exchequer, and compose reports, for the plaintiff, and having failed to do so, the plaintiff,
Mr. Clarke, filed a bill for an InjunctioB, and
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Lord Eldon, when refusing the injunction, in

I

cannot compel Mr. Price to sit
in the court of exchequer and take notes and
compose reports; and the whole of his judgment shows that he proceeded (and so it has
been considered hi later cases) on the ground
that there was no covenant, on the part of
the defendant, that he would not compose reports for any other person.
The expressions
in the judgment are; "I cannot, as in the
other case" (referring to Morris v. Colman,
18 Ves. 437), "say that
will induce him to
write for the plaintiff by preventing him from
writing for any other person;'"
and then
come these important words, "for that is not
the natm*e of the agreement" Lord Eldon
therefore was of opinion, upon the construction of that agreement, that it would be
against its meaning to affix to it a negative
quality and import a covenant into it by implication, and he, therefore, very properly as
I conceive, refused that injunctian. That
case, therefore,
In no respect touches the
question now before me, and I may at once
declare, that if
had only to deal with the
affirmative covenant
of the defendant J.
Wagner that she' would perform at her Majesty's Theatre, I should not have granted any
injunction.
think, the authorities are very
Thus far,
strong against the defendants'
contention;
but the case of Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333,
to which I have already alluded, is the first
case which has in point of fact introduced all
the difficulties on this part of the law. There
Mr. Kean entered into an agreement precisely
similar to the present He agreed that he
would perform for Mr. Kemble at Drury
Lane, and that he would not perform anywhere else during the time that he had stipulated to perform for Mr. Kembla Mr.
Kean broke his engagement a bill was filed,
and Vice Chancellor Shadwell was of opinion that he could not grant an injunction to
restrain Mr. Kean from performing elsewhere, which he was either about to do or
actually doing, because the court could not
enforce the performance of the affirmative
covenant that he would perform at Drury
Lane for Mr. Kemble. Being pressed by that
passage which I have read from in the lord
chancellor's judgment in Morris v. Colman,
18 Ves. 437, he put that paraphrase or commentary upon it which
have referred to;
that is, he says:
"Lord Eldon is speaking of
a case where the parties are in partnership
together." I have come to a different conclusion, and I am bound to say that. In my
apprehension,
the case of Kemble v. Kean
was wrongly decided and cannot be maintaineffect said,

I

I

I

I

ed.

The same learned judge followed up his decision in that case in the subsequent one of
Kimberley v. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340.
That
was a case of hiring and service, and the
v>ce chancellor
there virtually admitted that
a negative covenant might be enforced in this
court, and quoted an instance to that effect
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within his own knowledge.
He said: "I remember a casfe in which a nephew wished to
go on the stage, and his imcle gave him a
large sum of money in consideration of his
covenanting
not to perform within a particular district; the court would execute such
a covenant, on the ground that a valuable
consideration had been given for it" He admits therefore the jurisdiction of the court,
if nothing but that covenant remained to he
executed.
The learned judge however adds,
"but here the negative covenant does not
stand by itself. It is coupled with the agreement for service for a certain number of
years, and then, for taking the defendant into
•
•
•
partnership,
this agreement cannot
be performed In the whole, and therefore this
court cannot perform any part of it" Whatever

may

have

been the

mutual

obligations

in that case, which prevented the court from
giving effect to the negative covenant, I am
not embarrassed
with any such difaculties

I

here, because, as
have already shown, both
are on the part of the defendants.
The case of Hooper v. Brodrick, 11 Sim. 47,
was cited, as an instance in which the court
had refused an injunction under circumstanbut, in that case, the
ces like the present;
lessee of an inn had covenanted to use and
keep it open as an inn during a certain time,
and not to do any act whereby the license
might become forfeited. In point of fact the
application was that he might be compelled
to keep it open, and the vice chancellor makes
this observation:
"The court ought not to
have restrained the defendant from discontinuing to use and keep open the demised
premises as an inn, which is the same hi effect as ordering him to carry on the business
of an innkeeper; but it might have restrained him from doing, or causing or permitting
to be done, any act which would have put it
out of his power, or the power of any other
person, to carry on that business on the premises. It is not, however, shown that the defendant has threatened, or intends to do, or
to cause or permit to be done, any act whereby the licenses may become forfeited or be
refused;
and therefore the Injunction must
be dissolved."
That therefore is an authority directly against the defendants, because
it shows that if there had been an intention
covenant this court
to break the negative
would have granted the injunction.
The case of Smith v. Fromont, 2 Swanst
330, was also relied upon by the defendants,

the covenants

as an instance where the injunction had been
refused, but there there was no negative covenant. It was an attempt to restrain, by injunction, a man from supplying horses to a
coach for a part of a road, when the party
who was applying for the injunction was
himself incapable of performing his obUgation
Lord Eldon,
to horse his part of the road.
in refusing the injunction and deprecating the
Interference
of the court in such cases, there
recollect of an
said: "The only instance

I
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application to this court to restrain the driving of coaches occurred in the case of a person who, having sold the business of a coach
proprietor from Reading to London, and undertaking to drive no coach on that road,
afterwards established one. With some doubt,
whether I was not degrading the dignity of
this court by interfering, I saw my way in
that case; because one party had there covenanted absolutely against interfering with the
business which he had sold to the other."
That again is a direct authority, therefore,
as Lord Eldon exagainst the defendants,
pressly says he had interfered in the case of
a negative covenant, although he could not
interfere on that occasion because there was
no such covenant
have been made upon a
Some observations
decision of my own in Ireland, In the case of
Gervais v. Edwards, 2 Dm. & W. 80; that decision I believe to be right, but it is quoted
to show that I was of opinion that this court
cannot interfere to enforce specific performance, unless it can execute the "whole of an
I abide by the opinion there
agreement
expressed, and I mean to do nothing in this
case which shall in any manner Interfere
with that opinion. That was properly a case
for specific performance, but from the nature
of the contract itself there was a portion of
I said, in
It which could not be executed.
cannot execute this contract which
effect:
is intended to be binding on both parties; I
cannot execute a portion of this contract for
one, and leave the other portion of the contract unexecuted for the other; and, there1
fore, as I cannot execute the whole of the
contract, I am bound to execute no part of it
That, however, has no bearing on the present
leave notliing xmperformed
case, for here
which the court can ever be called upon to

I

I

I

perform.

In Hills V. CroU, 2 Phil. Ch. 60, Lord Lyndhurst refused to enforce an Injunction to restrain the violation of a negative covenant
It was a case in which A. had given to B.
a sum of money, and B. covenanted that he
would buy aU the acids he wanted from the
manufactory of A., who covenanted that he
would supply the acids, and B. also covenanted that he would buy his acids from no
other person.
Lord Lyndhurst refused to
prohibit B. from obtaining acids from any
other quarter, both because the covenants
were correlative, and because he could not
compel A. to supply B. with acids; and if,
therefore, he had restrained B. from taking
acids from any other quarter, he might have
ruined him in the event of A. breaking his
affirmative covenant to supply the acids.
That case has never been rightly understood.
It is supposed that Lord Lyndhurst's decision was based upon a wrong principle; that
he followed the authority of Gervais v. Edwards and such cases, and that he improperly applied the rule which was in that class
of cases properly applied, but under the circumstances of the case before him I think
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the rule was not Improperly applied.* The
next case which has been so much observed

upon was that, before Lord Cottenham, of
Dietrichsen v. Cabbum, 2 Phil. Ch. 52. That
was a very simple case, and the question
upon what principle it was decided formed
the subject of discussion before me. A man,
in order to obtain a great circulation of his
patent medicine, entered into a contract with
a vendor of such articles, giving him a general agency for the sale of the medicine, with
40 per cent, discount, and stipulating that
he would not supply anybody else at a larger
discount than 25 per cent. He violated his
contract and was proceeding to employ other
agents with a larger discount than 25 per
2 The following, containing
all the material
portions of Lord Lyndhurst's judgment in Hills
V. CroU, is taken from the shorthand writer's
notes, and has been kindly furnished to the reporters by one of the counsel who was engaged
in that cause, and by whom a very full report
of the case will be found published, in "Reports of Cases in the Law of Real Property and
Conveyancing,"
volume 1, p. 541:

"THE LORD CHANCELLOR

"In this case of Hills v. Croll, Croll had obtained two patents for the purpose of purifying
gas, and the result of the purification of gas
was the manufacture
of muriate of ammonia
and sulphate of ammonia.
He entered into a
contract with Hills, who is the plaintiff in this
suit, and the contract was to this effect:
Mr.
Croll was to purchase all the acids that he was
to use in his process under his patent from Mr.
Hills. Mr. Hills, on his side, was to have the
right of purchasing all the ammonia that should
be produced as the result of those processes, at
certain prices as to the one and as to the other.
In addition to this, there was a stipulation
that, in all the licenses that were granted for
using those patents, the parties to whom those
licenses were to be granted should he bound to
purchase all the acids which were used in the
processes from Mr. Hills, and that Mr. Hills
should have the same option that he had in the
case of CroU, of purchasing from them all the
ammonia that should be produced in the course
of the processes. It was also stipulated that
Mr. Hills should have the option to supply
either muriatic acid or sulphuric acid, as he
should think proper, regulating
his option by
the market prices of the muriate of ammonia
and the sulphate of ammonia.
think this is
the substance of the original agreement beagreement
tween these parties.
The
was entered into in the month of March, 1841.
It
was found, on the part of Mr. CroU, that the
mode of payment and other arrangements with
respect to this agreement were inconvenient,
in consequence of which a correspondence takes
place between him and Mr. Hills, in the month
of September, 1842, and the agreement was
modified according to the terms of a letter,
think, in September, written by him.
dated,
in the original agreeOne of the stipulations
ment was that Mr. Hills should be a signing
party in all the licenses that were granted by
Mr. Croll for the use of the patent. The first
stipulation, in the letter of September, was that
he should not be required to be a signing party; but it provided tiat there should be a covenant in all those agreements, a covenant to the
effect stated in the original agreement, namely,
that the parties to whom the licenses were
granted should purchase their acids from Hills,
and give Hills the right to purchase the amRegulations
monia.
were also made altering
the terms on which the acids were to be purchased and the ammonia to be sold.
There
were some other subordinate
stipulations
to

I

I
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cent Aa injunction was applied for and
was granted. It was said tliat it was properly granted, because it was a case of partnership. This, however, was not the fact;
it was not a case of partnership, but was
strictly one of principal and agent; and it
was only because there was the negative
covenant that the court gave effect to it It
is impossible to read Lord Oottenham's judgment without being satisfied that he did not
consider it to be a partnership, though he
said it was in the nature of a partnership;
and in a popular sense it might be so called,
because the parties were there both dealing
with respect to the same subject, from which
which it is not necessary at present to advert
The letter, however, concluded with a stipulation to this effect, that if Mr. CroU was in

any particular
to depart from the agreement
modified the original agreement was to be
enforced.
I think those two documents, the
original agreement and the letter, formed the
substance of the contract between the parties
as it existed after September, 1842.
"Some doubt was expressed as to whether or
not the contract so modified has been acted upon in that shape. It appears beyond all doubt
that it was so acted upon, because the accounts
were, from time to time, rendered on the footing of the modified agreement, and it is also
clear from the letter of Mr. Hills of the Sth
of December, in which he refers expressly to
the prices that were regulated by the letter of
•September, 1842."
His lordship here referred to another question raised in the course of the discussion,
namely, whether the second or modified agreement had been put an end to by the operation
of the clause providing for the enforcement of
the first or original agreement; and, after remarking that it was unnecessary for him for
the purpose of the present question to come to
any conclusive decision on that point proceeded
as follows:
"Those are the facts of the case for the purpose of raising the narrow question, as it appears to me, which the court has to decide.
The bill was filed for the purpose of calling on
the court to declare that that agreement should
be specifically performed.
"Now there is no principle of the court which
understand to be more clearly established
than this, that the court will not decree an
agreement to be specifically performed, unless
it can execute the whole of the agreement."
The question, therefore, in this case will be
whether the court has power, from the nature
of this agreement, to execute the whole of it —
every part of it. Part of the prayer which is
consequent upon a specific performance is that
the defendant should be restrained from purchasing acids from anybody but Mr. EQUs, and
also that he should be restrained from granting licenses, except according to the agreement
that was in force between tte parties.
Now, then, with respect to the first of these
points, there is a stipulation
on the part of
Hills that he will supply the acids; there is a
stipulation
on the part of Mr. CroU that he
will purchase acids from Hills, and from no
other person.
Has the court any power whatever to compel Mr. Hills to comply with that?
Can the court order Mr. Hills to continue the
manufacture
of acids for the purpose of supplying Mr. CroU?
Can the court call upon
him, if he should not manufacture
acids, and
require him to purchase acids for the purpose
of supplying Mr. Croll? It is clear,
apprehend, that the com't has no such power.
There
are cases in which the court wiU do indirectly
so

I

I
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each was to have a benefit but In no legal
sense was it a partnership.
Up to the period when Dietriohsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phil. Oh. 52, was decided, I apprehend that there could have been no doubt
on the law as applicable to this case, except for the authority of Vice Chancellor

ShadweU; but with great submission it appears to me that the whole of that learned
judge's authority is removed by himself by
his decision in the later case of Eolfe v.
Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88. In that case A. B. and C.
were partners as tailors. A. and B. went
out of the trade on consideration of receiving
£1,000 each, and C. was to continue the buslwhat it cannot do directly.
A case commonly
cited for that purpose is the case of a nuisance.
The court would not compel a party who had
erected a wall to the- nuisance of another,—

would not compel the party by any direct order
to pull down that wall; but the court can
make an order requiring him not to continue
the nuisance, which would have the effect of
compelling him to pull down the wall.
In the
case of Morris v. Colman, the court restrained
Mr. Colman from writing for any other dieatre,
inferring from that that the order would compel Mr. Colman, or have the tendency to compel Mr. Colman, to write for the Haymarket
Theatre.
But in this case the court has no
power to compel Mr. Hills to supply acids by
ordering him not to supply acids to any other
person; that is not the agreement, nor was it
ever intended that it should be the agreement.
Therefore, unless the court can compel him by
a direct order to supply Mr. Croll from time to
time with the acids that Mr. Croll requires, it is
quite clear that this court cannot execute all
the parts of this contract.
The court cannot
therefore, compel the party specifically to perform the contract
It was thrown out in the course of the argument, that this court might compel one party
to perform his part of the contract and leave
the other party to his remedy at law. No such
principle has ever been acted on in this court;
it has been so laid down over and over again,
and, in a recent case that was cited at the bar
fGervais v. Edwards, 2 Dru. & War. 80), Sir
Edward Suyden held that, unless this court
can execute every part of the contract, this
court will not compel a specific performance of
a part.
When this cause therefore comes to a
hearing, I am of opinion that according to the
facts as they at present stand, and according
to the statement of the principle
have mentioned, this court cannot restrain Mr. Croll
from purchasing acids elsewhere, because it
cannot compel Mr. Hills on his side to furnish all the acids that may be necessary for
If
the manufacture carried on by Mr. Croll.
the court cannot do this, it cannot restrain the
parties at the hearing.
It is quite clear that
upon this interlocutory
application the court
cannot restrain Mr. Croll from purchasing acids
elsewhere.
apprehend therefore that the decision of the vice chancellor, which proceeded
on the principle I have stated, and rightly on
have stated, and which I believe
the grounds
is the principle of this court, and the principle
on which the vice chancellor acted as to that
part of the case is correct;
and equally applies, as it appears to me it does, to that part
of the notice of motion with respect to the libecause that forms a part of the concenses,
tract, — ^the general contract.
If the court cannot execute the whole of the contract it cannot execute the contract in part; therefore
am of opinion that in this case the motion must
be refused, and refused with costs.

I

I

I
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A. entered Into a
not carry on the
he had just sold,
within certain limits, and C. entered into a
covenant that he would employ A. as cutThe bill was filed
ter at a certain allowance.
simply for an injunction to prevent A. from
setting up as a tailor within the prescribed
limits, and the vice chancellor grr ted that
injunction. It was objected that this court
could not grant the injunction when there
was something remaining to be performed,
for that A. had a right to be employed as
a cutter, which right this court would not
even attempt to deal with or enforce as
against C. That case therefore was open
to a difficulty which does not occur here;
in fact the same difiiculty which might have
arisen in Hills v. Croll, 2 Phil. Ch. 60, beBut the vice chancelfore Lord Lyndhurst.
lor held that to be no difficulty at all, observing that the bUl simply asked for an injunction which he would grant, although he
could not give effect to the affinaative covenant to do the act in respect of which no
specific performance was asked.
His own
decisions in Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333, and
v. Jennings,
In Kimberly
Id. 340, were
pressed upon him; but he observed, "that
the bills in the cases cited asked for specific performance of the agreement, and that
the injunctions were sought as only ancillary to that relief, but the bill in the present
case asked merely for an injunction."
He
no longer put it on the Inability of the court
to enforce a negative covenant, but he put it
on the form of the pleadings.
Whether that
form was sufficient to justify his opinion is
a question with which I need not deal; but
I am veiy clearly of opinion that the case of
Rolfe V. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88, does remove the
whole weight of that learned judge's authority on this subject
It was said in argument that the Injunction prayed in Rolfe v. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88,
was merely ancillary to the relief; but it will
be seen that that was not so, and that the
prayer extended only to the injunction, and
had nothing to do with relief in the shape of
specific performance; and the learned judge
himself stated that if it had gone to that extent, he, foUovdng his former decisions, would
not have granted the Injunction.
From a careful examination of all these
authorities I am of opinion that the principles and rules deducible from, them are in
direct contravention of those principles and
rules which were so elaborately pressed upon
me during the argument; and I wish it to be
oess on his own account
covenant that he would
trade of a tailor, which
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distinctly understood that I entertain no
doubt whatever that the point of law has
been properly decided In the court below. It
was nevertheless, and with some reason, said
that although the point of law should be decided in the plaintiff's favor, still he might
be excluded from having the benefit of It on
the merits of the case.
His lordship here entered Into a minute
examination of the statements
In the answers and affidavits as to the unauthorized
addition of the restrictive clause, and as to
the nonfulfillment by the plaintiff of his portion of the agreement.
In reference to those
points he observed that, whether the clause
was originally added with or without authority, the evidence showed a clear acquiescence on the part of the defendants to its
remaining In the agreement;
that the operation of the agreement had been In the
first instance postponed to suit the convenience of the defendants; and that as to the
payment of the £300 although the plaintiff
could not have come into a court of equity
to enforce the contract without having tendered the amount stipulated to be paid, yet
it was distinctly proved that It had In fact
been paid to the common agent of both parties for the purpose of being handed to the
defendants. His lordship concluded by saylug that, looking at the merits and circumstances of the case, as well as at the point
of law raised, he must refuse this motion
with costs.
In the course of the argument, and In order to prove the plaintiff's readiness to perform his part of the contract an affidavit
made by Dr. Bacher was read, which was to
the effect that he had written and sent a letter to the defendant J. Wagner, informing
her of his having received from the plaintiff
the £300, and offering to pay that sum according to her instructions.
A letter of the
same date as that referred to In the affidavit
was admitted to have been received by the
defendant J. Wagner, but it was positively
denied that it contained any such offer. The
letter itself was not forthcoming, and its
nonproduetlon was not accounted for.
No
copy was kept by Dr. Bacher.
The lord chancellor observed that, when
the affidavit, as to the contents of the letter
was made. Dr. Bacher could not have known
that the letter would not be produced; that
the affidavit therefore, if imtrue, was at the
Imminent peril of exposure by the production
of the letter; and that under such circumstances the representation in the affidavit
must be taken to be true.
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MONTAGUE

v.

FLOCKTON.

(li. R. 16 Eq. 189.)
May 26, 1873.

This was

a motion on behalf of the plaintiff, Henry James Montague, the lessee and
manager of the Globe Theater in London,

for an injunction to restrain the defendant,

Charles Poston Flockton, from acting, or
causing his name to be advertised as about
to act, at any place other than the plaintiff's
theater, or otherwise than for the plaintiff's
benefit, for a period of nine months, from
the 2d of October, 1872, and in particular
from acting at an intended dramatic performance at the Crystal Palace,
In August, 1871, an engagement was proposed to the defendant on behalf of the
plaintiff, that the defendant should perform,
upon certain terms specified, at the Globe
Theater. To this proposal the following answer was returned by the defendant, dated
the 16th of August, 1871, and addressed to
Mr. Edward English, the plaintiff's agent:
accept the engagement
"Dear Sir:
for
the Globe Theater, under the management
of H. J. Montague, Esq., at a weekly salary
of five poimds, and, if required to go into
the provinces, traveling expenses paid and
20 per cent, on my London salary.
Line of
business, old men and character business; to
commence
on or about 2d October,
1871.
For the season of not less than nine months'
duration. A fortnight's rehearsal to be given prior to opening, subject to the rules and
regulations of the theater.
"[Signed]
0. P. Flockton."
During the pendency of the last-mentioned
namely, on the 2d of March,
agreement,
1872, the plaintiff and the defendant entered
into another agreement, which was accepted
by the defendant, in these terms:
"I hereby accept the renewal of my engagement
with H. J. Montague, Esq., for
his next season on the same terms as at
present existing between us.
"[Signed]
O. P. Flockton."
It appeared that In May, 1872, a notice
was posted in the greenroom of the Globe
Theater to the effect that the season would
close on the 4th of June, on which day all
pending engagements would terminate, and
the house was accordingly closed upon that

I

day.

A

company was then formed by the plain-

tiff for certain theatrical performances In

the provinces, in which the defendant took
part, and these performances commenced on
the 4th of June, and terminated on the 28th
of September, 1872.
The next London season at the Globe
Theater commenced In October, 1872, and
the defendant, Mr. Flockton, played at the
theater as he had previously done till the
10th of March, 1873, when he requested the
plaintiff to allow him to perform at the
Regent's Park Theater, which was to be
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opened In May.
Upon this occasion, according to the plaintiff's statement, the defendant said: "I only ask you to lend me, and
shall finish my engagement with you afterwards."
The plaintiff declined to accede to
the defendant's request, on the ground that
he should require his services for the next
piece that was to be brought out. On the
2d of April the defendant wrote the following letter to the plaintiff:

I

"Dear Sir: As you are aware my engage
ment with you terminated on the 2d of December last, pursuant to our agreement bearing date the 2d of March, 1872,
am desirous to close my connection
with your
and therefore now give you four
theater,
weeks' notice in pursuance of such my de-

I

sire."
The matter was then placed by the plaintiff in the hands of his solicitors, Messrs.
Lumley, who wrote to the defendant stating
that he had taken a wrong view of the
terms of the contract, which did not In fact
terminate until nine months after the commencement of the season, in October, 1872;
that the defendant was causing Mr. Montague considerable Inconvenience
and loss,
by not attending the rehearsal of a new
play soon to be produced, although every
reasonable notice had been given him; and
they called upon him to be in attendance the
following morning at 11 o'clock to rehearse
the part assigned to him.
This summons not being attended to by
the defendant, the plaintiff was obliged to
engage another actor, Mr. Palmer, to perform the part assigned to the defendant.
The plaintiff then discovered that the defendant was negotiating for an agreement to
act at a new theater In course of erection
in London, before the expiration of the term
alleged to be comprised in the agreement
of the 2d of March, 1872, and on the 28th
of April, 1873, the plaintiff also discovered
that the defendant was advertised as Intending to act on the 3d of May at the Crystal
Palace in the part of Polonius In Hamlet,
and consequently this bill was filed for an
injunction in the terms already stated.
It was alleged by the defendant that, according to the prevailing custom, the manager had the right of closing the season by
The plainnotice, and that he had done so.
tiff alleged that the notice did not close the
There was conflicting evidence on
season.
this point.
Lumley & Lumley, solicitors for plaintiff.
Mr. Oakes, solicitor for defendant
Mr. Glasse, Q. C, and Mr. E. Cutler, for
plaintiff.
Mr. Hemming, for defendant

SIR R. MALINS, V. C, after reading the
letter of the defendant dated the 16th of

August
perform'

1871,

accepthig

the

engagement to
the season.

for the plaintiff during

of at least nine months,

continued:
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The first question Is, what is the meaning
of that contract? It has been argued that it
was an engagement for the season, and that
it left the performer at the mercy of the
proprietor to terminate the season whenever
It is said that Mr. Montague
he thought fit
having put up a notice in the greenroom of
the theater in the month of May, 1872, notifying that the season's engagements
would
terminate on the 4th of June then nert, that
My
that has put an end to the contract.
opinion is that If an actor engages himself
for the season he leaves himself at the
mercy (within reasonable limits of construction) of the proprietor of the theater to fix
But that is not the
what the season is.
because,
meaning of this contract;
whUe
the proprietor, Mr. Montague, engages Mr.
Flockton for the season, there is a stipulation, which is for the protection of the performer, that that season is not to be one
month, two months, or three months, as the
proprietor may think proper, but that, whenever he may choose to terminate his season,
that season, for the purpose of paying the
actor, is not to be less than nine months.
In my opinion, it was absolutely impossible,
provided Mr. Flockton performed his part
of the contract, for Mr. Montague to evade
performing his part of it by paying the stipulated salary for a period of not less than
nine months.

I

am bound
This contract, then, being, as
in the only way it
to assume, understood,
by each of the parties,
conld be understood,
was commenced in or about the month of
October, and matters went on satisfactorily
on both sides, as
must assume, because in
the month of March, five months after the
contract had been commenced, and while Mr.
Flockton was still performing for Mr. Montague, a proposal was made by Mr. Montague,
and was accepted by Mr. Flockton, in these
terms: "I hereby accept the renewal of my
engagement with H. J. Montague, Esq., for
ihis next season, on the same terms as at
Ipresent existing between us." Now, what is
Bthe meaning of "the next season"?
am
I perfectly clear that it was a repetition of the
Aold contract;
it was to be the next season
commencing in October, 1872, lasting for not

I

I

than nine months. It follows that, for
in 1872 and ending in
1873, Mr. Montague, accepting these terms, is
bound to pay Mr. Flockton for nine months,
and Mr. Flockton is equally bound to perform for Mr. Montague, if Mr. Montague requires him to do so. I am surprised that by
any ingenuity Mr. Flockton should have persuaded himself that the meaning of that contract was, as he stated in his letter, that the
next season was not the London season, but
The thing Is, in my
the country season.
It has nothing to
opinion, perfectly absurd.
season; because the
do with the country
original contract was this: He is to have
£5 a week U required to go into the provless

the season beginning
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inces; assuming, therefore, that he may be
required ta go, he will agree to do so, and
in that case he Is to have his traveling expenses paid, and 20 per cent additional upon his London salary. The original contract
is for a London engagement, with the privilege on Mr. Montague's part of requiring him
to go into the provinces, where he would be
entitled to 20 per cent, additional and all
traveling expenses paid. Therefore, when he
says the next season, it is subject to the same
stipulation;
it is for the London theater,
with the right on the part of Mr. Montague to
require him to go into the provinces upon
those terms.
The contention of Mr. Flock-*
ton that the next season commenced in the
|
month of June and ended in the month of /
September is. In my opinion, simply ridicu- (
lous.
I totally differ from it and I am clear \
'
that it meant the next season, commencing
in October and terminating at the earliest
at the end of nine months.
Then let us see what was the view of the
parties themselves, and how this was acted
upon.
If it were according to Mr. Flockton' s
view, how did it happen that he commenced
acting for Mr. Montague again in the month
of October last and continued uninterruptedly and amicably, as I understand, to act
for him down to the month of April? The
object of it is evidently that which Is stated
by the plaintifE in his affidavit filed the 6th
of March; and, as it is not contradicted by
Mr. Flockton, I must take It to be perfectly
accurate. Mr. Montague says: "On or about
the 20th day of March, 1873,
was in my
dressing room at the Globe Theater with a
friend, and the defendant came in and asked
me if
would allow him to go and play a
very fine part at the Regent's Park Theater,
which it was proposed to open in the month
of May, and, he added [now, here Is an ad-fi ,, mission of the whole case], 'Of course, youV\ U^
will lend me for a time only; then
will\ft^
come back and finish my engagement.'
I v
said, in reply, 'I am sorry, my dear Flockcannot, as I hope to have you in my
ton,
next piece.' On my saying that he walked
away rather annoyed." That was on the
20th of March.
Then what is the next thing
I am satisfied from the evidence
he does?
that, there being a piece then in preparation,
it was the intention of Mr. Montague that
Mr. Flockton should take a part in it; but,
unfortunately, before it came out Mr. Flockton, on the 2d of April, adhering to this most
unjustifiable view of the contract writes to
Mr. Montague this letter: "As you are aware
my engagement with you terminated on the
2d of December last, pursuant to our agreement bearing date the 2d of March, 1872, I
am desirous
to cease my connection with
your theater, and therefore now give you
four weeks' notice in pursuance of such my
desire." Now, he knew perfectly well that
Mr. Montague was not aware of any such
thing as the termination of the agreement in

I
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is,

far from Mr. Montague not performing his
part of the contract or being desirous to
avoid employing Mr. Flockton in his new
piece, as was suggested,
Messrs. Lumley
wrote a letter to this effect: "Mr. Montague
states, further, that you are even now causing him considerable inconvenience
and loss
by your not attending to the rehearsal of a
new play soon to be produced, although every
reasonable
notice has been given you, and
we now call upon you to be in attendance
to-morrow on the stage to rehearse the part
assigned to you at 11 o'clock, at which hour
the company assemble
for the purpose of
rehearsal." Therefore it Is Mr. Flockton who
is now repudiating his contract
He is called upon to perform it, but he adheres to his
refusal, and seeks an engagement, first at
the Regent's Park Theater, and secondly at
the Crystal Palace. Now, unless theatrical
managers are to be completely at the mercy
their performers, the performers are not
|.of
I to be suffered to break their engagements
/ whenever they think fit. I can readily bej lieve, if Mr. Flockton had requested Mr. Montague to allow him to perform the part of
Polonius in Hamlet at the Crystal Palace,
that his request would have been acceded
to, and this suit would not have been instituted; but that was not all that Mr. Flockton wanted. In setting his contract at defiance, it is perfectly clear his object was not
simply to perform at the Crystal Palace, but
also to perform at the Regent's Park Theater, either because he could get a better salary or be enabled to play a higher class of
characters,
which perhaps to an actor is as
strong an inducement as any money that can
be given to him. But he is, in my opinion,
entirely wrong.
.
If he is put upon his contract, he Is bound
/ to perform for Mr. Montague for the season;
and I am glad to hear from his coimsel, Mr.
Hemming, that Mr. Flockton expresses his
willingness, If the court puts a different construction upon it to his own, to submit to the
opinion of the court, and perform his part of
the contract
Now, that being the effect of the agreement between the parties, that Is, that Mr.
Flockton has bound himself for the whole of
the season which commenced In October last
for nine months, which, on the one hand,
obliges Mr. Montague to pay him his salary

and obliges Mr. Flockton,
on the other hand, to perform for Mr. Montague for the same period, it is said. In order to avoid this, that he Is not bound, because there is no negative stipulation In the
I certainly am imder the imprescontract.
sion that in the case of Lumley v. Wagner, 1
De Gex, M. & G. 604, if there had been no
negative stipulation the court would have Interfered;
gather this particularly from
and
the passage In Lord St Leonard's judgment,
Id. 618, where he says: "The agreement to
sing for the plaintiff during three months at
his theater, and during that time not to sing
for anybody else, Is not a correlative contract;
It Is, In effect, one contract and though, beyond all doubt, this court could not interfere
to enforce the specific performance
of the
whole of this contract, yet. In all sound construction, and according to the true spirit of
the agreement, the engagement to perform
for three months at one theater must necessarily exclude the right to perform at the
same time at another theater."
It happened
that that contract did contain a negative
stipulation, and, finding It there. Lord St
Leonards relied upon it; but
am satisfied
that if it had not been there he would have
come to the same conclusion, and granted the
injunction, on the ground that Mdlle. Wagner; having agreed to perform at Mr. Lmuley's theater, could not at the same time be
permitted to perform at Mr. Gye's.
But
however that may be, it is comparatively unimportant because the subsequent authorities have completely
settled this point
It
appears to me, on the plainest ground, that
an engagement to perform for nine months
at Theater A. is a contract not to perform at
Theater B., or at any other theater whatever.
How is a man to perform his duty to
the proprietor of a theater if, when he has
engaged himself to perform for him, he Is to
go away any night that he may be wanted
must treat Mr. Flockto another theater?
ton as If he were the greatest actor In the
world, and as if wherever he went the public would run after him; and according to
this, if a proprietor engages an actor to perform for him, he is not, because he is only
wanted for three nights in the week, to be
at liberty to go and perform at any other
theater dm-lng the other three nights, and
thereby take away the advantage of the contract which he has entered into with his employer.
That in my opinion, is utterly Inconsistent with the proper construction of the
There Is no doubt whatever that
contract
of these contracts
the proper construction
that where a man or woman engages to perform or sing at a particular theater for particular period, that Involves the necessity of
his or her not performing or singing at any
a

I

for nine months,

during that time.
does not rest upon my opinion only,
was acted upon in Webster v. Dilbecause
lon,
Jut. (N. S.) 432. In that case there
other

That

it

December, for he knew that' the conversatloii
of the 20th of March which occurred between
them took an enthrely different view of the
case, and after making that admission himself to Mr. Montague I cannot conceive that
anything could be more unjustifiable than
that Mr. Flockton should say, "As you are
aware, my engagement with you terminated
on the 22d of December last." That was objected to by Mr. Montague, who,
think,
acted in perfect good faith.
He remonstrated, and, finding his remonstrances
were not
attended to, he applied to his solictors.
So
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Swanston applied for the injunction, and Vice
Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood "thought the
words of Lord St. Leonards were sufficiently
strong to justify his making the order, and
he granted an injunction restraining the defendant from acting at any other place than
the plaintiff's theater during the ordinary
hours of performance there of twelve consecutive nights, commencing on the 20th of AprU,
the plaintiff undertaking to abide by such order as to damages as the court might direct"
fully adopts there the principle that
Is
not necessary to have a negative covenant In
order to prevent the performance at another
theater. In Fechter v. Montgomery, 33 Beav.
think aU men must concur In the reason22,
ableness of the views of the master of the
rolls. Mr. Fechter had engaged Mr. Montgomery, who had been a provincial actor, and
desired to appear on the London boards to
characters, and Mr.
perform Shakespeare's
Fechter had kept Mr. Montgomery for ffve
months idle, but he paid him bis salary. Mr.
Montgomery's object was to be occupied;
he
did not want to be kept idle, he wanted to
show his talents to London audiences, and
being clear that Fechter had kept him five
months perfectly idle, and, for all that appeared, was likely to keep him idle for another five months, Mr. Montgomery would not
submit to it and broke his engagement Mr.
Fechter then filed
bill for an injunction, and
in my opinion the master of the rolls could
not have come to any other conclusion than
that Mr. Fechter had broken his part of the
contract and therefore he would not enforce
The contract
as against Montgomery.
there did not contain any negative stipulation
that he would not perform except for Mr.
Fechter.
The master of the roUs in that case
says (33 Beav. 26):
"But having regard to
the situation of the parties, having regard to
the nature of a contract of this description,
and having regard also to the previous letter
of the 21st of Jime, 1862, written to Mr.
Bamett,
and the conversation which took
being entered
place prior to this agreement
into, with respect to which conversation there
does not appear to me to be much difference
was an
on either side,
am of opinion that
agreement entered into by Mr. Fechter to emreasonable
ploy Mr. Montgomery, during
time, to act at this theater, and that it was
an agreement on the other side that he (Mr.
should not perform elsewhere
Montgomery)
the consent of Mr. Fechter; there
mutuality in the agreement entered
was
on the one side, that he
Into on both sides;

a

Theater in certain characters for twelve sucproposed
cessive nights,
to perform during
the same period at another theater.
Mr.

what his abilities and talents were before
London audience, and on the other side, that
he should not act elsewhere unless with the
permission of the plaintiff."
There are, therefore, Sir W. Page Wood, when vice chancellor, and the master of the rolls. Lord
RomiUy, taking precisely the same view, that
proan engagement to act at one theater is
There
hibition against acting at any other.
is also the whole principle involved In the
De Gex & J.
case of De Mattos v. Gibson,
totally dif276, which was with regard to
ferent subject undoubtedly, namely, the chartering of a ship. The ship was chartered for
a particular voyage, and the charterer prototally
posed to sell her, and employ her in
different manner.
There the court decided
that there was
contract that she should not
be employed for any other purpose, and granted an injunction against her being so employthink, therefore, that
ed accordingly.
is
decidedly established, and
should desire, asi
far as my opinion is of value on the subject,!
that it should be considered my opinion, that
man agreeing to act in one particular]
theater during the season is party to
conV
tract that he will act there and not anyj
as neces-,
where else. A negative contract
sarily implied as
had been plainly expressed.
Then the result Is: here
contract entered into for value.
It
said by
Mr. Flockton that the plaintiff has refused
to perform his part of the contract, and has
That
also refused to allow him to perform.
Is explained in the affidavits. It Is not atIt is perfectly clear
tempted to be answered.
that, in consequence of Flockton having absented himself, and given the notice of the
2d of .October, when this new piece was about
to be brought out Mr. Montague was obliged
Mr. Pabner, to
to apply to another actor,
act in the place of Mr. Flockton, and that, In
consequence of the default of Mr. Flockton
to perform his contract, he has brought this
Mr. Montague very
trouble upon himself.
properly said: "I have engaged Mr. Palmer.
You have brought
cannot turn him out.
this upon yourself, and while this piece lasts
cannot employ you to perform in it" But
if he had not done that, am perfectly clear
that he would have continued to employ him
of his not
there, and that the circumstance
being employed is entirely In consequence of
his attempting to repudiate his own contract.
am clearly of
Under these circumstances,
opinion that Mr. Montague has established
that Mr. Flockton Is under an engagement to
perform for him, and, being under that engagement, is not at berty to perform at any
other theaterTyhateVer witho ut Ilia ftemrts?
thinlTTFirrTirgitef "Sr'Ve^^"g?lstTSP*
'sion.
portance for actors to understand, that entering Into
contract to perform at Theater A.
obliges them to perform there alone, and that
they cannot be permitted to perform anywhere else so long as the other party performs
his part of the agreement
a

I

I

no argument on the part of
suppose they did not argue
the defendant
It because they found they could make nothThe defendant Dillon, an actor,
ing of It
having agreed to perform at Sadler's Wells
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am, therefore, of opinion that Mr. Montague is entitled to the injunction.
Mr. Hemming aslxed that the injunction
might not he extended to prevent Mr. Flockton from fulfilling the engagement he had already entered into to perform once more at
the Crystal Palace.
Mr.
The Vice Chancellor recommended

OP CONTRACTS,

Montague

to concede this request as a favor,

Mr. Glasse said that Mr. Montague would
not object to the defendant's performing once
more at the Crystal Palace.
The Vice Chancellor thereupon granted the
injunction in the terms of the prayer, but so
as not to Interfere with Mr. Flockton's playing one more day at the Crystal Palace.
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DONNELIi

▼.

BENNETT.

(22 Ch. Div. 835.)
Chancery.

Feb. 8, 1883.

By an agreement dated the 15th of December, 1882, and made between the plaintiff, J. Donnell, a manure manufacturer, of
the one part, and Cormack, a fish ciu^r and
fish smoker, of the other part, it was agreed
that Cormack should sell and that the plaintiff should buy all parts of fish not used by

Cormack In liis business of a fish curer and
fish smoker at the price of 23s. per ton for
the Sfpace of two years from the 31st of December, 1882, and in consideration thereof
Cormack further agreed that he would not
sell during the said space of two years any
fish or parts of fish to any other manufac-

and the plaintiff further
turer whatever;
agreed that he would take and pay for all
fish or parts of fish which Cormack should
deliver to him at the said price of 23s. per
ton delivered at the plaintifFs works.

It

was admitted that the defendant never

delivered any fish or parts ot fish under the
contract to the plaintiff, but that he entered
into a contract with the defendant Bennett
to deliver aU the parts of fish which he did
not require in his business to Bennett; it
was also admitted that the plaintiff had suffered damage by this breach of contract, and
that the defendant Bennett had paid Corsums of money to induce
mack considerable
him to break his contract with the plaintiff,
in order that Bennett might obtain the subof all the refuse of fish
stantial monopoly
In Grimsby or the neighborhood.

This was an action by the plaintiff against

Bennett and Cormack as co-defendants asking for an Injimction to restrain Cormack
from selling any fish to Bennett or any other
manufacturers except the plaintiff, and to restrain Bennett from buying any such fish
from Cormack.

H. A. Giffard, Q. C, and Mr. Hall, for
plaintiff. Cozens-Hardy, Q. C, and Mr. Williamson, for defendants.
Bower, Cotton & Bower, for plaintiff.
Williamson, Hill & Co., for defendants.

FRY, J. The question which arises Is by
no means an easy one. It is difficult because
of the state of the authorities upon the point.
It appears to me that the tendency of recent
decisions, and especially the cases of Pothergill V. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132, and of
Wolverhampton and W. Ry. Co. v. London
and N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 16 Eq. 433, is

towards this view— that the court ought to
look at what Is the nature of the contract
between the parties; that If the contract as
a whole Is the subject of equitable jurisdiction, then an Injunction may be granted In
support of the contract whether It contain or
but
does not contain a negative stipulation;
that if, on the other hand, the breach of the
contract is properly satisfied by damages,
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then that the court ought not to interfere
whether there be or be not the negative^tipsay, appears to me to be
ulation. That,
the point towards which the authorities are
tending, and I cannot help saying that in my
judgment that would furnish a proper line
by which to divide the cases. But the question which I have to determine is not whether that ought to be the way in which the line
should be laid down, but whether it has been
so laid down by the authorities which are
binding on me.
Now several cases have been cited by the
plaintiff as authorities in favor of his contention. In the first place there Is the case
of Dletrlchsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phil. Ch. 52, in
which undoubtedly the court enforced by
way of injunction a stipulation not to sell
except In a particular manner, and there the
whole contract was one which could not
have been performed speeifleally by the court.
Still more, in Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex,
M. & G. 604, the court enforced by way of
Injunction a portion of a contract the whole
of which could not have been enforced by
way of specific performance; and Lord St
Leonards in considering that case discussed
the question whether an injunction ought to
be granted in some cases In which specific
performance cannot be granted, and he determtaed that question plainly In the affirmative. He made these observations (Id. 619):
"Wherever this court has not proper jurisdiction to enforce specific performance it
as far
operates to bind men's consciences,
as they can be bound, to a true and literal
and it will
performance of their agreements;
not suffer them to depart from their contracts at their pleasure, leaving the party
with whom they have contracted to the mere
chance of any damages which a jury may
give. The exercise of this jurisdiction has,
believe, had a wholesome tendency towards
the maintenance of that good faith which
exists in this country to a much greater
and aldegree perhaps than In any other;
though the jurisdiction is not to be extend
ed, yet a judge would desert his duty who
did not act up to what his predecessors have
handed down as the rule for his guidance
in the administration of such an equity."
It Is plain, therefore, that Lord St. Leonards did not adopt the view which has occurred to me as that towards which the more
recent cases have been tending.
That Is the way in which the direct authorities stand hi eases In which there is a
negative clause, and they appear to me to
show that In cases of this description where
a negative clause Is foimd, the court has enforced It without regard to the question
whether specific performance could be granted of the entire contract
Then it is said by Mr. Cozens-Hardy that
In all those cases the negative contract enforced was but a part of a larger contract,
and that It was a separable part of that
larger contract, and that those cases do not

I
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apply to a case like the present, in which,
as h^ suggests, the negative contract Is coextensive with the positive contract.
Upon that argument two Inquiries arise.
In the first place. Is It true to say that the
negative contract Is In the present instance
coextensive with the positive? In my judgment it is not. The affirmative contract Is
that the vendor will sell all his fish refuse
for two years to the purchaser. The negative contract is that during two years he will
not sell any refuse fish to any other manufacturer whomsoever; leaving it open to him
so far as regards the negative contract, either
not to sell at all, or to sell to some person
other than a manufacturer.
But in the next
place one must inquire whether the authorities support any such distinction as that
which has been urged by Mr. Cozens-Hardy.
It appears to me that they do not
In Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G.
the contract was that Mdlle. Wagner
would sing three months at Her Majesty's
Theater in London. The negative contraxit
was that she would not "use her talents at
any other theater, nor in any concert or reunion, public or private, without the written
authorization of Mr. Lumley."
It is quite
true that the contract contains certain stipulations as to how many nights she should be
required to sing, but it appears to me to be
efvldent that the substantial contract—the affirmative contract—was that she would sing
Of course she could
there for three months.
not be always singing, and therefore the contract must state necessarily some limits as
to how often she was to sing, but when she
did sing during the three months she was to
sing at Her Majesty's Theater; the negative
terms were that during thti three months she
would not sing anywhere else than at Her
Majesty's Theater. It appears to me that
those two contracts are substantially coexBut further than that it is to be
tensive.
borne in mind that Lord St. Leonards does
604,
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not dwell on the distinction which is now
sought to be drawn, and so far as I am
aware no trace of It Is to be found in the
earlier authorities.
But then comes the case of Oatt v. Tourie,
L. R. 4 Oh. 654, before the Lords Justices!
in which Hills v. Croli, 2 Phil. Oh. 60, was referred to. Now Hills V. CroU was a case which
contained
an affirmative and negative contract, and Lord Justice GifCard expressly said
that if that case is to be taien as laying
down that the court is to refuse to act on a
negative covenant wherever there is a correlative obligation which It cannot enforce,
it does not apply. If It is taken as going
that length, it is contrary to the case of Lumley V. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & 6. 604, and
must be considered as overruled.
It appears to me, therefore, that that point
which has been urged upon me does not receive any sanction from the earlier authorities.

I

have come to the conclusion,
therefore,
upon the authorltiee, which are binding upon
me, that
ought to grant this injunction. I
do so with considerable difficulty because I

I

find it hard to draw any substantial or tangible distinction between a contract containing
an express negative stipulation and a contract containing an affirmative stipulation
which implies a negative.
I find it exceedingly difficult to draw any rational distinction between the case of Fothergill v. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132, and the case now before me. But at the same time the courts
have laid down that, so far as the decisions
have already gone in favor of granting injunctions, the injunction is to go.
It appears to me that this case is wlthio
the earlier decisions, and although I should
be far from sorry if the court of appeal were
to take a different view, I think I am bound
I
here by the authorities, and therefore
grant the Injunction till the hearing of the
cause.
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WM. ROGERS MANTJF'G CO. v. ROGERS.
(20

Ati.

467, 58 Conn. 356.)

Snpreme Court of Errors of Oonnecticnt
17. 1890.

Feb.

Appeal from superior court, Hartlord
county; Fenn, Judge.
This was a suit to enjoin the violation
ol a contract between Frank W. Rogers
and the Wm. Sogers Manufacturing Company and the Rogers Cutlery Company as
follows: "(1) That said companies will
employ said Rogers in the business to be
done by said companies, according to the
stipulations of said agreement, for the period of twenty-flve years therein named, if
said Rogers shall so long live and discharge the duties devolved upon him by
said Watrous as general agent and manager of the business to be done in common
by said companies, under the directions
and to the satisfaction of said general
agent and manager; it being understood
that such duties may include traveling for
said companies, whenever, in the judgment of said general agent, the interest o'
the business will be thereby promote-"
(2) The said companies agree to pay said
Rogers for such services so to be rendered,
at the rate of $1,000 per year for the first
five years of such services, and thereafter
the same or such larger salary as may be
agreed upon by said Rogers and the direotors of said companies, said salary to
be in full during said term of all services to
be rendered by said Rogers, whether as an
employe or an officer of said companies,
unless otherwise agreed.
(3) The said
Rogers, in consideration of the foregoing,
agrees that he will remain with and serve
said companies under the direction of said
Watrous, as general agent and manager,
Including such duties as traveling for said
companies, as said general agent may devolve upon him, including also any duties
as secretary or other officer of either or
both of said companies, as said companies
may desire to have him perform at the
salary hereinbefore named for the first five
years and at such other or further or different compensation thereafter during the
remainder of the twenty-five years as he,
the said Rogers, and the said companies
may agree upon.
(4) The said Rogers
during said term stipulates and agrees
that he will not be engaged or allow his
name to be employed in any manner in
any other hardware, cutlery, flatware, or
hollow-ware business either as manufacturer or seller, but will give, while he shall
be so employed by said companies, his entire time and services to the interests of
said common business, diminished only by
sickness, and such reasonable absence for
vacations or otherwise as may be agreed
upon between him and said general agent. "
The complaint was held insufficient, and
the plaintiffs appealed.
F. Cbamberlin and E. S. White, for appellants.
C. R. Ingersoll and F. L. Hungerford, for appellee.

ANDREWS, C.J. Con tracts for personal
service are matters for courts of law, and
equity will not undertake a specific per2 Kent, Comm. 258, note b;
formance.
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Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Ed w. Ch. 529 ; Sanqnlrico V. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 316; Haight v.
Badgeley, 15 Barb. 499; De Rivafinoli v.
Corsetti, 4 Paige, 264. A specific performance in such cases is said to be impossible
because obedience to the decree cannot be
compelled by the ordinary processes of the
court. Contracts for personal acts have
been regarded as the most familiar illustrations of this doctrine, since the court
cannot in any direct manner compel the
party to render the service. The courts in
this country and in England formerly held
that they could not negatively enforce the
specific performance of such contracts by
means of an injunction restraining their
violation. 8 Wait, Act. & Def. 754 ; Marble
Co. V. Ripley, 10 Wall. 340 ; Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill, 487; De Pol v. Sohlke, 7 Rob.
(N. Y.) 280; Kemble y. Kean, 6 Sim. 333;
Baldwin v. Society, 9 Sim. 393; Fothergill
v. Rowland,!.. R.17Eq.l32. The courts in
both countries have, however, receded
somewhat from the latter conclusion, and
it is now held that where a contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary
personal services or acts, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual,
or are peculiar and individual in their
character, the court will grant an injunction in aid of a specific performance.
But
where the services are material or mechanical, or are not peculiar or individual, the
partj' will be left to his action for damages. The reason seems to be that services of the former class are of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of giving the injured party adequate compensation in damages, while the loss of services of the latter class can be adequately
compensated by an action for damages.
2 Story, Fq. Jur. § 958a ; 3 Wait, Act. & Def.
754 ; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1348 ; California Bank
V. Fresno Canal, etc., Co., 53 Cal. 201 ; Singer
Sewing-Machine Co. v. Union Button- Hole
Co., 1 Holmes, 253, Lumley v. Wagner, 1
De Gex, M. & G. 604; Railroad Co. v. Wythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880; Montague v.
Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189. The contract
between the defendant and the plaintiffs is
made a part of the complaint. The services which the defendant was to perform
for the plaintiffs are not specified therein,
otherwise than that they were to be such
asshould bedevolved upon him bythegeneral manager; "it being understood that
such duties may include traveling for said
companies whenever, in the judgment of
said general agent, the interests of the
business will be thereby promoted ; " and
also "Including such duties as traveling
for said companies as said general agent
may devolve upon him, including also any
duties as secretary or other officer of either
or both of said companies as said companies may desire to have him perform."
These services, while they may not be material and mechanical, are certainly not
purely intellectual, nor are they special, or
unique, or extraordinary ; nor are they so
peculiar or individual that they could not
be performed by any person of ordinary
intelligence and fair learning. If this was
all there was in the contract it would be
almost too plain for argument that the
plaintiffs should not have an injunction.
The plaintiffs, however, insist that the
negative part of the contract, by which
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the defendant stipulated and agreed that
he would not be engaged in or allow hia
name to be employed in any manner in
any other hardware, cutlery, flatware or
hollow-ware business, either as a manufacturer or seller, fully entitles them to an
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than the names of Smith or Stiles or John
Doe. There is nothing from which the
court can see that the use of the defendant's name by the plaintiffs is of any value
to them, or that its use as a stamp by
their competitors would do them any ininjunction against its violation. They jury other than such as might grow out
aver in the complaint, on information and of a lawful business rivalry. If by reason
belief, that the defendant is planning with of extraneous facts the name of the defendcertain of their competitors to engage ant does have some special and peculiar
with them in busineBS,witb the intent and value as a stamp on their goods, or its use
purpose of allowing hisname to be used or as a stamp on goods manufactured by their
employed in connection with such business rivals would do them some special injury,
as a stamp on the ware manufactured ; such facts ought to have been set out so
;nd they say such use would do them that the court might pass upon them. In
great and irreparable injury. If the plain- the absence of any allegation of such facts
tiffs owned the name of the defendant as we must assume that none exist. The
a trade-mark, they could have no difficulty plaintiffs also aver that the defendant inin protecting their, ownership ; but they tends to make known to their rivals the
make no such claim, and all arguments or knowledge of their business, of their cusanalogies drawn from the law of trade- tomers, etc., which he has obtained while
marks may be laid wholly out of the case. in their employ. But here they have not
There is no averment in the complaint shown facts which bring the case within
that the plaintiffs are entitled to use, or any rule that would require an employe
that in fact they do use, the name of the to be enjoined from disclosing business
defendant as a stamp on the goods of their secrets which he has learned in the course
own manufacture, nor any averment that of his employment, and which he has conPeabody v. Norsuch use, if it exists. Is of any value to tracted not to divulge.
them. So far as the court is informed, the folk, 98 Mass. 452. There is no errorin the
defendant's name on such goods as the Judgment of the superior court. The other
plaintiffs manufacture is of no more value Indges concurred.
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METROPOIilTAN EXHIBITION
EWING.

(42 Fed.

CO. T.

19&)

Circuit Court, S. D. New York.

March 25,

1890.

In Equity. On bill for injunction.
Joseph F. Choate and George F. Duysters,
for plaintiff.
Henry Bacon, for defendant.
WALLACE, J. This action Is brought to
restrain a threatened breach of contract for
of personal services which
the performance
require special aptitude, skUl, and experience.
It is a case in -which an action at law would
not afford the plaintiff an adequate remedy
for the breach, and in which the power of the
court should be exercised by preventive interposition, if it is found that the contract Is
such as the plaintiff claims it to be. The
are such that, unless a precircumstances
liminary injmiction Is granted, the plaintiff
will obtain no effectual remedy, liecause, bofore the cause can be brought to final bearing, the time will have passed within which
the relief sought would be practically useful,
and, if it be then adjudged that the plaintiff
is entitled to a permanent injunction, the
judgment wUl be declaratory merely.
Although preliminary relief is not to be granted
■in a case in which it is doubtful whether the
plaintiff will be finally successful, yet, where
the questions are such that they can be fully
•considered and as safely decided upon a mo-tion for a preliminary injunction as at final
hearing, it Is the duty of the court to consider
and determine them, and not defer the party
invoking its assistance to a time when a decree, If awarded, would be too late.
The contract upon which the plaintiff
founds its claim for relief is in form between
ihe New York Base-Ball Club as party of the
first part, and the defendant as party of the
second part; but there Is no reason to doubt
■that the New York Base-Ball Club was the
agent of the plaintiff in entering into the
contract, that the plaintiff is the real principal, that the contract was intended to inure
for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that the
plaintiff is entitled to enforce it against the
-defendant to the extent that the New York
Base-Ball Club could do so. The doctrine is
now generally recognized that, while a court
-of equity will not ordinarily attempt to enforce contracts which cannot be carried out
by the machinery of a court, like that Involved in the present case, it may nevertheless practically accomplish the same end by
-enjoining the breach of a negative promise,
and this power will be exercised whenever
the contract is one of which the court would
direct specific performance, if It could practically compel its observance by the party refusing to perform through a decree for spewhere
-ciflc performance. It Is Indispensable,
the contract does not relate to realty, that it
Ae one for the breach of which damages
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would not afford an adequate compensation
to the plaintiff.
It must be one in which the
plaintiff comes into court with clean hands,
and which Is not so oppressive as to render
It unjust to the defendant to enforce it It
must be one in which there are mutual promises, or which is founded on a suflacient consideration. It must be one the terms of
which are certain, and in respect to which the
minds of the parties have distinctly met, so
that there can be no misunderstanding of
their rights and obligations.
The contract is executed as of the date of
April 29, 1889. It is a formal document, consisting of 20 articles, by which the New York
Base-Ball Club employs the defendant, and
the defendant undertakes to perform professional services as a base-ball player for the
club for the season (specified in article 2) beginning April 1, 1889, and ending October 31,
1889.
Article 20 provides that the salary to
be paid the defendant shall be $2,000, payable semi-monthly. Among other things, the
contract provides by different articles that
the club may at any time terminate the contract on 10 days' notice to the defendant,
whereupon the obligations of both parties are
to cease; that the club shall provide the defendant while "abroad" with proper board
and lodging, and pay all necessary traveling
expenses;
that if the defendant, during the
term of his employment, be guilty of any excessive indulgence in liquor, or of gambling,
or of insubordination, he shall be liable to
certain specified penalties; and that, if the
club ceases to be a member of the National
Clubs,
League of Professional
Base-Ball
either compulsorily or voluntarily, the "defendant shall, if the right of reservation be
transferred" by the club to any other club,
receive from that club at least the same
amount in salary that he receives by the
present contract. It contains, also, the following provision:
"Article 18. It is further
understood and agreed that the party of the
first part shall have the right to 'reserve* the
said party of the second part for the season
next ensuing the term mentioned in paragraph 2, herein provided, and that said right
and privilege is hereby accorded to said party
of the first part upon the following conditions, which are to be taken and construed
as conditions precedent to the exercise of
such extraordinary rights or privileges, viz.:
(1) That the said party of the second part
shall not be reserved at a salary less than
that mentioned in the 20th paragraph herein,
except by the consent of the party of the second part; (2) that the said party of the second part, If he be reserved by the said party
of the first part for the next ensuing season,
shall not be one of more than 14 players then
under contract,— that is, that the right of reservation shall be limited to that number of
players, and no more."
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant
was one of 14 players, and no more, so reserved under said contract; that on the 22d
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day of October, 1889, plaintiff exercised its
option to reserve the defendant for the season of 1890 by giving the defendant due and
timely notice, in writing, of its intention to
do so; and that, nothwlthstanding the exercise of this option, the defendant has engaged his services for the season of 1890 to
another organization, to act for it as a baseball player during that season.
The plaintiff
insists that, by the terms of the contract, it
is entitled to the services of the defendant
as a base-ball player for the season of 1890
upon the terms and conditions of the contract for the season of 1889, except the condition giving a right to reserve him for a
subsequent season.
The case turns upon the meaning and effect of the clause and contract which gives
the club the right to reserve the defendant
for the season next ensuing.
It is plain
enough that the option is a right of reservation for the next ensuing season only,— the
season ensuing the term mentioned in article 2,— and does not extend beyond the term
from April 1, 1890, to October 31, 1890.
It
is equally plain that the salary for the ensuing season is to be the same as that for the
season of 1889, unless the parties mutually
But what is the charconsent to a change.
acter of the option which the plaintifC is permitted to exercise?
What is the right to "reserve" the defendant? If it Is the right to
retain and have his services as a base^ball
player for the season of 1890, when is the
right of election to be manifested, and upon
what terms are these services to be rendered?
Can the club wait until April 1, 1890,
before it manifests its intention to exercise
the option? Is the club to pay the defendant's board and lodging while he is "abroad,"
serving the club, during the season of 1890?
Can the club discharge him at any time during that season on 10 days' notice? Are the
penalties
for intoxication, gambling, or insubordination enforceable during the season
of 1890? In short, does the contract embody the definite understanding of the parties to it in respect to their reciprocal rights
and obligations after the season of 1889 shall
have ended? If the term, "the right to reserve," has no defined meaning,
and there
were no extrinsic sources by which to ascertain the sense in which it is used by the parties, it would be an ambiguous phrase.
As
applied to a contract for personal services,
the right to reserve would convey a very unintelligible conception of the conditions and
incidents of the service to be rendered or
enjoyed.
A contract by which one party
agrees, for an equivalent, to reserve himself
for another for a stated period, or to reserve
himself as a lawyer or doctor or artist or
laborer for a specified term, would very inadequately express a promise to devote his professional or manual services exclusively to
the other during that period; and the promise of a base-ball player to reserve himself
for a particular club for a given season
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would hardly, without more, convey any definite meaning of the understanding of the
parties.
It certainly would not bind him to
submit to any special rules or regulations respecting the performance of his services not
expressly consented to, or not to be necessarily implied from the nature of the employment and the situation of the contracting
parties. If it had been the meaning of the
contract to allow the club to renew the engagement of the defendant for a second season upon the same conditions
as those for
the first season, that intention could have
been easily and unequivocally expressed. As
it is, it is left wholly to implication, unless
the "right to reserve" is a term having a defined and specific signification.
This ambiguity suggests such grave doubt as to the
meaning of the clause that in two adjudged
cases, in which it has been considered by the
courts, the judges have thought it too indefinite to be enforceable.
In Exhibition Co. v.
Ward, 9 N. Y. Supp. 779, (in the supreme
court of this state,) Mr. Justice O'Brien was
of the opinion that the failure to provide for
the terms and conditions of the contract for
the second season rendered the clause so indefinite and uncertain that it could not be
the basis of equitable relief, or that it meant
that every player is bound for the ensuing
season upon the same terms and conditions
as those of the first season, including the
signing of a new contract containing the option to reserve.
In Philadelphia Ball Club
against Hallman, in the court of common
pleas of Philadelphia, Judge Thayer was of
the opinion that the failure to designate the
terms and conditions of the new engagement
under which the player is to be reserved
rendered the contract of reservation wholly
uncertain, and therefore incapable of enforcement.

Where the terms employed to express some
particular condition of a contract are ambiguous, and cannot be satisfactorily explained by reference to other parts of the
contract, and the parties have made other
contracts in respect to the same subject-matter, and apparently in pursuance of the same
general purpose, it is always permissible to
examine all of them together in aid of the interpretation of the particular condition; and,
if it is found that the ambiguous term has
a plain meaning by a comparison of the several contracts and an examination of their
provisions, that meaning should be attributed to it In the particular condition. So,
also, if it appears that the term used has an
established meaning among those engaged in
the business to which the contract has reference, and, unless it is given that meaning,
is indefinite and equivocal, it should be
treated. In Interpreting the contract, as used
according to that understanding; and In construing a contract the court is always at liberty to look at the surrounding and antecedent circumstances, and avail itself of the
light of any extrinsic facts which wiU enable
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to Tiew the contract from the standpoint
of the parties at the time when it was made.
In the present case, it will satisfactorily appear, by resort to these sources of interpretation, that the term "right to reserve" is
used in the contract in the sense that obtains in base-ball nomenclature, and that it
is intended to signify an option, the character of which was well understood by baseball clubs and professional players when the
Obviously, the
present contract was made.
right to reserve given by the eighteenth
clause of the contract Is the same thing as
the right of reservation mentioned in that
part of the contract which provides that the
present dub may disband, and transfer its
right of reservation to some other club. The
agreement is in a form common to all contracts between base-ball clubs organized under what is known as the "national agreeprofessional players, a form
and
ment"
which is prescribed by the national agreement The national agreement is a compact
between the various base-ball "associations
constituting the National League Base-Ball
Clubs and the American Association of BaseBall Clubs, made with a view to regulate the
rights and obligations of the members as respects one another. One of its paramount
features consists of provisions regulating the
privilege of clubs to reserve a stated number
of players.
The provisions are framed to
prevent any club of the National League or
the American Association from engaging a
player already reserved by another, and to
render the player so reserved Ineligible for
by any other club. They reemployment
quire each club, on the 10th day of October
in each year, to transmit to all the other
clubs a reserved list of players, not exceeding 14 in number, then under contract, and
of such players reserved in any prior list
who have refused to contract for another
year, and declare such players ineligible to
Inasmuch as
contract with any other club.
the parties to the national agreement comprise all, or substantially all, the clubs in the
country which employ professional players,
this national agreement, by indirection, but
practically, affects every professional player,
and subordinates
his privilege of engaging
as he chooses to the option of the club by
which he is under reservation. As is stated
in a recent publication edited by a prominent
professional player: "The most important
feature of the national agreement, unquestionably, is the provision according to the
club members the privilege of reserving a
No other club of
stated number of players.
any association under the agreement dare engage any player so reserved. To this rule,
more than any other thing, does base-ball,
as a business, owe its present substantial
By preserving intact the strength
standing.
of the team from year to year, it places the
business of base-ball on a permanent basis,
and thus offers security to the Investment
of capital. The reserve rule itself is a usur-

it
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pation of the player's rights; but It is, perhaps, made necessary by the peculiar nature
of the ball business, and the player is indirectly compensated by the Improved standing of the game.
The reserve rule takes a
manager by the throat and compels him to
keep his hands off his neighbor's enterprise."
In the contracts between clubs and players as framed prior to November, 1887, there
was no provision by which the player consented to the option for reserve on the part
of the club.
But the contracts did contain
a condition that the player should conform
to, and be governed by, the constitution and
provisions of the national agreement;
and
the player thereby assented to become ineligible for engagement by any other club
of the league during the season of his engagement by a particular club, or while the
option of re-engaging him for an ensuing
year on the part of that club remained in
Changes were made from time to
force.
time in various features of the national
agreement.
The players were obliged to inform themselves of the latest changes, in
order to understand the precise terms of
their contract vrith the clubs.
They became
unwilling to consent to a form of contract
by which they were to be subjected to conditlojis not mentioned in the contract itself.
In November, 1887, a committee representing the professional players met a committee representing the parties to the national
agreement for the purpose of agreeing upon
certain changes to be made in the form
of the contract.
The committees finally
agreed that the obnoxious clause In the contract should be omitted, and the clause now
found in the eighteenth article should be inserted.
This was the origin of the clause
giving to the club, by the contract itself, the
option of reserve.
The clause was manifestly inserted in order to give, by an express
condition, the right of reservation to the
clubs which theretofore the players had only
given by agreeing to be bound by the terms
By ascertaining
of the national agreement.
what that right of reservation was, It can
be plainly seen what the parties had In mind
in using the term in the present contract.
If, when the contract was made, the term
had a well-understood definition, there was
no necessity to particularize in the contract
the conditions or characteristics of the option.
Reference has already been made to the
provision of the national agreement requiring each club, on the 10th day of October
in each year, to transmit to all the other
clubs a reserved list of players, and declaring such players ineligible to contract with
any other club. This provision is to be read
In connection with another provision of the
national agreement, which prescribes that no
contract shall be made "for the services of
any player by any club for a longer period
than seven months, beginning April 1st and
terminating October 31st, and no such con-
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tract for services to be rendered after the
expiration of the current year shall be made
prior to the 20th day of October of such
year."
The two provisions, read together,
allow a period of 10 days to intervene between the time when a club can exercise the
privilege of placing a player upon its reserved list and the time when it can make a
contract with him for services to be rendered in an ensuing year, thus emphasizing a
distinction between the right to treat the
player as reserved and the contract which
is to fix the terms upon which the reservation is to be complete.
The effect of these
provisions is that, when the club has exercised its privilege of reservation, no other
club is permitted to negotiate with the player; but the club which has placed him upon
the reserved Ust, and no other, is then at
liberty to enter into a contract with him to
obtain his services for an ensuing year. Consequently the right of reservation is nothing
more or less than a prior and exclusive right,
as against the other clubs, to enter into a
contract securing the player's services for
another season. Until the contract is made
which fixes the compensation of the player
and the other conditions of his service, there
is no definite or complete obligation upon
his part to engage with the club. He agrees
that he wiU not negotiate with any other
club, but enjoys the privilege of engaging
with the reserving club or not, as he sees
fit. Read with this understanding, the clause
In question by which the privilege of reserving the defendant is given to the club
expresses definitely the terms of the option.
If the club exercises the right of reservation, it agrees in advance that the player
shall receive at least as large a salary as
he has received during the current year, and
leaves it open to him to contract on that
basis for the next season, or to insist on a
larger salary. All the other terms of the
are matters of negotiation beengagement
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tween the club and the player. The law
implies that the option of reservation is to
be exercised vrtthin a reasonable time; but
when this has been done the right to reserve
the player becomes the privilege, and the
exclusive privilege, as between the reserving
club and the other dubs, to obtain his services for another year if the parties can agree
upon the terms. As a coercive condition
which places the player practically, or at
least measurably, in a situation where he
must contract with the club that has reserved him, or face the probability of losing
any engagement for the ensuing season, it
Is operative and valuable to the club. But,
as the basis for an action for damages If
the player fails to contract, or for an action
to enforce specific performance, it is wholly
nugatory. In a legal sense, it is merely a
contract to make a contract if the parties
can agree.
It may be that heretofore the
clubs have generally insisted upon treating
the option to reserve as a contract by which
they were entitled to have the services of
the player for the next season upon the
terms and conditions of the first season, and
even requiring him to enter into a new contract containing the option for reservation;
and it may be that the players have generally acquiesced in the claims of the clubs.
However this may be, the players were not
in a position to act independently; and, if
they had refused to consent to the terms
proposed by the clubs, they would have done
so at the peril of losing any engagement.
The facts, therefore, are not such as to permit any weight to be given to the acts of
the parties as evincing their own construction of the contract.
It follows that the act of the defendant
in refusing to negotiate with the club for an
engagement for the season of 1890, while a
breach of contract, is not the breach of one
The motion
which the plaintiff can enforce.
for an injunction is denied.
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ALIiEGHHNT BASE-BALJj CLUB t.
BENNETT.
(14 Fed.

257.)

Circuit Court, W. W. Pennsylvania.

Novem-

ber 18, 18S2.

In Equity.
witli agreement
personal

Bill

to

enforce

compliance

to enter into contract to give
services.

Bill in equity by the Allegheny Base-ball

a corporation of Pennsylvania, against
Charles W. Bennett, a citizen of Michigan,
to compel the respondent to execute a formal
contract to give his exclusive services as a
base-ball player to the complainant during
the base-ball season of 1883, and also for an
Injunction to restrain him from executing a
like agreement with the Detroit Base-ball
Club, and from performing such services for
any other person or corporation than the
complainant during the season named.

Club,

The bill was filed on the fifth day of Oc-

tober, 1882, and was based upon the following written instrument, to-wit:
"It is hereby agreed, this third day of
August, 1882, between the Allegheny Base-

ball Club and Charles W. Bennett, that said
Charles W. Bennett hereby promises and
binds himself that between the fifteenth and
thirty-first days of October, 1882, he vtIU sign
a regular contract of the Allegheny Baseball Club, a chartered company belonging to
the American Association of Base-ball Clubs,
which contract shall bind him to give his
services as a base-ball player to said club
for the season of 1883, and shall bind said
Allegheny Club to pay him the sum of $1,700 for and during such season of 1883; and
in consideration of his agreement to sign
such a contract in October, the sum of $100
is now paid to said C. W. Bennett, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. Witness our hands and seals this third day of
August,

1882.

"The Allegheny Base-ball Club, by
"H. D. McKnight, President [Seal.]
"C. W. Bennett
[Seal.]
"A. G. Pratt Witness."
The bill averred substantially that the
complainant was engaged in the business of
playing base-ball for profit, and that by the
expenditure of much time and large sums
of money it made preparations for the exhibition of such games, and expected to receive large returns from the same; that the
respondent was a skillful player of base-ball,
of his agreement with
and. In consequence
complainant E. N. Williamson and James
F. Galvln, two other skillful players, had entered into a similar agreement with complainant; that respondent had refused to
sign the "regular contract" referred to, and
had entered into a like contract with the
that, accordingly,
Detroit Base-ball Club;
Williamson and Galvin refused to keep their
with complainant, and that
flaid engagement
•the base-ball season had now so far advan-
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ced that complainant could not secure

other
players of equal skill with said Bennett, Williamson, and Galvin, whereby complainant
"would be seriously damaged, to an amount
of not less than $1,000."
The bill prayed that Bennett be required to
sign the "regular contract," and perform his
covenants,
and also that he be restrained
from entering into a similar contract with
the Detroit Base-ball Club, or any other association or person, and from playing base
ball "for hire,' during the base-ball season
of 1883, for any other than complainant.
The complainant moved for a preliminary
Injunction.
The motion was argued by
James Batewell, and was opposed by A.
Tauslg, and was denied.
The respondent
then filed a general demurrer, on the
grounds: (1) That the bill was prematurely
brought; (2) that the agreement was a mere
preliminary
arrangement, anticipating the
making of a final contract, and that, therefore, there was no contract before the com't
capable of specific enforcement; (3) that the
agreement was unlimited as to place, and
was, therefore, imreasonable and void as
against public policy, as covenants in restraint of trade; (4) tiiat the complainant
had an adequate remedy at law.

A. Tausig, A. W.
Brown, for demurrer.
To maintain

Duff,

and

Marshall

a suit there must be a cause
action when such suit is commenced.
55 Ga. 329; 29 111. 497; 4 Sneed, 583.
One
who has anything to do on a particular day
has the whole of that day to perform such
act, so that suit for a breach of performance
cannot be instituted until the next day. 102
Mass. 65; 6 Watts & S. 179; 18 Cal. 378.
And, In general, the time within which a
contract is to be executed is as much the
essence of It as any other part. 6 Wis. 120;
43. Me. 158; 18 Ind. 365; 17 Me. 316; 22
Me. 133.
to
(1) The present bill for an injunction
restrain the defendant from playing with the
Detroit Club, as In violation of the alleged
agreement, will not lie for the reason the contract is a mere preliminary arrangement, and
not a final agreement What are the terms
of the alleged contract? They provide and
contemplate the execution of a regular agreement in order to bind the parties and render
the contract mutual, final, and conclusive.
The preliminary contract shows that it was
executed with reference to a future and final
agreement between the parties. A contract
requires mutuality as to all its essential
terms, stipulations, and conditions.
Is there
any allegation upon the face of the bill that
a final, regular contract was ever agreed upon between the parties? There is no contract, therefore, capable of being enforced in
a court of equity, and the present bill must
Railway Co. v. Wythes, 5 De
be dismissed.
Gex, M. & G. 888. Specific performance will
not be decreed If It is not clear that the

of

636

SPEOIFIO PERPORMANOE

minds of the parties have come together.
Wlstar's Appeal, 80 Pa. 484.
(2) Spect&c performance -will not be enforced, directly or indirectly, unless the agreement is mutual, its terms certain, its enforcement practicable, and the complainant is
without adequate redress in an action at law,
(Blsp. Eq. § 377, and cases cited; 10 Wall.
339; 5 De Gex, M. & G. 888;) and it will
not be enforced when it is doubtful whether
an agreement has been concluded, (14 Pet.
77; 81 Pa. 484;) nor where the duties are
continuous and require skill and judgment,
A court of chancery will not
(10 Wall. 339.)
decree the specific performance of a contract,
where it would be impossible for the court to
enforce the execution of its decree, or where
the literal performance, if enforced, would be
Bisp. Eq. 436.
a vain and idle act.
contract is legal
(3) Even if the alleged
and binding on the defendant, the demurrer
should be sustained, because the plaintiff has
an adequate remedy at law.
It may have to
pay a higher salary to secure a player of
Bennett's skill, and the difference would be
the measure of damages for breach of contract.
(4) Even if the court should be of the opinion that a contract was executed, full, final,
and mutual as to all its terms, conditions,
and stipulations, and also of opinion that
negative covenants not to exercise a trade,
profession,
or calling within reasonable limits may be enforced by injunction, such conclusion would have no application to enjoin
The contract is
and restrain the defendant.
unreasonable and void on grounds of public
policy, as in cases of covenants in restraint
of trade, because it is unlimited. McClurg's
Appeal, 58 Pa. 51; Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brewst
342; Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Oh. App. 654.
(5) The demurrer should be sustained because equity will not indirectly enforce specific performance of a' contract for personal
services where the services require a succession of acts whose performance cannot be
by one transaction, but wiU be
accumulated
continuous and require the exercise of special
knowledge,
skill or judgment. Pom. Spec.
Per. § 312; Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6; De
Pol v. Sohlke, 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 280; Sanquiricio
V. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315; Kemble v. Kean,
6 Sim. 333; Hills v. CroU, 2 Phila. 60; Rolfe
V. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88; Fothergill v. Rowland,
L. R. 17 Eq. 132; Kimberley v. Jennings, 6
Sim. 340. The personal acts with respect to
which courts of equity entertain jurisdiction
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to decree specific performance
have reference to property of some kind. There is nona
where a contract for personal services alone
has been actively enforced.
There are sev*
eral, however, in which the court has interfered negatively. Thus, in the case of a theater, considered as a partnership,
a contract
with the proprietors not to write dramatic
pieces for any other theater is valid, and a
violation of it will be restrained by injunction. Clark V. Price, 2 Wils. 157; Willard,
Eq. 278. But where there is no partaership
between the parties, and the defendant has
violated his engagement to one theater and
formed a conflicting engagement with another, a court of equity will not interfere either
actively to compel performance of one contract, or negatively to prevent the performWillard, Eq. 278; Kemance of the other.
ble V. Kean, 6 Sim. 333.
The cases where
injunctions have issued relate (1) to partnership agreements;
(2) to property of some
kind; (3) to express negative covenants.

Willard, Eq.

If

277,

278.

the court should be of opinion that
the alleged contract is complete, mutual, certain, and final, and that under it the plaintiff
has no full, complete, and adequate remedy
at law, the present bill will not lie for the
prematurely
following reasons:
(1) It is
brought. No injury to plaintiff (if any) can
arise until the ball season of 1883 commences. As the plaintiff will not be actively engaged under the alleged contract until the
regular season of 1883 opens, no damage can
result until that time from the act which it
is sought to enjoin. (2) There is no right to,
or necessity for, an injunction, for it cannot
appear, at the present time, that defendant
will play ball during the season of 1883^
De Rivin violation of said alleged contract.
aflnoli V. Corsetti, 4 Paige, 264; De Pol v.
the injury be
Sohlke, 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 283.
doubtful, eventual, or contingent, equity will
not enjoin. Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274;
Huckenstein's Appeal, 70 Pa. 108. If the
alleged injury Is only problematical, accordmay or may not
ing as other circumstances
arise, or if there is no pressing need for an
Injunction, the court will not grant it until.
Kerr,
a tort has actually been committed.
Injunc. 339.
(6)

If

James Bakewell and

J.

S. Ferguson,

ACHESON, D. J. (orally).
tained and bill dismissed.

contra.

Demurrer

sus-

/^
McGOWIN
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REMINGTON.

(12 Pa. 56.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Sept 20,

1849.

Appeal from aistrlct court, Allegheny county, in equity.
Ou the 6th Septembei-, 1847, Z. W. Remington filed a bill in equity, setting forth that,
prior to the grievances complained of, he had
heen for many years a surveyor and regulator
of the streets, lanes, and alleys of the city of

Pittsburgh, and other places around said city,
many plana and plots
and throughout said
lands and grades of
drafts of surveys of
plantations in other counties adjoining, and
possessed certain furniture and instruments
of surveying, which were of great value to
him, a list of which is appended to this bill,
and prayed to be made and taken as part
thereof,— marked as "Exhibit A."
That on or about Ist April, 1843, intending
to engage in other occupations and to remove
from Pittsburgh, where he had before resided
and had his office for several years, and reposing all confidence
in the defendant, the
defendant having been for several years under the complainant's tuition and under his
service as a surveyor, the complainant, desirous and Intending to benefit defendant,
who purposed to succeed and follow in the
business pursued by the complainant, left in
the care and custody of defendant, and for
the mere purpose of promoting the interest
and business of defendant, all his plots of
survey and plans, drafts and property, as set
forth in Exhibit A, besides other plots and
drafts, which he cannot recollect, that defendant might refer to and use in his said business until they would be required by complainant, he, complainant, expecting some
day to resume his old business of surveyor at
Pittsburgh, in case he should not succeed in
his new occupation.
That complainant, after he had left the
said plots, plans, drafts, and property with
defendant,
went to dwell in Beaver county,
and left them in the office which complainant
had occupied before and at his said departure
from Pittsburgh, and the possession of which
«aid office he gave up to defendant along with
the said plots, plans, drafts, and ftimlture
and instruments aforesaid, all which things
are of real value to complainant, and very
difficult and impossible to replace or procure,
and no damages for which in a court of law
and as such had made
of ground in said city
county, and maps of
streets and roads, and

■could compensate.

That complainant had used efforts since to
furniture, and instruprocure
his papers,
ments, to no purpose, defendant refusing to
deliver them up, and now threatening that he

will destroy them rather than give them up to

complainant.
And complainant believes and is informed
that the defendant is now engaged in copying
many of said plots, plans, and drafts for his
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and to be used by him as a surveyor
in and about said city of Pittsburgh and adjoining counties, to the great lojury of complainant; and complainant believes that defendant is disposed and is likely to injure,
and fraudulently intends to destroy or secrete
said plots, plans, drafts, and instruments, so
that complainant may not recommence
his
orwn use,

business.

That complainant returned to Pittsburgh In

the spring of this year, and some time in July
last went to defendant's office and demanded
of defendant the return of his said plots,

plans, drafts, and instruments, informing him
that he had returned to Pittsburgh and opened an office, and resumed his business as a
surveyor; defendant refused to deliver them
to complainant, and said there were some of
them he, defendant, could not get along with-

out

The bill then went on to propound Inter^
rogatories to the defendant touching the several allegations of fact before made, and
prayed that McGowin be decreed to deliver
up to the plaintiff the said plots, etc., and any
copies thereof made since demand.
The bill
further prayed an injunction to restrain McGowin from copying, and from destroying, or
injuring, or secreting said plots, etc., and a
subpoena to answer.
The exhibit, marked A,
contained a detailed list of plots, drafts, furniture, instruments, etc., demanded.
The subpoena issued forthwith, and September 9, a bond having been filed, application was made for an Injunction, which was
awarded and issued.
4th October rule to
plead, answer or demur by first Monday in
November.
29th
October demurrer filed,
which was overruled 22d December, and a
second special injunction awarded. 3d January, 1848, answer filed, and motion to dissolve Injunction.
The answer was to the following effect:
It
admitted that Remington was a surveyor, and
as such had in bis possession plans, plots,
maps, etc., such as were specified in the bill,
with certain exceptions, particularized in a
schedule of explanations; that he removed to
Beaver,
occupied
and that respondent
his
The answer affirmed that
office after he left
the plans, etc., were greatly overrated in
value, and have no such peculiar characteristics as to make them subjects of equity jurisdiction, by reason of their unique and original description; that most, if not all of them,
could be supplied or substituted from other
offices, and from private individuals, and
from the public records of the county and
state, being generally copied, and mostly from
papers unofficial and unauthenticated.
It affirmed that the plans, etc., belonged, some of
them to the respondent, some to other persons,
and denied the demand for them, etc.
The complainant filed a replication, and

took evidence of his having made the demand mentioned In his bill. On 13th January, 1849, the cause having been heard on
the bill, answer, exhibits, and proofs, and on
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argument of counsel, the court ordered and
decreed that the clerk of the court do deliver to the complainant the papers, maps,
and plans, which have been placed by order
of the court in his custody, and it is ordered
and decreed further that the defendant deliver unto Read Washington, Esq., one of the
masters in chancery,
all the plots, plans,
drafts, furniture, and instruments, left in defendant's possession as set forth in the bill
of complainant, and v^hich are not now in the
possession of the clerk of this court, and also
of any copies thereof which may have been
made by respondent since the day of the de^
mand thereof stated in the bill, and that the
master have power, and Is hereby required to
ascertain by interrogatories to be exhibited in
writing to defendant, whether there are any
of the said plans, maps, plots, drafts, furniture, or instruments disclosed in said bill in
his possession undelivered, and that the master require defendant to answer thereto upon
oath, and to inquire upon interrogatories of
defendant, to be administered to him under
oath, what copies of or copying from said papers he may have made, and whether the
same have been delivered up; and that said

master make report (if required by further
order) to this court thereof.
And further ordered that the injunction
heretofore issued be continued and made perpetual, and that the said master deliver to
the complainant the said plans, plots, drafts,
furniture, and instruments which may be
placed in his hands by virtue of this decree.
And further ordered that the costs and fees
in this suit be taxed by the clerk, and that
the bill thereof be immediately paid by the
defendant into court
On 20th January, 1849, defendant appealed
from this decree, and 20th June following decree was made for a specific delivery, for refusing obedience to which a rule for attachment was taken, and on 4th September reIn this court these exspondent appealed.
ceptions were taken:
(1) Want of jurisdiction over subject-matter of the bill.
(2) The bill presents no sufficient ground
for the Interference of a court of equity in
Pennsylvania.
rem(3) The courts of law have adequate
edies.

(4) The decree covers some descriptions of
property which are not the subject of equity
Jurisdiction under any state of facts.

Craft & McGandless, for appellant.
Dunlop, for appellee.

Mr.

BELL, J. The defendant having failed to
sustain, by proof, his allegation of sale or
gift of the articles sought to be recovered
by this bill, the contest in this court is reduced to two questions: First, whether the
bill presents sufficient grounds to warrant
the interference of a court of equity, in this
state, under the statute conferring equitable
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jurisdiction?
Secondly, whether that portloD
of the decree which covers the surveying
instruments and furniture described in the
exhibits annexed to the bill can be sustained?
As to the first point, the defendant insists
that the only remedy is at law. Though the
action of replevin is, with us, a broader
remedy than in England, lying in all cases
where one man improperly detains the goods
of another, it is in no instance effective to
enforce a specific return of chattels, since a
claim of property and bond given is always
sufficient to defeat reclamation, no matter
what may be the eventual issue of the conAs, therefore, our common-law
test.
tribunals are as powerless for such a purpose,
as the similar BngUsh courts, the propriety
of exerting the equitable jurisdiction now
invoked must depend with us on the same
reasons that are deemed sufficient to call it
Here, as there, the ininto action there.
quiry must be whether the law affords adequate redress by a compensation in damages,
where the complaint is of the detention of
personal chattels. If not, the aid of a court
of chancery will always be extended to remedy the injury, by decreeing a return of the
thing itself.
The precise ground of this jurisdiction is
said to be the same as that upon which the
specific performance of an agreement is enforced, namely, that fruition of the thing,
the subject of the agreement, is the object,
the failure of which would be but iUy supplied by an award of damages.
Lowther v.
Lowther, 13 Ves. 389. In the application of
this rule some difficulty has been experiThe examples afforded by the Engenced.
lish books are usually those cases, where,
from the nature of the thing sought after,
its antiquity, or because of some peculiarity
connected with it, it cannot easily, or at all,
be replaced.
Of these may be instanced the
title deeds of an estate and other muniments
of property, —valuable paintings (Lowther v,
Lowther, supra); an antique silver altar
piece (Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 3 P.
Wms. 389); an ancient horn, the symbol of
tenure, by which an estate is held (Pusey
V. Pusey, 1 Ves. 273); heirlooms (3 Ves. &
B. 18); and even a finely carved cherrystone (Amb. 77). Such articles as these are
commonly esteemed not altogether, or perhaps at all, for their intrinsic value, but as
being objects of attachment or ciu-iosity, and,
therefore, not to be measured in damages
by a jury, who cannot enter into the feelings of the owner. So too the impossibility,
or even great difficulty, of supplying their
loss, may put damages out of the question
as a medium' of redress. But these are not
the exclusive reasons why chancery interferes, for there may be cases in which the
thing sought to be recovered is susceptible of
reproduction or substitution, and yet where
damages
could not be so estimated as to
cover present loss or compensate its future
consequent inconvenience.
And I take it
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this Is always so, ■where, from the nature
of the subject or the immediate object of the
parties, no convenient measure of damages
can be ascertained; or, where nothing could
answer the justice of the case but the performance of a contract in specie.
Of this
Buxton V. Lister, 3 Atk. 384, furnishes an
example in the analogous instance of a con-

tract for the sale of personalty,— contracts,
which are most commonly left to be dealt
with at law. It was a bill to enforce the
of an agreement for the purperformance
chase of several large parcels of growing
who
wood, to be severed by the defendants,
were to have eight years to dispose of it,
and to pay for it in six yearly installments.
Lord Hardwicke was, at first, extremely reluctant to entertain the bill, but after discussion came to the conclusion that, though
relating to a personal chattel, it was such
an agreement that the plaintiff might come
into chancery for a specific performance.
He insta/iced the case of Taylor v. Neville,
which was a bill for the performance of articles for the sale of eight hundred tons of
iron, to be paid for in a certain number of
where the decree
years, by installments,
prayed for was made; and proceeded to
"Such sort of contracts as these difobserve:
fer from those that are immediately to be
There are several circumstances
executedA man may contract
which may concur.
for the purchase of a great quantity of timber, as a ship carpenter, by reason of the
and this is on the
vicinity of the timber;
On the part of the seller,
part of the buyer.
suppose a man wants to clear his land in
order to turn it to a particular sort of husbandry; there nothing can answer the justice of the case but the performance of the
Similar in principle is
contract in specie."
the case of Falls v. Eeid, 13 Ves. 70, where
the plaintiffs prayed the restoration of an
engraved silver snuffbox, used for many
years by a society, as the symbol of their
v. Thomson,
association;
and Nutbrown
where a tenant brought a bill against his
lessor, who, under the pretense of the tenhimself of
had repossessed
ant's covenant,
the land, and seized upon the stock of cattle,
which by the lease the tenant was to enjoy
for seven years. The objection was that the
tenant's remedy, if he was entitled to one
at all, was at law, in damages. But how,
asked Lord Eldon, are damages to be estiThe direction to a
mated in such a case?
jury must be to give, not the value of the
A
chattels, but their value to the tenant!
be propounded in
may
well
question
similar
f
By what standard would you
our case.
injury the plaintiff may sustain
measure
the
y
in future from being deprived, even for a
brief period, of the use of papers essential
Their
to the prosecution of his business?
intrinsic value might, perhaps, be ascertained
by an estimate of the labor necessary to
theip reproduction, admitting the means to
be at hand, and within the power of tbe
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But how could a tribunal ascerplaintiff.
tain the probable loss which, in the meantime, might be sustained? The present pecuniary Injury might be little or nothing,
and so possibly of the future; or it might
be very great, depending upon the unascertalnable events of coming time, as these may
be influenced by the misconduct of the dethink,
fendant. T hese considera tions sh ow,
the case ig^ot one tof^am agp^] Besides,
as many of the maps, plans, surveys, and (
calculations are said to be copies of private j
papers, we are by no means satisfied they/
could be replaced at all. Certainly not with- )
out permission of the owners; a risk to
which the plaintiff ought not unnecessarily
If to these reflections we add
to be exposed.
the fact that some of these documents are
the originalv work of the plaintiff, of value
upon data possibly no
as being -predicated
longer accessible, a wrong is perpetrated i
which a chancellor ought not to hesitate in (
relieving.
It is enough for this purpose that
alierfect relief at law is not apparent The
thing to be guarded against is, not the invasion of the defendant's rights, for he
stands here absolutely without any, except
the common interest every citizen has in
preserving the proper line of distinction that
divides the jurisdiction and limits the powers of the several courts. What is to be
avoided is an unnecessary trespass upon the
province of the common-law tribunals, and
this is to be tested by the simple query
whether they offer a full remedy for the
wrong complained of?
But there is another ground upon which
this proceeding may be sustained. In Falls
V. Reid, the snuffbox was deposited with the
defendant, as a member of the society, upon
certain terms, to be redelivered upon the
Lord Rosslyn
happening of certain events.
held that under these facts, the defendant
was a depositary on an express trust which,
upon a common ground of equity, gave the
plaintiff title to sue in that court; and in
this he was supported by Lord Eldon, in the
subsequent case of Nutbrown v. Thornton.
According to the proof in our case, the papers and documents claimed were left with
the defendant under the express understanding that they were to be redelivered whenever the plaintiff should see fit to resume
the business of his then profession in this
city. It is then the case of direct confidence I ^fj^_
violated,— a spell sufficiently potent to callj •^^^
into vigorous activity the authority Invoked.*
As to the second question, it is perhaps
enough to say that, when once a court of
equity takes cognizance of a litigation, it
will dispose of every subject embraced within the circle of contest, whether the question
be of remedy or of distinct yet connected
topics of dispute. If the jurisdiction once
attaches from the nature of one of the subjects of contest, it may embrace all of them,
for equity abhors multiplicity of suits. Thus,
in the case last cited, the chancellor ruled

I
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that where a person Is found wrongfully
in possession of a farm, over which the
court had undoubted power, and also in possession of the stock upon it, at the same
time and under the effect of the same wrong,
the court will undoubtedly make him account
for and deliver back the whole. In the case t
at bar the surveying InBtruments and officey
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furniture stand In the same category with \
the maps, drafts, etc., were delivered to thej
defendant at the same time, and are withheld by an exertion of the same wrong.
In
short, tJiey enter into and make part of the
same transaction, and may, therefore, be the
objects of the same measure of redress.
Decree affirmed.
Cc^^A^t^M,^—

«
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PARK & C. I. R. CO. v. CONEY
rBOSPBOTISLAND & B. R. CO.
(39

N. E.

Court of Appeals

17,

144 N.

of New York.

Y.

152.)
Dec. 11, 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term.

Second department

Action by the Prospect Park & Coney Island Railroad Company against the Coney
Ifil&nd & Brooklyn Railroad Company for
specific performance. From a Judgment of
the general term (21 N. Y. Supp. 1046) reversing a judgment for plaintiftf, It appeals.
Reversed.
George W. Wlngate, for appellant
liam N. Dykman, for respondent

BARTLETT,

J.

Wil-

The parties to this action

entered into a contract June 1, 1882. and thp
plaintifF seeks to compel Its specific performance.
The special term rendered judgment
f«r plain ti£F; the general term seversed the
judgment; and the plaintifiF comes here under the usual stipnlation In ease of affirmance.
The reversal was for error both of
law and fact, and, the failure to Insert a
certificate that the case contains all the evidence having been cured by the amendment
of the return by the supreme court, we are
called upon to review the facts as well as the
law.
At the time of making the contract, the
plaintiff owned a steam surface railroad,

usually known as "Culver's Coney Island
Railroad," which extended from Coney Island to a depot at the comer of Ninth avestreet, in the city of
nue and Twentieth
Brooklyn, and adjoining Greenwood Cemetery; the plaintiff also owned certain horsecar railroads, which were entirely distinct
from the steam railroad, extending from the
depot to Pulton
ferry; the plaintift also
owned a charter entitling it to construct a
herse-car line from the depot to Hamilton
Ferry and other points. The defendant, at
the time of executing the contract, was operating certain horse-car lines which ran
from Hamilton, Fulton, and other ferries,
and from the East River bridge, to Ninth
street and Ninth avenue, and through Ninth
street,
on Fifteenth
avenue to Fifteenth
street to Coney Island avenue, and thence
to Coney Island.
These lines wa-e operated
whoUy by horses.
By the contract the plaintiff granted the defendant the right to use
its tracks on Ninth avenue from Fifteenth
street to the d^>ot at Ninth avenue and
Twentieth street, free of charge, for 21 years
from Jime 1, 1882.
The defendant covenant-|
ed to run during the spring, summer, and
fall months, to plaintiff's depot, cars to connect with the furies and all plalntifTs trains
to and from Coney Island.
The plaintiff
agreed to furnish defendant necessary terminal facilities at the depot This contract
was obviously advantageous to both parties.
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)-41
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The plaintiff secured passengers
to Coney
Island from defendant's lines, and the defendant greatly increased its travel by having a direct connection with steam transit
to Coney Island.
The defendant's horse-car
line to Coney Island could not successfully
The
^compete with plaintiff's steam route.
plaintiff provided defendant with the necessary terminal facilities as required, and the
contract was acted upon by both parties uatU the month of October, 1889.
At that time
there was a change in defendant's management, and the company contracted for an
electrical equipment from the Parade Ground
to Coney Island, commonly known as the
"Trolley System." The plaintiff, In May,
1800, finding that defendant was not running
cars to the depot as required by the contract,
requested
performance, and was advised
that the defendant was under no obligations
to run the cars, and did not intend to do
This action was commenced the following
October.
It is insisted by the defendant that tbi
adoption of the trolley system is, in contemj
plation of law, a use of steam, under th(
clause in the contract .which provides thai
if the defendant shall use steam as a motive
power between Ninth avenue and Fifteenth
street, in the city of Brooklyn and Coney
Island, either party can terminate the contract on six months' notice, and that the correspondence
and answer in this case are
equivalent to notice, and the contract no
longer exists. We agree with the special I
term that the electrical system adopted by I
the defendant cannot be regarded as the use
|
of steam as a motive power. Hudson River/
Tel. Co. V. Watervliet Turnpike & Ry. Co.,'
135 N. Y. 393, 402, 32 N. E. 148.
It would be
In disregard of the natural and obvious meaning of language to hold otherwise. We cannot agree with the general term that the use
of the words "steam as a motive power" was
only another form of referring to rapid transit, by whatever means accomplished.
To
so hold would be to make a new contract
for the parties.
The defendant Insists, further, that by rea'
and by
son of certain acts of plaintiff,
changes in the surrounding circumstances, it
would be inequitable and tmjust to enforce a
specific performance of the contract
This
leads us to consider some additional facta
disclosed by the record.
plaintiff \
1885,
On the 9th of December,
leased to the Atlantic Avenue RaUroad Com- /
pany all its franchises to eonstruct and oper-f
ate horse-car railroads in the city of Brooklyn, and on May 27, 1887, In pursuance of
chapter 282 of the Laws of 1886, conveyed
said rights and interests absolutely.
The |
l)ease and conveyance
were made expressly
j
subject to tbe contract in question, and reserved all the defendant's rights th^eunder.
They also required the Atlantic Avenue Railroad Company to operate the Vanderbilt Avenue Railroad Company as had been prevt

it'
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proper business methods, but we are unable
ously done by the plaintiff. The defendant
to perceive any reason, unuer the proofs as
made no objection to this transfer until after
presented, why defendant should be released
its refusal to perform the contract Defendfrom the obligations of a contract entered
ant urges that it was greatly damaged by
into in good faith by both parties, and that
the fact that the Atlantic Avenue Railroad
has been practically construed by years of
Company had completed, under the franchise
performance.
It may very well be that, un- \
obtained from plaintiff, a horse-car line to
We are unable to perder a contract having 21 years to run, chere
the Hamilton ferry.
may be such a change of conditions as wiU
ceive how defendant has suffered any damage, in view of the fact that it purchased
affect unfavorably
the one party or the
other;
but this offers no reason for refuswith full knowledge of plaintiff's franchise,
It ing specific performance, unless subsequent
and its desire to dispose of the same.
by the uncontradicted evidence
appears
events have made iperforraance by the dethat defendant sought to purchase of plaintiff
fendant so onerous that the enforcement
this franchise to complete a route to the
would impose great hardship and cause little
or no benefit to the plaintiff. Trustees v,
Hamilton ferry either just before or about
317; Murdfeldt v.■]
Thacher,
87 N. Y. 316,
the time the contract was executed.
Railroad Co., 102 N. Y. 703, 7 N. B. 404. In
The defendant further contends that the
the case at bar the plaintiff, we think, would
plaintiff, under a proper construction of the
contract, was not at liberty to sell out its be benefited by defendant running the transfer car In Ninth avenue from Fifteenth street
street-car interests, although not restrained
by any positive provision.
This contention
to its depot at Twentieth street. On the
is based mainly on the alleged fact that the
other hand, it may be assumed that the deAtlantic Avenue Railroad Company is an
fendant, by cheaper fare, and its ability to
active rival of defendant, and did not have
carry passengers to Con^ Island without
the same motive to deal fairly with defendtransfer, will be able to secure its full share
ant that plaintiff had while seeking to build
of the passengers to and from the seashore.
The principal
up its Coney Island business.
The result of compelling the specific percomplaint against the Atlantic Avenue Railformance of this contract will be to afford
road Company Is based upon the manner in
public an opportunity, when
the general
which it performed the contract in regard to
traveling over the line of defendant from
defendant's terminal facilities at the depot,
the ferries, to make cliolce of the route they
corner Ninth avenue and Twentieth street.
will take to Coney Island when arriving at
The evidence does not satisfy us that there
Ninth avenue and Fifteenth street WhUe It
was any persistent effort to delay the cars of
may be somewhat to the disadvantage
of
defendant at that point, or to prevent pasdefendant to perform Its contract, under the
sengers from the steam road selecting from
present circvunstances, when active competithe cars in waiting the one in which to ride,
tion exists between plaintiff and defendant,
without undue interference. .We think tha - yet that fact presents no legal reason for discharging it from the obligations of its con. contract
wa^ ^bstantially ^ perj n'^^^'qfl hY
tract
^^lainGyandL^_gran^_ta|^^SS|to_tgEginal
faciiffies of deferiiiant,"aSd', even if this wer^^
As a final point, the learned counsel for
nottfce case, the defendant 'couinEr?S"^comthe defendant insists that equity will not
peUed the observance of its contract rights
enforce the specific performance of a conin every particular by resort to the court
tract having some years to run, which rer^he fact already referred to, that defendant quires the exercise of skill and judgment,
more
j continued to act tmder the contract for
and_ a conJapuous series of a cts. Whil e there^
Is some co^ic^'ln'thV ^esj" and all are_nofe
/ than four years after this lease to the At/ lantic Avenue Railroad Company,
without
tiTBe reconciled, yet the great woi^jl^t of riivery strongly
objection, must be taken
3^prTyper mits specific performance in ffie
I
"
L against it in a court of equity. It seems to
case'tlt bilf. "The special term enjoinea the
us very clear that when the management of "tielKJlluant from operating any of its cars undefendant was changed In October, 1889, and
less It performs its contract with, the plainthe road from the Parade Ground to Coney
tiff. The provisions of this contract are
Island was operated by electricity, it at once
neither complicated nor difficult, and are
became an active and successful rival of the
such as a court of equity can enforce, in its
plaintiff In securing passengers to and from
discretion. A few of the cases may be reConey Island, and had every motive to rid
ferred to, as illustrating the power vested
itself of the conti-act, if it could be legally
in a court of equity to compel the specific
done. We agree with the learned trial judge
performance of contracts similar to the one
that while it is impossible, under the statie of
at bar. In Storer v. Railroad Co., 2 Younge
the proofs,
to determine to what extent
& C. N. R. 48, the court compelled the deplaintiff has been damaged by defendant's
fendant to construct and forever maintain
adoption of the trolley system, yet it is clear
The court
an archway and its approaches.
that it has suffered considerable loss. It ia,
said there was no difficulty in enforcing such
of course, entirely legitimate for defendant
In Wilson v. Railway Co., I* Ra decree.
to secure to itself whatever share of the
9 Eq. 28, the defendant was compelled to
Coney Island travel it can by the exercise of
See, also.
erect and maintain a wharf.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

OF CONTRACTS.

643

the afrrcomL-nt, the defendant could not be \
t. Railroad Co., L. R. 13 Eq. 44. In
compelled to run trains upon its road, yet it \
Wolverhampton & W. R. R. v. Loudon & N,
might properly be enjoined from running any 1
W. R. R., L. E. 16 Eq. 433, the agreement
regular trains which did not stop at the sta- I
between the two companies was that the
tion. The objection that the judgment In '
defendant should work the pl.iintifC's line,
this case Involves continuous acts, and the
and, during the continuance of the agreeconstant supervision of the com-t. Is well m'_'t
ment, develop and accommodate the local
by the reasoning in Central Trust Co. v.
and through trade thereof, and carry over It
Wabash, St Louis & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed.
The bill was filed to
certain specific traffic.
546, being affirmed as Joy v. St Louis, 138
restrain the defendant from carrying a porU. S. 1, 47, 50, 11 Sup. Ct. 243, where Judge
tion of the traffic which ought to have passBlatchPord wrote the opinion. As to ined over the plaintiff's line by other lines of
convenience,
The point was made that the
or circumstances which affect
the defendant
the interest of one pai-ty alone, constituting
court could not undertake to enforce specific
because It would require a
a reason why performance should not be deperformance,
creed, the case of Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10
series of orders and a general superintendWall. 339, 358, furnishes a clear discussion
ence to enforce the performance, which could
of the general principles Involved.
he pile.
not conveniently be administered by a court
of justice. The injunction issued, and Lord
is that .acdnS'act_js_to_ bg judged as of the ^
Selborne said (page 438): "With regard to
the argument that, upon the principles ap- ~ttffie _s£^EK|hlt was entered^ into, and, ir
fair when ma.,de, "the fact thaifltTiai^become
ylicable to specific performance, no relief
a hard one by the force of BUbsequenf ciT;^
can be granted, I cannot help observing that"
cumstances orlchangilig'events will not necesthere is some fallacy and ambiguity in the
sarily prevent its speciijs^eji&rmaxice. See,
way in which. In cases of this character,
also, Stuart V. Railway Co., 15 Beav. 513;
those words 'specific performance' are used.
* • * The common expression, as applied
Mortimer v. Capper, 1 Brown, Ch. 156; Jackson V. Lever, 3 Brown, Ch. 605; Paine t.
to suits known by that name, presupposes an
Meller, 6 Ves. 349; Paine v. Hutchinson, L.
from an executed,
executory, as distinct
•
•
»
R. 3 Eq. 257; Telegraph Co. v. Harrison, 145
Confusion has someagreement
A large
U. S. 459, 472, 473, 12 Sup. Ct 900.
consideratimes arisen from transferring
number of other cases might be cited, sustions applicable to suits for specific performtaining the power of the court to decree the
ance, properly so called, to questions as to
specific performance of this contract, but we
the propriety of the court requiring sorhe» • •
There can be no
do not deem It necessary.
thing or other to be done in specie.
well-founded doubt as to the power of the
Ordinary agreements for work and labor to
court In the premises, and the important
be performed, hiring and service, and things
question is whether, in the exercise of a wise
of that sort, out of which most of the cases
discretion, and in view of all the circumhave arisen, are not, in the proper sense of
stances, specific performance should be dethe word, cases for 'specific performance';
After a most careful consideration of
creed.
in other words, the nature of the contract is
this case, we hav e reached the conclusion
not one which requirea the performance of
that thp plai'ntilT isTftntitlprl tn hay«Jj]P ''""some definite act, such as the court Is In the
habit of requiring to be performed by way ^^ct.","^^1S^W^ jgr^FmB3r ''"MLe order of
of administering superior justice, rather than "1Ee~generair^^mis"reversed, and the judgwith
ment of the special term Is affirmed,
to leave the parties to their remedies at law.
♦ • • The question is whether, the defendAll concur, except
costs in all the courts.
ANDREWS, C. J., who dissents on the ground
ants being in possession, they are not at libthat plaintiff, having established a rapiderty to depart from the terms on which it
road, although the propulsion is by
transit
they
have
that
should
was stipulated that
electricity, has met the condition of the conpossession."
The American cases are equally
In Lavn-ence v. Railway Co., 36 tract which entitied it to terminate such conclear.
tract, or at least has pla-ced itself in such a
Hun, 467, the defendant was, among other
position that a court of equity will not enthings, to erect a depot at which all trains
force si>ecific performance. Ordered accordSpecific performance was dewere to stop.
ingly.
creed; the court holUiug that although, under,
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WILLARD
(8

T.

TAYLOE.

Wall. 557.)

Supreme Court of the United

States.

Dec,

1869.

Appeal from the supreme court of the District of Columbia.
This was a suit in equity for the specific
performance of a contract for the sale of
certain real property situated in the city of
Washington, in the District of Columbia, and
adjoining the hotel owned by the complainant, Willard, and known as Willard's Hotel.
The facts out of which the case arose were
as follows:
In April, 1854, the defendant leased to the
complainant the property in question, which
was generally known in Washington as "The
Mansion House," for the period of ten years
from the 1st of May following, at the yearly
rent of twelve hundred dollars. The lease
contained a covenant that the lessee should
have the right or option of purchasing the
premises,
with the buildings and improvements thereon, at any time before the expiration of the lease, for the sum of twentytwo thousand and five hundred dollars, payable as follows:
two thousand dollars in
cash, and two thousand dollars, together
with the interest on all the deferred instalments, each year thereafter until the whole
was paid; the deferred payments to be secured by a deed of trust on the property,
and the vendor to execute to the purchaser
a warranty deed of the premises, subject to a
yearly ground-rent of three hundred and
ninety dollars.
At the time of this lease gold and silver, or
bank bills convertible on demand into It,
, were the ordinary money of the country, and
I the standard of values. In 1861 the rebellion broke out, lasting till 1865.
In the interval, owing to the infiux of people, property
In the metropolis used for hotels greatly Increased in value, and as was alleged by Tayloe, who produced what he deemed a record
to show the fact, the complainant, Willard,
assigned an undivided half of the property
which had been leased to him as above-mentioned to a brother of his. In December,
1861, the banks throughout the country suspended payments in specie, and In 1862 and
1863,
the federal government issued some
hundred millions of notes, to be used as
money, and which congress declared should
be a tender in the payment of debts.
Coin
soon ceased to circulate generally, and people used, In a great degree, the notes of the
government to pay what they owed.
On the 15th of April, 1864, two weeks before the expiration of the period allowed the
complainant for his election to purchase —
the property having greatly increased In
value since 1854, the year In which the lease
was made— the complainant addressed a letter to the defendant, inclosing a check, payable to his order, on the Bank of America,
In New York, for two thousand dollars, as
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the amount due on the 1st of May following
on the purchase of the property, with a
blank receipt for the money, and requesting
the defendant to sign and return the receipt,
and stating that If it were agreeable to the
defendant he would have the deed of the
property, and the trust deed to be executed
by himself, prepared between that date and
the 1st of May.
To this letter the defendant,
on the same day, replied that he had no time
then to look Into the business, and returned
the check, expressing a wish to see the complainant for explanations before closing the
matter.
On the following morning the complainant
called on the defendant and Informed him
that he had two thousand dollars to make
the first payment for the property, and ofEet,
ed the money to him.
The money thus offered consisted of notes of the United States,
made by act of congress a legal tender for
debts.
These the defendant refused to ac-,
cept, stating that he understood the purchase-money
was to be paid In gold, and
that gold he would accept, but not the notes,
and give the receipt desired.
It was admitted that these notes were at the time greatly
depreciated In the market below their nominsd
value.i
On repeated occasions subsequently
the complainant sent the same amount— two
thousand dollars— in these United States
notes to the defendant In payment of the
cash instalment on the purchase, and as often were they refused by him.
On one of
these occasions a draft of the deed of conveyance to be executed by the defendant,
and a draft of the trust deed to be executed
by the complainant, were sent for examination, with the money.
This last was prepared for execution by
the complainant alone, and contained a provision that he might, If he should elect to do
so, pay off the deferred payments at earlier
dates than those mentioned In the lease.
These deeds were returned by the defendant, accompanied with a letter expressing
dissatisfaction at the manner In which he
was Induced to sign the lease with the clause
for the sale of the premises, but stating that
as he had signed it he "should have carried
the matter out" If the complainant had proffered the amount which he knew he had offered for the property, meaning by this statement, as the court understood it, if he had
proffered the amount stipulated In gold. No
objection was made to the form of either of
the deeds.
Soon afterwards the defendant left the city
of Washington, with the intention of being
absent until after the 1st of May.
On the 29th of April the complainant, finding that the defendant had left the city, and
perceiving that the purchase was not about
to be completed within the period prescribed
the 15th of April and May 1st,
one dollar in gold was worth from one
dollar and seventy-three cents to one dollar
and eighty cents in United States notes.
1 Between

1864,

SPBOIFIO PERFORMAI^OE OF CONTRACTS.

originally contemplated and provided
thus subjecting the defendant to risk
and expense in making a new investment.
The answer concluded with an allegation,
that "by the great national acts and events
which had occurred when the complainant
filed his biU, and which were still influencing
all values and Interests in the country, such
a state of things had arisen and now existed,
as according to equity and good conscience
ought to prevent a decree for specific performance in this case, upon a demand made
on the last day of a term of ten years, even
been

for;

is(

it

3

ent bill was filed—he had lost this right by
the transfer of the half to his brother; that
the complainant had not demanded an execution even of the contract which he himself
set forth, but by the drafts of the trust deed
sent to Tayloe, and which was the trust deed
of which he contemplated the execution, he
proposed to pay, at his own option, the whole
before the expiration of the
purchase-money
ten years, and thus would interfere with
the duration of that security and investment
in the identical property leased, which had

a^

The answer set up that the complainant,
even on his own showing, had no case; that
there was no proper tender; that even if the
complainant once had a right to file a bill
in his sole right — the way In which the pres-

Cox

Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts
of the case, delivered the opinion of the
court.
The covenant In the lease giving the right
or option to purchase the premises was in
the nature of a continuing offer to sell. It
was a proposition extending through the
period of ten years, and being under seal
must be regarded as made upon a sufficient
consideration, and, therefore, one from which
the defendant was not at liberty to recede.
When accepted by the complainant by his
notice to the defendant, a contract of sale
between
the parties was completed.
Railroad Co. V. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224; Welchman
V. Spinks, 5 Law T. (N. S.) 385; Warner v.
Willington, 3 Drew. 523; Railroad v. Evans,
6 Gray, 25. This contract is plain and certain in Its terms, and In its nature and in the
circumstances attending its execution appears to be free from objection. The price
stipulated for the property was a fair one.
At the time its market value was under fifteen thousand dollars, and a greater increase
than one-half in value during the period of
ten years could not then have been reasonably anticipated.
When a contract is of this character It
the usual practice of courts of equity to enforce its specific execution upon the applica-/
tion of the party who has complied with ltd
stipulations on his part, or has seasonable
and in good faith offered, and continue^
ready to comply with them.
But
is not'
This form af rethe invariable practice.
lief
not
matter
of a5solute_right_ to
is a" rnaFter resting in the
jeitneirBftJli;
discretion of the court, to be exercised upon
a consideration of all the circumstances of
The jurisdiction, said
each particular case.
Lord Brskine (12 Ves. 332), "is not compulsory upon the court, but the subject of discretion. The question Is not what the court
must do, but what It may do. under [the]
circumstances, either exercising the jurisdiction by granting the specific performance or
abstaining from It."
And long previous to him Lord Hardwicke
and other eminent equity judges of England
had, in a great variety of cases, asserted
the same discretionary power of the court.
In .loynes v. Statham, Atk. 388, Lord Hardwicke said: "The constant doctrine of this
ft

ant.

Curtis, Poland & Howe, for appellant.
& McPherson, contra.

I

instalment of the purchase-money in United
States notes, and to execute the trust deed
stipulated to secure the defeixed payments,
and the refusal of the defendant to receive
the United States notes and to execute to
It also set forth
him a deed of the premises.
the departure of the defendant from the city
of Washington, and his intended absence
and albeyond the 1st of May following,
leged that the appeal was made to the equitable interposition of the court, lest on the
return of the defendant he might refuse to
allow the complainant to complete the purchase, and urge as a reason that the time
within which it was to be made had passed.
The bill concluded with a prayer that the
court decree a specific performance of the
agreement by the defendant, and the execution of a deed of the premises to the complainant; the latter offering to perform the
agreement on his part according to its true
intent and meaning.
The bill also stated some facts, which it is
unnecessary to detail, tending to show that
the acquisition of the property in question
was of especial importance to the complain-

if in strict law (which was denied) the complainant was entitled to make such demand."
Both Tayloe and Willard were examined
as witnesses.
The former testified, that
when the lease was executed he objected to
a stipulation for a sale of the premises, and
that Willard said it should go for nothing.
Willard swore that he had said no such
thing.
The court below dismissed
the bill, and
Willard took the present appeal.

s

by the covenant in the lease, and apprehensive that unless legal proceedings were taken
by him to enforce its execution his rights
thereunder might be lost, instituted the present suit
In the bill he set forth the covenant giving
him the right or option to purchase the premises; his election to purchase; the notice to
the defendant; the repeated efforts made by
him to obtain a deed of the property; his offer to pay the amount required as the first

645

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

/

it

it

a

'

or| iii|

cated at the time, a bill was filed to enforce
its specific execution, but Lord Hardwicke
is reported to have said that, without regard
to the other circumstance,
the hardship
alone of losing half the purchase-money,
it
the contract was carried into execution, was
sufficient to determine the discretion of the
court not to interfere, but to leave the parties to the law.
The discretion which may be exercised
this class of cases is not an arbitrary
capricious one, depending
upon the mere!
pleasure of the court, but one which is
con-|
trolled by the established doctrines and set:\
tied principles of equity. No positive rule
can be laid down by which the action o(
the court can be determined in all cases. In
general it may be said that the specific relief
will be granted when it is apparent, from
view of all the circumstances of the particular case, that it will subserve the ends of
justice; and that
will be withheld when,
from a like view, it appears that
will produce hardship or injustice to either of the
parties.
It is not sufficient, as shown by tlie
cases cited, to call forth the equitable interposition of the court, that the legal obligation under the contract to do the specific
thing desired may be perfect.
It must also
appear that the specific enforcement
will
work no hardship or injustice, for if that
result would follow, the court will leave the
parties to their remedies at law, unless the
granting of the specific relief can be accompanied with conditions which will obviate
that result.
that result can be thus obviated, a specific performance will generally
in such cases be decreed conditionally. It
the advantage of a court of equity, as observed by Lord Redesdale in Davis v. Hone,
Schoales & L. 348, that it can modify the
demands of parties according to justice, and
where, as in that case,
would be inequitable, from
change of circumstances,
to enforce a contract specifically, it may refuse its
decree unless the party will consent to
conscientious modification of the contract, or,
what would generally amount to the same
thing, take a decree upon condition of doing
or relinquishing certain things to the other
is

If

it

a

a

party.
In the present case objection is taken to
the action of the complainant in offering, in
payment of the first instalment stipulated,
It was insisted
notes of the United States.
by the defendant at the time, and
is contended by his counsel now, that the covenant
in the lease required payment for the property to be made in gold . The covenant does
not in ternlSTpecify gold as the currency in
which payment is to be made; but gold,
said, must have been in the contemplation
of the parties, as no other currency, except
for small amounts, which coiild be discharged
in silver, was at the time recognized by law
as a legal tender for private debts.
Although the contract in this case was not
until the proposition of the decompleted

is

it

it

court is, that it Is in their discretion, whether in such a bill they will decree a specific
performance or leave the plaintiff to his remedy at law." And in Underwood t. Hitcbcox, 1 Vas. Sr. 270, the same great judge said,
in refusing to enforce a contract: "The rule
of equity in carrying agreements
into specific performance is well known, and the
court is not obliged to decree every agreement entered into, though for valuable consideration, in strictness of law, it depending
on the circumstances."
Later jurists, both in England and in the
United States, have reiterated the same doctrine. Chancellor Kent, in Seymour v. Delancy, 6 Johns. Ch. 222, upon an extended
review of the authorities on the subject, demares it to be a settled principle that a spell cifie performance of a contract of sale is not
/ a matter of course, but rests entirely in the
U discretion of the court upon a view of all
Ithe circumstances; and Chancellor Bates, of
^^elaware, in Godwin v. Collins, i-ecently decided, upon a very full consideration of the
adjudged cases, says, that a patient examination of the whole course of decisions on this
subject has left with him "no doubt that, as
a matter of judicial history, such a discretion
has always been exercised in administering
this branch of equity jurisprudence."
It is true the cases cited, in which the discretion of the court is asserted, arose upon contracts in which there existed some inequality
or unfairness in the terms.by reason of which
injustice would have followed a specific perBut the same discretion is exerformance.
cised where the contract is fair in its terms,
if its enforcement, from subsequent events,
or even from collateral circumstances, would
work hardship or injustice to either of the
parties.
In the case of City of London v. Nash,
a lessee, had
1 Ves. Sr. 12, the defendant,
covenanted to rebuild some houses, but, instead of doing this, he rebuilt only two of
On a bill by
them, and repaired the others.
performance Lord
the city for a specific
Hardwicke held that the covenant was one
which the court could specifically enforce;
for
but said, "The most material objection
the defendant, and which has weight with
me, is that the court is not obliged to decree
a specific performance, and will not when it
would be a hardship, as it would be here
upon the defendant to oblige him, after having very largely repaired the houses, to pull
them down and rebuild them." In Paine v.
Brown (cited in Ramsden v. Hylton, 2 Ves.
Sr. 306) similar hardship, flowing from the
specific execution of a contract, was made
the ground for refusing the decree prayed.
In that case the defendant was the owner
of a small estate, devised to him on condition
that if he sold it within twenty-five years
one-half of the purchase-money
should go to
his brother. Having contracted to sell the
property, and refusing to carry out the contract under the pretence that he was intoxi-
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fendant was accepted in April, 1864, after
the passage of the act of congress making
notes of the United States a legal tender for
private debts, yet as the proposition containing the terms of the contract was previously
made, the contract Itself must be construed
as if it had been then concluded to take effect
suljsequently.
It is not our intention to express any opinion upon the constitutionality
of the provision of the act of congress, which makes the
notes of the United States a legal tender
for private debts, nor whether, if constitutional, the provision is to be limited in its application to contracts, made subsequent to
See Hepburn v.
the passage of the act.
Oriswold, 8 Wall. 603. These questions are
the subject of special coDisideration
in other
•cases, and their solution is not required for
the determination of the case before us.
In
the view we take of the case, it is immaterial
whether the constitutionality
of the proviThe relief which
sion be aflarmed or denied.
the complainant seeks rests, as already statdiscretion
the court;
ed, in the sound
and, if granted, it may be accompanied with
such conditions as will prevent hardship and
The suit itinsure justice to the defendant.
self is an appeal to the equitable jurisdiction
, -of the court; and, in asking what is equitable
to himself, the complainant necessarily submits himself to the judgment of the court, to
■do what it shall adjudge to be equitable to
the defendant.

of

The kind of currency which the complainant offered, is only important in considering
the good faith of his conduct.
A party does
not forfeit his rights to the interposition of

la court of equity to enforce
/' formance of a contract, if he

a specific per.
seasonably and
in good faith offers to comply, and continues
ready to comply, with its stipulations on his
part, although he may err in estimating the
■extent of his obligation.
It is only in courts
^
-of law that literal and exact performance is
/-required.
The condition of the currency at
I the time repels any imputation of bad faith
in the action of the complainant.
The act of
congress had declared the notes of the United
States to be a legal tender for all debts,
without, in terms, making any distinction between debts contracted before,
and those
Gold had al■contracted
after its passage.
most entirely disappeared from circulation.
The community at large used the notes of
the United States in the discharge of all
They constituted, in fact, almost the
■debts.
entire currency of the country in 1864. They
were received and paid out by the government; and the validity of the act declaring
them a legal tender had been sustained by
-nearly every state court before which the
The defendant, it
question had been raised.
is true, insisted upon his right to payment
in gold, but before the expiration of the period prescribed for the completion of the purchase, he left the city of Washington, and thus
■cut off the possibUity of any other tender than

i
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the one made within that period.
In the
presence
of this difficulty, respecting the
mode of payment, which could not be obviated, by reason of the absence of the defendant, the complainant filed his bill, in
which he states the questioq/Tvraclr-irai
arisen between them, and invokes the aid of
the court in the matter, offering specifically
to perform the contract on his part according
to its true intent and meaning.
He thus placed himself promptly and fairly before the
court, expressing a willingness to do whatever it should adjudge he ought in equity
and conscience to do in the execution of the

,
contract.
Nothing further could have been reason- \
ably required of him under the circumstances,
even if we should assume that the act of congress, making the notes of the United States
a legal tender, does not apply to debts created before its passage, or, if applicable to
such debts, is, to that extent, unconstitutional
and void.
In the case of Chesterman v. Mann, 9 Hare,
212, it was held by the court of chancery of
England, that where an underlessee had a
covenant for the renewal of his lease, upon
paying to his lessor a fair proportion of the
fines and expenses to which the lessor might
in obtaining a renewal of his
be subjected
own term from the superior landlord, and o
any increased rent upon such renewal, and
there was a difference between the parties
as to the amount to be paid by the underlessee, he might apply for a specific performance of the covenant, and submit to the court
the amount to be paid.
So here in this case,
the complainant applies for a specific performance, and submits the amount to be paid
by him to the judgment of the court
We proceed to consider whether any other
circumstances have arisen since the covenant
in the lease was made, which render the enforcement of the contract of sale, subsequent
ly completed between the parties, inequitable
Such circumstances are asserted to have arisfirst, in the greatly inen in two particulars;
creased value of the property; and second,
in the transfer of a moiety of the complainant's original interest to his brother.
It is true, the property has greatly inSome increased in value since April, 1854.
crease was anticipated by the parties, for the
covenant exacts, in case of the lessee's election to purchase, the payment of one-half
If thej
more than its then estimated value.
actual increase has exceeded the estimate]
then made, that circumstance furnishes no
ground for interference with the arrangement]
of the parties. J£h.e ^.uestion, in sucJbL cas^
always js^ was the contract^ at the.,;^
I
was made, a r easonable and_faIj.jaDe?
such were the fact, the parties are consid-j
ered as having taken upon themselves
the!
risk of subsequent fluctuations in the value I
of the property, and such fluctuations are not i
allowed to prevent its specific enforcement.
Wells v. Railway Co., 9 Hare, 129; Low v. I
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12 Me. 441; Fry, Spec. Perf. §§
Here the contract, as already stated, was, wlieii made, a fair one, and in all
its attendant circumstances, free from objection. Tlie rent reserved largely exceeded the
rent then paid, and the sum stipulated for
the property largely exceeded its then market
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to secure the deferred payments, sent to the
defendant for examination, was prepared for
execution by the complainant alone, and contained a stipulation that he might, if he
should so elect, pay off the deferred payments at earlier dates than those mentioned
in the covenant in the lease; and it is objected to the complainant's right to a specific
value.
The transfer, by the complainant to his performance, that the trust deed was not
brother, of one-half interest in the lease, as- drawn to be executed jointly by him and his
suming now, for the purpose of the argu- brother, and that it contained this stipula' ment, that there is, in the record, evidence,
tion. A short answer to this objection is
found in tht fact, that the parties had diswhich we can notice, of such transfer, in no
agreed in relation to the payment
/ respect afEects the obligation of the defendto be
made, and until the disagreement ceased no
1 ant, or impairs the right of the complainant
The
deeds were required. It is admitted that the
\^to the enforcement of the contract
brother Is no party to the contract, and any form of the trust deed was not such a one
partial interest he may have acquired therein,
as the defendant was bound to receive, but
the defendant was not bound to notice. The
as it was sent to him for examination, good
faith and fair dealing required him to indiowners of partial interests in contracts for
land, acquired subsequent to their execution',
cate in what particulars it was defective, or
with which clauses he was dissatisfied.
are not necessary parties to bills for their
The original parties on one
Whether it was the duty of the complainant
enforcement
or defendant to prepare the trust deed, acside are not to be mixed up in controversies
cording to the usage prevailing in Washingthe parties on the other side, in
between
ton, is not entirely clear from the evidence.
which they have no concern.
If the entire contract had been assigned There is testimony both ways. The true
rule, independent of any usage on the subto the brother, so that he had become subject, would seem to be that the party who
stituted in the place of the complainant, the
In that is to execute and deliver a deed should precase would have been different
event, the brother might have filed the bill,
pare it. It is, however. Immaterial for this
case, what rule obtains In Washington. Unand insisted upon being treated as representing the vendee. The general rule is, that the
til the purchase-money was accepted, there
parties to the contract are the only proper
was no occasion to prepare any instrument
parties to the suit for its performance, and,
for execution. So long as that was refused
except in the case of an assignment of the
the preparation of a trust deed was a work
entire contract, there must be some special
of supererogation. Besides, the execution of
the trust deed by the complainant was to be
circumstances to authorize a departure from
simultaneous with the execution of a conthe rule.
veyance by the defendant. The two were to
The court, says Chancellor Cottenbam, In
Tasher v. Small, 3 Mylne & C. 69, "assumes ^be concurrent acts; and if the complainant
jurisdiction in cases of specific performance
Iwas to prepare one of them, the defendant
of contracts, because a court of law, giving /was to prepare the other, and it is not predamages only for the non-performance of the
tended that the defendant acted in the matcontract, In many cases, does not afford an
ter at all.
adequate remedy. But in equity, as well as
The objection to the trust deed, founded
upon the omission of the name of the comat law, the contract constitutes the right,
plainant's brother as a co-grantor, does not
and regulates the liabilities of the parties;
and the object of both proceedings is to
merit consideration. All that the defendant
place the party complaining, as nearly as
had to do was to see that he got a trust deed,
possible, in the same situation as the defend- as security for the deferred payments, from
ant had agreed that he should be placed in.
the party to whom he transferred the title.
C It is obvious, that persons, strangers to the
The defendant states in his testimony that
contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to
when the lease was executed he objected to
the rights nor subject to the liabilities which
the stipulation for a sale of the premises,
arise out of it, are as much strangers to a and that the defendant told him that it
proceeding to enforce the execution of it as
should go for nothing. And it has been
they are to a proceeding to recover damages
argued by counsel that this evidence should
for the breach of it."
control the terms of the covenant. The anWhen the complainant has received his
swer to the position taken is brief and decideed from the defendant, the brother may
First, nothing of the kind is averred in
sive.
claim from him a conveyance of an interest
the answer; second, the testimony of the
in the premises, if he have a valid contract
defendant in this particular is distinctly
for such interest, and enforce such convey- contradicted by that of the complainant, and
ance by suit; but that is a matter with
is inconsistent with the attendant circumwhich the defendant has no concern.
stances; and third, the evidence is inadmisIt seems that the draft of the trust deed. sible. When parties have reduced their conTreadwell,
235, 252.
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Aracts to writing, conversations controlling
i/or changing their stipulations are, in the abf sence of fraud, no more received in a court
I of equity than in a court of law.
Upon a full consideration of the positions
of the defendant we perceive none which ^
s hould preclude the com pliant from claim;
"Tng a specinc "performance or the contract.
THe o"niy~-questroh remaining is, Tipon "what
terms shall the decree be made? and upon
this we have no doubt.
The parties, at the time the proposition to
sell, embodied in the covenant of the lease,
was made, had reference to the currency
the n rec ognized by l aw as a legal ten der,
'whlctrco HHlsl e d O nly of goig"anjrsnYercoin^
dollars of
TrTras-ier-a~specifie~BuitffBer'oi
that character that the offer to sell was
made, and it strikes one at once as inequitable to compel a transfer of the property for
notes, worth when tendered in the market
only a littie more than one-half of the stipulated price. Such a substitution of notes for
coin could not have been in the. possible expectation of the parties. Nor is it reasonable to suppose, if it had been, that the covenant would ever have been inserted in the
against the
lease without some provision
substitution. Tte complainant must, therefore, take his decree upon payment of the

'
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stipulated

price in gold

649
and

silver

coin.

Whilst .he se^s_ggjiity Jie-mustjia. eqmts.
^TEe^ecree^of the court below will, there-

fore, be reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to enter a decree for the execution, by the defendant to the complainant,
of a conveyance of the premises with warranty, subject to the yearly ground-rent specified in the covenant in the lease, upon
the payment by the latter of the instalments
past due, with legal interest thereon, in gold
and silver coin of the United States, and
upon the execution of a trust deed of the
premises to the defendant as security -for
the payment of the remaining instalments
as they respectively become due, with legal
Interest thereon, in like coin; the amounts
to be paid and secured to be stated, and the
form of the deeds to be settled, by a master; the costs to be paid by the complainant.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, with NELSON, J.,
concurred in the conclusion as above announced,-^that
the complainant was entitled
to specific performance on payment of the
price of the land in gold and silver coin,—
but expressed their inability to yield their
assent to the argument by which, in this
case, it was supported.
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FISH

V.

(69
Supreme

LESER
III.

et al.

384.)

Court of Illinois.

Sept. Term.

1873.

Appeal from superior court, Cook county;
Joseph E. Gary, Judge.
This was a bill for specific performance,
filed by John Fish against John Leser and
Johanna Iieser, his wife. The substance of
the material facts is given in the opinion of
the court.

Nissen & Barnum, for appellant.
for appellees.

son, Sackett & Bean,

Wilkin-

CRAIG, J. This was a bill, filed in the superior court of Cook county, by John Fish, appellant, against John Leser and Johanna Leser, appellees, to enforce the specific performance of a contract for the sale of a certain lot
in Chicago.
Upon the hearing of the case, the
court entered a decree dismissing the bill and
the complainant prosecuted this appeal.
. Co urts of equit y will not always e nforce
thespecififpieHormance
of a contract ^uch
*"appi!cafions are addressed to ttie sound legal
discretion
of the court, and^tte^ourt^mugt.
to a great extent, by the_ fagts
-b€L..goxe£ned,
of _each case, jaOEis piesented.
" A speci fic performance wiU not be decreed
unless the a^ffnent has been entered_ into
with perfect fairnessr^"nd with out misa^ r^
misrepre sentatf5S ~Bf
oppressionT
'TTensioiij
Frisljy t. BailanceTll Scam7"287'; trnHefwood"
V. Hitchcock, 2 Ves. Sr. 279.
The contract
must be fair, equitable and just, and the complainant should be prepared to show that it
will not be unjust or oppressive on the defendant to have the contract enforced.
Stone
V. Pratt, 25 111. 25.
We will, then, examine some of the leading facts in this case, and see if the complainant has brought himself within the principles announced, which are necessary In order to enable him to obtain the relief he asks,
in a court of equity.
It appears that the defendants, or one of
them, ui the fall of 1871, were the owners of
the property in question, and had owned and
resided upon it for many years.
The appellees are foreigners
by birth with but little
education, and are not well acquainted
with
our language;
they transacted but little business,— Indeed, the evidence shows that John
Leser has, for several years, been scarcely
competent to transact any business;
they can
write, but are unable to read our writing.
The house In which they resided, on the
property in question, together with other
property on the same street, was destroyed
by the fire of October 9, 1871.
Previous to
the fire their property was not desirable, and
could not readily be sold in the market, on
account of the bad repute of other houses on
the same street.
The fire, however, removed
this objection
to the street, and property
Immediately began to advance.
Farwell &
Co. commenced to build on the same street,
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on the next block west, which also caused
property to advance.
These facts were unknown to the Lesers, but were well known
to enterprising business men. Under these
circumstances,
the Lesers, soon after the fire,
were sought out by one John P. White, a
real estate agent in the city, who desired to
get an agency to sell Oielr property.
This property, at the time of the sale, as
near as we are able to judge from the evidence, was worth $30,000— some of appellees'
witnesses place it as high as $35,000, while
appellant's witnesses fix its value at $21,000
Burt, who owned the east half
to $22,000.
of the same lot, testifies he fixed the price
of his lot at $30,000, but withdrew it from
market, and would not sell at that price, and
his opinion is this lot is worth that amount.
White had several interviews with the
Lesers. He wanted to act as their agent;
advised them to sell; claimed that property
would depreciate
rather than Increase in
value.
He never informed them that Farwell & Co., and others, were buying and preparing to build in that neighborhood,— a fact
that was well known to business men.
Johanna Leser, In her evidence, says:
"White came again; said he had a man to
buy the lot, and he would give $20,000, and
we told him we would not sell for that;
he said it would not be worth more in ten
years.
My husband said, if you give me
$21,000 I will sell to you.
This he refused.
White told me to coax my husband to take
$20,000. I told him I would not.
He then
said, well, I will not take another step towards selling your lot, and before spring you
will offer it to me for $18,000."
During this time appellant was frequently
at White's office, ana he and White were
negotiating on the lot.
White, in his testimony, says, they had
given him verbal authority to sell the lot;
that,
after having several interviews, he
called on them with an offer from appellant
of $20,000 cash for the property.
This they
did not decide to take, but the next day he
called again to see if they would accept the
offer he had made them for appellant
He
prepared and took with him a paper for them
to execute, authorizing him to sell the lot
After discussing the matter some time, they
would not accept appellant's offer, but they
made this proposition: they would take $16,000 cash, and the purchaser assume and pay
a mortgage of $5,000 that was on the lot
and pay commissions to White; he Informed
them he did not believe appellant would give
that, but he would make him the offer.
The next day, which was November 1st
White called on John Leser, where he and
his two sons were at work, and obtained his
signature to a paper, which turned out to
be authority to sell the lot which reads as
follows:
'Chicago, Oct 31, 1871.
"John P. White, real estate agent In
consideration of one dollar, by us received,
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we hereby authorize you to sell our lot, being the west half of lot 7, in block 94, in the
school section addition to Chicago, for the
sum of twenty one thousand dollars ($21,you to have all over that amount
000) net;
you can get, for your commissions for such
The terms of payment we require is
sale.
all cash, except the assumption of a mortgage of $5,000 by the buyer, now up n said
lot;
we to furnish abstract showing title
good in us, subject to the said $5,000 mortThis proposition good for ten days
gage.
from date hereof.
"Yours, etc.,

"John Leser.
"Johanna Leser.

[Seal.]
[Seal.]"

White testifies that the paper was read to
and he and his two sons understood
what it was. But in this he is contradictThey swear
ed by Leser and his two sons.
a portion of it was read in a low tone, but
none of them understood It
They did not
know that Leser was giving any authority to
White to sell the lot; supposed it was a
writing that Leser would wait ten days before making a sale, but did not know it was
anything further.
White then carried the paper to Johanna
Leser, and she, as she testifies, saw her husband had signed it, and not knowing what it
Leser,

was, also executed the paper.
On November 8th White sold the property
to appellant, by written contract, as follows:

"Chicago, Nov. 8, 1871.
"Received of John Fish five hundred dollars ($500) to apply as a payment on the following described real estate, this day bargained and sold to the said Fish, to wit: the
west half of lot seven (7), in block ninety-four
(!H), in the school section addition to Chicago,
sold at and for the price or sum of twentyone thousand dollars ($21,000), upon the following terms of payment, to wit: the said
Fish is to assume and pay a certain mortgage
of five thousand ($5,000) dollars, which is
now upon said property, with interest from
date hereof, according to its tenor and effect,
and the remainder of the purchase money, to
wit: fifteen thousand five hundred ($15,500)
dollars, as soon hereafter as we deliver him
a good and sufficient deed of conveyance to
the said described real estate, with release
of dower, free and clear of all liens or incum$5,000
brances, except the above mentioned
we
mortgage, which the said Fish assumes;
to furnish an abstract showing title good in
us, said abstract to be delivered within ten
days from date hereof, and the said deed to
be delivered within thirty days from date
hereof.

"Witness our hand and seals this
first above written.
"John Leser,
"Johanna Ijeser.
"By John P. White, Their
"John

day and

date

[Seal.]
[Seal.]

Agent
Fish."
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When appellees were notified of the contract, they refused to ratify it
Can it be said that this contract, which
appellant is seeking to enforce, has been entered into with fairness, and without misapprehension ? ,jHiportant facts, were artfu lLvconcealed from tixe Lesers by cmewhojigim'ed to be their agent, and if they tad bAen..
"EnbwBrtt' cannot be "pretended the authority
would have been given to sell.
The fact is apparent, the Lesers, who were
weak-minded and unacquainted with business,— terror-stricken
with the great fire
which, in a moment, swept away the home
they had occupied for years, — were overreached by a shrewd real estate dealer, who acted
in the interest of another, under the guise of ,
a friend and agent of them.
^e contract can neither b e said to be fair,
equita ble, or just. To take from them properiF'wm-th $30,000 for $21,000, when considered in connection with the other facts disclosed by this record, is an outrage that a
court of equity cannot for a moment tolerate
■

"oP" sanClloii.""

TEerB~iS, however, another principle which,
when applied to this case, forbids a court of
equity from decreeing a specific performance of this contract
An agent employed
to sell, c annot himself b ecome me purcn aagr;
or_an_a^nt_emgIoyea" to b uy, cannot b elthe
selleE 3Sd, upon tTSe'^ame principle, it is
"held~ tfiat a contract made by one who acts
"^
.asthe^gentofboth paftles may be avoir"

_byjnher_princi^.

SioryTAg^

^Before this written authority to sell was
given, White came to the Lesers with a proposition from appellant of $20,000, and urged
them to accept it. His commissions were
to come from appellant. As soon as he executes the contract of sale, he goes with appellant to the recorder's office and has it
placed on record.
Under his counsel and advice, appellant makes a tender of the purHe takes appellant to an atchase money.
torney for advice, and introduces him; nor
does he stop at this. He offers to pay appellees' counsel their fees, not to exceed $1,000,
if, upon an examination of the papers, they
should advise and effect a ratification of the
contract by appellees.
These facts tend to show that this agent
was employed to buy as well as to sell. Appellees had bargained for the skill and labor
of White, their agent and had a right to expect and demand his undivided services in
their behalf and for their interest. This
they have not secured, and a court of chancery will not lend its aid to enforce a contract which, in equity, is regarded as con-

structively fraudulent.
Other questions have been discussed by the
counsel on each side of this case, but, in the
view we have taken of the case, it becomes
unnecessary to decide them.
The decree of the superior court will be
affirmed.
Decree

affirmed.
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BTONE

V.

PRATT,

D'Wolf the said

Court of Illinois. April Term, 1860.
Appeal from the superior court of Chicago.
This was a bill of chancery, ffled by Horatio O. Stone against Jeremiah H. Pratt and
Amos Pratt.
The bill charges, in substance, that, in
1849, one Calvin D'Wolf was the owner in
fee of the north fifteen acres of the "W. %,
S. W. qr., sec. 34, T. 39 N., R. 14 E., in
Cook county, 111., and that, in May, 1852,
by subsequent sales and conveyances, Amos
Pratt acquired the title to said land; that
on September 28, 1852, Amos Pratt, by an
agreement
in writing, sold the same, with
other lands, to Clement H. D'Wolf for the
sum of $4,050, of which sum $100 was paid
in hand, and said D'Wolf agreed to pay the
balance, as follows:
$600 in one year, $670
In two years, $670 in three
years, $670 in
four years, $670 in five years, and $670 in
six years from the date of the agreement,
and to pay all assessments and taxes on
the land. The agreement provided that, upon the performance on the part of the purchaser, Pratt should make and deliver to
D'Wolf a quitclaim deed for the premises,
with covenant of warranty as to the acts of
Pratt only, and also provided for a forfeiture of the agreement,
at the election of
Pratt, In case of default of any of the payments. In which event D'Wolf was to be
treated as tenant of Pratt.
The bill then charges that on September
23, 1853, Amos Pratt purchased certain other lands of one Warren Parker, for the sum
of $8,000, payable as foUows: $2,666.66 on
October 10, 1853, the like sum on September
Supreme

23,

1854,

and

the

same

sum

the complainant bought of Clement H.
fifteen acres of land for
$4,225 to be paid in the manner following:
$275 cash; $600 on September 28, 1853, and
$670 on September 28th in each of the years
1854,
1855,
1856,
1857, and 1858; that the
contractgave^mplaina nt the ri ghttojSirr
Sti~tSe paymentsTSceptj ge firstTto AaTO—
Pratt, upon fiiragreement with D'WSfTand
that, upon payment in either way D'Wolf
was to convey the fifteen acres to complainant; that after the purchase, by complainant, of the agreement between Amos Pratt
and D'Wolf, the latter made a deed of the
land to complainant, and the agreement between the complainant and D'Wolf was canceled; that complainant had requested Pratt
to execute to him a deed for said fifteen
acres of land, which he refused to do, and
that the complainant had been informed that
he had conveyed the premises to Jeremiah
H. Pratt, his brother, and that the deed to
him was without consideration,
and made
to defraud the complainant, and that Jeremiah H. Pratt had full notice of the rights
and equities of complainant; that complainant had demanded a conveyance also from
said Jeremiah H. Pratt, but that he refused
to make it, and claimed to own the land.
The bill prayed for a decree compelling
the Pratts to release and quitclaim the fifteen acre tract to the complainant, and for
1853,

(25 111. 16.)

on

September

that, to secure the payment of the
first installment, he assigned to Parker his
agreement with D'Wolf, before stated, and
the same, with hia written agreement with
Parker, was deposited with Brown & Hurd,
to be held by them till Pratt's first installand if Pratt paid the
ment became due;
same when due, the papers were to be returned to him, otherwise to be delivered to
Parker, who was to have the right to sell
at public sale the agreement between Pratt
and D'Wolf, and retain out of the proceeds
$1,000 as liquidated damages for Pratt's default; that Pratt failed to pay Parker the
first installment, and that he, on January
24, 1854, sold said agreement
at public auction, having first given due notice of the sale,
and that complainant became the purchaser
of the same for the sum of $1,000.
The complainant insisted that by said purchase he became the owner of all Pratt's
right, title, and interest in the land, and the
said agreement with D'Wolf, with power to
enforce the same, and that If Pratt had any
interest in the land, he held only a naked
legal title as trustee for the complainant.
The bill then charged that on January 15,
23, 1855;

OP CONTRACTS.

general relief.
Jeremiah H. Pratt answered the bill, and
also filed a cross-bill, making Clement H.
D'Wolf a party, praying for the cancellation
of the agreement between Amos Pratt and
D'Wolf as rescinded for nonpayment of the
purchase

money.

The complainant answered the cross-bill,
and replications were filed to the several answers.
The original bill was taken as confessed as to Amos Pratt.
The cause was
heard by the court upon the pleadings and
proofs, and a decree entered, dismissing the
original bill.
Scates, McAllister & Jewett, for appellant
S. W. Randall and Snapp & Cone, for appellees.

CATON, C. J.
A. Pratt by

On the 23d of September,
Indenture, agreed to sell, and
convey to D'Wolf, or his assigns, several parcels of land for the gross sum of four thousand
and fifty dollars, all on time except one hundred dollars; and D'Wolf, by the same instrument, agreed to pay the purchase money as
1852,

therein stipulated.
On the 23d of September, 1853, Pratt agreed
that certain covenants with one Parker should
be performed on the 10th of October, 1853,
and, upon his failure to do so, was to forfeit
and pay the sum of one thousand dollars as
stipulated damages, to secure which he deposited with Brown & Hurd the obligation
ef D'Wolf to pay him the purchase money,
and they were authorized to deliver it to
Parker, in case Pratt failed to perform or to
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Hurd delivered the contract which Pratt had
left with them, as above stated, to Parker,
who, on the 28th of January, 1854, sold it
in pursuance of his original contract with
Pratt, and Stone became the purchaser for
one thousand dollars, which was just sufficient to pay the forfeiture provided for in the
contract between Pratt and Parker.
Stone, insisting that by the purchase of the
contract, he was entitled to recover the money due thereon in place of Pratt, and that
Pratt was thereby in effect fuHy paid the
purchase money for which he had agreed to
convey the premises sold to D'Wolf, filed this
bill to compel Pratt to convey to him the fifof
which he had purchased
teen acres,
D'Wolf, parcel of that which D'Wolf had
bought of Pratt
With the view we take of the case, it is
unnecessary
to advert to the sale of the
premises by A. Pratt to J. H. Pratt
It is a well settled rule of law, that an
entire contract cannot be divided so as to
compel a party to perform it in parcels, either to different persons or at different times.
jJWhen D'Wolf sold a part of the premises to
iStone, he could not thereby impose the legal
obligation upon Pratt to convey that portion
i'to Stone, and the balance to himself. That
would be making it in fact two contracts instead of one.
It was asking him to make
satisfaction of two instead of one. In case
of disagreement it exposed him to two prosecutions instead of one, and required him to
This is a
make two deeds instead of one.
hardship which the common law will never
allow to be imposed upon a promisor or an
obligor. Nor is this principle of the common
law ignored by courts of equity, although in
exceptional cases they will oyerlook it, where
it is necessary to protect the rights of an
innocent fair, and bona fide purchaser
against a contemplated fraud.
This is a bill for the specific performance
of an agreement by one who at law has no
claims whatever upon the defendant, at least
in his own name.
Such a bill is always addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which must be governed by the circumstanIn the
ces of each case as it is presented.
case of Lear v. Chouteau, 23 111. 39, this court

a

Parker, forbade Brown & Hurd delivering

the contract, which had been deposited with
them, to Parker.
On the 15th of January,
1853, Stone purchased of D'Wolf fifteen acres,
part of the premises which Pratt had sold
and agreed to convey to D'Wolf. Brown &
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court of equity to
said: "In order to induce
must
contract,
enforce specifically
must bej
good consideration,
founded on
reasonable,
fair and Just. If Its terms are
such as our sense of justice revolts at this!
court will not enforce it, though admitted to
be binding at law."
It may be added that
the complainant must show no oppression or
unconscionable advantage, when he comes inremedy
to
court of conscience asking for
He
beyond the letter of his strict rights.
must not ask for a favor beyond his teclmical
legal rights when he bases his claim to that
hard, oppressive, technical adfavor upon
vantage. He must stand before the court
prepared to meet its scrutiny without a blush,
relying upon the advocacy of
well regulated
conscience in his favor. Such must not only
be his own position, but he must show that
is not unjust or oppressive to the defendant,
to compel him to perform specifically.
Let us then examine for moment the position of these parties respectively. Waiving
the question of the division of the contract
the complainant, before he could call on the
defendant to convey to him this land, was
obliged to satisfy an obligation which secured
to the defendant about four thousand dollars.
He attempts to do this, not by paying him or
any one else having
right to receive the
money, the actual amount due, or to become
due, on the contract, but he pvurchases the
contract at
forced sale for one thousand
dollars. This is the extent of his merit. The
defendant, by his contract with D'Wolf, was
entitled to receive about the sum of four
thousand dollars, before he could be asked,
even by D'Wolf himself, to convey any porNow, what has he realtion of the premises.
ized for this four thousand dollars' worth of
land? Absolutely nothing. His claim, or
right to receive the money, was sold (and upon the validity or effect of that sale we pass
Nothing more,
no opinion) to pay a forfeit
—nothing for which he had received value.
strictly leNow all of this may have been
gal transaction. The defendant, by his own
f^ly, may have frittered away his legal right
to this money or to the land, but
is not
such
transaction as should induce
court
of equity to throw down the legal barriers
which surround the defendant, and compel
him to do more for the ease and benefit of
the complainant than the strict rules of law
will give him. Equity will never give the
pound of flesh, although it is in the bond, butj
will leave the law to give its value only
We shall not compel the defendant to recognize a dividing up of his obligations under
this contract, but shall allow him, without
regret, to insist upon his legal rights.
The decree of the court below is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
a

pay the thousand dollars.
And Parker was
authorized to sell this contract of D'Wolf, In
open market, and thus raise the money with
which to pay himself the thousand dollars.
Before the 11th of October, 1853, Pratt,
that he had been defrauded by
alleging

OF CONTRACTS.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

854

THOMPSON
<43

Supreme

N. W.

796,

V.

WINTER.

42 Mien. 121.)

Court of MiuBesota.

Nov.

30,

1889.

Appeal from district court, Redwood county; Webber, Judge.
M.
John H. Bowers, for appellant
Thompson, for respondent.

/.

J.

GiLFiLLAN, C.
This is an action to
compel specific performance of a contract in
Tlie
the nature of one to convey real estate.
defendant had purchased the land from tlie
state, paying 15 per cent, of the purchase
price, and receiving? certificates of purchase.
February 1, 1886, these parties entered into
a contract in writing, whereby defendant
agreed that, upon full performance on the
part of the plaintilT, he would transfer by
deed of assignment the said land certi licates.
Plaintiff was to pay therefor $590, according to two promissory notes, — one for $190,
due October 1, 1886, with interest at 10 per
cent., and one for $400, due two years from
February 1, 1886, with interest at 8 per cent.,
— and pay all taxes and assessments, and the
The
unpaid purchase money to the state.

plai ntiff fully performedjt his contra ctjon his
—
part : In Miircn, iSSSTthe parties made~Hn
oral" agreement, by wliich defendant agreed
to make certain improvements for the plaintiff on the land, by breaking, erecting buildings, and digging a well, for which plaintiff
agreed to i)ay him the cost thereof, with interest; such payment not to be made before
K the expiration of five years from the time of
making the improvements- Afterwards, purdefendant made
\ suant to sucli agreement,
^
such improvements to the amount of $500,
no part of which has been paid. The plaintiff was insolvent. On tliese facts the court
below denied specific performance.
From the memorandum filed by the court
below it appears that the specific performance was refused, in the exercise of what the
court deemed its discretionary power, the
reasons for so exercising that power being
stated; that plaintiff has become insolvent;
that the value of the improvements is equal
to the purchase price; and that plaintiff can
The mere fact
be compensated in damages.
thai a person has a contract for tlie conveyance to him of real estate does not entitle
him, as of right, to the interposition of a
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court of equity to enforce it. The matter of
compelling specific performance is one of
sound and reasonable discretion, — of judicial, not arbitrary and capricious, discretion.
There must be some reason, founded in
equity and good conscience, for refusing the
relief. Such reason lias been generally found,
by the court refusing it, in some mistake or
fraud or unconscionableness in the contract,
or in some laches on the part of the plaintiff
clianging the circumstances so as to make it
inequitable to compel a conveyance, or where
the claim Is stile, or there is reason to beBut, whatever the
lieve it was abandoned.
reason may be, it must have some reference
to, some conneclion with, the contract itself,
or the duties of the pa^-ties in relation to it.
We have never found a case where the court
refused the relief as a means of enforcing
some independent claim of the defendant
against the plaintiff, nor because the defendant had some independent claim which he
might not be able to enforce against tlie
If such could be regarded as an
plaintiff.
equitable reason for denying relief, every action of the kind might Involve the investigation of all unclosed transactions between the
parties, whether relating to the contractor
subject-matter of the action, or entirely distinct from it. In this case there is no reason
to suppose tlie contract other than a fair one.
The plaintiff has been prompt in performing
on his part, and in seeking his remedy. The
defendant has a claim against plaintiff, entirely independent of the contract to convey,
which claim, by the terms of the agreement ■
under which it arose, was not to become due |
for more than three years after the timei
The possibility'
when he was to convey.
that when it becomes due he may not be able
to enforce it, by reason that jilalntiff's msolvency may continue, does not make it inequitable to enforce this contract already
matured.
That a purchaser may have an
adequate remedy by action for damages, although a reason for not holding what he has
done to be part performance to take the case
out of the operation of the statute of frauds,
is of itself no reason for withholding the
proper remedy, where the contract is valid
under the statute. The order is reversed,
and the court below will enter judgment on
the findings of fact in favor of plaintiff fur
I the relief demanded in the complaint.
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FALCKE

V.

GRAY.

against Mrs.

(4 Drew. 651.)

High Court of Chancery.

1859.

In this case the bill was filed for a specific
performance of a contract entered into between the plaintiff, Mr. Falcke, and Mrs.
Gray, one of the defendants, by which Mrs.
Gray had agreed that, at the expiration of a
six-months lease to the plaintiff of her furnished house, he should have the option of
two china jars at the price of
purchasing
£40.

In January,

the plaintiff, being desirous of finding a furnished house, applied
to Mrs. Gray, who was willing to let hers,
and, on looking over It, he observed the two
jars, the subject of the suit. He had for
twenty-five years carried on the business of
a dealer in curiosities, china, etc., and was
eminent in his trade, and was well acquainted with the prices which articles of this kind
would fetch.
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1859,

Shortly afterwards he had an Interview
with Mrs. Gray at her house; and Mr. Brend,
from the oflBce of Boyle & Bryden, estate and
house agents, who were Mrs. Gray's agents in
A
the matter, attended to advise Mrs. Gray.
discussion arose as to the terms of letting,
and ultimately a rent of seven guineas yer
week was agreed upon, with an option to the
plaintiff that he should, at the end of the
term, be at liberty to purchase certain articles of furniture at a valuation, to be inserted
including the two china
in the agreement,
jars, which were valued at £40.
With regard to the valuation of these jars
at £40, It appeared from the evidence that Mr.
Brend told Mrs. Gray that he did not know
the value of the jars, but he should think
and the agreethey were worth £20 apiece;
ment was drawn up, putting the value of £40
on the jars, and was signed by Mrs. Gray
and the plaintiff.
On the 26th of January
the plaintiff went to the house while his agent
was taking the inventory, and then the jars
had been removed; and on the same day Mrs.
Gray came to Mr. Falcke's house, and informDuring
ed him of the removal of the jars.
the Interval between the 19th and the 26th
of January Mrs. Gray, having begun to doubt
whether the jance placed on the jars was
fahr, was advised that it would be as well to
take the opinion of Mr. Watson, also a dealer
in curiosities; and, on the 26th, she accordingly went to Mr. Watson, and desh:ed him
to come in the evening to value the jars.
This he did; and on seeing the jars he was
so much struck with their beauty, etc., that
he offered Mrs. Gray his check for £200 for
Mrs. Gray then asked Mr.
them at once.
Watson if he thought she would be doing anything wrong in so selling them, and he told
her It was all right; and she then took his
check and Mr. Watson took away the jars.
Mr. Watson was made a defendant to the bill.
The plaintiff now Insisted that he was entitled to a decree for specific performance
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Gray, and to delivery

of the

jars as against Mr. Watson; and on that part
of the case the question was whether the
transaction was a bona fide one on the part
of Watson, or whether he knew of the contract between Mrs. Gray and the plaintiff.
The defendant insisted that it was a contract
for chattels, and could not be enforced.
The evidence as to the actual value of the
vases was conflicting, but, putting it at the
lowest, it greatly exceeded £40.
Mr. Baily and Mr. Waller, for plaintiff.
Mr. Glasse and Jones Bateman, for Mrs.
Gray. Mr. Greene and Mr. Speed, for Mr.
Watson.

THE VICE CHANCEDLOR (after stating
the facts above stated).
The first ground of
defense is that, this being a bill for the specific performance
of a contract for the purchase of chattels, this court will not interfere;
but I am of opinion that the court will not
refuse to interfere simply because the contract relates to chattels, and that if there
were no other objection the contract in this
case is such a contract as the court would
specifically perform.
What is the difference in the view of the
court between realty and personalty In respect
to the question whether the court will interfere or not? Upon what principle does the
court decree specific performance of any contract whatever? Lord Redesdale in Harnett
& L. 549, says:
v. Yeilding, 2 Schoales
"Whether courts of equity in their determinations on this subject have always considered
what was the original foundation for decrees
very much doubt
of this nature,
believe
that, from something of habit, decrees of this
kind have been carried to an extent which
has tended to injustice. Unquestionably the
original foundation of these decrees was simply this, that damages at law would not give
to which he was
the' party the compensation
entitled; that is, would not put him in a situation as beneficial to him as if the agreeSo that
ment were specifically performed."
the principle on which a court of equity pro"A court of law gives damages
ceeds is this:
for the nonperformance, but a court of equity
says, "that is not sufficient,—justice is not
satisfied by that remedy"; and therefore a
court of equity will decree specific performance, because a mere compensation in damages is not a sufficient remedy and satisfaction for the loss of the performance of the
contract
Now why should that principle apply less
to chattels? If in a contract for chattels
damages will be a sufficient compensation,
the party Is left to that remedy.
Thus if a
contract is for the purchase of a certain quantity of coals, stock, etc., this court will not
decree specific performance, because a person
can go into the market and buy similar articles, and get damages for any difference in
the price of the articles hi a court of law;

I
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but, If damages would not be a sufficient compensation, the principle on which a court of
equity decrees specific performance is just as
applicable to a contract for the sale and purchase of chattels as to a contract for the sale
and purchase of land.
In the present case the contract is for the
purchase of articles of unusual beauty, rarity, and distinction, so that damages would
not be an adequate compensation for nonperformance; and I am of opinion that a
contract for articles of such a description Is
such a contract as this court will enforce;
and, in the absence of all other objection,
should have no hesitation
in decreeing spe-

I

cific performance.
The next ground of defense is that the
contract in the present case is a hard bargain between the plaintiff and Mrs. Gray;
and it is insisted that the inadequacy in
price Is so great that on that ground the
court will not decree specific performance.
Now the price put on these jars was £40.
What was their actual value? Certainly to
talk of their value is to talk of somethmg
which is very artificial and fluctuating, depending upon the taste and caprice of the
community; but still the jars derive their
value from their beauty, distinction, and
rarity, and those qualities give them a selling value. They have a value in the marAccording to the plaintiff's own stateket.
ment their value would be £100, or, if between persons not brokers, £125; and it is
the interest of the plaintiff to represent their
A better test of
value as low as possible.
their value is what Mr. Watson -has given
for them; and I think I may assume that
£200 at least would be a fair price, though I
cannot help thinking that their real value
rather exceeded than fell short of that sum;
but, taking £200 as the fair value, the price
placed on the jars by Mr. Brend was only
That this
one-fifth of their selling value.
was a hard bargain in the sense of its being for a very inadequate price there can be
no doubt; and the defendant insists that, on
this ground, the court wUl not enforce specific performance.
On the other hand, the plaintiff insists
that, although it is true that in hard bargains, using the terms m one sense, the
court will not decree specific performance,
still that that does not apply to cases of
mere inadequacy of price; and this is the
question I have now to consider.
The general rule with regard to hard bargains is that the court will not decree spe[
cific performance, because specific perform) I
ance is in the discretion of the court for
j the advancement of justice; such discretion,

j/

r

/ indeed, to be exercised, not according to caprice, but on strict principles of justice and
\ equity. In the case of White v. Damon, 7
Ves. 30, Lord Bldon says:
"I agree with
Lord Rosslyn that giving a specific performance is matter of discretion, but it is not an
arbitrary, capricious discretion.
It must be
I

\J

OF CONTRACTS.

regulated upon grounds that vrtll make It
The principle upon which the
com-t acts with respect to hard bargains appears to me to have been truly expressed by
Lord Langdale in the case of Wedgwood v.
Adams, 6 Beav. 600; and the passage in
which he enunciates the principle has been
quoted with approbation by Lord Justice
Turner in Watson v. Marston, 4 De Gex, M.
& G. 239.
Lord Langdale in Wedgwood v.
Adams says that the court exercises its discretion and decrees specific performance unless it would be highly unreasonable
to do
so, and that what is more or less unreasonable cannot well be defined. It must depend
on the circumstances of each particular case.
As it is admitted by the plaintiff that in
cases of hard bargains generally the court
will not interfere, it is not necessary to go
Into any of the eases on the subject other
than those which turn more or less on Inadequacy of price; and here I may observe
that in some cases the court has refused
specific performance on the ground of the
hardness of the bargain, where there has
been not the least impropriety of conduct on
the part of the person seeking specific performance. In most of the cases there has
been some other ingredient besides mere inadequacy of price, but I vnll refer to those
In which I find the opinion of the judges
express on that particular point.
In Young v. Clerk, Prec. in Chan. 538, the
defendant agreed to grant a lease of certain
lands to the plaintifC for fourteen years at a
rent of £40. The plaintiff had already been
lessee of the same lands for many years,
and knew that the value of the lands was
not £40, but £167, and in that case specific
performance was refused; but there was in
that case the circumstance that the defendant, having recently come into possession of
the land, came to look at it, and stayed at
the plaintiff's house, and desired to see the
plaintiff's underleases, in order to ascertain
what the plaintiff had realized from the
property. The plaintiff evaded showing him
the underleases, and the defendant remained
In Ignorance of the true value of the land.
If the bUl had been to set aside the conLord
tract, it would not have succeeded.
Thurlow said: "I must take it to be the
law that if a man contracts to purchase an
estate for a certain price, and the intending
purchaser knows at the time that there are
mines under the estate of which the vendor
is ignorant, still, as this court is not a court
of honor, the court wUl not set aside the
contract on a bill by the vendor; but nobody can doubt that the court would not
decree specific performance of such a contract, and there is a wide distinction between
a case in which the court would, on the one
hand, decree specific performance of an Incontract, and, on the other, set
complete
aside a complete contract" And in giving
judgment the lord chancellor said that this
court was not bound to decree a specific exe-
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of articles where they appeared to be
or founded on a fraud, or
jwhere it would be unconscionable to assist

I cntion

\ unreasonable
•them.

The next case Is Klen v. Stukeley, 1 Brown,
Pari. Gas. 191; Gilb. 155, which was a bill
in the equity side of the court of exchequer
by the vendor for the specific performance
of an agreement for the purchase of land, for
which lie purchaser had agreed to pay forty
It was proved In the case that
years' value.
the plaintiff had left his deed with the defendant, and that there were no objections
to the title; but a decree was made for specific performance.
On appeal, the house of
great doubt whether such
lords entertained
a bargain should be carried out by a court
of equity, but they came to no decision on
that point
The next case Is Southwell v. Nicholas, reported in a note to Howell v. George, 1 Mad.
In this case the plaintiff's father and the
9.
defendant
Nicholas' brother, having some
houses in Spring Gardens, agreerf to purchase
two old houses and pull them down to make
an entrance into Spring Gardens. The houses
were pulled down, and the plaintiff's father
paid his share of the purchase money.
The
defendant's
brother died, and his estates
were sold for the payment of his debts.
On
a bill by the plaintiff
for the specific performance of the agreement
as to the two
houses, it was contended by the defendant
that there should be no specific performance,
as his brother's estates had been sold, and
there would be no consideration accruing to
him for the expense he would be at
The
master of the rolls was inclined to decree
that the parties should pay for the two houses
in proportion to the value of their houses to
be benefited, but the matter was compromisplaintiffi
ed by parties agreeing that the
should pay two-thirds and the defendant onethird for the two houses.
The next case is Vaughan v. Thomas, 1
Brown, C. C. 556. In this case the defendant agreed with the plaintiff for the sale to
him of an annuity of £300 a year for the
defendant's life, at five years' purchase.
The
himself as being
defendant then represented
only fifty-five of age, and the plaintiff Insured
the defendant's life on that footing; but two
years afterwards he discovered that the defendant was sixty-one years of age at the
time of granting the annuity, and the plaintiff was obliged In consequence to Increase
"Upon his representing this to
the insiu-ance.
the defendant, It was agreed that the plaintiff should grant to the defendant an additional annuity, which was expressed to be
granted for £250, but in fact no money was
paid on that occasion.
In December, 1779,
the defendant applied to the plaintiff to repurchase the annuity, and an agreement was
entered into by them by which the plaintiff
agreed to give up the annuity on payment
of £1,500, the original purchase money, and
all arrears then due, deducting the sum of
H.& B.Eq.(2d Ed.)— 42
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for four years of the additional annuity of £50. The arrears then due
were £475, so that the sum settled for the
repurchase was £1,775. After the agreement
had been signed the plaintiff struck out his
name, and two days after another agreement
was prepared, whereby the plaintiff relinquished the annuity and all arrears for £2,000.
The plaintiff filed a bill for the specific performance of this agreement It was referred
to the master to find the value of the original
and additional annuity and the defendant's
age.
The master found that the annuity was
worth nine years' purchase
when it was
granted.
The plaintiff contended that the
bargain was fair, and that he was entitled to
the assistance of the court to carry it into
execution; but the master of the rolls was
of opinion that if they assisted the plaintiff
they would be sanctioning a very unconscientious bargain, and that the plaintiff was not
entitled to the aid of the court The bill was
therefore dismissed.
In the case of Heathcote v. Paignon, 2
Brown, 167, there was nothing but inadequacy of price, and the master of the rolls
referred it to the master to report on the
actual value.
The master found a value of
£500, for which only £200 had been given,
and the court refused specific performance.
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by Lord
Thurlow, and the contract was set aside as
being unjust.
The next case I shall mention Is Day v.
Newman, 2 Oox, 77. In that case the court
but
refused to decree specific performance,
left the parties to their remedies at law on
the ground of inadequacy In price. That
case appears to me to be a distinct decision
£200, the amount

on the question.
White V. Damon, 7 Ves. 30, was a case of
a purchase at an auction; yet Lord Rosslyn,
on the simple ground of inadequacy In price,
performance.
This case
refused specific
therefore shows that inadequacy in price is
a sufficient ground for refusing specific performance. Lord Eldon took a different view,
but it was on the ground that the sale was

by auction.
Now •these two last-mentioned
cases appear to me to be decisive on the point; and
I am of opinion that In the present case I
ought to refuse specific performance on the
mere ground of inadequacy of price, even If
there were none other.
But there is another circumstance In this
What was
case besides mere inadequacy.
It was not
the nature of the transaction?
the case of a bargain between seller and buyer, the one trying to get the highest, and the
other to give the lowest, price. The Intention
of the parties was that a fair and reasonable
price should be placed on the articles, and
that the plaintiff should have the option of
purchasing at such fair and reasonable price.
Mrs. Gray, though she was told by Mr.
Brend that he was not a judge of the value,
thought that the £40 mentioned by him was
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such a fair price as a competent person would
place on the jars; and It was upon that footing that she made the agreement.
She was
not herself a competent judge, though she
knew they were of considerable value.
Mr.
Falcke knew that she was contracting on that
footing, and he knew that the price put upon the jars by Brend was not a fair price.
(The vice chancellor, after going through the
plaintiff's evidence, from which it appeared
that he, knowing that £40 was greatly insufficient, it being only two-fifths of the value,
as he said, allowed the contract to be signed on that footing, proceeded:)
The question
is whether he can come to the court to compel Mrs. Gray to sell the jars to him for £40.
I admit that this court is not a court of honor, but it appears to me that, although Mr.
Falcke has done nothing he was legally
bound not to do, yet, consistently with the
authorities and justice of the case,
must
I refuse specific performance.
It has, however, been contended that Mrs.

I
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Gray, having sold the Jars to the defendants
the Watsons, should not have been made a
defendant; but Mrs. Gray has placed herself
in such a position that the suit could not go
on without her being madp a party. The bill,
therefore,
must be dismissed without costs
as against her.
With regard to the defendants the Watsons, the question is whether they bad notice, when they purchased from Mrs. Gray,
that she had entered Into an agreement by
virtue of which she could not sell them to
another person.
Now I cannot help entertaining some suspicion that the Watsons
knew something more than that a mere question had arisen as to value; but the onus
of proving that they had notice lies on the
plaintiff, and I think that, although there
is some doubt on the evidence, notice to them
has not been sufliciently proved.
Under all
the circumstances, I think the bill, as against
the defendants the Watsons, must be dismissed, with costs.
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PAIXE

V.

MEIXER.

(6 Ves. 349.)
Chancery.

July

22, 1801.

Upon the 1st of September, 1796, the plaintiffs sold to the defendant, by auction, some
houses In Katcliffe Highway, upon the usual
terms, a deposit of 251. per cent, and a proper conveyance to be executed upon payment
of the remainder of the purchase money at
The premises were with
Michaelmas next.
but a
others subject to certain annuities:
trust of stock was declared for the payment
The first abstract deof these annuities.
livered was clearly defective: so that the
at that
purchase could not be completed
A further abstract was delivered to
time.
the solicitor for the defendant, at the end
of September, or the beginning of October.
He insisted upon having a release from the
The treaty continued ttirough
annuitants.
Octob^; and about the end of that month
the defendant's solicitor agreed to waive all
objections, ii the plaintiff would allow him
and if the trustees of the
eleven guineas,
stock would join in the conveyance; and re'
fused a proposal to give up the purchase.
I The plaintiff agreed to make the allowance
desired.
On the 4th or 5th of November the
defendant's
solicitor sent a draft of a conrveyance. The trustees of the stock were preby a
vailed upon to join in the conveyance
{
\new declaration of trust The draft was returned to the defendant's solicitor; the deeds
were engrossed;
and upon the 16th or 17th
of December
he declared himself satisfied
with the title; and said, the deeds would be
ready in two or three days; and that he
complete
should
the purchase
under the
promise of the eleven guineas.
Upon the
ISth of December the houses were burnt:
the insurance having been suffered to expire
On the 20th of Decemat Michaelmas 1796.
ber the defendant's solicitor wrote a letter;
observing, that he had taken an objection to
the freehold title; and should not have
thought anything more of the purchase, but
for the covenant of indemnity from the trustees, inserted in the draft by him, and approved by one of the trustees of the stock:
but as that had been struck out by another
trustee, he could not advise his client to accept the title; and he should call for the
deposit
The bUl was then filed, praying a specific
performance
of the contract; and a decree
was made by the late lord chancellor, simply
referring it to the master to see whether a
good title could De made.
This decree was
dissatisfactory to both parties, as not deciding the question; and a petition of rehearing
was presented by the plaintiff.
Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Cox, for plaintiff,
Insisted, that the objection to the title from
the charge of the annuities was frivolous:
there being a fund of stock with a trust declared upon
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Mr. Sutton and i.^r. Lewis, for defendant.
—The delay in performing this contract
arose from the defect of the title; and the
plaintiff ought to have acquainted the defendant with the circumstance of the insurance expiring. In Stent v. Baylis, 2 P. Wms.
3
217, referred to in Mortimer v. Capper,
Brown, Ch. 156, Sir Joseph Jekyll expresses
2 P. Wms.
a clear opinion upon this case.
220. Pope V. Roots, 7 Brown, Ch. 184.
Mr. Mansfield, in reply.— All the cases referred to are got rid of by Jackson v. Lever,
3 Brown, Ch. 605.
The former cases proceeded upon this fallacy, that the party could
not have the thing bought; for chance had
decided against him: but he had the chance;
and he must take it each way. In the case
of a life it might last fifty years, and might
drop the next day.
But this is not a purchase of property aepending upon the contingency of life, like an annuity. A man purchasing a house is to consider with himself,
whether he will insure or not. Not a word
was said about insurance: therefore notice
was not incumbent on the plaintiffs;
and
there was as much negligence in the defendant in not inquiring about that
Such an
accident did not occur to either of them.
If
in the sale of a house nothing is said about
Insurance, it could not enter into the bargain.

LORD CHANCELLOR.— The abstract first
delivered was undoubtedly imperfect in certain respects.
It did not go back further
than forty-three years; and there was no
specific mention of the property in Ratcliffe
Highway in the abstract
There was also
Unquesthe objection upon the annuities.
tionably that abstract was not satisfactory;
and the express condition of the sale could
not be complied with. Harrington v. Wheeler, 4 Ves. 686; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265.
Of course the defendant could not be called
Then It was
on to pay his purchase money.
with the vendee to choose to go on with the
bargain, or to put an end to the contract.
The agent however chose not to put an end
to It; and though a circumstance took place
at Michaelmas sufficient to put an end to any
action of law, the contract was kept alive,
It is
at least to the 10th of December.
clear, the objection was given up as to the
freehold title; and the only difference was as
to the indemnity against the annuities, afI do not
fecting these with other premises.
consider whether this objection is of form
or substance: but leave it to be determined,
when it may be necessary, whether the purchaser under such circumstances has not a
right to insist that the annuitants shall release the premises;-, or whether this court
will say, under all circumstances the pm'chasers shall take the premises burthened
with the annuities, with a great number of
others, and seek their indemnity against the
trust property and the trustees, if they preferred a personal covenant by the trustees.
If in equity these premises belonged to the

660

SPEOIFIO PERFORMANCE

vendee, he would have a title to the rents and
profits at Michaelmas by relation; and he
must pay the purchase money with interest
First, it is said, the title
from that time.
was never accepted in fact: 2dly, if not, mider these circumstances
a court
of equity
will not compel a specific performance. As
to the second point, the objection is grounded upon two circumstances: 1st, the simple
fact of the fire; 2dly, that the premises had
been insured prior to the contract; that that
fact, and the fact that the Insurance expired at Michaelmas
1796, were not disclosed; and that the premises
afterwards remained uncovered by any insurance.
The
authority of Sir Joseph Jekyll has been mentioned: but no ease has been cited in support
of that dictum; and it is in a degree suggested, not admitted, at the bar, that it may be
considered
over-ruled by subsequent cases.
As to the mere effect of the accident itself
no solid objection can be founded upon that
simply; for if the party by the contract has
become in equity the owner of the premises,
they are his to all intents and purposes.
See
Foster V. Foust, 2 Serg. & R. 11. They are
vendible as his, chargeable as his, capable
of being incumbered
as his; they may be
devised as his; they may be assets;
and
they would descend to his heir.
a man
had signed a contract for a house upon that
land, which is now appropriated to the London Docks, and that house was burnt, it
would be impossible to say to the purchaser,
willing to take the land without the house,
because much more valuable on account of
this project, that he should not have it. As
to the annuity cases and all the others, the
true answer has been given; that the party
has the thing he bought, though no payment
may have been made; for he boughtsub-

)

If

ject to^conUngMicy.
If^TB''"a I'tSUl' "eiitSE?"
he of c5i3SeHSB^It.
Then as to the noncommunication, I cannot say that, in my
judgment, forms an objection; for
do not
see how I can allow it, unless I say this
court warrants to every buyer of a house
that the house Is insured, and not only insured, but to the full extent of the value.
The house is bought, not the benefit of any
existing policy. However general the practice of Insuring from fire ia, it is not imiversal; and it is yet less general that houses
are Insured to their full value, or near it
The question, whether insured or not, is

I
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with the vendor solely, not with the vendee;
imless he proposes something upon that; and
makes it matter of contract with the vendor,
that the vendee shall buy according to that
fact, that the house is insured.
1 am therefore of opinion, that if the agent on behalf
of this purchaser did accept this title previously to the destruction of the premises,
the vendors are in the situation in which
they would have been if the title and the
conveyance were ready at Michaelmas 1796,
but by the default of the vendee were not
executed, but the title was accepted, and the
premises were burnt down on the quarter
day.
As to the fact, where there has been
a great deal of treaty, and a considerable
hardship must fall upon one party, if the
case is to be put entirely upon the fact, the
court must guard against surprise;
and I
am not sure, even the plaintiff's witnesses
accurately tmderstand the nature of the
facts they depose to. It is to be observed,
they are all the plaintiff's agents, subject to
the influence necessarily belonging to that
situation. The case is therefore not sufficiently clear upon the fact, and there ought
to be some reference to the master or an
Inquiry before a jury; but that must not be
upon the validity of the title; for it is clear,
the objection to the freehold title, that it was
not old enough, and the other objection, that
the purchaser had a right to insist upon a
release of the annuities, were waived. The
question between them Is, whether the parties agreed that an Indemnity should be given in any form; and If so, in what form.
The Inquiry must be, whether the title had
been accepted by the agent on behalf of the j
defendant on or before the 18th of December J
1796.
That inquiry wUl miscarry, unless the
master, or the jury. If satisfied that there
was an acquiescence In the proposal, shall
be of opinion, that Is an acceptance of the
proposal.
should think, a court of law
would hold that: but If there Is any doubt
of it,
would rather refer It to the master
to Inqtdre, whether the agent on behalf of
the defendant had accepted or acquiesced in
the proposal; with a dfrectlon,
that he
should be lixamined; and they will appreciate the credit due to him; and will not
forget, that he was bartering for himself for
eleven guineas; If that appears.
and the referThe decree was reversed;
ence to the master directed accordingly.
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GOULD

V.

MUROH.

(70 Me. 288.)
Supreme Judicial

Court of Maine.

Oct. 29,

1879.

Assumpsit on two promissory notes by
Bills Gould against Lewis W. Murch.
It is stipulated in the report that the case
was to be tried if defendant has any defense, otherwise defendant was to be deThe notes were given in considerfaulted.
Deation for a bond conveying real estate.
fendant took possession of the property when
the notes and bond were given; and while
but before the matuhe was in possession,
rity of the notes, the property was destroyThe question presented is whethed by fire.
fer such destruction of the premises constituted a failure of consideration for the notes.
C. L. Jones, for plaintiff.
Walton & Walton, for defendant.

LIBBBY, J. The notes In suit, with thret
others, were given in payment for a lot of
land on which were a dwelling house and
other buildings; and on payment of the notes
at maturity, the plaintiff agreed to convey
the premises to the defendant
The defendant was to have possession of the premises
till he made default of payment as agreed,
and he entered into possession
under the
agreement.
Within a year from that time
the buildings were burnt without the fault of
either party.
The question presented to the court is
whether the destruction of the buildings can
be set up by the defendant as a defense to
the notes.
We thin k it can be.
When the owner of a lot of land with buildings upon it agrees to convey it at a future
day on payment of the purchase money by
the purchaser, and before payment and conveyance the buildings are destroyed by fire

without the fault of either par^, the loss
must fall upon the vendor; and if the buildings formed a material part of the value of
the premises,
the vendee cannot be compelled to take a deed of the land alone, and
pay the purchase money; and If he has paid
it he may recover It back. Thompson v.
Gould, 20 Pick. 134, and cases there cited.
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Gould V. Thompson, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 224;
Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514.
In Thompson v. Gould, the authorities bearing upon the question were elaborately examined and considered, and Wilde, J., in the
opinion of the court says: "In respect to the
loss of personal property, under the like circumstances, the principle of law is perfectly
clear and well established by all the authorities. When there is an agreement for the
sale and purchase of goods and chattels, and
after the agreement and before the sale la
completed the property is destroyed by casualty, the loss must be borne by the vendor;
the property remaining vested in him at the
time of the destruction. Tarling v. Baxter, 9
7
Dowl. & R. 276; Hlnde v. Whitehouse,
East, 558; Rugg v. Mlnett, 11 Bast, 210. No
reason has been given, nor can be given, why
the same principle should not be applied to
real estate.
The principle in no respect depends upon the nature and quality of the
property, and there can therefore be no distinction between personal and real estate."
In WeHs v. Calnan the same rule was affirmed. Gray, J., in the opinion of the court,
very clearly and tersely states it as follows:
"When property, real or personal, is destroyed by fire, the loss falls upon the party who
is the owner at the time; and if the owner of
a house and land agrees to sell and convey it
upon the payment of a certain price which
the pturchaser agrees to pay, and before full
payment the house is destroyed by accidental
fire, so that the vendor cannot perform the
agreement on his part, he cannot recover or
retain any part of the purchase money."
The reasons upon which the rule is based
are clearly and fully stated In the cases cited,
and it is unnecessary to repeat them here.
But the use and occupation of the premises
by the defendant, from the time the agreement for the sale and purchase was made,
formed a part of the consideration for the
notes;
and the plaintiff can recover in this,
action a sum equal to the value of the use of \
the premises while the defendant occupied ]
Wells v. Calnan, supra.
them.
In accordance with the stipulations in the
report, the action must stand for trial.

APPLETON, C. J., WALTON, BARROWS
DANFORTH, JJ., concurred.
SYMONDS, J., did not sit.

and
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MARKS

et al. r.

(4 S. W. 225,

TICHBNOR.1
85 Ky. 536.)

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May

5,

1887.

Appeal from clrcviit court, McLean county.
Owen & Ellis and W. B. Noe, for appellants. Jep. C. Jonson, for appellee.

LEWIS, J.

Appellee having sold, and by
October 24, 1884, conveyed, to
appellants three tracts of land adjoining,,
and constituting one farm, instituted an action to recover judgment on the notes given
for the purchase money, and to subject the
land to satisfy it In defense, appellants
state that the deed as written does not contain the whole contract entered into between
the parties, but a portion of it was by mistake omitted, and that they accepted the
deed upon the condition of the execution by
appellee of the following writing, which embraces the omitted part:
"I have this day sold to James A. and
Samuel C. Marks my farm known as the
'Daniel McFarland Farm.' I agree to cover
said bouse, and put two coats of paint on
deed executed

the

outside,

and

deliver

the

same

to

said

parties by or on the first day of January,
1885.
Eleven thousand of the shingles is to
be hand-shaved shingles, and the remainder
I also agree to furnish
to be cut shingles.
as much as 200 feet of sheeting if needed on
said house; and, if any more is needed, said
T. C. Tichenor."
Marks is to furnish it
It is further stated that about November
29, 1884, the dwelling-house mentioned was
of which
destroyed by fire, in consequence
appellee never did deliver it, and they therefore ask that the notes sued on be credited
1 The purchaser under an executory contract
for the sale of land is the equitable owner.
Burkhart v. Howard (Or.) 12 Pac. 79; Gilbert
V. Sleeper (Cal.)
Id. 172; Alpers v. Knight
(Cal.) 8 Pac 446; Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed.
498; Martin v. Carver (Ky.) 1 S. W. 199;
Bartle v. Curtis (Iowa) 26 N. W. 73w Any ac-

cidental loss accruing between the time of his
purchase and the conveyance of the legal title
must be borne by him, and he is entitled to all
the benefits.
Martin v. Carver (Ky.) 1 S. W.
199.
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by the value of the house, which they aver
was $1,0(00.
It is stated in the reply, and
not controverted, that, at the time of the
sale of the land, it was in the possession of a
tenant of appellee, whose term did not expire until January 1, 1885, of which fact
appellants were aware, and that time was
agreed on in view of such tenancy.
In the sale of land it becomes the real
pf^gP^ bf'the vendeefro m
execution"
deIT\^ry,^
anJTacceptancejof the .;^tten con-'
'
frlct. "It Is veSarbTe as his, chargeable as'
his' and capable of being devised or descending as his." Consequently it is a well-established and reasonable rule that the destruction of buildings thereon by fire, between
the time of such contract of sale and the
time fixed upon in the contract for the delivery of possession by the vendor to the
vendee, must be the loss of the latter and
not of the former.
Calhoon v. Belden, 3
Bush, 674.
There are only two exceptions
to this rule. The first is when, as was the
case in Combs v. Fisher, 3 Bibb, 51, there is
an express contract to deliver the possession
of the land, with the improvements or buildings thereon, in the same situation as was
the case when the sale was made.
The
second Is when, as was In Cornish v. Strutton, 8 B. Mon. 586, the building has been
destroyed by the culpable negligence of the
vendor.
There Is no allegation or proof that the
destruction of the dwelling-house In this case
was caused by the negligence of the vendor,
or any other person; nor do we think the
contract, fairly construed, amounts to an express agreement
by the vendor to assume
the risk of the destruction of the buildings
by fire.
The purpose of the supplemental
contract executed by appellee was to provide
for the repair by him of the house as therein agreed, and which the evidence shows
he did do, but not to insure it against destruction by fire, or to shift the risk from
appellants to himself. He simply covenanted
to deliver possession, without any express
undertaking to sustain any loss that might
arise from the burning of the bouse.
Judgment afi^rmed.

j^
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V.

BEACH

et al.

(12 N. E. 32, 105 N. Y. 661.)
April
Appeals of New York.
of
Court

ISSl.

26,

Application to modify interlocutory judgment
This was an action for specific performance, brought against defendants, as executors, upon a contract for the sale of land,
in pursuance of a power in the testator's
will. The plaintiff deposited the unpaid portions of the purchase money at the time
when the conTeyance should have been exeUpon a former appeal (9 N. B. 41)
cuted.
the interlocutory judgment against the executors was, with some modifications, affirmed,
by which the plaintifE's prayer for specific
was granted, and he was not
performance
required to pay interest on the purchase
money.
The object of this application is to
have such interest allowed the executors.
Milton A. Fowler,

for appellants.

O.

D.

M. Boker, for respondent

RAPALLO, J. When this case was before us on the appeal from the interlocutory
judgment, it appeared from the findings that
the unpaid portion of the purchase money
($10,500) had been tendered to the executors
on
the first of March, 1882, and that, on
their refusal to accept the same, and deliver
the deed, that sum had been deposited by
the plaintiff in the First National Bank of
LowviUe to the credit of the executors, 'to be
paid to them on the delivery of the deed.
There was nothing to show that after that
the plaintiff had derived any benefit from the use of the fund, and presumptively it had lain idle and unproductive.
Therefore the purchaser was not charged
with interest on the purchase money.
It is now shown, by affidavits, that, shortly after this deposit, the fund was wholly
or in part withdrawn from the bank by the
plaintiff, and we are now asked to add to
the modifications directed in the opinion a
further provision charging the plaintiff with
If the
interest on the amoimt so withdrawn.
fact had appeared in the case when before
us on appeal, this modification would doubtless have been proper, and even now we
might find means to make it, if no other
facts were shown on the part of the plaintiff raising a counter equity. But, in opposition to the application of the defendants, the plaintiff presents affidavits showing
that during the pendency of this action, in
consequence of neglect and mismanagement
on the part of the defendants, the ditches
on the premises have been allowed to be
filled up, the buildings to become dilapidated,
the water-works to go to decay, the fences
to be destroyed, and the value of the property to be thus depreciated to an amount exceeding the interest on the unpaid purchase
If these facts had appeared, they
money.
undoubtedly would have influenced our judgdeposit
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ment in respect to allowing interest upon the
purchase money, or making some other provision for compensating the plaintiff for the damages alleged to have been sustained. Where
specific
performance Is decreed, the court
will, so far as possible, place the parties in
the same situation they would have been in
it the contract had been performed at the
time agreed upon, and by the application of
the rule of courts of equity, by which things
which ought to have been done are considered as having been done at the proper time,
the vendor is regarded as trustee of the land
for the benefit of the purchaser, and liable
to account to him for the rents and profits,
or for the value of the use and occupation,
and the purchaser Is treated as trustee of
the purchase money unpaid, and charged
with interest thereon, unless the purchase
money has been appropriated, and no benefit has accrued from it to the purchaser.
But this is not the only manner which the
court has adopted to adjust the equities of
the parties.
For instance, where the subject of the purchase was a leasehold estate
in a mill, and the delay of performance of
the contract was attributable to the vendoi
for his failure to show good right to assign
his lease, and dilapidations had occurred, he
was charged with the expenses of repairs
required to put the mill in tenantable condition, and of those which had been incurred
for keeping up the machinery until the purAnd
chaser could prudently take possession.
In Ferguson v. Tadman, 1 Sim. 530, where
the estate had deteriorated in value by reason of mismanagement and neglect, during
five years which elapsed between the filing
of the bill for specific performance and the
decree, the amount of the deterioration, with
interest, was ascertained, and allowed to the
plaintiff out of the purchase money which
In Worrall v.
had been paid into court.
Munn, 38 N. Y. 137, these principles were
recognized; and the vendee, having obtained
a decree for specific performance, was allowed the damages sustained, during the pendency of the suit, by deterioration from
waste committed by the defendant during
the pendency of the suit.
If the matter should now be opened for
the purpose of letting the defendants in to
claim interest on the purchase money, it
would be no more than just that the same
Indulgence should be extended to the plaintiff, to let him In to prove the damages he
caused by
claims by reason of deteriorations
mismanagement and neglect.
These points
appear to be the only ones as to which the
parties have been unable to agree, in settling
From the affithe form of the Judgment.
it would seem that the
davits presented,
damages claimed by the plaintiff would about
equal the interest claimed by the defendants; but, if the judgment below is modified
so as to admit the allowance of Interest, it
should also be modified so as to admit proof
of the damages claimed. If the statements
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In the affidavits are correct, justice would
apparently be done by leaving the matter as
it is, and confining the modifications of the
interlocutory judgment to those directed in
tne original opinion of this court, which appear to be substantially contained in the
modified judgment as proposed on the part
of the plaintifC.
The details, however, are
subject to settlement in the supreme court.
But if the defendants desire to insist upon
their claim to be allowed interest, and to
contest the amount of damages resulting
from deterioration and mismanagement, the
modified judgment should contain provisions
referring it to the referee to ascertain what
amount of the sum deposited in the bank
was withdrawn by the plaintiff, or subject
to his control, and for what length of time,
and charging him with interest thereon during that time. The amount of deterioration
of the property, by reason of mismanagement and neglect,
between the first of
March, 1882, and the time of plaintiff's obtaining possession, should also be ascertained and charged, either to the defendants, as
executors,
or to the defendant Emily P.
Beach, as the equities may appear.
She certainly has no reason to complain of any loss

OF CONTRACTS.

she may sustain through this litigation, as
appears to have been caused by her persistent refusal to carry out the contract,
which, according to the findings of fact, was
intelligently entered into by her, and was a
fair contract for the full value of the farm,
and was beneficial to all concerned in the
By this unjustifiable refusal on her
estate.
part, all parties have been subjected to damage, and there is no reason why the loss
should fall upon the plaintiff, who seems to
have been always ready to perform his part

it

oi the contract.

It is to be hoped that, upon the principles
here indicated, the counsel for the respective
parties may be able to agree upon the form
of judgment to be entered.
Otherwise
it
may be settled by the supreme court, and
the interlocutory judgment may be modified
so as to provide for the ascertainment and
allowance of the interest claimed by the
defendants, and also of the damages claimed
by the plaintiff, at the election of the dethe defendant shall not confendants.
sent to have the damages ascertained and
allowed, the application for the allowance of
interest is denied.

If

(All

concur.)
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LEWIS

v.

HAWKINS

et al.

Wall. 119, 23 L. Ed. 113.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Oct 1874.
from the Circuit Court for the
Appeal
Western District of Arkansas.
(23

A- H. Garland, for appellant
for the ■widow.

Pike & John-

son,

SWAYNB, Justice. Upon the execution of
the notes and the title-bond between Lewis
and Hawkins, Lewis held the legal title as
trustee for Hawkins; and Hawkins was a
trustee for Lewis as to the purchase-money.
Hawkins was cestui que trust as to the for1 Story, Eq.
mer and Lewis as to the latter.
Jut. I 789; 2 Story, Bq. Jur. § 1212; 1 Sugd.
Vend. 175; Swai-twout v. Burr, 1 Barb. 499;
Champion t. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 402. The
seller under such circumstances has a Tendor's lien, which is certainly not impaired by
The equitable
withholding the conveyance.
estate of the vendee is alienable, descendible,
and devisable In like manner as real estate
The securities for the
held by a legal titla
are personalty, and in the
purchase-money
event of the death of the vendor, go to his
personal representative. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §
It docs not appear that the title-bond
1212.
or
Hawkins to take possession,
authorized
that he did so. If there were no such auhe
thority, and he entered into possession,

held as a licensee or tenant at will. Suflem
Townsend, 9 Johns. 35; Dollttle v. Eddy,
The vendee cannot in such cases
7 Barb. 75.
dispute the title of his vendor any more than
the lessee can dispute that of his lessor.
Whiteside v. Jackson, 1 Wend. 422; Hamilton V. Taylor, 1 LitL Sel. Cas. 444. Any
other person coming into possession under the
vendee, either with his consent or as an inJackson
truder, is bound by a like estoppel.
having
V. Walker,
7 Cow. 637. Hamiter,
bought and assumed the payment of the purchase-money stipulated to be paid by Hawkins, took the property subject to the same liabilities, legal and equitable, to which it was
1 Story,
subject in the hands of Hawkins.
Eq. Jur. § 789; 1 Sugd. Vend. (Perkins' Ed.)
Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 402;
175;
V.

Muldrow's Ex'rs v. Muldrow's Heirs, 2 Dana,
2 Har. & J. 64; Shipman v. Cook, 16 N.
J. Bq. 254.
released
The discharge In bankruptcy
Hawkins from personal liability for his debt,
but the statute of limitations cannot avail to
upon
I»x>tect the land from the vendor's Hen
It, for the purchase-money which Hawkins
agreed to pay, and which Hamiter, when he
bought the land, assumed and agreed to pay
for him.
We have already shown that as between
Lewis and Hawkins there was a trust which
embraced the purchase-money and fastened
itself upon the land. The debt did not affect
his assignee personally, but as we have shown
also It continued to bind the land In all re887;
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If the transfer had not been made.
The trust was an express one. Its terms and
purposes were evinced by the title-bond, and
the promissory notes to which that instrument referred. "As between trust.ee and cestui que trust, in the case of an express trust,
the Eitatute of limltatian has no application,
and no length of time is a bar. Accounts
have been decreed against trustees extending
over periods of thirty, forty, and even fifty
years.
The relations and privity between
trustee and cestui que trust are such that the
possession
of one is the possession of the
other, and there can be no adverse possession
during the continuance of the relation.
•
•
♦ A cestui que trust cannot set up the
statute against his co-cestui que trust, nor
against his trustee.
These rules apply in all
Perry, Trusts, §
cases of express trusts."
spects as

863.

"Ag between trustees and cestui que trust,
an express trust, constituted by the act of the
parties themselves, will not be barred by any
length of time, for in such cases there is no
adverse possession, the possession of the trustee being the possession
of the cestui que
trust." Hill, Trustees, 264*.
The same principle applies where the cestui
que trust is in possession.
He is regarded as
"Therefore,
a tenant at will to the trustee.
until this tenancy is determined there can be
no adverse possession between the parties."
Id. 266*. The relation once established is
presumed
to continue, unless a distinct denial, or acts, or a possession inconsistent with
it are clearly shown. Whiting v. Whiting, 4
Gray, 236; Creigh's Heirs v. Henson, 10 Grat.
231; Splekemeln v. Hotham, Kay, 669; Garard V. Tuck, 65 E. C. L. 249, 8 Man. G. & S.
231; Decouche v. Savetler, 3 Johns. Oh. 190;
Anstiee v. Brown, 6 Paige, 448; Kane v.
Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90.
In many of the cases It is held that the
lien of the vendor under the circumstances of
Linthis case Is substantially a mortgage.
gan V. Henderson, 1 Bland, Ch. 236; Moreton
V. Harrison, Id. 491; Relfe v. Relfe, 34 Ala.
It is well settled that the possession of
504.
the mortgagor Is not adverse to that of the
In the case last cited It is said
mortgagee.
that to apply the statute of limitations
"would be like making the lapse of time the
origin of title in the tenant against his landlord." That the remedy upon the bond, note,
is
or simple contract for the purchase-money
barred in cases like this, in no wise affects
the right to proceed in equity against the
land. As in respect to mortgages, the lien
will be presumed to have been satisfied after
the lapse of twenty years from the maturity
of the debt, but in both cases laches may be
explained and the presumption repelled.
The principles
Moreton v. Harrison, supra.
upon which this opinion proceeds are distinctly recognized in Harris v. King, 16 Ark. 122.
That case alone would be decisive of the case
before ua. The considerations which apply
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where the vendor In such cases resorts to an
action of ejectment were examined by this
court in Burnett v. CaldweU, 9 WaU. 290.
The bill avers the tender of a deed by the
complainant to Hawluns before the bill was
filed.
The answer of Hawkins denies the allegation. The testimony of Lewis sustains
the bill; that of Hawkins the answer. The
averment is not established. Except as to
If
the costs the point Is of no significance.
the tender of a deed had been properly made,
and there had been no unjustifiable r«dstance
to the taking of the decree by the complainant, to which he is entitled, he would have
There bebeen required to pay all the costs.

OP CONTRACTS.

ing a contest, and it appearing that a tender
would have been without effect, the costs
must abide the result of the litigation. Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Oh. 144; Hanson V. Lake, 2 Younge & C. 328.
Theni is manifest error in the decree, but
the bill is defective in not making the heirsat-law of Hamiter parties, unless there is
some statutory provision of the State of Arkansas which obviates this objection.
If necessary the bill can be amended in the
court below.
Decree reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to proceed in conformity with
this opinion.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
BISSELIi
(96

V.

HETWABD.

U. S. 580, 24 L. Ed. 6T8.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

Oct

1877.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United
States for the district of South Carolina.
William C. Heyward, who was seised in
fee of certain lands in the state of South
Carolina, made his last will and testament,
bearing date Jan. 20, 1852.
So much thereof a.s relates to them is as follows: "I give
to my brother, Henry Heyward, of New Xorli"
(here is a description of the lands), "for and
during the term of his natural life, and, after
give the
the determination of that estate,
same to my friend, William C. Bee, and his
hehs, to prevent the contingent remainders
limited from being barred; In
hereinafter
trust, nevertheless, during the lifetime of my
said brother, to apply the income thereof to
his use and benefit; and, from and after his
decease,
I give the use of the same estate,
real and personal, to his eldest son, Henry
Heyward, Jr., if then living, until he attains
the age of twenty-one years; and if he should
survive his father, and attain the age of
twentjH)ne years, to him and his heirs for
ever: but in case the said Henry Heyward,
Jr., should not survive his father, and attain
the age of twenty-one years, then I give the
whole of the said estate, real and personal,
after the decease of my brother, Henry Heyward, for the use of the person who may
thereafter,
from time to time, sustain the
character of heir male of the body of my
said brother, Henry Heyward, as such term
was used In the common law before the
abolition of the rights of primogeniture, until such person shall attain the age of twenty-one years, or the expiration of twenty-one
years from the death of my said brother,
whichever may first happen; and, after the
happening of either of those events, to the
then heir male of the body of my brother,
absolutely and for ever."
On the eighteenth day of June, 1863, William C. Heyward
contracted to sell, for
$120,000, said lands, to John B. Bissell;
who
took immediate possession of them, which he
has ever since retained. On July 31, following, he paid $20,000 of the purchase-money.
During that year, and before the completion
of the purchase, Heyward died, and said
Bee, appointed the executor of his will, duly
qualified as such.
Owing to the civil war
and other causes, matters remained unaltered
in their main features until March, 1870,
when said Henry Heyward, a citizen of New
York, filed his bill against said Bissell and
said Bee, citizens of South Carolina, to compel the specific performance, by Bissell, of
his agreement to purchase. The answer of
Bissell admits the agreement and his possession of the property, and his payment of
$20,000; and alleges that he was provided
with the means of paying the balance of the
purchase-money;
that neither said William

I
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C. Heyward, nor, since his death, said Bee,
tendered him a conveyance;
and that he was
willing to pay when he should receive a
valid conveyance; that he sold sixty-three
bales of cotton, for cash in Confederate notes,
and on Feb. 11, 1861, tendered the said balance, in said notes, to the executor, who declined to receive them, on the ground that
Bee, in his
he could not make a good title.
answer, admitted the tender to him by Bissell, and his refusal to accept it, on the
ground that he was advised that he could
neither make a title nor safely accept payment in Confederate currency. It was admitted, on the hearing below, that said money was tendered at that date, in such currency; that the parties through whom a good
title could be made lived in New York; and
that, after Bee's refusal to accept the notes
tendered,
Bissell used them for other purposes.
It does not appear by the pleadings, the
evidence, or the agreed statement
of facts
on file, whether Henry Heyward, Jr., who
was living when the bill was filed, and had
then attained the age of twenty-one years,

is now living. There is neither allegation
nor proof of his death.
The court decreed that Bissell should perform his contract of purchase, and pay, in
United States currency, a sum equal to the
value of $100,000 in Confederate currency on
June 18, 1863, the day of sale, with interest
thereon until Feb. 11, 1864; from and after
which day he should pay interest only on
such a sum as was the value of $100,000 on
said 18th of June, less its value on said 11th
of February; said values and interest to be
ascertained by the clerk of the court to whom
the cause was referred, as master, to state
and report the same;
that upon Bissell's
maldng the payment as stated and reported,
that the clerk, "as master to said William C.
Bee, executor of William C. Heyward," convey the premises in fee-simple;
but that, upon his failure so to pay, the master should
sell the property, at public auction, for cash.
Said Henry Heyward died before the execution of the decree. On Nov. 23, 1874, Zef a
Heyward,
his wife, Zefita Heyward, his
daughter, and Frank Heyward, his son, filed
their bill of revivor, reciting the original bill,
the proceedings thereunder, the reference to
the master, the death of said Henry,— leaving a last will and testament, which was duly proved before the surrogate of the county
of New York,— their appointment to execute
the same, and that said Zefa alone took upon herself the execution thereof, and qualified accordingly, and praying that the bill
might be revived. This bill was duly served; no answer was made, and an order of revivor was entered accordingly.
The master subsequently reported that the
balance found by him to be due upon the
contract was $28,353.50; and that, In reaching that result, he compared the value of the
Confederate currency, in which the contract
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was payable, with United States paper currency at the date of the contract and of the
tender.
He found that, on the 18th of June,
1863, $1 in United States currency was worth
currency; and that on
$5.20 in Confederate
the 14th of February, 1864, the value was
The court confirmed the report,
$1 to $13.01.
Dec. 15, 1874; and decreed that the interlocutory decree previously rendered be carried into execution.
Bissell thereupon appealed to this court; Bee declining to join in
the appeal.

William A. Maury, for appellant.
McOrady, for appellee.

Edward

MR. JUSTICE HUNT, after stating the
case, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is objected that there is a fatal defect
of parties complainant. The point of this ob-

jection is that Henry Heyward and William
C. Bee were not able together to make a title
that ought to be satisfactory to Bissell, and
hence that the decree should be reversed.
The will of William C. Heyward took effect only upon his death. Until the occurrence of that event, the devisees therein named had no more title to or interest in the
property in question than if their names had
not been mentioned in the will. If he had
consummated
his contract with Bissell by
executing a deed of the property, this would
have worked an absolute revocation of the
devise as to this property. The execution of
the contract (with the partial payment thereon) was a transfer in equity of the title of
the land to Bissell; leaving tn the representatives of William 0. Heyward simply a naked
title as trustee for Bissell, to be conveyed
By the terms
upon performance on his part.
of the will, this legal title was vested in
William C. Bee, the trustee to preserve remainders.
Henry Heyward was tenant for life, and as
such offered to convey to Bissell, "by feoffment, and livery of seisin, and to procure the
release of right of entry and action by William C. Bee, the remainder-man for preserving contingent remainders;" and he avers in
his bill that this would have made a good
and effectual conveyance of the legal estate.
Bee held the legal title under the will, and
his title to the legal estate continued in force
as long as the remainders were contingent;
and there is nothing in any part of the record showing that such was not the condition of the title when Heyward offered to
convey, and that it is not so at the present
time.

Chancellor Kent says (4 Kent, Comm. p.
"The trustees are entitled to a right of
entry in case of a wrongful alienation by the
tenant for life, or whenever his estate for
life determines in his lifetime by any other
means.
The trustees are under the cognizance of a court of equity, and it will con256),
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trol their acts, and punish them for a breach
of trust; and if the feoffment be made by
the purchaser with notice of the trust, as was
the fact in Chudleigh's Case, a court of chancery will hold the lands still subject to the
former trust. But this interference of equity is regulated by the circumstances and
justice of the particular ease.
The court
may, in its discretion, forbear to interfere;
or it may and will allow, or even compel,
the trustees to join in a sale to destroy the
contingent remainder, if it should appear that
such a measure would answer the uses originally intended by the settlement."
To this
he cites many authorities.
We think this objection is not well taken.
Was there error in the amount decreed to
be paid?
One of the statements of fact in the case
sets forth that Bissell tendered the money;
and falls to state that he deposited it, or in
any manner set it apart or appropriated it
for the purpose of the tender.
The other
states that he used the money he had thus
The legal effect is the same. To
provided.
have the effect of stopping interest or costs,
a tender must be kept good; and it ceases
to have that effect when the money is used
by the debtor for other purposes.
Roosvelt
Giles v. Hart, 3
V. Bank, 45 Barb. 579;
Salk. 343; Sweatland v. Squire, 2 Salk. 623.
The defendant insists that the value of the
Confederate notes should be reduced to gold
or sterling exchange, which would still farther depreciate their value.
This objection cannot be sustained. By
the laws of the United States, all contracts
between individuals could then be lawfully
discharged in the legal-tender notes of the
United States. These notes, and not gold or
sterling exchange, were the standard of value to which other currencies are to be reduced to ascertain their value. Knox v. Lee, 12
Wall. 457; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1;
Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604; Rev. St. S. a
p. 285.
Confederate

notes, although without the
authority of the United States, and, indeed,
in hostility to it, formed the only currency
of South Carolina at the date of the transactions in question. United States currency
was unknown, except when found upon the
person of the soldiers of the United States
taken and held as prisoners.
Confederate notes can in no proper sense
be treated as commodities
The conmerely.
tract in question was made payable in terms
in dollars; but both parties agree in writing
that Confederate-note
dollars were intended.
The $20,000 was paid in Confederate notes;
and, when the defendant tendered his $100,it in Confederate notes as
000, he tendered
dollars, and he obtained them by selling sixty-three bales of cotton for Confederate dollars. Stewart v. Salamon, 94 U. S. 434.
Decree

affirmed.
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TAYLOR, J. The facts hi this ease are
substantially as follows:
On the 14th of
May, 1887, the plaintiff agreed to convey to
the said defendant a certain lot of land situate In Ashland county, described as follows:
"Commencing
at the north-west corner of lot
No. one, (1.) in block No. six, (6,) of the village of Hurley, according to the recorded
plat thereof; thence
east twenty-five (25)
feet; thence south ninety (90) feet; thence
west twenty-five (25) feet; and thence north
nmety (90) feet to tne place of begmning,"
—for the consideration of $2,500 agreed to be
paid by the defendant
That on the same
day the plaintiff executed a deed of conveyance to the said defenaant which both parties supposed contained a correct description
of the property sold to the defendant; but
ui fact, the description was imperfect and
does not describe the land sold and intended
to be conveyed.
The description in the deed
is as follows:
'"The following described real
estate situated in the county of Ashland, and
state of Wisconsin, —^to-wit:
commencing at
the north-west comer of lot number one, (1,)
in block number six, (6,) in the village of
Hurley, according to the recorded plat thereof; running thence west twenty-five (25)
feet; thence south ninety (90) feet; thence
east twenty-five (25) feet; thence north ninety (90) feet to the original point of beginning." Said deed was recorded in the proper
recorder's office, and on the same day the
defendant
executed
and delivered to the
plaintiff a mortgage upon the property sold
by the plahitiff to the defendant in which
mortgage the property is correctly described,
to secure the payment of $1,000, part of the
purchase money.
The complaint alleges the
non-payment of a part of the money due upon the mortgage,
and asks judgment first
to correct the description In the deed from
the plaintiff to the defendant and for a judgment to foreclose the said mortgage.
The
answer admits all the material allegations
of the complaint, and further admits that
supposing the plaintiffs deed had conveyed
to her the land she pturchased, she went into
the possession of the same, and paid $300
of the sum secured by said mortgage;
that
on the 27th day of June, A. D. 1887, a fire
broke out In the frame store building situate on said lot and It was wholly destroyed
by fire, the defendant having no Insurance
thereon, thereby destroying the greater part
of the value of said lot to the defendant
It
is admitted that this frame building was on
the lot when the plaintiff agreed to convey
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the same to the aefendant and at the time
the deed was in fact made, and the mortgage back to the plaintiff given to secure
the $1,000, part of the purchase price.
The
defendant also alleges in her answer that,
at the time she purchased the lot of the
plaintiff, the building on said lot was Insured by the plaintiff for the sum of $800,
in a reliable insurance company; and that
he agreed to transfer said insurance policy
to the defendant, for the sum of $40, to be
paid by the defendant; and that the plaintiff neglected and refused to transfer said
insurance policy to the defendant to her
damage.
The defendant also alleges a refusal on the part of the plaintiff to make a
good deed of conveyance
of the property
actually purchased by her, and sets up, as
a counter-claim, a demand
for the money
actually paid by her upon such purchase.
The action was tried by the court, and, after
hearing the testimony offered by the respective parties, the court decided in favor
of the plaintiff and gave judgment reforming the deed and for a foreclosure of the
mortgage.
The defendant excepted to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a careful reading of the testimony, we
think it very clear that the findings of fact
are fully sustained by the evidence, and the
conclusions of law, and the judgment thereon in favor of the plaintiff, are clearly right.
The learned coimsel for the defendant contends that the judgment is erroneous, because It clearly appears from the findings
and the evidence that, before the commencement of this action, and before a perfect
deed had been given by the plaintiff to the
defendant for the real estate in dispute, the
building situate thereon had been burned;
and so the plaintiff could not make a perfect
title to the premises sold to the defendant,
the house burned being a very material part
of the lot sold. He argues that when a party
agrees to convey real estate to another for a
fixed price, and when a considerable portion
of such price is paid for the buildings situate
thereon, and such buildings are destroyed by
fire, without the fault of the purchaser,
before the title is conveyed to him, he may
refuse to take a conveyance,
and recover
the purchase money already paid, and to this
proposition he cites Thompson v. Gould, 20
Pick. 134, and Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass.
514.
We think this case is clearly distinguishable from the cases cited.
In those
cases the buildings on the premises were destroyed before the time for making the deed
had arrived, and it does not appear in thp
case last cited that the purchaser had taken
possession under his contract. In the case
at bar, the contract was a sale to be paid
for on delivery of a deed, and the deed was
A deed was deto be delivered immediately.
livered which was supposed to convey the
land to the defendant and she took actual
as owner thereof, gave back a
possession,
mortgage
to secure part of the purchase
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money, the other part having been paid In
cash.
We think It very clear that, when
this Imperfect deed was given, the purchase
price paid, and possession taken of the property intended to be conveyed by the defendant, the whole equitable title, at least to the
land, vested In the defendant; and while
such equitable title was vested In the defendant, the house was destroyed by fire.
Upon Its destruction the defendant did not
seek to avoid her contract, but rebuilt on the
lot, and continued In the actual possession of
the same up to the time of the commenceUnder such a state of
ment of this action.
facts, we think the defendant must be considered the owner of the premises
at the
time of the fire, and the loss must fall on
her. Whether we would feel bound to follow
the decisions of the court of Massachusetts,
had the defendant been In possession of the
lot under a contract for a deed to be executed at some future time, and before that time
had arrived the house had been destroyed
by fire, without the fault of either party,
need not be determined in this case. For all
practical purposes, the defendant was the
owner of the bouse and lot when the fire
occurred, and the Massachusetts cases place
their decision upon the ground that the actual owner must stand the loss. In addition
to this, when the court by Its judgment corrected the deed, the legal estate became vested In the defendant from the time of the
execution and delivery of the deed.
The learned counsel for the appellant urges
another point as error, viz.: That the court
did not make any findings upon his counterclaim for damages for a breach of contract
on the part of plaintiff to transfer to her the
policy of Insurance he held upon the building
at the time the same was burned.
We have
looked into the testimony which bears upon
that question, and think It is entirely insufficient to sustain a finding thereon In favor of
the defendant
But the counsel for the de{•

./■

fendant Insists that, If it be admitted that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the plaintiff, stUl, it was error
for the court not to make a finding on the
question.
The exceptions of the defendant
are not sufficient to raise that question In
this court The record does not show that
he called the attention oi the court to the
matter, or that he asked the court to make a
finding on that point.
All he did was to
except to the findings because there was no
finding on that question.
These exceptions
are not made In court, and probably never
came to the knowledge of the court until he
was asked to sign the bill of exceptions in
the case.
The rule was established in this
court in Wllldnson v. Wilkinson, 59 Wis.
557, 560, 18 N. W. 527; Barry v. Schmidt,
57 Wis. 172, 15 N. W. 24; Wrlgglesworth v.
Wrlgglesworth, 45 Wis. 255-257; Mead v.
Supervisors, 41 Wis. 205; Williams v. Lumber Co., 72 Wis. 487, 40 N. W. 154,— that,
if a party to an action desires any particular
finding of fact he must call the attention
of the court to the matter of fact upon which
he desires a separate finding; otherwise, he
cannot avail himself of the neglect of the
This rule is
court to make such finding.
only applicable to a case where the testisustains the findings made by the
mony
court, and there Is not sufficient evidence in
the case to require, as a matter of law, a
finding different from those found by the
court upon some other material matter. In
this case, the court having omitted to find
for either party on the counter-claim made
by the defendant in her answer, and the evidence being of such a character as would
have clearly Justified the court in finding
against such counter-claim, we must infer,
from his omission to make a special finding
on that point, that he found against the defendant's claim.
We think the case was
fairly tried, and that the judgment is right
The judgment of the circuit la affirmed.
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This was an action brought for

the purpose of compelling the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land.
According to the allegations of the petition,
the defendants,
who were the owners of a
city lot upon which was situated a building,
entered into a written agreement to sell the
same to the plaintiff for the sum of $16,000, of
which $5 was paid when the writing was
signed, and the balance was to be paid when
l^e vendee should satisfy himself that the
The
(.vendors' title to the property was good.
plaintiEE had agreed to take the property, but,
though it is not affirmatively stated in the
petition, it is clearly inferable therefrom that
The writhe never entered into possession.
ten agreement to sell the property was sign28, 1899.
A conveyance of
ed on January
the property was delayed while the plaintiff
was investigating the title, and after this investigation a further delay was occasioned
by the fact that the defendants could not
have canceled a security deed which they
had given to the property, for the reason that
the holder thereof refused to cancel the same
until his bond for titles was surrendered, and
that paper had been lost by the defendants.
Pending this delay, on June 8, 1899, the building on the bargained premises was destroyed
by fire through no fault of the defendants.
There were at the date of the fire in full
force policies of fire insurance for amounts
The plainaggregating the sum of $10,000.
tiff avers his desire to comply with the contract of sale, so far as it is possible, in the
changed condition of affairs, to carry the
*same into effect He alleges that he is will■ ing to take the land, and that the amount'
to be paid by him should be ascertained by

I

Vhe application of equitable principles. There
was no agreement between the parties with
reference to the ownership of the policies of
insurance prior to the actual conveyance of
the property, though It was agreed that when
In accordance
the property was conveyed
with the terms of the contract the policies of
Insurance should be assigned to the plaintiff.
The prayers of the petition were that
the defendants be decreed to make to plaintiff a conveyance of the land under the terms
set forth in the contract of sale, the court
to make an abatement in the purchase price
to the extent of the value of the Improvements destroyed by fire, and for general reprayers were added
By amendment,
lief.
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that, in the event the court should be of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to an
abatement of the purchase money by reason
of the destruction of the improvements, a
decree should be entered that upon payment
of the purchase money the defendants should i
be required to make to plaintiff a deed to the |
land, and turn over to him the insurance
money collected.
There was a demurrer to
the petition on the ground that the facts set
forth did not entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed, and that on account of the chan- 1
ged condition in affairs a specific perform- \
ance of the contract was impracticable. The I
court sustained the demurrer and dismissed
the petition, and to this ruling the plaintiff |
excepted.

1. "When a binding agreement
is entered
into to sell land, equity regards the vendor
as a trustee of the legal title for the benefit of the vendee, while the latter Is looker!
upon as a trustee of the purchase money for
Bisp. Eq. (5th
the benefit ef the former."
Ed.) § 361. This rule, however, is not applicable unless there is an ability as well as a
willingness on the part of the vendor to
convey;
the purchaser not being considered
as the owner from the date of the contract
unless the vendor is prepared to convey a
1 Warv.
clear title and is not in default.
In the case of Mackey v.
Vend. p. 195.
Bowles, 98 Ga. 730, 25 S. B. 834, it was
held that if, after the parties had entered
into a binding executory contract to sell, the
property was damaged before the vendor
was in a condition to convey, the loss fell
upon the vendor, and not on the purchaser.
The loss in that case arose out of the destruction by fire of a building situated upon
the land which was the subject-matter
of the
sale. See, also, in this connection, Kinney v.
Hickox, 24 Neb. 167. 38 N. W. 816; Thompson
Applying the princiV. Gould, 20 Pick. 134.
ples above alluded to to the present case, as
the vendee had not gone into possession before the fire, and the vendors were not,
prior to that occurrence, in a position where
they could make to the vendee an unincum
bered title to the property,
thejwere the
owners of the property at thetote'Jng^^s. Vxi
tEe""rcss *TeBTiltmg tKeref rom
occurredr
muSt fail ,upon them.- if the cof3facr'''Iias
been so far completed that the vendee is to
be treated as the owner of the premises, then
the loss falls upon him, as was the case in
Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, where it was
held that when there was a contract for the
sale of houses, which, on account of defects
In the title, could not be completed,— the
treaty, however, proceeding upon a proposal
to waive the objection upon certain terms,—
and the houses were burned before the conveyance, the purchaser was bound if he accepted the title; and the fact that the vendor allowed Insurance on the houses to expire on the day on which the contract was
originally to have been completed, without

anf

notice to the vendee, makes no difference.
2. The next question to be determined is.
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was entitled to collect the insurance?
As has been seen, the loss occasioned by the
fire fell upon the vendors, and it would seem
that the Indemnity against loss should belong
This is, we believe, the rule in
to them.
If the contract of sale had been
such cases.
that the vendors would
so far completed
have held the legal title as trustees for the
vendee, then they would likewise have held
title to the policies In the same capacity.
rBiit, as they were the owners of the property to the extent that the loss occasioned
1
upon them, they will also be
I by the fire fell
I treated as owners of the property so far as
/ the right to the insurance on the building
In Poole v. Adams, 33 L. J.
/ Is concerned.
l^(N. S.) G39, it was held that a purchaser of
property insured, which was destroyed by fire,
does not by the mere fact of purchase acquire a right to the insurance money. It has
been held in some cases that, where a contract of sale Is so far completed that the vendor is to be treated as the trustee of the
vendee, <'ie vendor would also hold In trust
for the vendee a policy of insurance which
was on the property at the time the contract
was made, and that, if a loss by fire occurred between the date of the contract and
the time fixed for the delivery of the deed,
the vendor would be compelled to account
to the vendee for the insurance money collected on the policy, as he was in equity the
owner of the property at the time of the
Reed v.
fire, and the loss fell upon him.
also, InsurSee,
Luliens, 44 Pa. St 200.
ance Co. V. UpdegrafC, 21 Pa. St 513; Williams V. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765, 37 L.
R. A. 150; Grange Mill Co. v. Western Assur.
The rule is thus
Co. (111. Sup.) 9 N. E. 274.
stated by the supreme court of Ohio in Gilbert V. Port, 28 Ohio St 276 (Syl., point 8):
"As between vendor and vendee under a
valid and subsisting contract of sale of real
estate, covered by a policy of insurance,
where a loss insured against occurs after the
date of the contract and before conveyance,
the true test for determining for whom the
money recovered on the policy belongs, In the
absence of stipulations governing, is to determine who was the owner, and which party
actually sustained the loss." As in the present case the loss fell upon the vendors, they
were entitled to collect and hold the money
due by the insurance companies on the policies Issued on the property.
3. When there has been a binding agreement to sell improved real estate, and before
the property is conveyed the improvements
upon the property are destroyed by fire
without the fault of the vendor, will a court
of equity compel, at the instance of the vendee, a specific performance of the contract?
Section 4041 of the Civil Code declares:
"The vendor seeking specific performance
must show an ability to comply substantially with his contract in every part, and as to
all the property; but a want of title, or other inability as to part, will not be a good
answer to the vendee seeking performance,
■who

A\

^^

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

OF CONTRACTS.

who is willing to accept title to the part,
receiving compensation for the other.
If
the defects in the vendor's title be trifling
or comparatively small, equity will decree
at his instance granting compensation for
such defects." The section quoted is but a
modification of the general rules recognized
by courts of equity in reference to application for the specific performance of con"It Is settled that immaterial detracts.
ficiencies will not deprive the vendor of his
right to have the contract performed as
against the vendee, provided that the deficiencies are such as may be compensated In
money.
Under such circumstances, the vendee may be compelled to take the property,
and a suitable deduction will be made in the
But, if the deficiencies are material
price.
and Important, the vendee will not be compelled to take the property. He is entitled
to have what he bargained for, and it would
obviously be extremely unjust to force anything upon him which he bad not designed
or contracted to buy. If there is a failure in
that which is an inducement to the purchase, he will not be compelled
to take."
Bisp. Eq. (5th Ed.) § 389. In Gould v. Murch,
70 Me. 288, it was held:
When the owner
of land with a building thereon agrees to
convey it at a future day on payment of the
purchase money, and before payment and
conveyance the building is destroyed by fire
without the fault of either party, the loss
must fall upon the vendor; and, if the building formed a material part of the value of
the premises, the vendee cannot be comnelled to take a deed to the land alone, and pay
See, also, Smith v.
the purchase money.
Cansler, 83 Ky. 367; Wells v. Cahian, 107
Mass. 514; Powell v. Railroad Co., 12 Or.
488, 8 Pac. 544; Kinney v. Hickox, 24 Neb.
167, 38 N. W. 816; Huguenin v. Courtenay,
21 S. C. 403.
It may be stated as a general"!
rule that, where property which Is the sub- 1
Ject of a contract of sale has been substantially damaged or materially changed be
tween the date of the contract of sale and
the time when the vendor offers to convey,
the courts will not decree a specific performance of the contract at the Instance of th<
vendor.
The reason for this Is apparent.
The vendor has no right to force upon the
vendee something which he has not agreed
to buy. The rule is different, however, when
the application for specific performance
comes from the vendee.
There Is a manifest
reason for this difference.
The vendee has
a right, if he sees proper to do so,, to accept
less than he bargained for, and compensation for the loss of that which he does not
obtain. If, for any reason, the vendor cannot convey to the vendee substantially what
the contract calls for, of course a specific
performance of the contract according to Its
terms Is Impossible.
Such obstacles to a
specific performance may arise from a defect in the title to some portion of the premises bargained for, or from the fact that
the Interest of the vendor Is different from
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that described In the contract, or the propvendee.
It is true that in nearly If not
erty may be subject to Hens or Incumbranquite all of the cases the Inability on the
ces, or, if the subject of the contract Is land,
part of the vendor to convey what the conit may be deficient in quantity or quality
tract called for arose from some fact which
"In such a case there are only
. or value.
was in existence at the time the contract of
/ three possible alternatives for a court of sale was made, such as defects in the title
'
equity to pursue:
Either to refuse its remto a part of the premises, deficiency in quanedy entirely; or to enforce the contract withtity or quality or value of the property
which was the subject-matter of the con^out any regard to the partial failure, compelling the purchaser to take what there is
tract, and the like. There does not seem,
to give, and to pay the full price, as agreed;
however, to be any good reason why the
or to decree a conveyance of the vendor's
principle should not be applicable where the
actual interest, and allow to the vendee a
inability of the vendor to convey a part of
pecuniary compensation or abatement from
that which his contract stipulated for arose
the price proportioned to the amount and
subsequent to the making of the contract,
value of the defect in title or deficiency in
out of some transaction in which the vendee
the subject-matter."
Pom. Cont. § 434.
In
was not involved; and the fact that the
the same connection the author just quoted
vendor was himself without fault would not
«ays: That the first alternative might often
seem to be an obstacle which would prevent
contravene the wishes and interests of both
the application of the rule. Requiring a
parties, and cannot, therefore, be tal^en as
vendor to pay damaees to his vendee for a
That the second one
Che universa. rule.
failure to convey property which subsequent
would be extremely unjust and inequitable,
to the execution oi the contract of sale was
though it Is occasionally resorted to when
destroyed by fire is no greater hardship than
the vendee is not in a situation which entirequiring a vendor to pay damages on actles him to favorable consideration.
That
count of his having ignorantly, though honthe third is based upon equitable principles.
estly, and after the exercise of all possible
It endeavors to preserve the rights of both
diligence, bargained away something which
parties, and. is therefore constantly resorted
he did not own, but which he believed was
to and applied by courts of equity in aid of
his own. That he would be required to pay
although under
a vendee, and sometimes,
damages in the latter case, no one will
more and greater restrictions, in aid of the
doubt. That he should be in the former
vendor.
But that there are circumstances
case, ought not, it would seem, to be questioned, upon principle.
under which even a vendee Is not allowed
In Lombard v. Chito avail himself of the doctrine. In section
cago Sinai Congregation, 64 111. 477, which
"If the purchas- was a case of an executory contract for the
435 the same autnor says:
er is willing and desirous to tal^e the partial
sale of real estate, where the vendor was
interest which the vendor can convey, and
to furnish an abstract of title, and, if not
especially if ne is the party calling upon the
satisfactory, he was to have tlie option of
perfecting the title, or annulling the contract
court for relief, there can be but little difficulty in granting him the remedy of perand returning the money paid, and the abformance,
with a reasonable compensation
stract failed to show title, and the vendor
for the defects." Mr. Bispham, in his work
failed to exercise his option, after notice to
on the Principles of Equity, thus states the
do so, until after buildings thereon were derule:
"It may sometimes happen that de- stroyed by fire, the vendor still remaining in
fects exist which render the property less
possession. It was held, on a bill by the venvaluable than the contract price, but which
dee for the specific performance of the connevertheless may not be of so vital a charactract as to the land, and compensation for
ter as to induce the purchaser entirely to
the buildings and property destroyed, that
the contract was not so complete as to make
-rthrow up his bargain. In such a case the
^equity of specific performance with compenthe land the property of the vendee, so as to
sation comes mto play for the benefit of the
throw upon him the loss of the buildings,
vendee.
He is entitled to have the agreement
and that upon specific performance being
carried out, and* yet at the same time to
ordered the vendee was entitled to compenhave an abatement or allowance made by
sation for the loss, to be deducted from the
purchase money, and that the vendor was
jreason of the defects." Bisp. Eq. (5th Ed.)
entitled to Interest on the unpaid purchase
See, also, Pry, Spec. Perf. (3d Ed.)
T'SQO.
II 1222, 1223; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. (13th Ed.) § money only from the time a good title to
779;
2 Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) § 589, p. 1311;
the property was shown, the vendor being
2 Beach, Mod. Eq. Jur. §§ 624, 627; 22 Am.
entitled to the rents and profits up to such
time.
The case just referred to is the only
& Eng. Enc. Law (1st Ed.) pp. 942, 943; Barone which has been called to our attention
bers V. Gadsden, 6 Rich. Eq. 284, 62 Am.
which is at all similar to the present case.
Dec. 390.
The text-books and cases cited
Upon principle, however, we have no hesishow that the doctrine of specific performtancy In holding that the vendee in a cas.e
ance, with compensation for defects when
like the present is entitiecl .to-bav e "a c^nthe vendor cannot convey exactly what his
contract calls for, is thoroughly established, •"Veyance ma3e tlTHm pf^he land^ggg^ cqmand it is in rare cases where the court will
■J¥ilsation for tH'e'loss of ttie building^ pro"vided the loss thus" sustained Ti^apabie of
refuse such relief at the instance of the
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)—43
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computation. K the plaintiff sustains his
allegations, a decree should be entered that
the defendants convey to him the land
which was the subject-matter of the contract, and that the purchase price be abated
In such an amount as is Just and reasonable
in view of the changed condition of the
property.
4. If the difference In value between the
Interest contracted for and the Interest that
can be conveyed is Incapable of computation,
of course the court will not undertake to enter a decree for specific performance,
with
compensation for defects.
But, as has been
said, In the light of many adjudicated cases,
"It is conceived that the court will seldom
now consider a difficulty of this kind insuperable." Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d Ed.) § 1240. We
do not think the present case falls vnthin
the rule above referred to, as it seems to us
that the amount which should be allowed to
the plaintiff as compensation
for the loss
sustained by him in not obtaining a conveyance of the land with the building on it can
be made the subject of exact computation.
I
I Let It be kept In mind that the plaintiff Is
I entitled to be placed, so far as property and
jmoney will place him, in exactly the same,
/position that he was In on the day that the
contract of sale was entered into. If on that
day the property was worth more than he
agreed to pay for it, be Is entitled to the
profit on his bargain. If, on the other hand,
the property was worth less than he agreed
to pay for It, he must suffer the loss.
Let
it be ascertained what was the market value
of the property with the building on It on the
day 'that the contract was entered Into. Let
it also be ascertained what was the market

.•vu'-^'^-^A
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value of the lot without regard to the buildIng on that day. If the market value of the
Improved
lot was more than the contract
price, the difference between these two sums
would be the profit that the plaintiff would
have realized on his bargain.
Deduct the
amount of profit from the market value of
the lot alone, and the sum remaining will be
the amount which the plaintiff should be
required to pay. If the market value of the
property and the contract price are the same,
then the plaintiff should be required to pay
a sum which would equal the market value
of the lot without the building. If the market value of the whole property was less
than the contract price, then the plaintiff
should be required to pay the market value
of the lot without the building, and in addition to this the difference between the market value of the lot and building and the
price, provided that In no event
contract
should the plaintiff be required to pay more
than $16,000. While we find no rule for computing the amount of compensation In such
cases, we think the above rules are in accordance with equitable principles, and are deducible from the general rules which seem
to have been recognized by the courts and
See, in this connection. Smith
text writers.
79 Ga. 410, 7 S. B. 258; 2
V. Kirkpatrick,
Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) pp. 1311, 1312; 2 Beach,
Mod. Eq. Jur. § 629; Wilcoxon v. Calloway,
67 N. O. 463; Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d Ed.) |
1239.
The prayers of the petition were broad
enough to authorize relief along the line»
above Indicated. The court erred In sustaining the demurrer, and the case should be tried
In the light of what Is here laid down. J'udgAll the Justices concurring.
ment reversed.
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LBONABD

v.

CRANE

et

al

'

(35 N. m 474, 147 111. 52.)
Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct.

27,

1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; B. D. Youngblood, Judge.
Bill by Elizabeth A. Leonard against J. MeKendree Crane and others. A cross bill was
filed by Isaac Crane. A decree was ontered
dismissing the biU and granting the prayer
Complainant appeals.
of the cross biU.
Affirmed.

The other facts fully appear In the following statement by PHILLIPS, J.:
A biU was filed by appellant for specific
and substantially alleges that
performance,
complainant, in consideration of certain personal property and a certain amount to be
paid in cash, purchased a house and lot occupied by J. McKendree
Crane and wife.
It is alleged by the complainant that the contract was consummated by a deed having
been signed by the parties, whiph was delivered to the husband of complainant. Mho
was present with a notary public, by whom
the acknowledgment was to be taken; and it
is further claimed that the deed was acknowledged.
It is further averred by the
complainant
that the wife of J. McKendree
Crane, on the morning after the trade was
consummated, got possession of the deed for
the purpose of ezammtng it, and refused to
surrender
the same, and subsequently destroyed It. A supplemental bUl was filed, in
which it Is alleged that J. McKendree Crane
and wife made a conveyance of same lot to
Isaac Crane, who at the time held a mortgage on the premises.
It is further averred
that after the conveyance
to Isaac Crane
the premises were occupied by his tenant,
and appellant commenced
a proceeding in
forcible detainer, and recovered a judgment
against the tenant, which was not appealed
from; and that said Isaac Crane had notice
of the claim of appellant at the time he received a deed conveying the premises to him.
The answer denies the execution and delivery of a deed conveying the premises to
complainant, as alleged in her biU, and avers
the premises were occupied as a homestetid;
and that the signing of the deed by the wife
of J. McKendree Crane was procured by
threatening to institute a lawsuit against
her; and that at the time of the signing of
the said deed by said McKendree Crane he
was so intoxicated as to be wholly incapable
and incompetent to do business, and the
complainant had notice thereof. A crc«s bill
was filed by Isaac Crane, which averred the
conveyance of the premises to him by J. McKendree Crane and vrife, and that he entered
into possession of the same by placing on
said premises his tenant, against whom proceedings were instituted in forcible detainer;
and that said tenant conspired and colluded
with the appellant to deprive the said Isaac
Crane of possession, and neglected to sign
an appeal bond; and prays in said cross bill
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for an accounting for rents, and that the
possession of the premises may be restored
to him. A decree was entered dismissing the
original and supplemental bills and granting
the relief prayed in the cross biU of Isaac
Crane, and appellant excepted, and brings
the record to this court by appeal.

Albert Watson and John W. Burton, for
appellant. J. M. Durham and C. H. Patton,

for

appellees.

PHILLIPS, J., (after stating' the facts.)
The evidence of this record clearly shows
the premises were occupied by J. McKendree
Crane and wife as a homestead, and were in
value less than $1,000. The testimony shows
that a deed signed by J. McKendree Crane
and wife contained a clause relinquishing the
homestead right, but there is no evidence to
show that the acknowledgment as claimed
to have been made by the notary public contained any clause with that relinquishment
By the conveyance act it Is requisite that in
the deed there shaU be contained a clause
waiving the right of homestead, and a similar clause must be contained in the acknowledgment of both the husband and wife; and
the estate of homestead thus created can be
relinquished only in the mode pointed out by
the statute, or by abandonment. This rule
is sustained by the uniform decision of tnis
court Richards v. Greene, 73 lU. 54; Eldridge V. Pierce, 90 lU. 474; Trustees, etc., v.
Hovey, 94 lU. 394; Browning v. Harris, 99
lU. 459.
Where a bUl is filed to restore a
deed, by which deed a conveyance
of the
the
homestead is sought to be consummated,
proof must be such that it must show a deed
that would be sufla.cient to convey the homestead; not only by evidence of the relinquishment of the homestead in the body of
the deed, but the acknowledgment must contain a relinquishment of the hoinestead, acknowledged by the husband and wife. The
evidence also shows that the husband of the
complainant, with a notary, accompanied J.
McKendree Crane to his house, and that others subsequently came to the house, and for
more than one hotur efforts were made to induce the wife to sign the deed, which had
been prepared before the visit of the husband with the notary to the house; and the
proof clearly shows that at the time J. McKendree Crane was mudi intoxicated, and
that both he and the complainant's husband
Bought to induce Mrs. Crane to sign the deed
by persuasion; and that further, complainant's husband said that he had pmrchased the
property, and that It would save her trouble
If she would sign it, and that threats of abandonment were made by her husband, and
other threats were made by him tmless she
signed the deed, and during this period of
time of more than an hour in which these
efforts were made to induce the wife to sign
this deed she was seeking to have the execution of the deed put off until next morning, daimlng that her husband was too much
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Intoxicated to do business,

and claiming that

It was the only home she had, and, in tears,
begging for time to be allowed to consult

with her father-in-law, but, overcome by the
persistence with which the demand on her
to execute the deed was made, she signed the
deed, and just before signing her husband
gave her $20, which was to be her own, and
that sum she tendered the husband of the
complainant when on the next morning he
offered to pay the balance of the purchase
money, he having previously paid Crane $20.
There is no evidence in the record showing
any acknowledgment of the deed by ber other
than the simple signing of the same, nor is
there evidence showing any inquiry made of
her by the notary.
On this state of facts a court of equity may
It was
well refuse specific performance.
held in Fitzpatrick v. Beatty, 1 Oilman, 454:
"Nor will a court of equity decree a spedflc
performance where the contract is founded
In fraud. Imposition, or mistake, or where it
would be unconscientious to enforce it" In
Frisby v. Ballance, 4 Scam. 287, It was held:
"An application for the specific performance
of a contract is addressed to the sound legal
discretion of the court, and it is not a matter
of course that It will be decreed, because
Indeed,
a legal contract is shown to exist
the oii^n and ground of' tliis jurisdiction is
that a compensation, for damages is inadequate to the fuU measure of the parties' equitable rights. It is not necessary to authorize this court to refuse a specific performance that the agreement should be so
tainted with fraud as to authorize a decree
aiat it should be given up and canceled on
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account • • • A specific performance will not be decreed unless the agreement
has been entered into with perfect fairness,
misrepresentaand without misapprehension,
tion, or oppression." To the same effect are
Race V. Weston, 86 lU. 91; Proudfoot v.
Wightman, 78 lU. 553. There is some conflict in the evidence as to whether the deed
was taken from the table, after it was
signed, by the notary public or by the husband and agent of the complainant, but from
the view we take of this record that questhat

tion is immaterial.
The evidence in this record shows the personal property which was sought to be transferred as a part consideraitioQ was valued at
$300 between Leonard and Crane, and ttie
weight of proof shows that the value of
the pro.perty was not to exceed $150; and
this fact in conibeetioin with the condition
in which J. McKendree Crane was, and
the drcumstanoes under which the signature
of the wife was obtained, are such tliat it
would be unconscionable for a court of equity to order a conveyance to be made. In
the absKice of proof that the acknowledgment contained a clause relinquishing the
rights of homestead, a court of equity cannot decree the title as vested in the complainant by reason of execution of the deed
Thus, it was not ershown by the evidence.
ror to dismiss the original and supplemental
bnis of complainant; and, the complainant
having wrongfully obtained poesession of the
premises as against Isaac Crane, and he being entitled to liie same, it was not error to
grant the relief prayed for in the cross bill.
The decree is affirmed.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
GRAYBIIiL

et al. v.

BRAUGH.

(17 S. E. 558, 88 Va. 895.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
20, 1893.

April

Appeal from circuit court. Botetourt county.

Bill by E. J. Braugh against Mary W. T.
Graybill and others for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land.
From a decree in complainant's favor, defendants appeal. Reversed.
E. & E. N. Pendleton,
Benj. Haden, for appellee.

for appellants.

FAUNTLEROY, J. This is an appeal
from decrees of the circuit coiut of Botetourt county, rendered on the 20th day of
May, 1890, and the 27th day of January,
1891, in a chancery suit in said court depending, in which E. J. Braugh is complainant and Mary W. T. Graybill and Lewis
H. Graybill, her husband, and A. Nash Johnston, are defendants.
It appears from the
record in this case that on the 12th day of
March, 1888, Lewis H. Graybill bought of
J. H. H. Figgatt, special commissioner of
the circuit court of Botetoiut county, in the
cause therein pending of J. P. Thrasher vs.
Brierly and others, a tract of land in Botetourt county, Va., containing about 50 acres;
that on the 3d day of February, 1890, before the purchase money had been paid, and
before any deed had been made to Graybill
for the land, the said Graybill gave to E.
J.-^r a:UBh an uy tlDn-tn—tmti ng- and uniler'
seal^er-the purehase of this land l)y Braugh
—torthe nominal considerafloh of one dollar,
BttC^iirfacV nothing, it is admitted, was
STer'paid to GraybiUby Braugh, not even
—the-one "dollar for the said option. On the
20th of March, 1890, J. H. H. Figgatt, the
commissioner aforesaid, upon the payment of
the purchase money for the land by the
judicial purchaser, Lewis H. Graybill, conveyed the land to Mary W. T. Graybill, the
wife of Lewis H. Graybill, by the direction
of said Graybill, as he was ordered by the
decree of sale to do.
On the 22d of March,
1890, Lewis H. Graybill and wife conveyed
this land to A. Nash Johnston for $2,000.
At the time of this purchase Johnston was
informed that Lewis H. Graybill had given
an option to E. J. Braugh on this land for
the period of 10 months from February 3,
1890,
but that nothing had been paid by
Braugh on said option, and that it bound
Braugh to pay or do nothing whatever, and
It was therefore not binding on Lewis H.
GraybUl. At the April rules, 1890, of the
circuit court of Botetourt county B. J.
Braugh filed his bill in this suit, asserting
the said option as a binding contract, which
he prayed to have specifically performed, and
that the deed from J. H. H. Figgatt, commissioner, to Mary W. T. Graybill, and the
deed from Lewis H. Graybill and Mary W.
T. GraybiU, his wife, to A. Nash Johnston,
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be set aside, vacated, and annulled, and
charging Mrs. Graybill, Lewis H. GraybilJ,
A. Nash Johnston, and J. H. H. Figgatt, commissioner, with notice of his option, and
with fraud In the execution of the deeds
aforesaid.
The said parties filed their demurrers and
answers, and denied the allegations and eqtuties of the bill, and the circuit court of
Botetourt county, by the decrees complained
of, decided that both Mrs. Graybill and A.
Nash Johnston had notice of the said option
at the time qt receiving their respective
deeds, and that said option is an enforceable
contract, and binding on all the parties. Including A. Nash Johnston, and directing A.
Nash Johnston to convey the land to E. J.
Braugh, without retaining a lien on the land,
upon the payment by E. J. Braugh of the
cash payment and first deferred payment,
and , executing bonds for the second and
third deferred payments of the purchase
money, "with security approved by the clerk
of this court," etc., "thereby substituting for
the vendor's lien to secure the deferred payments of the purchase money mere personal
security, and that, too, not such as might
be satisfactory to the parties interested, nor
such as should be approved by the court, but
with security approved by the clerk," etc.
Johnston did not buy the land from Lewis
H. Graybill, Juji from Mrs . Mars M. Tari|vhiii Lewis _g. Graybi ll never had anj
title to the land, and the interest of Braugh,
if any, by virtue of a mere naked option
to buy, which did not bind him to buy In
any event whatever, was not such an interest in the sub.i ect or wnicn a purchaser
or which equity
"^ff^vahiejslboundjpjaotice,
w m regard!""^ Pom. Eq. Jur. § 692.
mKf-V
"Sal or option contracts are not favored in "^
equity, and the want of mutuality of obllga- j
tion and risk may generally be urged as bar
2 Warv. Vend,
to their specific enforcement.
" Equity requires an actual consider - ■
p. 769.
ation, and permits the want of It to be
"shown, notwTtEsfanding the seal; and applies
the_doctra5e To covenants, settlement's, and'
executory agreementsj)f"every description.^
In respect to volun1 Pom. ~Eq. Jur. § 383.
tary contracts, or such as are not founded
on a valuable consideration, courts of eqidty
do not interfere to enforce them as against
the party himself, or as against volunteers
claiming under him. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §
In Duval v. Bibb, 4 Hen. & M. 116,
706a.
It was held that in equity either party to a
deed may aver and prove against the other
the true and -actual consideration on which
the deed was fotmded, though a different
consideration be expressed therein. .Eguity,
the form and looks to the s^ disregards
~
s tence]7 The' homln&i consiaeration of one
3oIlar in the option, it Is admitted, was never
paid, and the option says: "It Is agreed by
the parties hereto that there shall be no
obligation upon the said E. J. Braugh by
virtue of this agreement, unless within the

/
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period of the said ten months he pays one
third ot the purchase money." He did not
sign the option, and It did not bind him to
do anything.
He attempted to make a large
profit on an inyestment of nothing, and without the obligation to do anything, and he
simply failed. The complainant's bUl should
have been dismissed In the circuit court_fflt.
.■/ ■
^wan |t,^ jnntjalHy- of obligation In the optlon sued upon. It professes to bind one of
the parties absolutely, and stipulates only
for the Indefinite pleasure of the other; and
it cannot, therefore, be specifically enforced.
Ford V. Buker, 86 Va. 79, 9 S. B. 500. It,
appears that neither party conmoreoyer,
templated a sale subject to the wife's (Mrs.
Graybill's) contingent right of dower, and
In this respect this case is ruled by the case
of Dunsmore v. Lyle, 87 Va. 391, 12 S. B.
610, where specific performance was refused,
even though the bill offered to take a deed
from Lyle subject to the wife's dower. In
this case the complainant Braugh seeks to
enforce a conveyance of the land free from
the dower interest of Mrs. Graybill, who
never signed the option, and who, on hearing of it, interposed her remonstrance immediately, and communicat ed -h er refusal to
be bound by It to Braueh.'V^peeific
execn-

an apreem pnt t^ ppl j and convey yill.
n ot ordinarily be decreed against the vendor.
yTn ariiea man, whose wife refuses to yjTv
J
in'the lieed, w henThere Is no proof pffra^iit .

jlon of

in'Tier refusal. imles£jhe^piiiiv
chaser is ""willin ^to pay the fulTl)u
rcha^
purchase
mone y^ aS3^ ac cept the^deedIt- .her
Jafiring.^ 2 Wafv. Vend. p. 769. See Clarke
V. Kelna, 12 Grat 98.
Mrs. Graybill held
the legal title to the land, and she is In no
manner bound by the option of her husband,
to which she was not a party, and against
which she protested, from the first moment
that it came to her knowledge.
Dunsmore
V. Lyle (Va.) 12 S. E. 611; McCann v. Janes,
1 Rob. (Va.) 256; Clarke v. Reins, 12 Grat
98; Booten v. Scheffer, 21 Grat 474; Iron
Co. V. Gardiner, 79 Va. 305; Litterall v.
Jackson, 80 Va. 604; Cheatham v. Cheatham's Bx'r, 81 Va. 395; Railroad Co. v.
Dunlop, 86 Va. 846, 10 S. E. 239. The circuit court erred In overruling the demurrer
of Graybill and wife to the complahiant's
bUI, and we are of opinion that the decrees
appealed from are wholly erroneous, and our
judgment Is to reverse and annul them, and
to enter a decree here dismissing the complainant's bill.
Reversed.
oji^^is part
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et al. v.

HALL

estate as intestate

et al.

(16 N. E. 896, 125 111. 95.)
Supreme

Court of Illinois.

Appeal from

circuit

Killum, Judge.
This Is a bill for the

May 9,

court,

Kane

1888.

county;

Charles

specific performance
of an agreement, entered into between the
heirs of Alexis Hall, to set aside a win made
by him, brought against the widow and minor
heirs of Eugene Hall, one of the parties to the
agreement

Sherwood & Jones, for appellants. A, J.
Hopkins, N. J. Aldrich, P. H. Thatcher, and
Charles

"Wheaton,

for
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appellees.

SBCBLDON, O. J. The defense set up in
this case Is that the contract of January 19,
1883, was not a complete contract, and that,
not being complete. It Is as no contract, and
80 that alleged agreement
cannot be specifically enforced; that the only complete contract
there could have been m the case would have
been that of February 10, 1883, had the papers of that date all been executed and delivered, but as they were not, the attempted
of February 10th was not comcontract
pleted, and hence there is no contract whatever to be specifically performed.
It would
seem from the evidence
that the will of
Alexis Hall, made on December 7, 1881, had
come to the knowledge of his children, and
had created a family dissatisfaction from Its
giving to Eugene the larger jMirt of the estate,
and Its being executed under the circumstances It was; and that threats had been
made by the other children that they would
contest the will.
To reconcile this family difference, the writing of November, 1882, appears to have been made, and signed by all
the children, whereby they agreed that there
should be an equal distribution of their father's estate between his four surviving children when the time for such distribution
should come. It seems that another cause of
difficulty had sprung up between Eugene and
his sister Matilda, and her husband, from a
long-standing note for $2,300 which had been
given by the two latter to Eugene, and was
unpaid, and for which the latter had taken
collateral securities, which had failed to be
collected from the negligence of Eugene, as
was contended.
This additional difficulty was
amicably composed by these brothers and sisters by their all generously sharing equally
among them and the widow the burden of
this Plummer Indebtedness; and soon after
the death of Alexis Hall they came together,
and executed this second agreement, of January 19, 1883. By this agreement all the
four children and the widow agreed to settle
the demands of Eugene on Matilda Plummer
and her husband, by each bearing one-fifth
part of the Plummer indebtedness; and they
renew their former agreement of November
previous to set aside the will of Alexis Hall,
and that there should be a distribution of his

estate.
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This

agreement

is

signed by the widow, who did not sign the
November agreement.
This is an agreement of a most praisekind, — an
arrangement
worthy
amicable
among brothers and sisters of difficulties between them, which would have been carried
out to the entire satisfaction of them all but
for the sudden death of Eugene. It Is an
agreement which a court of equity will look
upon, favorably, and readily interpose its specific performance, unless there be some insuperable bar to prevent.
The written agreement of January 19th Is plain, clear, and full;
It bears upon its face evidence of ample consideration, and is of itself a complete contract That this would be an obligatory contract, although It was understood at the time
that there should thereafter be a more formal
instrument drawn up and executed to express
the parties' agreement, is abundantly established by the authorities. Powle v. Freeman,
9 Ves. 351; Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely,
4 De Gex, J. & S. 638; Pratt v. Railroad Co.,
21 N. Y. 305; Wbarton v. Stoutenburgh, 35
N. J. Eq. 266. All there is that can be urged
against the completeness of this written contract of January 9th is that It omits to state
one alleged term of the contract which was
then made, viz., that Eugene was to have the
home farm at an appraisal to be fixed by appraisers.
This is an independent matter,
separate and distinct from the two subjects
of agreement
named In the writing,— the
Plummer Indebtedness, and the setting aside
of the will. The bill does not ask to have
performed a contract resting partly in a writing and partly in parol. It does not depend
upon, or seek anything whatever respecting,
the alleged parol part of the contract; but it
Is the defendants who are placing reliance
upon this parol part of the contract, setting
It up in defense, and In defeat of the perIf the
formance of the contract in. writing.
defendants would not have the enjoyment of
the parol part of the contract, and so not
have the benefit of what they contracted for,
there would be some equity in such a defense.
The heirs of Eugene allege, against
the performance of this written contract, that
he was to have the home farm, and that this
But If he
is not expressed in the writing.
does not get the home farm, and the other
children convey their interest in It to him or
his heirs, there would seem to be no equity
in such a defense of the mere omission of the
vmtlng to say that Eugene was to have the
home farm at a price to be fixed by appraisAnd just such is the case presented
ers.
Two of the children, Stephen A. and
here.
Matilda Plummer, have executed agreements
for conveying to Eugene their interest in the
The other of the three children,
home farm.
Mrs. Summers, Is ready and willing, and
offers by the bill, to make a like agreement
for conveyance of her interest In the home
farm; so that the defendants do or will, under the offer of the bill, get the entire benefit
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the parol part of the contract. There is no
equity, then. In the defense which is set up,
that this parol part of the contract was not
expressed in the writing of January 9th; and
we think the authorities establish that such a
defense is not sustainable where the defendant gets seciured to him all the benefit of the
parol portion of the contract. In Railway Go.
V. Winter, 1 Craig & P. 57, a bill by the company for the specific performance of a written contract for the purchase of real estate,
where there had been a subsequent parol
agreement that the company should also pay
for timber on the land, and for certain expenses, performance was decreed, subject to
the parol variation; and Lord Chancellor Cottenham said: "This is not a case within the
meaning of those decisions in which the court
has said that it will not specifically perform
the contract with a variation, If the court
finds a written contract has been entered into, and the plaintiff says, "That was agreed
upon,' but then there were certain other terms
added, or certain variations made, the court
holds that in such a case the contract is not
in the vyriting, but in the terms which are
verbally stated to have been the agreement
between the parties, and therefore refuses
specifically to perform such an agreement
On the other hand, it is quite competent for
the defendant to set up a variation from the
written contract; and it will depend upon
the particular circumstances
of each ease
whether that is to defeat the plaintiff's titie
to have a specific performance, or whether

'

the court will perform the contract; taking
care that the subject-matter of this parol
agreement
or understanding is also carried
into effect, so that all parties may have the
See
benefit of what they contracted for."
Robinson v. Page, 3 Russ. 114; Price v.
Dyer, 17 Ves. 357. In 3 Pars. Oont (5th
Ed.) 389, the author says: "It is a principle
of equity jurisprudence that parol evidence is
admissible to rebut, but not to raise, an equity; and this principle or rule gives rise
Although,
here to an Important distinction.
to resist a specific performance, a defendant may show by parol that the written document does not fully represent the contract
between the parties, and thus defeat the bUl,
or compel the plaintiff to accept a performance with a variation, yet a plaintiff cannot
have a decree for a specific performance of
a vmtten
contract with a variation upon
parol evidence."
In Park v. Johnson, 4 Allen, 259, after a review of the English cases
upon the subject,
the court says:
"The
weight of authority seems clearly with the
plaintiff on this point, [of having specific
performance, where ready to take the written
agreement, and fully to perform the omitted
stipulation:] and, while the court would refuse to give them aid in compelling the lit-
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eral execution of a written contract which
does not contain the whole agreement, they
allow the objection to operate no further
than to require the party seeking the aid of
the court to modify the written contract so
as to embrace all the stipulations that are
alleged to have been omitted or subsequently
varied."
When Mr. Aldrich met the parties on February 10th he brought with him five papers, namely: (1) The agreement between the
four children to set aside the will; (2) an
agreement between the widow and children
to settie the Plummer Indebtedness;
(3) a
renunciation of the will by the widow; (4) an
A, Hall and
agreement
between
Stephen
Eugene A. Hall 'for a conveyance by the
former of an undivided one-fourth of the
Alexis Hall farm; (5) a like agreement between Mrs. Plummer and Eugene A. for conveyance of a like tmdivlded one-fourth.
The
first three were on that day executed by all
the parties there present, and delivered to
Mr. Aldrich; Mrs. Summers being the only
party absent.
The first three papers contained, essentially, nothing more than the
agreement
of January 19th, amplified by
legal verbiage; and the signing of them by
Mrs. Summers was of no moment, as she had
signed the 19th January agreement The
other two agreements for conveyances by
Stephen A. and Mrs. Plummer were also
signed by them, respectively, on February
A like agreement for a conveyance
10th.
by Mrs. Summers,
who was absent, was
thereafter to be executed by her, which she
has ever been ready and willing, and offers
by the bill, to execute.
Whatever of hicompleteness
there may be in these papers
of February 10th, or any one of them, has
no bearing, as we conceive, upon the present
bill. It does not call In aid that transaction,
and In no way depends upon it. The bill
is rested wholly upon the agreement of January 19, 1883, and asks the specific performance of that agreement
As the specific performance is only asked subject to the defendants having all the benefit of the alleged
parol part of the agreement which is claimed
to have been made, we are of opinion the
complainants are entitled to have the agreement of January 19, 1883, specifically performed.
It is claimed that the defendant Marion
O. Hall has a dower Interest In the land.
Whether that be so or not is no objection to
a decree of specific performance against the
heirs of BJugene A. Hall. Any decree of
conveyance might be made subject to whatever right of dower, if any, Marion O. Hall
may have in the land.
The decree will be reversed, and the cause
in conremanded for further proceedings

formity with this opinion.
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KELSBT
(27

et al. v.

Pac

CROWTHEIR

et al.

695. 7 Utah, 519.)

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept

12,

1891.

Appeal from district court. Salt Lake county; Elliot Sanford and T. J. Anderson,
Judges.
Suit In equity by Lewis P. Kelsey and J.
K. Gillespie against W. J. Crowther, J. T.
Lynch, and William Glassman, to enforce a
specific performance of a contract to sell land.
Complaint was dismissed, and plaintlfCs appeal. Affirmed.
P. L. Williams, Waldemar
0. W. Powers, for appellants.
for respondents.

Van Cott, and
Arthur Brown,

J. This is a suit In equity
the specific performance of the
following contract: "Salt Lake, Utah, September 13, 1887. Received of Lewis P. Kelsey and J. K. GiUespie the simi of fifty dollars, being part consideration of the purchase
price, to wit, 52,750.00, at which the undersigned agrees and contracts to sell, and by
good and sufficient warranty deed convey,
free of all Hens, to said Kelsey & GiUespie,
the following described lot of ground, to wit:
The east thirty (30) acres of the south half
of the southwest quarter of section three, (3)
township one (1) south, of range one (1) west,
of Salt Lake meridian. Said purchaser to
have after this date thirty (30) days for the
examination of the title of said premises, and,
in case said title is adversely reported on by
the attorneys of the said purchasers, thai the
said part consideration hereby receipted shall
be at once returned to said purchasers; but
hereby contract
if said titie is approved
and agree to and with said Kelsey & Gillespie that I wUI at once, on the payment of
said balance of agreed purchase money, towit, ?2,700.00, duly execute, sign, and acknowledge a full and perfect warranty deed
conveying to said purchasers the entire title
to said premises, and
agree to at once furnish an abstract of titie to said premises
and other needful papers."
The complaint
alleges a tender of the money, although an
abstract was not furnished, a demand for a
deed, and the failure to make same.
The answer is a specific denial of the allegations of
the complaint
A trial was had by the court
findings of fact, and a judgment that the
complaint be dismissed, from which judg^
ment the plaintiffs appeal. The testimony
is all in the record, and we do not deem it
important to review the findings of fact made
by the trial com:t The claim of the appellants is that the evidence does not justify
the judgment
It shows that the contract
was signed and delivered on the 13th day of
BLACKBURN,

to enforce
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September, 1887; that the defendants failed
altogether to furnish an abstract; that at
no time within the 30 days did the plainUfCs
offer to pay the purchase money and demand
a deed, but on the 31st day, October 14, 1887,
defendant Crowther went to the office ofi
plaintiffs, and told Kelsey, one of the plain-l
tiffs, that he did not come round yesterday,
and that his time was up, and Kelsey sald\
that he had forgotten it, and Crowther further told him that he had forfeited his $50;
but he further said—but this Kelsey denies
—he offered him back the $50.
This occurred on the street in front of the office of
plaintiffs, Crowther being in his buggy with
his wife; and Kelsey went immediately into his office, and brought a bag with money
in it, and said, "Here is your money," but
CrovTther
drove off, and refused to wait.
Kelsey says the amount of money required
was in the bag. Kelsey further says that
the offer of the money was on the condition
that Crowther's wife would also sign the
deed.
We think this judgment must be affirmed.

The contract is an option.
The plaintiffs had 30 days In which to tender the monBy the terms of the
ey and demand a deed.
contract they did not have 31 days, and,
having failed in that time to tender the money, they lost their right to enforce the contract Nor do we think the failure of the
defendant to furnish an abstract extended the
time.
It might make him liable for damages, but not enlarge or change the terms
of the contract
2. It does not appear from the evidence in
this case that the plaintiffs have not a full
and complete remedy at law for all the damages they may have suffered by reason of
any and aJl breaches of this contract. If any
were committed by the defendant Crowther;
and as a rule specific performance of contracts is not enforced in equity, where the
parties Injured by breach of contract can be
completely compensated in a suit at law.
3. The plaintiff Kelsey says that he offered the money on the condition that the wife
of the defendant Crowther would sign the
A husband cannot contract away his
deed.
wife's right of dower. A court of equity has
no power on the husband's contract to compel a wife to relinquish her dower rights.
Therefore the offer of the money was upon a
condition that could not be complied with,
and That was not obligatory upon the d^
fendant, and "that a court of equiEy "could
not
' '
enforce," and was no offer at aHT 3 Pom.
Bq. Jiir. § r4(K) et seq.' We'see no reason for
the reversal of this judgment
It is therefore affirmed.
1.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
SCOTT

(45 N. W. 532,
Supreme

et aJ.

76 Wis. 662.)

Court of Wisconsin.

April

29,

1890.

Appeal from circuit court, liincoln counM. Webb, Judge.
Curtis & Curtis, for appellants.
Courts of equity will not decree specific
performance in the case of stale or suspiWalker v. Jeffreys, 1 Hare,
cious claims.
348; Heaphy v. Hill, 2 Sim. & S. 29; Williams V. Williams, 50 Wis. 311, 318, 6 N. W.
Bep. 814; Anthony v. Leftwich, 3 Rand.
(Va.) 238; Pigg v. Corder, 12 Leigh, 69;
Madox V. McQuean, 3 A. K. Marsh. 400;
Ruff's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 319, 11 Atl. Rep.
553; Railroad Co. V. Bartlett, 10 Gray, 384;
Haughwout V. Murphy, 21 N. J. Eq. 118;
Merritt v. Brown, Id. 401; Johns v. Norris,
22 N. J. Bq. 102; AVhite v. Bennett, 7 Rich.
Ea. 260; McDermid v. McGregor, 21 Minn.

ty ; Charles

-consist of certain 40 acre tracts lying in
townships 32 and 33, ranges
and
in
Lincoln county, Wis., appended to the
complaint.
The defendant Walter A.
Scott, as such trustee, answered said comphiint, and alleged that said contract was
incomplete, and that it was intended thereby that the plaintiff and Thomas B. Scott
9,

V.

7,

COMBS
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G82

is

should thereafter select and locate said
lands, and agree to such selection, and
that the plaintiff neglected to cause such
selection to be made for more than tour
years, and until the death of said Scott,
and that now it is impossible to ascertain
what lands were intended by said contract.
He denied that said list of lands, so appended, contained the lands contemplated
by the agreement, excepting, perhaps,
about seven 40-acre tracts in township 32,
in range 6; and alleged, further, that he
ignorant of many of the facts alleged in
the complaint, and that it is now impossible, by reason of the death of his father,
111.
Bump & Hetzel, for respondent.
Thomas B. Scott, to execute said memo.,
randum, and that the plaintiff ought not
Orton,
This is an action for specific
to have specific performance of the same,!
performance,
brought by the plaintiff,
on account of his laches and unreasonable!
Harrison Combs, against Walter A. Scott,
delay in attempting to enforce the same,
trustee of the estate of Thomas B. Scott,
On the trial both parties introduced testideceased, and his heirs as defendants, of
mony to show what lands were intended
"
the following contract, viz. :
May 1, 1882.
as " stump lands, " and what lands come
In consideration of one dollar and other
within the boundaries mentioned in the
valuable considerations, to-wit, settlement
contract, and the testimony relating thereof all suits, actions, differences, and matto was quite contradictory, but tlje cirters of difference, agree to give to Harcuit court found, upon what appears to
rison Combs, of Applington, Iowa, on or
have been, perhaps, a preponderance of
before July 1, 1882, a good and suflBcient
the testimony, and as correctly and accudeed in fee-simple of all my right, title, and
rately as practicable and possible, that cerinterest of, in, and to the stump lands
tain 29 of said 40-acre tracts were the lands
which
now own, lying within one and
within theintent and meaning of said conone-half or two miles of Hay Meadow
tract; and rendered judamient that the decreek, in Uncoln county, Wisconsin, not
fendant Walter A. Scott^s such trustee,
being adjacent to and along Prairie river,
convey the same to the plaintiff. From
all in town thirty>two, in ranges six and
that judgment this appeal is taken.
seven, and town thirty-three, in ranges six
The objection to this judgment that has
and seven ; the Intention being to convey
peculiar force, and makes the strongest
to said Combs all the lands lying on and
appeal to a court of equity, is that specific
along Hay Meadow creek from below, adperformance ought not to Bgve^^ tggn adjacent, and above the dam on said creek, "TOaged m tnis^ caseon accogft totT^hel aclieg
not including cedar lauds on lower end of
a ug unreasonabTJEL dfiTay oftSe plaintiff in"
Hay Meadow, or lands below the mead- -pntigihg his suit. ^The coritraeL is dUleil
ow ; the
intention being to include all 'Ma,i>
aim waa to be performed July
■
etump lands opposite, above, and in the
1882.
Thomas B. Scott died October
vicinity of the dam of Combs, on Hay
1886, and this action was commenced
in
Meadow creek, — elands that the outlet of
April, 1888. These lands, July
1882, when
hauling off timber that would go to Prai- the contract was to have been performed,
rie river not to be included.
[Signed]
according to the testimony of the plaintiff
Thomas B. Scott, [Seal.] In presence of
himselfvJsgr g_of the valu e of only ^10 for
alleged
W. McLeod."
The plaintiff
in
each 402acre3ract, and at the time of the
lis complaint that he demanded a convey^EpiaTEliey were wO iUi frum 20 to
Iha eaince of said lands of Thomas B. Scott in
as much, or from $200 to $500 for each 40life-time, and that he refused so to conacre tract. The timber on these lands has
>y the same; and that he demanded a
become much more valuable by the long
c0nve.yance of the same of the defendant
delay, and a railroad has been built, and
is in operation, through these lands, and
/alter A.Scott, the trustee of said estate,
and that he also refused so to do; and that
thecountry generally has been greatly imhe has no adequate remedy at law for the
proved since July
1882.
The plaintifl
breach of said contract, and that said Jias never taken any are or the lands;,
lands have greatly increased in value since
^a^Jag neglected to i[yariiy'"faxes
the breach thereof; and that he owns a
t^mLaM"TrSS allowea' ffiany oi nemto"
mill in the vicinity of said lands, built for
be solffloftax'fes'; said- Thonffls~BT
the purpose of manufacturing the timber IffTits Itfe-time, paid all the taxes on ScottT
them,
thereon, which will be greatly depreciated
and redeemed them from previous sales for
in value in case said lands are not contaxes; and the defendant, as trustee, has
veyed to him. The plaintiff also alleged
paid all the taxes since the death of Thomthe location and description of said lands,
as B. Scott, at an expenseof many hundred
according to the terms of the contract, to
dollars,— many times as much as the value
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of the parties, and in the situation of the
of the lands when the contract was made.
subject-matter of the contract, the destrucThe enforcement of the contract at maturity would have been of merely nominal
tion of evidence, and the death of one of
the parties to the contract, who if living
expense and damage to Thomas B. Scott,
could make clear what his successor might
but will now impose an enormous claim
not be able to explain, are mentioned in
upon his estate of many thousands of dolAnthony v. Leftwich, 8 Rand. (Va.) 238, as
lars. There was a delay of over four
reasons for denying the relief. InRuff'sAp.^^g^while Thomas B. Scott was living,
ajftr^earlv two
since, before bringpeal, 117 Pa. St. 319, 11 Atl.Rep. 553, a rail^egfrs
J
ing the suit, ana wffihout extenuation or
road had been built, which brought the
It would be difficult to find a case lands within reach of market, and greatly
excuse.
In the books of greater change in the situenhanced theirvalue, and some ofthelands
ation and value of the lands, and the cirhad been sold, and the. plaJaiiff laid by
for years while these changes wefe^Tffig
cumstances material to the relief occasioned by the delay, or in which specific peron. It was held me^ui table 1;o'd6dreespeformance has ever granted under such circifle performance.
That was very much
Although it may not be im- like this case. The lands have been sold
cumstances.
possible to select, locate, and identify the
tor taxes, and yet the plaintiff waited unlands within the intention of the contract,
til they became vastly enhanced in value
by railroad and other improvements.
it has certainly been rendered much more
difficult and uncertain by the death of one
Specifi^performance will not be enforced.if
of the parties whose personal knowledge Tof^any reason if TsinequltaBIe. to do so.
would seem to be requisite, if not necesWilliams V. Williams, supra. The following authorities enforce the principle that
sary, to determine what lands were meant
by "stump lands," and the meaning of the
laches and unreasonable delay in bringing
other unusual conditions of the contract.
suit will defeat an action for specific perPom.
The material testimony of Thomas B.
formance of a contract to convey.
Spec. Perf . §§ 407, 408, and cases cited ; Fry
Scott has been utterly lost by the delay.
He refused to convey the lands, and could Spec. Perf. §§ 1072, 1078, 1079; Bads v.
Williams, 4 I)e Gex, M. & G. 691; Watson
do no more than to await the suit of the
plaintiff for the specific performance or for V. Reid, 1 Russ. & M. 236; Southcomb v.
Bishop of Exeter, 6 Hare, 226 ; Harrington
the breach of the contract. The plaintiff
V. Wheeler, 4 Ves. 686 ; Alley v. Deschamps,
waited until the statute of limitations had
13 Ves. 225 ; McWilliams v. Long, 32 Barb.
nearly run on the contract before bringing
194; Delavan v. Duncan,
485;
49 N. Y.
his suit. "It is a ,8ettled prin ciple that a
Davison v. Associates, 71 N. Y. 333; Hens pecific pertoa nance of a contract nf sale
a matt erof.c p urse,'5uf rests entirelx , derson V. Hicks, 58 Cal. 364; Taylor v.
lB"not
Isi
Merrill, 55 111. 52; Smith v. Lawrence, 15
'teTEe'discretion of the court, upon a vj£K
—5f
Chancellor Mich. 499; Holt v. Rogers, 8 Pet. 420; Pres5^ "Ehe circumstances.;^'
ton V.Preston, 95 U.S. 200; State v. West,
Seymour v.'belancey, 6 Johns. Ch.
-iONTTin
" A ma ttg|not of absolute
222.
ht
in
68 Mo. 229.
See other cases cited in appelri^
lants' brief. The reasons are abundant '*
the party, bur'Of souna aiscretion m the
"
-TStoryr Eq. Jut . §' 769.
gpeciflc
why equitable relief should be denied In
—TiOttft.""
this case. The disparity in the value of \
peHbrmance' will not be decreed when for
I
'
It is the lands, of from 20 to 50 told over their
any reason it would be inequitable.
value when the contract was made, as of
an application to sound
discretion.'"
I
when it was to ha ve been performed, is amChief Justice Ryan, in Williams v. Williams,
" The unquesple reason to leave the plaintiff to his legal
50 Wig. 311 , 6 N. W. Rep. 814.
remedy for the breach of the contract.
tionable jurisdiction » » • is not comIn analogy to all other like cases, as in
pulsory upon the court, but the subject of
"
Lord Ekskine, in Radcliffe v. the sale of personal property, or for breach
discretion.
of the covenant of seisin in deeds, the plainWarrington, 12 Ves. 331. The learned
tiff would be entitled only to recover the
counsel of the appellant has cited in his
consideration paid and interest, or the difbrief numerous authorities to the same
ference between that and the value of lands
effect, but the principle is elementary, and
In when they ought to have been conveyed,
the above authorities are sufficient.
or at most, and by the most liberal rule,
consideration of the peculiar circumstances
of this case, we cannot but think that it. the value of the lands at the time of the
wnnld t^P, an fl.);)pafi of sound .dlscretionts,
breach of the con tract. The equitable rem" Unreasonable delay m
edy in this case would be so extravagantly
^^^antsuch relief.
greater than at law that it would scarcely
performance
specific
bringing
suTl'foFthe
\
seem to be in the same case. Being comI of a contract to convey will be a defense to
pelled to remit the plaintiff to his remedy
the relief, especially where the other party
at law, the rule of damages in such a case
has made improvements in the mean time,
or the property has greatly increased in 'may as well be considered. Therule seems
Eq.
not to be uniform in the different courts.
value." Johns v. Norris, 22 N.
In Loomis v. Wadhams, 8 Gray, 557, a case
''102.
The delay of only about two years
was held sufficient to defeat the action in much like this, where the lands had to be
selected, the rule was that the plaintiff
Haughwout V. Murphy, 21 N. J. Eq. 118, and
might recover the value of the lands that
Merritt v. Brown, Id. 401. Where oneparty
might have been selected at the time the
to the contract has notified the other party
that he will not perform it by refusing to conveyance ought to have been made.
Where the vendor acted in bad faith in reconvey as in this case, acquiescence in this
fusing to convey on account of the enby the other party, by a comparatively
brief delay in enforcing his right, will be a hanced value of the land, the damages
bar to this remedy. McDermid v. McGregor, were the difference between the contract
price and the enhanced value when the
21 Minn. HI. Change in the circumstances
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conveyance should have been made. 1
eration ol the contract in money or values.
Sedg. Dam. top p. 368; Baldwin v. Munn, 2
The real consideration
must have been
Wend. 399; McNair v. Compton, 35 Pa. St.
very small in amount, and scarcely more
Key,
Head.
the
Key
448,
In
v.
3
rule
23.
than nominal, for it appears that Thomas
paid and interest,
waB the consideration
B. Scott paid the plaintiff, on such settlewhether the vendor acted In bad faith or
ment, the sum of $5,000 in money. The
not. The rule in the supreme court of the value of the lands, at the time the deed
United States is the price of the land as was to be made, was only 10 for each 40
settled by the contract at the time of its
acres, or $290 in gross, according to the
breach. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109.
testimony of the plaintiff himself. That
This is in' analogy to the sale of personal
sum, and interest thereon to the time of
property. In Gale v. Dean, 20 111. 320, the the trial, is all the compensation in money
rule was the value of the land at the time
the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and of
the breach of the contract.
would this he, at least, has no reason to com
seem that in the majority of cases the rule
plain.
is the consideration money and interest,
The question remains, what can be done
lor the difference between the consideration with this suit? The usual practice would
/and the value of the land when it should
be to dismiss this complaint, and leave the
Uiave been conveyed. It would be fruitplaintiff to proceed in an action at law to
less to examine the cases to any greater
recover his compensation in money for the
consideration,
extent. In cases of property
breach of the contrax;t by the defendor cases where the consideration Is other ant. But it seems that the statute
ol|
than money, or barter contracts, the value
limitations has already run on the contract, and the plaintiff has no remedy at
ot the land at the time of the breach is the
therefore , that
rule from necessity, and as approximating
law. We have conclade
nearer to what the plaintiff has lost.
the cireuTt courj c.QHghtjQjfitaiiy^iB_Buit
Brigham v. Evans, 113 Mass. 538. The rule
equityrEp^,£OB!JBlSlg. , jUS tiE§.. JjetweeBT "
in such a case as this has not been settled "ttlBTfSraS&rrThe usuaTrule in equfty'is,
/in this state. For non-delivery of chat- tBie~Ti!Wurt" cannot grant the relief prayed,
tels, the damages are their value at the
to grant such relief as the partyis entitled
time when they shall have been delivered,
to upon the fEicts, and In cases ot specific
Inperformance,
and interest to the time of trial.
for any reason the title
gram V. Rankin, 47 Wis. 406,
N. W. Hep.
cannot be conveyed, to hold the case tor
Wip. 206, it
compensation to the plaintiff. Story, Eq.
In Hall v. Delaplaine,
755.
was a contract to convey, but with some
Jur. 19, and cases there referred to. Hall
peculiar features, and the rule was theconBut in this case the
V. Delaplaine, supra.
In Yenner v. court deems it inequitable to adjudge the
sideration and Interest.
Hammond, 36 Wis. 277, the penalty was conveyance of the land, notwithstanding
fixed in the contract, but Chief Justice
the defendant is able to convey. This is
Ryan discusses the rule in such cases, and
an unusual case for retaining jurisdiction
leaves the question open whether, in some
in equity to grant compensation, but
cases, the vendee may recover damages in
there does not appear to be any reason
why it may not be done as well as In cases
excess of the consideration and Interest.
The rule, so far as it has been considered
of Inability of the defendant to convey, on
bv this court s. unauestionablv. th at noththe well-known principle that a court of
equity, having obtained juri8diction_Jar.
^SS-i3-§5S§SILPL.i^5. consifleration^HTi^
ougnt"
roose. m &y felain it lor anbth er, to",
£ere8t_can..^e,re£P verecTTor perEaps
the general rule. This" give fHH-TeU(Ji, o
betWEen tne
to' say that such
parties, pertinent to the facts of the case
rule is in harmony with cases of breach of
the covenant of seisin. Rich v. Johnson,
"When the impossibility of a specific perPin. 88; Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684,
formance is disclosed at the hearing, and
In this case the considera10 N. W. Rep.
the suit was brought by the plaintiff in
ignorance of such fact, the- court will
tion is very small and Indefinite. The contract Is based on final settlement of suits award the remedy of damages. " Pom. Eq.
and other mattgjs between the parties.
Jur. 1410, and note. In Hopkins v. Gilman, 22 M'^is. 476, a bill was filed tor speThe learned counsel of the " appellant has
well said in his brief that of course the cific performance of an agreement to arbiamount claimed in these suits would af- trate, and to execute a lease, and the court
ford no criterion as to the amount the
held that such relief could not be granted.
plaintiff was to receive, " or,
The present chief justice says in his opinmay add,
that it was understood by the parties he
ion: "Now, although the facts alleged are
did receive, by the contract. The best,
insufficient to justify a decree for specific
not the only, criterion of that amount,
performance, yet we think a court of eqwould seem to be the value of the lands at uity may retain the suit for the purpose of
the time the contract was made, or when
awarding compensation for the value of
the deed was to be made, which wouM be
Undoubtedly an acthe improvements.
the same thing for there is no evidence
tion for damages for non-performance of
that their value had changed in the mean the contract would be the usual remedy.
time. That would be the most favorable
But must this suit be dismissed, and the
rule to the plaintiff that could be adopted
plaintiff tumedoverto that remedy alone?
in this case. Such a rule, we have seen,
It seems to us not, but that the court,
has been sanctioned in many cases, and,
having acquired jurisdiction of the cause,
applied to this case, must stand as an exshould provide and grant any relief conception to what understand is the gensistent with the case made by the comeral rule already established by this court,
plaint and embraced within the issue;"
in consequence of the impossibility of asciting Tenney v. Bank, 20 Wis. 152; Leon-"
certaining with any certainty the considard v. Bogan, Id. 540 Greason v. Ketel;
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tas, 17 N. Y. 491; and Barlow v. Scott, 24
N. Y. 40. We think this case comes within the principle and practice ol that case,
and may be retained for the purpose of
awarding compensation as above determined. The circuit court applied the same
principle in giving compensation to the
plaintiff for one 40-acre tract, which had
been sold ajnd conveyed for non-payment
of taxes, but in doing so adopted a rule of
damages unsupported by any authority,
by gi'Wng the plaintiff the present value
thereof. The present attitude of this case
was not anticipated sufllciently for the
counsel to argue or cite authorities upon
the above question, but to save time and
expense, and malie a full disposition of the
case in this court, and determine the mandate to be sent to the circuit court, we
have concluded to decide all questions necessary to a full disposition of the case.
We think that the selection and location
of the lands, and the identification thereof,
made by the finding of the circuit court,
should be taken as the lands within the
meaning of the contract, and $10 for each
40-acre tract thereof should i>e taken as
the value of said lands at the time when a
conveyance thereof was to be made according to the contract, and interest thereon from that time to the time of the trial,
as full compensation and damages for the
breach of said contract by the said Thomas
B. Scott, deceased, and by the defendant
as trustee of his estate, and judgment
should be rendered accordingly. But this,
we think, should be left optional with
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Bald defendant, or to have a new trial
to determine what lands are within the
intent and meaning of said contract, and
the value thereof on the 1st day of July,
1882, the time fixed in said contract for
We do not think
the conveyance thereof.
that the contract is so uncertain that
it cannot be executed or enforced, and
we think that the finding ol the circuit
court as to the lands embraced in the contract, and the value thereof at $10 for each
40-acre tract at the time aforesaid, are supported by the evidence, and are as near
correct as practicable.
It is doubtful if
the result of another trial to determine the
same facts would be of any advantage to
either party. But inasmuch as the defendant contends that the finding of what
lands are embraced within the contract is
not supported by the evidence, and as the
retaining of the suit for damages to avoid
the operation of the statute of limitations,
and the rule of damages established, are
favorable to the plaintiff, we have concluded to make a new trial in the case optional with the defendant. The judgment
of the circuit court is reversed, and the
cause remanded, with directions to render
judgment for the plaintiff in accordance
with this opinion, or to grant a new trial
at the option of the defendant, to determine the above facts, viz. : (1) Whatlands
are embraced in the contract ; and (2)
their value on the 1st day of July, 1882 ;
and to render judgment accordingly.
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FRAME

V.

FRAME

et al.

S. E. 901, 32 W. Va. 463.)
Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
June 26. 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Braxton county; Henry Bbannon, Judge.
This was a chancery suit, brought September 12, 1887, in the circuit court of Braxton
county. The bill was filed at October rules,
1887, and it alleged that the plaintiff, L. M,
Frame, was the son of William B. Frame,
deceased, who was a former resident in said
That the plaintiff lived with his
county.
father, and worked, aided, and assisted him
on his farm till the plaintiff married, on May
1, 1855.
That the said father owned seven
or eight different tracts of lands in said
county, and, being desirous of compensating
the plaintiff for his services and of starting
him in life, proposed to him, if he would go
upon a certain tract of land, situated on the
south side of Elk river, about one mile from
Frame's mill, in said county, — containing
100 acres, — and cultivate and improve the
same, that he would give him said land, and
make him a deed therefor.
This tract was
granted to said William B. Frame by the
commonwealth of Virginia, by patent dated
September 30, 1846, a copy of which is filed
with the bill, and shows the metes and
bounds of this tract. That the plaintiff accepted the proposition, and, on or about May
12, 1855, moved upon said tract of land, and
has ever since lived upon said land, claiming, as the bill says, and holding, the same
adversely to all the world, — and further alleged that the plaintiff's possession has been
open, notorious, and exclusive from that day
to this, — a period over 32 years, — and he
still owns, possesses, and claims the same.
Some years after the plaintiff moved upon
said tract of land, his father became the
surety of one A. W. Wilson, on a constable's
bond, in the month of May, 1868. Being apprehensive that he might be made liable, by
reason of such suretyship, for the default of
said Wilson, he determined to convey all of
his lands to his two sons, John W. Frame and
Thomas J. Frame; and accordingly, by deed
bearing date the 26th of May, 1868, — a copy
of which was filed with the bill, — ^he conveyed to his said two sons seven different
tracts of land, one of the said tracts being
the same tract which 13 years previously he
had granted to the plaintiff, and placed him
in possession of. Why his father, William
B. Frame, included the plaintiff's tract of
land in said conveyance, the plaintiff is not
advised.
"Certain it is that it was never intended by his father or by his brothers to deprive him of the ownership or possession oi
said tract of land, even if tliey could legally
have done so.
His said brothers well knew
all the facts in relation to the agreement under which he went into possession of said
land; well knew his long possession, improvement, and cultivation of the same, and
well knew he was entitled to a deed therefor.
[n fact, they never disputed the plaintiff's
(9

Supreme

OP CONTRACTS.

right to said land, never attempted to oust
him from the possession thereof, never set
up any claim thereto, nor did any act in the
least tending to assert a claim thereto, exThe character of
cept as hereinafter stated.
said conveyance was well understood by the
said William B. Frame and his said two
sons, the said William B. Frame remaining
in possession of said lands, except the tract
sold to the plaintiff, until his death, and paying taxes therein, except the tract owned by
the plaintiff, the taxes upon which were paid,
It was not until July,
by the said plaintiff.
1886, that either of said brothers did any act
which in the slightest asserted any claim to
the plaintiff's land. On the 1st day of July,
1886, John H. Frame, by deed of that date,
conveyed an undivided half of five of said
tracts of land, including the tract owned by
the plaintiff, to George Goad, trustee, to secure to Jelenko & Bro. the sum of ®482.54,
evidenced by a negotiable note of that date
and payable six months after date, also to secure to Jelenko & Loeb the sum of $536.54,
evidenced by note of that date, payable six
months after date, with provision that upon
default of payment of said notes, or either of
them, said trustee should, upon request of
the holder of said notes or either of them,
sell the said undivided half of said land acA copy of said
cording to law, for cash.
deed is here filed as part hereof, marked 'Exhibit No. 8.' The firm of Jelenko & Bro. is
composed of the defendants Jacob Jelenko
and Gustavus Jelenko, and the firm of Jelenko & Loeb is composed of the defendants
William Jelenko and Charles Loeb. At the
time of the conveyance by John H. Frame
to said George Goad, trustee, the plaintiff
was still in the open, notorious, and exclusive possession of said 100 acres of land, and
by law the said George Goad and Jacob
Jelenko and Gustavus Jelenko and William
Jelenko and Charles Loeb had constructive
notice of the rights of the plaintiff to said
100 acres of land, and his ownership thereof,
and, in addition thereto, had actual notice of
That on the 22d
such right and ownership.
day of August, 1877, the said John H. Frame
having made default in the payment of said
notes, the said George Goad, as trustee, sold
the said undivided one-half of said five tracta
of land, including the plaintiff's tract of 100
acres, at public auction, to the highest bidder, at which sale the said defendant Charles
Loeb became the purchaser of said undivided one-half of said five tracts of land, including the land of plaintiff, at the price of $700.
That the said George Goad is about to convey the same to the said Loeb by a deed
The plaintiff says that the
as such trustee.
said deed from William B. Frame to his sons
Thomas
and John H. Frame, and the
trust-deed from the said John H. Frame to
the said Goad, constitute a cloud upon thfr
title of the plaintiff to said 100 acres of land^
and the deed from Goad to Loeb, when made,
will still further cloud liis title. He is advised that he has a right to have said cloudsremoved, and to have specific execution of.
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his said contract, made with his said father,
and the legal title to said land conveyed to
He therefore asks that said contract
him.

specifically executed; that the said George
and enjoined from 'Conveying the undivided one-half of said 100
acres to the said Charles Loeb; that the said
Frame, George
John H. Frame, Thomas
Goad, and the parties secured by said deed of
trust, be held to have no interest in said 100
acres of land; that the clouds arising from
the conveyance
hereinbefore set out be removed by this honorable court; that the said
Frame, and
John H. Frame, Thomas
George Goad be required to unite in a deed
conveying said 100 acres of land to the plaintiff, and that he have such other, further,
and general relief as the court may see fit to
grant."
The parties defendant to this bill were the
plaintiff's said two brothers, and the trustee
George Goad, and said two firms secured by
said deed of trust, and Charles Loeb, the purchaser of this tract of land at the public sale
under the deed of trust.
The exhibits referred to in the bill were all filed with it.
The following is the answer of Thomas J.
Frame, filed December 5, 1887: "To the
Hon. Henry Brannon, etc. — Defendant, for
answer to said bill, says that he does not desire to controvert the right of the said L. M.
Frame to have specific execution of his contract, as set out in said bill, and he here tenders a deed for all his right, title, and interest in the said 100-acre
tract of land, and,
having answered, asks to be hence dismissed,
with his costs.
Thomas
Feame." The
deed referred to in this answer was filed with
this answer, and thereupon this order was
made: "Thomas
Frame this day filed his
answer to plaintiff's bill, to which the plaintiff replies generally, and the said Thomas
Frame, having by his answer tendered a deed
for all his right, title, and interest in the
tract of 100 acres of land in the bill mentioned, which deed is accepted by the plaintiff, it is ordered that this cause be dismissed
as to the said Thomas J. Frame, but be retained for further proceedings against the
other defendants; and said L. M. Frame
hath leave to withdraw said deed from the
"
papers of this cause.
rules,
1887, all the other
At the October
defendants other than John W. Frame filed
their joint and several answers, wliich were
as follows:
"These defendants, for answer
to said bill, say that it is true, as alleged in
the plaintiff's said bill, that defendants Jelenko & Bro. and Jelenko & Loeb were creditors of John H. Frame in the sums and at
the times set out in the plaintiff's bill, respectively, and for which the said John H.
Frame, in order to secure them in their re,
day of
spective sums on the
188-, conveyed to the defendant George
Goad, trustee, his undivided half interest in
the five tracts of land in the plaintiff's bill
mentioned, situated on Elk river, near
Frame's Mill, in Braxton county, among
he

Goad be restrained
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which was a tract containing 100 acres,
claimed by plaintiff in his bill filed in this
It is also true that the said undicause.
vided half interests in the said five tracts of
land conveyed to the S84d George Goad, trustee, as, aforesaid, were on the 22d day of August, 1887, by order of the defendants Jelenko & Bro. and Jelenko & Loeb, sold by the
said George Goad, trustee, after giving notice
as required by law, at public auction, at the
front door of the court-house of Braxton
county, for cash, to Charles Loeb, at the
price of $700.00, he being the highest bidder
therefor, wliich amount was paid on day of
said sale by said Loeb. A deed was obtained
by said Loeb from said trustee, on 1st day of
October, 1887, which is here filed, marked
•Exhibit No. 1,' and made part of this answer.
These respondents deny that the
plaintiff ever had any title, or semblance of
title, to the said 100 acres of land claimed by
him in his said bill, or that his possession
thereof was adverse and exclusive for the period of time alleged in his bill, or it ever was
so held by him for any period of time from
the time his said father obtained his grant
from the commonwealth of Virginia therefor to the present time. ■These respondents
here expressly deny ever having had any notice, either actual or constructive, of any
claim of title by plaintiff to said tract of land,
or of any right thereto by him whatever.
These defendants, for further answer, say
that they are advised and believe and charge
that plaintiff never had any contract of purchase with his said father for said 100 acres
of land, but that, if he had any such contract, it was without consideration, and cannot affect the title of either George Goad,
trustee, or defendant Charles Loeb, to said
land ; that if the plaintiff ever occupied, resided on, or controlled in any manner said
tract of land in the life-time of his said father,
it was a mere tenancy at will, and not under
These defendants
a contract of purchase.
also deny that William B. Frame, in his lifetime, ever made plaintiff any proposition to
the effect that if he (plaintiff) would move
upon said 100 acres of land, and improve it,
These
that he would give said land to him.
defendants, having answered fully all material allegations in the plaintiff's bill charged,
pray hence to be dismissed, with their costs
in this behalf expended, and they will ever

pray,"

etc.

The exhibits referred to in this answer
were filed as exhibits with it. Depositions
were taken both by the plaintiff and by the
The plaintiff proved by one
defendants.
witness, a nephew of "William B. Frame, that
the plaintiff, L. M. Frame, had had possession of and lived upon the 100-acre farm
named and described in the bill for 31 years,
That he, the witness,
—ever since 1856.
went to the residence of plaintiff's father one
morning in 1856, and William B. Frame told
him he had given the plaintiff, "Lemuel,
" and he pointed
a farm yesterday morning,
out this 100-acre tract, which was in sight,
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"across the river, " as the farm he had given
him; and he said he had given his otlier
He
lands to John and Thomas, his sons.
said that "Lemuel could go to work, or
starve."
He said they would have to give a
woman who was in the house on this farm
two bushels of corn in order to get her to
leave and give up the house to Lemuel, so he
could move in.
Lemuel Frame, the plaintiff,
moved on the place a week or 10 days afterwards, and has been in the occupation of it
ever since. The witness proved, also, that
he had since then gotten timber trees off this
tract of land. He got the timber trees of the
plaintiff, L. M. Frame, who always clMimed
this as his farm.
These trees were sawed
for the witness at the mill of the plaintiff's father, William B. Frame, who knew
where these trees came from, but set up no
claim to them. He never disputed about
them, and never claimed that the plaintiff,
L. M. Frame, did not own this tract of land,
as he claimed.
The members of William B.
Frame's family,— his wife, sons, and daughter, and a son of the plaintiff's family, — who
were all examined, all testified they had never
heard of William B. Frame's giving his sons
John H. Frame and Thomas J. Frame any
lands in 1856, as bad been testified to by
their cousin. But the daughter testified that
she had lived with her father in 1856, up to
1864, and at that time she heard him say frequently he had given L. M. Frame the farm
lie claimed in this suit; that he moved on the
land within a month after it was given to
him, and has lived on it ever since.
Her
father always called it "Lemuel's place."
The widow of William B. Frame, whom he
married in 1864, proves the same statement
that she heard made by William B. Frame
She never heard him say he had
frequently.
given any other lands to his other children
in 1856. The plaintiff himself testified that
he had lived on tlie 100-acre farm in controversy since the 18th or 20th of May, 1856;
that his father gave it to him, and he moved
on it and occupied it as his own, and he did
not occupy it as a tenant of his father. His
occupancy of it has been open, notorious, and
visible. He has cultivated the land, cleared
it, fenced it, and cut saw-logs from it. He
The
cleared and fenced on it some 72 acres.
whole of this was fenced prior to 1871. He
has planted on it 800 apple-trees, and some 50
peach-trees, and, while the house he lived in
was on the land when he went there, he had
put up another house on the land; also, a log
stable.
John H. Frame and Thomas
Frame, his brothers, to whom he had conveyed this and other tracts of land in 1868,
frequently got timber trees off of the land,
buying them from him and not disputing his
ownership of the land. John H. Frame had
in this way bought timber from him off of
this land in 1868 and 1869. The plaintiff's
son proved that about 18 months ago his
father. Lemuel M. Frame, had offered to sell
this farm of 100 acres to one T. A. Reip at
$50 for the house and garden, and $1 apiece
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for the bearing apple-trees and walnut-trees.
Witness told John H. Frame of this offer,
which he had declined.
John H. Frame said

witness' father had better have reduced the
price, of the trees to 50 cents, rather than
miss the sale.
He knew of John H. Frame
on several occasions buying a stick of timber
off of this tract of land and paying witness'
father for it. He proved his father had li ved
on this land from his earliest remembrance,
and he was now 30 years old.
He always
claimed the farm as his own, and every one
spoke of it as his father's farm.
He had
cleared and inclosed about three-fourths of
it. On the other fourth was a maple-sugar
orchard of 15 or 16 acres, from which his
father made sugar every year.
He knew of
his father more than once selling a stick of
timber off of this land to his grandfather,
William B. Frame. He bought one of these
sticks of wood about 1866.
William B.
Frame died in 1876.
It was also proved by other witnesses that
the plaintiff, L. M. Frame, had lived on this
tract of land some 30 years; that during all
that time he claimed it as his own farm ; that,
although it was taxed to his father, William
B. Frame, till 1868, and after that to John H.
Frame, and Thomas J. Frame, yet the taxes
were always paid by plaintiff, L. M. Frame.
He testified that about 1882 he refused to pay
the taxes on this tract of land, unless the
sheriff made out a separate receipt for this
tract, and did not have it as it had been on
the receipt for the taxes of all the lands
owned by John H. Frame and Thomas J.
Frame, and after that a separate receipt was
made out by the sheriff for this tract of land.
The defendants Jelenko & Bro. and Jelenko &
Loeb were wholesale merchants, doing business in Charleston, Kanawha county, W. Va.
John H. Frame was a retail merchant at
Frametown, Braxton county, W. Va. He
purchased goods of these two wholesale
firms in 1882, and continued thereafter to do
When he commenced doing business
so.
with these firms they made inquiry of the
clerk of the county courtof Braxton with reference to his financial condition, and what
real estate he owned, and with what personal property he was taxed, and whether
there were any liens on his property.
They
were informed that he owned a moiety of
the seven tracts of land conveyed to him and
his brother Thomas J. Frame.
They included the 100-acre tract now claimed by the
plaintiff, L. M. Frame.
At the foot of a
copy of this deed for these seven tracts of
land from William B. Frame to Thomas J.
Frame and John H. Frame was this memorandum, sent to a member of the firm by said
county clerk:
"The only lien on record
have been able
against the above, so far as
to find, is a judgment lien against John H.
Frame, in favor of Philip Frankenberger,
for $143.90, with interest from the 13th day
of June, 1885, and $1.90 costs.
find that
John H. Frame is assessed on the personal
property book of this county with the aggre-
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gate sum of $96, consisting of 8 head of cattle, at $40; 2 hogs, $4; 1 watch or clock, at
$2; farming implements, $5; household, etc.,
have given the boundary to each
$45;
tract as it is in the deed above mentioned."
A member of one of the firms, Charles
Loeb, went up to Braxton county, to try and
collect the amount due them for boots and
shoes they had sold to John H. Frame,
which amounted to $536.54. He said he
could not pay it, but was willing to secure
them on his real estate, if they would give

I

him six months' longer credit.
Charles Loeb, one of the members

To this

of said
firm, agreed; whereupon John H. Frame
gave his note for the balance due the firm,
payable in six months, and a deed of trust
dated July 1, 1886, on an undivided moiety
of five tracts of land, including the 100-acre
"When
by the plaintiff.
tract claimed
made this arrangement for my firm, Jeleiiko
also, as the agent of the firm of
& Loeb,
Jelenko & Bro., wholesale dry-goods merchants in Charleston, settled the balance due
them from him to Jelenko & Bro.', bought of
This balance was
them by .John H. Frame.
$482.54, for which he executed his note to
Jelenko & Bro., dated July 1, 1886, payable
in six months, which was secured by said
deed of trust on said five tracts of land, including the 100-acre tract claimed by the
" This deed was executed, and duplaintiff.
ly acknowledged and recorded in the county
court clerk's ofBce of Braxton county, on
July 2, 1886, both by John H. Frame and
his wife, Amanda Frame.
The trustee in
this deed of trust, Gleorge Goad, pursuant to
the provisions in this deed of trust, sold the
said one undivided moiety of these five several tracts of land, and Charles Loeb became
the purchaser thereof for $700, which being
paid in cash, said trustee executed and delivered to him a deed for one undivided moiety of these five tracts of land, including this
This
100-acre tract claimed by the plaintiff.
deed is filed with the answer of the defendants, it having been recorded.
A lawyer, on
behalf of Lemuel M. Frame, when these
lands were being offered for sale and before
they were sold, publicly announced that the
party purchasing this 100-acre tract claimed
by Lemuel M. Frame could not get any title
thereto, as he had claimed the land for 30
years, and lived upon it, and the trustee.
Goad, said: "Certainly, you can only get
such title as is in me."
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J., {after stating the facts as
first question presented by this
The
aSooe.)
record is, will a court of equity specifically
enforce in any case, or against any one, a
verbal gift of land from a father to a child,
as in some cases it is difiScult, if not impossible, in principle, to distinguish
gifts and
will, before considering directly
sales?
this question, state briefly the law in referH.& B.E(}.(2d Ed.)-44
Green,
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ence to the specific enforcement of verbal
sales of land, and the principles on which it
is based.
By the statute of frauds, passed in
1677, and a similar statute to be found where-

ever
shall
lanil,
in or
upon

the common law prevails, "No action
be brought upon any contract or sale of
tenements or hereditaments, or interest
concerning them, unless the agreement
which such action shall be brought, or
some memorandum or note thereof, shall be
in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by some person tliereunto by him lawfully authorized." See Code
W. Va. 1887, c. 98. The English courts, very
soon after the passage of their statute of
frauds, took the view that, while the chancery courts were as much bound by this statute as the common-law courts, yet, as it was
the peculiar province of a chancery court to
relieve against fraud, a court of chancery,
despite this statute, would specifically enforce
a verbal contract for the sale of land when
the refusal to execute the contract would itself amount to the practicing of fraud by the
defendant on the plaintiff.
In so doing, they
said, they were engrafting no exception on
this statute, but simply proceeding to prevent
fraud upon general principles which prevailed
universally in courts of equity, and it would
never do to so construe the statute of frauds,
as to promote instead of suppressing fraud,
as it was intended to do.
See Browne, St.
Frauds, § 457. If the defendant has partly
performed his part of such contract, and his
act of part performance is incapable of compensation in damages, it would obviously be
fraud on the plaintiff to permit the defendant to refuse to execute such contract because
it was verbal; and in such case a court of
equity will compel the specific performance
of such verbal contract. If, for example, the
vendor of real estate, by a verbal contract, has
delivered possession of the land to the vendee,
this will entitle the vendee who is in iY)ssession of the land to compel a specific performance of the contract by making a deed therefor on the payment of the purchase money;
for otherwise the vendor might sue the vendee as a trespasser, and to permit him to do
so after he has put the vendee in possession
under the verbal contract would be to permit
him to take advantage of his own wrong, in
repudiating bis obligation, and it would be
punishing the vendee, who has complied with
If the vendee has taken
his ovra obligation.
possession of the land, the courts regard that
the wrong done by compelling him to surrender
the possession of it as a trespasser is such an
injury as could not be compensated In damages, and hence there is no other way of punishing the recalcitrant vendor for committing a
fraud on the vendee, who has complied with
his contract, by treating him as a trespasser.
The authorities supporting these views are
numerous, both in England and America.
See 2 Loraax, Dig. p. (40,) 55; 1 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 761 ; Wat. Spec. Perf . § 270. It is also
settle'd, both in England and America, that,
if the vendee under a verbal agreement for
the purchase of real estate expends labor or
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money in improving tlie same, the contract is
thereby partly performed, and the statute of
frauds has no application to it. In such a
case the improvements by the vendee in possession constitute valuable and equitable consideration, and entitle him to specific execution of the contract which he complies with
fully on his part. There is, then. First, the
verbal agreement; second, the delivery and
taking possession of the estate in accordance
with the agreement; and, third, the expenditure of money in consequence and in faith
of the agreement; and, fourth, a complete
compliance with the agreement by the vendee, by the payment of the entire purchase
money. If the first of these circumstances
alone exists, the statute of frauds denies all
When the second ensues, the venrerftedy.
dee has partly performed his contract, and
has taken a step which would render it a fraud
on the part of the vendor to divest him of his
When the
possession and refuse him a deed.
third circumstance follows, in expenditures
to improve the land, all the powers of equity
are summoned into action to protect the vendee on several grounds, each sufficient and
each distinct in its nature.
It will then,
when the vendee fully complies with his contract, compel specific execution by the vendor
— First, because it would be a fraud in him
to refuse it; secondly, he would profit by his
own fraud, in acquiring the improvements
with the land he sold; and, thirdly, because
the vendee has introduced a valuable consideration, which, if he lost it, could not be restored to him, and is not ordinarily of a nature to be compensatory in damages.
These
views are well sustained by both English and
See
Sugd. Vend.
American authorities.
(8th Amer. Ed.) p. (151,) 226; 1 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 761 ; Browne, St. Frauds, § 487a; Wat.
Spec. Perf. § 280; Rhea v. Jordan, 28 Grat.
a
683; Tracy v. Tracy, 14 W. Va. 243.
donee, being a child, under a parol gift of
real estate by a father, take possession and
expend money or labor to improve it as
against the donor, he stands upon the same
footing as a piirchaser for a valuable consideration. The statute of frauds has no application to the transaction, and equity will
compel its specific performance by requiring
him to execute his deed to consummate his
gift. We will now consider parol gift speIf A. points to a house and lot, and
cially.
says to his child, 13., "I give you this house

I

If

"I

and lot," and B. says,
accept the gift,"
and nothing more passes in reference to the
matter, a court of equity will take no cognizance of it. B., if he had paid A. for the
house and lot, without taking possession,
could not compel him to execute a deed, because he could have his remedy in recovering
the money he had paid, with interest, in a
court of law. A fortiori, a court of equity
will not entertain B. when he has paid nothing; and, if B. should sue at law, he can recover nothing, because A.'s promise or gift
was without consideration, — a nudum pactum, — and B. has suffered no damages.
The
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has not changed his situation, and
there is no basis for an appeal to a court of
equity to interpose. But suppose B. enters
the house and makes it his home, and goes
on to act as owner, and improves the premises by the expenditure of money or labor.
He digs ditches and enriches the land. He
builds fences for its permanent protection.
He plants out trees, clears the land and
lives in the house.
These acts change the
situation and fix the gift. Why?
Because
valuable consideration has now entered into
the transaction.
The agreement of gift has
been partly performed, by acts which cannot
be undone. A valuable consideration may
be a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to
the promisor.
What was in its inception?
A promise sustained only by a good consideration — the love and affection of a father to
a child— has by such acts become in effect a
promise sustained by a valuable consideration.
It may be regarded as settled law in this
state and in Virginia that a verbal donee of
land — a child, who, under the verbal gift, has
taken possession of the land and improved it
— has a right to demand in a court of equity
a specific performance of the contract by the
execution of a deed by the father, thereby
consummating his verbal gift. This was so
held in Shobe's Ex'rs v. Carr, 3 Munf. 10, decided as long ago as 1811, and this case has
been repeatedly followed or recognized as law
by numerous Virginia decisions ever since.
See Darlington v. McCoole, 1 Leigh, 36; Reed's
Heirs v. Vannorsdale, 2 Leigh, 569; Pigg v.
Corder, 12 Leigh, 69; Cox v. Cox, 26 Grat.
There are also numerous authorities
305.
Freeman
in other states to the like effect.
V. Freeman, 43 N. Y.34; Lobdellv. Lobdell,
33 How. Pr. 347; Shepherd v. Bevin, 9 Gill,
32; Young v. Glendenning, 6 Watts, 510; Galbraith V. Galbraith, 5 Kan. 409; Kurtz v.
Hibner, 55111. 521; McLain v. School-Directors, 51 Pa. St. 196 ; Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1;
If,
Hardesty v. Richardson, 44 Md. 617.
however, a father give his child verbally a
farm, and put him in possession thereof, but
he neither spends money nor labor in improving the land, it is very questionable in Virginia and in West Virginia whether the child,
in a court of equity, could compel the father
to make him a deed. It was so decided in the
cases of Stokes v. Oliver, 76 Va. 72, and Keff er V. Grayson, Id. 517. In these cases it was
held that the love and affection of a father to
a child is not enough, of itself, to warrant a
decree for a specific performance, even when
the agreement to make the gift is in writing,
But
and the child in possession of the farm.
the contrary was held by this court in Marling V. Marling, 9 W. Va.-79. But, in delivering the opinion of the court, in that case, on
page 95, 1 express my own opinion, that,
while such agreement need not be under seal,
it must be a formal agreement, in writing,
duly delivered as such, and while in such case,
the consideration being good, though not
valuable, a court of equity could properly disdonee
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pense with the seal to it, yet it could not dispense with its being a formal agreement in
writing, and a verbal agreement to give a
farm to a child could not be enforced specifloally, even when the child had been put in

possession of the farm, but such agreements
of gift, when performed in part by putting
the donee in possession, have been enforced
See Tilghman, C.
in
in some states.
Lessee of Syler v. Eckhart, 1 Bin. 380; Big.
Fraud, 386; Smith, Eq. 254, 255; Mahon v.
Baker, 26 Pa. St. 519.
And it must be ad-

J.,

milted that the reasoning which supports tha
enforcement of a verbal contract of sale partly performed by the simple delivery of possession appears equally applicable when there
is a verbal gift of land by a father to a child,
accompanied by the delivering of the possesSee 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 761,
sion of the land.
and articles of John W. Daniel in the April,
1883,
number of Virginia Law Journal,
where the question we are considering is elabMany of
orately discussed in an able article.
ha,ve adopted
the views taken in said article
in this opinion.
have thus far been discussing the right of
a donee or vendee of real estate by a verbal
agreement to enforce specifically such verbal
agreement when the donor has put the donee
in possession of the land.
We will now consider whether the law is modified when the
vendee or donee in possession of the land
seeks to have his contract specifically enforced
against a subsequent purchaser for valuable
consideration of the donor, or against a jud^^ygient creditor of the vendor or donor.y Inthe
/nrsf'prace,Tt mus¥beobserved~that wBen the
vendee or donee is in possession of the land,
openly and notoriously living upon it, for instance, there cannot be a purchaser of the
land for valuable consideration without notice from the vendor or donor, because such
possession by the vendee or donee of itself
conveys notice to the whole world of the
equitable title of the vendee or donee, and of
bis right to the legal title; the possession of
realty being the fact of most comprehensive
and far-reaching consequences that bears upon its title.
The perfect legal title was originally conferred by this delivery of possession
or livery of seisin.
A fee was not perfect
without this delivery of possession, but, if
accompanied by such delivery of possession,
it was perfect, even though it was a mere
verbal transfer. The earth has been described
as that universal manuscript, open to the
"When, therefore, a man proeyes of all.
poses to buyer deal with realty, his first duty
is DO read this public manuscript; that is, to
look and see who is there upon it and what
And, if the person in
are his rights there.
possession has an equitable title to it, be is as
much bound to respect it as if it was a perfect legal title, evidenced by a deed duly recorded.
See 2 Sugd. Vend. 866; Sedg. & "W.

I

I

Tr. Title Land, §717; IStory.Eq. Jur. §400;

Big. Fraud, 293, 294; Floyd v. Harding, 28
Grat. 410; Merithew v. Andrews, 44 Barb.
207; Grimstone T. Carter, 3 Paige, 421; Had-
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dnck V. Wllmavth, 5 N. H. 181; Knox v.
Thompson, 1 Litt. (Ky.)350; Tuttle v. JackBon, 6 Wend. 213; Parks V. Jackson, 11 Wend.
442; Morgan v. Morgan, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 383.
When the sale or gift of the land is by a verbal agreement, the terms of such agreement
must be definite and made out with reasonable certainty.
See Wright v. Pucket, 22
Grat. 370. By reasonable ceitainty is not
meant a mathematical certainty; but what is
meant is that the evidence adduced must leave
the court satisfied and convinced as to the
terms of the agreement, and it must be so
definite as to guide the court safely into carrying it into execution. The plaintiff who
seeks a specific performance of a verbal contract or gift of land, or, indeed, who seeks
the aid of a court of equity to enforce any
equitable right, must show that he has used
reasonable diligence, and that his claim is
not a stale claim.
See 1 Bart. Ch. Pr. § 23.
As there stated, it is a familiar doctrine of
the courts of equity that nothing can call them
into activity but conscience, good faith, and
reasonable diligence.
Where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing.
We will assume, first, that a verbal gift of
this 100 acres of land, patented to William B.
Frame September 30, 1846, was by him,
about May 12, 1856, made to his son Lemuel
M. Frame, and the donee then took possession of this 100 acres, exercising an undisputed ownership over it from that time, selling
timber off it to his father and others, and had
lived upon it and cleared it up and cultivated
it ever since, and that considerable time and
money had been spent by him in improving
this tract of land. These facts the counsel
of the plaintiff, L. M. Frame, regard as
If they are really proven,
clearly proven.
with the requisite degree of distinctness and
certainty, then, on the authorities we have
cited, it would seem clear that the son of L.
M. Frame had a right to specifically enforce
this agreement against his father, William B.
Frame, provided he used reasonable diligence
in instituting his suit, and did not permit
his claim to become too stale before he brought
his suit. It is claimed by the plaintiff, L. M.
Frame, that he was in the exclusive and uninterrupted possession of this farm, claiming
against all the world, and especially against
his father, the donor, — actually selling him
timber off this land. It was unnecessary for
him to institute this suit while this state of
things existed. The donee, L. M. Frame,
was not called upon to act, no one disputing
his right to the same, and he having held
and use of it. There is much
possession
strength in this view; and, so long as this
state of things existed, the court might be
disposed to excuse the plaintiff, L. M. Frame,
for not instituting this suit for a specific
How long did this state of
performance.
things exist? The record shows until May
26, 1868.
But not thereafter, for William B.
Frame, the father, exercised the most decisive act of ownership over this 100-acre tract;
for on that day, tor a consideration stated on
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of the deed to have been $500, he ana
his wife conveyed to their sons Thomas
and John "W. Frame seven different tracts of
land, including the tract of 100 acres claimed
to have been given verbally to said L. M.
Frame 13 years before.
This put it entirely
out of his power to make a deed of this land
to L. M. Frame, knowing that he could not
acquire a valid title for this tract of land, on
which he was living, except by instituting in
a court of equity a suit for the speciflc performance of the verbal agreement to give it
to him, made by his father some 13 years
before. He never could have acquired a good
title to this tract of land by living upon it,
claiming it as his own, and exercising rights
of ownership over it, no matter how notorious, undisputed, and exclusive such possession was. For, as he entered upon the land
by permission of his father, who had the legal
title, his possession was admitted in subordination to his father's title, and was not,
therefore, and could not become, adversary to
his father's title, or the title of those claiming by deed under his father. See Hudson v.
Putney, 14 W. Va. 561. He knew, therefore, as early as June, 1868, that if he wanted a title to this 100-aore tract, on which he
lived, he would have to get It by asking a
court of equity to compel the legal owners to
convey the land to him, as the true equitable
owner. It was his duty, therefore, if he did
not mean to abandon his equitable title, to
have instituted this suit in a reasonable time
after January 1, 1868. It may be said that
he did not know that his father then conveyed this tract of land to his two brothers.
But though, perhaps«we cannot assume that
be knew this deed was made to his brothers by
bis father simply because it was promptly put
on record, yet there is his own statement in
his deposition of facts, which shows that he
did know of the making of this deed to his
brothers, for he says he always paid the taxes
on this land, though it was taxed in his
father's name until 1868, and then in the
name of his brothers ; that the tax-bill was
thus made out, and he paid the taxes on this
tract, though the tax-bills were made out
against his brothers, and that he refused to
pay them after a while, if not differently
He was thus reminded each year
made out.
by these tax-bills, tl;iat the legal title of this
land was in his father till 1868; after that,
in his brothers. It was clearly his duty, when
it was thus made known to him that he could
not acquire legal title to this land except by
suit, for him to have brought such suit with
reasonable promptness, especially as 13 years
had already expired since he claimed the
equitable right to this land. But he did not
institute such suit for more than 19 years,
and some 32 years after the alleged verbal
promise of his father to give him this land.
In the mean time his father had died, and
one of his brothers, to whom, in 1868, his
father had conveyed this land, and the records
of the clerk of tlie county court showed that,
upon the fact that he owns this land, this broththe face
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er had acquired a credit, and been trusted, and,
on his giving security to pay debts so owed, hi
the shape of a deed of trust on his Interest in
this and other lands, the trustee had sold said
interest in said land at public auction for cash.
There is a strong contrast between the care
and diligence of the plaintifE in protecting his
rights and that of the defendants. Before
they extended credit to the plaintiff's brother,
and took this deed of trust of him, they had
the clerk's records in the county court of
Braxton, where his brother lived, examined, to
ascertain what lands he owned, and whose
liens were upon them, and all they now ask
is that, as they liave used every precaution in
conducting their business, the court will not
deprive them of the security they took by
setting up an equitable title of the plaintiff,
of which they bad no actual notice and of
which the plaintiff must have, in the nature
of things, known that they could take no notice. They were wholesale merchants, living remote from Braxton county, in Charleston. The defendant John H. Frame was
engaged in the mercantile business in the
county of Braxton, and his brother, (the
plaintiff,) who lived near him, must have
known that in conducting such business
he would buy his goods of wholesale merchants, at a distance, and thus incur debts,
and such creditors would have no means of
knowing his pecuniary condition, except as
it was shown by the records in the clerk's
So, by his neglect
oflBce of the county court.
in bringing the suit the plaintiff must have
known he was furnishing his brother John
H. Frame the means of imposing on the
wholesale merchants, of whom he was buying his goods on credit, as to his pecuniary
condition.
Just what might have been expected did occur, and loss must now be sustained. Should this loss be sustained by the
plaintiff, who was so grossly careless, or by
the defendants, who acted with caution and

Vigilantihus non dormientibus
diligence?
Jura suhveniunt.
But the staleness of the plaintiff's clahn is
not the only difficulty in making out this case,
as presented by this record.
have heretofore assumed that he proved the verbal gift
of this 100 acres of land from his father in
But has he proven the agreement to
1856.
make this gift with the requisite degree of
certainty and distinctness, such as a court
of equity should require, especially when it
is borne in mind that the plaintiff, who alleges this verbal agreement, asks to have it
speciflcaUy enforced, to the obvious loss of
purchasers from his brother for valuable
consideration, without any actual notice of
such verbal gift? The bill alleges that the
plaintiff lived with his father, and worked
and assisted him on his farm, until his marriage, which occurred on May 1, 1855; that
his father at that time was the owner of seven
or eight different tracts of land in Braxton
county, W. Va., and being desirous of compensating tlie plaintiff for his services, and
starting him in life, proposed to him that if
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he would go upon a certain tract of land,
situated on the south side of Elk river, about
one mile above Frame's mill, in said county,
containing 100 acres, and cultivate and improve the same, he would give said land to
him, and make him a deed therefor.
The
plaintiff accepted this proposition of his
father and on or about May 12, 1855, moved
upon said land, and has since held and claimed
This
the same adversely to all the world.
possession has been open, notorious, and exclusive from that day to this, — a period of
" Some
years after the plaintiff
over 32 years .
moved on this land, — in the month of May,
1868, — being apprehensive that he might be
made liable by reason of his suretyship of a
constable named Wilson, because of his default, he determined to convey all of his said
land to his two sons, the defendants Thomas
and John H. Frame.
He made them a
deed, duly recorded, a copy of which is filed
with the bill. On the face of the deed the
consideration purports to be $500 cash."
This verbal agreement by the, plaintiff's
father to give him this tract of land was not
an absolute promise to give him the land,
and make him a deed therefor, but was only
a conditional promise that he would do so if
the plaintiff (his son) would cultivate and
In what way he was reimprove the same.
quired to improve the same is not stated in
the bill, if it were specilied by the father at
But, as the bill states that "the
tlie time.
plaintiff [the son] accepted the proposition,
moved upon the land, erected a house thereon, and commenced to cultivate and improve
the same," it is very probable that the building of a dwelling-house on this farm, as a
residence for his son and his family, (he hav-

J.

ing married,)' was an improvement required
of the son by the father.
This is the more
probable as we may Infer from the proof in
the case that the house then on the land was
a very indifferent one, — in fact, one not fit to
be occupied
by his son's family as tlieir
But even this very indifferent
dwelling.
house was then occupied by a woman, who
might not surrender the possession of it.
There is no direct proof as to the character of
this house that was on the land, but the
plaintiff's son proves that about a year before this suit was brought his father (the
plaintiff) offered to sell to T.A. Eeip the house
and garden at $50, and his brother John said
his father should have taken less than he
think, fairly infer
asked for it. We may,
from this that the house was hardly fit for a
man and his family to occupy.
The plaintiff
testified he built a house on this land.
But
assume it was a very poor house, as he continued to live in a house worth less than $50.
When he built this house does not appear.
It only appears that the son (the plaintiff)
moved into the house on the place when the
This, the
gift was made by the father.
proof shows, was not at the time he was
married, on May 1, 1855.
There is nothing
said about his marriage in the evidence.
If
the agreement was that the father would
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make the deed to the plaintiff, (the son,) if
he would build a residence on the farm and
improve it, as the bill says, such an agreement was a conditional agreement.
The building of the residence and improving the farm being a condition precedent to
the son's acquiring a riglit to demand a deed
of the father, and if a time was named when
the house was to be built, if the son failed to
build the house in the specified time, or of
the character named, he lost forever a right
to demand a deed of the fatlier.
Keffer v.
Grayson, 76 Va. 517. Some 12 years after
this parol agreement to make a gift on certain conditions to his son, (the plaintiff,) the
father actually conveyed this land to two
other sons.
"Why he did so," the bill says,
"the plaintiff is not advised. Certain it is
that it was never intended by his father or
his brothers to deprive him of the ownership
or possession of this tract of land." It seems
to me, a probable explanation of the conduct
of the father and brothers to the plaintiff is
that, he having failed to comply with the
condition on which only the father was to
convey him the land, — that is, as surmise,
to build in a certain specified time a house of
a particular character, — he had no right to
demand a deed of his father, and his father
was at liberty to convey It to his other sons;
and this he did because of the failure of the
plaintiff to comply with the condition imposed
on him by his father, the plaintiff, and hia
famUy, after 12 years, still living in a house
worth less than $50.
The answer of the defendants to the appellee's bill denied this verbal gift by the father to his son (the plaintiff).
of this land. This put on him the burden of
proving this parol agreement of his father to
give him this land; and the law, we have
seen, required him to prove the agreement
with deflnlteness and accuracy. Has tliis
been done? It seems to me, it has not. No
one who was present when the alleged verbal agreement was entered into by the father
and son for the gift of this tract of land testifies in the case to what then transpired, or
as to the terms of, or conditions attached to,
the gift. That it was a conditional agreement we only learn from the allegations in
the bill. There is not one particle of evidence showing what the terms or conditions
of this gift were. The whole proof consists
of subsequent admission by the father that
he had given this land to his son (the plaintiff) or admission by conduct or by acts that
he regarded this farm as belonging to his
But such statements and
son (the plaintiff.)
conduct are what would naturally have occurred had the verbal gift of this farm to his
son (the plaintiff) been a conditional one,
such as is set out in the bill, or such as I have
above suggested. Naturally, the father would
haveexpectedtheconditionprecedentattached
to the gift would in good time have been
complied with by the son, and the gift thus
perfected; and, anticipating that this would
be the case, the father would naturally speak
and act as if this farm belonged to his son.
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and tbongh he bad no right to demand a deed
Tor this farm unless he complied strictly with
the conditions precedent to the gift, whatever they were.
The most direct and satisfactory evidence of this verbal agreement was
deposition of a nephew of the father, giving
what was said casually by the father to the
witness the day after this verbal gift of this
farm to bis son, (the plaintiff.) This we will
analyze. He says in his deposition taken
October 17, 1887: "L. M. Frame, the plaintiff, has resided on this farm of 100 acres
about 31 years.
went to his father's, William B. frame's, one morning, and be said to
have made way with my land.'
me:
said, • Have you?' and he said, • Yes.
gave
Lemuel a farm yesterday,' — and he pointed
to the 100-acre farm across the river as the one
be bad given him.
He said be let John and
Tom have the balance. He had owned six
or seven tracts of land. He said: 'Kow Lemuel can go to vrork, or starve.' He said too,
they would have to give Nancy Jones, to get
her out of the bouse, two bushels of corn, before Lem could move in." Though this witness is so definite as to what was said then,
still it is obvious that bis testimony is far
from being satisfactory.
It gives the details
of a casual conversation in which the witness
had had no interest and which occurred some
31 years before.
We know there must have
been very substantial errors in it For instance, the bill does not pretend that William B. Frame gave all his land to bis three
sons at that time, in 1856; but it says he gave
this one farm of 100 acres to bis son (the
plaintiff) then, and the balance of bis land
to bis two other sons, John and Tom, some
12 years afterwards, and not one member of
the family, or a single other witness, ever
beard of any gift at that time of any of his
lands by William B. Frame to any of his
children except this 100 acres to bis son, (the
This, suppose, was a mistake
plaintiff.)
made by the nephew as to what his uncle,
William B. Frame, then said to him. He
This
beard this many years afterwards.
witness said the father said, "Now Lemu"must go to work."
el," (the plaintiff,)
This does not look as if the gift was made, as
the plainstated in the bill, "to compensate
tiff for bis past services, and to start bim in
life." He bad lived with his father, but we
may infer from what his father said that he
did not think bis past services deserved compensation, but rather considered that be bad
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heretofore supported him in idleness, and he
to do so no longer, but he must "go
to work or starve."
There is in this conversation corroborative evidence of the small
value of the house on this 100 acres of land,
for it was supposed Nancy Jones would let
the son move into this house, and she would
give it up, for the trifling compensation of
two bushels of corn. She could not have regarded the house at all desirable to live in, if
she could surrender it so easily.
This conversation took place before the son (the
plaintiff) had taken possession of this farm,
and when, of course, the conditional gift
named in the bill was imperfect, and when,
of course, the son bad no right to demand a
deed of the father; and, though the statements and acts of the father subsequently
show simply that he had given his son (the
plaintiff) this farm, and were made after he
bad taken possession, yet none of them are
inconsistent with the gift being conditional
and the condition not compli^ with, and
this, one suspects, was the case, from his
father having some 12 years' afterwards
made to two other sons a deed for this farm.
It seems to me, therefore, that the plaintiff
has failed to show with the requisite degree
of distinctness and accuracy the terms of the
verbal agreement made by his father, giving
him this land, because of the great lapse of
time (31 years) before the institution of this
suit.
The court below ought to have dismissed
his bill at his costs.
The court below, obviously, by its order made December 5, 1887,
properly dismissed the bill as to the defendant Thomas J. Frame, he tendering with his
answer a deed to the plaintiff for his moiety
of the land, which the plaintiff was willing
to accept, but the court below erred in its decree of May 2, 1888, specifically enforcing
said alleged verbal contract against the other
defendants. This decree must be set aside,
annulled, and reversed, and the appellants
must recover of the appellee, L. M. Frame,
their costs in this court expended, and this
court, entering such order as the court below should have done, must dismiss the bill
of the plaintiff, and the defendants below,
other than Thomas J. Frame, must recover
of the plaintiff below their costs expended in
the court below.
proposed

Sntdee, p., and English,
Brannon, J., absent.

J.,

concurred.
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Appeal from the circuit court of the
United States for the district of Nebraska.
This is a suit to compel the specific performance by the appellant, Cheney, of a
written agreement entered into May 28,
1880, between him and the appellee, Libby,
whereby the former demised and let to the
latter tjie possession and use of, and contracted, bargained, and agreed to sell to
him, two sections of unimproved land in
€age county, Neb. The defendant claimed
that the contract was forfeited, long before
this suit was brought, by Llbby's failure
Upon
to comply with its stipulations.
that ground he resists the granting of the
relief asked. The circuit court adjudged
tliat the plaintiff was entitled to a decree.
The question to be determined is whether there was any such default upon the
part of the plaintiff, Libby, as deprived
him of the right to specific performance.
The sum agreed upon forthe possession,
use, occupancy, and control of the land
was $1,861.60 yearly, represented in Llbby's notes, and in the taxes assessed and
to be assessed against the land. The price
for the land was $8,960, of which $1,600
was paid at the date of the contract. The
"
balance was to be paid, without notice
or demand therefor," in annual installments, at the times specified in promissory
notes, of .even date with the contract,
which were executed by Libby to Cheney
at Tecumseh, Neb. The notes were made
payable to the order of Cheney, at the oflSce
of Russell & Holmes, private bankers in
that cil^. Eight of the notes represented
the balance of the principal debt, — each
one being for $920,— and were payable, respectively, in 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 years
after date. The remaining 10 notes repi-esented the annual interest.
Libby agreed to meet the notes as they
respectively matured, pay the taxes on the
land for 1880 and subsequent years, and,
during that year, ( the weather permitting, )
break 200 acres, and build on the land a
frame barn of 16 feet by 20, and a frame
dwelling-house
of a story and a half.
Cheney undertook to pay the taxes of 1879
and previous years, and bound himself to
convey the land, in fee-simple, with the ordinary covenants of warranty, (reserving
the right of way that might be demanded
for public use for railways and common
roads,) upon the payment by Libby of the
several sums of money aforesaid at the
times limited, and the strict performance
of all and singular the conditions of the

,
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contract.
It was further stipulated between the
parties that "time and punctuality are
material and essentiaV ingredients in this
contract. "
That if Libby tailed to perform and complete all and each of the payments, agreements, and stipulations in the agreement
mentioned, "strictly and literally," the
contract should become void; in which
event all the interests created by the con-
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tract in favor of Libby, or derived from
him, should immediately cease and determine, and revert to and revest in Cheney,
without any declaration of forfeiture or
re-entry, and without any right in Libby
of reclamation or compensation for moneys paid or services performed.
That, in case the contract was forfeited,
Cheney could take immediate possession of
the land, with all the crops, improvements, fixtures, privileges,
and appurtenances thereon or appertaining thereto ;
Libby to remain bound for all taxes then
assessed against the premises, and all installments of principal or interest then due
on the contract to be regarded as rent.
That whenever one-half of the purchasi
price was paid, with all accrued interes
and taxes, Cheney should execute a deed
as provided for in the contract, and taki
notes and a mortgage for the remalnin;
payments, to run the unexpired time.
That when Libby's right to purchase
the land terminated by reason of non-performance of his covenants, or his failure to
make the payments, or any of them, at the
time specified, he should be deemed to have
only the rights of a tenant, and to hold
the land underthe contract as alease, subject to the statute regulating the relation
of landlord and tenant; with the right in
Cheney to enforce the provisions of the
contract, and recover possession of the
land, with all thefixtures, privileges, crops,
and appurtenances thereon, as if the same
was held by forcible detainer.
The agreement also contained
these
stringent provisions:
That no court
should relieve Libby from a failure to comply strictly and literally with the contract;
that no modification or change of the contract could be made, except by en try thereon in writing signed by both parties ; and
that no oversight or omission to take notice of any default by Libby should be
deemed a waiver by Cheney of the right to
do so at any time.
Libby went into possession under the
contract. He, and those in possession under him, had, prior to the commencement
of this suit on the 26th of February, 1887,
broken up and cultivated most of the land,
and made improvements thereon of a permanent and substantial character. Nearly
all of these improvements were made prior
to the 1st of January, 1885. He met all
the obligations imposed upon him with respect to the breaking up of the land and
its improvement by the erection thereon
of buildings. His evidence, which is uncontradicted, was: "We have broken up
and cultivated aboutl,200 acres; built five
houses and stable and outbuildings to each
house; made wells to each house; erected
two wind-mills ; fenced one whole section
with wire and posts, and fenced half of
other section with hedge; we have set out
some fruit-trees and shrubbery, — all to the
value of about ten thousand dollars. All
was done under and in pursuance of this
contract. "
He also met promptly all the notes givfor principal and interest maturing prior to 1885. Thetotal amount paid by him
prior to that date, including $1,600 paid at
the execution of the contract, was in excess of $5,000.
en
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But the defendant insists that there was
such default upon the part of the plaintiff,
with respect to the notes maturing May
28, 1885, as worked a forfeiture of the eontract, and, consequently, that specific perThe precise
formance cannot be decreed.
grounds upon which this contention rests,
as well as those upon which the plaintiff
relies in support of his claim for relief, cannot be clearly understood without a careful scrutiny of all that passed between the
parties in reference to the lands in ques-

tion.
The plaintiff resided in Iowa, while the
defendant resided at Jerseyville, 111. The
notes given by the former were upon
blanks furnished by thelatter's agent, who
caused them to be made payable in Tecumseh. Neb., at the private bank of Kussell & Holmes, through whom the defendant had, for many years prior to 1880,
made collections, and with whom he had
kept an account. The first payment under the contract was made in bank drafts
delivered to the defendant's agent in Tecumseh. All the other notes falling due in
1880

jj

\j>'
' '

^

/

to

1884,

inclusive,

(except the interest

note maturing in 1882,) were paid by bank
drafts sent to Russell & Holmes, who
placed the proceeds to the credit of Cheney
in their bank. The checks of the latter
upon that bank, on account of those deposits, were always paid in current funds.
The draft to pay the interest note for 1882
was also sent to Russell & Holmes, but, as
Cheney had not transmitted that note to
them, the draft was forwarded to him.
He received it, and sent thenote to Libby.
In no single instance prior to 1885 did he
tmake objection to the particular mode in
which. Libby provided for the payment of
his notes, or intimate his purpose to demand coin or legal-tender notes in payment. In every instance, except as to the
interest note for 1882, the notes were paid
at the banking-house of Russell &Holme8,
and by drafts sent to' and used by them for
that purpose.
Butitis quite apparentfrom theevidence
that Cheney, in 1885, indulged thehope that
he could bring about a forfeiture of the
contract for non-compliance upon the part
of Libby with its provisions, and that he
would, in that or some other way, get the
land back. It is proper to advert to the
circumstances justifying thatconclusion.
On the 4th of March, 1885,— all previous
installments having been punctually met,
—Libby offered. In writing, to pay all the
principal notes mentioned in the contract,
as well as the interest note due May 28,
1885. if a deed was made to him . To this offer Cheney replied, under date of March 19,
1885: "Your letter of the 4th has just
reached me. I have no papers with me,
and cannot attend to the matter as you
request. I expect to go to New Orleans
"to the Exposition, and to be at home in
time to s^ to it properly. If I am behind
time, no harm will come to you." Libby
wrote again, under date of May 20, 1885,
renewing the offer contained in his letter
of March 4th. Under date of May 23, 1885,
—only five days before the notes for 1885
matured,— Cheney replied: "Tours of 20th
is received.
think it probable that
can do as you suggest, but
will be in

I

I
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Beatrice [the county-seat of Gage county,
where the lands are] between the 1st and
10th of June on other business, and will
then make inquiries, and see if
can lend
the money to good hands, and will then
"
let you know more certainly.
On the 26th of May, 1885, Libby sent to
Russell & Holmes a draft upon the First
National Bank of Omaha, Neb., made by
one Stuart, a private banker doing business at Madison, in the same state, for
$1,251.20, which was the amount of Libby's two notes for principal and interest
that matured May 28, 1885. It was sent
in payment of those notes, and was received for that purpose by Russell &
Holmes. They accepted it for the amount
of money named in it, and were therefore
ready to take up Libby's two notes when
presented for payment at their office.
On the 28th of May, 1885, A. W. Cross, of
the First National Bank of Jerseyville, 111.,
— where Cheney resided,— appeared at the
banking-house
of Russell & Holmes, and
made a deposit of $5,000, all in current
funds, and a good portion of it in bills of
his own bank. While there he inquired of
Russell & Holmes (without disclosing the
reason for his inquiry) whether they kept,
"a legal-tender revenue, [reserve,] as national banks were required to do." He
was told that they did not, but that a
supply of legal tender was on hand. About
2 o'clock of the 1st of June — which, as May
31st fell on Sunday, was the last day of
grace for Libby's two notes due in 1885,
(Comp. St. Neb. c. 41, § 8)— one of Cheney's
attorneys went into the bank of Russell &
Holmes, and asked if he could begivenf5,000 in legal-tender notes in exchange for
other currency.
His request was complied
witl
At a later hour of the same day
Cheney appeared in the bank, without having responded to Libby's offer, twice made,
to pay all the notes for the principal debt,
and the interest note maturing in 1885.
He came there with checks, drawn by
Cross, to be cashed, and asked, as an accommodation to him, that they be paid in
legal-tender notes. He was promptly accommodated to the extent of $2,500. But,
when he asked for $2,500 more in legal-tender notes, Holmes suspected there was a
scheme to exhaust his bank of legal-tender
notes, and refused to comply with this request. After Russell & Holmes had thus,
by way of accommodation, paid to Cheney
and his attorney $7,500 in legal-tender
notes, — but not until the hour for closing
the bank, on that day, against the public
had passed,— Libby's two notes were presented by Cheney, and payment thereof demanded in coin or legal-tender notes. The
bank offered to pay in current funds, as
they had previously done inrespectto Libby's notes, but Cheney declined to take in
payment anything except coin or legaltender notes. The notes were then placed
by him in the hands of a notary, who was
conveniently present, and the latter presented them for payment, announcing that
he would not receive anything except
United States notes or legal-tender funds.
Payment in such funds was refused by the
bank, and the usual protest was made.
The notary and Cheney then left the room,
the latter saying, before leaving, that "he

I
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would call in the morning. " But he did
not call the next or upon any subsequent
day.

Within 15 or 20 minutes after Cheney and
hisnotary leftthebank, Holmes, of the firm
of Russell & Holmes, went to the office of
the notary to find Cheney and pay the notes
in the funds demanded.
But Cheney was
not there, and the notes were in his hands.
iDQuiry was made at the principal hotel
and at other places, but he could not be
found. Holmes was Informed that he had
left town.
Libby having been notified of the protest
of the notes, notwithstanding he had, in
due time, sent a bank draft to Russell &
Holmestu be used in payingthem, directed
Stuart, the banker at Madison, Neb., tc
The latter
go immediately to Tecumseh.
arrived there on the 9th of June, and, having learned what passed between Cheney
and Russell & Holmes, determined to pay
off the notes in such funds as Cheney demanded. He informed the notary, who
had protested the notes for non-payment,
that hewas then ready, in behalf of Libby,
to pay them in gold. The latter did not
have the notes, did not know where Cheney
had gone, and said that the latter "did
not want the money, but that he wanted
the land back."
Stuart having knowledge of Cheney's
letter, in which he notified Libby of his
purpose to visit Beatrice between the 1st
and 10th of June, went to that place in
seai-ch of Cheney, but could not find him.
Libby wrote to Cheney, under date of
June 12, 1885, informing him that gold was
deposited at Russell & Holmes' office to
pay the two notes due May 28, 1885.
This
letter was received by Cheney in due course
of mail. On the 20th of June, 1885, the latter inclosed to Libby twelve unpaid notes,
(including the two due May 28, 1885,) saying that the contract of May 28, 1880, was
"terminated and ended by your failure to
pay the two notes due May 28, 1885, and
otherwise to comply with the contract,
which is now null and void. " How Libby
had " otherwise " failed to meet his obligations under the contract does not appear.

Under date of June 23, 1885, Russell &
Holmes advised Cheney by letter of the
fact that they were authorized by Libby
to pay, and they were ready to pay, the
notes due May 28th, including protest fees,
in legal-tender notes or coin. Libby, under date of June 25, 1885, replied to Cheney's letter, saj ing . " refuse to accept said
notes, excepting the two which were paid,
and have this daysentthem to your bankers, Messrs. Russell & Holmes, of Tecumseh,
Neb., for your use and benefit, and subject
to your order.
shall make payments as
fast as they become due, and shall require
you to execute a conveyance of the land
in accordance with the terms of the contract. It will be useless for you to send
me any of these notes, except you send them
for payment. " Under date of June 29, 1885,
Russell & Holmes advised Cheney that they
had received from Libby his notes, amounting to $6,679.20, subject to his (Cheney's)
order. The latter wrote July 9, 1885, in reply to Libby's letter of June 25th, that he
did not recognize the notes placed with
Russell & Holmes as being subject to his
order.

I
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On the 20th of August, 1885, Libby, by hia
attorney, made a tender to Russell &
Holmes of $120 in gold coin as a balance of

one-half of the purchase money, and offered
to surrender the contract and execute a
mortgage and notes for the balance of the
purchase money, as stipulated in the contract, and demanded a deed; of all which
Cheney was notified. The latter replied,
under date of August 22, 1885, that he
would not receive any money from Libby,
and refused to make a deed.
It further appears that the plaintiff
punctually paid into the bank of Russell &
Holmes the amounts of the notes due in
1886 and 1887.
The funds remained in that
bank and are now there, subject to Cheney's order, on presenting the notes. Of
these payments hewas promptly informed.
Shortly before the commencement of this
suit Libby again offered to Cheney to pay
in cash all the unpaid portion of the principal debt named 4n the contract, and all interest due at that date. He also renewed
his offerto execute a mortgage on the land
to secure all unpaid installments not due,
and demanded a deed. But those offers
being
declined, the present
suit was

brought.
A. A. Goodrich, for appellant.
vidson, for appellee.

8.

P. Da-

Mr. Justice Hahlan, after stating the
facts in the foregoing language, delivered
the opinion of the court.
The peculiar wording of the written contract renders itsomewhatdoubtful whether there was a sale of the lands to the appellee to be made complete by a conveyance of the legal title or defeated .altogether, according to his performance or failure
to perform the conditions upon which he
was to receive a deed ; or whether he was
simply given possession, paying a fixed
amount, annually, for use and occupancy,
with the privilege of purchasing, and with
the right to demand a conveyance in feesimple, upon the performance of those
conditions. Taking the whole contract
together, we incline to adopt the former
as the true interpretation.
Such was the
view taken by the supremecourt of Nebraska of a similar contract as to land between Cheney and one Robinson. Robinson V. Cheney, 17 Neb. 673, 679, 24 N. W.
Rep. 378. But it is not necessary to express
any decided opinion upon this question;
for, in any view, it is clear from the contract, not only that appellant could retain the legal title until the appellee's obligations under it had all been performed,
but that he could resume possession immediately upon the failure of the appellee
to meet, punctually, any of the conditions
to be performed by him. Time may be
made of the essence of the contract "by
the express stipulations of the parties,
or it may arise by implication from
the very nature of the property, or the
avowed objects of the seller or the purchaser." Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet.
172, 174 ; Secombe v. Steele, 20 How. 94, 104 ;
Holgate v. Eaton, 116 D. S. 33, 40, 6 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 224; Brown v. Trust Co., 128 U S.
The parties
403, 414, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127.
in this case, in words too distinct to leave
room for construction, not only specify
the time when each condition is to be per-
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formed, but declare that "time and punctuality are material and esBential ingredients" in the contract, and that it must be
"strictly and literally" executed. However harsh or exacting its terms may be,
as to the appellee, they do not contravene
public policy; and therefore a refusal of
the court to give effect to them, according
to the real intention of the parties, is to
make a contract for them which they have
not chosen to make for themselves. 1
Sugd. Vend. (8th Amer. Ed.) 410, (268;)
Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92, 94; Eipwell
These
V. Knight, 1 Tounge & C. 401, 415.
observations are made because counsel for
the appellant insists, w^ith some confidence,
that an affirmance of the decree below will
necessarily be a departure from the general principles just stated.
But there are other principles, founded in
justice, that m ust control the decision of the
present case. Even where time is made material, by express stipulati on, theli

^i^-lio" t^ unreasonable delay,
aafljlQ.?ircTims Laiices haveintervened that

^£5El2IISS-4i."

woSllnrSrderirunTusrBrinnr^

give such relief. The discretion which a
court of equity has to grant or refuse specific performance, and which is always exercised with reference to the circumstances
of the particular case before it, (Hennessy
v. Woolworth, 128 D. S. 438, 442, 9 Sup.Ct.
Rep. 109,) may and of necessity must often
be controlled by the "conduct of the party
who bases his refusal to perform the contract upon the failure of the other party
to strictly comply with its conditions.
Seton V. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 279; Levy v.
Lindo, 3 Mer. 81, 84; Hudson v. Bartram,3
Madd. 440, 447; Lilley v. Fifty Associates,
v. Tuttle, 22
101 Mass. 432, 485; Potter
Conn. 512, 519. See, also, Ahl v. Johnson,
20

How.

511, 518.

class bel ongs, i n our iudg;ment.
thecontract
tBTcSBrBHSre^sr^lthough
""between Cheney and Libby called tor naSr
m.ent in dollars, the latter might well have
supposed, unless distinctly informed to
the contrary, that the former would be
willing to receive ^sarsoLJnnds ; that is,
such as are ordinarily received by men of
business or by banks; and such funds were
received in payment of all of Libby 's notes
falling due in 1880 to 1884, inclusive. While
this course of business was not aji absolute waiver by Cheney of his right to demand coin or legal-tender paper in payment of notes subsequently falling due,
such conduct, during a period of several
produce the ImI years, was calculated to
7 pression upon Libby's mind that current
/ or bankable funds would be received in
/ payment af any of his notes ; and therefore, upon every principle of fair dealing,
[Cheney was bound to give reasonable noItice of his purpose, after 1884, to accept
1 ^.O*!^^'^ ^'^'^^ funds as under the contract,
'^'■'^^Btrictly interpreted, be was entitled to deViand. No such noticewas given. On the
contrary, the just inference from the testimony is that Cheney designed to throw
Libby off his guard, and render it impossible for the latter, or for the bankers to

To this
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whom he sent drafts to be used In paying
his notes, to supply the requisite amount
of coin or legal-tender paper on the very
day the notes matured, and at the moment
of their presentation for payment. The
efforts of Russell & Holmes, within a few
moments after Cheney left their bank on the
1st of June to find him, and to pay off the
notes in legal-tender paper, and the eftorts
of Libby, by his agent, as soon as he was
informed of Cheney's demand for payment
in coin or legal-tender paper, to reach him,
and to pay off the notes maturing in 1885,
in lawful money, and his repeated offers,
subsequently, to pay them in such money,
showed the utmostdill gence. and suffiRient.ly e^fiiHP his fflmTm^.n pay in ppln mi
Megal-l^TiMgrpn.pffr p^ th^ y"''Y ?"y *"'"
""notes matuTSoT To permit Cheney, under
ffie circiimsEailces disclosed, to enforce a
forfeiture of the contract, would enable
him to take advantage of his own wrong,
and to reap the fruits of a scheme formed
for the very purpose of bringing about the
aon -performance of the contract.
But it is contended that the provisionin
thecontract forbidding its modification or
change, "except by enti^ thereon in writing signed by both parties, " coupled with
the provision that no court should reUeve
Libby from a failure to comply strictly and
literally with the contract, stands in the
way of a decree for specific performance..
It is sufficient, upon this point, to say that
such provisions — if they could in any case
tetter the power of the court to do justice i
according to the settled principles of law
— cannot be applied where the efficient
cause of the failure of the party seeking
specific performance to comply strictly and
literally with the contract was the conduct of the other party. If the defendant
had agreed, in writing, signed by himself
alone, to accept current funds, and not to
demand coin or legal-tender notes, and,
notwithstanding such agreement, he bad
demanded coin or legal-tender notes, under circumstances rendering it impossible
for the plaintiff to meet the demand on the
day limited by the contract, would he be
permitted to say that the contract was forfeited for the failure to make payment according to its pro-visions?
We suppose
not, although, according to his argument,
such an agreement, not having been signed
by both parties and indorsed on the contract, would not estop him from insisting
upon a strict and literal compliance with
its terms.
It results from what has been said that
the failure of the plaintiff, Libby, in person
or by agent, to pay the notes maturing in
1885 in coin or legal-tender paper, at the
time they were presented by Cheney for
payment at the banking-house of Russell &
Holmes, did not work a forfeiture of the
contract, and does not stand In the way of
a decree for specific performance.
In respect to the notes falling due in 1886
and 1887, the evidence satisfactorily shows
that the plaintiff, at the times and place appointed for their payment, offered, and
was then and there ready, to pay them in
lawful money, but, the notes not being on
either occasion in the hands of Russell &
Holmes tor collection, he could not make
actual payment, but left the money at
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that the notes falling due in 1885, 1886, and
1887 had been paid when this decree was
passed. If those notes had been placed by
Cheney with Russell & Holmes for collection, and the latter had collected the
amounts due on them, then they would
have been paid; for, in such case, that firm
would have been the agent of the payee to

;

;
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collect the notes, and the money received
by them would have belonged to him.
In Ward v. Smith, 7 WaU. 447, 450, the
question arose as to whether a bank at
which certain bonds were made payable
was the agent of the holder to receive payment. The court said: "It is undoubtedly true that the designation of the place of
payment in the bonds imported a stipulation that their holder should have them at
the bank, when due, to receive payment,
and that the obligors would produce there
the funds to pay them. It was inserted
for the mutual convenience of the parties.
And it is the general usage in such cases for
the holder of the instrument to lodge it
with the bank for collection, and the party .
bound tor its payment can call there and \
take it up. If the instrument be not there
lodged, and the obligor is there at its maturity with the necessary funds to pay it,
he so farsatisfles the contract that he cannot be made responsible for any future
damages, either as costs of suit or interest,
for delay. Whpii th e instrument is lodged
jyjth the bank for collectio n, the bank hs zcomes the agent on:15el)ayee or "obligee to.
reeeivje payments
The agency extends na
further, and without special authority an]
agent can only receive payment of the debt!
due his principal in the legal currency
the country, or in bills which pass as money at their par value by the common conseiit of the community. In the case at bar
only one bond was deposited with the
Farmers' Bank. That institution, therefore, was only agent of the payee for its
collection. It had no authority to receive
payment of the other bonds for him or on
his account. Whatever it may have received from the obligors to be applied on
the other bonds, it received as their agent,
not as the agent of the obligee. If the
notes have depreciated since in its possession, the loss must be adjusted between
it" cannot fall
the bank and the depositors
See, also,
upon the holder of the bonds.
Adams V. Commission, 44 N. J. Law, 638,
where this question is elaborately examined Hills V. Place, 48 N. Y. 520 Gas Co. v.
Pinkerton, 95 Pa. St. 62, 64; Wood v. Saving Co., 41 111. 267.
Russell & Holmes, then, did n ot becom
receive fhTi iHJUOCnT
the agent-otehene3rto
of the notes, by reason simply drtltrtacT
that the notes v/ete made payable at their
bank. The funds left by Libby with them
to be applied in payment of the notes of
1885, 1886, and 1887 are therefore his property, not the property of Cheney. The utmost effect of Libby's offer, within a rea1885, to pay the
sonable time after June
note of that year in lawful money, and of
his offers, at the appointed times and place,
to pay the notes of 1886 and 1887, was to
prevent the forfeiture of the contract, and
to save his right to have it specifically performed, so far as that right depended upon
his paying those notes. But they must be

y

e
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contract. Indeed, after the surrender by
Cheneyln 18S5 of the notes due In that and
subsequent years, and his formal notification to Libby that he regarded the contract as forfeited and would not receive
any money from him, Libby was not
bound, as a condition of his right to claim
specific performance, to go through the useless ceremony of tendering payment at the
banking-house
of Russell & Holmes of the
lotes maturing in 1886 and 1887. Brock v.
^idy,13 Ohio St. 306 ; Deichmann v. Deich;nann, 49 Mo. 107, 109 ; Crary v. Smith, 2 N. Y.
In Hunter v. Daniel, 4 Hare, 420, 433, it
60.
"
•vas said • The only remaining point insisted upon was that the making of every payment w as a condi ti on precedeirt to the right
of the plaintiff to call for the execution of
the agreement, or, in fact, to call for the
benefit of it ; and it was argued that the
bill could not properly be tiled before the
plaintiff had, out of court, fully performed
The general rule in equity
Ms agreement.
certainly is not of that strict character.
A party filing a bill submits to do everyrhing that is required of him ; and the pracnice of the court is not to require the party
to make a formal tender w^here, as in this
case, from the facts stated in the bill, or
from the evidence, it appears that the tender would have been a mere form, and
that the party to whom it was made"
would have refused to accept the money.
Whether that be a sound view or not with
reference to the particular contract here in
question, Libby did, in fact, make a proper
tender of payment as to these notes. Before the bringing of this suit he had paid,
and offered to pay, more than one-half of
Che price for the land and all accrued interest and taxes, and therefore was enutled by the terms of the contract to a
deed, he executing notes and a mortgage
for the remaining payments to run the unexpired time, as stipulated in the agreement.
The court below found that the notes
falling due in 1885, 1886, and 1887 were
paid ; that the plaintiff had deposited with
the clerk for the defendant a mortgage on
the land to secure the payments due 8, 9,
and 10 years after the date of the contract;
and that he had fully done and performed
every obligation imposed upon him to entitle him to a deed. It was adjudged that
the defendant, within 40 days from the deand deliver to
cree, execute, acknowledge,
the plaintiff a good and sufficient deed,
with the usual covenants of warranty,
(excepting the right of way that maybe demanded for public usefor railways or common roads,) conveying to him the land in
question, and In default of which it was
adjudged that the decree itself should operate, and have the same force and effect,
as a deed of the above description.
We are not able to concur in the finding
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their bank to be paid over to Cheney whenever the notes were presented at that
place. The notes due in those years were,
it is true, in the manual possession of Russell & Holmes, but they were not in their
custody by direction of Cheney, for collection or for any other purpose. Libby did
aJl that he could do with respect to the
notes falling due iu those years in order to
comply " strictly and literally" with the
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axitnally paid by him before lie is entitled
deed, or to a decree that will have the
force and effect of a conveyance. Under the
circumBtances it was not absolutely necessary thathe should havebronght the money into court for the defendant at the time
he filed his bill. His offer in the bill to perform all the conditions and stipulations of
the contract was sufficient to give him a
standing in court. Irvin v. Gregory, 13
Gray, 215, 218; Hunter v. Bales, 24 Ind.
299. 303; Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind. 576, 579.
But the decree of specific performance ought
not to become operative until he brings

S to a

intocourtforthedefendantthe full amount
necessary to payoff the notes for principal
and interest falling due in 1885, 1886, and
Caldwellv.Cassidy,8Cow.271; Hax1887
tonv. Bishop, 3 Wend. 13, 21; Hills v. Place,
supra; Wood v. Saving Co., supra; Webster V. French, 11 111. 254, 278; Carley r.
Vance, 17 Mass. 389, 391 : Doyle v. Teas, 4
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Scam.

McDaneld v. Kimbrell,
The defendant is not en-

202, 261, 267 ;

3 G. Greene, 335.

titled to interest after the respective tenders were made, because it does not appear
that the plaintiff has, since the tenders,
realized any interest upon the moneys left
by him for Cheney at the bank of Russell
& Holmes.
Davis v. Parker, 14 Allen, 94,
104; January v. Martin, 1 Bibb, 586, 590;
Hart V. Brand, 1 A. K. Marsh. 159, 161; 2
Sug. Vend. (8th Amer. Ed.^

628.)

314, 315, (627,

The decree below is affirmed. But it is
adjudged and ordered that the said decree
be and is hereby suspended, and shall not
become operative until the plaintiff brings
into the court below for the defendant the
full amount of the notes for principal and
interest executed by him to the defendant,
and madepayable on the 28th daysofMay,
1885, 1886, and 1887, without interest upon
any note after its maturity.
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Appeal from district court, Washington
county; McCluer, Judge.
W. H. Norris, for appellant. Fnyetto
Marsh, for E. W. Durant and others.
N. & I. W. Cfistle, for E. L. Hospes and
Searlea dk Gail, tor Union
Isaac Staples.
Depot St. Ry. & T. Co.

J.

Vanderburrh, J. The demurrers to the
complaint interposed in behalf of defendants Durant, Hospes, Hersey, Staples, the
Union Depot Company, and O'Gorman,
receiver, were sustained by the trial court,
and the complaint held sufficient as to the
From the order susother defendants.
taining the demurrer the plaintiff appeals,
and the principal question presented for
our determination is whether the complaint states a cause of action in respect
to the defendants

above named.

Gener-

actions of this kind, the
merits can be best determined upon proofs
after answer; but we will examine and
consider such questions as are fairly before us on this appeal.
brought solely
1. If the action were
against the defendants who executed the
contract for the right of way, whom, for
convenience, we will style "obligors,"
though equitable relief is demanded, a recovery might be had for damages, and
treating it as an action for damages, the
defendants would, if they required it, be
entitled to a jury trial. Davison v. Associates, 71 N. Y. 334.
But certain lots,
through which the right of way was bargained for, are alleged to have been conveyed to certain other defendants, who
are joined in the action, and who are not
parties to the agreement, and against
whom equitable relief, by way of specific
performance, is sought. The two causes
of action — one for damages and one for
the special relief — cannot properly be united, and this is one ground of the demurrer.
The action, then, must be treated as an
equitable
one for specific performance,
with incidental relief, by way of compensation for such portion of the property
in question as cannot be reached ; and the
sufficiency of the complaint must be determined solely In respect to the right of the
plaintiff to such relief.
2. It is charged
in the complaint that,
In order to induce the plaintiff to construct a line of its railroad from a point
on its River Division from Hastings to the
city of Stillwater, the defendants Staples,
Durant, Hospes, Hersey, and Sabin, with
one Torinus, since deceased, on the 15th
•day of July, 1881, agreed in writing with
this plaintiff that the city of Stillwater
would and should give this plaintiff a
right of way, 56 feet wide, through certain
real property, as described in the complaint; and that on its part the plaintiff.
In and by the same agreement. In consideration of the Dremises, undertook and
ally, in equitable
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agreed, among other things, that It would
at once begin the construction of such
branch line, and continue the same with
all practical dispatch until the completion
thereof; and that it did in all things well
and truly fulfill and perform such agreement on its part. There is no doubt as
to the sufficiency of the consideration to
uphold the undertaking of the defendants,
or that the parties are mutually bound,
subject to the conditions of the contract.
Railroad Corp. v.Babcock,6 Mete. (Mass.)
846.
3.

In respect to the defendants in whose
favor the demurrer was sustained, it is
not claimed that any of them now own or
are interested in the property in question
here, except the Union Depot Company,
and O'Gorman, receiver. The last named
are not parties to the agreement, but are
properly joined as having some interest in
the property. But the decree of the court
for specific performance of the contract
could only be made operative against
them, or any other persons than the
original obligor^, in so far as they have
acquired from the latter portions of the
right of way contracted for with notice.
As to such lands, such parties would
stand in their shoes, and be bound; but
as to the lots acquired by the Union Depot Company of other parties, by purchase or condemnation, the contract is entirely nugatory, and in respect to the several tracts of land designated in the complaint as having been so acquired by the
Union Depot Company, it could not be
bound in this action. From the terms of
the contract providing that the city
would give a right of way, and the specification of the ownership of the several lots
set forth in the complaint, it will not be
Implied that the defendants at any time
owned or had title to any of them, save
as therein set forth. From the complaint
It appears that theUniou Depot Company
acquired title to the north 49 feet of lot 2,
in block 28, from Helen M. Torinus and
Louis E. Torinus, her husband. What the
latter's interest was, does not appear.
The defendant Sabin, one of the signers of
the agreement in question, acquired, by
purchase from Torinus, an undivided half
of the south 35 feet, in width, of lot 7,
and of the north 56 feet of lot 8, September 16, 1881. Sabin also purchased of defendant Durant and another, September, 1881,
the north 15 feet in width of lot 7, and the
undivided half of the south 35 feet in width
half of the
thereof, and the undivided
north 56 feet in width of lot 8; and at the
same time purchased of Torinus the other
undivided half of south 35 feet of lot 7,
and north 56 feet of lot 8. Sabin also purchased lot 5, and a portion of lots 5, 7, and
8, described in the complaint, was conveyed by him to the Union Depot Company, and is included in the right of way, 56
feet in width, described in the agreement.
It is also alleged that the title in fee to the
south 30 feet in width of lot 8 to lot 9, and
the north 75 feet in width of lot 10, block
28, appear to be in the city of Stillwater,
since 1875, as and for a part of Nelson
street, and as part and parcel of the " Levee, " so called.
It further appears that
the depot company have acquired divers
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other parcels of the same block from other
persons, not parties to the contract, and
have also granted to the plaintiff a certain portion of the lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, in blocli 28, lying within sucli 66-feet
strip, or right of way. The defendant Sabin is the only one of the signers of the
contract who appears to have title to any
of the land in question, in block 28, and hia
interest is confined to that part of lots 5,
7, and 8, above described, and not already
conveyed to the depot company.
The only land in block 28, within the right of
way, which. In case specific conveyance
were decreed under the contract, would
be subject to be so conveyed, is the land
held by Sabin, and so much of the land of
the depot company within the right of
way not already conveyed to the plaintiff
by it as it derived from Sabln, as above
stated.
As before intimated, land procured by the depot company from strangers to the contract would not be affected
by it. As to block 27, the obligors, by the
same contract, further agreed to purchase
so much of block 27 as lay east of the alley, and to grant such right of way, as
aforesaid, through the same to the plaintiff. As respects the lots in this half block,
through which the right of way in question was in fact located, it appears that
on September 15, 1881, the Union Depot
Company, defendant, acquired title from
Isaac Staples to one-half of lot 1, and lots
3, 4, and 5; and March 1, 1882, from defendant Hersey and others, to the other
half of lot 1; and March 23, 1882, to lot 2,
from Seymour, Sabin & Co., of which firm
defendant Sabin was .: member. It does
not appear, however, what Interest Hersey and Sabin had in the lots conveyed.
4. The city has not furnished the right of
way, as agi-eed, and the defendants have
not caused it to be done, or procured it
themselves, through either block.
Tlie
question now arises whether, upon the
facts herein stated, a case is made for the
interposition of a court of equity so as to
warrant a decree for specific performance
as to the defendants Union Depot Company and Sabin, and to award a judgment for damages against other defendants, by way of compensation for the deficiency. The court will not undertake to
compel the defendants, jointly or severally,
to purchase the specific property, or to
procure the right of way from the city.
And it is not a case for compensation, because, conceding that the court niigbt
compel the depot company and Sabin to
convey a partial interest representing a
relative or proportionate share of individual obligors, as above described, the same
would be relatively so small, as compared
with the whole amount embraced in the
contract, that the compensation or damages would apparently be the main object
of the suit, in such cases a court of
equity will not assess damages as compensation, but only where they are incidental to the principal ground of relief,
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and the court will leave the party to hi9
action at law, unless he will consent toaccept the part subject to conveyance
without damages. Earl of Durham v.
Legard, 34 Law J. Ch. 590. In some
cases, however, where the vendor shows
title to a portion only of the land contracted, or has wrongfully parted with
part, justice maybe donebyan apportionment of the consideration, if the vendee
consent to take part with an abatement
of the price. 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. (4th Ed.),
pt. 2, p. 1146. So, where the vendee knows
at the time of entering into the contract
(as may be implied in this case from the
terms of the contract) that the vendor
has title to a part only of the land, compensation will be denied. Wat. Spec. Peri.
This is not
§ 506; 5 Wait, Act. & Def.781.
a case between vendor and vendee. By
the contract the right of way was to be
procured by or from others by gift or purchase. The plaintiff did not contract for
a conveyance from the defendants. It did
not rely upon the individual ownership of
the obligors. The city was to give the
right of way; and, as to block 27, the defendants were to purchase the entire half
block jointly, and jointly bear the harden.
It was not fairly within the contemplation of the parties that the interests
which the individual obligors might havein some of the land embraced in the proposed right of way should be made subject to enforced conveyance under the contract, if unfulfilled in its scope and purpose by the obligors, who jointly entered
into it. Equity, it is true, looks at the
substance of the contract, and, when the
agreement can be substantially, though
not literally, carried out, without changing the nature of the contract, or substituting a new one, and do justice between
the parties, it will be so enforced. The
doctrine of compensation rests upon this
principle.
And so where land is held astenants in common by several persons,
who have joiutly agreed to convey the
same, some of whom are not bound, or
are deceased, those who are liable, or
who survive, may be compelled, in a suit
on the contract, to convey their individual or proportionate interests as tenants
in common. Hooker v. Pynchon. 8 Gray,
550.
But such is not this case. The contract did not contemplate a conveyance
of individual interests, but the acquisition
of the right of way by the public, and by
the joint act or purchase by the obligors ;
and, as to block 27, an essential condition
and inducement to the parties was the
purchase of the half block, and not the
right of way merely. In any view of the
case,
and apart from the question of
laches, considering the nature of the contract, the state of the title, the indefiniteness and uncertainty in the description
set forth in the contract, we think that
the parties should be left to their action
at law, and the interposition of a court of
eq nity is not warranted.
Order affirmed.
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HAFFEY

V.

LYNCH.

(38 N. EJ. 298, 143 N.

Y.

Court of Appeals of New York.

241.)

Oct

9, 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
first department.
Action by Michael H. HafCey against Sarah
Lynch for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. From a judgment of the general term (23 N. Y. Supp. 59)
affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Charles Strauss, for appellant
Anderson, for respondent

Henry H.

EARL, J. At an auction sale of the defendant's real estate the plaintiff purchased a
parcel of land described In the complaint at
the price of $7,800, and paid 10 per cent of
the purchase price, besides certain fees and
The parties signed a written conexpenses.

tract specifying the terms of s^le, and the
time and place of full performance by the
By the written contract the defendparties.
ant was to convey the land "by the usual
deed containing full covenants with warranty." The defendant did not tender to the
plaintiff such a deed as he claimed he was entitied to, and then he commenced this action
against her to compel the specific performUntil the trial of the
ance of the contract
action it appeared that she had at the time
of the sale such a titie to the land as she
But subsequently one
was bound to give.
Nathaniel Jarvis, Jr., claiming the land in
fee, brought an action of ejectment against
her to recover the land, and filed a lis pendens. The plaintiff knew of this claim and
f
this
when he commenced
J the lis pendens
/action; and solely on account of the existand such knowlence of the lis pendens,
edge thereof, the court refused specific perWe
formance, and dismissed the complaint
think the learned court fell into error, and
that tpon the undisputed facts found. It
shoidd have given to the plaintiff judgment
for specific performance.
We must first notice the issue joined by
The plaintiff alleged in his
the pleadings.
complaint the contract; that he had performed the same, and was ready and willing to
perform the same upon receiving such a
conveyance as he was entitled to; that after
several postponements of time for the performance of the contract at the request of
the defendant her attorney tendered to him
a deed of the land, at the same time saying
to him that she could not give him a valid
and marketable titie to the land, because it
was incumbered; that he rejected the deed
on the ground of the alleged incumbrance
upon the land, at the same time notifying her
that he was ready and willing to perform on
his part if she would give him such a deed
as he was entitied to; that she refused to
give him such a deed; that the title to the
land was Incumbered and rendered unmar-
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ketable by the lis pendens filed In the ejectment action; that the defendant could at all
times have obtained the cancellation and dis-.
charge of the lis pendens, and could havel
conveyed to him such a title as the contract j
entitled him to. She, in her answer, ad- 1
mitted the making of the contract; denied
that he had performed, or was ready and
willing to perform, the contract, on his part;
admitted the commencement of the ejectment
suit and the filing of the lis pendens; alleged that she had tendered to him such a
deed as she was bound to give; denied that
she was at any time unable or unwilling
to convey the land; and alleged that she
could at all times since the execution of the
contract have conveyed the titie of the land
to him according to the contract, had she
been so disposed,
and that she has at all
times been ready and willing so to do. It
thus appears that the issue between the parties was as to the performance of the contract the plaintiff alleging that he had performed,- and was ready and willing to perform, and the defendant alleging that she
had performed, and was ready, willing and
able to perform, on her part On the trial
the plaintiff was the sole witness sworn, and
the trial judge, after finding the ownership
of the land by the defendant, and the making
of the contract, found as follows: "That the
plaintiff has in all things performed all the
terms and conditions of said contract, and
has been, on his part, ready and willing to
fulfill the same, and accept a conveyance of
the fee of the said property."
"That the
said defendant, through her attorneys, has,
prior to the commencement of this action, refused to make said conveyance under the
said agreement, notwithstanding the plaintiff's frequent requests therefor."
"That
such refusal on the part of the defendant to
make such conveyance was due to the fact
that one Nathaniel Jarvis, Jr., had, after
said sale, but before the day fixed for the
delivery of the deed thereunder, commenced
an action in ejectment in this court against
said defendant claiming the ownership of
the premises in question, and had filed a
notice of the pendency of said action in the
office of the clerk- of the city and county of
New York, on March 6. 1889." "That thereafter, and before the trial of this action, the
said ejectment suit was brought to trial,
and the complaint therein was dismissed, and
from the judgment entered on which dismissal an appeal was taken to the general
term of this court which court affirmed said
judgment; and no appeal from said order of
the general term has been taken to the court
of appeals, and the time to do so has now
expired."
"That the said plaintiff has expressed his consent at the trial of this action
to accept from the defendant a conveyance
of said land by the usual deed containing
full covenants with warranty, subject to the
reservations contained in the eighth paragraph of the said terms of sale." "That
less than three years have passed since the
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rendering of judgment and the filing of the
damages for a breach of contract
The rule
Judgment roU in the said decision of Jarvis
has been modified since the Code practice
V. Lynch."
And he found, as conclusions of
which authorizes the joinder of legal and
law, "that the sale having been made in
equitable causes of action; and, while the
good faith, and the question as to the title
equitable relief will be denied in such a case,
of the said premises having arisen since the
now the action wUl be retained, and the issue
sale, the defendant should not be compelled
as to the breach of contract and damages
to give a warranty deed, or procure a policy
will be sent to a jury for trial. Sternberger
of title insurance of the Lawyers' Title Inv. McGovem, 56 N. Y. 12. But this rule was
surance Company, insuring the title to the
adopted in equity not solely because at the
said premises to' the plaintiff;" "that the detime of the commencement of the action the
fendant is entitled to judgment dismissing
defects In the title existed, to the knowledge
the complaint upon the merits of the action;"
of the vendee, but also because the case was
"that such judgment should be without prejsuch that at the time of the rendition of
udice to the right of the plaintiff to bring
the judgment the court could not grant the
an action for damages for breach of the conequitable relief. The rule and the ground
tract set forth in complaint."
upon which it Is based have no application to
The plaintiff has been defeated In his aca case where the defect has disappeared at
tion thus far on the ground that It was imthe time of the triaJ, and the court can then
possible for the defendant to perform her
give an effective judgment for the equitable
contract at the time of the commencement
relief demanded;
and no case can be found,
of the action, and that he knew it was. She
prior to this, where an equity court has denied si)ecific performance because the ven(^did not set up such a defense in her answer,
but, on the contrary, alleged that she was
dor's title was defective at the commenceable and ready to perform her contract, and
ment of the action, but valid and perfect at
there was no proof showing that it was then
the time of the trial. In such a case, why
Impossible for her to perform the contract
should not the vendor perform? He is able
to, and the vendee Is entitled to performance
There was no evidence showing what basis,
if any, the claim of title to the land by unless some other defense has intervened,
and the court Is able to enforce performance!.
Jarvis had. It may have been colorable, and
not real or substantial. It did not appear
Here the plaintiff was willing to take such
1tTWS'*as"Tjifer'defeBdairt-<e<dd-- eony6yTITT5g'
that she had made any effort whatever to re■move the incumbrance of the lis pendens.
It '^^Sl. 'riI6"''e3Sctui(illl siilt "Had' Anally "re^
rwas her duty to perform the contract, and -suKSa In favor of the defendant
The lis
/to make all reasonable efforts to remove any pendens had ceased to be operative, and
I obstacle which stood In the way of her per- could, if necessary, have been removed. The
fact that Jarvis could have paid the costs
Iformance.
The plaintiff was not In fault
and taken a new trial under the statute Is of
for refusing to accept a deed which the deno Importance.
There was final judgment
fendant at the lime declared would convey
against him, and the contingency that he
an incumbered title. He was entitled to_a
might take a. new trial is of no more Immarketable title.
MdMe "V. Williams, 115
portance
than the contingency that some
[TT-^rSSBr^SrwrE. 233; Vought v. Williams.
120 N. Y. 257, 24 N. B. 195.
It Is a gen- other person might at some time commence
an action to recover the same land. Equity
eral rule in equity that the specific performcourts,
in awarding relief, generally look
ance of a contract to convey real estate vrill
at the conditions existing at the close of the
not be granted when the vendor, In contrial of the action, and adapt their relief to
sequence of a defect in his title, is unable
to perform. In such cases specific performthose conditions. The plaintiff In an equity
action, as a general rule, should not be turnance Is denied because the court cannot ened out of court on account of any defense
force its judgment, and because, also. It
would be oppressive to the vendor.
But If Interposed to his action, if at the time of the
trial the facts are such that If be then comthe defect in the title existed at the date of
menced his action he would be entitled to the
the contract, or was due to some fault or
to some act of the vendor subsequent to the
equitable relief sought
If a vendor has
contract, the court wiU generally entertain
no titl e, or a de fective tlQe^ta ^land whlch"'^
an action for specific performance, and rehe coffEFacts jo selj, "aftn 'subsequeTjily
ffj;^
tain jurisdiction for the purpose of awardtSiSs^y'tSerfecF" titled he ^ illl ^^ ''impelled
ing damages for the breach of the contract.
tiy"tHii"'g'elid ge to perform ^s contrac t. Fry.
But where, as in this case, the defect In the
AndwEy^should
tSl)u<W"l'Uri."Ba Ed.) 480
title arises after the making of the contract,
the vendor not be compelled to perform if
without any fault of the vendor, and the
he perfects his title while the action for spevendee knew of the defect In the title when
cific performance is pending? A perfect title
he commenced his action, the court will not
by the vendor Is no part of the vendee's
retain the action for the purpose of awardcause of action, and he is just as much ening the damages.
Wiswall v. McGrOwan,
titled to the equitable relief, and the equity
Hoff. Ch. 125; Morss v. Elmendorf, 11 Paige,
court Is just as competent to give It, wheth277.
This rule was adopted because the er the title of the vendor was perfected bevendee should not commence a fruitless acfore or after the commencement
of the
tion In equity simply to recover there his
action. It does not appear that anything OO'
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curred after the commencement of the action which should bar the relief asked by the
There are no complications growplaintifC.
ing out of the lapse of time, and no material
change in the situation of the parties, or
of the land in controversy.
"We therefore
sea no reason to doubt, uiwn the facts found,
th»* the plaintiff was entitled to specific perH.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 45
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formance of the contract; and the Judgment should be reversed,
and a new trial
granted, costs to abide event
and BARTLBTT, JJ.,
and GRAY. JJ., disC. J., not sitting.

FINCH, O'BRIEN,
PECKHAM

concur.
sent.

ANDREWS,

Judgment

reversed.
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GOTTHELP

V.

STRANAHAN.

(34 N. B. 286, 138 N. Y. 345.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

June

6, 1893.

Appeal from city court of Brooklyn, general term.
Action by Charles Gotthelf against James
S. T. Stranahan to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale of lands.
Prom a judgment of the general term (19
N. Y. Supp. 161) aflSrming a judgment for
plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Modified.
George
counsel,)

G. Butcher, (Wm'. O. De Witt, of
for appellant. George G. & P.

Reynolds, for respondent.

ANDREWS,

C.

J.

The original contract,

made on the 7th day of January, 1891, was
by its terms to be completed by a conveyance and payment of the unpaid purchase
money on the 9th day of Pebruary in the
same year.
The vendee was to pay for
the property the sum of $22,500, as follows:
$2,000 on the execution of the contract,
$4,750 on the execution of the deed, and the
balance of $15,750 in five years, with interest, to be secured by mortgage
on the
land. The vendor was to convey the land
by warranty deed In fee simple, free from
all incumbrance. The vendee, on the execution of the contract, paid the simi of $2,000
as provided.
the contract had been performed on the 9th day of Pebruary, 1891,
according to its terms, the question now
presented would not have arisen. The assessments
had not then been laid and, If
the deed had been given on that day, they
would have become a charge on the land
subsequent
to the conveyance, and the defendant would have been under no obligation, legal or equitable, to pay them.
They
would have attached as a charge upon the

If

But by the
title acquired by the plaintiff.
mutual assent of the parties the completion
of the contract was postponed from time to
time, in all for a period of three months,
until May 4, 1891.
The first postponement,
until Pebruary 16, 1891, was for the accommodation of the plaintiff; the others were
for the accommodation of the defendant, to
enable him to clear the land of squatters
who had gone upon it without permission
and erected shanties and hovels in which
they lived, and between whom and the defendant, in some cases, an Irregular sort of
tenancy had grown up by the payment and
receipt from time to time of small sums as
rent. During this period of three months
two assessments on the property for local
Improvements were laid and confirmed by
the city of Brooklyn,— one on the 3d day of
March, 1891, for $901.12, for the grading and
paving of Bush street; and one on the 20th
day of April, 1891, for $1,079.33, for the
grading and paving of William street. This
action Is brought by the vendee against the
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vendor to compel a specific performance of
the contract of sale. The defendant is ready
and willing and has offered to convey the
premises with covenant of warranty as of
the 9th day of Pebruary, 1891, the day
originally fixed for the execution of the deed.
The plaintiff insists that the vendor Is bound
to warrant the title as against the assess-

This is the controversy
mentioned.
case, and the point for determination
is whether the plaintiff, upon equitable principles, is entitled to the relief he seeks, and
to cast upon the defendant the burden of
paying the assessments.
He does not ask
to be relieved from the contract. He elects
to have a decree for performance upon such
conditions as the court shall determine, in
ease it shall be held that upon principles of
law or equity he is not entitled to demand
a covenant by the defendant covering th&
lien created by the assessments.
The premises contracted to be sold consisted of a block and part of a block of land
in one of the outlying wards of Brooklyn,
which, when the contract was made, was
partly covered by water, and was unfenced
and commons.
Bush street, adjoining the
southerly side of the land, was a traveled
road, and had been such for many years.
It was graded to some extent, but had not
It was an ordinary country
been paved.
road. One of the assessments was for the
ments

in the

contemplated Improvement of Bush street
William street, to which the other assessment related, was mostly under water. In
view of the peculiar system of local improvements prevailing In Brooklyn, one question
presented
Is whether the assessments
in
question constituted Incumbrances on the
land In May, 1891, when the defendant offered to convey, within the true meaning of
the contract of sale. The charter of Brooklyn is unique in respect to its system of
local Improvements. The district of assessment is to be prescribed, and the estimated
cost of contemplated local Improvements
is
required to be assessed on the district benefited, and a warrant for the collection of the
issued, and at least one-third
assessments
of the aggregate assessment must have been
collected before any contract for making the
Improvement is authorized to be made; and
the city may, even after the assessments
have been collected, decline to make a contract, or to go on with the Improvement, and
may discontinue the proceedings, returning
the money collected on the assessments. Law»

In oth1888, c. 583, tit 19, §§ 1-8, Inclusive.
er cities, assessments for local Improvements
In
follow the performance
of the work.
Brooklyn they precede the execution, and are
The contemplated imcollectible in advance.
provements of Bush and William streets, for
which the assessments In question were laid
have not yet been made. There is no explanation of the delay.
When the proceedings were
initiated does not appear, and, referring to-
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provlsloils, there can be no Inferthat any step whatever had been taken
when the contract of sale was executed, or
prior to the 9th of February, 1891, when, by
the original contract, the deed was to have
The parties entered Into a conbeen given.
The
tract for the sale of unimproved land.
consideration to be paid and received was presumably based on the value of the land In its
existing condition. William street had no existence except on the city map, and Bush
Whether this
street was an ordinary road.
condition would be changed at any time, and
whether WUUam street would be raised and
made dry land, and Bush street be improved
and brought to the condition of an ordinary
city street, could not be known by the parties
If they anticipated that at
to the contract
some time the city would enter upon the improvement of this section of the city, they
knew that any charge which might be imin the conposed on the property embraced
tract for the expense of such improvement
would represent the benefit recelveS by It from
as the theory of such asthe improvement,
sessment Is that the value of the land would
be enhanced by at least an equivalent amount.
It is impossible to suppose that the parties
contemplated when the contract was executed
created by the force of
that incumbrances
public law for Improvements initiated after
the maldng of the contract and Intermediate
that date and the time fixed for the conveyIf the
ance should be paid by the vendor.
then the
contract can have this construction,
plaintifC is entitled to property not In the condition it was In when he contracted to purchase It, but an improved estate, improved at
the expense of the vendor by the act of the
city, which he could not control. Initiated aftThis construction
er the contract was made.
would compel the vendor to pay out of the
purchase money the cost of an improvement
which by so much has Increased or will increase the value of the property, and the
vendee would acquire property which he did
not pay for.
The question as to the true meaning of the
contract to convey free from all incumbrances
Is quite different from that which would be
made intermepresented by an assessment
diate the date of the contract and the time
fixed for the conveyance for a local Improvement made before the contract was entered
into.
In that case the purchaser buys with
made, and presumably pays
the improvements
a price fixed with reference to the land in Its
The case of periodical
existing
condition.
assessed
taxes for the support of government,
and laid between the date of a contract and
the time fixed for the conveyance, would constitute an Incumbrance within the meaning of
the covenant.
The time of the imposition of
such taxes Is known In advance, and unless
excepted from the covenant would be deemed to be covered thereby. But under the charfor local Imassessments
ter of Brooklyn
the charter
ence
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are made in advance of the execuThey represent, or are supposed to represent, benefits thereafter to be
secured to the property assessed.
The time
when Improvements
will be initiated cannot
be known.
The contract to convey free from Incumordinarily has reference to incumbrances
brances or liens actually existing when the
contract is executed, or thereafter created, or
suffered by the act or default of the vendor.
While the assessments In question constituted,
under the charter of Brooklyn, liens on the
lands assessed from the time of their confirmation by the common council, and are, in a
strict sense, Incumbrances thereon, we are of
opinion that they are not incumbrances within the meaning of the contract.
They did not
diminish the value of the subject of the contract. The plaintiff will acquire what the defendant intended to sell and what he expected
to receive, and, but for the postponement of
the time of the execution of the deed, the
plaintifC would have taken his title before the
assessments
were laid. This incident ought
not to impose upon the defendant a loss pro
tanto of so much of the purchase money. But
even if the contract, by its true interpretation.
Imposes upon the defendant the legal obligation to pay the assessment, this is not decisive of the right of the plaintiff to relief
by way of specific performance. This equitable remedy cannot be claimed as a matter
of right. It is discretionary with the court
to grant or withhold it in furtherance of justice or to prevent injustice. Where, by reason of circumstances attending the making of
the contract, such as fraud, accident, mistake,
advantage has been
or where unconscionable
taken, or where, by reason of circumstances
which have intervened between the making of
the contract and the bringing of the action,
remedy
of the equitable
the enforcement
would be inequitable, and produce results not
within the intent or understanding of the parties when the bargain was made, and there
has been no Inexcusable laches or inattention
in not
by the party resisting performance,
foreseeing
and providing for contingencies
arisen, the court
which have subsequently
may and wUl refuse to specifically enforce the
contract, and will leave the party to his legal
The cases are very numerous under
remedy.
this head, and no hard and fast rule can be
formulated by which it can be readily determined how the discretion of the court in a givBut it seems to
en case should be exercised.
us to be very clear that to enforce the contract in this case by requiring the defendant
to covenant against the assessments in question would violate the spirit of the contract,
and convert the equitable power of the court
Into an instrument for the accomplishment of
rank injustice. The case of Wlllard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 564, contains an able discussion
of the principles governing the courts in administering relief by way of specific performprovements

tion of the work.
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ance of contracts, aBd Mr. Justice Field, In
hia opinion in that case, so fully cites the authorities that a further reference to them here
is unnecessary.
We think the Judgment of
the special and general terms should be modified by excepting from the scope of the cove-
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nant in the deed to be given by the defendant
the assessments
tn question, and that, as
modified, the judgment should be affirmed,
with costs to the defendant in all courts. All
concur, except GRAY, J., not voting.
Judgment accordingly.

y
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OORBIN

V.

TRACT

et aL

(34 Conn. 325.)
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Term,

Sept.

1867.

Bill in equity, brought by the petitioners,

joint stock corporation, to the superior
to compel the
court for Hartford county,
specific performance of a contract to assign
The snpeiior court (Lioomis,
a patent right
J.) passed a decree In favor of the petitioners, and the respondents filed a motion for a
The case
new trial and a motion in error.

a

is sufficientiy stated In the opinion.

C. E. Perkins, In support of the motions.
Mr. Hubbard and C. E. Mitchell, contra.

J.

CARPENTER,
It appears that the contract set out lu the plaintiffs' biU was not,
at the time of its execution, duly stamped
pursuant to the laws of the United States.
On the 26th day of March, 1867, the collect-

or of the first collection district of this state
and
caused said instrument to be stamped,
then and there entered upon its margin the

following certificate:
"I have this day afiBxed the proper stamp,
required by law, to this instrument, and satisfactory evidence having been furnished
that the omission to affix a stamp at the
proper time was the result of Inadvertence,
and without design to evade the law, the
Hartford, March 26,
penalty is remitted.
H. A. Grant, Collector."
1867.
To the admission of this instrument, thus
obthe respondents
stamped, in evidence,
The corjected, but the court received it
rectness of this ruling Is the only question
presented by the motion for a new trial.
The law of the United States (Stat 186566, p. 142) makes the instrument if executed
without a stamp, "with intent to evade the
provisions
of this act," "invalid and of no
The act further provides that the
effect."
collector of the revenue shall, upon the payment of the price of the proper stamp required by law, and of a penalty of fifty dollars, aflSx the proper stamp to such instrument, and note upon the margin thereof the
date of his so doing, and the fact that such
penalty has been paid; and the same shall
thereupon be deemed and held to be as valid,
to all intents and pmTwses, as If stamped
But this provision
when made or issued.
does not apply to this case as the respondfor there is no preents seem to suppose;
was executed
tense that this Instrument
without a stamp with the Intent to evade
the provisions of this act but on the contrary, the proper officer has expressly found
that the omission to fix stamps was the result of inadvertence, and without design to
evade the law.
There Is, however, a proviso In the act
which Is applicable to this case. That pro"That when It shall apviso is as follows:
pear to said collector, upon oath or other-
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wise, to his satisfaction, that any such Instrument has not been duly stamped at the
time of making or Issuing the same, by reason of accident mistake. Inadvertence,
or
urgent necessity, and without any willful design to defraud the United States of the
stamp, or to evade or delay the payment
thereof, then and in such case, If such instrument, &c., shall within twelve calendar
months after the first day of August, eighteen hundred and sixty six, or within twelve
calendar months after the making and Issuing thereof, be brought to the said collector
of revenue to be stamped, and the stamp
tax chargeable thereon shall be paid. It shall
be lawful for the said collector to remit the
penalty aforesaid, and to cause such instrument to be duly stamped." The act further
provides that such instrument "may be used
in all courts and places in the same manner
and with like effect as If the Instrument had
been originally stamped."
The certificate of the collector brings this
case within the spirit and letter of this part
of the act, and the contract was properly
received in evidence.
A new trial is not advised.
2. Under the motion in error, It Is objected
that the petitioners have not made out a
case for the Interference of a court of equity,—that courts of equity in this state vyill
not interfere to enforce agreements to seU
personal property unless the circumstances
are such as to make a trust, because there Is
in such a case a remedy at law by an action

for

damages.

The objection assumes .that there is a distinction, In questions of this character, between real and personal property. If any
such distinction exists, It does not go to the
extent claimed.
The ground of the jurisdiction of a court of
equity In this class of cases is that a court of
law Is inadequate to decree a specific performance,
and can relieve the Injured party
only by a compensation In damages, which. In
many cases, would fall far short of the rewhich his situation might require.
dress
Whenever, therefore,
the party wants the
thing in specie, and he cannot otherwise be
fully compensated, courts of equity will grant
They will decree
him a specific performance.
the specific performance of a contract for the
sale of lands, not because of the peculiar nature of land, but because a party cannot be
So In
adequately compensated In damages.
the general rule
respect to personal estate;
that courts of equity will not entertain jurisdiction for a specific performance of agreements respecting goods, chattels, stocks, choses In action, and other things of a merely personal nature. Is limited to cases where a comin damages furnishes a complete
pensation
2 Story, Eq. Jur.
and satisfactory remedy.
§§ 717,

718.

_ The jurisdiction, tiierefore,_of_a_court of_eg;
uitjj does~not "pfoce^ upon agy_ distinction
between

real estate" and~personal

estate,

but

\p

It

a

It

it,

ter invention may supersede
or
may Itself
be an infringement of some patent already
existing. On the other hand
may be so simpie in its principle and construction as to defy
all competition, and give its .owner
practical
monopoly of all branches of business to which

applicable.
In any event its value cannot
be known with any degree of exactness until
after the lapse of time; and even then
doubtful whether
can be ascertained with
sufficient accuracy to do substantial justice becompensation in dam--Ttl
tween the parties by
ages.
On the whole we are satisfied that
justice can only be done. In
case like this.
by a Specffic performance of the contract
There
therefore no error In the decree
complained of.
The other judges concurred.
is

it

1
1

it

a

a

is

/—

upon the ground that damages at law may
not, in the particular ease, afford a complete
remedy.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 716-718, and
cases there cited; Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231.
When the remedy at law is not full and complete, and when the effect of the hreach cannot be known with any exactness, either hecause the effect will show itself only after a
long time, or for any other reason, courts of
equity will enforce contracts in relation to personalty.
3 Pars. Cent (5th Ed.) 373.
An application of these principles to the
case before us relieves it of all difficulty. The
contract relates to a patent right, the value of
which has not yet been tested by actual use.
All the data by which its value can be estimated are yet future and contingent Experience
may prove it to be worthless, another and bet-
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November 1, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Clinton county,
In chancery; Vernon H. Smith, Judge.
This is a suit by John Hicks, Robert M.
Steel, Josiah Upton, and Cornelius Bennett
against William S. Turcli and Townsend A.
Ely, for the specific performance of a conDefendants appeal from an order
tract.
overruling their demurrer to the bill.
James L. Clark and Geo. P. Stare, for apO. Ii. Spaulding, for appellees.

pellants.

J.

SHERWOOD, O.
The bill In this case
is filed to obtain a decree for the specific performance of a contract reading as follows:
"Riverton, Neb., October 31, 1885.
"Due David S. French, attorney in fact for
Hicks, Bennett & Co., eighteen
thousand
three hundred and sixty-six dollars, ($18,366.00,) being the balance on consideration of
one-half interest in personal property and
lands this day sold Robert M. Steel, John
Hicks, William' S. Turck, and Townsend A.
Ely; above sum to be paid by assignment
of a certain mortgage on lands in Gratiot
county, Michigan, to said David S. French,
attorney, for $2,000; and balance of sixteen
thousand
three hundred and sixty-six dollars ($16,366)
to be paid by promissory note
due and payable on or before five years from
date, with annual interest at seven per cent,
per annum, said note secured by mortgage
on the undivided one-half interest in said

ranch property, as collateral security for
payment of said sum of sixteen thousand
three hundred and sixty-six dollars, and interest as aforesaid.
Wm. S. Turck.
"Townsend A. Ely."
The bill states that at the time the note
was given the complainants were a firm located and doing business under the name
of Hicks, Bennett & Co., in Michigan, and
were seized of a large quantity of lands in
the county of Franklin, in the state of Nebraska, the particular description of which
Is fully set out in the bill; that on that day
said firm by David S. French, its attorney
in fact, conveyed by full covenant warranty
deed the lands described in the bill to John
Hleks and Robert Steel, who resided at St.
Johns, Mich., and the defendants, who resided at Ahna, Mich., for the sum of $32,732; that the pm:chasers upon said sale entered upon said premises, and ever since
have had the actual possession thereof; that
on the same day Hicks, Bennett & Co. sold
to the grantees in said deed all the cattle,
stock, hay, grain, farming implements, tools,
and other personal property on said land for
the sum of $10,000; that in consideration of
the premises, and in payment to the complainants for the undivided one-half of the
said real and personal property, Turck and
Ely, who knew all about the lands, the title

it

(40 N. W. 330, T2 Mich. 311.)
Supreme Court of Michigan.

of complainants thereto, and the condition
of the personal property, agreed to pay to
complainants $21,366, being one-half of the
total purchase price of the land and personal property, the payments to be made as
$3,000 in their promissory note due
follows:
in two years, and which they gave, and that
they would secure and pay the balance of
the purchase price by assigning to the said
French, who was attorney In fact of the
complainants, a certain real-estate mortgage
of $2,000 on lands in Gratiot county, Mich.,
and for the remaining sum of $16,366 would
at once execute and deliver to French, for
complainants, their promissory note for that
amount, due on or before five years from the
date thereof, with annual interest at 7 per
cent, and seciue the payment of the same
by mortgage on the undivided half of the
lands so deeded to them; that the said
$2,000 mortgage was assigned, as promised
by the said defendant Turck, but the said
defendants refused to and have not made
the note and mortgage to complainants for
the $16,366, as they agreed to do, and still
request
refuse to comply with complainants'
for them so to do. Complainants further
say and aver in their biU that they have
complied in all things with and fully kept
their agreement with said defendants, and
performed all its requirements on their part
in the premises, and are now entitled to
have said note and mortgage from said defendants as they promised to make
in
accordance with the written agreement hereinbefore referred to, and which was, after
being made by defendants, duly given to
said French, for the complainants, who now
have the same. The complainants ask the
court, upon the foregoing facts, to decree
that defendants specifically perform their
with the complainants, and exagreement
ecute and deliver to them said note and
The defendants appeared in the
mortgage.
case, and demm'red to complainants' bill, assigning two grounds of demurrer: (1) That
the facts set up in the bill are not sufficient
to entitle complainants to the relief prayed;
complete and
have
(2) that complainants
adequate remedy at law touching all matters
The cause was heard
set up in the bill.
before Judge Smith in the Clinton circuit,
who made a decree overruling the demurrer,
and allowUig defendants 20 days in which to
answer.
We are satisfied this decree was proper.
The defendants had received the full consideration for what the complainants asked.
remedy
The complainants might have had
at law; but we are by no means sure
would be an adequate one. On the contrary,
the remedy at law, when resorted to. Is liable to a very great variety of perplexities
and embarrassments arising from the want
of the note promised, the refusal to give
gross violation of their contract,
which is
for which the demurrer concedes no excuse
can be given. The note was liable to run
it,

et aL

a
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five years, and complainants had the right
to have the amount owing thereon during all
the time it did run secured by the mortgage.
The land was not within the jurisdiction of
the courts in this state.
It could be easily
transferred to bona fide holders, and the perils of insolvency are not beyond the possibilities among business men, as all experience
shows. All these are circumstances of more
or less embarrassment when the remedy at
law is resorted to. It Is but equitable and
just that this contract should be specifically
performed upon the showing made in this
bill. This bill is not filed for an accounting,
nor to enforce payment of a debt, but to
compel a party to comply with his promise,
of+pr receiving the full consideration upon

OP CONTRACTS.

which

it was

made,

to make

and

execute

of indebtedness, and give security
for the payment thereof. There is no proceeding at law which can accomplish
this.
Equity alone can take cognizance of such a
case, and do justice between the parties.
The bill furnishes a clear case for the exercise of that sound legal discretion which
the court must always use in awarding
evidence

specific

performance,

and the learned

circuit

judge was right in so holding.
The decree below will be aflBrmed, and the cause remanded,
with Instructions to the circuit judge to allow defendants 20 days In which to answer
the bill after remittitur shall have been filed.
will recover their costs.
The complainants
The other justices concurred.

SPEOIFIO PERFORMANCE
GAGE
(65

V.

FISHER.

N. W. 809, 5 N. D. 297.)

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Nov. 11,

1895.

Appeal from district court, Burleigh counJudge.
Action by J. R. Gage against Asa Fisher.
Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
6. W. Newton and S. L. Glaspell, for appellant Alexander Hughes, for respondent.
ty; W. H. Winchester,

CORLISS,

J. We

have reached the con-

clusion in this case that we must decide
against the defendant and respondent, on
Taking the view of the
his own theory.
facts which is most favorable to him, we are
yet compelled to hold that he has neither any
defense to the note sued on, nor any valid

counterclaim against the plaintiff for money
paid by him to plaintiff in part payment of
We will state our reasons for
such note.
this conclusion as briefly as the complicated
nature of the case will permit.
The action is on a promissory note for $3,000 given by defendant to plaintiff.
The
consideration for the note was the sale by
plaintiff to defendant of 10 shares of the
stock of the First National Bank of Bismarck, N. D. The date of this transaction
The capital stock
was December 19, 1893.
of the bank was $100,000, divided into 1,000
shares of $100 each.
For some time prior to
1888, plaintiff and defendant had both been
directors of this bank, and defendant had
been president thereof. In 1888 plaintiff was
dropped from the directory, and in 1889 the
defendant also ceased to be a director. The
control of the bank was then in the bands of
a, number of stockholders,
who acted in
unison, and who were more or less hostile
Among these
to defendant and plaintiff.
stockholders
were George H. Fairchild, H.
R. Porter, and Daniel Bisenberg. This group
of stockholders will be designated in the
course of this opinion as the "Fairchild interest" The defendant, for the purpose of
securing control of the bank, began purchasing its stock, and in the summer of 1892 he
found himself the owner of 489 shares of
such stock, and in the possession of a proxy
to vote 16 shares more, owned by a Mrs.
Shaw.
Had this condition of affairs remained unchanged until the next annual
meeting, in January, 1893, the
stockholders'
defendant would have been master of the
situation, and would have secured full control of the bank, electing his own board of
oirectors, and, through them, such oflBcers
of the corporation as he might see fit to
elect.
While this condition existed, the defendant claims that he was induced to part
with his control over the Shaw stock at the
suggestion of plaintiff, and under his promise to allow him (the defendant) to control,
or in other words to direct, the voting of this
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stock at the next annual stockholders' meeting, in January, 1893. Relying on this promise of the plaintiff to defendant, who, unquestionably, could have voted the Shaw
stock at such meeting, had he so desired, defendant notified Mrs. Shaw that she could
sell this stock to the Fairchild interest
The
plaintiff, the defendant, and Mrs. Shaw were
all hostile to the Fairchild interest; and the
motive which prompted defendant in releasing his control over the Shaw stock, and
In suggesting to Mrs. Shaw that she sell it
to the enemy, was apparently a desire to induce the Fairchild interest to assume the
heaviest possible burden, without at the
same time giving them control of the majority of the stock. Defendant, having purchased 2 more shares, was now the owner
of 491 shares; and, when plaintiff promised
him control of his 10 shares, defendant felt
sure of a majority, and therefore permitted
the control of the Shaw stock to pass from
him. Plaintiff now held the balance of power. The Fairchild interest began to bid for
his stock. Finding that plaintiff, despite his
promise to allow defendant to control his
stock at the meeting, intended to sell to the
enemy unless he (the defendant) purchased
It for the sum of $5,000, he finally yielded to
this demand, and the contract of sale was entered into on this basis. It is not claimed,
however, that plaintiff, from the start, intended to inveigle by his promises the defendant into a position where he could take
advantage of the necessities of his situation
to extort from him an exorbitant price for
the stock.
Fraud is not claimed, except as it
is urged that plaintiff's subsequent conduct
was fraudulent in contemplation of law.
Two thousand dollars of the purchase price
was paid at the time of the sale, and the
note in suit, for $3,000, was given for the
balance of the consideration. Subsequently
the defendant paid $1,000 on this note, and
thereafter this suit was brought to recover
the remaining $2,000 due thereon, with interest. The defendant interposed as a counterclaim a claim to recover back the $3,000 so
paid; having, as he insists, rescinded the
contract, and offered to restore to plaintiff
the 10 shares of stock delivered under it
The trial court rendered judgment in his favor, both on the plaintiff's claim against him,
and on his claim against the plaintiff; directing
that the note be canceled, and that defendant
recover from plaintiff the consideration paid,
namely, $3,000.
It is true that the plaintiff
claims, and he so testified, that the agreement
between him and the defendant was that he
would give defendant the preference in purchasing the stock, in case he offered as much
for it as the Fairchild interest; and. If this
be the case, he was acting strictly under the
contract, in demanding the sum of $5,000 for
his stock from the defendant. In that event,
both law and good morals would approve the
course.
But the trial court found that the
contract was as we have stated, and we will
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for the purpose of this decision,
uation to extort from him an exorbitant price
that this finding is correct. The defendant
for the stock. The fallacy of this reasoning
certainly cannot, and he does not, claim that
lies in its untenable assumption that defendhe proved a case more favorable to himself
ant, at the time he bought the stock for
than the findings, nor does he pretend that
$5,000, under the stress of necessity, could
he can ever establish a stronger case on anhave maintained an action against plaintiff
other trial.
to compel the specific performance by him
Taking these findings as the basis of our
of his contract to allow defendant to vote his
decision, we are very clear that the court
If, at the time de(the plaintiff's) stock.
erred in deciding the case in favor of the defendant agreed to pay $5,000 for this propThe court erred in its conclusions
fendant.
erty, he was powerless to secure redress in
of la-w that the facts found established a
a court of equity,— if at that time the plaindefense to the note, and also a valid countertiff could not be compelled to permit him
claim for the $3,000 paid on account of the
(the defendant) to vote the stock,— then plainpurchase price. We regard the contract for
tiff had a perfect legal right to sell to whom
the sale of the 10 shares of stock for $5,000
he pleased^ for such price as he could obas entirely legal, and we do not consider
tain, and therefore had an undoubted legal
that the defendant is in position legally to
right to sell to defendant for $5,000, so long
price
claim that, because an unconscionable
as defendant, being under no other pressure
was extorted from him on account of the nethan that of his necessities, agr eedjp pay
cessities of the situation, he has any right,
l^gL^m 'toJ;_'iJ^'"L>efenaant has no right ^
after having, with full knowledge of the
insist that he~"was unexpectedly placed in
facts, submitted to the demand, to rescind
this peculiar position, relying on the promise
the contract he deliberately made.
If it is of plaintiff; for, if it was a pro mise which a
true (but we express no opinion on this
cou rt of e quity wouSTnot enforce, ne had no'
question of fact) that the plaintiff, after hav- "RgETtoTeiySD BtrCE-promise.
He was*BOTina
ing induced the defendant to part with the
te'~EHbw that ihe plaintiff might refuse to
carry out his agreement, and that In that
control of the corporation, by letting the
Shaw stock slip from him on promise to subevent he (the defendant) would be powerless
stitute his (plaintiffs) stock for the Shaw
to compel its performance, but must, to save
stock, and to allow defendant to use the
himself from being baffled in his scheme,
plaintiff's stock as he (the defendant) could
buy the stock at such a figure as it could be
purchased for. Even assuming the contract
have used the Shaw stock at the next annual
meeting, his subsequent conduct in repudiatto allow defendant to control the stock to be
ing his agreement was an act of gross pervalid, so that its breach would subject plainfidy, and the using of his power, under such
tiff to liability for damages, still defendant
circumstances, to coerce the defendant into
cannot use the breach of that promise as a
paying an exorbitant price for this stock,
basis for rearing upon it this'' argument
that plaintiff took advantage of his neceswhich was worth in the general market not
sities, unless such contract could be specifwas base and dishonorable
in
over $500,
ically enforced in equity. Plaintiff had a leBut the decision of this case
the extreme.
gal right to take advantage of his necessities,
turns on a larger question,-^;thejuieatum-fl£
There Is no pretense that
and exact such price as he could under the
pubUcp^icy^
"plainBicwasguilty of any fraud in the sale circumstances secure, if he could not be compelled by a court of equity to allow defendof the stock. Thenartiea both dealt at arm 's
ant to vote the stock. If plaintiff could break
_Jength. There was no concealment o f any fact.
Inhere was no misrepresentation, wnafever
this promise without liability for damages,
relation of confidence which theretofore exbecause it was void, he could charge what
isted between the plalntifC and defendant
he chose for the stock, and defendant would
must have ceased, whatever esteem which
have no legal ground for complaint. So if
the defendant had entertained for the plainthe breach of this promise, assuming it to
tiff must have instantly perished, when he
be valid, subjected him to liability only for
damages, he yet could break it, and compel
was confronted by the plaintiff with this, to
the defendant to buy the stock and pay him
the defendant, unconscionable demand that
he pay him $5,000 for stock which, as dewhat he asked for it, without rendering himfendant understood, the plaintiff had agreed
self liable to the charge of having, in legal
contemplation, extorted an unconscionable
he was to have the right to use at the meeting without compensation. Whatever defendcontract from the defendant. Suppose that
ant did at this time must have been done,
the contract was valid, and that its breach
not cheerfully, in a spirit of confidence, but
would have subjected the plaintiff to liabilreluctantly, with, anger in his hear t, and
ity for $500 damages. He might have broken
therefore with ITS' disposition on his part to
It, and then have taken the position that,
yield to any demand, except so far as coerced
while he was liable for these damages, he
by the necessities of his position.
yet had the undoubted legal right to break
It is said that plaintiff having, by his prom- such contract and Incur such liability, and
ises, induced the defendant to place himself
thereupon sell the stock to whom he pleased,
In the plaintiff's power, the plaintiff should
without being liable for anything more; and.
not be allowed to take advantage of the sitIf the defendant desired to purchase on the
assume,
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terposition of
court of equity. But, when
such peculiar features exist, equity will decree specific performance. Eckstein v. Downing (N. H.)
Atl. 626; Appeal of Goodwin
Gas-stove & Meter Co. (Pa. Sup.) 12 Atl.
736; Cook, Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law,
737, 738; White v. Schuyler,
Abb. Prac. (N.
S.) 300; Treasurer v. Mining Co., 23 Cal. 390;
True V. Houghton,
Colo. 318; Bumgardner v. Leavitt (W. Va.) 13 S. E. 67.
When
the only peculiar feature is the desire of the
plaintiff, with the aid of the stock he is seeking to obtain, to secure the control of
corporation, this, perhaps, so far from being a
ground for taking the case out of the ordinary rule, may be a reason for denying the
relief sought. While it is not Illegal for a^
controlling Interest
stockholder to buy up
In a corporation, and so absolutely rule its
affairs, and while it is also true that agreements to vote stock together are not, when
carried out, Ulegal, in the sense that the law
regards the vote as void or voidable, yet it
may be contrary to public policy for a court
of equity to decree specific performance of
contracts touching the control of stock, where
the sole object of the person who is seeking
to enforce the contract is thereby to secure
control of the corporation. We do not say
that such a contract is necessarily void, as
repugnant to pubUc policy, but we are by no
means clear that a court of equity would
specifically enforce it. It may be that sound
public policy demands that a court of equity
should never lend its aid to the enforcement
of a contract relating to stock, when the sole
object of the person who wishes it enforced
Is to give that person control of the corporate affairs. Efforts are often put forth to
secure the management of a corporation,
which are inspired by laudable motives. But
it is also true that many of these schemes
to obtain the control of corporation are conceived and carried on in a spirit inimical to
the interests of the minority stockholders,
and not infrequently for the purpose of so
managing the affairs of the corporation as to
force them to sell their holdings at practically such a figure as the majority stockholders
should dictate. Should courts of equity adopt
minority stockholdthe practice of giving to
er the right to enforce specific performance
contract to buy stock, simply to enable
of
him to control the corporation, or, what is(
still more indefensible, the right to vote or\
control the voting of stock that he does not
own, to enable him to secure control of the
corporation, they would find that in many
cases they had suffered their functions to be
perverted by designing rren; that they had
in fact been lending to dishonorable schemes
such effectual aid as to insure their consummation. Proof that the object was legitimate, that the motive was pure, would furnish no guaranty that the real purpose was
not to wreck or mismanage the corporate affairs.
In no case can court determine with
certainty just what course the minority
a

The defendant could not complain
'that an unfair advantage had been taken of
him, for, if it is the law that a court of equity will not enforce such an agreement as
the original one in this case, but will leave
then
the party to his action for damages,
defendant was bound to know that he was
all the time at the mercy of the plaintiff,
who might at any moment repudiate the contract, without other liability than for damages; and the defendant was in this positloi because be had failed to take the pretion
to secure a promise that would fully
caution
can
He has no legal right to apjiro
rotect him.
peal to equity for relief because the plaintiff took advantage of this struggle for supremacy to exact from him (defendant) an
enormous price for his stock, if he (the defendant) failed to secure from plaintiff such
a contract to protect him against such exaction as a court of equity would enforce for
his protection. Before this promise to allow the defendant to vote the stock was
made, plaintiff might have sold his stock to
defendant for $5,000 without the possibility
ot any rescission of the contract. If defendant saw fit to let the Shaw stock go, without
securing in place of it an agreement that he
could enforce in equity against the plaintiff,
and without securing the plaintiff's stock itself, he voluntarily relinquished his vantage
(ground without taking the precaution to protect himself legally, and trusted himself and
his interests to tije honor of the plaintiff;
knswing full well, as he testifies himself, that
the plaintiff, in the Impending struggle for supremacy, would be sorely tempted to desert
Vhim, and, being only human, might fall.
If we should affirm this judgmenl^ we
would give the defendant all the benefit he
<!ou]d have obtained from
decree of specific
performance, rendered before the stockholders' meeting, that defendant be allowed to
vote the stock.
Defendant would recover
his money; plaintiff would have back his
stock; and it is undisputed that defendant
has in fact voted the stock in the manner he
desired to vote, and has, through the use of
this stock, secured control of the corporation.
We are satisfied that, both on principle and
tinder sound authority, the true rule is that
Z' a court of equity shoiild never specifically enforce
contract by which one person agrees
that another should control his stock without
purchasing it, where the sole ground of the
appeal to equity is the desire of the party
making the appeal to secure control of a corporation through the use of the stock he is
It is a general rule
control.
)»flms seeking to
/that a court of equity will not enforce a
specific performance of a contract for the
Corporate stock
Sk sale of personal property.
comes within the scope of this rule, unless
there are peculiar features calling for the In-
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same terms as another person had offered,
he had a legal right to make a new contract
of sale with him (the defendant), and the
contract would be as valid as a sale to a
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stockholder, when armed by the court with
this absolute power over the corporation, will
pursue when he has attained hia vantage
"ground.
It is therefore possible that the
question whether specific performance should
be decreed ought not to turn on the court's
1 surmise or guess as to the ulterior purpose of
\the person who is seeking to secure control;
'but because there is always danger that such
purpose may be dishonest, and because the
court can never surely know the truth as to
the real motive, it may be that courts of equity should inflexibly refuse to aid the minority stockholder In his effort to obtain control. In this case the defendant's motive appears to have been honorable, and we have
no doubt that such is the fact.
He was
merdy seeking to take the management of
the bank from persons who, in his judgment,
were mismanaging it, and resume control of
its affairs, that it might be built up for the
benefit, necessarily, of all stockholders.
But
perhaps this fact should not influence us.
If the specific enforcement of such a contract
is to turn oo the opinion of the court touching motives, it is obvious that in many cases
dishonest projects will receive effectual equitable aid.
The decision of the Pennsylvania supreme court In Foil's Appeal, 91 Pa.
/St. 434, strongly supports the view that eq'
uity would not specifically enforce a contract
for the sale of stock where the only ground
for invoking the aid of the court is the peculiar value of the stock to the person who
has contracted to buy it, because of his de^slre to secure control of the corporation.
The bill In that case was filed to compel
specific performance of a contract to purchase stock in a national bank.
The basis
of the application to equity was the desire of
the plaintiff to secure control of the bank.
The coxiit unanimously held that, on grounds
of public policy, the relief should be denied.
The court said: "While the legal right of the
complainant to buy up sufBcient of the stock
of this bank to control it in the interest of
himself and friends may be conceded, it is
by no means clear that a court of equity will
lend its aid to help him.
A national bank is
a quasi public institution.
While it is the
property of the stockholders, and Its profits
inure to their benefit, it was nevertheless intended by the law creating it that it should
be for the public accommodation.
It furnishes a place, supposed to be safe, In which
the general public may deposit their moneys,
and where they can obtain temporary loans
upon giving the proper security. There are
three classes of persons to be protected,— the
the noteholders, and the stockdepositors,
holders.
We have no intimation that the
bank, as at present organized, is not prudently and carefully managed. The stock, as now
held, is scattered among a variety of people,
and held in greater or lesser amounts.
It Is
difficult to see how the small stodiholders,
who have their modest earnings invested in
It, the depositors, who use it for the safe-
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keeping of their moneys, or the business public, who look to it for accommodation in the
way of loans, are to be benefited by the concentration of a majority of its stock in the
hands of one man, or in such way that one
man and his friends shall control it. * • »
We are In no doubt as to our duty in the
premises.
We are of opinion that the end
sought to be attained by this bill is against
public policy, and for that reason we refuse
our aid."
It Is true that some stress was laid by the
court on the fact that the plaintiff was operating with borrowed capital, in his efforts
to secure control of the bank. Biit this fact
was not treated as decisive, and it is clear
from the whole trend of the opinion that the
absence of this fact would not have resulted
in a different ruling in the case. Moreover,
this fact was adverted to as tending to sho^r
that the object was to speculate, and not to
Invest funds in corporate stock. But in the
case at bar the defendant never intended to
Invest a dollar in plaintiff's stock until he was
compelled to do it to enable him to accomplish his real purpose, which was to secure
control of the bink. In Moses v. Scott (Ala.)
4 South. 742, after stating that a vote based
upon a prior agreement to vote as a unit
would not necessarily be Illegal, the court
say, at page 744: "Whether an agreement tovote as a unit, or as an agreed majority may
dictate, for any given length of time, is a
contract so binding in its terms that no party
to it can withdraw from it or disregard it
without the consent of his fellows, may be a
Possibly public policy
different question.
may exert an influence in the solution of this
problem.
And even if such a contract be
lawful, and on its face exert a continuing
force, the grave question comes up, will a
court of chancery, in its enlightened discretion, lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract of so doubtful policy?" However, we
are not called upon to settle this interesting
The case before us
question in this case.
presents a stronger one against the exercise
of the equitable powers of the courts to enforce specific performance than a contract for
the purchase of stock; for here the contract
the
was to give the minority stockholder
right to dominate and direct the judgment of
the plaintiff, as stockholder, in the voting of
his stock, without owning the stock himself.
Every other stockholder
in the bank had
the right to demand that the plaintiff should,
if he desired so to do, exercise at the very
time of the annual meeting his own judgment^
as to the best interests of all the stockholders, untrammeled by dictation, and unfetterWe
ed by the obligation of any contract.
know of no case where a court of equity has
enforced such an agreement We regrard as
controlling on this question the rule that an
irrevocable proxy to vote stock is revocable.
See Cook, Stock, Stockh. & Coip. Law, § 610,
note 6.

There is another reason, and to our mind
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still stronger reason for holding that defendant could not have secured in a court of equity a decree specifically enforcing this conThe plaintiff's promise to allow the
tract.
defendant to control his stock was based upon an illegal consideration, — one condemned
by public policy,— and the promise was thereThe trial court
fore not binding In law.
found that before defendant suffered the
Shaw stock to pass beyond his control, and
before plaintiff tiad agreed to permit defendant to control his stock, defendant had informed the plaintiff that it was his purpose
to vote his own and the Shaw stock to make
plaintiff one of the directors of the bank,
and that it was also his purpose to cause him
(plaintiff) to secure employment in the bank
when the new board of directors was elected;
that he desired the advice and co-operation of
plaintiff in securing such control, and the selection of suitable persons to put in the diThe court
rectory to carry out his plans, etc.
also found that thereafter plaintiff represented to defendant that he did ngt need the
Shaw stock "to accomplish his said purpose,"
interthat he had better let the Pairchild
that stock, and that he (the
est purchase
plaintiff) would not permit his stock to be
bought or controlled by the PairchUd interest, but that he would vote his stock with
the defendant's stock at the next annual
stockholders' meeting, for the persons agreed
upon by plaintiff and defendant for directors,
and would in every way aid and assist defendant in the consummation of his plans for
securing the possession, control, and manageThese findment of the bank and Its affairs.
ings make it apparent that one of the considerations,
if not the main consideration,
which infiuenced plaintiff in agreeing to give
defendant control of his stock, was the previous statement of defendant that he intended to make plaintiff a director, and see that
In the bank by the new
he was employed
board of directors to be elected at the apThat both
proaching stockholders' meeting.
parties understood that at least a portion of
the consideration for plaintiff's co-operation
with defendant in the project to obtain control of the corporation was the promise of
defendant
to give him employment in the
bank is apparent from a written contract
subsequently
entered into between the parties. On the 19 th of December, but entirely
separate from the contract of sale, the defendant signed and delivered to plaintiff, who
accepted the same, the following memorandum of agreement: "Bismarck, N. D., Dec.
19, 1892.
In consideration of J. R. Gage
joining me in effecting the controlling interest of the capital stock of the First National
hereby agree to furnish
Bank of Bismarck,
said J, R. Gage a position as cashier of said
bank at a salary of not less than $100 per
month, payable monthly, beginning at the
11th day of January, 1893, and during his
ability to perform his duties as cashier, provided such control is assumed at such time:
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Asa Fisher."
In connection with this agreement the court made a finding of fact which
conclusively shows that, all along, one of the
inducements to plaintiff's promise to vote his
stock with defendant's stock was the promise
of the latter to give him a place in the bank.
"That said agreement was signed by the defendant, Fisher, and was then and there, on
said 1901 day of December, 1892, delivered to
plaintiff, J. R. Gage, by the defendant, and
was then and there accepted and retained
by said plaintiff, and he, the said plaintiff,
then and there promised to perform said
agreement on his part; that said contract,
interpreted and explained by the circumstances under which it was made and the
subject to which it relates, was Intended by
each of the pai-ties thereto as follows: That
the plaintiff would vote his said ten shares
of stock at the annual meeting of the stockholders of said bank, to occur in the month
of January following, for the persons agreed
upon by the plaintiff and defendant for the
directors of said bank, and that he would
aid, assist, and co-operate with the defendant
in carrying out tne plans which they had previously discussed and agreed upon for the
management of said corporation, as hereinbefore set forth, and that the defendant
would use his Influence with the said persons proposed and agreed upon for directors,
when chosen, to elect the plaintiff to the position of cashier of said bank, at a salary of
not less than $100 per month, during his ability to perform said duties."
It is apparent from the findings that this
written agreement
represents
the previous
oral understanding between the parties, reduced to writing.
It is not claimed that the
parties entered into three different contracts.
There were only two agreements made.
One
related to the control of the stock by defendant without buying It. The other was the
contract of sale. The court expressly finds
that this written contract was no part of the
contract for the sale of the stock. That one
of the considerations which induced plaintiff
to enter into an agreement to vote his stock
with defendant's stock was the defendant's
promise to secure his employment in the
bank, is apparent from the findings to which
we have referred; and as it is not pretended,
and does not appear, that two different contracts relating to the control of plaintiff's
stock by defendant preceded the contract of
sale, we can find no escape from the conclusion that the promise on which defendant relied in parting with the Shaw stock was a
promise made by plaintiff under the expectation, justified by defendant's promise, that he
(plaintiff) was to have a place on the board
of directors, and also a position In the bank,
at a salary. We are strengthened in this
view by the consideration that, unless the
promise to give plaintiff employment was
part .of the original arrangement, the subsequent written promise of defendant would be
without consideration. If plaintiff, for a suf-

\
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ficlent conslderatloii, had already promised
to let defendant control his stock, an agreement on the part of defendant to give him an
additional consideration for the right which
was already his would be a purely gratuitous
So far from its
promise, not binding in law.
appearing that defendant regarded that he
was making such a promise, he shows by
the written agreement signed by him that the
sole consideration running to plaintiff for his
agreement to permit defendant to control his
stock was defendant's promise to secure him
a position as cashier in the bank. It is Impossible to conceive that so shrewd a man as
the defendant would have promised In writing to give plaintiff a position In the bank,
If such had not been part of the original understanding; for, unless it was part of It,
the defendant had already secured, by his
contract with plaintiff, all he could ever obtain by making additional promises.
The
case would be similar to that of a person, after having secured a contract for the sale to
him of stock for a specified consideration,
promising in writing that In consideration of
such sale he would give the owner of the
Such a
stock a place In the corporation.
promise would not be made by a reasonable
being under such circumstances.
The fact
that such a contract was made In this case
is convincing to our minds that the real consideration running to plaintiff for his original
control the stock
promise to let defendant
was the promise of defendant to give him employment in the bank. This was what InAt
duced plamtifC to make the promise.
ieast, we are satisfied that it was one of the
{,
■
The contract was therefore connnducements.
^ .Afrary to public policy and void. At least a
portion of the consideration was illegal, and
hence the promise founded on It was a promThe law
// ise which no court would enforce.
case leaves both parties where It
In
such
a
I*
finds them.
To neither will It give redress.
That a contract relating to the purchase or
control of corporate stock, founded in whole
or in part upon a promise to secure for the
In.
person who owns the stock employment
the corporation, and an office therein, Is illegal and void, Is a doctrine supported by the
Woodruff
voice of the decisions.
V unanimous
V. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309; Noel v. Drake,
28 Kan. 265; Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass.
501; Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98; Cone's
Ex'rs V. Russell (N. J. Ch.) 21 Atl. 847; West
135 U. S. 507, 10 Sup. Ct. 838.
V. Camden,
In the case last cited the court, referring to a
contract, one element of which was a promise
to give one of the parties to it permanent employment as manager of a corporation in
which he was a stockholder, said: "It was a
contract, the purpose and effect of which was
as a stockholder
to Influence the defendant,
and oflScer of the company. In the decision of
a question affecting the private rights of others, by considerations foreign to those rights,'
and the defendant, by the contract, was placed under direct and very powerful 'induce-
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ment to disregard his duties to other members of the corporation,
who had a right to
demand his disinterested action in the selection of suitable officers.'
He was to be In a
relation of trust and confidence, which would
require him to look only to the best interests
of the whole uninfluenced by private contracts.
We think this salutary rule is applicable in this case, notwithstanding the alleged contract was not corruptly made for private gain on the part of the defendant There
were other stockholders
in the company.
The defendant and the Standard Oil Company, for whose benefit it is alleged the contract was made, were not all the stockholders;
and it seems to us that it was certainly the
right of those other stockholders to have the
defendant's judgment, as an officer of the
company, exercised with a sole regard to the
interests of the company." It cannot be
claimed that the illegal parts of this contract
could have been separated from the remainder, and the agreement sustained to that extent The case falls within no exception to
the general rule that where a part of a contract is illegal the whole agreement is void.
It was not a case where the contract had
been executed on one side, and the person
who had received the benefit of it was asked
to pay only the legal consideration he had
agreed to pay, the illegal consideration being
waived. In such a case the agreement can
be sustained to the extent of the legal considCasady v. Woodbury County, 13
eration.
Iowa, 113; 1 Pars. Cont. 380. So far as any
consideration ran to plaintiff, there was only
a single consideration to induce him to make
his promise to allow defendant to vote his
stock,
e. the promise to give him employBut even if he had been himent in the bank.
duced to make this promise for money, in addition to the agreement to give him a position
In the bank, still the legal part of the consideration could not have been separated from
the illegal, for no coini: could say, in the light
of the actual contract that he would have
made the promise to allow his stock to be voted by another solely for the cash consideration. To separate the legal from the illegal conand
sideration,
imder such circumstances,
then sustain and enforce the contract as so
radically altered, would be to make a new
contract for one wrongdoer, t» enable him to
against the other wrongdoer, who
enforce
would be no more culpable, an agreement
which he never made. See Greenh. Pub. PoL
p. 17, rule 21, and page 24, rule 25, and cases
dted; 2 Add. Cont pt 2, bottom paging, 762,
and cases in note 1; Tobey v. Robinson, 99
lU. 222-233; Comp. Laws, § 3533. For both of
the reasons set forth in this opinion, we are
clear that at the time plaintiff and defendant
made the contract of sale sought to be rescinded by defendant the latter was powerless to compel the plaintiff to carry out his
promise to allow defendant to vote his stock,
and that, therefore, as defendant to secure
control of the bank, saw fit to buy the plains
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it,

another to extort from him an unconscionable contract. See Hough's Adm'rs v. Hunt,
15 Am. Dee. 569, and note.
Neither can It i
be said that the defendant was compelled to
pay more for the stock than the market price.
The strife of the controlling factions to secure control of the majority of the stock, to
be lised at the approaching stockholders'
meeting, had temporarily given to this stock
a value above its Intrinsic value. To the purchaser of
it meant victory and supremacy
In the management of corporate affairs. Why
should defendant claim that an exorbitant
price had been extorted from him, if he was
paying only what plaintiff could have secured
from the opposing faction, had defendant declined to buy at that figure? The counsel f<>r
the defendant, in his learned and exhaustive
brief, and in his very able oral argument before the court, has presented everything that
could possibly be urged in favor of the case he
represents;
and this, too, with great ingenuity and force. But while we fully agree with
him thali
the facts foimd be true, his client
just grievance in the forum of conhas
science, yet we are unable, because of the
considerations of public policy to which wa
have alluded, to give him any legal redress.
The Judgment of the district court is in all
things reversed, and that court is directed to
modify its conclusions of law in accordance
with this opinion, and to enter judgment for
the plaintiff for the full amount due on the
note, for principal and Interest
All concur.
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to relieve him, because he had been Impelled j
by his desires to pay a large price for the I
thing bought.
The cases rited by counsel
for defendant do not lay down any such doctrine. They are cases where one person has
taken advantage ot the financial distress of

a

tiff's stock for the sum of $5,000, he conid
not, after availing himself of an of the adrantages growing out of the possession of
snch stock, rescind the sale, on the theory
into
that he was coerced by his necessities
making a hard bargain.
The confidential relations existing between
the plaintiff and defendant would not transmute into a contract binding in equity a contract which otherwise would not be enforced
Eqmty will not grant
by a court of equity.
or withhold relief because the promisor was
or was not trusted by the promisee, but it
will withh(M relief, In all cases of this char. acter, irrespective of the question of confidential relations, because public policy demands
(I that equitable aid should not be extended to
Nor is
Uwhat is in fact an illegal scheme.
There any force in the contention that the
case is brought within the scope of the doetrine that a court will relieve a party whe
has made a contract under the stress o£ great
necessity.
As we have already demonstrated, the defendant
has only himself to blame
for trusting to a promise the fulfillment of
which equity would not compeL
He was in
no different position trom that which he
would have occupied had the promise of plainAnd it is too clear
tiff never been made.
to justify argument that had plaintiff demanded $5,000 fear this stock, without having
made any prior promise to permit defendant
to control it, the defendant, if he saw fit to
yield to this demand, would have been entitled to no relief on the ground that it was a
hard bargain, extorted from him by Ihe necessities of his situation. It would be a novel
and dangerous doctrine that a party who, In
his anxiety to secure property, had paid more
^ than its market value, could appeal to equity
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NEW ENGLAND TRUST
(38

Supreme

N. B.
Judicial
Suffolk.

432,

CO. v.

ABBOTT.

162 Mass. 148.)

Court of Massachusetts.
Oct.

18,

1804.

Report from superior court, Suffolk county.
Action by the New England Trust Company against Abbott, executor of the will
of Josiah Gr. Abbott, deceased, to compel
a transfer to the company of certain shares
of its stock held by defendant's testator, and
to enjoin defendant from further prosecuting
an action at law to recover the dividends
Judgment for plaintiff.
on said shares.

for
W. G. Russell and J. L. Stackpole,
L. S. Dabney and F, J. Stimsom,
plaintiff.
for defendant.
MORTON, J. This Is a bill brought by
the plaintiff to compel the transfer to it, by
the defendant, as executor of the will of
Josiah 6. Abbott, of certain shares in the
plaintiff corporation, which were held by
said Abbott at his decease, and which, it
is alleged, he agreed, when the certificates
were issued to him, should be appraised at
his death by the directors, and transferred
to the plaintiff at the appraisal, if the directors so elected.
The biU also seeks to
enjoin the defendant from prosecuting an
action at law brought by him against the
plaintiff to recover certain dividends upon
said shares that have been declared by it
The plaintiff was organized in 18G9, under
a special charter (Acts 1869, c. 182), with a
capital of $500,000, which was afterwards
increased to $1,000,000. The terms of the
alleged agreement are found in the by-laws,
of which all that is now material is as
follows:
"Art 7. Any member of this corporation
who shall be desirous of selling any of his
shares, the executor or administrator of any
member, deceased, and the grantee or assignee of any shares sold on execution, shall
cause such, their shares, respectively, to be
appraised by the directors, which It shall
be theh: duty to do on request and shall
thereupon offer the same to them for the
use of the corporation at such appraised
value; and, if said directors shall choose to
take such shares for the use of the corporation, such member, executor, administrator,
or assignee shall, upon the payment or tender to him of such appraised value thereof,
and the dividends due thereon, transfer and
assign such share or shares to said corporation; provided, however, the said directors
shall not be obliged to take said shares at
the appraised value, unless they shall think
it for the interests of the company; and If
they shall not within ten days after such
shares are offered to them in writing, take
the same, and pay such member, executor,
administrator, or assignee the price at which
the same shall have been appraised, such
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member, executor, administrator, or assignee
shall be at liberty to sell and dispose of the
same shares to any person whatever.
"Art 8. The directors shall have power,
and it shall be their duty, to sell and dispose
of the shares which may be transferred as
aforesaid to the corporation, whenever, In
their judgment, it can be done with safety
and advantage to the corporation; and in
all sales made by the directors, under any
of the aforesaid provisions, it shall be their
duty to sell the shares to such persons as
shall appear to them, from their situation
and character, most likely to promote confidence in the stability of the institution;
no greater number than one himdred shares
being assigned to any one person, nor, in the
case of a person already a member, a greater
number than will be sufficient to increase
his previous number to one hundred shares."
These by-laws were adopted before any
Aftercertificates of stock were issued.
wards, but before the capital was increased,
article 7 was duly amended by adding to it

the following:
"It shall be the duty of such executor, administrator, grantee, or assignee to offer
said shares for appraisal, and to be taken
by the corporation, if it shall so elect, whenever requested by the actuary or secretary,
and no dividends or interest shall be paid
or allowed after a failure to comply with
provided, that such request
such request:
shall not be made imtil after the payment ot
one dividend and the expiration of six
months from the death of the owner or sale
as aforesaid, but the offer may be made at
any earlier period if the party shall prefer."
Every certificate contained on Its face, as
part of the certificate, the provision that
"said shares are transferable only in person
or by attorney, duly constituted, on the
books of the company, and In the manner
and upon the conditions expressed in the bylaws of the company, printed upon the back
of this certificate." On the backs of the
certificates were printed by-laws 7 and 8.
By-law 7 was printed as amended on the
backs of those issued after the increase.
There were also on the stubs from which the
certificates were detached, in the certificate
books, two receipts given and signed by the
defendant's testator at the time the two cer-

tificates were issued to him in the original
and increased capital, which were each as
"Received the above certificate
follows:
subject to the conditions and restrictions
therein referred to, and to the by-laws of the
agree to conform."
company, to which
The defendant contends that these by-laws
are void. We have not found it necessary
to consider that question, and we express no
opinion upon it We think that the case
may well stand on the ground that the defendant's testator entered into an agreement
with the plaintiff to do what the plaintiff
now seeks to compel his executor to do. It
is manifest that a stockholder may make a
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contract with a corporation to do or not to
do certain things in regard to his stock, or to
waive certain rights, or to submit to certain
restrictions respecting which the stockholders might have no power of compulsion over
In Adley v. Whitstable Co., 17 Ves.
him.
"It has been
315, 322, Lord Eldon says:
frequently determined that what may well
be made the subject of a contract between
the different Interests of a partnership would
For Instance, an
not be good as a by-law.
among the citizens of London
agreement
that they would not sell except In the markets of London would be good; yet it has
been declared by the legislature that a bySee, also, Davis
law to that effect is void."
etc., 8 Mete. (Mass.) 321;
V. Proprietors,
Bank of Attica v. Manufacturers' & Traders'
Bank, 20 N. Y. 505, 6 Cook, Stocks & S. § 408.
In the present case the certificates were issued to the defendant's testator In consideration of the payment by him to the corporation of the amount due for the stock,
and of the agreements with it on his part
which they contained. By accepting them
without objection, and by signing the receipts, he must be held to have agreed to
the conditions printed on the backs of the
The fact that the conditions
certificates.
may
were contained
in by-laws
which
have been invalid as such does not render
his agreement void, if the contract was in
substance one which the corporation had
power to make.
We think that it had such
power.
It is held in this state that a corporation, unless prohibited, may purchase its
own stock (Dupee v. Water Power Co., 114
Mass. 37); and we see nothing opposed to
public policy in such an agreement as this,
with corporations like this. If honestly carried out by the directors, it tends to secure a
trustworthy
body of stockholders, from
which those having the care and management of the affairs of the corporation naturally would be selected.
It certainly cannot be contrary to public policy that the
managers
of this and similar institutions
should be persons of skUl who possess the
confidence of the public. The restraint upon
alienation is no greater than is often agreed
to.
In England it is not unusual to find in
the deeds of settlement or articles of association under which corporations or joint-stock
companies have been organized, and which
correspond to the charter and by-laws here,
provisions requiring the stockholder, in case
he wishes to transfer his stock, to offer it to
the directors, or to submit to them the name
of the transferee for approval.' Bargate t.
Shortrldge, 5 H. L. Cas. 297; Poole v. Middleton, 29 Beav. 646; Ex parte Penney, 8
7 Ch.
Oh. App. 446; Moffatt v. Farquhar,
Dlv. 591; Chappell's Case, 6 Ch. App. 902.
No objections seem to have been made to
In this state, the legislathese provisions.
ture, in numerous instances, has provided, in
the charters of corporations like this, that
the shares shall be transferable according to
H.&B.B(J.(2dEd.)—
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such rules and regulations as the stockholders shall establish, and not otherwise. It is
hardly possible that the legislature was Ignorant of the construction which has been
put upon the power thus conferred, and
which in the case of the first corporation of
the kind chartered In the commonwealth,
the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance
Company (Acts 1818, c. 180), was shown, it
is said, by the adoption of by-laws from
It is
which those in this case were copied.
true that this charter contains no provision
in regard to by-laws or to the transfer of
shares; but the policy of the legislature cannot be affected by such an omission, especially in view of the fact that many of the
charters since granted contain this provision.
Neither do we think that the agreement Is
void for the reason that it authorizes the
plaintiff to invest, as the defendant contends, in its own stock, or because it compels
the defendant to submit .to the appraisal of
the directors. If the enumeration in its charter of certain things in which it may invest
Is to be construed as excluding, among others,
its own stock, we think that the object of
the agreement is not to secure the transfer of
the shares to the plaintiff as an investment,
but to enable the directors to dispose of it to
such person or persons as shall appear to
them, from their situation and character,
most likely to promote confidence in the stability of the institution; and though, pending
its disposition by the directors, it may, for
convenience's sake, be placed with the company's securities, and dividends, if declared,
collected upon it, that does not alter the essential character of the tenure upon which
the company holds It It is settled that one
may agree to sell his property at a price to
be determined by another, and that he will
be bound by the price so fixed, even though
the party establishing it was interested; provided the interest was known, and no objection made by the parties, and no fraud or
bad faith is shown. Brown v. Bellows, 4
Pick. 179, 189; Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass.
373, 389; Haley v. Bellamy, 137 Mass. 357,
359; Fox V. Hazelton, 10 Pick. 275; Strong
V. Strong, 9 Gush. 569; Benj. Sales (6th Am.
Ed.) § 88, note 3.
The defendant objects that there was no
real appraisal, and that he did not offer the
stock for appraisal. The records of the plaintiff show that at a directors' meeting, at
which were present 16 directors, it was voted
that the defendant's stock be appraised at
$220 per share, and taken for the use of the
corporation. The directors were not bound
to give the defendant notice or a hearing
(Palmer v. Claxk, supra); and we must assume that they gave the matter such attention as, in their opinion, was necessary, and
that the appraisal correctly expresses their
judgment, after taking into account such
matters as they thought should be considered. There is nothing to show that they were
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so mistaken about the facts that what they
did was in no fair sense an appraisal of this
stock, but of something eise. It Is said that
so, it was, at
they omitted the good will.

If

most, an error of judgment, which would not
Invalidate the appraisal. It was not a condition precedent to the appraisal that the defendant should offer the stock. The agree-

ment of defendant's testator was, in sub-

stance, that the stock should be appraised by
the directors, and that it might be taken at
the appraisal by them if they so elected; and
that has been done. The offer was for the

purpose of fixing a time from which the 10
days should begin to run at whose expiration
the stockholder could dispose of his stock
If the directors had not elected to take it.
If the directors appraised the stock, and
voted to take it at the appraisal, an offer was
unnecessary.
Lastly, the defendant contends that the
plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance, because the stock was greatly undervalued, and because the plaintiff has a remedy at law. It is evident that to remit the
plaintiff to an action at law for damages
would defeat the very purpose of the contract, and would not, we think, furnish an
adequate remedy. No stock in the plaintiff
company has ever been sold in the market,
and all the shares that have been transferred
have been transferred to the plaintiff, and
disposed of by the directors in the manner
provided. About three-fourths of the stock
of the original subscribers has been thus
transferred. There is no evidence that the
testator ever objected to this mode of dealing
with it; and we see no good reason why the
plaintiff should be obliged to accept damages for which it might be difBcult to lay
down a clear rule, instead of performance.
Railroad Corp. v. Babcock, 6 Mete. (Mass.)
346; Oushman v. Manufacturing Co., 76 N.
T. 365. The case would perhaps stand differently If the shares were bought and sold in
the market like most stocks. Adam v. Messinger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. B. 491. The defendant does not charge the directors with
any fraud in the appraisal. He expressly disclaims that. It is well settled that where one
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agrees that another may fix the price for certain property, or the sum to be paid for material or services, the decision of the party
selected cannot be impeached
by showing
that he has committed an error of judgment,
or failed to avail himself of all the information which he might have obtained, or has
valued the property too high or too low.
Palmer v. Clark, supra; Flint v. Gibson, 106
Mass. 391; Robbins v. Clark, 129 Mass. 145;
Railroad Co. v. March, 114 U. S. 549, 5 Sup.
Ct 1035; Stevenson v. Watson, 4 0. P. Div.
148; Sharpe v. Railway Co., 8 Ch. App. 597;
Richards v. May, 10 Q. B. Div. 400; Tullis v.
Jacson [1892] 3 Ch. Div. 441; Ranger v. Railway Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 72. The evidence that
was offered by the defendant relating to the
value of the stock was therefore rightly excluded.
It is equally well settled that specific
performance of an agreement to convey will
not be refused merely because the price is
inadequate or excessive. The difference must
be so great as to lead to a reasonable conclusion of fraud, mistake, or concealment in the
nature of fraud, and to render it plainly inequitable and against conscience that the
contract should be enforced.
Chute
v.
Quincy, 156 Mass. 189, 30 N. B. 550; Lee v.
Kirby, 104 Mass. 420; Park v. Johnson, 4
Allen, 259; Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 6 Mete.
(Mass.) 346, 352; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet
271; Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch,
339; Belchier v. Reynolds, 2 Keny. pt 2, p. 87;
Weekes v. Gallard, 21 Law T. (N. S.) 655;
Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d Am. Bd.) § 424, note L
It is to be observed that this is a suit directly between the company and a stockholder,
to enforce a contract made with the company by the latter, and that the rights of
third parties are not involved. Many of the
cases cited and relied upon by the defendant are cases where the rights of third parties are involved, and therefore inapplicable
to this.
The result is that the plaintiff is entitled
to a decree compelling the defendant to convey the shares upon payment by It of the
amount of the appraisal, with interest, and
enjoining him from prosecuting the action at
law. Ordered accordingly.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
CONGER

et al. v.

NEW YORK, W.

R. CO.

S. & B.

(23 N. E. 983, 120 N. Y. 29.)
Court

of Appeals of New York, Second Division.
March 18, 1890.

Appeal from supremocourt, general term,

department.
Action by Clarence R. Conger and another against the New York, West Shore
& Bnfialo Railroad Company. A judgment In favor of defendajit, entered upon
the decision of the special term, vras affirmed at the general term, and plaintiff
second

again appeals.
Clarence R. Conger, for appellants.
vw Frost, for respondent.

Haisht,

J.

Cal-

This action was brought

to compel a speclflc performance of a contract. The Jersey City & Albany Railway Company was incorporated for the
purpose of constructing and operating a
railroad from Fort Montgomery, in the
county of Orange, to a point on the Hudson river opposite to the city ot'NewTorli.
As such incorporation it entered into a
written agreement with one Catherine A.
Hedges, the plaJntiffgl^rflator, in and by
the ternfs oi wnicn shegave' to the company a right of way across her premises
in Rockland county upon certain conditions, one of which was that the company
should locate a station in the gorge commonly known as the " Long Clove, " and
stop thereat five express trains each way
Subsequently the Jersey City & Al■ dally.
bany Railway Company was consolidated
j with the North River Railway Company,
/ under the name of the North River Railroad Company, and that company was
[
L^onsolidated with the defendant, which
was incorporated for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad from
the New Jersey state line, through the
state of New York, to the city of Buffalo.
The defendant has entered upon the lands
of the said Catherine A. Hedges, and constructed its road-bed across the same, but^
has not constructed any tatio n there' It
on m Ta»^^^Eon ^ ClOVfe ..^O l'geror~stopped
The
'~a5y~Of-^ttirexBreB8 trains.- thereat.
TnaTtfOurt has found as facts that a suitable station for the accommodation of passengers, and the receipt and delivery of
freight, at the Long Clove gorge, could be
built by the defendant only at a considerable expense, because of the nature of the
ground at tliat point; that the place
where the plaintiffs demand that the steition be located is near the mouth of a long
tunnel, and at a sharp curve in the defendant's railroad, upon the side of a steep
mountain approached by steep grades in
both directions ; that it is sparsely settled.

r
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and if a station were established there it
would be of no use to the public; that
very little, if any, benefit would result to
the plaintiffs, by the erection of a station,
or the stoppage of the trains thereat;
that the public convenience would not be
promoted, but the public travel would be
delayed; and, as a conclusion of law, that
a specific enforcement of the agreement
would work hardship and injustice to the
defendant, and such enforcement will not
subserve the ends of justice; that specific
performance should be denied, and the
plaintiffs left to their action for damages
for a breach of the contract. The evidence sustains the findings of the trial
court, which have been affirmed by the
general term.
The questions for our consideration are therefore narrowed to a
determination as to whether the conclusions of law reached are justified under the
findings of fact.
It has been the well-settled doctrine ot\
this court that the specific performance of
a contract is discretionary with the court,
and that performance will not be decreed
where it will result in great hardship and
injustice to one party, without any consideration, gain, or utility to the other, or
in a case where the public interest would be
prejudiced thereby. Clarke v. Railroad Co.,
18 Barb. 350; Trustees
v. Thacher, 87 N.
T. 311-317; Murdfeldt v. Railway Co., 102
N. Y. 703, 7 N. E. Rep. 404; Day v. Hunt,
112 N. Y. 191-195, 19 N. E. Rep. 414.
As we have seen, the Long Clovegorgeis
located upon the side of a steep mountain,
in a sparsely settled district, and is approached by a steep grade, and that a
passenger station, with an approach thereat, could be constructed only at a considerable expense. These are reasons worthy of consideration, but, if there were no
others, the trial court might not have
deemed them sufficient to refuse specific
performance.
But they are followed by
another, which gives additional force and
weight, and that is that the public travel
will be delayed by the stoppage of the
trains, and that the public convenience
will not be promoted. The defendant is a
corporation organized under the laws of
the state, and is a common carrier of passengers and freight. Its duties are largely of a public nature, and it is bound to so
operate fiEsToad
run its trains.and
las"x5
'
'
promote the pubTic interest and convenience, andj in view of the tact that bat lit-;
tie if any benefit would result to the plam;
tiffs by the erection of a station arid the
Bt'oppage of trains thereat^ as found by^
the trial court, it appear^ to us fKat" that
court properly refused to decree specific
performance and remanded the plaintiffs to
their action for damages. The judgment
should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except Bbown, J., not sitting.
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ROSS et al.

y.

PARKS.

(8 South. 368, 93 Ala. 153.)
Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. IS, ISQO.

Appeal from chancery court, Jackson county; Thomas Cobbs, Chancellor.
Bill to enforce specific performance of a
The title to the
contract to convey land.
land in controversy was in one Jeremiah
French. On the 15th day of December, 1887,
French agreed, in writing, to convey the
land to the complainant, Parks, if Parks
would pay him $200 by December 15, 1888.
At the execution of this option, 50 cents was
paid, and expressed in the contract as the
This contract to sell, or opconsideration.
tion, was signed by French and his wife,
but was not signed by Parks.
It was recorded In the probate office, and defendants,
Ross and McClendon, had actual notice of
its execution.
After the execution of this
contract, French moved to Texas. Subsequently, Ross and McClendon sent an agent
out to Texas where French was, and through
said agent offered French $800 for the land in
controversy,
and thereby, on November 21,
1888, procured a deed from French and his
wife, conveying to Ross and McClendon the
Belegal title to the land in controversy.
fore the expiration of his option, under the
contract of French, Parks paid French the
$200 purchase money as therein agreed, and
a deed to said lands from said
received
French and his wife, which was executed on
and bore the date of 28d of November,
1888.
On December 21, 1888, the said Ross
and McClendon brought an action of ejectment against Parks to recover the possesof which
sion of the land in controversy,
Thereupon, on
Parks was in possession.
January 29, 1889, Parks filed the bill in this
case against said Ross and McClendon, and
prayed to have the ejectment suit enjoined;
the deed made by French and wife to Boss
and to have Ross
and McClendon canceled;
and McClendon specifically perform the contract entered into by French and wife,—
making to the complainant a good and perOn a
fect title to the land in controversy.
final hearing upon the pleadings and proof,
the chancellor granted the relief prayed, and
the defendants now appeal, and assign this
decree as error.

J. E. Brown and Watts & Son, for appellants. L. W. Days and D. D. Shelby, for
appellee.

J. A general rule governing
of specific performance is that the
contract must be mutual, and that either
party is entitled to the equitable remedy of
Exceptions to this
a specific performance.
and one
general rule are well established,
class of contracts to which the exceptions
may be applied are those which are unilatThe
eral in form. Pom. Cont §§ 167, 168.
exception as to unilateral contracts has been
COLEMAN,

cases
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fully recognized and adopted in this statei
The case of Moses v. McClain, 82 Ala. 370, 2
South. 741, was for a specific performance of
the following contract: "For and in consideration of the sum of one dollar in hand paid,
I hereby give A. J. Moses an option on my
lands and improvements situated near Sheffield, and known as my 'House Place,' containing one hundred and twenty acres, more
or less, for the sum of eight thousand dollars. * * • This option good for 2 days.
[Signed] J. W. McClain."
It was contended
that Moses, the covenantee, bound himself
by no writing, and not having bound himself, he could not in this proceeding hold
McClain bound; that the contract not being
mutually binding, chancery will not compel
its specific performance.
The court declared
as follows: "Mutuality is frequently said to
be one of the conditions of a rightful suit
for specific performance.
The authorities,
however, do not carry it to the length contended for. Where the contract is fair, just,
and reasonable in all its parts, and the partysought to be charged has so bound himself
as to meet the requirements of the statute
of frauds, the election of the other contracting party to treat the contract as binding,
and to enforce it, meets all the requirements
of the rule;" citing Wilks v. Railroad Co.,
79 Ala. 180; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1405, and
notes; Wat. Spec. Perf. Cont. § 201; Cherry
V. Smith, 39 Am. Dec. 150.
The case of
Johnston v. Trippe (C. C.) 33 Fed. 530, is
an authority directly on the point in question,
the contract being almost Identical in its provisions. The difCerent authorities are very
generally quoted and commented on, and the
conclusion
the same as held by this court,
The evidence fails to show that there was
such forcible entry and unlawful detainer
as to deprive complainant of his right to
file a bill to remove a cloud from title, but
the equity of the bill does not depend upon
that principle. "The complainants, holding
the equitable title, bring their bill to compel
a conveyance of the legal title by those who
hold it in ti'ust for them.
In such a case,
the jurisdiction in no wise depends upon posGray v. Jones (0. C.) 14 Fed. 83;
session."
Shipman v. Fumiss, 69 Ala. 562.
The doctrine is well settled that when the
vendor, after entering into a contract of sale,
conveys the land to a third person, who has
knowledge or notice of the prior agreement,
such grantee takes the land impressed with
the trust In favor of the original vendee,
and holds it as trustee for such vendee, and
can be compelled, at the suit of the vendee,
to specifically perform the agreement by conveying the land in the same manner, and to
the same extent, as the vendor would have
been liable to do had he not transferred the
legal title. Pom. Cont. § 465, and note. The
same rule Is declared in Dickinson v. Any,
25 Ala. 424; Meyer v. Mitchell, 75 Ala. 475.
It may be stated as a sound principle of
law. If an owner of land in writing gives
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another an option on land, for a valuable
consideration, whether adequate or not, agreeing to sell it to him at a fixed price, if accepted within a specified time, it is binding
upon the owner, and upon those who pm*chase from the owner with a knowledge of
Moses v. McClaIn, 82 Ala.
such agreement.
MauU
370. 2 South. 741; 33 Fed. 530, supra;
45 Ala. 134, and authorities.
V. Vaughn,

such dreumstances, the fixed time is
material part of the contract, and when
supported by a valuable consideration, the
owner of the land cannot revoke the ofCer before the time has expired within which the
Under
a
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offer may be accepted.
We do not declare
that if no specified, definite time was fixed
by the parties, and the contract of offer was
not supported by a valuable consideration,
such an offer could not be revoked.
We express no opinion upon this question.
Johnston V. Trippe (C. C.) 33 Fed. supra; Wilks v.
Railway Co., 79 Ala. 185; Falls v. Galther,
9 Port. 617; Cherry v. Smith, 3 Humph. 19;
1 Story, Cont § 496; 1 Pars. Cont. *481, bottom p. 511; Bish. Cont. § 325; Benj. Sales.
§ 42.

We find no error in the
chancellor. Affirmed.

decree

of the

y
SPECIFIC PERFOEMANCE

December

19,

1887.
•.n equity.
Bill for specific performance by
complainant J. L. Johnston against R. B.
Trippe, defendant On demurrer.

if

G. A. Howell, for complainant
Hopkins & Glenn, for defendant

fect

"Witness my hand and seal, this January

20, 1887.

"[Signed]
R. B. Trippe.
"Witness:
"[Signed] 3. H. Curtright, M. L. Cohen."
Tjhis Instrument was sent, about the time
of its execution, by defendant to complainant by mail to his home In Charleston, South
Carolina, and received by complainant
DeThat equity will not specifically enforce a
contract wanting in definiteness or mutuality,
see Bourget v. Monroe (Mich.) 25 N. W. Rep.
514; Hall y. Loomis (Mich.) 30 N. W. Rep.
374; Mosea v. McGlain (Ala.)
South. Rep.
741; Recknagle v. Schmalz (Iowa) 33 N. W.
Rep. 366; Durkee v. Cota (Cal.) 16 Pac. Rep.
5; Fogg V. Price (Mass.) 14 N. B. Rep. 741.
2

is

(i.

NEWMAN, J. This is a bill filed by complainant against defendant to enforce the specific performance of a certain conditional or
optional contract for the sale of land.
The
bill, after stating some preliminary correspondence and negotiation between complainant and defendant relative to the sale of certain land In White county, Geor^a, by the
latter to the former, alleges that in January,
defendant prepared and executed the
1887,
following written instrument:
"Georgia, Pulton County.
This agreement
witnesseth, that the imdersigned R. B. Trippe,
of said state and county, agrees that if said
J. Lamb Johnston, of Charleston, S. C, or
any one for him, pays or causes to be paid
to the said R. B. Trippe, one thousand dollars,
on or before January 20, 1888, that the said
R. B. Trippe, for himself, his heirs and assigns, covenants and agrees that he .will make
to the said Johnston good and sufficient title
to lots of land numbers 9 and 25, in 3d district, White county, said state. And it is further agreed that if a draft for $50.00 this day
drawn by R. B. Trippe, with this option bond
attached, is paid at sight, then said R. B.
Trippe wUl make said title. If nine hundred
and fifty dollars is paid him on or before January 20, 1888; If said sums of money are not
paid within the time mentioned, that is, $50.00.
on sight draft and $950.00 within twelve
months from this date, then this bond to be
null and void; and It is understood that if
e.,
dollars
the balance of one thousand
$950.00) is not paid by January 20, 1888, the
$50.00 paid on sight draft is forfeited to said
R. B. Trippe, and that this option bond is
null and void, otherwise of full force and ef-

1

the land, and offering, if complainant would
release him from his obligation, to return the
$50 paid him, and to pay complainant $50 in
addition,
the other sale was made. In the
same letter defendant
stated that the bond
sent by him to complataant was not legally
binding anyway. Complainant promptiy replied, both by wire and letter, to defendant
refusing to release him from his obligation to
convey the land In pursuance of the before
In the same letter hi which
stated contract
the complainant refused to release defendant
be Instructed defendant to submit his deeds
and that upon,
to complainant's attorney,
their approval by him, complainant would pay
the balance, $950. This defendant failed and
refused to do, but wrote complainant that he
declined to furnish the tities or convey the
land in accordance with his contract; and in
the same letter inclosed a check payable to
his, defendant's,
order, and Indorsed by him
In blanl^ which he tendered as repayment of
This letter was received by comthe $50.
plataant ta Nacoochee, Georgia, on the night
of March 17, 1887.
On the next day, March
18th, complainant went to Atianta, the home
of defendant, sought an Interview with him,
and immediately returned
to him the $50
check which he had received from him; stating to defendant that he refused to receive it;
and defendant now has the check in his posComplainant at the same time tensession.
dered to defendant $950 ta cash, and demandgood
ed that defendant make complainant
and sufficient titie to the land ta controversy,
which tender defendant refused, and refused to convey, and repeatedly refused to carry
A tender
out his contract with complataant.
is made ta the blU of $950; and the prayer
for a decree for specific performance against
defendant with an alternative prayer for damcanages, ta the event specific performance
An amendment has been filnot be obtained.
ed to this bill, which amendment alleges that
the property described ta the bill, bargataed by
defendant to complainant. Is now worth the
sum of $3,000, and also that the damages to
complainant resnlttag from such refusal and
the failure of the defendant to perform his
decontract exceed $3,000. To this bill
on
murrer has been filed, which demurrer
two grounds: First, that this court has no
Jurisdiction of the subject-matter in the bill
.eta ted; and, second, that the complataant has
not shown a right to any relief against deis

Circuit Court, N. D. Georgia,

fendant also drew on complainant
sight
draft for $50, which was sent with the foregoing written histruihent to Charleston.
His
draft was honored and paid at once by complainant and defendant received the $50.
Some time after this, defendant wrote to complainant, saying he had an offer of $1,500 for
a

TRIPPB.1

a

T.

(33 Fed. 530.)

a
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fendant
The first ground Is based upon the fact
that the amount ta controversy, as shown
by the original bUl, Is not sufficient to give
this court jurisdiction; the bill havtag been
filed 8tac@ the passage of the act of March
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and at length by many courts of high authority.
The case very generally referred
to and relied upon to sustain the rule requiring that a contract must be mutually
binding to justify its enforcement, is the
decision of Lord Redesdale in the case of
Lawenson v. Butler, 1 Schoales & L. 13.
A careful examination of that case and the
argument and reasoning of the Lord Chancellor will show that the decision was put
mainly upon the ground that where parties,
enter Into an agreement, each supposing the
other to be bound thereby, and it transpires
that one was not bound, such party could
not have specific performance of the contract by the other. He says, in concluding
the opinion, (page 21:) "No man signs an
tract to take the land and pay defendant
agreement but under a supposition that the
the remainder of the purchase money, deother party is bound, as well as himself;
fendant could not be required to carry out the
There is a general rule of law, unand therefore, If the other party is not
agreement
bound, he signs it under a mistake. That
doubtedly, that this element of mutuality must
mistake might be a ground for relief in
exist to justify enforcement of specific perFry, Spec. Perf. i 286; Wat equity, but is surely not a ground for speformance.
cific performance. Under these circumstanSpec. Perf. § 196. It is also true that there
In Fry ces, the impression upon my mind is that I
are cle ar exceptions to this rule.
must dismiss the bill. This agreement was
on specific performance it is stated in sec"The contract may be signed in mistake. It is manifest that Butuon 291, as follows:
ler could not have executed a lease in comof such a nature as to give a right to the
pliance with it; and as he could not, it is
performance to the one party which it does
manifest that this is not the agreement he
not give to the other; as, for Instance, where
meant to sign."
a lessor covenants to renew upon the request
of his lessee, or where the- agreement is in
F.rom a note to this case, (page 21,) it
But the more would seem that the Lord Chancellor was
the nature of an undertaking.
not himself entirely satisfied with the deciaccurate view of such cases as the first, —
sion, as he proposed that the case lie over
perhaps of all that could be treated as wantuntil the next day to look into the cases
ing miatuality,— seems to be that they are
stated that
cited, when plaintifE's counsel
conditional contracts; and when the condithey were content with a dismissal of the
tion has been made absolute, as, for instance,
bill without costs, and it was ordered acin the case above stated, by a request to
cordingly. These comments upon and citarenew, they would seem to be mutual, and
tions from this much-quoted case, are not
capable
of enforcement by either party
miade to question the existence of the genalike."
eral rule alluded to, but to show that its
In Wat Spec. Perf. § 200, in discussing
application, even m its origin, was a matter
the matter of exceptions to this general rule,
of difficulty, and its extent uncertain.
the author says: "But it is w ell settled that
renew
Counsel for defendant relied in argument
an optional agreement to convey^or_to
"'
here mainly on the cases of Marble Co. v.
wrEEout~"any
caren ant 'or""o6 Iiga^
a~l6ase,
Ripley, 10 Wall. 339; Tyson v. Watts, 1
"OrnrTolpurcEase oFacceptTand without any
'mntuality of reinedy, wiU be "enforced in eq- Md. Ch. 1; Duvall v. Meyers, 2 Md. Ch.
proper cbnsideraflon,^ 401; and Peacock v. Deweese, 73 Ga. 570.
"TiilyTrTtTs1Ena30e~5gon
~"oF~l?jrffis
parT^oTa lease of other contract
In the case of Marble Co. v. Ripley, other
questions were made growing out of combetween the parties that may be the true
plex and intricate partnership relations; but
consideration for it, though such an agreeone reason why specific performance should
ment can perhaps scarcely be called an exnot be decreed was want of mutuality.
ception; for, being in fact a conditional conAfter stating this as a reason why specific
tract, when the condition has been made
performance should be refused in that case,
absolute by a compliance with its terms,
the court proceeds to give what is termed
the contract becomes mutual, and capable of
a "still more satisfactory reason for withenforcement by either party. A contract f or
holding a decree for specific performance."
the sale of real estate, at the option of ihe
and lioace, may
But want of mutuality was undoubtedly recvendee only, upbn"nstection
enforced, but th%~ ognized as applicable to that case. In the
not only T3e~specificairy
refusarerthe'vendor to accept the purchase later case of Butler v. Thomson, 92 U. S.
412, the court, in the opinion, uses the folmoney will not destroy the mutuality, though
lowing language: "There may be an offer
the vendee' could thereupon withdrawTiis
which would
to sell subject to acceptance,
'^election."
bind the party offering, and not the other
The decisions upon this question have been
party until acceptance.
The sarnie may be
numerous, and It has been discussed ably
3,

1887.

seems

to be obvi-

ated by the amendment since filed, fixing the
value of the land at $3,000 and the damThere was
ages at not less than that sum.
very little discussion upon this point, in the
and it was not strongly urged.
argument,
The serious and main question in the case
arises under the second ground of the demiurrer, that the complainant has not shown
The
a right to any relief against defendant.
question made is that this contract between
defendant and complainant lacks the element of mutuality, which is necessary to authorize a court of equity to decree a speThat is to say, that, as
cific performance.
complainant was not compelled by his con-

1
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said of an optional purchase upon a sufficient consideration." The court then alludes
to a class of cases under the statute of
frauds where one party signed a contract
and the other did not. The language as

tion of this agreement on the ground that It
has not been signed by the plaintiflC, and that
the defendant could not have enforced It
against the plaintiff.
am very well aware
that a doubt has been entertained by a judge
^quoted
seems to me to indicate a recognition
.in this court of very high authority, [referby the court of offers to s ell subject to acring to Lord Redesdale, hi Lawenson v. Butler,] whether courts of equity would specificeptance, and optional purchases upon "suffl"cTent consideraHonras'eice ptioSrtoTEiFgen- " cally execute an agreement where one party
only was bound. There exists no provision in
era lrule' re gmrlng mutua lity of_ o bIigation i"n
the contraci. it woumte far from clear the statute of frauds to prevent the executhat Marble Co. v. Ripley, even standing
tion of such an agreement;
and Sir James
Mansfield, who certainly had great experience
alone, should be regarded as controlling in
this case; but the language used in the later
in courts of equity, lays it down in the case
case of Butler v. Thomson shows clearly,
of Allen V. Bennet [3 Taunt 169,] that a conthink, that that court would not so regard
tract signed by one party would be enforced in
equity against that party, and that such was
it. The two cases from the Maryland Chancery Decisions referred to may be disposed
the daily practice of that court."
of with the remark that in neither case
He proceeds to say that "in a case where
cited were the facts at all like the facts that
the court finds a party who has been and is
endeavoring to obtain some undue advantage,
are presented in the case now before this
court.
In the case of Peacock v. Deweese,
or has been playing what is called fast and
loose,' the court would not assist him." In
the supreme court of Georgia held that the
contract sought to be enforced, in that case
the case of Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484,
lacked the element of mutuality, and stated
the chancellor, after discussing, among other
have just cited, concludes thus:
cases, those
that as one reason why specific performance
"I have thought, and often intimated, that the
would not be decreed.
The court also stated,
however, that "the agreement is gratuitous,
weight of argument was in favor of the conand entirely voluntary on the part of the struction that the agreement concerning lands,
A court of equity never to be enforced in equity, should be mutually
defendant in error.
specific
performance
binding; and that the one party ought not to
a
of a voluntary
iees
^^ieci
Code, § 3189. Any
be at liberty to enforce, at his pleasure, an
qr^ gratuitous contract.
"fiact showing" fhe con&act to be unjust or agreement which the other was not entitied to
unfair or against good conscience, justifies
It appears to be settled (Hawkins v.
claim.
the court in refusing to decree a specific Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770) that though the plainperformance. Code, § 3190." The undertaktiff has signed the agreement he never can
ing of the two Deweeses in that case was enenforce it against the party who has not signtirely without consideration to them\. Peaed it. The remedy, therefore, in such cases Is
But, notwithstanding this objecnot mutual.
cock agreed to make such tests of the land
for the discovery of minerals as were "sat- tion, it appears from the review of the cases
isfactory to himself." The two Deweeses had
that the point is too well settled to be now
questioned."
their land tied up by this option for six
In a later case in New York— In re Himter,
any remuneration
months without receiving
1 Bdw. Ch. 1—the vice-chancellor
uses the foltherefor, and it was evidently the view of
lowing language:
"In the next place. It Is
the court that the agreement by Peacock
said the covenant to sell is not mutual, the
to make such tests as were "satisfactory to
lessee not being bound to purchase, and that
himselC" was not such a consideration as
This may be as this is a 'one-sided' agreement, the court
would support the contract
will not decree a specific performance.
The
think, from the use of the langathered,
cases of Parkhurst v. Cortlandi, 1 Johns. Ch.
or gratuitous contract"
guage "voluntary
and Benedict v. Lynch, Id. 370, have
282,
This, then, was an optional agreement to sell,
been referred to as eslablishing this point
wholly without consideration.
Chancellor Kent there intimated that such was
have thus far given attention prlncipaUj*
the rule; but in a subsequent case in the
to the authorities relied upon by the eminent
court of errors— Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns.
in this case, without
counsel for defendant
referring to the long line of decisions which, It 484— he had occasion to review that opinion,
which he found to be erroneous, and admits
seems, hold that contracts such as the one beIn the case that the point is too well settled the other way
fore the court will be enforced.
The court may, therefore^
to be questioned.
of Powle V. Freeman, 9 Ves. 351, it was held
Ithat an agreement in writing for the sale of In a proper case, where there is a covenant on
one side, and no mutuality, decree a perf^ a^
\an estate was binding If signed only by the
— Bestaesrui a case
ancc:
Ivendor, and followed by direction to his atjiES the_tijeg gntlt
may be peculiarly proper. The"rent may have
(tomey to prepare a proper agreement for both
In the case of Ormond v. been fixed at $600 as an inducement to the
I parties to sign.
power of purchasing the property.
This is a
I Anderson, 2 Ball & B. 863, where the court
fair Inference."
dismissed the bill upon another ground, the
In the case of Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N.
following language was used In the opinion:
Eq. 256, it is held that "the general prin"An objection has been made to the execu-
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dple is that where the contract Is Incapable
of being enforced against one party, that party is equally incapable of enforcing it against
But the principle does not apply
the other.
■where the contract, by its terms, gives the
one party a right to the performance, which
it does not give to the other party." And in
the case of Howralty
v. Warren, 18 N. J.
Eq. 124, after stating the general rule as the
existence of mutuality, and that unilateral or
optional contracts are not favored in equity,
"But modern authorities
the court proceeds:
have narrowed this doctrine down to cases in
which there is no other consideration.
And
it is now well settled that an optional agreement "tp^^eoirTgy,

or~Tenew ~a-lease;'"WItg6ut

or ob ligati on to purehas£_orjie;_
ceptr anS^wittoiJt any mutuiallty of sesmgdjj
wiirWeoIorcedin'equrEyT
ifit is made upon
propeF^o nside ration",' or forms part of a lease'
or "other contract between the parties, that
may beTlTeWie'coHgiaefatlon for it."
A number of cases are then cited by the
court to sustain this view, among them the
cases I hare just referred to.
The language
last quoted seems to me to be a very clear
statement of the correct rule in this matter.
In Smith's Appeal, 69 Pa. 474, the matter before the court being an optional contract for
the sale of land, it was held that thg cnntrapt
In the case of Rogers t.
would be enforced.
Saunders, IS Me. 92, 33 Amer. Dec. 635, the
com-t
cites the decision of Chancellor Kent
in Clason v. Bailey, and states that this appears to be now the generally received docIn Vassault v. Edwards, 43 CaL 458,
trine.
it is held that: "A proposal to sell real estate,
reduced to writing and signed by the vendor
alone, in which he recites that he has sold to
the vendee the land for a price named, and
has received a certain sum as a deposit, as
part payment, which the vendor was to refund
if the title was rejected or bad, the sale to be
subject to a search of and approval of title,
the vendee to have twenty days for the examination of the title, is a valid contract of sale
entered into between the parties."
To the same effect is the case of Schroeder
The court, after
V. Gemeinder,
10 Nev. 355.
stating that there are many exceptions to the
"We
rule in the cases, as to mutuality, says:
thini: it may now be considered as well settled by all, or nearly aU, of th e modem a ub
thofttjesriiwtt-g-conrl at ecijfll£_ln. acflsfisjor
the sneciflc perf orman ce of. optional contracts.
~a9.d covefaal S-to lease or convey la nd. wiH enfor ce thT co venantralthoush the remedy is not
mutual, provided It Is shown to- have been
made upon a fair consideration, or where it
forms part of a contract, lease, or agreement,
which may be the true consideration for it."
Entering into the discussion of this quesany" covenant
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tion, in many of the cases, is that part of the
statute of frauds providing that contracts for
the sale of land must be in writing, signed by
the party to be charged thereby, or some person by him lawfully authorized.
(This law
as codified in Georgia, is in section 1950, Code
1882.) It is held in some of these cases that
the question should be controlled by the language of the statute just quoted; and that, as
the contract need be signed by only one party, viz., the party to be charged thereby, it is
only necessary that he should be bound.
It
seems to me, however,
that the question of
mutuality is one distinct and apart from any
question that might arise under the statute of
frauds. It is a matter separate from, if not
over and above it, and
have considered it in
that view. I thinli it is settled by the above
authorities, and others that might be cited,
that where an owner of land gives another,
for a sufficient consideration,
an option or
privilege to purchase the land within a given
time, in writing, with full knowledge of the
fact that he is bound and the other party is
not, it is such a contract as will be enforced
in equity at the instance of the party holding
the option.
Does such a contract Indeed lacli
mutuality? The seller, for fair consideration,
agrees to give the proposed purchaser a certain fixed time in which to make the contract
mutual, by acceptance of the offer to sell. If
he accepts within the specified time, both parties are fully bound.
Now, as to this case. Here, for a reasonthe sum of $50, the deable consideration,
fendant agrees that the complainant shall
have the privilege of buying his land within a
year; that is, the defendant sells to him for
$50 the privilege of purchasing the land within a year. That contract, the sale by defendant to complainant of the privilege of purchasing, is executed by the payment by complainant of the sum agreed upon. The remainder
of the contract Is conditional upon the complainant's accepting within a year the continuing offer of the defendant to sell him the
land.
see no reas on w hy a court o f equity
On the
sh ould'no ^ enforce" such a contract.
"contrary, it seems to 'me "TTwoulH^e Inequiam clear,
table to refuse Its enforcement.
therefore, that this case does not come within the class where laclt of mutuality will prevent enforcement of the contract, and that it
does come within a well-recognized exception
to that rule, of optional sales upon fair considThis case Is considered now, of
eration.
course, upon the facts as stated in the bill.
How it may be affected by what the defendant can hereafter show must be a matter for
My conclusion is that
future consideration.
the demurrer must be overruled on both
grounds, and it will be ordered accordingly.
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O'CONNOR
(30

Atl.

V.

1061,

Court of Chancery

TYRRELL
53

N.

J.

et aL

Jan.

21,

1895.

Bill by Lawrence O'Connor against Peter
Tyrrell and others for specific performance

of a contract to convey land.
dismiss bill. Motion denied.

On motion to

Charles L. Corbin, for the motion.
Garrick, opposed.

of the failure of said parties of the
first part so to deliver said deed at the time
herein stated, said party of the second part
hereby agrees to surrender possession of said
premises, within fifteen days from June 26th,
1894, to James Tyrrell, one of said parties of
the first part hereto.
And said party of the
second part shall not, under any circumstances, be held to be liable for any rental for
the occupancy of said premises."
In pursuance of this agreement, the complainant paid
$250 In cash, broke up his home in the city
of New York, and moved to the premises conevent

Eq. 15.)

of New Jersey.
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McGILL, Ch. The motion Is made in virtue of the 213th rule, and takes the place of
a demurrer to the bill. The case presented by
the bill is this: James Tyrrell, for himself,
and as attorney in fact for others, who are
cotenants
with him of certain land In the
city of Bayonne, on the 20tli of April, 1894,
agreed to sell that land to the complainant
for $7,250, of which $250 was to be paid upon the execution of the agreement of sale,
and the balance was to be paid upon the delivery of the deed, on the 21st of the following May,— $5,000 in cash, and the remainder
by assumption of the payment of a mortgage
of $2,000, by which the property was incumUpon examination of the title. It was
bered.
discovered that the power of attorney under
which James Tyrrell assumed to act for his
cotenants, who lived in Ireland, though duly
executed, was defectively acknowledged by
some of the cotenants.
Therefore, It was
agreed that, Instead of having the power of
attorney reacknowledged, the deed should be
directly executed by all owners of the property, and be sent to Ireland for that purpose.
As more time would be required in such execution than the terms of the contract of sale
would admit of, a new agreement was entered into on the 8th of May, by which the former contract was annulled, and the 26th of
June w?s fixed for the delivery of the deed,
and the full consummation
of the transaction.
The litter agreement contains this stipula"Said party of the second part [O'Contion.
nor] shall have possession of said premises
on the 14th day of May, 1894; and, in the
event of the failure of said parties of the
first part to deliver the deed at the time and
in the manner hereinafter referred to, the
said parties of the first part hereby agree
to repay to said party of the second part the
said sum of $250, heretofore paid as part of
the consideration money, and, in addition
thereto, such sum, not exceeding $1,250, as
said party of the second part shall have paid
upon the examination or guaranty of the title to said premises, or in the repair, improvement, or furnishing of the building, or
ground, or the survey thereof, or shall have
In any way incurred or expended In the preparation for the purchase of and taking of title to said premises, not exceeding the said
sum of $1,250; such payment to be accepted
by said party of the second part as liquidated
damages for any breach of this agreement
by the said parties of the first part; and. In

tracted to be conveyed to him, upon which
he made repairs which have cost him nearly $2,000. On the 26th of June, 1894, he duly tendered the $5,000 he was then to pay,
and demanded a deed, in accordance with
the terms of the agreement
To which tender and demand, James Tyrrell replied that,
as attorney in fact, he was unable to deliver
the deed, and that he desired a statement of
the complainant's expenditures, contemplated
by the clause of the contract which has been
quoted, in order to ascertain and pay the sum
agreed upon as liquidated damages, and also
that he desired to fix a day, within the terms
of the contract, upon which the complainant
would surrender to him possession of the

land.
The only question presented in the argument was whether this court will compel a
conveyance to the complainant, notwithstanding the provision for the payment of liquidated damages upon the breach of the contract; the contention in behalf of the defendants being that by the agreement the parties have expressly stipulated the measure
of the damages which will result from the
nonperformance of the agreedefendants'
ment, and therefore equity will leave the
complainant to the recovery of those damages, on the groimd that an appeal to equity
is unnecessary,
since the legal relief, by
agreement, has been rendered adequate.
For the breach of contracts the common
law gives a single remedy.
It requires the
wrongdoer to pay a sum of money as compensation.
When the contract broken Is an
obligation to pay money, that remedy amounts
to specific performance. But there are many
contracts,
for the breach of whidi such a
remedy is inadequate; and that Inadequacy
has given rise to the jurisdiction of chancery
to enforce specific p^ormance of contracts,
requiring the performance or omission of the
very acts agreed upon.
The remedy is thus
made identical with the right withheld, and
the defendant is thereby deprived of the option, which the legal remedy practically gives
him, to disregard the actual obligation by which
he Is bound, and pay a sum of money in the
place thereof.
Pom. Spec. Perf. Cont. § 3.
The Inadequacy of the legal remedy, by compensation in damages. Is generally regarded
as conspicuous In cases of agreements for the
sale and purchase of real estate^ each parcel
of which differs in some respects from others.
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Sucli property Is usually bought because it
possesses some feature -which attracts by personal gratification, and determines the purchaser to make some particular use of it
The present case is not an exception to this
usual condition. The description of the property discloses Its boundary upon the shore of
the Newark Bay, with its expanse of water,
and the occupancy of it by the complainant
Indicates that he has determined to make it
his residence, and his expenditures upon it
give evidence of his appreciation of its situation and surroundings. It is thus made plain
that compensation in damages will not be
the full measure of relief which a breach
of the contract by the defendants, In justice,
Tliis situation primarily leads to
demands.
a critical examination of the contract and the
have quoted, to
meaning of its clause which
ascertain the correctness of the defendants'
assumption that a stipulated sum has been
fixed as damages to be had for the mere nonof the contract by the defendperformance
That which was contracted foir was
ants.
A portion of
the purchase and sale of land.
the purchase money was to be paid at once,
and the purchaser was to go into possession
pending the execution and delivery of the
deed, when the remainder of the purchase
It was in contemmoney was to be paid.
plation that he would proceed to repair, improve, and furnish the property. In the event
of the defendants' failure to deliver the deed,
he was to surrender the possession of the
land to their agent; receive back the purchase money paid, together with his expendiThat repayment
tures, not exceeding $1,250.
and surrender were expressly made dependent upon the failure of the defendants to deliver the deed. In this arrangement, which
repayment upon the happening
contemplated
of the one event, —failure to deliver the deed,
—was Interpolated the parenthetical clause,
that such repayment was to be accepted by
the complainant as liquidated damages for
"any breach" of fiie contract by the defendants.
As the repayment was limited to a
single event, and made payable upon the happening of that event only, the words "any
breach,"
in the parenthetical clause, could

I
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not have a broader significance than failure
to deliver the deed, for the complainant was
bound to accept the repayment only in that
event
It is to be noted that upon the defendants' failure to deliver the deed, the complainant is to have merely pecuniary reimbursement,
and not compensatory damages.
He is to have nothing for his disappointment,
trouble, and discomfort
The inference from
a submission to such inadequate damages is,
think, that a stronger meaning was intended to be given to the word "failure" than
mere arbitrary refusal of the defendants to
deliver the deed. "Failure" is the result of
action 'Which predicates earnest effort and
not mere inaction and refusal to do. It Is in
think, that the word was used
this sense,
in this contract It demanded from the defendants a bona fide effort to deliver the complainant a deed which would vest in him
the titie to the property. It was failure after
such effort that was to constitute the breach
for which reimbursement was to be accepted
as satisfaction.
It is obvious that the contract was not an alternative one, to convey
Damages were to be paid
or pay damages.
upon a "breach" of the contract which primarily required an honest effort to perform,
and failure, and do not become a factor m the
consideration of remedies until that precedent condition Is performed. The professed
Inability of James Tyrrell to deliver the deed
required does not prove the inability of him
and his cotenants to carry out the contract
upon their part The case presented, then,
is this: A certain sum is agreed upon as satisfaction to the complainant if bona fide effort
to make him title fails. So far as it appears
by the bill, the defendants can make that
title, and the aid of this court is invoked to
compel them to do so.
think that as the
facts now appear, the complainant is clearly
entitied to a decree, and that the case is not
brought within the controversy referred to
in Crane v. Peer, 43 N. J. Eq. 557, 4 Aa 72,
or affected by the intimation of Chancellor
Halsted in St Mary's Church v. Stockton, 8
N. J. Eq. 520, as the defendants' proposition
The motion will be denied, with
suggests.

I

I

I

costs.

c

AVL.

OF CONTRACTS.

--,

"^

L'.t^XM
...

I

c

■>

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

7»2

GRUBB

et al. v.

SHARKEY

et al.

(20 S. E. 784, 90 Va. 831.)

Supreme

Court of Appeals
22,

of Virginia.

Dec.

1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Botetourt county.
Bill by one Sharkey and others against one
Decree for complainants,
Grubb and others.
and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Benj. Haden and John H. Lewis, for appellants. J. 5. H. Figgatt and C. M. Lunsford, for appellees.

LEWIS, P.
performance.

This was a suit for specific
In April, 1887, the appellees

conveyed to the appellants a tract of land containing about 19 acres, adjoining the lands of
the Lynchburg Iron Company, situate in Botetourt county. Below and contiguous to this
land is a grazing farm owned by the appellees, which, at the time of the conveyance to
the appellants, was mainly, if not solely, watered by a stream flowing through both tracts.
The land was purchased by the appellants
for the purpose of erecting and operating
It was accordingly
thereon an ore washer.
covenanted in the deed of conveyance that if
the said stream should be made continuously
muddy by the proposed ore washing, so as to
render the water therein unfit for stock, the
appellants would lay a %-inch pipe from a
certain spring branch above, so as to conduct
a supply of clear water over the land to a
designated point on the appellees' farm, and
there erect a trough for the use of stock.
The bill, which was filed In October, 1889,
after setting out substantially the foregoing
facts, alleges that this covenant has not been
observed by the defendants
(the appellants
here); that they have not laid a pipe and
erected a trough, as they covenanted to do,
notwithstanding the water in the said stream
has been continually muddy and unfit for
stock, in consequence of washing ores on the
and
land, since the date of the conveyance,
although they have often been requested so
to do.
The bill also states that the complainants have been compelled. In consequence of
the defendants' default, to drive their stock a
considerable distance to water, whereby they
and damhave been greatly inconvenienced
aged. And the prayer of the bill is that the
defendants be required to specifically perform
their covenant, and to make proper compensation to the complainants for the damage
sustained by them, etc.
there
The defendants being nonresidents,
was an order of publication. An attachment
was also sued out, which was levied on the
At the May term, 1890,
said 19 acres of land.
a decree was entered for the specific performance of the contract, with a further provision
that the defendants pay to the complainants
$750 damages for the breach of the contract
At the ensuing October term, the defendants
appeared, and filed their petition, praying that
the decree be set aside, and that they be al-
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lowed to make defense.
They thereupon,,
with the leave of the court, demurred to the
bill, and also answered.
In their answer
they stated, among other things, that since
the commencement
of the suit they had laid
the pipe and erected a trough as they had
agreed to do, and that this was done before
the decree was entered.
The cause was then
referred to a commissioner, with directions to
ascertain and report, among other things,
what damages, if any, the complainants had
sustained by reason of the alleged breach of
the contract, in obedience to which the commissioner subsequently reported that they had
been damaged to the amount of $900.
This
finding was afterwards, upon exceptions to
the report, reduced by the court to $750, and
by the same decree it was ordered that "performance of said contract be confirmed to the

complainants."
1. A number of objections have been urged
to this decree, none of which, in our opinion,
are well founded. In the first place, the case
stated in the bill is undoubtedly within the
jurisdiction of a court of equity. The contract therein sought to be enforced Is not
one requiring personal labor, or the exercise
of any peculiar skill or judgment, or involving the performance of continuous duties
and supervision. On the contrary, it is such
a contract as could be readily performed bj
a lmost any ordina ry jorkroan, and-itaastturg.
Ts such tnat jhelFemedy at law fpr itg b r^gf]l_
IsT^ge ciuater~T£is brines the case within
the~general rule that a court of equity has)
jurisdiction to enforce specific performance
st a contract by a defendant to do defined
work upon his own property, in the performance of which the plaintiff has a material interest, and which is not capable of
adequate compensation
In damages; as, for '
example, an agreement on the part of a railway company to make an archway under its
tracks, or to construct a siding at a particular point for the convenience of an adjoining landowner. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 721a;
Storer v. Railway Co., 2 Younge & 0. Oh.
48; Greene v. Railway Co., L. li. 13 Eq. 44.
It is, moreover, well settled that, as auxiliary
to its authority to decree specific performance, a court of equity may award damages
for a breach of the contract, to be assessed
either by an issue of quantum damniflcatus
or by a master, at its discretion. Phillips v.
Thompson, 1 Johns, Ch. 131; Nagle v. Newton, 22 Grat. 814; CampbeU v. Rust, 85 Va.
653, 8 S. B. 664.
This, indeed, is not dis
puted.
But the appellants contend that their
performance of the contract in question before the entry of the decree, although subsequent to the filing of the biU, left nothing
to be specifically enforced, and consequently
that the auxiliary power to decree damages
was likewise at an end. In other words,
the contention is that, after the pipe was
laid and the trough erected, the suit was
nothing more than a suit to recover damages, of which equity has not jurisdiction.

PECIFIC PERFORMANCE

OF CONTRACTS.

733

compensation or damages will be decreed
view. The court
having acquired jurisdiction
of the" case
him. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 794; Ndson v.
.jifmi BiiuTla We'ground, no subseqiient asLplL Bridges, 2 Beav. 239; Chapman v. Railroad
^Ee defendants' could oust that jur isdiction. . Co., 6 Ohio St 119.
'
;f~principle, as laid" d6Wn
2. As to the further point made by the
Judge Staples in Walters v. Bank, 76 Va.
appellants in the petition for appeal, upon
12, that, when a court of equity has once
the authority of Pennoyer v. NefE, 95 U. S.
acquired jurisdiction of a cause, it may go on
714, that state courts have no power to
render, judgments or decrees in personam
to a complete adjudication, even to the exagainst nonresident defendants, who are
tent of establishing legal rights and granting legal remedies, which would otherwise
it is
summoned merely by publication,
That
enough to say that here the defendants, after
he beyond the scope of its authority.
rendition of the decree of the May term,
is a very strong case. The object of the suit
1890, appeared and defended on the merits,
was to subject the estate of a married woman
thus submitting themselves to the jurisdicto the payment of a certain negotiable note,
tion of the court; so that the case stands
upon which the appellant was Indorser, or
upon the same footing, so far as the power
to require the appellant to pay It In the
and jurisdiction of the court are concerned,
progress of the case, it appeared that there
as if they had been personally served with
was no separate estate, whereupon it was
process at the commencement
of the suit
insisted that, as the supposed existence of
a, separate
3. Both sides complain of the amount of
estate was the sole ground for
awarded; the appellants contenddamages
^oing into equity, the court could proceed no
ing that the amount is excessive, while the
further, and that the bill should be disappellees insist that the sum reported by the
missed. But this view was rejected, and a
commissioner, viz. $900, ought to have been
■decree rendered against the appellant for
allowed, and that the circuit court erred in
the debt, which this court aflarmed, on the
reducing the amount to $750. Without reprinciple above stated. So it has been held
viewing the evidence before the commissionthat where the complainant was originally
er, we deem it suflScient to say that we see
■entitled to a specific performance, but pendno reason to disturb the decree on this or
ing the suit the subject-matter of the litigaany other point It is therefore affirmed.
tion Is established or destroyed, he will not
Decree affirmed.
be turned round to his remedy at law, but

But this Is a mistaken
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EOGERS LOCOMOTIVE & MACHINE
WORKS V. ERIE RY. CO.
(20 N.

J.

Eq. 379.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct Term,

1869.

This was a motion for a preliminary In-

The argument was had upon a
rule to show cause upon the biU filed and an
affidavit of James Fisk, Jr., hi reply to the
allegation of the bill as to the insolvency of
the Brie Railway Comi)any.
The bill sets forth that the Erie Railway
Company, by virtue of the provisions of the
charter of the Paterson & Hudson River
Railroad Company, of the lease of that road,
and the acts of the legislature giving validity
to that lease, and authorizing it to finish and
extend that road to the Hudson river, and
confirming the reorganization of the Erie
Railway Company under its present name,
became a common carrier between the city
of Paterson and the present termination of
its railway near the Hudson river, at the
Long Dock; that it ^wna 'bouiifl to _^aEry
^J^ight iv amV^^^iajCoJi^S^o^^^st^^B
!se actir" wKcril' f oT^ loco jratesJ^^Ta
ie°^ize usually made 35d
^eSgiBS^f
■^^fnoHve
jvmction.

senE'~awr~''^

^""■TiOT^iaffianEsr

wo^

amoimt to $31.80 for each locomotive; that
the company or some of its directors have
of Ildevised
a scheme for the purpose
legally increasing the rate to be charged for
such transportation; that they procured the
company to be chartered by the name of the
"Union Locomotive Express Company," with
power to forward and carry locomotives and
other property; and that the Erie Railway
Company or its stockholders or directors are
using this express company, and combining
with its directors, for the purpose of increasing the rates of transportation from Paterson to Long Dock; and that it has entered
into an agreement with the express company
that it should have the exclusive right of
transporting locomotives over the road; that
the express company have the power to
for forwarding without any limit
charge
as to amount, and do actually charge $250
and asfor transporting ^aeh locomotive,
sume only the llaDility of forwarders, and
the Erie Railway Company refuses to accept
for transportation at its depot at Paterson
any locomotive to be transported to Long
Dock, or to transport the same, unless
through the express company; that the complainant built two trucks, on which it was
in the habit of placing its engines and drawing them over the street railway from the
manufactory to the depot of the Erie Railway Company at Paterson, which were suitable to rim upon that road, and which could
be taken to tiong Dock with the locomotives
thus loaded upon them; that the Erie Railway Company, when these trucks so loaded
were last tendered to it for transportation,
caused them to be taken over its road in
the opposite direction, into the state of New

*-^/\^i^
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York, and detains and keeps them there, sothat the complainant has no means to offer
its locomotives
to the Erie Railway Company for transportation, and that this is done
Intentionally to carry out the fraudulent combination with the express company, so that
the latter must be employed, at their exorbitant rates, to carry all the locomotives; and
that new trucks cannot be constructed or provided under several months.
The bill further alleges that the manufacture of locomotives has become a large and
imiwrtant business in Paterson, and that the
complainant and others have established their
worlfs there on faith of the means of transportation provided by law over the railway
of the defendants; that being compelled to
pay such sum for transportation will compel
them to add the amount to the price of their
locomotives,
and will injure their business
in competition with other establishments, and
omission to deliver would make them liable
to damages.
The bill alleges that this combination of the
Erie Railway Company is a fraud upon the
stockholders,
because they receive by the
only $10 for each locomotive
agreement
transported by the express company, when,
by law, they would he entitled to receive,
and would receive from the complainant and
others, more than three times that amount
for the same service, if performed directly
for them.
The bill prays for an Injunction to direct
and compel the Erie Railway Company to return the two trucks to Paterson into the possession of the complainant, and to transport
to the wharf, at Long Dock, all locomotive
engines of the complainant that may be delivered at the depot at Paterson, at the rates
prescribed by law, and to direct and compel
it to perform its duty as a common carrier;
also to restrain It from removing the complainant's trucks out of its possession, and
from preventing it from obtaining possession
thereof, an^restraining the other defendants,
that is, Jay/Gould, James Fisk, Jr., the Union
Marsh
Locomotive Express CompaBy,^.N.
Kasson, James G. Dudley, Henry J. Smith,
and C. Valletta Kasson, from entering Into
any agreement or doing anything to prevent
or hinder the Erie Railway Company from
transporting the locomotives of the complain,
ant over its road.
The bill charges that the Union Express
Company was got up by Jay Gould, James
Fisk, Jr., and Frederick A. Lane, three of the
directors of the Erie Railway Company, in
combination with N. Marsh Kasson, James
6. Dudley, Henry J. Smith, 0. Valletta Kasson, and P. K. Randall, as a contrivance to
shift the duties of common carriers from
the Erie Railway Company, and to enable
the defendants, or some of them, to make Illegal and exorbitant charges for transportation.
A. B. Woodruff,
briskie, opposed.

for the motion.

L.

Za-

INJUNCTIONS.

THE CHANCELLOR.

If

the allegations

of the bill are true, and they are supported
by the affidavits annexed,
and are not denied by answer or affidavit, they present a
flagrant case of refusal to perform the duties imposed upon it by law, and for which
its franchises were granted, by a corpora-

tion public in its object and almost such in
Railway companies have deleIts character.
gated to them as part of their franchises
power of the state.
much of the sovereign
In consideration of their discharging part of
what are the proper duties of government,
that is, providing the means of commerce
and intercourse by constructing the roads
which are the avenues of that commerce.
And when, being authorized, they assume to
operate these roads, they have devolved upon them in consideration of that franchise
the additional duty, which is not one of the
proper functions of the government, of common carriers, and are obliged to transport
all merchandise and passengers on the terms
fixed in the grant through whigh they obtain
their franchises. In this case the wrong is
attempted to be aggravated by the charge
that it is done through a corrupt combination between the directors of the company
and others, by which these directors, in violation of their duties and trust, conspire for
their own emolument to cause the company
under their control to refuse to perform the
duties imposed on it by law. In such manner
that the public are injured by extortionate
charges, and the stockholders defrauded of
their just dues, and also in such manner
that the state can cause the valuable franchises of which they are possessed as a right
of property to be annulled and forfeited for
the willful violation of the compact by which
they were granted.
These allegations may not be true, and may
be totally disproved at the hearing; but as
their truth is sworn to, and is not denied, I
am hound to treat them as true for the pmv
So far as they
poses of this application.
relate to dereliction in duty to the stockholders of the Erie Railway Company, the complainant cannot have here any relief based
upon them.

I will also assume for the purposes of
this application that the Brie Railway Company having, as the legal assignees of the
Paterson & Hudson River Railroad Comr
pany, and of their franchises. Including the
right to finish the road to the Hudson river
and to tunnel Bergen hill, constructed the
extension of the road to the Hudson river,
holds it as part of that road, and subject to
all the restrictions and duties imposed upon
that road by the charter of the original company; and that it Is therefore a common carrier, bound to transport goods over this extension, as well as over the residue of the
road, at the rates fixed in the charter.
Whether this duty could be performed by
delegating to another person or company
who would discharge It in the same manner,
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and for the same compensation, and with
the same liabilities, need not be discussed
They have attempted to delegate it to
here.
a company who do not attempt or offer to
perform the duty as common carriers, or
subject to the liabilities of common carriers,
but only as forwarders, and who charge for
this imperfect performance more than four
times the rate authorized to be charged by

the Erie Railway Company. They therefore do not provide any one to discharge the
duty required of them, and they utterly refuse to perform it themselves, and have
bound themselves by a contract that no one
but the express company shall perform it.
Such contract may be void, both as ultra
vires and contrary to law, yet it is proper
to be .considered as showing the Intention
of the company not to perform this part
of their duty.
The injury to the complainant, too, is of
that nature, that while there may be aj
remedy at law, as by recovery of damage
for Injury, yet is such that cannot be ad&
I
quately relieved by suits for damages.
is continually recurring, and will require
continued and repeated suits, and continued
litigation, and the expenses of each suit
would make the recovery of the excess paid
I now assume that
an inadequate remedy.
the Erie Railway Company Is, and will remain, solvent.
The affidavit of the proper
officer of the company, which is legally before the court, clearly shows that the company is not solvent, or likely to prove so.
But, although the injury is proved, and
the subject-matter is such that a court of
equity will not refuse relief, on the ground
that there is adequate relief at law, the
question remains whether the injunction
here applied for can be granted, or any part
of it. There are injuries which this court
cannot redress, although there may be no
satisfactory remedy at law, and those which
this court can redress, for which no preliminary Injunction can Issue.
The two chief objects for which the injunction is asked are to compel the railway
company to return to the complainant its
trucks, and to compel it to transport the locomotives of the complainant from Paterson
to Long Dock at the legal rates of freight i
These are to compel the company to act, not
And the act comto refrain from acting.
manded Is the whole duty of the company,
and its performance is the whole right of
It is not the case of a
the complainant
prohibition of keeping up a structure or
maintaining some material object, the erection and continuance of which is the act that
deprives the complainant of his right, and
the destruction or removal of which would
restore the enjoyment of It
It is contended by the defendant that a
mandatory Injunction, or one which commands the defendant to do some positive
act, will not be ordered, except upon final
hearing, and then only to execute the decree
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avoid. If the Injury be already done, the
or Judgment of the court, and never on a
preliminary or interlocutory motion. Or that,
writ can have no operation, for it cannot
if it ever does so issue, it is only in cases be applied correctively, so as to remove it."
In that case, the Injury done was driving
of obstruction to easements or rights of like
nature, in which a structure erected and kept
piles for a bridge, so as to obstruct navigation. A mandatory Injunction to remove
as the means of preventing such enjoyment
will be ordered to be removed, as part of them would have remedied the whole evil.
In Hooper v. Broderick, 11 Sim. 47, a
the means of restraining the defendant from
Interrupting the enjoyment of the right.
preliminary injunction to restrain a tenant
Although there is some conflict in the aufrom discontinuing to keep an inn was disI am of opinion, solved on the ground that it was mandatory,
thorities and decisions,
the same as if he was commanded to keep
after examining into them, that this position,
with the limitation, is the established docan inn.
in Blakeman v. Navigation Co., 1 Mylne
trine of the courts of equity, and that it is a
proper and discreet limitation of the use of & K. 154, Lord Brougham, after a review
the preliminary injunction, as well as susof the cases (page 188) and quoting with
approbation what Lord Hardwicke said in
tained by the weight of authority.
Kyder v. Bentham, that "he had never
.Tustice Story, in 2 Eq. Jur. § 861, says:
"A writ of injunction may be described to known an order to puU down on motion,
be a Judicial process, whereby a party is
and but rarely by decree," refused so much
required to do a particular thing, or to reof the injunction prayed for as directed the
defendant, Powell, to fill up the collateral
frain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ. The most
The cases of the East India Co.
pond.
Spencer v. London
common form of injunction is that which
V. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83;
operates
as a' restraint upon the party in
and Birmingham Hallway Co., 8 Sim. 193;
the exercise of his real or supposed rights,
and of Durell v. Prltchard, 1 Ch. App. 244,
and Is sometimes called the remedial writ
are to the same effect And In the last
of injunction.
The other_form, commandi ng
case. Lord Romilly, M. K., held that the
an act to be. doner. s sometimes c all ed ffie* court, upon final hearing, could not issue a
'
because"rt issues "altST a de^. mandatory injunction directing a wall to he
3ui|iffl§I]]]wrtC
'Ta'ee,
and 1l~"ln'*TEi~nature
otista e^eeaogni taken down; yet the lords justices on appeal held that it had the power, but that in
to efllorce
ttie_jame7^
'
"5f£ Eden*"begiiis^ his treatise on Injuncthe case before them it should not be exercised, and dismissed the appeal.
tions by saying: "An injunction is a writ
Issuing by the order and under the seal of a
There are cases In which mandatory incourt of equity, and is of two kinds. The
junctions have been ordered on motion, but
they are ail, or nearly all, cases in which
one is the writ remedial; for, in the endless
variety of cases In which a plaintiff is entisome erection placed and maintained by the
tled to equitable relief, if that relief condeiendant to effect the injury complained
sists in restraining the commission or conof was ordered to be removed, or its maintetinuance of some act of the defendant, a
nance forbidden, on the ground that the
court of equity administers it by means of defendant effected the act he was restrained
The other species
the writ of injunction.
from doing by continuing such section.
of Injunction is called thg^lTOfgiaTwrit, and
In Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Brovra, Ch.
- Tasmig'''mliggaTe1irt;rT'' aegfeerttnrTrTnTT^
688, which is referred to as the leading case
mandatory injunction. Lord Thurlow or"IgfTy aFsTnB^ai~TJ§TiI|rTSnra^]|naturej^^
'
- for
" "'
— — ~— ■
^"
dered an injunction to restrain defendant from
execuTOiir*
"It using his dams and other erections, so as to
p. 260, It is laid down:
f Til "nfewT Inj.that
equity has not Jurisdlcprevent the water from flowing to the comsettled
(seems
plainant's mill in such quantities as It had
jtlon to compel, on motion, the performance
ordinarily done before April 4, 1785. The eff of any substantive act"
In 3 DanieU, Oh. Prac. 1767, it is said: "It fect of this may have been to compel the reBut as
moval of the part erected after 1785.
is to be observed that the court wUl not, by
injunction granted upon interlocutory applithe case states the injury complained of to
I
cation, direct the defendant to perform an
be that Lord Byron so used his dam and
J
act, but might, upon motion, order the degates as to let the water flow irregularly, to
(
fendant to pull down a building which was
the complalnant^s injury, I do not see in the
report any direction, express or implied, to
clearly a nuisance to the plaintiff."
Lord Hardwicke, in an anonymous case
take down anything, or to do any act whatin 1 Ves. Jr. 140, restained the further dig- ever.
In Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 192, the obging of a ditch, but refused, on motion berore answer, to order the part dug to be ject of the injunction was to compel the restoring of a stop gate which was viTongfully
filled up.
Lord Bldon would not order It to
Chancellor Vroom, in Attorney-General v. removed.
the preventing
but restrained
be restored,
New Jersey R. & Transp. Co., 3 N. J. Eq.
"The injunction is a preventive
the use of the water by complainant by the
141, says:
remedy.
It interposes between the complain- removal of a stop gate, which was equivalent
ant and the Injury he fears or seeks to to an order to restore it, and was bo Intended.
I

I
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In Eanken v. Husklsson, 4 Sims. 13, the
court restrained the defendant from permitting an erection to remain. This was equivalent to an order to remove it; but it is like
the others, simply removing that by which the
defendant continued, the nuisance to be restrained.

In Mexborough v. Bower, 1 Beav. 127, Lord
Langdale ordered an injunction to restrain
permitting the communication complained of,
by which complainant's mine was flooded, to
The Injunction was to prevent
remain open.
the flowing of the mine, by restraining or removing the means by which the defendant
continued to do it.
In North of England By. Co. v. Clarence By. Co., 1 Golly. 507, the Injunction
prayed for was against maintaining a wall,
and after the rights of the parties had been
referred to, and settled in the court of the
exchequer. Vice Chancellor Bruce hesitated to
grant the Injunction, although he held (page
might be
521) that mandatory injunctions
yet he referred the case to Lord
granted;
Chancellor Lyndhurst, who, it is stated, granted the injunction In nearly the terms of the
prayer; but whether it included this mandatory part does not dlstinctiy appear.
The case
established the right of the complainant to
build a bridge over the railway of the defendant and to rest the supports of the scaffolding
on the soil; and the mandatory prayer was
that defendants should remove a wall placed
on their grounds to hinder it.
In Greatrex v. Greatrex, 1 De Gex & S. 692,
the Injunction was against preventing the
plaintiffs from having access to the books of
the firm, and against removing them from, or
keeping them at, any other place than the
place of business of the partnership, as the
defendant had removed the books.
This was
equivalent to an order to restore them, but
yet it did not command any act to be done.
In Heracy v. Smith, 1 Kay & J. 389, the
Injury was covering with tiles the chimneys
from the butler's pantry of the complainant
Lord Hatherly (the present lord chancellor,
then vice chancellor, Sir W. P. Wood), on the
authority of Bobinson v. Lord Byron, granted
an injunction the effect of which was, and
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 47
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was intended to be, to compel the defendant
to remove the tiles; but he declined to adopt
the mandatory form, but restrained the defendant from doing any act to prevent the
smoke from arising.
The substance of the
judgment is grounded on the power of the
court to remove an erection made by the defendant to effect the Injury to be redressed,
when that erection is the means by which the
defendant continues to inflict the injuries from
which the court intended to restrain; and the
form of it is an acknowledgment of the general principle that an Interlocutory injimction
should not command the doing of any positive

act

A number of authorities and cases were cited on the argument to show that courts of
equity will, in certain cases, decree the restitution of particular chattels; but these are all
cases where it was so ordered upon final
hearing. There is no case of any interlocutory Injunction being granted or even applied
for, for such purpose.
It would be a simple
and easy substitute for the action of replevin;
and there is nothing in this case to warrant
such order, even upon final decree. The value
of these trucks can be fully recovered at law,
and, as to the use of them in the meantime,
new ones could be built sooner than a suit in
equity be brought to final hearing.
feel, therefore, constrained to refuse the
Injunction so far as these mandatory prayers
are concerned.
As to so much of the prayer
as asks to restrain James Fisk, Jr., and the,
other defendants named in it from entering into any agreement, or doing anything to pre- '
vent or hinder the Erie Railway Company
transporting the complainant's locomotives, 1
think the injunction ought to be granted.

I

They are conspiring with the Erie Railway
Company to injure the complainants in a
way for which the redress at law Is not adequate, and therefore should be enjoined from
doing any acts to that end.
I do not intend to intimate any opinion upon
the question whether this court has power on
the final hearing to give the complainants the
relief they seek by compelling the Erie Bailway Company to transport their locomotives
at the established fares.
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WHITECAR

MICHEJNOR

et al. v.
(37

N.

J.

et al.

Bq. 6.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

May Term,

1883.

Bill for injunction. On motion for mandatory Injunction. On order to show cause.
On bill and answer.
S. K. Bobbins and B. ,D. Shreve, for complainants. R. S. Jenkins, for defendants.

THE CHANCELLOR.

The complainants
a minister
of the Methodist Episcopal denomination,
who has been duly appointed for the present
conference year to the charge over the Methodist Episcopal Church at Moorestown, and
certain of the members of that church. The
defendants are the trustees of that church.
The bill states that the defendants, on the
29th of March last, closed the church against
the members and congregation,
and have
kept it closed ever since.
It prays an injunction to compel them to open It for the
religious
uses to which it was dedicated.
It appears from the blU and the admissions
of the answer that the church was organized
imder the rules, regulations, and discipline
prescribed by the general conference of the
Methodist Episcopal Church in the United
States, and was duly Incorporated on or
about the 21st of August, 1815, under the
act "to incorporate trustees of religious societies," by the name of "The Methodist Episcopal Church at Moorestown";
that Rachel
S. Andrews, In September, 1858, conveyed to
Deacon Brock, Caleb Penimore, Thomas Mar^
ter, James Moore, John Ireland, Isaac Browning, and Paul Crispin, "trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Moorestown, in the
county of Burlington and state of New Jersey," the lot of land on which the church
edifice la built, for the use and benefit of the
members of the Methodist Episcopal Church
at Moorestown, and that afterwards the
members of that church built thereon the
church edifice in question as a place of worship, according to the rules of faith of the
Methodist Episcopal Church in the United
States, and subject to Its discipline, and that
fthe church edifice has been used as such
j from the time of its erection until it was closed by the trustees on the 29th of March
last; that on the 27th of that month the
'
Rev. Dr. Wiley, one of the bishops of the
Methodist Episcopal Church of the United
States, and in whom, by the rules and regulations of the general conference, was reposed the power, and on whom was Imposed
the duty, of appointing for the present conference year the ministers for the various
churches constituting the New Jersey Annual
Conference,
to which annual conference the
church at Moorestown belongs, appointed Dr.
Whitecar to that church for that year (being
his second annual appointment to that
church) as minister in charge, and the latter
are Rev. Dr. Charles

H. Whitecar,

accordingly entered upon the discharge of his
duties, and in the course thereof proceeded
to the church building on the 29th of March
for the purpose
f holding the usual prayer
meeting there, but found the doors of the
church locked and a notice thereon dated that
day, and purporting to be given by the board
of trustees and signed by its secretary, that
the church would remain closed until further notice; that he and the members of the
church there assembled were compelled to
disperse
without gaining entrance to the
church; that the members present appointed
a committee of six of their number to call
with the minister upon the president of the
board of trustees and learn the cause of the
closing of the church and preventing the
minister and the members from holding service therein; that the committee called on the
president and made inquiry; that at the
time another of the trustees was present
with the president; that In reply to the inquiry the president said that he had not the
keys and did not know where they were,
and, at the same time, said to the committee
that the trustees had the power and authority to close the church^Jtait gave no reason for doing so; that the committee, on the
same occasion, asked him to show them the
deed of the diurch property,
but he, while
admitting that he had it in his house, where
the interview took place, refused to show it
to them.
It also appears, by like statement
and admission, that the trustees have kept
the church locked ever since the date mentioned, the 29th of March, and have refused
to permit It to be used for public worship or
even for the meeting of the quarterly conference, which is presided over by the elder
of the district. The defendants, by their an
swer, assert their loyalty to the Methodist
Episcopal Church In all respects, and theli
willingness to obey its rules, regulations, ani
discipline so far as they comport with thefc*
legal obligations, as they understand them
under the before-mentioned deed of trust,
and allege that their action In closing the
church against Dr. Whitecar is in accordance with the expressed wishes and determination of the majority of the members of
the church, and because they are of opinion that the welfare of the church demands
that he should not be its pastor.
On the argument of this motion It was stated in behalf of the defendants,
and it is so
averred in the answer, that their action in
closing the church was due to the fact that,
in view of the trust in the deed for the land
on which the church edifice is built, they considered It their duty to obey the wishes of the
majority of the members of the church as to
who should ofiJciate as its settled pastor, notwithstanding those wishes may be in confiict
with the rules, regulations, and discipline of
the Methodist Episcopal Church.
This view,
however, is entirdy erroneous.
Not only so,
but there is, in fact, no ground whatever for
assuming that, by reason of anything in the
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they are under any obligation different
the church belongs to the Methodist Episcopal
connection, as it is admitted it does, there is
from that which would devolve upon them
merely as trustees of the church had the deed
no warrant of law, discipline, or usage for the
acts of the defendants.
been made directly to the corporation and exWhat is known as
the itinerancy of the preachers, and the absopressed no trust The deed, as before stated,
was made, not to the corporation,
but to lute power of the bishops over the appointments of the preachers to the churches, is part
certain persons who, at the date of the conof the discipline.
veyance, were the trustees of the church. It
conveys the property to them with the addiChief Justice Gibson said, in Com. v. Cornish, 13 Pa. 28S, 290, that in the Methodist
tion of "Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal
Episcopal Church in England and America the
Church at Moorestown, in the County of Burlington and State of New Jersey," after their
election and ordination of the priesthood
by
names, in trust for that church, and the only
the general or annual conference, the ordination of them by laying on of hands by a bishop
proper use and behoof of the members thereand elders, and fixing of their appointments by
of. Neither the defendants nor any of them
are parties to that deed, and neither they nor
the bishop, are cardinal points, the last of
any of them claim by descent, grant, or devise
them a distinctive one. He adds that it is the
They are merely rock on which the church is founded and on
from the grantees therein.
elected in Februwhich it has prospered.
trustees of the corporation,
Remove the church
Neither th e legal n or theequiary, 1882.
from it, he says, and it ceases to be MethoThe ~3istic; and he also says that the election and
table title to"the "property is in them.
"-tHtter-1«te-Ts~ln^Bre TTOrperationranaP they ordination of elders, and the fixing of their
merely represent the corporation as trustees
appointments,
are regulated by articles which
holding the title of the corporation on a simare fundamental.
Said Judge Edmonds, in
ple trust which makes them bar^ depositaries
the ease of People v. Steele, 2 Barb. 397, 413:
Bq. 583.
"I am irresistibly conducted to the conclusion
of the title. Morgan v. Rose, 22 N.
And the case would not be different if they that the itinerancy of the priesthood, enforced
by the power of the episcopacy. Is now and for
held the legal title under the deed. But they
By the act of incor- more than a century has been the well-estab! do not hold that title.
lished practice of this church, is clearly defined
poration the trustees did not acquire the authey
thority
claim
In the doctrines and discipline, and has been
which
close
the
church
to
I
Morgan v. Rose,
again and again understandingly and advisedj building at their discretion.
; ubi supra.
ly justified and defended by the highest ecclesiastical tribunal known in its constitution." In
vMor have they power, under the_dlscjpline
ot-thfijchuishijodose itJLgainst_the_duiy_ ap- the case last cited, which is the leading case
on the subject, and which in Its circumstances
pointed preaehOTJ~llK(ugir'a majoHfEy of the
that they should do so. was s,ubstantially identical with this, the very
mSbefs'are'desirous
Nor have they such power under the trust in question presented here as to the right of the
'
trustees ofTKMetiiodist Episcopal church to.
The trust is that the grantees
the deed.
exclude' the blslop'S' appointee" "Was"J53iclaliy
therein named, and the survivors of them,
will hold the decided against the trustees:," Therer" as ~h6fe7
their successors and assigns,
property for the only proper use and behoof" the trustees claimed to be supported In their
action by the majority of the members of
of the members of the Methodist Episcopal
also,
Brunnenmeyer v.
See,
the church.
Church at Moorestown, their successors and
It is admitted that that Buhre, 32 111. 183.
assigns, forever.
But it is urged by the defendants that acchurch was organized under the rules, regulacording to the practice of this court there
tions, and discipline prescribed by the genershould be no mandatory injunction In this
al conference
of the Methodist Episcopal
case before the final decision of the cause. On
Church of the United States, and It is not
It was the filing of the bill an injunction was grantdenied that it has been so ever since.
ed, but it was not mandatory in its character.
in 1815, now nearly seventy
Incorporated
It indicated that in the judgment of the court,
years ago. The very name of the corporation
As a on the case made by the bill, the defendants ]
indicates its character and connection.
ought to be restrained from closing the church ,
Methodis t Episcopal chi achjt_is subject to
ITW building against the preacher and the church, i
those rtjfisj-regiilattons, and^discipJiner
not alleged
thaF the appoilrtmenr^of tha It did not, however, require them to open
under the nonand they refused to open
preacher was unauthorized or Irregular, but
deed,

It

it,

J.

I

a

a

Their refusal was
mandatory prohibition.
violation of the command of the writ,
not
and the application for an attachment against
them for contempt was therefore properly denied. The present application was subsequentmandatory injunction.
made to me for
granted an order to show cause
thereupon
why such an injunction should not be granted,
and the defendants then put in their answer.
The whole case is now before me, and the defendants have been heard upon the applicaly

that a majority of the members of the church
desire that the preacher appointed shall not
be permitted
to act as the pastor of the
church,— to discharge the duties of the place
It is
to which he has been duly appointed.
not claimed that there is any warrant In the
discipline of the church for the action of the
trustees, nor that the discipline provides that
the wishes of the majority of the members
shall determine whether the preacher appointIf
ed to the charge shall act as such or not.

INJUNCTIONS.

740

I am

of the opinion that judged by tlielr
and assuming the truth of the facts
alleged, they are without justificathe act complained of; and I see no
for
either Jurisdictional or prudential,
refusing the writ While the jurisdiction of
the court to interfere by way of mandatory
injunction should be exercised with the greatest possible caution, yet where the right to restrain the violation of which the Injunction is
asked for is clearly made out, and there is a
present want of the use of that right, the
The court is al-.
court should not hesitate.
ways very reluctant to grant a man3al^7
Tiijun^ctibn oh ah inter!Kutory appncat JonTTSut"
—wE§fe"exfreme or very _serious~aamage woulff"
—
Snsi35"fiom wittholding it, as m~cases ot iff"
TSffCTOTcejwith easemen ts or other cases flfc.
'^ndtogjmgjedftte. rellem_^wiji De ^nted.
tion.
answer,
therein
t tion for
' reason,

<>i^.cztJLA

%M.«.-^^-^-^^

Joyce, Prin. InJ. 57; Rogers Locomotive &
Machine Works v. Brie R. Co., 20 N. J, Eq.
379; Thropp v. Field, 26 N. J. Bq. 82; Longwood Valley R. R. Co. v. Baker, 27 N. J. Eq.
In this case it is not reasonable, under
166.
the circumstances, to permit the defendants
to deprive the church of the use of the edifice
imtil the final hearing.
The property is held,
by the defendants on a simple trust, and thej
are unwarrantably withholding the use of it
from those for whose use they hold it. They
have been heard and thehr defense fully laid
before the court and considered.
There will\
be an injunction commanding them to
desist]
and refrain from continuing to keep the church/
closed at such times as to prevent the preach-j
er, Dr. Whitecar, and the members of the
church, from using it for the purpose of religious worship and church business.

^ZZ:z^l^^

.^^^-^oL^l

INJUNCTIONS.
WATSON

T.

SUTHERLAND.

(5 WaU. 74.)
Supreme

Court of the United States.

Dec,

1866.

Appeal from circuit court of the United
for the district of Maryland.
Watson & Co., appellants in the suit, having issued writs of fieri facias on certain
judgments which they had recovered in the
circuit court for the district of Maryland
against Wroth & Fullerton, caused them to
be levied on the entire stock in trade of a
retail dry goods store In Baltimore, in the
possession of one Sutherland, the appellee.
the exclusive ownerj Sutherland, claiming
ship of the property, and insisting that Wroth
& Fullerton had no interest whatever In It,
filed a bill in equity, to enjoin the further
prosecution of these writs of fieri facias, and
so to prevent, as he alleged, irreparable injury to himseU. The grounds on which the
bill of Sutherland charged that the injury
would be irreparable, and could not be compensated in damages,
were these:
that he
was the bona fide owner of the stock of
goods, which were valuable and purchased
for the business of the current season, and
not aU paid for; that his only means of payment were through his sales; that he was
a young man, recently engaged on liis own
account in merchandising, and had succeeded in establislung a profitable trade, and if
his store was closed, or goods taken from
him, or their sale even long delayed, he
would not only be rendered insolvent, but
Ills credit destroyed, his business wholly
broken up, and his prospects in life blasted.
The answer set forth that the goods levied
on were really the property of Wroth & Fullerton, who had been partners in business
in Baltimore, and who, suspending payment
In March, 1861, greatly in debt to the appellants and others, had, on the 27th October,
1862, and under the form of a sale, conveyed
the goods to Sutherland, the appellee; that
Sutherland was a young man, who came to
this country from Ireland a few years ago;
that when he came he was wholly without
property; that since he came he had been
salesman
in a retail dry goods store, at a
small salary, so low as to have rendered it
impossible
for him to have saved from his
earnings any sum of money sufficient to have
made any real purchase of this stock of
which the
goods from Wroth & Fullerton,
answ» set up was accordingly a fraudulent
transfer made to hinder and defeat creditors.
It further stated that the legislature of
Maryland had passed acts staying executions
from the 10th of May, 1861, until the 1st of
Novembw, 1862; that previous to the 1st
November, 1862, Wroth & Fullerton had determined to pay no part of the judgments
rendered against them; and that from the
10th May, 1861, until the 1st November, 1862,
judgments, amounting to between $30,000
and $40,000 had been rendered against them;
States
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that between
the date of the suspension,
March, 1861, and the 27th October, 18C2, they
had sold the greater portion of their goods,
and collected a great many of the debts due
them, but had paid only a small portion of
those which they owed; secreting for their
own use the greater portion of the money
collected, and with the residue obtaining the
goods levied upon.
It added that there was no reason to suppose that the levy aforesaid, as made by said
marshal, would work irreparable injury to
the appellee, even if the goods so levied on
were the property of the complainant, as
property of the same description, quantity,
and quality, could be easily obtained in market, which would suit the appellee's purpose
as well as those levied upon, and that a jury
would have ample power, on a trial at common law, in an action against the respondents, now appellants, or against the marshal
on his official bond, to give a verdict commensurate with any damages the said appellee could sustain by the levy and sale of

\

.

the goods aforesaid.
On the filing of the

bill a temporary In-\ f
Junction was granted, and when the causes
was finally heard, after a general replication!
filed and proof talsen, it was made perpetual./
These proofs, as both this court and the
hardly established, as
one below considered,
Sutherland, the alleged fraud on
respected
creditors.
The appeal was from the decree of perpetual Injunction.
Mason, Campbell & McLaughlin, for defendants. Wallis & Alexander, contra.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion
of the court
There are, in this record, two questions for
Was Sutherland entitled to
consideration.
invoke the interposition of a court of equity ?
warrant the ^
and, if so, did the evidence
court below In perpetuating the injunction?
It is contended that the injunction should
have been refused, because there was a complete remedy at law. If the remedy at law
is sufficient, equity cannot give relief, "but
It is not enough that there is a remedy at
law; it must be plain and adequate, or in
other words, as practical and efficient to the
ends of justice, and its prompt administraHow could
tion, as the remedy in equlty."i
at law, for the
Sutherland be compensated
Injuries he would suffer, should the grievances of which he complains be consummated?
If the appellants made the levy, and prosecuted It In good faith, without circumstances of aggravation. In the honest belief that
Wroth & Fullerton owned the stock of goods
(which they swear to In their answer), and
It should turn out, in an action at law instituted by Sutherland for the trespass, that
the merchandise belonged exclusively to him.
It Is well settled that the measure of dam-

/

I

Boyce's

Bx'rs v. Grundy. 3 Pet. 210.
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Pet. 272; 282.
Baldw. 142,
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Conard v. Pacific Ins. Co..
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Conard,
Fed. Gas. No. 10,647.

.

cannot be awaxd-

compensation

\

wHck

n a tr ial at law,
"Commercial ruin to Sutherland might,
therefore, be the effect of closing his store
and selling his goods, and yet the common
law fail to reach the mischief. To_preYent
a consequence like this,
court of egul^
/steps "iSParfests'tfie proceedings in limine;
brings the parties before it; hears their allegations and proofs, and decrees, either that
the proceedings shall be unrestrained, or else
perpetually enjoined The absence
of a
'"plain and adegagta-^emfijy^^atjawaffords
he only teSt o equity'jurisdj ction, aScTSe'
g^plication of this principle £b
particular
case, must depend altogether upon the character of the case, as disclosed in the pleadings.
In the case we are considering, it is
very clear that the remedy in equity could
alone furnish relief, and that the ends of
justice required the injunction to be issued.
The remaining question In this case Is
one of fact.
The appellants. In their answers, deny that
the property was Sutherland's, but Insist

a

it

I j

but__for

jd

If

U

ij/"

'

a

.

that
was fraudulently purchased by him
of Wroth & Fullerton, and is subject to the
payment of their debts.
It seems that
Wroth & Fullerton had been partners In
business In Baltimore, and suspended payment In March, 1861, In debt to the appellants, besides other creditors. Although the
appellants did not recover judgments against
them until after theh: sale to Sutherland, yet
other creditors did, who were delayed In consequence of the then existing laws of Maryland, which provided that executions should
be stayed until the 1st of November, 1862.
Taking advantage of this provision of law,
the answer charges that Wroth
Fullerton,
after their failure, collected
large portion
of their assets, but appropriated to the payment of their debts only a small portion thus
realized, and used the residue to buy the
very goods In question, which Sutherland
fraudulently purchased from them on the
27th of October; 1862, In execution of
combination and conspiracy with them to hinder, delay, and defraud their creditors.
The
answers also deny that the Injury to Sutherland would be Irreparable, even
the stock
were his, and Insist that he could be amply
compensated by damages at law. After general replication was filed, proofs were taken,
but, as In all contests of this kind, there was
a great deal of Irrelevant testimony, and very
much that had only a remote bearing on the
question at Issufe between the parties.
It
unnecessary to discuss the facts of this case,
for
would serve no useful purpose to do so.
We are satisfied, from a consideration of the
whole evidence, that Wroth & Fullerton acted badly, but that Sutherland was not a/
party to any fraud which they contemplated/
against their creditors, and that he made the
purchase In controversy, In good faith, andj
for an honest purpose.
The evidence also shows conclusively, that
had not the levy been arrested by Injunction, damages would have resulted to Sutherland, which could not have been repaired
at law.
The decree of the circuit court Is, there-

it

If the property were not sold, could not
extend beyond the Injury done to It, or, If
sold, to the value of I^ when taken, with Interest from the time of the taking down to
the trial. 2
'
And this is an equal rule, whether the suit
is against the marshal or the attaching creditors, if the proceedings are fairly conducted, and there has been no abuse of authority.
Any harsher rule would Interfere to prevent
the assertion of rights honestly entertained,
,
/i4id which should be judicially Investigated
Mand settled.
"Legal compensation refers
/solely to the Injury done to the property taken, and not to any collateral or consequentlal damages, resulting to the owner, by the
nrespass."»
Loss of trade, destruction of
■credttr and failure of business prospects^ are
'coDartef al or^consequehllal
damages, which"
l8~cIaimeil~wouId~result from "the trespass,
ages,

it
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INJUNCTlONa.
McHENRY
(90 N.

V.

Y.

JEWETTT.
58.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

1882.

Action by one McHenry against one JewFrom an order of the General Term
affirming an order of the Special Term granting a preliminary Injunction restraining defendant from voting on certain stock either
In person or by proxy, or from giving a proxy
pendente lite, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
W. W. MacFarland, for appellant
B. F.
Dunning, for respondent

ett

ANDREWS, C. J. The complaint shows
that the plaintiff Is pledgor of shares of railroad stock transferred on the books of the
company to the defendant as trustee for the
pledgee, and the action is brought to restrain
the defendant from voting upon the shares
at the meetings of stockholders, which it is
alleged he has heretofore done, and claims
the right to do In the future by reason of his
title and right as trustee of the stock. The
order from which this appeal is taken grantrestraining the
ed a temporary injunction
defendant, pendente lite, from voting on the
We think the Injunction was imshares.
properly allowed, for the reason that it does
not appear
from the complaint that the
plaintiff is entitled to the final relief for
which the action is brought, and in such case
injunction
is unauthorized.
a temporary
Code, § 603.
It is claimed on the part of the
plaintiff that within the general rule that a
pledgee has no right to use the thing pledged,
the defendant is not entitled to vote upon
the shares, which it is insisted is a use of
the shares in violation of this rule. On the
other hand, the defendant claims that the
voting power passes to the pledgee of corporate shares transferred on the books of the
corporation to the pledgee, as incident to
the pledge, and according to the presumed
intention of the parties. Without considering this question, but conceding the plaintiffs claim, it does not follow that he Is entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from voting on the shares. ,It is
nnf- i^iif^cient to authorize the remedy by injunctio n that a„Yi, o;^atian (ft a naked _j[egal^
right oif property is threatened,__There must
some special ground of jurisdiction, and
where an injunction is the final relief sought
facts which entitie the plaintiff to this rem-

^

must be averred in the complaint and
established on the hearing. The complaint
In this case is bare of any facts authorizing
final relief by injunction.
It is true that it
is alleged that the defendant by the use of
the shares has been enabled to a great extent
to control the management
of the corporation in the interest of the New York, Lake
Erie & Great Western Railway Company,
with Uttie or no regard to the best Interests
of the company issuing the shares. But
there are no facts Supporting this allegation,
nor is it averred that the interests of the latter company have been prejudiced, or that the
value of the shares has been impaired by the
acts of the defendant
So also it is alleged
that it is greatiy against the plaintiff's interest as a shareholder to permit the defendant to vote upon the shares, and that the
plaintiff will suffer great and irreparable inedy

jury if the defendant is
But no facts justifying

permitted to do so.
these conclusions
are stated, and the mere allegation of serious
or irreparable injury, apprehended or threatened, not supported by facts or circumstances tending to justify it is clearly insufficient
Neither injury to the plaintiff's property,
inadequacy of the legal remedy, or any
pressing or serious emergency, or danger of
loss, or other special ground of jurisdiction,
is shown by the complaint. The complaint
therefore does not show that the plaintiff is
Corpo-'
entitied to final relief by injunction.
ration, etc., v. Mapes, 6 Johns. Oh. 46; Printing Establishment v. Fitch, 1 Paige, 98;
High, Inj. §§ 22, 34, 35, and cases cited.
The preliminary injimction was granted upon the complaint, and an affidavit verifying
therein, without stating any
the statements
additional facts. It is doubtless sufficient
that a probable or prima facie case be made,
to justify the granting of an injunction pen>
dente lite, but where, as in this case, it clearly appears that the complaint shows no cause
of action, then a preliminary injunction is
unauthorized, and the granting of It is error
of law, which may be reviewed by this
Code, § 190, srubd. 2; Allen
court on appeal.
V. Meyer, 73 N. Y. 1; Wright v. Brown,
67 N. y. 1; CoUins v. Collins,. 71 N. Y. 270;
Paul V. Hunger, 47 N. Y. 469.
The order of the general and special terms
All
should thererore be reversed, with costs.
concur, except BAPALLO, J., dissenting,

and TRACY,
Order reversed.

MILLER

\

Tt^-A

JJ.,

absent
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STEHNAU

T.

(27

N.

Supreme

CINCINNATI GAS-LIGHT
00KB CO.
B. 545, 48 Ohio St 324)

Court of Ohio.

May

5,

&

1891.

Error

to circuit court, Hamilton county.
Action was brought in the court of common pleas by the gas company against the
plaintiff in error to obtain an injunction.
In its. petition the company alleged the execution -of the following contract:
"This
contract, entered into this' 16th day of March,
by and between the Cincinnati Gas1886,
Light & Coke Company and Chas. J. Steinau, proprietor and occupant of the premises
Imown as 'The Palace,' and situated No. 80
West Fourth street, between Walnut and
Vine streets, witnesseth:
First. The said
the Cincinnati Gas-Light & Coke Company,
for and in consideration of the continued
use of not less than three-fourths the present average consumption of gas on said
premises, or other premises which the party
of the second part may occupy or remove to,
hereby agrees and binds itself to supply, under existing rules and regulations, at the
premiises above described,— except in cases
of unavoidable accident,—all the gas which
may be required to properly illuminate the
same, for a period of ten years next ensuing.
The gas so furnished shall at no time be of
less power or pm-ity than the present legal
standard. That it will accept in full i)ayment for gas so furnished in accordance
with the terms of this contract the sum of
one dollar and thirty cents per thousand
cubic feet, if paid at the office of said gas
company within the first three business days
after presentation of bill for gas supplied
during the period covered by said bill, but
in case such payment is not made within
the time specified, then the price shall be
one dollar and forty cents per thousand
cubic feet. Second. That the said Charles
J. Steinau, for himself, his heirs, or assigns,
for and in consideration of the reduction in
price above specified, hereby agrees to receive from the said the Cincinnati Gas-Light
& Coke Company aU the gas necessary for
the proper illumination
of the premises
above described,
or of other premises to
which he may remove, in quantity not less
than three-fourths of the present average
consumption; and that he vnll not, during
the period above named, introduce into or
use
on said premises oil lamps,
electric
lights, or other material or power for gen-

eral

illuminating purposes; or any other
gas than that supplied by the said the Cincinnati Gas-Light & Coke Company. Third.
It is further agreed and understood by both
parties to this contract that if during the
period above named the city council shall
pass, and the gas company accept, any ordinance by virtue of which the price of gas
to all private consumers in said city is reduced below the price above specified, then.
In that case, the said Chas. J. Steinau shall

not thereafter be required to pay any price
In excess of that named in said ordinance;
but in all other respects this contract shall
continue in force during the period aforesaid." It further alleged, in substance, that
at the date of the contract the regular price
for gas to private consumers was $1.70 per
thousand cubic feet, with a discount of 10
cents per thousand on monthly bills paid
within 5 days after presentation.
That price
continued until February 28, 1887, when the
price was fixed by the city council at $1.25,
with same rate of discount as before. The
average monthly consumption of gas for the
current year on the premises would be over
18,000 cubic feet if the defendant fulfilled
his contract
The plaintiff duly performed
all the stipulations and conditions of the contract on its part, and was ready, able, and
willing to continue to do so. But the defendant, disregarding his obligations under
the contract, refused to receive all the gas
necessary for the proper Illumination of the
premises,
and has introduced and is using
for general illuminating purposes material
or power other than the gas supplied by
plaintiff, viz., the Edison incandescent light
"By means of the light so created the eonsumption of gas for Illuminating purposes
will be and has been largely reduced below
the quantity agreed to be consumed on said
premises, as stated in said contract, if not
wholly done away with, and the company
will lose the benefit of said contract and
the gain and profit it is entitled to there,
from, and will suffer irreparable damage."
Wherefore plaintiff asks that defendant be
enjoined from using said electric light, or
any material other than gas snppUed by
plaintiff, for general Illuminating purposes
on said premises,
and for such other and
further relief as the nature of the case may
require. A demurrer to the petition was
overruled, and final decree of Injunction
entered against the defendant
This judgment was affirmed by the circuit court
To
reverse both judgments this error proceeding
is brought.

Kramer & Kramer, for plaintiff In error.
B. A. Ferguson, for defendant in error.
SPEAR, J. (after stating the facts as
In consideration of the continued
above).
use of not less than three-fourths the present average consumption of gas by Steinau,
the company stipulated that It would furnish him, for 10 years, all the gas necessary for the lighting of his place of business
at a price much lower than the then regular
price, to be paid monthly. Steinau stipulated to receive the gas in quantity not less
than three-fourths of the then average
monthly consumption, for the time named,
and further stipulated not to introduce or
use electric lights or material for general
lUnmiiTiating
purposes otber than gas to be
furnished by the company. No past consid-

INJUNCTIONS.
eration appears. The obligations of each
party are wholly in covenant, and are wholly
executory.
In other words, they are promises
merely.
The prayer is for injunction to restrain Steinau from using the electric light or
any material for general illuminating purposes
other than the gas to be furnished by the comInjunction is frequently resorted to as
pany.
a means of obtaining specific performance.
In
this case the purpose intended Is to prevent the
use of electric lights in order that Steinau
shall thus be compelled to comply with his contract, and use the company's gas.
The object thus sought is specific performance.

Against

the demand of the company it is

Insisted that a court of equity will not grant
an injunction to restrain a breach of negative covenants where the result will be to
effect specific performance of affirmative
covenants unless the affirmative stipulations
of the complaining party can be specifically
enforced against him, and that the petition
does not show but that the company
has an
adequate remedy at law. If either proposition
is sound, the demurrer was improperly overAs already stated, the object of the
ruled.
proceeding is, and the result reached, if it
is successful, will be, to specifically enforce
It seems
the contract as against Steinatk.

plain that,

if

the situation

of the parties

were reversed, and specific performance were
sought against the company, the court would
have no power to compel a full compliance
by the company with its stipulations to furnish all the gas needed for the period provided for in the contract
It might be in
the power of the court to enjoin the company from turning the gas off from Steinau's
service pipes so long as he complied
with
and it
its reasonable rules and regulations,
is possible that the company could, by mandamus, be compelled to furnish gas to Steinau while it continued to use the franchises
and privileges accorded it as a corporation
by virtue of the statute and the ordinances
of Cincinnati.
But these partial remedies.
If they might be available, would be wholly
apart from the contract; and, be this as it
niay„ it admits of no question that, upon
any state of facts appearing by the allega-

tions of this petition, it is beyond the power
of any com^ to compel the company to manufacture and supply gas for a period of 10
years.
How can the court order the company to continue the manufacture of gas
for the purpose of supplying this consumer?
How can it prevent this company from disBolvlng and going out of business, or from
Belling out to another which would not be
contracts?
The inbound by its personal
quiry, then, is, if the contract could not be
specifically enforced against the company,
may it be specifically enforced in its favor?
The authorities on the point are numerous,
Mr. Pomand, to some extent, conflicting.
eroy, in his work on Contracts, § 163, ob"The peculiarly distinctive feature
serves:
of the equitable doctrine Is that the re-
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right to a specific performance must
mutual. If, therefore, from the nature
or form of the contract itself, from the relations of the parties, from the personal incapacity of one of them, or from any othmedial
De

er cause,

the agreement

devolves

no

obliga-

tion at all upon one of the parties, or if it
cannot be specifically enforced against him,
then, and for that reason, he is not in general entitled to remedy of a specific performance against his adversary party, although
otherwise
there may be no obstacle arising,
either from the terms of the contract or
from his personal status and relations, to an
enforcement of the relief against the latter
individually."
Again, (section 165,) he says
that "it is a familiar doctrine that if the
right to the specific performance of a contract exists at all it must be mutual. The
remedy must be alike attainable by both
parties to the agreement." To this general
rule the courts have made an exception
where peculiar skill and labor are involved,
and this, apparently, upon the ground that
the element of personal and artistic sklU
renders the chances of damages at law uncertain and conjectural.
Of this class the
case of Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. &
G-. 604,
Is perhaps the leading case. The
defendant was a celebrated singer. She was
under contract to sing for a certain period
at the plaintiff's theater, and not to sing at
any other.
The court restained her from the
threatened breach of this negative covenant Later cases have followed this, and
the exception appears to be quite well established.
There are cases, besides those above referred to, both in England and in this country, which sustain the holding of the circuit
court, (2 Ohio Ch-. Ct E. 286,) that "where
there Is a clear and continuing breach of a
negative covenant in a contract, and where
an Injunction against the breach of It will
do substantial justice between the parties
by obliging the defendant to carry out his
contract or lose the benefit of a breach of It,
and the remedy at law is not adequate, or
the damages for such a breach are not susceptible of proper assessment by a jury, a
court of equity may properly restrain the
defendant from such a breach, though the
court might not be able to enforce a comperformance of the contract
plete specific
Singer Sewlngagainst the other party."
Mach. Co. V. Union Button-Hole, etc., Co., 1
Holmes, 253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; Chicago,
etc., Ry. Co. v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. (C.
C.) 24 Fed. 516; People v. Gas-LIght Co., 45
Barb. 137; Dietrichsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phil.
However, after a somewhat careOh. 52.
ful examination of the numerous cases cited
by counsel, and many others, we are inclined to the conclusion that the general
doctrine laid down by Mr. Pomeroy is sustained by the apparent weight of authority.
Hills V. Croll, 2 Phil. Ch. 60; Fothergill v.
Rowland, L. B. 17 Eq. 132; Bailey v. Col-
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lins, 59 N. H. 459; Pingle v. Conner, 66
Mich. 187, 33 N. W. 385; Iron Age Pub.
Co. V. W. U. Tel. Co., 83 Ala. 498, 3 South.
440; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Texas &
P. By. Co., 4 Woods, 317, 11 Fed. 625; Meason T. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335; Tyson v. Watts,
1 Md. Ch. 13; Richmond v. Railway Co., 33
Iowa, 423. It is important to note that an
essential
element of the proposition quoted
above is that the complaining party has no adequate remedy at law, and that his damages
are not susceptible of proper assessment by a
jury.
It goes without saying that if this
element is found wanting the rule laid down
cannot apply. On the part of the company
it is insisted that the condition referred to
is present in the case at bar. Let us see.
The stipulation of Steinau was that he would
receive gas in quantity not less than threefourths of the present average consumption.
The contract was to continue for 10 years.
It had been in force at the commencement
of the action about one year. The "present
average consumption" was a quantity easy
of ascertainment.
So long as Steinau used
the quantity of gas specified he wa-s in full
performance of his contract. When he ceasea taking that quantity he violated the contract, and when he established electric lights
in his place, and proceeded to Illuminate in
that way, it was clear that he intended to
wholly break and abandon the contract. The
company had the right to regard the contract as at an end, and no pretense or claim
of Steinau, so long as he refused to perform,
could avail to prevent the company from so
treating it
All contractual relations between the parties would then be terminated.
By force of the ordinance, and at prices fixed by the ordinance, and subject to all reasonable regulations, the company might still
be bound to furnish gas, but it could not be
required to furnish a foot of gas under the
The contract being thus, by the
contract
action of Steinau, at an end so far as he
was concerned, the company's cause of action was immediate. It could, if the damages were susceptible of proper assessment
at any time, have an action at once for Its

entire damages for the breach, and this
remedy did not involve a multiplicity of
suits.
James v. AUen Co., 44 Ohio St 226,
6 N. B. 246, is a case, in principle, like this
one.
This court there held that where the
offending party had wholly broken and abandoned the contract the party injured by the
breach could bring his action at once, and
recover his entire damages for the breach,
and that one judgment upon such claim
would be a bar to a future recovery.
That
rule, we think, applies to this case.
What
would stand in the way of adequate damages being awarded by a jury? The amount
of gas agreed to be nsed each month, the
duration of the time, the price to be paid
per thousand, (subject to changes, if any,
produced by the new ordinance,) were all
shown by the contract. If, added to these
facts, the jury should be put in possession
of the amount of "gain and profit" the company were making per thousand, what would
prevent a clear ascertainment of damages
upon that basis, reduced probably on account of payment in advance? Fothergill v.
Rowland, L. B. 17 Eq. 132; Chicago, etc.,
Ky. Co. V. New York, etc., Ry. Co. (0. C.)
24 Fed. 516.
It is doubted by some members
of the court whether a court of equity. In
where the
a case of specific performance,
granting or refusal of relief may depend so
largely upon the court's discretion, should
of
exercise it in favor of the enforcement
covenants which deprive a party of new and
valuable discoveries of science, and, in a
measure, tend to create a monopoly by contract But a decision of this question is not
necessary to a disposition of the case at bar,
and that, as well as whether a court of equity should, in any ' case, where full performance cannot be enforced, decree performance of negative covenants of one party, may properly be left to be determined
when a case arises which necessarily requires a decision upon them.
We are content to rest the decision of this case upon the
ground that the remedy of the defendant In
error is at law, and not in equity.
Judgment reversed.
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MANHATTAN MANUFACTURING & FERTILIZING CO. V. NEW JERSEY STOCKYARD & MARKET CO. et al.
(23

N.

J.

Eq. 161.)

Oourt of Chancery of New Jersey.

May Term,

1872.

Bill for an Injunction.
Heard on a rule to
show cause why an injunction should not isMr. McCarter, for complainant
I. W.
Scudder and Mr. Winfield, for defendants.

ZABRISKIB, Ch. The complainant is a
corporation of the state of New York, doing
business
at Communlpaw.
The defendant,
the stock yard company, a corporation of this
state, owns a large and extensive abattoir or
slaughter-house
at Communipaw. It has not,
for some years, slaughtered animals there,
but let to butchers the privilege of slaughtering their animals in the abattoir.
Previous to August, 1870, the blood and other remains of animals thus slaughtered there by
the butchers, not being removed or properly
cared for, had created a stench which became
a nuisance to the adjoining country, and the
was restrained by an injunction
I company
from permitting the business to be carried on
Vhere, unless on condition of having the blood
jand offal perfectly cared for.
The butchers
paid for the privilege of slaughtering there,
and left the blood and offal on the premises,
to be cared for by the stock yard company.
These di£9culties
became a serious embar/ rassment in the enterprise. The complainant
j undertook to manage this, and to remove and
I manufacture the blood and other abandoned
* refuse left on the premises by the butchers,
J so as to prevent any public or private nui' sance that might else arise from them.
To effect the objects of this arrangement,
I
; the stock yard company, on the 5th of August, 1870, made a lease to the complainant
of certain premises adjoining the abattoir, for
the specified business of manufacturing and
preparing fertilizers and manures, and the
materials for that purpose.
The term was
for twenty years from April 20th, 1867, with
privilege of renewal, and the rent to be paid
was fifteen per cent, of the net profits of the
business.
The lease contained this provision:
"The parties of the second part shall also
have the refusal and exclusive right of saving and taking all the blood of animals
slaughtered in the abattoir and sheep-house
of the parties of the first part, and of saving
and taking the animal matter and ammonia
from the rendering tanks of the parties of
the first part, and of using the same in their
business;" and also this agreement on part
of the complainant: "Said parties of the second part hereby bind themselves to save all
that is possible of the blood from the animals slaughtered, and the animal matter and
ammonia from the tanks, to prevent any ef-
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fiuvla or stenches from escaping, and to prevent any and all nuisance from being created in any manner whatsoever, either in saving the blood, animal matter, or ammonia, oi
In converting the same into articles of commerce."
The lease was executed by the president of
the stock yard company, in the name of the
company,
by aflSxing its common seal and
his signature. The execution was duly
proved, and the lease recorded in Hudson
county clerk's oflice, August 20th, 1870.
The complainant, on faith of the lease,
erected on the demised premises expensive
buildings and machinery for the purpose of
the manufacture.
These were completed by
January 9th, 1871. In the meantime arrangements had been made by the complainant with the stock company and its employes
for coagulating the blood on the premises,
and for preventing nuisances arising from
slaughtering in the abattoir. Part of this
coagulated blood had, with complainant's acquiescence, been delivered to John J. Craven,
one of the defendants, for making experiments or manufacturing it.
In April, 1871, the stock yard company
leased its abattoir to Henry R. Payson and
David H. Sherman, two of the defendants,
who have since carried on the business under the name of D. H. Sherman & Co. The
defendant, Isaac Freese, who was In the employ of the stock yard company as superintendent, and continued In the employ of D.
H. Sherman & Co. in the like capacity, entered into partnership with the defendant
Craven, who was also In the employ of the
stock yard company at the making of its
lease to the complainant, and with the defendant Sherman, under the name of "The
Bergen Manufacturing
Company," for the
purpose of manufacturing albumen and fertilizers.
After January 9th, 1871, the complainant
demanded all the blood of the animals slaughtered at the abattoir, but Craven made an arrangement with certain butchers who slaughtered there, for saving and taking the blood
of the animals slaughtered by them, and this
was permitted by Sherman & Co., and Freese,
their superintendent; and a large part of the
blood is thus taken and delivered to Sherman, Freese and Craven, and is lost to the
complainant.
By the record of the lease to the complainant, Sherman, Craven and Freese had constructive notice of its contents, and also It is
clear that they, as well as Payson, had actual notice. They do not deny this, but take
the ground that the blood, like all other parts
of the animal slaughtered, belongs to the
butcher, and that they or the stock yard company can no more control or deliver It than
they could control the flesh or hides. That
the butchers having discovered that the blood
has a merchantable value, have a right to
dispose of It for their own benefit; and that
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when they had determined to sell It, and not

to abandon It, Craven was under no obliga-

tion not to buy it, and his firm might receive
it through him without breach of faith.
This defence, at first sight, is seemingly
good; but it wholly rests upon the correctness of the premises, to wit, that the stock
<yard company had not the right or power
It is
TO control the disposition of the blood.
not claimed that it had, before the complainant's lease, granted to any one the privilege of slaughtering there. If It had, for a
term unexpired. It would have lost the control. Before that, they had permitted butchers to slaughter there without any provision
about disposing of the blood or offal. It
may, by custom, have been the effect of such
contract, that the butcher might leave the
blood and offal to be removed by the company. If left, the company was liable for
any nuisance occasioned by it. It cannot be
doubted that the company could have required, as a condition, that the butcher should remove the blood and offal. It had the right to
prevent any one from using the abattoir who
would not comply. Before the lease to the
complainant, this condition would have been
deemed a burden on the butchers, and might
have injured the business of the company.
It was in difficulty by reason of the nuisance
caused by leaving these matters, and the
injunction growing out of it. It was reThe consideration was
lieved by this lease.
the exclusive right to take the blood and
ofCal which was secured by covenant to the
"Tcomplainant.
After that, the company had
I the same right to demand of every one using
leave these matI the abattoir that he should
I ters for the complainant, as It bad to require
/ him to remove them. This could have been
*—
fihnexed as a condition to every permission
to use the abattoir, as well as the condition
to pay for the use. And this, by its covenant, the company was bound to do. D. H.
Sherman & Co., as the lessees, are bound,_bj^
And FreeseTtSven and
the'iame covemEi.
ShermaSnE£Hng~flotive of this obligation betheir business, are
fore they commenced
bound to refrain from interfering with these
rights of the complainant, and from taking
the blood and other matters which it la enti-

tled to take. Talk v. Moxhay, 2 Phila. 7T4;
De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De Gex & J. 276.
The facts that Freese and Craven transferred to the complainant their claim to a patent for making albumen from blood, and
took part in the arrangements for the lease
by the company in whose employ they were,
and that Craven interfered by these negotiations with the butchers after he was repulsed'
In his attempt to get into the employ of the
complainant, do not give greater validity
to the complainant's right; they may show
bad faith and vlndictiveness, and that they
are not entitled to any favorable consideration beyond their legal rights.
The injunction applied for is not a manda^
tory injunction; It is not to require the delivery of the blood, but to restrain Craven
from taking it, and the other defendants
from suffering or permitting any other person
than the complainant to take it
For this Injury there is a remedy at law,
|
but it is not an adequate remedy.
The value I
of the blood Is no measure of the injury, and
it is hardly possible to compute the damages
which the injury may occasion.
And redress
at law could only be obtained by a continued'
series of suits through the twenty or forty
years of the complainant's term. It is a
case peculiarly proper for the preventiveremedy by injunction.
Shreve v. Black, 4 N.
J. Eq. 177.
The defendants, in their answers, deny
that the seal of the stock yard company wasaffixed to the lease by authority of the directors. The bill alleges that the stock yard'
company made and executed the lease under
its corporate seal, and sets out a lease with'
the seal affixed, and signed by the president
The answer of the company Is not verified by
any one who has knowledge of the facts.
The present secretary swears that he believes the fax:tB to be true. Any deed of a
corporation, under its corporate seal and
signed by the proper officer, is presumed to
have been executed by authority of the corporation, until the contrary is clearly shown.
Leggett v. New Jersey Manuf g & Banking
Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 541.
There is no proof hera
to overcome this presumption.
The Injunction must issue as prayed for.- )

INJUNCTIONS.
GODFREY

(n Pac
Supreme

T.

BLACK.

84S, 39 Kan. 193.)

Court of Kansas.

April

7,

1888.

Error to district court, Sedgwicls county;

Judge.
Action of Injunction, commenced by Robert Black against" F. S. Roberts and M. O.
Roberts, partners as Roberts Bros., and C.
E. Godfrey, to restrain Roberts Bros, from
subletting any portion of the Manhattan Hotel, situated in the city of Wichita, and to
restrain C. B. Godfrey from occupying the

O. Beed,

hotel office as a real-estate
and brokerage
office. In his petition. Black stated, in substance, that he was the owner of the premises, and had constructed the building thereon to be used as a first-class hotel, and that
he let the same to the Roberts Bros., to be
used as an hotel, from the 1st day of July,
1885, to the 1st day of July, 1886, for a stipulated rent, payable in monthly installments.
It was further provided In the lease, which
was In writing, that Roberts "Bros, might
elect to take the premises for the further
period of four years after July 1, 1886, upon the same terms, by giving to Black a vrritten notice of such election at any time prior
to the 1st day of May, 1886. In pursuance

of that stipulation, Roberts Bros., within the
time, elected to retain the lease for the additional four years, and gave written notice
It was further
to that effect to the plaintiff.
provided in the lease that Roberts Bros,
might carry on any business In the building
incident to the hotel business; but it was expressly stipulated that they should not lease
nor underlet, nor permit any persons to occupy the premises, without the consent of the
plaintiff in writing having been first obtained.
He alleges that he has never given Roberts Bros, any consent to occupy the building for any purpose other than that of an
hotel, nor to lease or underlet the building
or any part thereof, nor to permit any persons to occupy the same except as guests of
He alleges that the premises were
the hotel.
to be occupied only as an hotel, and that
it is injurious to the hotel to carry on, in
the office thereof, the business of a real-estate agency and brokerage, and that it is
in
such an injury as cannot be compensated
Notwithstanding the premises, he
damages.
avers that Roberts Bros, have leased to C.
E. Godfrey a portion of the hotel building
and that Godfrey,
used as the hotel office;
are occupying the
his agents and employes,
same as a real-estate office and place of business.
He further states that Roberts Bros,
are threatening and Intending to continue
said lease and imderletting to Godfrey, and
that Godfrey intends to occupy the room in
the transaction of the real-estate business,
against the protest and without Black's eonHe asks
Kent, and to his irreparable Injury.
prohibiting
issue
Roberts
that injunction
Bros, from leasing or underletting the hotel
building and premises, or any part thereof,
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to Godfrey for a real-estate office, and restraining Godfrey and his agents and employes from occupying the office of the hotel,
or any part thereof, as a real-estate office.
The petition was verified and introduced in
evidence in support of the application for a
temporary Injunction.
In addition, the affidavits of several persons were offered, tending to shttw that the carrying on of a realestate business in the office of a first-class
hotel brings a crowd and an excitement which
interferes with the convenience and comfort
of guests, and tends to drive them away, and
to render the hotel unpopular.
O. B. Godfrey testified that he had leased from Roberts Bros, a space 8 by 20 feet, In the corner of the hotel office, and put a railing
around and furnished the same, and was
carrying on a real-estate business therein.
Upon a hearing had upon due notice, a temporary injunction was granted against Godfrey during the pendency of the action, enjoining him, and his agents and employes,
from further using any portion of the office
of the hotel as a real-estate office. To reverse the order granting the temporary injunction, O. E. Godfrey brings the case to
this court
Sankey & Campbell, for plaintifC In error.
Campbell & Dyer, for defendant in error.

JOHNSTON, J. (after stating the facts
We see no reason to disturb the

above).

as
or-

der granting the temporary Injunction.
The
building in question was constructed for
use as a first-class hotel, was rented for that
purpose,
and it was expressly
specified
in
the lease that the lessee should not sublet
the premises, or permit any one else to occupy the same, without the consent in writing of the lessor having first been obtained.
In direct violation of the terms of the lease,
Roberts Bros, sublet a portion of the hotel
office, to be used by Godfrey in carrying on
a business Inconsistent with the hotel business, and which, the testimony says, detracts
from the reputation and popularity of the
They had no right to sublet or permit
house.
|
the hotel to be used by Godfrey, and he ac-l
quired no right by the agreement made with I
them.

It

Is claimed that injunction Is not the
proper remedy In such case; and actions to
recover possession and to recover damages
for trespass, where the defendants could
have the issues submitted to a jury, are sugThe lessor i s not confined to these.
gested.
He has a
remedies, nor are they adequate.
right to Insisf that the covenants of the lease
shall be observed, and that the premises
shall be used only for the purposes agreed
upon.
It does not appear that the lease was
to terminate upon a breach of the covenants ;
but, even if the lessor had a right to re-enter,
that would not preclude him from obtaining
equitable relief to prevent a forbidden use
Presumably the continuof the premises.

1
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2

Is

a

t

a

§

a

evS-y day for the constantly recurring grievance, which would lead to
multiplicity of
suits; and the necessity of preventing these
is an exception which warrants the exercise
of the equitable jurisdiction of the court.
Besides, the lessor has a right to insist upon
his property being used ia the manner fixed
by agreement In the lease; and the testimony
tends to show that the carrying on of the
real-estate business in the office of the hotel
will deteriorate its value, and seriously iojure
the hotel; and in such cases equity will interfere to restrain the continuance of the injury.
High, Inj.
1142; Steward v. Winters,
Sandf. Ch. 587; Macher v. Hospital,
Ves. & B. 188; Stees v. Kranz, 32 Minn.
813, 20 N. W. 241.
Under the pleadings and the proofs, the
injunction was properly allowed,
temporary
and the order granting the same will be
2

ii

t

it

defendant was wholly unauthorized. In giving the opinion in that case, the writer carefully distinguished
from those like the
present one j^holding that injunction to re.-^
strain parties^^om putting leased proper^
to a use "not authorized" by he lease could
"
be maintained. "~'15' speaking of a re-entry by
was there remarked: "True,
the landlord,
he may perhaps declare the lease forfeited,
and recover the property; but he may not
desire to do this. He may not be able to
lease for the same rent, or to an equally responsible tenant; and the lessee ought not
to be permitted to compel the lessor either
to take back the property or tolerate a forbidden use."
Stees v. Kranz, 32 Minn. 313,
High, Inj. §§ 1138, 1144.
20 N. W. 241;

the right of the lessor to bring^
action to recover compensatory damages
for the trespass
sufficient ground for withholding the remedy of injunction. Equitable
relief may be properly extended in some cases
against trespass . An action
law against
the trespasser here would not be an aSeqiiate
remedy; \4: new "caiusTof "action wouKPartsg^
Neither

an

4

a

it

;:l

ance of the lease for the fnll term Is beneficial to the lessor, and he Is entitled to a performance la accordance with the contract
Upon this groimd the mere re-entry
made.
remedy, as
is held to be an inadequate
posidoes not leave the lessor in as good
tion as the enforcement of performance by
the tenant would leave him in. Bodwell v.
Crawford, 26 Kan. 292, is cited as an authority against maintaining the action.
The two
There no concases are very dissimilar.
tractual relation existed between the parties,
and the possession of the premises by the

1
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affirmed.

All

the justices concurring.

INJUNCTIONS.

APPEAL OP McCLURG.
(58 Pa. 61.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan.

20, 1868.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Chester
county.
In equity.
Dr. Benjamin Thompson filed a bill against
Dr. John R. McClurg, averring as follows:
That the defendant, being a practicing physician at dhandlervUle, Chester county, agreed,
on the 22d of January, 1859, with the plaintiff, to sell him his office fixtures and furni.ture, etc., with his good wiU in his profession,
/for $125, and bound himself to remove not
iless than twelve miles from the place, and
\never thereafter to establish himself as a
within twelve miles without the
j physician
consent,
to use his Influence
to
/ plaintiff's
; throw his practice to the benefit of the plain■ tiff, and give countenance
to no other in that
averring further that the defend: direction,
himself as a physician
ant had established
■ within five miles of his former location withThe bUl prayed
out the plaintiff's consent
that he might be restrained from practice in
his present location, and from establishing
himself elsewhere within the. prescribed limits.

The answer alleged that the fixtures, etc.,
were worth at least $300; that the agreement
as written did not contain the whole agreement of the parties; that the restraint was to
have application only so long as the plaintiff
should remain on the property then occupied
by the defendant; that the plaintiff had ceased to occupy that property, and the defendant
had not interfered and did not Intend to interfere with the plalntifTs practice.
The case was referred to Joseph Hemphill,
Esq., as examiner and master.
The agreement given in evidence Is dated
January 22, 1859, and, besides the agreement
to sell to the plaintiff the defendant's fixtures,
etc., "with the good will of his profession,"
for $125, contains this covenant:
"The said J. K. McClurg hereby binds and
pledges himself to remove not less than twelve
mUes from his present location, and for ever
hereafter not to estabhsh himself in the practice of his profession,
within twelve mUes,
without the free consent of the said Dr.
Thompson; also to use all his influence to
throw all his practice to the benefit of the
said Thompson, and to give countenance
to
no other in that direction."
The evidence of plaintiff was that defendant moved away in the spring of 1859, and
the plaintiff left his residence, gave up his
practice at another place, and went into the
property, where he remained till the summer
of 1864, when he moved to a house about
of a mile from It, and shortly
three-quarters
afterwards removed about a quarter of a
he continued to practice as a
mile further;
physician; defendant moved to PrestonviUe,
five or six miles from his former place, with
the declared Intention of practicing as a phy-
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sician; that there was nothing in the article
to which the defendant had not assented.
The defendant gave evidence that $125 was
the price only of the articles sold, and the
scrivener added "good will"; also that the
restraint was applicable only whilst the plaintiff occupied defendant's former place.
The master reported that the evidence sustained the allegations of the bill, and that
there was no evidence offered of fraud or mistake in drawing the agreement, and reported
in conclusion:
"Upon the whole, neither fraud or mistake
having been established, the subscriber Is of
opinion that the plaintiff having proven his
blU, and the defendant failed to establish any
effective answer thereto, the law and equityV
of the case gives to the plaintiff the right toR
the injunction prayed for and costs of suit."i(
Exceptions were filed by the defendant to
the report,
which was confirmed, and the
court (Butler, P. J.) decreed that "an injunction be issued restraining the defendant from
establishing
himself in the practice of his
profession of medicine within the limits of
twelve miles from the location on the 22d day
of January, 1859, or remaining, as at present
established, -within said limits, and from practicing his said profession within the circle
of his practice at the date aforesaid.
The defendant appealed, and assigned the
decree for error.
W. Darlington, for appellant
J. S. Futhey, for appellee.

W. MacVeagh

and

SHABSWOOD, J. That contracts restraining the exercise of a trade or profession in particular localities are valid, when there is a
fair and reasonable ground for the restriction,
as in the case of the sale of the good will of
a trade or business when the vendor covenants not to pursue the same business within
certain prescribed limits, is beyond question.
The leading case is Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.
Wms. 181, in which C. J. Parker delivered a
long and elaborate opinion. The doctrine has
been at rest ever since, as Lord Kenyon declared in Davis v. Mason, 5 T. R. 118, in
which a bond by a surgeon not to practice
within ten miles of the place where the obligee lived was held good, and a similar undertaking by an apothecary, not to set up his
business within twenty miles, was sustained
in Hayward v. Young, 2 Chit 407. The appellee had therefore a clear legal right under
his contract. Ought a court of equity to enforce it by injunction?
When Mr. Eden wrote his valuable treatise
on the law of Injunction, he stated that he
had not been able to find any reported cases
in which the court had interfered by that process to restrain the breach of such a covenant.
He admits, however, that it may be inferred
from Lord Eldon's observations In Crutwell
V. Lye, 17 Ves. 335, that there is no reasonable objection to the exercise of such a juris-
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In that case,
Eden, InJ. 223, 224.
however, there was no contract, but merely
the sale of a trade with the good wiU, which,
without express covenant or fraud, was held
not to prevent the vendor from setting up the
same business.
Lord Bldon said, "A man
might stand by and give encouragement generating a confidence that he would not engage
in such a trade, inducing other persons to involve themselves, on the ground of which conduct this court might interpose."
If equity
would enforce an implied contract within reasonable limits, a fortiori they ought to interfere In the case of an express one. Accordingly several subsequent decisions both In
England and America have acted on this
Harrison v. Gardner, 2 Madd. 198,
principle.
was the case of a retiring partner, who, according to the statement of the bill, had giv€n an assurance verbally that he would not
set up in the same line of business In the
street In which it had been carried on before,
or its immediate vicinity. The vice chancellor. Sir Thomas Plumer, said, "Suppose there
was no dispute as to the facts stated in the
bill, but that they were admitted, it is clear
the court would relieve."
In Williams v. Williams, 2 Swanst. 253, Lord Eldon granted an
Injunction in a similar case of a retiring partner where, however, there was an express
'
agreement in writing.
Butler v. Burleson, 16
Vt. 176, was like this, a contract between two
practicing physicians, and it was enforced by
injunction. "When there is an express covenant," said O. J. Williams, "and an uncontroverted mischief arising from the breach of
it, equity wlU grant an injunction to restrain
In this case_Jhgre is an express
the breach.
Tl ie mischie f arising~^om th?'
■coqtc^,
"EEgach^ of_it. .cannot be repaired^ nor_can_jt
igell be_esgmatedy iCTurt^anaw wojili^adequate remeayrana" the damages
fprd
will be continuing and accruing from day to
•day, and, furthermore, the object of the contract can only be obtained by the parties conforming expressly and exactly to its terms.
It seems, therefore, to be a very proget-case
chancery to *^2orce the ~'con^
for a court
the
--tract by granting~an"InjunctIonTo~pfevent
Tjreacb of 'itraccordmg" to T:he "seKowiedged"
principle on which courts of equity act in similar cases." The same doctrine was maintainJudge
•ed in Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind. 200.
King also recognized it as established in
Palmer v. Graham, 1 Pars. Bq. Cas. 476, and
awarded an injimction on the ground of the
of an action at law to give the
inadequacy
party aggrieved a full and perfect remedy
for such a breach of good faith.
We see nothing to distinguish this from the
It has been objected that the
cases cited.
Upon that subconsideration was inadequate.
ject 0. J. TIndal, delivering the opinion of the
iourt of exchequer chamber, In Hitchcock v.
diction.

jg

^

Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438, said: "If there is no
consideration,
or a consideration of no real
value, the contract in restraint of trade, which
in itself is never favored in law, must either
be a fraud upon the rights of the party restrained, or a mere voluntary contract, nudum pactum, and therefore void.
But if, by
adequacy of consideration,
more is intended,
and that the court must weigh whether the
consideration
is equal in value to that which
the party gives up or loses oy the restraint
under which he has placed himself, we feel
ourselves bound to differ from that doctrine.
A duty would thereby be imposed upon the
court, in every particular case, which it has
no means whatever to execute.
It is impossible for the court, looking at the record, to
say whether in any particular case the party
restrained has made an improvident bargain
or not." This is not like a bill for the specific
performance of an unexecuted contract, where,
if the bargain is a hard one or founded on an
Inadequate consideration, a chancellor will refuse to interfere, but leave the party to his
legal remedy.
This agreem ^t was fully_exThe ajpellanr removeSpaSa" the~ap^
ecuted.
peliee, on the faith of it, gave up his practice
at the place where he was before established,
and setUed In the new neighborhood.
He
canno t._be put in_statu_qua, We cannotj^Tfy^
our decree^ restore tb'iimme practice he has
given up, nor could any damages a jury would
give be an adequate compensation.
Even if
it should be a sum which would purchase a |
life annuity equal to his former income, that
would not provide for that increase from year
to year which enlarged experience and widening reputation would, in all probability, hava
insured to him had he remained where he
The appellant has returned and estabwas.
lished himself within the prescribed limits in
violation of his agreement.
It was said that
he did not mean to interfere with the appellee's practice;
but how can he well avoid it
if he is called upon by his old patients and
others?
It was with a view to this that the
contract stipulated that he/ihould not estab-^
lish himself in the practice of his profession
within twelve miles. This distance was doubtless named because it was considered sufficient
to render the practice in the appellant's old
circle, reaching a distance of five or six miles
on either side, secure to the appellee.
We^
agree with the court bel ow that such a re- .
Stratnt is BOtTIgreasonabie,"nor g reater th an
the •appetI6e'S"PKJtg5lion "may require.
Decree afilrmedT aftfie costs of the appel-

lant

THOMPSON,

O.

J.,

dissenting,

not on the

ground of want of power in the court, but because not a case In which specific performance should be decreed, but the party left to
his action at law.

INJUNCTIONS.
GRANB RAPIDS SCHOOli FURNITURE
OO V. HANEY SCHOOL FURNI-

TURE

CO. et al.

(52 N. W. 1009, 92 Mich. 558.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. July 28, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Kent county,
in chancery; William E. Grove, Judge.
Bill by the Grand Rapids School Furniture
Company against the Haney School Furniture Company, Elijah Haney, and George A.
BuUard for an injunction.
There was a demurrer to the bill, which was sustained, and
complainant brings error. Reversed.
Taggart, Wolcott & Ganson, for appellant
Taggart & Denison, for appellees.

J. The

biU of complaint in this
is a manufacturing corporation, having its office and
manufactory at Grand Rapids;
that ever
since its organization, in 1887, the defendits have been engaged In circulating thousands of circulars, containing the statement
[that the goods of complainant infringed a
:ertain patent issued to the defendant Haley, who was and Is the president of the corporation, and threatening to bring suit against
any and au persons purchasing or using
goods of the complainant's
manufacture;
that these claims and threats were made in
bad faith, and with fuU knowledge that the
patent was invalid, and that the complainant was In possession of facts and proofs
sufficient to defeat any suit that might be
brought for its infringement;
that said
threats were made for the purpose of intimidating parties who were likely to be customers of the complainant, and had to a considerable extent accomplished their object;
but no suits having been brought for infiingement of said patent, the threats had
I lost their force, and hence a fraudulent and
collusive
suit had been instituted for the
(
I purpose of obtaining a decree which could be
' used to deceive
and intimidate the public;
that such decree had been obtained, and the
defendants had begun to use it for the purpose aforesaid, and were intending so to use
it continuously, and on a very large scale,
to the great injury of the complainant's business, though the amount of such injury was
very difficult to prove or determine by any
I accurate measure. The prayer of the bill is
/Ithat the defendants may be perpetually en/ joined and restrained from stating, publish\ mg, or claiming, in any manner, that the
\aaid decree is anything other or different
Trom a decree obtained by collusion, and
from claiming that it is an adjudication upon the merits as to the validity of the said
Haney patent, and from using such decree in
any way or form to Influence or threaten
any person or party against purchasing the
school furniture manufactured and sold by
To this bill the Haney
the complainant.
School Furniture Company, one of the said
defendants, filed a general demurrer; and,
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 48
LONG,

case alleges that the complainant
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the case having come on to be heard thereon, the court held that the bill of complaint
did not set up any facts giving a court of
/
equity jurisdiction to grant relief, and enf
tered a decree sustaining the demurrer,
and
dismissing the complainant's bill. From this
decree the complainant appeals to this court.
The English courts, by recent decisions,
have exercised the injunctive jurisdiction to
restrain injurious
publications concerning
property which operate as a slander of the
owner's title, and libelous publications which
are injurious
to the plaintiff's business,
trade, or profession, and the wrongful use
of a name by which the public would be misled, and the plaintiff injured in his business.
Thus far, however, most of the American
courts seem unwilling to follow the example
of the recent English decisions, and decline
to extend the jurisdiction, so as to restrain
such torts as libels on business, slanders of
title, and the like.
In Massachusetts the
English decisions are expressly repudiated.
Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf'g Co.,
114 Mass. 69; Whitehead v. Kitson,
119
Mass. 484.
Injunctions to restrain libelous
publications concerning plaintiff's business
were also refused in Association v. Boogher,
3 Mo. App. 173; Manger v. Dick, 55 How.
Prac. 132; and Singer Manuf'g Co. v. Domestic Sew. Mach. Co., 49 Ga. 70. In the
case of Bmack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46, Judge /
Blodgett allowed the injunction.
It appears f
that Kane issued and widely distributed cir- /
culars in which he claimed that Emack's/
goods infringed his patent. He stated that)
he should not sue Emack, but should bring|
suits against all customers of Emack, and
collect ■royalty and damages from all of
them. Judge Blodgett said: "The gravamen
of this case is an attempted intimidation by
the defendant of complainant's c«stomers by
threatening them with suits which defend•
"■ •
ant did not intend to prosecute.
If
a court of equity cannot restrain an attack
like this upon a man's business, then the
party is certainly remediless, because an action at law in most cases would do not good,
and his ruin would be accojnplished before an
adjudication could be reached." In the recent case of Casey v. Typographical Union,
45 Fed. 135, the case of Emack v. Kane, supra,
was cited and approved by Judge Sage. It
appeared in the Casey Case that parties had
conspired together to injure the complainant
Circulars were gotten out
In his business.
and widely distributed, containing threats
of pecuniary loss and injury to those who
should do business with the complainant.
The claim was made in that case, as in
this, that equity had no jurisdiction, because
the injurious publication was merely a lib«l
on complainant's business, and, for any loss
which the union inflicted, he had a plain
and adequate remedy at law. Judge Sage
remarked, however, that it is idle to say that
such publications are nothing more than
libels, and that the only remedy for the in-
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Jury Inflicted Is an action at

la-w; that, while
they have certain characteristics of libels,
they are more than libels, and there is no
plain and adequate remedy at law for such

injuries.

We think the bill In this case states a
materially different from the Massachusetts cases and the other cases holding
that equity has no jurisdiction to restrain
a libel. Here It Is claimed and alleged in the
bill that Elijah Haney and the Haney School
Furniture Company entered Into a conspiracy with defendant BuUard to obtain a decree
in favor of Haney and against BuUard,
which might and should be used by the conspirators to injure the complainant.
The
fact Is recited that. In pursuance of such
conspiracy, a bill was filed In the United
States court for the eastern district of Michigan, and a decree obtained by fraud and collusion, for the purpose of benefiting the
trade of the Haney School Furniture Company at the expense of complainant; that
the defendants well knew the patent was invalid; and that the complainant was in possession of facts and proofs sufficient to defeat any suit that might be brought for the
infringement of said patent.
The prayer of
the bill is, not that defendants be enjoined
from making whatever claims they see fit
concerning their patent, nor from threatening to bring suits, even though such threats
but that the defendI be made In bad faith;
ants be restrained from using a decree
fraudulently and eolluslvely obtained to the
injury of complainant, and from claiming
that such decree is an adjudication upon the
merits as to the validity of such patent; or
from using it in any way or form to influence
or threaten any person or party against purchasing the school furniture manufactured
and sold by complainant. The case, as stated in the bill, is certainly more than a mere
claim for an injunction arising out of a libel
case

of complainant's business.

A conspiracy Is
claimed to have been entered Into between
the defendants for the very purpose of injuring the complainant, and that by such
conspiracy a false and fraudulent decree
was obtained, settling the rights of the Haney School Pumlture Company to the patent, under which the complainant was and is
operating;
that the defendants are publishing to the world, and especially to the customers of the complainant, that such decree
was valid, the defendants well knowing it to
be false and fraudulent;
and that, in any
court where the complainant had the right
to appear

and

be

heard,

it

could

establish

the fact that such patent was absolutely
void, and that Mr. Haney and the Haney
School Furniture Company had no rights under it, and that complainant was legally entitled to its use. Admitting that the weight
of authority in this country is against the
proposition that a court of equity has jurisdiction by injunction to restrain the publication of a libel upon one's business, it is
no answer to the questions here raised.
Th^
complainant has no adequate remedy at law,

under"~thB~cir(nimsEances
~Eere^ state5. "It
cannot be said that It should lie by and wait
the slow and uncertain processes of a suit
for damages for its redress.
Under the
charge in the bill, which we must take as
true, the complainant is rightfully operating
under such patent, and it has no remedy
adequate for the fraud and wrong perpetrated upon it, except as aided by a court of
equity.
The facts stated make a much
stronger case than those in Casey v. Typographical Union, supra, calling for the aid of
the Injunctive power of a court of equity.
The decree of the court below must be reversed, with costs, and the demurrer over-,
ruled. The defendants will have 20 days
to answer the bill. The other justices con-

curred.
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O. & W.

THDJI

CO.

V.

TLOCZYNSKI.

(T2 N. W. 140, 114 Mich. 149.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. Sept. 14, 1897.

Appeal from circuit court, Kent county. In
chancery;
Allen O. Adsit, Judge.
Bill by the O. & W. Thum Company against
AppoUonlous A. Tloczynskl.
From a decree
AflBrmfor complainant,
defendant appeals.
ed.

Certain of the secrets sought to be protected
by this bill were protected by patent, while
others wei-e not.

L. Fitch (Frederick W. Stevens, of counfor appellant. Earle & Hyde and Butterfield & Keeney, for appellee.
0.

sel),

MOORE,

'

,
j
\

J.

The complainant is the succes-

sor of the firm of O. & W. Thum, who were
of .sticky fly paper.
It filed
manufacturers
a bill of complaint to restrain defendant communicating to others the secret processes and
methods, and the knowledge of ^secret machinery, which were learned by him while in
The court bethe employ of O. & W. Thum.
low granted an injunction, as prayed in the
Defendant appeals.
bUl of complaint.
The testimony Is voluminous, and very conWe are satisfied, however, that it esflicting.
as
tablishes, by a very clear preponderance,
The defendant entered the employ
follows:
They at that time
of O. & W. Thum in 1887.
were manufacturing sticky fly paper by machinery, and from formulae known only to
They at that time had but one
themselves.
man and one boy in their employ.
The business was carried on in the attic of the house,
and in a small building in the back yard. The
processes and machinery that were regarded
as secret, and of great value to the firm, were
used only by the members of the firm.
As
the business grew, it became necessary to employ more persons, and among others employed was the defendant.
Because of the increase in the business and the employment of
more persons, other precautions
were taken,
as the necessity grew for taking them.
The
public were excluded from the premises.
The
employ®' at one machine were not allowed to
Inspect other machines used In the manufacture, and were not allowed to visit all portions
of the premises.
Very rigid and careful requirements were made and enforced to guard
the formulae, the processes of manufacture,
and knowledge of the machinery used, so that
no one could learn them, or either of them, to
the detriment
of the firm. The business of
the firm steadily grew in magnitude, so that
when defendant left its employ, in 1892, about
$100,000 was invested In the business, and a
large number of persons were given employShortly before this bill was filed, comment.

plainant recrfved the following letter: "Grand
Rapids, Mich., Jan. 7, 1893. The O. & W.
Mr. Wm. Thum— Dear Sir:
Thum Co., City.
It is about fifteen months since I left your
shops, and during that time have been more
or less troubled by outside people In regards
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to fly paper and Its manipulations at your
^yorks; not so much so until lately, whep there
were representatives
from two large firms,
one from Ohio, which was represented by the
president and their attorney, which
looked
up in G. R. Dun's, who quote them at $500,000, who were here for one week, and were
directed by some people here in the city to
They told me that they had sufficient
me.
artillery to put the paper on the market, but
were a little short on cavalry in its workings;
also told me that they were ready at any time
to make arrangements,— that is, as soon as I
say yes.
can show letters from the above
firm and others. I have not said a single word
of its manufacture since
left you, but do not
think It's my place to keep mum unless you
Awaiting your early reply,
desire it.
remain, yours, truly, A. A. Tloczynskl."
It
very soon became evident that defendant was
negotiating with others to engage in the man,
ufactm-e of the same product the complainants
were making, and this bill was filed.
The terms of employment were not reduced
to writing, and there is a sharp conflict of testimony between the defendant and O. & W.
Thum as to the terms of his employment, so
that it becomes necessary to consider carefully all the testimony in the case to arrive at the
truth. One cannot read all the testimony,
In the light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the condition of the business at the
employof the defendant's
commencement
and
development
ment, and its subsequent
growth, without coming to the conclusion that
the defendant and his employer regarded his
relation to them as a confidential one, and that
he should not disclose or make improper use
The conclusion
of the secrets of the business.
is irresistible that defendant would not have

I

I

I

I

employed, and information which was
imparted to him would not have been conveyed, if it had been understood that he might
sever his relations with his employers at any
time, and sell the valuable information which
had been imparted to him whenever he could
find a market. The inception, growth, and development of the business; the manner in
which It was conducted; the care taken to exclude the public from means of obtaining
the fact that,
knowledge of the processes;
when new machinery was to be constructed,
part of it was got at one place, and part at
another, so that no person outside of the memembers of the firm and their immediate
machine in
ployes, should see a completed
operation; the fact that employfis in one department of the manufactory were not allowed in other departments; and the care
which was taken to prevent employes from
obtaining knowledge of any branch of the
business, except that in which the employs
was immediately engaged, of aU of which the
defendant had knowledge,— all indicate conclusively that the business and processes were
secret, and that no one knew that fact better than the defendant.
We think it clearly
established by the testimony that the employbeen
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ment was upon the agreement that defendant
•would not use the information imparted to
him to the harm of his employer.
In our view, the only important question involved in the case is whether an employ^,
when his employment terminates, may make
use of secrets confided to him by his employer,
necessary to be confided to him in the conduct
of the business, when It Is understood and
agreed that he shall not make use of the seso imparted to the detriment
cret knowledge
of the employer, and, if he attempts so to do,
may he be restrained by writ of injunction?
It is said by counsel that the remedy by injunction will not be granted In such a case as
this, where, from the nature of the subject,
there could be no decree for a specific performance; citing Newbery v. James, 2 Mer. 446;
Williams v. Williams, 3 Mer. 157; Kimberley
V. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340.
It is also said that a decree for a specific performance will not be granted where the court
has not the means of seeing that Its decree
shall be carried out; citing Voorhies v. Frisbie, 25 Mich. 482; Blanchard v. Railway Co.,
31 Mich. 43; Bumpus v. Bumpus, 53 Mich. 346,
An examination of the Micliigan
19 N. W. 29.
cases cited shows that in those cases the court
was asked to decree the performance of an affirmative act, where the agreement was of an
indefinite and uncertain character. Instead of
being asked to enforce a definite agreement
As to the other cases, If
not to do an act
they tend to sustain the contention of the defendant, they are contrary to the great weight
of authority.
Is It not true that. If one discovers a process of manufacture or an invention which Is of use to individuals and the
right in It,
he has a property
community,
and that an agreement which must be respected may be made In relation to keeping the
process of manufacture or the Invention a secret between the discoverer or owner and an
employ^, which agreement Is made one of the
It has been
conditions of the employment?
! said by a very able justice: "If one invents
'
or discovers and keeps secret a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not. Indeed, an exclusive
right to It as against the public, or against
those who. In good faith, acquire knowledge
of it; but he, h as a property In It whi gJi.A
court of chanc&^—miLjrote ct against one
who, 'In~if^atioa _^L.?25!!K3~i^nd~breach_ gt
confideiieei undertakes to apply it to his own
use, or to disclose It to ttilrd persons,:
Pea"
body V. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452." And, again,
Mr. Justice Gray, who delivers the opinion,
says: "In this court It Is settled that^a-SfiCJtet
and that a
_artjs_aJegaLsafeject_^j)rggeEty,
bond for the conveyance of the exclusive right
to it is not open to the objection of being In
restraint of trade, but may be enforced by action at law, and requires the obligor not to
divulge the secret to any other person. Vickery v. Welch, 19 Pick. 523; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 373, 374.
In Jarvis v. Peck, 10
Paige, 118, such a bond was held valid in eq-

uity."
In Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N. 3. Bq. 400,
2 Atl. 379, the coiu-t adopts the language of
Justice Gray, and holds that there Is a property In a secret process of manufacture.
Hardware Co. V. Walbel (S. D.) 47 N. W. 814.
A recent and Instructive case Is tliat of
Eastman Co. v. Keichenbach (Sup.) 20 N. T.
Supp. 110.
"To briefly summarize, then, the
established facts of this case. It appears that
the plaintiff Is the owner of valuable trade secrets, which were either discovered by one or
or necessarily dismore of the defendants,
closed to them, while occupying a confidential
relation towards the plaintiff; that as to such
trade secrets as were discovered by either
or Passavant, they have underReichenbach
taken and agreed to give plaintiff the exclusive property in and control over the same;
and that. In violation of this agreement, they
are now proposing to make use of them, or
some of them, in such a manner as to materially Injure the plaintiff's business. With these
facts established, the application of the legal
principles which must govern the disposition
of the case does not appear to be a very formidable undertaking. It may be safely asthink, that whateva :
sumed at the outset,
remete_^a jntlff mayjjave does not reside In

I

The very natiffe"^oTtIie~^case,
■aTcoutt-Slaw
the pecunaF^aracter of the Injury liable to
damages
and the Incalculable
be inflicted,
which may possibly result, all show most conclusively that legal relief Is totally Inadequate
for plaintiff's protection, and that its only resort must be to a ^urt of equity^ The learned counsel for defendants has contended, with
all the adroitness and skill at his command,
which is but another way of saying that such
contention has been put forth with all possible
adroitness and skill, that this case Is not one
of which a court of equity can take jurisdiction; and several authorities of both English
and American courts are cited In support of

this claim.
I am constrained, however, to hold
that the wright of authority Is opposed to his
view of the law.
The question presented is
an interesting one, and would justify a somewhat analytical review of the cases which bear
upon either aspect of it did time permit; but,

for the purposes

of this adjudication. It will

be necessary to advert to such only as are
In Mordeemed conclusive upon this court.
ieon V. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, which is an English case. It was held that an injunction would
Issue to 'restrain the use of a secret In the
compounding of a medicine not being the subject of a patent, and to restrain the sale of
such medicine by a party who acquired knowledge of the secret in violation of the contract
of the party by whom It was communicated,
An apand in breach of trust and confidence.
peal was taken from the decision of the vice
chancellor, and in 1852 the case was affirmed
by the court of chancery, and It was there
held that 'there Is no doubt whatever that
where a party who has a secret In trade employs persons under contract, either express or
implied, or under duty, express or ImpUed,
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those persons cannot gain knowledge of that
up against
set
em-secretrTcntt^then
—RTorison V. ItMoat, 21 Lawtheir
J. Ch.'
ployers:'
In 1868 the supreme court of Massachu348.
setts recognized and followed the authority of
Morison v. Moat, and in the opinion of Gray,
J., the law is thus stated:
If a party 'invents
or discovers and Iseeps secret a process of
manufacture, whether a proper subject for a
patent or not, he has not indeed an exclusive
risht to it as against the public, or against
those who in good faith acquire linowledge of
it but he has property in it which a court of
chancery will protect against one who, in violation of contract and breach of confidence,
undertakes to apply It to his own use, or to
The jurisdiction
disclose it to a third person.
in equity to interfere by injunction to prevent such a breach of trust when the injury
would be irreparable, and the remedy at law
inadequate, is well established by authority.'
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452. The language above quoted was cited with approval
in Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N. J. Bq. 400, 2 Atl.
f' 379, and it is almost identical with that emwriters of recognized
j ployed by elementary
in discussing the same question.
I standing
I Judge Story says:
'Courts of equity wiU re( strain a party from making a disclosure of secrets communicated to him in the course of a
and it matters not
confidential employment,
in such cases whether the secrets are secrets of
i trade or secrets of title, or any other secret&
[ of the party important to its interest.' 2 Story,
Eq. Jut. 952.
See, also, 1 High, Inj. (2d Ed.)
p. 15.
The same doctrine has obtained in this
state for at least half a century, and has been
enunciated by a line of decisions which, with
a single exception,
Jarvis v.
is unbroken.
Peck, 10 Paige, 118: Hammer v. Barnes, 26
How. Prac. 174; Champlin v. Stoddart 30
Hun, 300; Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30,
23 N. B. 12.
The Champlin Case was decided by the general term of this department,
Smith, P. J., writing the opinion, in the course
of which he takes occasion to say that '% fi"cr et in tra de is fully r ecognizfid, as .s^QSS^tj_
Uf equity, the disclosure of which will be.rei_
By a careful reading
st rained by Injunction.'
— Bfthe various decisions upon this subject, it
will be seen that some are made to depend
upon a breach of an express contract between
the parties, while others proceed upon the theory that where, a confidential relation exists
between two or more parties engaged in a
business venture, the law raises an implied
contract between them that the employ^ shall
not divulge any trade secret imparted to him
or discovered by him in the course of his employment,
and that a disclosiu-e of such secrets, thus acquired, is a breach of trust, and
a violation of good morals, to prevent which
It should
a court of equity should interv ene.
"TilsoHBe
observed in this connectioD that the
word 'property,' as applied to trade secrets and
trade inventions, has its limitations; for it is
undoubtedly true that when an article manufactured by some secret process, which is not
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the subject of a patent, is tlirown upon the
market, the whole world is at liberty to discover, if it can by any fair means, what the
process is, and, when the discovery is thus
made, to employ it in the manufacture of similar articles. In such a case the manufacturer's or inventor's property in his process is
gone, but the authorities all hold that, while
knowledge obtained in this manner is perfectly legitimate, that which is obtained by any
breach of confidence
cannot be sanctioned;
and this distinction is quite forcibly presented
in a recent decision of the court of appeals, to
which the attention of this court has been directed by the supplemental
brief of defendJudge Landon, in his opinion,
ant's counsel.
speaking of the plaintifC's claim, says: 'His
case is unlike those in which the Injunctive
process of the court is sought to restrain the
disclosure of a secret or the publication of a
letter which may prove injurious to business
or character.'
Bristol v. Society, 132 N. Y.
264^267, 30 N. E. 506.
But without multiplying citations or prolonging consideration of the
legal aspect of this case, it may be said, by
way of conclusion, that the principle contended for by the plaintiff Is not only abundantly
supported by authority, but is likewise founded in good cominon sense, and is peculiarly applicable to the case in hand.
Here is a party,
which, by the expenditure of large sums of
money, and the exercise of much sldU and ingenuity, has built up a large and prosperous
business, the capital of which consists largely
in certain inventions and discoveries made by
its officers, servants, and agents.
The world
at large knows nothing of these inventions
and discoveries, because they are locked within the brains of those who conceived them.
The defendants, who have been largely instrumental in perfecting them, while under
both an express and Implied contract to give
plaintiff the benefit of their inventive genius, propose now to disregard their legal and
moral obligations by creating a new establishment, where these Inventions and discoveries
may be employed to plaintiff's serious injury.
This is not legitimate competition, which it is
always the policy of the law to foster and encourage, but it is contra bonns mores, audi
constitutes a breach of trust, which a court of I
law, and much less a court of equity, should j
not tolerate." Fralich v. Despar (Pa. Sup.) 30 I

Atl.

It

521.

is argued in this case that there Is no express contract shown, and that an implied contract is not such a one as will be enforced.
We think the testimony discloses verj^ cleat
ly an ex p ress ayeement betWieaTthe employer and We employed, out, if it may be stated
that the only agreement is an implied one,
growing out of oral statements taken in connection with the facts and circumstances surrounding the business, the parties, and their
acts, still, if it is clearly established by aU
that was said and done that the secrets confided to the defendant were not to be disclosed
by him to others, and were not to be used by

vq

V
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him except when he was In the employment
of those who Imparted to him the secret, or
their legal representatives,
and that was one
of the conditions of his employment, we do
not think it would make any difference in the
principle involved.
The knowledge came to
him in the course of a confidential employment, relying upon his using the knowledge
only for the benefit of the employer.
It is
said by an eminent writer:
"On the whole,
the doctrine may be generally stated that
wherever confidence is reposed, and one pari ty has it in his power, in a secret manner, for
his own advantage, to sacrifice those interests
which he is bound to protect, he will not be
Ipermitted to hold any such advantage."
Story,
Eq. Jur. § 323.
The same authority, when
discussing the subject of what cases injunction will be issued in, says: "Upon similar
grounds
of irreparable mischief, courts of
equity will restrain a party from making a
disclosure of secrets conununickted to him in
the course of a confidential employment;
and
it matters not, in such cases, whether the secrets be secrets of trade, or secrets of title, or
any other secrets of the party important to his
Thus a party has been restrained
interests.
from using the secret of compounding a medicine not protected by patent, when It appeared that the secret was imparted to him, to his
own knowledge, in breach of faith or contract
on the part of the persons communicating it."
Story, Eq. Jur. § 952, and many cases there
cited.
10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 949; High,
Inj. i 19; Davies v. Clough, 8 Sim. 262; Williams V. Assurance Co., 23 Beav. 338; Morison V. Moat, 9 Hare, 241; Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394; Tipping v. Clarke, 2
Hare, 393; Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452";
Champlin v. Stoddart, 30 Hun, 300; Salomon
V. Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Atl. 379.
The case of Little v. Gallus (Sup.) 38 N. Y.
Supp. 487, is against the contention of the deIn that case the plaintiff was a
fendant.
maker of typewriter ribbons by secret processes
and formulae. The defendants entered his employ when they were minors. The court says:
"It seems, therefore, too plain for controversy
that the plaintiff was the owner of a process or
invention which possessed great value, and
which he had secured at the cost of much
time, trouble, and expense; that the defendants, Grallus and Bostwick, occupying a confidential relation towards the plaintiff, gained
a knowledge of the process and formulae employed by him in conducting his business;
that they well understood the nature of his
business, their relations to it, and the care
which was used to keep the same secret; and
that, notwithstanding the knowledge thus obtained, and in violation of the faith and confidence reposed in them, they surreptitiously
made memoranda of these formulae, and are
now using the same, as well as all the other
knowledge obtained while in the plaintiff's
service, to start and operate a rival establishThe only question therefore, to be dement.
termined UDon this state of facts, is whether or

not they shall be permitted to carry out their
intentions.
It is contended by the plaintiff
that his case is brought directly within the

rule laid down In that of Kodak Co. v. Reichenbaeh, 79 Hun, 183, 29 N. X. Supp. 1143, recently decided by the general term in the Fifth
department;
and the defendants, while conceding that the law of the case is there correctly stated, insist that the facts do not
warrant its application here.
We find ourselves unable to concur in the view thus taken, and which was carefully elaborated upon
the argument by the learned counsel for the
The facts of this case differ
defendants.
from those of the Reichenbach
somewhat
Case, In that there was no written agreement
entered into between these parties by which
the employes undertook to give to their employers exclusive right in, or control over, any
Inventions discovered by, or disclosed to, the
former; but we are unable to see how this
the defendants'
strengthens
contention.
In
the case cited there happens to be an express
It is asserted, in
contract, but, nevertheless,
the opinion of the court, and such is unquestionably the correct rule, that the law raises
an implied contract that an employg who occupies a confidential relation towards his employer will not divulge any trade secrets imparted to him or discovered by him in the
and we do not see
course of his employment;
why the defendants, Gallus and Bostwick, are
not under just as strong an obligation to observe and keep sacred the trust reposed in
them as they would be had they reduced the
contract which the law implies to writing.
Nor does the fact that they entered the plaintiffs service while minors, and at first perunimportant
formed duties comparatively
in
their character, relieve them from a faithful
Gallus, at
observance
of their obligation.
least, was ultimately advanced to a position of
great responsibility, and both of them had
attained their majority before attempting to
take improper advantage of the knowledge imparted to them while in the plaintiff's employ,
and their present experiments are not in the
direction of legitimate competition, but involve a breach of trust which we think the
court should prevent"
Tabor v. Hoffman,
118 N. T. 31, 23 N. E. 12; Tuck v. Priester, 19
Q. B. Div. 629; Pollard v. Photographic Co.,

40 Ch. Dlv. 345.
It is the contention of the defendant that
the contract sought to be enforced is void as
against public policy because it Is In restraint of trade; citing Richarson v. Buhl, 77
Mich. 632, 43 N. W. 1102; Association v.
Starkey, 84 Mich. 76, 47 N. W. 60i. These
cases are not in point. They are cases where
the purpose of the contract was to create a
monopoly, by providing by contract that established industries should cease to do business, which, of course. Is unlawful; but that
is not the purpose of the contract under conHere processes and machinery
sideration.
have been Invented which the owners believe
would be of great value to them if they could

INJUNCTIONS.
To use them
be used upon a large scale.
upon a large scale required the employment of
a number of persons, to some of whom some
of the secrets of the business and the machinery must be disclosed.
If these secrets
were disclosed to others, who might use them
to establish a business of like character, they
would cease to be valuable to the owner. Is

there anything unreasonable in enforcing an
agreement that such secrets shall not be disIt has been repeatedclosed by the employe?
ly held that contracts for the exclusive use of
a secret ait are not in restraint of trade, for
See
the public has no right to the secret.
Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 372, and cases
cited; Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345.
We cannot see how it can be against public
Interest to allow an employer to make such
conditions of employment with his employes
as will give him the fullest protection to his
property right In his process or invention, and
at the same time enable him to employ a great
many employes In its production. To enable
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one to do this would be a benefit to the public
It would secure employment
in many ways.
to more persons than would otherwise be employed, and a larger output would be made of
The evidence discloses that
a useful article.
it does not require a man of special skill to
do the work done by defendant when in the
employ of the predecessors In business of the

complainants. To restrain him from making
of what he has not discovered is not an injustice to him, and does not abridge his right
to work along those lines which would not be
harmful to those to whom he has sustained a
position of confidence.
It is to the advantage of both parties that such a contract
should be allowed. By means of it the defendant secured employment which he could not
have secured without it, and at the Same time
his employers were secured against competition which might be ruinous. Beal v. Chase,
31 Mich. 531.
The decree of the court below is affirmed,
with costs. The other justices concurred.
use
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DUNCOMBB
(45

N. W.

1004,

V.

FELT.

81 Mich. 332.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June

6, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Van Buren
county, in chancery; George M. Buce,
Judge.
SpaSbrd
F. J. Atwell, for appellant.
Tryon and A. J. Mills, for complainant.

LONG, J. The hill was filed in this cause
for an injunction to restrain the defendant
from cutting and removing any of the
timber or trees standing or growing upon
the premises described in the bill, and from
committing or permitting any waste of
laid premises. The bill alleges that comolainant is the owner in fee of the premises, containing about 160 acres subject to
wa, life-estate in the defendant.
That the
'complainant derived his title through a
sheriff's deed, upon an execution sale to
satisfy a judgment against Setb H. Felt.
That said Seth H. Felt derived his title
through a deed made and executed to him
by the defendant, Horatio O. Felt, and his
wife. That at about the time of conveyance of said premises to Seth H. Felt he
made, executed, and

delivered

a lease in

writing to Horatio O. Felt and wife. This
lease is set out in full in the record.
The
bill also alleges that said Horatio O. Felt
is in actual possession and occupancy of
the premises under and by virtue of said
lease, and that his wife is now deceased.
That upon about nine acres of said premises is growing and standing a large
amount of valuable oak and other timber,
fit for sawing and lumbering purposes,
and that said timber constitutes a large
portion of the value of said premises. The
bill then states: "Tour orator further
shows that the said Horatio O. Felt has
caused to be cut, and is causing to be cut,
and is cutting, lumbering, and removing
from said premises, a large portion of said
timber and trees crowing thereon, and
threatens to continue so to do, and has
already cut about five acres of said timber.
Your orator further shows that thereby
the said Horatio O. Felt is committing
waste upon said premises and irreparable
injury thereto, and materially lessening
the value thereof. Your orator further
shows that if the said Horatio O. Felt is
permitted to continue to cut down said
timber and lumber, and commit waste
upon

said

premises, as aforesaid, and is

not restrained from so doing by an order
and injunction of this honorable court, the
value thereof will be depreciated to the
amount of at least five hundred dollars.
And your orator further shows that said
cutting and removing of said timber and
said lumber upon said premises by said
Felt has been and is being done without
the authority or consent of your orator,
and against his wishes and direction thereon, and without any authority or right
All of which actIn said Felt so to do.
ings and doings of the said Horatio O.
Felt, who is made defendant herein, are
contrary to equity and good conscience,
and tend to the manifest wrong, injury,
" The lease
and oppression of your orator.
let out in thebill of complaint was executed I

before thecomplalnant derived his title under the sheriff's deed, and contains the following clause. "To have and to hold the
said demised premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said parties of the second
part, their executors, administrators, and
assigns, for and during and until the full end
and term of their natural lives, so long as
either of them shall live, yielding and paying therefor, during the continuance of the
lease, unto the said party of the first part,
nothing; this lease being given in consideration of the second parties having conveyed the premises herein described to the
first party, and under no consideration
whatever are the second parties to be removed ffom the possession of the said
premises except as they shall voluntarily
surrender their rights under this lease.
And it is expressly understood that the
second parties are to have as full and complete control of said premises, while they
or either of them shall live, as though such
conveyance had not been made. " A general demurrer was filed, and on the hearing in the court below was overtuled, and
decree entered forcomplainant makingthe
injunction perpetual,
defendant appeals.
The claim of counsel for the complainant
is that on the premises there are only
about nine acres of growing timber ; that
this timber is needed for the use of the
farm, and its destruction makf s a case of
actionable waste, to be restrained by injunction. The rights of the parties must
be determined by the construction given
to these clauses in the lease above quoted.
The title to the premises was in defendant, Horatio O. Felt. When he and his
wife deeded the same, they took back this
lease, by the terms of which they were to
have and to hold the premises "tor and
during and until the full end and term
of their natural lives, so long as either
of them shall live, yielding
and paying • • • nothing." The consideration was the conveyance of the premises to Seth H. Felt. It is further provided
in the lease that the lessees are not to be
removed from the premises on any consideration whatever, except as they might
voluntarily surrender their rights under
the lease. Then follows the clause which
it is claimed gives the defendant the right
to take the timber in question. "And it
Is expressly understood that the second
parties are to have as full and complete
control of said premises, while they or
either of them shall live, as though sucb
conveyance had not been made."
The
complainant acquired all the rights in
the premises under his purchase at the execution sale that Seth H. Felt had, but
with notice of all the conditions in this
lease. It is therefore contended by counsel that the lease gave defendant the same
interest or property in the estate as he had
before he and his wife conveyed the lands
to Seth H. Felt, and that he can deal with
it in all respects as though he was the
owner, the only limitation being that of
duration of the estate, and that the clauses
In the lease above set out in effect are
equivalent in meaning with the old clause
In leases without impeachment for waste.
Counsel for defendant insists that the
doctrine laid down in Stevens v. Rose, 69

INJUNCTIONS.
Mich. 2fi0, 37 N.W. Bep. 205, fuUy sustains
his claim that the defendant has the right
to remove this timber, and do all other
acts that he could have done as owner in
fee, and that the defendant's
estate is not
impeachable for waste. His claim is not
sustained by that case. It was there held
that the words " to have and to hold, and
to use and control as the lessee thinks
proper for his benefit during his natural
life," clearly import a lease without imIpeachment for waste, and that the defend/ ant had the right to do all those acts
/ which such a tenant may exercise, but
( that the words were not to be treated as
I importing a license to destroy or injure
\ the estate, but to do all reasonable acts
\consistent with the preservation of the eawate which otherwise might in law be
Vaste. In the present case it is conceded
that there are only 9 acres of timber on
the whole 160-acre tract, that the defendant has already cut about 5 acres, and
threatens to cut and carry away the re'
mainder.
have never understood the
/ rule of the common law to be so broad as
contended for by counsel for defendant.
The clause "without impeachment
for
waste" never was extended to allow the
! very destruction of the estate itself, but
only to excuse permissive waste. 10 Bac.
Abr. p. 468, tit. "Waste."
In Packington
V. Packington, decided in 1744, and cited
by Bacon, (reported 3 Atk. 215,) the plaintiff alleged that the defendant. Sir H.
Packington, had cut down a great number
of trees, and had threatened to cut down
and destroy them all. Lord Hakdwicke
granted an injunction to restrain the
waste. The lease in the case was made
without impeachment
of waste.
Mr.
Greenleaf in his Cruise on Beal Property,
(volume 1, p. 129,) lays down the rule
thus: "The clause without impeachment
of waste, is, however, so far restrained in
equity that it does not enable a tenant for
life to commit malicious waste so as to destroy the estate, w^hich is called 'equitable
waste,' for in that case the court of chancery will not only stop him by injunction,
but will also order him to repair if possible the damage he has done. " In 10 Bac.
Abr. tit. " Waste, " p. 469, it is said: "So,
where a lease w^as made by a bishop for
twenty-one years without impeachment of
waste, of land that had many trees upon
I it, and the tenant cut down none of the
trees till about half a year before the ex/
/ piratibn of his term, and then began to
fell the trees, the court granted an injunction; for, though he might have felled
trees every year from the beginning of his
term, and then they would have been
growing up again gradually, yet it is unreasonable that he should let them grow
till towards the end of his terra, and then
sweep them all away ; for, though he had

I

761

citing

Abraham

At

▼.

BuM»,

Freem.

Ch.

law no prohibition
against waste lay against the lessee for
life or years deriving his interest from the
act of the party. The remedy was confined to those tenants who derived their
interest from the act of the law, but the
timber cut was, at common law, the property of the owner of the inheritance, and
the words in the lease " without impeachment of waste" had the effect of transferring to the lessee the property of the timBowies' Case, 11 Coke, 79; Co. Litt,
o?AI2aa,.
The modern remedy in chancery by
injunction is broader than at law, and equity will interpose in many cases, andstay
waste where there is no remedy .at law.
Chancery will interpose when the tenant
affects the inheritance in an unreasonable
and unconscientious manner, even though
the lease begranted without impeachment
of waste.
4 Kent, Comm. (13th,
78;
Perrot v. Perrot,3 Atk.94; Aston v.Ed.)
Aston,
1 ves. Sr. 264; Vane
v. Barnard, 2 Vern.'
738; Kane v. Vanderburgh, 1 Johns. Ch. 11.
In the case of Kane v. Vanderburgh, supra, it was said: "Chancery goes greater
lengths than the courts of law in staying
waste. It is a wholesome jurisdiction, to
be liberally exercised in the prevention of
irreparable injury, and depends on much
latitude of discretion in the court. " In
this state an action on the case for wasteis authorized by chapter 271, How. St.
This has superseded the common-law
remedy, and relieves the tenant from the
penal consequences of waste under the statute of Gloucester, aii the owner now recovers no more than the actual damages which
the premises have sustained, while that
statute gave by way of penalty the forfelt53.

the common

A

ure of the place wasted, and treble damages, and this harsh rule was adopted by
many of the American states by the early
statutes. This statute giving a right of action in courts of law for waste does not,
however, deprive the court of chancery of
jurisdiction in proceedings
to restrain
threatened waste.
There can be no doubt that the defendant in the present case has much of thecharacter of a tenant in fee, but he cannot
destroy "the inheritance.
He may taken
the timber for his own use, and do aU
those acts which a prudent tenant in feewould do. He cannot pull do wn the buildings or destroy them, or cut and destroy
fruit trees, or those planted for ornament
and shelter; neither can he be permitted
to entirely strip the land of all timber, and

convertltintolumber,andsellitawayfrom
the inheritance.
It is not claimed that thetimber is being used for betterments on
the premises, but it is admitted that the lifetenant is selling it for his own gain and profit. The demurrer was properly overruled.
The decree of the court below will be afThe other justicespower to commit waste, yet this court firmed, with costs.
will model the exercise of that power;" concurred.
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GRIFFITH
(25

Atl.

V.

427,

HILIilARD.
64

Vt

Supreme Court of Vermont,

Nov.

J

643.)
General

Term.

5. 1892.

Appeal from cliancery court, Rutland
county; Taft, Chancellor.
Action by Silas L. Griffith against John
H. Hilliard. From a decree sustaining a
demurrer to plaintiEf's bill for an injuncthe bill pro forma,
tion and dismissing
orator appeals. Reversed and modified.
J. C. Baker, for orator. S. A. Barman,
for defendant.

START, J. The defendant, John H. Hilliard, by the demurrer contained in his
answer, claims that a court of equity haa
no jurisdiction of the matters alleged in
the bill. The bill alleges, among other
things, that the orator is the owner of
the land in question; that its substantial
value is made up of the wood and timber
growing thereon; that some of the de-

fendants,

under a license from the defend-

ant, Hilliard, have entered upon the land,
are engaged in cuttingand drawing tiiii tier
therefrom, and threaten to continue to do

so. For the purpose of determining the
question now beforn the court, these allegations must be taken as true. To permit this wood and timber to be cut in the
manner the defendants are doing, and
threatening to do, under a license from
defendant, Hilliard, is to permit a destruction of the orator's estate as it has been
held and enjoyed. The power of a court
of equity to interpose by injuuctiuu to
prevent irreparable injury and the destruction of estates is well established, and
this power has been construed to embrace
trespasses of the character complained 6(
In the orator's bill. Where trespass to
property consists of a single act, and it is
temporary in its nature and effect, so that
the legar remedy of an action at law for
damages is adequate, equity will not interfere; but if, as in this ca se, repeate d.
acts are^doliBor threatened, altJipjjgh
eaeiTOf Btipnacfs, talten by itself, may not
be destructive
to.t.lie estate,j)ir inflicjt,irr,
reparable iniuryj— aiul^tlTe egaT^reinedy
may, therefore, bead
e io
sinr^^each
aloflailtiifi_.en tire"wrong
^le act if it stoa
may be' prevented or stopped by InjuneT^ion.'^Smith v.KocE759 Vt. 23270 tl. Kep.
551; Langdon v. Templeton, 61 Vt. 119, 17
Atl. Rep. 839; Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S.
539, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. ^15; Iron Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. Y. 703; Power Co. v. Tibbetts,
31 Conn. 165; Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. 28;
Livingston v. Livingston, 6 Johns. Ch.
(Law Ed.) 496; High, Inj. 724-727; Shipley
v. Ritter, 7 Md. 408; Scudder v. Trenton
Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq.694; 1 Pom.

j

Eq. Jur. § 245; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1357;
Murphy v. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278, 22 Atl. Rep.

418.

the legal remedy be adequate for each singlei.act if it stood alone. It is said by
udge Story in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, (volume 2, §§ 928, 929:) ""If the )
trespass be fugitive and temporary, and
adequate compensation can be obtained
in an action at law, there is no ground
to justify the interposition of courts of I
equity.
Formerly, indeed, courts of equity were extremely reluctant to interpose
at all, even in regard to cases of repeated
trespasses;
but now there is not the
slightest hesitation if the acts done or
threatened to be done to the property
would be ruinous or irreparable, or would
Impair the just enjoyment of the property
in the future. In short, it is now granted
in all cases of timber, coals, ores, and
quarries, where the party is a mere trespasser, or where he exceeds the limited
right with which he is clothed, upon the
ground that the acts are, or may be, au
irreparable damage to the particular species of property. " In Iron Co. v. Reymert,
supra, it is said that mines, quarries, and
timber are protected by injunction, upon
the ground that injuries to and depredar
cions upon them are, or may cause, an
irreparable damage, and also with a
view to prevent a multiplicity of actions
for damages, which might accrue from
continuous violations of the rights of the
owners ; and that it is not necessary that
the right Should be first established in an
action at law. In Ei-hardt v. Eoaro, supra, Mr. Justice Field says: "It is now
a common practice in cases where irremediable mischief is being done or threatened, going to the destruction of the substance of the estate, such as the extracting of ores from a mine, or the cutting
down of timber, or the removal of coal,
to issue an injunction, though the title to
the premises be in litigation. The authority of the court is exercised in such cases,
through lis preventive writ, to preserve
the property from destiruction pending
legal proceedings for the determluatioQ
of the title."
When It appears that the title is in dispute, the court may, in its discretion, issue a temporary injunction, and continue
it in force for such time as may be necessary to enable the orator to establish his
title in a court of law, and may make the
injunction perpetual when the orator li.-is
thus established his title; or the court
may proceed and determine which party
has the better title; or ft may dismiss the
bill, and leave the orator to his legal remedy. Bacon V. Jones, 4 Mylne & C. 43a;
Duke of Beaufort v. Morris, 6 Hare, 340;
Campbell v. Scott, 11 Rim. 31 ; Kerr, Inj.
209; Ingraham v. Dunnell, 5 Mete. (Mass.)
118; Rooney v. Soule, 45 Vt. 303; Wing v.

In the case of Murphy ▼. Lincoln, supra,
the bill charged the committing of several
trespasses by the defendants by drawing
wood and logs across the orator's land.
The defendants claimed a right of way.
The court ft)und the issue of fact in favor
of the orator, and held that a court of
equity had jurisdiction to enjoin the commiBBlon of a series uf trespasses, alUiough

Hall, 44 Vt. 118; Lyon v. McLaughlin, 32
Vt. 423- Hastings v. Perry, 20 Vt. 278;
Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. Rep. 258;
Barry v. Harris, 49 Vt. 392. In Bacon v.
Jones, supra. Lord Cottenham says:
"The jurisdiction of this court is founded
upon legal right. The plaintiff cominginto
court on the assumption that he haa the
legal right, and the "court granting Its assistanceon that ground. When a party
applies for the aid of a court, the application for an injunction is made either during the progress of the suit or at the hear-

INJUNCTIONS.
nnd In both cases, I apprehend, great
latitude and discretion are allowed to the
-court in dealing with the application.
When the application is tor an interlocutory injunction, several courses are open.
The court may at once grant the injunction siaiplicifer, without more,— a course
which, though perfectly competent to the
court, is not very likelyto be taken where the
defendant raises a question as to the validity of the plaintiff's title; or it may follow

Ins;

cise of the discretionary power which the
court possesses. The orator, by his bill,
makes out a strong case forequitable consideration. The sole value of the premises in question is in the wood and timber
growing thereon. The orator has heretofore held and occupied them for the purpose of manufacturing lumber and charcoal from such timber and wood. He has

the more usual, and, as I apprehend, more
wholesome, practice in such a case, of
either granting an injunction, and at the
same time directing the plaintiff to proceed
to establish his title at law, and suspending the grant of the injunction until the
result ol the legal Investigation has been
ascertained, the defendant, in the mean
time, keeping an account.
Which of these
several courses ought to be taken must
depend entirely upon the discretion of the
court, according to the case. When the
cause comes to a hearing, the court has
also a large latitude left to it; and
am
far from saying that a case may not arise
In which, even at that stage, the court
will he of opinion that the injunction may
properly be granted without having recourse to a trial at law. The conduct and
dealings of the parties, the frame of the
pleadings, the nature of the patent right
and of the evidence by which it is established, these and other circumstances may
combine toproducesucha result, although
this is certainly not very likely to happen,
and I am not aware of any case in which
it has happened.
Nevertheless
it is a
course unquestionably competent to the
court, provided a case be presented wWch
satisties the mind of the judge that such a
course, if adopted, will do justice between
Again, the court may at the
the parties.
hearing do that which is the more ordi—
jnary course, it may retain the bill giving
I the plaintiH the opportunity of first estabright at law. There still
[ llshing his
remains a third course, the propriety of
which must also depend upon the circumstances of the case, — that of dismissing the
bill atonee." Although Bacon v. Jones was
a case relative to a patent right, the remarks of the lord chancellor are applicable
to any case in which the orator's title is
in dispute.
The case of the Duke of Beanfort V. Morris, supra, was a bill for an injunction toprotect the orator'scoal mines
from injury from the water flowing into
them from the defendant's coUiery ; and it
was ordered that the bill be retained for
12 months, with liberty to the orator to
bring such actions as he might be advised
were necessary, and thatthe injunction issued in the cause be continued for such
time.
We think the granting of the temporary
Injunction in tbiH case was a proper exer-

I
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expended large sums of money in the erection of mills and coal kilns, in building
roads, and in procuring teams and work"
men for the prosecution of said business,
and has made contracts for the sale of
tsaid manufactured products. The defendants are engaged in cutting and removing
that which constitutes the chief value of
the estate, and threaten to continue to do
so. These acts, if continued, wiU. worit a
destruction of the estate; and render it of
no value for the purpose lor which it has
been held and enjoyed.
The case is one
peculiarly within the province of a court
of equity, through its preventive writ, to
Interpose and stop the mischief complained
of, and preserve the property from deBtryction. The defendant, John H. Billiard, having, before any evidence has been
taken or hearing had, put in issue the orator's title, insisted
that this issue be
tried in a court of law, the case is one in
1 which the court may properly, in its discretion, require the orator to establish his
I
I title in snch court before proceeding fur.
I ther with the cause, and such will be the
order of this court. The pro forma decree
of the court of chancery is reversed; the
demurrer contained in the answer of the
defendant, John H. Billiard, is overruled ;
the orator's bill is adjudged sufficient, and
defendant's (Billiard's) answer is ordered
brought forward, from which it appears
that the orator's title to the premises is in
controversy; therefore the cause is remanded to the court of chancery, with direction to that court to retain the cause,
and continue in force the injunction for
such time as, in the opinion of said court,
may be necessary to enable the orator to
bring and prosecute to final judgment
Buch action oractions as may be necessary
to establish bis title in a court of law;
and, in default of the orator so establishing his title within the time aforesaid, the
orator's bill to be dismissed, as against
the defendant, John H. Billiard, with
costs.
But if the orator shall, within the
time aforesaid, by a final judgment in his
favor in a court of law, establish his title
to the premises as against the defendant,
John B. Billiard, then the court will enter
a decree making perpetual the temporary
injunction, and make such order in relation to costs as to the court shall seem
meet.

TAFT, J.,didnotsit.
C*i^<
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WHEBLOCK

V.

I

NOONAN.

(15 N. E. 67, 108 N. X. 179.)

Court of Appeals

of New York.

January

17,

1888.

Appeal from general term, superior court,
city of New York.
Suit for mandatory injunction, by William
A. Wheelock, respondent,
against Michael
Noonan, appellant.
B. Laflin Kellogg, for appellant
Martin
& Smith and Geo. A. Strong, for respondent.

FINCH, J. The findings of the trial court
establish that the defendant, who was a total
stranger to the plaintiff, obtained from the
latter a license to place upon his unoccupied
lots, in the upper part of the city of New
York, a few rocks for a short time, the indefiniteness
of the period having been rendered definite by the defendant's
assurance
that he would remove them in the spring.
Nothing was paid or asked for this permission, and it was not a contract in any just
sense of the term, but merely a license which
by its terms expired in the next spring.
During the winter, and in the absence and without the knowledge
of plaintiff, the defendant covered six of the lots of plaintiff with
"huge quantities of rock," some of them 10
or 15 feet long, and piled to the height of
14 to 18 feet
This conduct was a clear
abuse of the license, and in excess of its
terms, and so much so that if permission had
been sought upon a truthful statement of the
intention it would undoubtedly have been refused.
In the spring the plaintiff, discovering the abuse of his permission, complained
bitterly of defendant's conduct and ordered
him to remove the rocks to some other locality. The defendant promised to do so, but
did not, and in the face of repeated demands
and omitted to remove the
has neglected
The court found as
rocks from the land.
matter of law from these facts that the original permission given did not justify what
was done either, as It respected the quantity
of rock or the time allowed; that after the
withdrawal of the permission in the spring,
and the demand for the removal of the rock,
the defendant was a trespasser, and the trespass was a continuing one which entitled
plaintiff to equitable relief; and awarded
judgment requhrlng defendant to remove the
rocks before March 15, 1886, unless for good
cause shown the time for such removal
should be extended by the court
The sole question upon this appeal is
whether the relief granted was within the
power of the court, and the contention of
the defendant is mainly based upon the proposition that the equitable relief was improper since there was an adequate remedy at
law. The plaintiff objects that no such deIf it arises upon the
fense was pleaded.
facts stated in the complaint it can scarcely
be said to be new matter requu:ed to be stated

In the answer, and
doubt whether, under the
present system of pleadhig, the technical objection is good. It is better, therefore, to consider the defense which is interposed.
One
who would justify under a license or permission must bring his acts within the terms of
the license.
He exceeds them at his imril.
There is no equity in allowing him to strain
them beyond their fair and reasonable interpretation. The finding shows permission asked for "a few stone," described as "a portion" of what defendant was getting from the
boulevard.
The plaintiff was justified in inferring that for the bulk of his stone the
defendant had a place of deposit and only
wanted additional room for a small excess, —
for a few stone. Under this permission defendant was not justified in covering six
lots vrith heavy boulders to a height of 14
to 18 feet.
The thing done was gravely and
substantially in excess of the thing granted,
and the license averred does not cover or
Beyond that the permission,
excuse the act.
extended only to the spring of 1880, and expired at that date. The immediate removal:
of the stone was then demanded, and from
that moment its presence upon plaintiff'slands became a trespass, for which therewas no longer license or permission. Such,
parol license, founded upon no consideration,
is revocable at pleasure, even though the licensee may have expended money on thefaith of it Murdock. v. Railroad Co., 7a
N. Y. 579. And this was a continuing trespass.
So long as It lasted It incumbered
the lots, prevented their use and occupationby the owner, and interfered with the possibility of a sale. It is now said that thfr
remedy was at law, that the owner could
have removed the stone and then recovered
of the defendant for the expense incurred.
But to what locality could the owner remove them? He could not put them In thfr
street; the defendant presumably
had no vacant lands of his own on which to throw
the burden; and it would follow that the
owner would be obliged to hire some vacant
lot or place of deposit, become responsible
for the rent and advance the cost of men
If
and machinery
to effect the removal.
any adjudication can be fomid throwing such
burden upon the owner, compelling him to
do in advance for the trespasser what the
latter is bound to do, I should very much
doubt Its authority.
On the contrary, thfr
law Is the other way. Beach v. Grain, 2 N.
Y. 97. And all the cases which give to thfr
Injured party successive actions for the continuance of the wrong are inconsistent with
the idea that the injured party must once
for all remove
Such is neither an ade-

it

quate remedy nor one which the plaintiff
was bound to adopt
But It is further said that he could sue^
at law for the trespass.
That is undoubtedly true. The case of TJllne v. Railroad Co.,
upon
101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. B. 536, demonstrates
abundant authority that In such action only
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the damages to its date could be recovered,
and for the subsequent continuance of the
trespass new actions following on in sucBut
cession would Iiave to be maintained.
in a case Uke the present, would that be an
adequate remedy?
In each action the damages could not easily be anything more than
the fair rental of the lot It is difficult to
see what other damages could be allowed,
not because they would not exist, but because they would be quite uncertain in

amount and possibly somewhat speculative
The defendant, therein theur character.
fore, might pay those damages, and continue
his occupation, and if there were no other
defiantly continue such
remedy,
adequate
and in spite of his wrong make
occupation,
of himself in effect a tenant who could not
The wrong In every such
be dispossessed.
case is a continued unlawful occupation, and
any remedy which does not or may not end it
is not adequate to redress the injury or reOn the
store the injured party to his rights.
other hand, such remedy in a case lilie the
present might result to the wrong-doer in
nearly akin to persecution. He
something
is liable to be sued every day, die de diem,
for the renewed damages following from
the continuance of the trespass; and while,
■ordinarily, there is no sympathy to be wastyet such multiplicity of
ed on a trespasser,
suits should be avoided, and especially under
circumstances like those before us. The
rocks could not be immediately removed.
The courts have observed that peculiarity
-of the case, and shaped their judgment to
It may take a long time, and
give time.
during the whole of it the defendant would
For reasons of
be liable to daily actions.
this character it has very often been held
-that while, ordinarily, courts of equity will
not wield their power merely to redress a
trespass, yet they will Interfere under peculiar circumstances, and have often done so
where the trespass was a continuing one, and
a multiplicity of suits at law was involved
In the legal remedy. The doctrine was recognized and the authorities cited in the Murdock Case, supra, and the rule deemed perThat case, and those referfectly settled.
red to, it is true, were cases of intrusion
where no consent had been given for the entry of the intruder, but whether the trespass
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was such from the beginning, or became one
after a revocation of the license, can make no
difference,
as it respects the adequacy
of
the legal remedy.
That is the same in either
event Two cases of the former character
Bowyer v.
were cited In the Uline Case.
Cook, 4 Man. G. & S. 236; Holmes v. WUson, 10 Adol. & E. 503.
In one stumps and
stakes had been left on plaintiffs land and
in the other buttresses to support a road;
in each an action of trespass had been
brought, and damages recovered and paid;
and in each, after a new notice to remove
the obstruction, a further action of trespass
was brought and sustained,— so that as I
have said, the legal remedy is identical, however the trespass originated.
It is a general rule that a court of equity
wiU act in such cases only after the plaintiff's
right has been established at law; but that
Troy & B. R. Co. v.
rule has its exceptions.
Boston, H. T. & W. Ky. Co., 86 N. Y. 128.
Where the facts are In doubt, and the right
such, undoubtedly,
would be a
not clear,
just basis of decision, though the modern
system
of trying equity cases makes the
rule less important. Where, as in an intruwhose occupasion by railroad companies
tion threatens to be continuous, the Injury
partakes of that character, an action at law
to establish the right has not been required.
Indeed, I am inclined to deem it more a
In
rule of discretion than of jurisdiction.
Avery v. Eailroad Co., 106 N. Y. 142, 12 N.
E. 619, to which we have been referred since
the argument, we were disposed to sustain a
mandatory injunction requiring defendant to
remove so much of a fence as obstructed
plaintiff's right of way, although the obstruction was not a nuisance, but an Invasion of
In that case the equitable
a private right.
remedy was not challenged by either coimsel
or the court, and evidently stood upon the
groimds here invoked; those of a continuing
trespass, the remedy for which at law would
be inadequate, and involve repeated actions
by the injured party for damages daily occurring.
These views of the case enable us to supIt should be afport the judgment rendered.
firmed, with costs.
All concur, except EUGBR, C. J., not voting.
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WILSON

CITY OP MINERAL
POINT et al.

T.

(39

Wis.

160.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Aug. Term,

1875.

by one Wilson
Action for injunction
against the city of Mineral Point and one
W eldenfeller.
Defendants demurred to the
complaint on the ground of defect of parties defendant, misjoinder of causes of action, and for insufficiency of facts to constitute a cause of action.
From an order
overruling the demurrer, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
The material allegations of the complaint

are that plaintiff is the owner and in possession of certain lots In the defendant city,
on which his dwelling house is situated; that
the lots are Inclosed with fences, and entirely surrounded by what purport to be public streets; that standing and growing upon
such lots are a great many fruit and ornamental trees and much shrubbery of several
years' growth and cultivation, and of great
value, and which greatly enhance the value
of the lots, and that such lots have been so
inclosed for twenty-five years; that the authorities of the defendant city claim that
such fences encroach upon the public streets;
that the common council of the city has ordered the defendant Weidenfeller, who is the
street commissioner thereof, to remove all
obstructions from the streets unless the persons encroaching upon the streets remove the
same within a specified time; and that such
commissioner threatens to, and, unless restrained by the court, will destroy the plaintiff's said fences, and will dig up and destroy many of his said fruit and ornamental
trees, and expose the balance thereof to be
destroyed for want of fences, to his "great
and irreparable damage."
It further alleges
that such fences do not encroach upon the
public streets of the city, and that the defendants have no right to remove the same,
or to dig up or destroy the plaintiff's trees,
etc.
The prayer Is for perpetual and tempo-

rary injunction.
M. M. Cothren, for appellants.
Jones, for respondent

LYON,

J. It

Wilson &

is sufficiently averred In the
complaint that the defendant Weidenfeller,
acting under the authority and orders of the
regularly constituted authorities of the defendant city. Is about to destroy fences,
fruit and ornamental trees and shrubbery
standing and growing upon premises owned
by the plaintiff and occupied by him as his
residence and homestead; that the pretense for

J

V.

so doing is that such fences, trees and shrubbery are within the limits of public streets;
but that such pretense is unfounded in fact,
and the defendants have no lawful authority
to do the threatened acts.
On the facts averred it is clear that the
plaintiff is entitled to an injunction as prayIt is quite true that
ed In the complaint.
the courts will not Interfere by injunction to
restrain the committing of a mere trespass,
for which, if committed, the recovery of damages in an action at law would be an adeIt is also true that the courts
quate remedy.
will interfere by injunction and prevent a
threatened injury, which, if infiicted, will be

irreparable.
An injury is irreparable when it Is of such
a nature that the injured party cannot be
therefor in damadequately compensated
ages, or when the damages which may result
therefrom cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. High, Inj. § 460,
It is said by Judge Story
and cases cited.
that: "If the trespass be fugitive and temporary, and adequate compensation can be
obtained in an action at law, there is no
ground to justify the Interposition of courts
Formerly, indeed, courts of equity
of equity.
reluctant to interfere at all,
were extremely
even in regard to cases of repeated tresBut now there is not the slightest
passes.
hesitation, if the acts done or threatened to
be done to the property would be ruinous or iror would impair the just enjoyreparable,
2 Story,
ment of the property In future."
Bq. Jur. § 928.
That the threatened injuries which this action was brought to prevent, would. If inflicted, be irreparable, In the legal acceptation of that term, and would greatly Impair
the just enjoyment of the plaintiff's property.
Is perfectly well settled. No one will seriously contend that a money compensation is an
remedy for the loss of the trees
adequate
and shrubbery which the complaint avers the
defendants threaten to destroy; and it would
be a denial of justice were the courts to refuse the plaintiff the protection he asks, and
thus permit his home to be permanently deSee High, InJ. g 467, and cases
spoiled.
cited.

We think the complaint states a cause of
and that
action against both defendants,
there is no misjoinder of causes of action,
We do not decide
and no defect of parties.
whether or not the complaint states facts
sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover
damages, but only, that If the averments
therein contained are true, he is entitled to
the Injunction prayed.
Order affirmed.
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are proceeding
(Sess. 32, c. 119), makes adequate provision for the party injured by the
laying of the conduits through his land, and
also affords security to the owner of the
spring, or springs, from whence the water is
But there is no provision for
to be taken.
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The statute under
of the village of Newburgh

2

THE CHANCELLOR.
which the trustees

a

1816.

a

22,

a

Aug.

a

Chancery.

The bill, which was for an injunction, stated, that the plaintiff is owner of a farm, la
the village of Newbnrgh, through which a
stream of water has, from time immemorial,
run, having its source from a spring in the
adjoining farm of the defendant, Hasbrouck,
and after entering the plaintiff's land, continues its whole course through his farm until it
empties into the Hudson river.
That this
stream greatly fertilizes his fields, and, running
near his house, serves for watering his cattle,
and for various domestic and economical purposes. That it supplies water to a brick-yard
on the farm of the plaintiff, where most of
the bricks used in Newburgh are made;
it
also supplies a large distillery erected by him
at great expense, and a churning mill, and water for a mill-seat, where the plaintiff is about
to erect a mill for grinding plaster of paris.
That the trustees of the village of Newburgh,
by false representations,
obthe defendants,
tained an act of the legislature, passed the
27th of March, 1809 (Sess. 32, ch. 119, vol. 5,
Webst Ed. 489), to enable the said trustees
to supply the inhabitants of the village with
pure and wholesome
water. That the trustees applied to the plaintiff for leave to divert the stream, offering him a trifling and
compensation,
which he revery inadequate
fused.
That the said trustees having obtainHasbrouck, the
ed leave from the defendant,
owner of the spring, to use and divert the
water, or a part thereof, that is, a stream one
inch and a quarter In diameter, taken from a
a conduit,
great elevation, have commenced
and threaten to divert the stream, dr a great
part thereof, from the plaintiff's farm. That
that if this is
the plaintiff is apprehensive
done, there will not, in a dry season, be waThe
ter sufficient
even for Ms cattle, &c.
plaintiff, therefore, prayed an injunction to
prevent the defendants from diverting the water, &c. The blU was sworn to, and the plaintiff produced several affidavits, which stated
that the stream was not more than sufficient
for the distillery, brick-yard, &c., of the plaintiff, and If diverted through a pipe, or tube, of
would greatly injure,
the proposed diameter,
if not render the works useless. One of the
affidavits stated, that the whole stream would
pass through a tube of one inch diameter, with
a head of five feet
Mr. Burr and J. V. N. Yates, for plaintiff.

2

Johns. Ch. 162.)

making compensation to the plaintiff, through
whose land the water issuing from the spring
has been accustomed to flow. The bill charges, that the trustees are preparing to divert
from the plaintiff's land, the whole, or the,
most part of the stream, for the purpose of
supplying the village. The plaintiff's right to ;'
the use of the water is as valid in law, and
useful to him as the rights of others who are
indemnified or protected by the statute; and
he ought not to be deprived of it, and we cannot suppose
was Intended he should be deprived of it, without his consent, or without
making him
just compensation.
The act is,
■unintentionally, defective, in not providing for
his ease, and
ought not to be enforced, and
was not intended to be enforced, until such
provision should be made.
It is clear principle in law, that the owner of land
entitled to the use of
stream of
water which has been accustomed, from time
immemorial, to flow through it, and the law
gives him ample remedy for the violation of
this right.
To divert or obstruct a water
private nuisance;
course is
and the books
are full of cases and decisions asserting the
right and affording the remedy.
Fitzh. Nat.
Brev. 184; Moore v. Browne, Dyer, 319, b;
Coke, 86; Glynne v. NichLutterel's Case,
ols, Comb. 43,
Show. 507; Prickman v. Trip,
Comb. 231.
The court of chancery has also
concurrent
jurisdiction, by injunction, equally clear and
well established in these cases of private nuisance.
Without noticing nuisances arising
from other causes, we have many cases of the
application of equity powers on this very subject of diverting streams.
In Finch v. Resbrldger,
Vern. 390, the Lord Keeper held,
long enjoyment of a water course
that after
running to
house and garden, through the
right was to be presumground of another,
ed, unless disproved by the other side, and the
plaintiff was quieted in his enjoyment, by injunction. So, again, in Bush v. Western Free.
plaintiff who had been in possesCh. 530,
long time, of
water course, was
sion, for
quieted by injunction, against the interruption
of the defendant, who had diverted it, though
the plaintiff had not established 'his right at
law, and the court said such bills were usual.
These cases show the ancient and established
jurisdiction of this court; and the foundation
preof that jurisdiction is the necessity of
ventive remedy when great and immediate
mischief, or material injury would arise to the
comfort and useful enjoyment of property.
The interference rests on the principle of
clear and certain right to the enjoyment of the
subject in question, and an injurious interruption of that right which, upon just and equiAnon.,
table grounds, ought to be prevented.
Vern. 120; East India Co. v. Sandys, Id.
127; Hills v. University of Oxford, Id. 275;
Anon.,
Ves. 414; WhitVes. 476; Anon.,
church V. Hide,
Atk. 391,
Ves. 453; Attora a
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ney General v. Nichol, 16 Ves. 338.

In the application of the general doctrines
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case, it appears to me
to be proper and necessary that the preThere is no
ventive remedy be applied.
need, from what at present appears, of sending the plaintiff to law to have his title
first established. His right to the use of
the stream is one which has been immemorially enjoyed, and of which he is now
In the actual possession.
The trustees set up
no other right to the stream (assuming, for the
present, the Charges in the bill,) than what
is derived from the authority of the statute; and If they are suffered to proceed and
divert the stream, or the most essential part
of it, the plaintiff would receive immediate
and great injury, by the suspension
of all
those works on his land which are set in
operation by the water. In addition to this,
he will lose the comfort and use of the
stream for farming and domestic purposes;
. and, besides, it must be painful to any one
to be deprived, at once, of the enjoyment of
a stream which he has been accustomed
aiways to see flowing by the door of his
/ iiwelling. A right to a stream of water is
as sacred as a right to the soil over which it
I
I flows.
It is a part of the freehold of which
no man can be disseised
"but by lawful
judgment of his peers, or by due process of
This is ah ancient and fundamental
law."
maxim of common right to be found in
magna charta, and which the legislature has
incorporated into an act declaratory of the
rights of the citizens of this state. Laws,

\ of the court to this
i
!

Sess. 10, c. 1.
have intimated

I

that

the statute

does not

deprive the plaintiff of the use of the stream,
He would be
be made.
until recompense
entitled to his action at law for the interruption of his right, and all his remedies
at law, and in this court, remain equally in
force. But I am not to be understood as
denying a competent power in the legislature
to talie private property for necessary or
and, perhaps, even
useful public purposes;
for the purposes specified in the act on which
But to render the exercise
this case arises.
of the power valid, a fair compensation must,
in all cases, be previously made to the individuals affected, under some equitable asThis is a
sessment to be provided by law.
necessary qualification accompanying the exercise of legislative power. In taking private
property for public uses; the limitation is
admitted by the soundest authorities, and is
adopted by all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal sense
of its justice.
Grotlus (De Jur. B. & P., bk. 8, c. 14, § 7),
Puffendorf (De Jur. Nat. et Gent. bk. 8, e.
5, § 7), and Bynkersb.cck
(Quoest Jur. Pub.
bk. 2, c. 15), when speaking of the eminent
domain of the sovereign, admit that private
property may be taken for public uses, when
public necessity or utility require it; but
they all lay it down as a clear principle of
natural equity, that the individual whose
property Is thus sacrificed, must be indemni-

fied.
The last of those jurists Insists, that .
private property cannot be taken, on any
terms, without consent of the owner, for
purposes
of public ornament or pleasure;
and, he mientions an Instance in which the
Roman senate refused to allow the praetors
to carry an aqueduct through the farm of an
individxial, against his consent, when intended merely for ornament. The sense and
practice of the English government
are
equally explicit on this point.
Private property cannot be violated in any case, or by
any set of men, or for any public purpose,
without the Interposition of the leglslaturei
And how does the legislature interpose and.
says Blackstone (1 Bl. \
compel?
"Not,"
stripping the
Comm. p. 139) "by absolutely
subject of his property, in an arbitrary manner, but by giving him a full indemnification
and equivalent for the injury thereby sus- '
tained. The public is now considered as an
individual treating with an individual for
an exchange.
All that the legislature does
is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price, and even this is
an exertion of power which the legislature
Indulges with caution, and which nothing
but the legislature can perform."
may go further, and show that this inviolability of private property, even as it respects the acts and the wants of the state,
imless a just indemnity be afforded, has
excited so much interest, and been deemed
of such importance, that it has frequently
been made the subject of an express and
fundamental article of right in the constiSuch an article is to
tution of government
be seen in the bill of rights annexed to the
constitutions of the states of Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Ohio; and it has been incorporated 4n some of the written constitutions
adopted in Europe, (Constitutional charter
of Lewis XVIII. and the ephemeral, but
very elaborately drawn, constitution de la
Kepublique Francaise of 1795.) But what is
of higher authority, and is absolutely decisive
of the sense of the people of this country, it
is made a part of the constitution of the
United States, "that private property shall
not be taken for public use, without just
compensation." I feel myself, therefore, not
only authorized, but bound to conclude, that
a provision for compensation is an indispensable attendant on the due and constitutional
exercise of the power of depriving an individual of his property; and I am persuaded
that the legislature never intended, by the
act in question, to violate or interfere with
this great and sacred principle of private
right. This is evident from the care which
this act bestows on the rights of the owners of the spring, and of the lands through
which the conduits are to pass. These are
the only cases In which the legislature contemplated or Intended that the act could or
should interfere with private right, and in
these cases due provision is made for its
There la
protection, or for compensation.

I
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why the rights of the plaintiff
should not have the same protection as the
rights of his neighbours, and the necessity
of a provision for his case could not have
occurred, or It, doubtless, would have been
Until, then, some provision be
inserted.
made for affording him compensation, it
would be unjust, and contrary to the first
principles of government, and equally contrary to the Intention of this statute, to take
from the plaintiff his undoubted and prescriptive right to the use and enjoyment of
the stream of water.
In the case of Agar v. Ganal Co., Cooper,
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)—49
no reason

769

an injunction was granted, on filing a bill
supported by aflBdavlt, restraining defendants acting under a private act of parliament, from cutting a canal through the land
of the plaintiff, in a line and mode not supposed to be within the authority of the stat77,

ute.

I shall,

accordingly, upon the facts charged

in the bill, and supported by affidavits,

as a

measure immediately necessary to prevent
Impending injury, allow the injunction, and
wait for the answer, to see whethCT the merits of the case will be varied.
Injunction granted.
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SHERRY

V.

PERKINS

et aL

(17 N. E. 307, 147 Mass. 212.)
Supreme

Judicial
Essex.

Ckturt of Massachusetts.

June

19,

1888.

Report from supreme judicial court, Essex
county; C. Allen, JiTlge.
Bill in equity, by I'atrick P. Sherry against
Charles E. Perkins and Charles H. Leach, for
an injunction to restrain the defendants, respectively president and secretary of the Lasters' Protective Union, from causing to be carried in front of the plaintiff's shoe factory a
banner on -which was the following inscription: "Lasters are requested to keep away
from P. P. Sherry's.
Per order L. P. U.;"
and also a banner on which was the. following: "Lasters on a strike; all lasters are requested to keep away from P. P. Sherry's until the present trouble is settled. Per order
L. P. U." The court, at the trial, found as
facts that members of the Lasters' Protective
Union entered Into a scheme, by threats and
intimidation, to prevent persons in the employment of the plaintiff, as lasters, from continuing in such employment, and in like manner to prevent other persons from entering Into such employment as lasters; that the defendants participated In the scheme; that the
use of the banner was a part of the scheme,
and Its use an injury to the plaintiff in his
The coiurt, after find
business and property.
ing the facts, reported the case to the full
court

H. P. Hurlburt,

borne, for plaintiff.

R. Lund, and T. M. Os-

The principal question in this case Is whether this court, as a court of equity, has jurisdiction to enjoin the acts complained of, upon
the findings of facts reported by the justice
who heard the case. The carrying of a banner or placard before a person's place of business, which injures such person in his business
An auand property, is a private nuisance.
thority directly in point is Gilbert v. Mickle, 4
Sandf. Ch. 357, in which it was held that a
placard paraded or posted in a public street,
before the door of an auctioneer, cautioning
strangers to beware of mock auctions, constituted a private nuisance remediable by injunction. The injunction in that case was refused
upon grounds not affecting the jurisdiction of
If the highway is obstructed by
the court.
crowds of people In consequence of the banner's being carried as described in the bill,
such carrying of the banner is a public nuisance.
Rex V. Cross, 3 Camp. 224; Rex v.
Carllle, 6 Car. & P. 636; Reg. v. Grey, 4 Fost.
& F. 73. But as the damage to the business
and property of the plaintiffs, found In the report, is special to the plaintiffs, they are entitled to an injunction. Walker v. Brewster,
L. R. 5 Eq. 25; Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147;
Soltau V. De Held, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 133.
The
entire scheme, "by threats and Intimidation,
to prevent persons in the employment of the

plaintiffs, as lasters, from continuing In such
employment,
and in like manner to prevent
other persons from entering into such employment as lasters," is a private nuisance to the
plaintiffs. Wood, Nuis. § 141, and cases cited.
Among the things which have been held to be
private nuisances are a market Illegally conducted within the limits of an established market, (Yard v. Ford, 2 Saund. 172;) a ferry carried on, without right, near a duly-licensed
ferry, (Stark v. McGowen, 1 Nott. & McC.
387;) the use of a toll-bridge Inside the limits
of a lawfully established toll-bridge, (Bridge
Co. V. Lewis, 63 Barb. 111.)
See 1 Com. Dig.
"Action on the Case for Nuisance," C. The
scheme in which the defendants are found to
have participated, has the same elements of
Injury as these cases of nuisance.
It is illegal, injurious to property, and continuous in
character.
See Railroad Co. v. Church, 108
U. S. 317, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719. This court
has full power to restrain a private nuisance
by injunction, both under the special provision
of the statute, (Pub. St. c. 151, § 2, cl. 9,)
and by virtue of its general equity powers
conferred by the statute of 1877, c. 178, which
is embodied in Pub. St. c. 151, § 4. The jurisdiction in equity now possessed by this court
is not Ifmlted by any restriction contained in
the last clause of Gen. St. c. 113, § 2, but is
In all respects as full as that of the Blnglish
1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 311,
court of chancery.
In respect to private nuisances, the Eng312.
lish court of chancery has from early times
exercised the right to restrain by Injunction.
This is not limited to cases in which there is
no redress at law. Indeed, the ability to recover substantial damages at law has been
declared to give the right to ask for an injunction against the continuance of the nuisance.
Lord Romilly, M. R., in Crump v.
Lambert, L. R. 3 Eq. 409, 412; 2 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 925 et seq.; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 252; 8
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1350; Emperor v. Day, 3 De
Gex, F. & J. 240, 241, (Lord CampbeU.)
The
scheme in which the defendants participated
was plainly Illegal and criminal, both under
the statute and by common law. Pub. St c.
74, § 2; Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, Crim. Cas.

Ill;

[etc.
Com. v.
v. Hunt 4 Mete.
Mass. 70. But the illegality of the I
nuisance, or its criminal character, does not I
ijolning
prevent the court from enjoining
Gilbert^
V. Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 358, Lord Calms In
Assurance Co. v. E:nott L. R. 10 Ch. 144. The
jurisdiction of courts of chancery over priis concurrent
vate nuisances
with that of
Fisk v. Wilber, 7 Barb. 395.
courts of law.
This court has repeatedly exercised its jurisCadigan
diction to restrain private nuisances.
V. Brown, 120 Mass. 493; Mills v. Mason, Id.
244; Woodward v. Worcester, 121 Mass. 245;
Tucker v. Howard, 122 Mass. 529; Davis v.
Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289. But whatever the injury complained of may be called, there Is
abundant authority for the intervention of a
court of equity to prevent Injury to property
by unlawful or' forcible acts, when the injury
592;

Com.

Dyer,

128

it
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Macanlay v. Shackell, 1 Bligh,
Is continuous.
(N. S.) 96, 127; Lord Bldon In Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 413; Emperor v. Day, 3
De Gex, F. & J. 217, 240, 241, 253; Spinning
Co. V. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, 37 L. J. Ch. 889,
and 19 Law T. (N. S.) 64. The various cases
in which the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name has been restrained, go upon the
principle of the injury to property involved.
Routh V. Webster, 10 Beav. 561; James v.
James, L. R. 13 Eq. 421 ; Hookham v. Pottage,
L. R. 8 Ch. 91; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1358. The
case of Spinning Co. v. RUey, supra, is almost precisely parallel to the present case, except that in the present case the placards are
paraded in a manner which makes them more
distinctly a nuisance than If they were merely
See, also, Dixon v. Holden, L. R.
posted up.
7 Eq. 488; Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10
Ch. 142; Mulkem v. Ward, L. R. 13 Eq. 619;
In NoPood Co. V. Massam, 6 Ch. Div. 582.
vember, 1874, the judicature act went into effect, and in a decision under the act, in the
case of Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. Div.
339, it was held that, after the jury had found
the fact of libel, an injunction would issue
against the continuance of the libel. Thomas
v. Williams, 14 Ch. Div. 864, (1880,) Fry, J.;
Loog V. Bean, 26 Ch. Div. 306. In this court
the case of Spinning Co. v. Riley, was referred to in the case of Diatite Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 114 Mass. 69, and the dissent there
expressed to the views of Malins, V. C, must
be understood as applicable only so far as the
language of the former case applies to the
question of libel, since the question of libel did
The same is true of
not arise in that case.
the reference to the same case in Partridge v.
See 3 Pom. Eq.
Hood, 120 Mass. 403, 406.
Jur. § 1358. As to private nuisance. Bridge v.
Bridge, 6 Pick. 376; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 925928.
As to the criminal character of the acts

113 Mass. 179;
272, note 5.
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Daniell, Ch. Pr. (4th Ed.)

John R. Baldwin, for defendants.
The carrying of the banner named in the
in the manner stated in the bill of
complaint, is not a nuisance.
If the words
printed on the banner are libelous, the complainants have an adequate remedy at law.
Equity will not restrain a libel. The manner of the publication of the words on the
banner cannot be restrained.
The case of
Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, is not
a precedent that establishes the injunctive jurisdiction. That case has been expressly overruled by Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch.
145, and unfavorably noticed in Diatite Co. v.
Manufacturing Co., 114 Mass. 69. The prayer
of the bill is so broad that no decree comporting wif h the terms thereof would be equitable.
report,

ALLEN, J.

The case finds that the defendentered, with others, into a scheme, by
threats and intimidation, to prevent persons
in the employment of the plaintiff from continuing in such employment, and to prevent
others from entering into such employment;
that the banners, with their Inscriptions, were
used by the defendants as part of the scheme,
and that the plaintiff was thereby injured In hia
The act of displaying
business and property.
banners with devices, as a means of threats I
and intimidation, to prevent persons from en j
tering into or continuing in the employment o:
the plaintiff, was injurious to the plaintiff, ana^
illegal at common law and_bj_Btatate^ Pub;
St. c. 74, § 2; Walkefv. Cronin, 107 Mass.
555.
We_ thinkjthat^ thejplalntiff is not restrjcted to his remedy by action at law, butjs
The acts and
erititieano reliefbyjnjuiiction^
The banners
"tiie injury"" were~^continuous.
were used more than three months before the
tiling of the plaintiff's blU, and continued to
complained of: The fact that the nuisance is
be used at the time of the hearing. The inindictable as a nuisance does not prevent the
jury was to the plaintiff's business, and adg>
1 High,
court from enjoining its continuance.
Inj. §§ 745, 752, and cases cited; Attorney q uate remedy coul d not be given by dama ges_,
General v. Hunter, l.Dev. Eq. 12; People v. tn^ suit at law. The wfoiag is not as argued
by' the defendants' counsel, a libel upon the
The English judicaSt. Louis, 5 Gilman, 351.
It Is not found that the
plaintiff's business.
ture act did not enlarge the jurisdiction of
inscriptions upon the banners were false, nor
Day v. Brownrigg, 10 Ch.
courts of equity.
do they appear to have been in disparagement
Div. 294; Gaskin v. BaUs, 13 Ch. Div. 324.
The scheme, in
of the plaintiff's business.
As to differences between this court, as a coin:t
banners
were displaythe
of
which
pursuance
chancery
becourt
English
of equity, and the
ed and maintained, was to Injure the plainfore 1874, see remarks of Wells, J., in Milkman
tiff's business, not by defaming It to the pubThe acts are
V. Ordway, 106 Mass. 232, 255.
lic, but_bijntlmidatmgi workmen, so as to denot libelous, but calculated to injure trade by
direct interference. See Bridge v. Bridge, 6 ter iEh«n f rojn^eep^ or making engagernents
The"Banner was a standwiith the plaintiff^
Pick. 398; Cafew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1,
were or wished to be in
all
who
ing
menace"
to
Inthe
against
whom
parties
the
15.
As to
the employment of the plaintiff, to deter them
junction should issue, inasmuch as the LastMainfrom entering the plaintiff's premises.
ers' Protective Union is aj^oluntary associataining it was a continuous, unlawful act, intion, and all its members cannot be ascertainjurious to the plaintiffs business and properthe same rule applies
ed by the plaintiflE,
ty, and was a nuisance, such as a court of eqwhich makes it proper for a few individuals
Gilbert v.
uity wiU grant relief against.
to sue in behalf of such an organization rep357;
Spinning
Co. v. RiMickle,
Ch.
4
Sandf.
defendthe
with
resented by and associated
Diatite Co. v. Manufacley, L. R. 6 Eq; 551.
See Birmingham v.
ants named in the bUl.
turing Co., 114 Mass. 69, was a case of defamGaUagher, 112 Mass. 190; Snow v. Wheeler,
ants
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atlon only. Some of the language in Spinning
Co. V. Riley has been criticised, but the decision has not been overruled.
See Diatlte Oo.
V. Manufacturing Co., ubi supra;
Assurance
Co. V. Knott, L. B. 10 Ch. 142; Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. Div. 339; Loog v. Bean, 26

Ch. Div. 306; Fooa Oo, ▼. Massam, 14 On.
Div. 763; Thomas v. Williams, Id. 864; Hill
21 Ch. Div. 778; Day v. BrownV. Davies,
rlgg, 10 Ch. Div. 294; Gaskln v. Balls, 13
Ch. Div. 324.
Decree for plaintiff.
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J. The principal question in this
is whether the defendants should be enjoined against maintaining the patroL
The reshows that, following upon a strike of the
plaintifTs worlnnen, the defendants conspired
to prevent him from getting workmen,
and
thereby to prevent tiim from carrying on his
business, unless and until he should adopt a
certain schedule at prices.
The means adopte
were peranas ion and ocial pressure, threats of
personaijnjunf_ or mJawfiirMrm_s:onvej^^[^
^^re^_employedj3rseek^- employment, and
j)f the plaintiff's
a patrol of Two men
Jn^ front
~~ffictoiy,
maintamed^ from half past
in the
morning till half past
in the afternoon, on
one of the busiest streets of Boston.
The number of men was greater at times, and at times
showed some litOe disposition to stop the plaintiffs door. The patrol proper at times went
further than simple advice, not obtruded beyond the point where the other person was willing to listen; and
was found that the patrol
would probably be continued
not enjoined.
There was also some evidence of persuasion to
The patrol was mainbreak existing contracts.
out
tained as one of the means of carrying
was used In comthe defendants' plan, and
bination with social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful harm, and persuasion
It was thus one
to break existing contracts.
means of Intimidation, indirectly to the plaintiff,
and directly to persons actually employed, or
seeking to be employed, by the plaintiff, and
of rendering such employment unpleasant or Inan
Such an act
tolerable to such persons.
unlawful Interference with the rights both of
An employer haa
employer and of onployed.
ALLEN,

case

is

Hale & Dlckerman, for plaintiff. Thomas H.
Russell and Arthur H. Russell, for respondents.

a

Report from supreme judicial court, Suffolk
county; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Judge.
Bill by Frederick O. Vegelahn
against
George M. Guntner and others for an injuncAn Injunction issued pendente lite retion.
straining the respondents from interfering with
the plaintiff's business by patrolling the sidewalk in front of or In the vicinity of the premises occupied by him, for the purpose of preventing any person In his employment, or desirous of entering the same, from entering It
or continuing In It; or by obstructing or interfering with any persons in entering or leavor by intimiing the plaintiff's said premises;
dating any person In the employment
of the
plaintiff, or desirous of entering the same; or
by any scheme or conspiracy for the purpose
hindering, interfering with, or
of annoying,
preventing any person In the employment
of
the plaintiff, or desirous of entering the same,
from entering It, or from continuing therein.
This injunction was approved.

i

Oct

(a

Couirt

1

Judicial
SufEolb.

92.)

a

Supreme

right to engage an persons who are willing
to work for him, at such prices as may be
mutually agreed upon, and persons employed or
seelong employment havecorresponding right
to enter into or remain in the employment of
any person or corporation willing to employ
These rights are secured by the constithem.
tution itself.
Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117,
28 N. B. 1126; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y.
S-9, 17 N. E. 343; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 ni. 71, 35 N. E. 62; Ritchie v. People,
155 lU. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Low v. Printing Co.
No one can lawfully in(Neb.) 59 N. W. 362.
terfere by force or intimidation to prevent employers or persons employed or wishing to be
employed from the exercise of these rights.
It is in Massachusetts, as in some other states,
even made
criminal offense for one, by intimidation or force, to prevent, or seek to prevent, a person from entering into or continuing
In the employment of
person or corporation.
Pub. St. c. 74,
not Um2. Intimidation
Ited to threats of violence or of pliysical Injmy
to person or property.
It has
broader signification, and there also may be a moral inPatrolling or picktimidation which is illegal.
etiog, under the circumstances
stated In
the]
report, has elements of intimidation like those
which were found to exist in Sheny v. Perkins,
147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307. It was declared
to be unlawful in Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, Or.
Cas. 592; Reg. v. Hibbert, 13 Cox, Cr. Cas.
82; Reg. v. Bauld, Id. 282.
It was assumed to
be unlawful in Trollope v. Trader's Fed. (1875)
H L. T. 228, though in that case the pickets
were withdrawn before the bringing of the biU.
The patrol was an imlawful interference both
with the plaintiff and with the workmen, within the principle of many cases; and, when instituted for the purpose of Interfering with his
business,
private nuisance.
became
See
Walker v.
Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass.
Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Barr v. Trades Council
(N. J. Ch.) 30 AU. 8S1; Murdock v. Walker,
152 Pa. St. 595, 25 Ati. 492; China Co. v.
BroWn, 164 Pa. St 449, 30 Ati. 261; Coeui
D'Alene Gonsol. & Min. Co. v. Miners' Union
of Wardner, 51 Fed. 260; Temperton v. Russell [1893]
Q. B. 715; Floyd v. Jackson,
52
[1895] 11 L. T. 276; Wright v. Hennessey,
Alb. Law J. 104
case before Baron Pollock);
Judge V. Bennett, 36 Wkly. Rep. 103; Lyons
V. Wilkins [1896]
Ch. 811.
The defendants contend that these acts were
justifiable,
because they were only seeJdng to
secure better wages for themselves, by compelling the plaintiff to accept their schedule of
wages.
This motive or purpose does not justi^
maintaining a patrol In front of the plaintiff's
premises, as
means of carrying out their conspiracy.
A combination among persons merely
to regulate their own conduct
within allowable competition, and Is lawful, although others
may be indlrecfly affected thereby.
But
combination to do injurious acts expressly directed
to another, by way of intimidation or constraint,
either of himself or of persons employed or seeking to be employed by him, la outside of allowit

(44 N. B. 1077, 167 Mass.

et aL

1
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Various deable competition, and Is unlawful.
cided cases fall within the former class; for example: Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421,
32 N. E. 744; Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 179;
Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499; C!om. v.
Heywood v. TiUson,
Hunt, 4 Mete (Mass.)
75 Me. 225; Cote t. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420,
28 Atl. 190; Bohn Manuf'g Co. v. Hollis, 54
Minn . 223, 55 N. W. 1119; steamship Co. v.
McGregor [1892] App. Cas. 25; Curran v. TreThe present
leaven [1891] 2 Q. B. 545, 561.
case falls within the latter class.
Nor does the fact that the defendants' acts
might subject them to an indictment prevent
a court of equity from issuing an injunction.
"
It is true that, ordinarily, a court of equity
wiU decline to issue an injunction to restrain
the commission of a crime; but a continuing
Injury to property or business may be enjoined, although it may also be punisliable as a
Sherry v. Perkins,
nuisance or other crime.
147 Mass. 212, 17 N. B. 307; In re Debs, 158
TI. S. 564, 593, 599, 15 Sup. Ot 900; Baltimore
& P. R. Co. V. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S.
317, 329, 2 Sup. Ct. 719; Cranford v. Tyrrell,
128 N. Y. 341, 344, 28 N. E. 514; Gilbert v.
Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357; Port of Mobile v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 126, 4
South. 106; Arthur v. Cakes, 11 C. O. A. 209,
63 Fed. 310; Toledo, A., A. & N. M. Ry. Co.
v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730, 744; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De Gex, P. & J.
217, 239, 240, 253; Hermann Loog v. Bean,
26 Ch. Div. 306, 314, 316, 317; Monson v. Tus-

Ill;

I

1 Q. B. 671, 689, 690, 698.
question is also presented whether the
court should enjoin such interference with
of the plaintiff
persons in the employment
who are not bound by contract to remain
with him, or with persons who are not under
any existing contract, but who are seeking

saud [1894]

A

A
intending to enter into his employment.
conspiracy to interfere with the plaintiff's
business by means of threats and intimida;' tion, and by maintaining a patrol in front of
i his premises, In order to prevent persons from
entering his employment, or in order to pre'{
vent persons who are in his employment from
! continuing therein, is unlawful, even though
to
I such persons are not bound by contract
enter into or to continue in his employment;
1 and the injunction should not be so limited as
1 to relate only to persons who are bound by ex*
Isting contracts. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass.
555, 565; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1;
Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. B.
807; Temperton v. BusseU [1893] 1 Q. B. 715,
11 L. T.
728, 731; Flood v. Jackson [1895]
We therefore think that the injunction
276.
should be in the form as originally issued.
' or

'

So ordered.

FIELD, 0. J. (dissenting). The practice of
Issuing injunctions in cases of this kind is of
very recent origin. One of the earliest authorities in the United States for enjoining, in
acts somewhat like those alleged
equity,
against the defendants in the present case, is

Sherry v. Perkins (decided In 1888) 147 Mass.
N. E. 307. It was found as a fact in
that case that the defendants entered into a
scheme, by threats and intimidation, to prevent persons in the employment of the plaintiffs as lasters from continuing in such employment, and, in like manner, to prevent other persons from entering into such employment as lasters; that the use of the banners
was a part of the scheme; that the first banner was carried from January 8, 1887, to
March 22, 1887, and the second banner from
March 22, 1887, to the time of the hearing;
and that "tliie plaintiffs have been and are injured in their business and property thereby."
The full court say: "The act of displaying
banners with devices, as a means of threats
and intimidation to prevent persons from entering into or continuing in the employment of
the plaintiffs, was injurious to the plaintiffs,
and illegal at common law and by statute.
Pub. St c. 74, § 2; Walker v. Cronin, 107
"The banner was a standing
Mass. 555."
menace to all who were or wished to be in
of the plaintiffs, to deter
the employment
them from entering the plaintiffs' premises.
Maintaining it was a continuous unlawful
act. Injurious to the plaintiffs' business and
property, and was a nuisance such as a court
of equity will grant relief against Gilbert v.
Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357; Spinnhig Co. v.
Gilbert v. Mickle,
Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551."
one of the authorities cited in Sherry v. Perkins,
was a suit in equity by an auctioneer against
the mayor of the city of New York to restrain
him and those acting under him from parading, placing, or keeping before the plaintiff's
auction rooms a placard as follows: "Strangers, beware of mock auctions." A temporary
Injunction was issued, but, on hearing, it was
Notwithstanding what is said in
dissolved.
his conthe opinion of the vice chancellor,
clusion is as follows: "I am satisfied that it
is my duty to leave the party to his remedy
Spinning Co. v. Riley
by an action at law."
is a well-known decision of Vice Chancellor
Malins. The biU prayed that the defendants
might be "restrained from printing or publishing any placards or advertisements similar to
those already set forth." The defendants had
caused to be posted on the walls and other
public places in the neighborhood of the plaintiff's works, and caused to be printed in certain newspapers, a notice as follows: "Wanted aU well-wishers to the Operative Cotton
Spinning, &c., Association not to trouble or
cause any annoyance to the Springhead Spinning Company lees, by knocking at the door
of their oflSce, until the dispute between
them and the self-actor minders is finally ter212, 17

32
Carrodus,
By special order.
The case was
Street, Oldham."
The vice chancellor
heard upon demurrers.
overhave stated,
says: "For the reasons
ruled these demurrers, because the biU states,
and the demurrers admit, acts amounting to

minated.

Greaves

I

I

Of this case,
the destruction of property."
the court, in Sherry v. Perkins, say: "Some

INJUNCTIONS.
of the language In Spinning Co. t. Riley lias
been criticised, but the decision has not been
The cases are there cited in
overruled."
•which that decision lias been doubted or critOf that decision, this court, in Boston
icised.
Diatite Co. t. Florence Manuf'g Co., 114
Mass. 69, say; "The opinions of Vice Chancellor Malins in Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R,
6 Eq. 551, in Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq.
488, and in Rollins v. Hhiks, L. R. 13 Eq.
355, appear to us to be so inconsistent with
these authorities [authorities which the court
had cited], and with well-settled principles,
that it would be superfluous to consider
whether, upon the facts before him, his decisions can be supported." Much the same
language was used by the justices in Assurance Co. V. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142, a part
of the headnote of which is: "Dixon v. HoldIn
en and Spinning Co. v. Riley overruled."
Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q. B. 435, 438,
Lindley, L. J., says of the case of Spinning
Co. V. Riley that it was overruled by the
court of appeal in Assurance Co. v. Knott.
Since the judicature act, however, the courts
of England have interfered to restrain, by injunction, the publication or continued publiparticularly
cation of libelous statements,
affecting the business or
those injuriously
property of another, as well as injunctions
similar to that In the present case. St. 36 & 37
Vict. c. 66, § 25, subds. 5, 8; Monson v. Tussaud [1894] 1 Q. B. 671, 672; Lyons v. Wllkins [1896] 1 Ch. 811, 827. But, In the absence of any power given by stalnite, the jurisdiction of a court of equity, having only the
powers of the English high court of chancery,
think, extend to aijoining acts like
does not,
those complained of in the case at bar, unless
they amount to a destruction or threatened
destruction of property, or an irreparable injury to it In England the rights of employers and employed with reference to strikes,
have
boycotts, and other similar movements
not. In genwal, been left to be worked out by
the courts from common-law principles, but
statutes, from time to time, have been passed
defining what may and what may not be permitted.
The administration of these statutes
largely has been through the criminal courts.
As a means of prevention, the remedy given
by Pub. St c. 74, § 2, would seem to b€ adequate where the section is applicable, unless
the destruction of, or an irreparable injury
to, property is threatened; and there is the
additional remedy of an indictment for a
I
at common law, if the
I criminal consgiggy
If the
'"«6ts of the defendant amount to that.
acts complained of do not amount to intimidation or force, It is not in aU respects clear
what are lawful and what are not lawful at
common law. It seems to be established in
this commonwealth that, intentionally and
without justifiable cause, to entice, by peiv
suasion, a workman to break an existing contract with his employer, and to leave his employment, is actionable, whether done with
actual malice or not Walker v. Oronin, 107

I
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Mass. 555. What constitutes Justifiable cause
undetermined.
remains in some respects
Whether to persuade a person who is free to
choose his employment not to enter into the
employment of another person gives a cause
of action to such other person, by some courts
has been said to depend upon the question of
actual malice; and, in considering this question of malice. It Is said that it is important
to determine whether the defendant has any
lawful Interest of his own in preventing the employment, such as that of competition in business.
For myself, I have been unable to see
how malice is necessarily decisive. To persuade
one man not to enter into the employment of
another, by telling the truth to him about
such f ' lier person and his business, I am not
convinced is actionable at common law, whatever the motive may be.
Such iwrsuasion,
when accompanied by falsehood about such
other person or his business, may be actionable, unless the occasion of making the statements Is privileged; and then the question of
This,
actual malice may be Important.
think, is the effect of the decision in Rice v.
Albee, 164 Mass. 88, 41 N. E. 122.
When
one man orally advises another not to enter
Into a third person's employment, it would,
I think, be a dangerous principle to leave his
liability to be determined by a jury upon the
question of his malice or want of malice, except in those cases where the words spoken,
were false. In the present case, if the establishment of ai patrol is using Intimidati'on or
force, within the meaning of our statute, it
If it does not amount
is illegal and criminal.
to intimidation or force, but is carried to such
a degree as to interfere with the use by the
plaintiff of his property, it may be lUegaL
But something more is nee- \
aafl. acti onable,.
If
'essaryTo" justify issuing an Injunction.
It is in violation of any ordinance of the city
regulating the use of streets, there may be a
prosecution for that, and the police can enforce the ordinance; but If It Is merely a
peaceful mode of finding out the persons who
intend to enter the plaintiff's premises to apply for work, and of informing them of the
actual facts of the case, in order to induce
them not to enter the plaintiff's employment.
In the absence of any statute relating to the
see no
subject,
doubt If It Is illegal, and
ground for issuing an injunction against it.
As no objection Is now made by the defendants to the equitable jurisdiction, I am of
opinion on the facts reported, as
understand them, that the decree entered by Mr.
Justice HOt-MES should be affirmed, without
modification.

I

I

I

I

HOLMES, J. (dissenting).
In a case like
the present, it seems to me that, whatever the
true result may be, It will be of advantage to
sound thinking to have the less popular view
of the law stated, and therefore, although,
when
have been unable to bring my brethren to share my convictions, my almost invariable practice is to defer to them in si-

I

y
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I

depart from that practice In this
lence,
to do
case, notwithstanding my tinwlUlngness
so, m support of an already rendered judgment of my own.
In the first place, a word or two should be
assaid as to the meaning of the report.
meant
sume that my brethren construe It as
It to be construed, and that, if they were not
prepared to do so, they would give an opportunity to the defendants to have It amended

I

with what

In accordance

I state

I

my meaning

to have been. There was no proof of any
threat or danger of a patrol exceeding two
men, and as, of course, an Injunction Is not
granted except with reference to what there
is reason to expect In its absence, the ques-

tion on that point Is whether a patrol of two
men should be enjoined. Again, the defendants are enjoined by the final decree from intimidating by threats, express or implied, of
physical harm to body or property, any person who may be desirous of entering into the
employment of the plaintiff, so far as to preIn order
vent him from entering the same.
to test the correctness of the refusal to go
further. It must be assumed that the defendants obey the express prohibition of the dethey do not, they fall within the
cree.
I Injunction as it now stands, and are liable to

If

summary punishment. The important difference between the preliminary and the final
I injunction Is that the former goes further,
forbids the defendants to interfere with
I andplaintiff's
business "by any .scheme * * *
f the
for the purpose of • * • pre; organized
/ venting any person or persons who now are or
may hereafter be • • * desirous of enterI
Ing
the [plaintiff's employment] from enter!
ing it."
quote only a part, and the part
which seems to me most objectionable. This
and
Includes refusal of social intercourse,
or argument, aleven organized persuasion
though free from any threat of violence,
either express or implied. And this Is with
reference to persons who have a legal right
to contract or not to contract with the plaintiff, as they may see fit. Interference with
existing contracts is forbidden by the final
I wish to insist a little that the only
decree.
point of difference which involves a difference of principle between the final decree
and the preliminary Injunction, which It Is
have mentionproposed to restore, Is what
ed, in order that it may be seen exactly what
we are to discuss. It appears to me that the
opinion of the majority turns In part on the
assumption that the patrol necessarily carries with It a threat of bodily harm. That assumption I think unwarranted, for the reaFurthermore, It
have given.
sons which
cannot be said, I think, that two men, walking together up and down a sidewalk, and
speaking to those who enter a certain shop,
do necessarily and always thereby convey a
do not think It possible to
threat of force.
discriminate, and to say that two workmen,
or even two representatives of an organization of workmen, do; especially when they
I

I

i

I

I

I

are, and are known to be, under the Injunction of this court not to do so. See Stimson,
Labor Law, f 60, especially pages 290, 29g300; Reg. V. Shepherd, 11 Cox, Cr. Cas. 325.
may add that I think the more intelligent
workingmen believe as fully as
do that
they no more can be permitted to usurp the
state's prerogative of force than can their opBut, If I am
ponents In their controversies.
wrong, then the decree as It stands reaches
the patrol, since it applies to all threats of
force.
With this pass to the real difference
between the interlocutory and the final de-

I

I

I

cree.
agree, whatever may be the law in the
case of a single defendant (Bice y. Albee, 164
Mass. 88, 41 N. E. 122), that when a plaintiff
proves that several persons have combined
and conspired to Injure his business, and
have done acts producing that effect, he
shows temporal damage and a cause of action, unless the facts disclose or the defendants prove some ground of excuse or justification; and take It to be, settled, and rightly
settled, that doing that damage by combined
persuasion Is actionable, as well as doing It
by falsehood or by force. Walker v. Cronin,
107 Mass. 555; Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass.
567, 25 N. B. 74; Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass.

I

I

148, 26

N. E.

417.

In numberless instances the
law warrants the intentional Infliction of temporal damage, because it regards it as justiIt is on the question of what shall
fied.
amount to a justification, and more especially
on the nature of the consideratlpns which
really determine or ought to determine the
answer to that question, that Judicial reasonThe
ing seems to me often to be Inadequate.
true grounds of decision are considerations
of policy and of social advantage, and It Is
vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and general propositions
Propositions
of law which nobody disputes.
as to public policy rarely are unanimously
accepted, and still more rarely. If ever, are
They recapable of unanswerable proof.
quire a special training to enable any one
even to form an intelligent opinion about
Nevertheless,

them.

In

the early stages of law, at least, they
are acted on rather as inarticulate
Instincts than as definite ideas, for which a
rational defense is ready.
have said In the last
To illustrate what
paragraph:
It has been the law for centuries that a man may set up a business in a
small country town, too small to support
more than one, although thereby he expects
and Intends to ruin some one already there,
and succeeds In his intent. In such a case
he Is not held to act "unlawfully and without justifiable cause," as was alleged in Walker V. Cronm and Rice y. Albee. The reason,
of course, is that the doctrine generally has
been accepted that free competition is worth
more to society tnan It costs, and that on
this ground the Infilctlon of the damage ia

generally

I
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privileged.

Ill,

134.

Com. t. Hunt, 4 Mete. (Mass.)
even this proposition nowadays

Yet

Is disputed by a considerable body of persons, including many whose intelUgence
is
not to be denied, little as wa may agree with
them.

I

have chosen this illustration partly with
It
reference to what
have to say next.
shows without the need of further authority
that the policy of allowing free competition

I

justifies the intentional inflicting of temporal
damage. Including the damage of interference
with a man's business by some means, when
the damage is done, not for its own sake, but
as an instrumentality in reaching the end of
victory in the battle of trade. In such a
case it cannot matter whether the plaintiff Is
the only rival of the defendant, and so is aimed at specially, or is one of a class all of
The only debatable ground ig
whom are hit.
the nature of the means by which such damWe all agree that it
age may be inflicted.
cannot be done by force or threats of force.
presume, that it may be done
We all agree,
by persuasion to leave a rival's shop, and
It may be done by
come to the defendant's;
the refusal or withdrawal of various iieeunlary advantages, which, apart from this consequence, are within the defendant's lawful
It may be done by the withdrawal
control.
of, or threat to withdraw, such advantages
from third persons who have a right to deal
or not to deal with the plaintiff, as a means
ftf inducing them not to deal with him either
as customers or servants.
Com. v. Hunt, 4
112, 133; Bowen v. MatheMete. (Mass.)
son, 14 Allen, 499; Hey wood v. TlUson, 75
Me. 225; Steamship Co. v. McGregor [1892]
App. Cas. 25.
have seen the suggestion
made that the conflict between employers and
But I venemployed was not competition.
ture to assume that none of my brethren
would rely on that suggestion. If the policy
on which our law is founded is too narrowly
expressed in the term "free competition," we
may substitute "free struggle for life." Certainly, the policy is not limited to struggles
between persons of the same class, competing
for the same end. It applies to all conflicts
.of temporal Interests.
pause here to remark that the word
• "threats" often Is used as if, when it appear'
.ed that threats had been made, it appeared
; that unlawful conduct had begun.
But it
As a general
\4 depends on what you threaten.
rule, even if subject to some exceptions, what
you may do in a certain event you may
threaten to do— that Is, give warning of your
Intention to do— In that event, and thus allow
the other person the chance of avoiding the
So, as to "compulsion," it deconsequence.
pends on how you "compel." Com. v. Hunt,
133. So as to "annoyance"
4 Mete. (Mass.)
Connor v. Kent, Curran v.
or "intimidation."
Treleaven, 17 Cox, Or. Oas. 3.54, 367, 368, 370.
In Sherry ▼. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E.
307, it was found as a fact that the display of
banners which was enjoined was part of a

I

Ill,

I

/ I

Ill,
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scheme to prevent workmen from entering or
remaining in the plaintiff's employment, "by
threats and intimidation."
The context showed that the words as there used meant
threats of personal violence and intimidation

by causing fear of it.
<
Bo far, 1 suppose, we are agreed.
But ther^ I
Is a notion, which latterly has been insisted \
on a good deal, that a combination of persons
\ '
to do what any one of them lawfully might 1 /
do by himself wiU m&ke the otherwise lawful
1/
conduct unlawful.
It would be rash to say /
that some as yet unformulated truth may
not be hidden under this proposition.
But,
in the general form in which it has been presented and accepted by many courts,
think
it plainly untrue, both on authority and principle.
Com. V. Hunt, 4 Mete. (Mass.)
KandaU v. Hazelton, 12 AUen, 412, 414.
There was combination of the most flagrant
and dominant kind in Bowen v. Matheson,
and in the Steamship Co. Case, and combination was essential to the success achieved.
But it is not necessary to cite cases. It is
plain from the slightest consideration of
practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and that the organization of the world, now going on so fast,
means an ever-increasing might and scope of
combination.
It seems to me futile to set
our faces against this tendency. Whether
beneficial on the whole, as think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be chan-

i

I

Ill;

I

ged.

One of the eternal conflicts out of which
made up is that between the effort of
every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under
the name of capital, to get his services for
the least possible return. Combination on
Combithe one side is patent and powerful.
nation on the other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be caram unaried on in a fair and equal way.
ble to reconcile Temperton v. Russell [1893]
1 Q. B. 715, and the cases which follow it.
But TemperWith the Steamship Co. Case.
ton V. EusseU is not a binding authority here,
do not think it necessary to
and therefore
discuss it.
If it be true that workingmen may combine
with a view, among other things, to getting
as much as they can for their labor, just as
capital may combine with a view to getting
the greatest possible return, it must be true
that, when combined, they have the same
liberty that combined capital has, to support
their Interests by argument, persuasion, and
the bestowal or refusal of those advantages
can
which they otherwise lawfully control.
remember when many people thought that,
apart from violence or breach of contract,
strikes were wicked, as organized refusals to
suppose that Intelligent economists
work.
and legislators have given up that notion to-

life is

I

I

I

I
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I

day.
feel pretty confident that they equally will abandon the Idea that an organized
refusal by workmen of social intercourse
with a man who shaU enter their antagonist's .
employ is unlawful, if it is dissociated from
any threat of violence, and ira made for the^
sole object of prevailing, if possible, in a contest with their employer about the rate of
wages.
The fact that the immediate object of
the act by which the. benefit to themselves
Is to be gained is to injure their antagonist
any
make It unlawful,
does not necessarily
more than when a great house lowers the
price of goods for the purpose and with the
effect of driving a smaller antagonist from the
Indeed, the question seems to me to
business.
have been decided as long ago as 1842, by
the good sense of Chief Justice Shaw, In
€om. v. Hunt, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 111.
repeat
said at the beginning, that
ia.t the end, as

I

I

this is the point of difference In principle, and
the only one, between the interlocutory and
final decree; and
only desire to add that
the distinctions upon which the final decree
was framed seem to me to have coincided
very accurately with the results finally reached by legislation and judicial decision in England, apart from what
must regard as the
anomalous decisions of Temperton v. Russell
and the cases which have followed It Reg.
V. Shepherd, 11 Cox, Cr. Cas. 325; Connor v.
Kent, Gibson t. Lawson, and Curran v. Tre-

I

I

leaven, 17 Cox, Cr. Cas. 354.
The general question of the propriety of
dealing with this kind of case by injunction
say nothing about, because
understand
that the defendants have no objection to the
final decree If It goes no further, and that
both parties wish a decision iq>on the matters
which
have discussed.

I

I

I
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HAAni/TON-BROWN
SHOE CO.
SAXEX et al.
(32

v.

S. W. 1106, 131 Mo. 212.)

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.
Nov. 26, 1895.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court
Bill by the Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Company to enjoin A. J. Saxey and others from
attempting, by threats and Intimidation, to
force complainant's employes to quit work.
A demurrer to the bill was overruled, and
defendants appeal
Affirmed.

John P. McDermott, for appellants.
B. Jones, for respondent.

Silas

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from
the final judgment of the circuit court of the
■city of St Louis on a demurrer to the plaintifif's petition, which is as follows:
"PlaintifC states that It is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of Missouri,
and is engaged in the manufacture of shoes
in the city of St Louis, Missouri, at TwentyFirst and Locust streets in said city, at
which place its factory for the purpose of its
said manufacturing business is located. And
plaintiff says that it has in its employ in
said manufacturing business, in its factory
as aforesaid, between eight and nine hundred persons; that all of these persons are
at work as operatives in some department or
other of said factory; that of these employes
as aforesaid a large number, to wit, about
two or three hundred, are women and girls,
and a large number, to wit, about two or
three hundred, are young persons, many of
them not being of age, and the balance of
said operatives are adult men; that all of
these persons are engaged in earning a livelihood at the business of this plaintifC aforesaid, and, on the other hand, this plaintifC
requires the services of these persons to
successfully carry on its business of manufacturing shoes as aforesaid. Plaintiff further states that all of these employes now
In the employ of this plaintiff are desirous
of continuing in the service of the plaintiff
In its said business as aforesaid.
Plaintiff
further states that ten or fifteen days ago
including all the desome of Its employes,
fendants herein, except the defendants
Thomas Beaty and P. J. McGarry, went out
of the employ of this plaintiff on what is
commonly called a 'strike,' claiming to have
some grievance against this plaintiff, and
which this plaintiff says was without any
reasonable ground to rest upon, and thereupon attempted to inaugurate among the
employes of this plaintiff what is commonly
called a 'strike'; that thereupon the said defendants, lately employSs of this plaintiff,
together with the defendants Beaty and McGarry and divers other persons, unlawfully
and wrongfully combined and confederated
together to terrorize, and thereby, by in-
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timidation and threats, to prevent the other
employes of this plaintiff from peaceably or
otherwise prosecuting their work in plaintiff's factory; that thereupon all of the defendants hereto, together with their associates and confederates, whose names are at
this moment unknown to this plaintiff, began and have constantly pursued in a course
of threats of personal violence and intimidation and persuasion, for the purpose, by
means of such intimidation and threats and
fear, to prevent the other employes of this
plaintiff from peaceably or otherwise prosecuting their work in plaintiff's factory; that
all of the said defendants hereto, together
with divers and sundry other persons, who
are their associates and confederates, have
constantly hung about the plaintiff's said
factory at the place aforesaid, and upon the
streets in close proximity, for the purpose
of picketing the premises of this plaintiff,
and, by putting the employes of this plaintiff in fear of bodily injury, to thereby keep
them from continuing their employment
with this plaintiff, and also for the purpose
of preventing other persons from entering
the employ of the plaintiff; and the said defendants and their associates and confederates, as a part of their policy of threats
and intimidation, and for the purpose of
carrying on their unlawful combination, have
gone to the homes of divers of the employes of
this plaintiff at nighttime, and then and there
undertaken
to induce, by persuasion and by
intimidation and threats, the employes of this
plaintiff from further prosecuting their work
in plaintifCs said factory.
And the plaintiff charges that the said defendants therein
named, and their associates and confederates, for a number of days, by the use of
threats
arid personal violence, intimidation,
and other unlawful means, have been and
are now, undertaking to prevent the employes of this plaintiff from prosecuting
their ordinary work, and are endeavoring to
induce them, by the unlawful means aforesaid, to quit the employment of this plaintiff.
And plaintiff says that by reason of the fact
that a great many of its employes are women and girls and young persons, that tue
defendants aforesaid and their associates
and confederates have succeeded in exciting
in the minds of the plaintiff's said employes,
or many of them, fear for their bodily safety, to such an extent that they cannot happily, as they have a right to do, prosecute
their ordinary work; and plaintiff says, by
reason of the premises. It cannot peaceably
and successfully prosecute its said business.
And plaintiff says it is without remedy at
law, and can only be fully protected and
relieved in a court of equity. Plaintiff therefore prays that the defendants, their associates and confederates, be enjoined by a
temporary order of Injunction, to be made
final upon the hearing of this cause, issued
out of this court, from in any manner Interfering with the employes of this plaintiff
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jurisdiction. It will be observed that the denow in the employ of the plaintiff, and from
In any manner interfering with any person
fendants do not claim to have the right to
do what the injunction forbids them doing.
who may desire to enter the employ of this
Their learned counsel even quotes the statplaintiff, by the use of threats, personal vioute to show that It Is a crime to do so. But
lence, intimidation, or other means calcuhe contends that the constitution of the Unitlated to terrorize or alarm the plaintiff's emed States and the constitution of the state
ployes, in any manner or form whatever,
of Missouri guaranty them the right to comand that said defendants and their associates and confederates aforesaid be restrainmit crime, with only this limitation, to wit,
that they shall answer for the crime, when
ed by the order of this court from undertaking, by the use of the means aforesaid, to incommitted, in a criminal court, before a jury,
and that to restrain them from committing
duce or to cause any of the employes of this
plaintiff to quit the employment of this
crime is to rob them of their constitutional
right of trial by jury. If that position be
plaintiff, and that the defendants aforesaid
correct, then there can be no valid statute
and their associates and confederates be
enjoined from congregating or loitering
to prevent crime.
But that position is contrary to all reason. The right of trial by
about the premises of this plaintiff at the
jury does not arise untU the party Is acplace aforesaid, and that they be required
by the injunction of this court to go about
cused of having already committed
the
f_you see a ma n advancing upon antheir ordinary business, and to abstain from
crime.
In any way interfering with the business of
otherr ^^ murder ous dflmeanof"and a_deaj-""
this plaintiff, and for such other and further Ty^eaponTandyQ a. arrest him.— disarm him.
— ygi TTlave'pCTEan a. jrevented an act which
and general relief as may to the court appear proper In the premises."
would have brought abo ut a trial by jury,
but c an you be "Baidrt6 hav e deprivea~EIin~or
The case was tried before the Hon. L.
his.ronsupil3on al right of Trial iy'jury ? The
Valliant, one of the judges of that court,
who, on overruling the demurrer, delivered
train^thou^i put In motion by the argument of the learned counsel for defendants
the following opinion:
on this point leads only to this end, to wit, I
"The amended petition states in substance
that the constitution guaranties to every man'
that the plaintiff conducts a large shoe
the right to commit crime, so that he may)
manufactory in this city, and has in its emenjoy the inestimable right of trial by juryi
ploy some eight or nine hundred persons,
"Passing now to the question relating to'
all of whom are earning their living in plainthe particular jurisdiction of a court of equitiff's employment, and are desirous of so
ty, we are brought to face the proposition
continuing; that the defendants, except two
that a court of equity has no criminal jurisof them, were lately in plaintiff's employ,
diction, and will not interfere by injunction
but have gone out of the same, on a strlte,
to prevent the commission of a crime. These
and are now, with the other two defendants,
two propositions are firmly established; and
engaged in an attempt to force the other
asjto the first, that a court of equity has no 1/
employes of plaintiff to quit their work and
join in the strike, and that to accomplish this •criminal jurisaic tibn',' t^r gI3s_no exception. <
TO tne "sgcgnd," that a
~of 'entity wllT
purpose they are Intimidating them with
threats of personal violence; that among •got interfefe by" Injunction to preyent thg
cojnmission of a crim e, that, too, is perhapsthe plaintiff's employes who are thus threatwithout exception, when properly interpretened are about 300 women and girls and two
ed, but it is sometimes
misinterpreted.
or three hundred other young persons; that
When we say that a court of equity will
the effect of all this on the plaintiff's businever interfere by injunction to prevent the '
ness, if the defendants are allowed to procommission of a crime, we mean that it will
ceed, would be to Inflict incalculable damnot do so simply for the purpose of preventage. Upon filing this amended petition, and
ing a Violation of a criminal law. But when
the plaintiff's giving bond as required by
theactcompla ined of threatens ^ n irrepa-^
law, a temporary injunction issued, restraining the defendants from attempting to force "fafilejojjSFlErthepro perty of an individual'
the plaintiff's employes to leave their work 'a .^ourt of equity will interfere to prevent
by Intimidation and threats of violence, or
tha£.injury, notwithstanding ttgact may als6"be it io^tion of a criiSiinarKw. In such
from assembling for that purpose in the vicinity of plaintiff's factory. The defendants
case the court does not Interfere to prevent
the commission of a crime, although that
have appeared by their counsel, and, by
may incidentally result, but it exerts its force
their demurrer filed, admit that all the stateto protect the individual's property from dements of the amended petition are true; but
struction, and ignores entirely the criminal
they take the position that, even if they are
portion of the act. There can be no doubt
doing the unlawful acts that they are charof the jurisdiction of a court of equity In
ged with doing, still this court has no right
such a case. On this question counsel have
to Interfere with them, because they say
dted cases in which courts of equity have
that what they are doing is a crime, by the
been denied jurisdiction to enjoin the publistat^ law of this state, and that for the
cation of a libel, and in those opinions are
commission of a crime they can only be
to be found the general statement of the
tried by a jury in a court having criminal

I
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proposition

above mentioned.

of libel is peculiar, and those

But the law

cases turn up-

on that peculiarity. The freedom of the
press has been so jealously guarded both in
England and in this country that our law
of libel is like no other law on the books.
Oiu: constitution provides that a man may
say, write, and publish 'whatever he will,'
being answerable only for the 'abuse of libLibel Is the only act injurious to the
erty."
rights of another which a man ca'nnot, under proper conditions, be restrained from
conmiitting; and that is so because the coni.stitution says he shall be allowed to do it,
Equity will
band answer for it afterwards.
§-not Interfere when there is an adequate rem'f cdy at law. But what remedy does the law
afCord that would be adequate to the plalnHow would their damages be
tifE's injury?
The defend•estimated? How compensated?
ants' learned counsel cites us to the criminal
statute, but how will that remedy the plainA criminal prosecution does not
tiff's injury?
propose to remedy a private wrong. And,
even if there was a statute giving a legal
remedy to plaintiff, it would not oust the
The legal remedy that
. equity jurisdiction.
closes the door of a court of equity is a
common-law remedy. Where equity had jurisdiction because the common law affords
no adequate remedy, that jurisdiction is not.
affected by a statute providing a legal remedy. What a humiliating thought it would
be If these defendants were really attempting to do what the amended petition charges, and what their demurrer confesses, —
that is, to destroy the business of these plaintiffs, and to force the eight or nine hundred
men, women, boys, and girls who are earning their livings in the plaintiff's employ to
quit their work against their will,— and yet
there is no law In the land to protect them.
injunction in this case does not hinder the
\'5The
P defendants doing anything that they claim
//they have a right to do. They are free men.
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and have a right to quit the employ of plaintiffs whenever they see fit to do so, and no
one can prevent l^em; and whether their
act of quitting is wise or unwise, just or unjust. It is nobody's business but their own.
And they have a right to use fair persuaslonl'
v^
to induce others to join them in their quit-j
ting. But when fair persuasion is exhausted
they have no right to resort to force or I
threats
of violence.
The law will protect /
their freedom and their rights, but it will
not permit them to destroy its freedom and
rights of others.
The same law which guaranties the defendants in their right to quit
of the plaintiffs at their
the employment
own will and pleasure also guaranties the
other employes the right to remain at their
will and pleasure. These defendants arel
their own masters, but they are not the mas-/ vw
ters of the other employes, and not only are/
they not the masters of the other employes,)
but they are not even their guardians. There
is a maxim of our law to the effect that one
may exercise his own right as he pleases, i
provided that he does not thereby prevent!
another exercising his right as he pleases.!
This maxim or rale of law comes nearer
than any other rule in our law to the golden
rule of Divine authority; That which —soa—iB Qiiifi hflv r nnntlirr_d" unto' you, do you.
.even--so--«Bta_JUifim,2---WhiIst_^e__stH3[[^^,
forcement of the golden rule is beyond lEe
mandate of a human tribunal, yet courts of
equity, by injunction, do restrain raen who
are so disposed from so exercising thW own
rights as to destroy the rights of Athers.
The demurrer to the amended petit^n is
overruled."
The law applicable to the case is so cleSS-ly
stated In this opinion of the learned judge
that to add anything to it would be a work
of supererogation. We adopt it as the opinion of this court, and affirm the judgment
All concur.
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CRAWFORD
(28

N. B.

et al, v.

514,

128

TYRRELL

N. T. 341.)

Court of Appeals of New York.
Appeal from supreme

court,

Oct

6, 1891.

general term,

Secoria department.
Action by John

P. Crawford and others
against Martin B. Tyrrell, to restrain defendant from keeping a house of ill fame,
and to recover damages for injury sustainJudgment
ed.
for plaintiffs.
Defendant
appeals.
Affirmed.
Jas. & Thos. H. Troy, for appellant
fred B. Mudge, for respondents.

I
I

Al-

GRAY, J. In this action, -which was
brought to restrain the defendant from keeping a house of ill fame and from using his
premises as an assignation house, and to recover damages
for injuries sustained, the
trial court found as facts that the house, as
maintained by defendant, was a resort for
prostitutes and licentious men, and that the
persons occupying rooms acted in a boisterous and noisy manner,
and indecently exposed their persons at the windows, "whereby the use and occupation of the plaintiffs'
premises have been interfered with and rendered uncomfortable, and whereby the occupants of the plaintiffs' premises have been
annoyed
and seriously disturbed." Such a
finding -was amply justified by the evidence,
and, indeed, it is not discussed by the appellant; but he argues that the plaintiffs
could not maintain a civil action of this nature, inasmuch as the damage they suffered
was a damage common to the whole commimity, and not special to them. If that
position had been sustained by the facts, I
do not doubt but that it would have been the
duty of the trial judge to have denied the
relief prayed for. The rule of law requires
of him who complains of his neighbor's use
of his property, and seeks for redress and to
restrain him from such use, that he should
sliow that a substantive injury to property is
committed.
The mere fact of a business being carried on which may be shown to be
immoral, and, therefore,
prejudicial to the
character of the neighborhood,
furnishes of
itself no ground for equitable interference at
the suit of a private person; and, though the
use of property may be unlawful or unreasonable, unless special damage can be' shown,
a neighboring property owner cannot base
thereupon any private right of action.
It is
for the public authorities, acting in the common interest, to interfere for the suppression
of the common nuisance.
See Francis v.
Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. 152. If the business
complained of is a lawful one, the legal

question presented In a civil action for private damage is whether the business is reasonably conducted,
and whether,
as conducted, it is one which is obnoxious and hurtful to adjoining property.
If the business is
unlawful, the complainant in a private action must show special damage, by which
the legitimate use of his adjoining property
has been interfered with, or its occupation
rendered unfit or uncomfortable.
That the
perpetrator of the nuisance Is amenable to
the provisions and penalties of the criminal
law is not an answer to an action against
him by a private person to recover for injury
sustained, and for an Injunction against the
continued use of his premises in a similar
manner.
The principle has been long settled
that the objection that the nuisance was a
common one is not available if it be shown
that special damage was suffered.
Rose v.
Miles, 4 Maule & S. 101; Rose v. Groves, 5
Man. & G. 613; Francis v. Schoellkopf, supra; Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9. One
who uses his property lawfully and reasonably, in a general legal sense, can do injury
to nobody.
In the full enjoyment of his
legal rights in and to his property the law
will not suffer a man to be restrained, but
his use of the property must be always such
as in no manner to invade the legal rights
The rights of each to the
of his neighbor.
enjoyment and use of their several properalways
ties should, In legal contemplation,
be equal.
the balance
is destroyed by
the act of one, the law gives a remedy in
damages, or equity will restrain. If the use
of a property is one which renders a neigh-

If

bor's occupation and enjoyment physically
uncomfortable, or which may be hurtful to
the health, as where trades are conducted
which are offensive by reason of odors, noises,
or other injurious or annoying features, a private

nuisance

is

deemed

to

be

established,

against which the protection of a court of
equity power may be invoked. In the present case the indecent conduct of the occupants of the defendant's house, and the noise
therefrom, inasmuch as they rendered the
plaintiffs' house unfit for comfortable or respectable occupation,
and unfit for the purposes it was intended for, were facts which
constituted a nuisance, and were sufficient
grounds for the maintenance of the action.
If it was a nuisance which affected the
and was the subject of
general neighborhood,
an indictment for its unlawful and immoral
features, the plaintiffs were none the less
entitled to their action for any Injury sustained, and to their equitable right to have
its continuance restrained. The judgment
appealed from should be affirmed, with costs^
All concur, except FINCH, J., absent
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WEINSTOOK,

LUBIN & 00.
(Nb. 18,375.)

t. MAEKS.

(42 Pac. 142, 109 Gal. 529.)
Supreme Court of California.

Oct. 12, 1895.

Department 1. Appeal from superior court,
Sacramento county; Matt F. Johnson, Judge.
Action by Weinstock, Lubin & Co., a corThere was a
poration, against H. Marks.
judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed in part
Johnson,
Holl & Dunn, for appellant
Johnson & Johnson, for resx>ondent

GAROUTTB, J. Plaintiff Is a «»rporatIon
carrying on a large clothing and dry-goods
Defendbusiness in the city of Sacramento.
ant is also a dealer in clothing of the same
general character, and Is carrying on business
in a building adjoining plalntifPs place of
business. The present action is one of injunction, and by its decree, among other things,
the court ordered defendant to. refrain from
further use of the name "Mechanical Store"
as the designation of his place of business,
and further decreed that defendant maintain
part of his store,
and place in a conspicuous
place on the outand also in a conspicuous
side or front thereof, a sign showing the proprietorship of his said store, in letters sufficiently large to be plainly observable by passers-by and customers entering therein.
Defendant appeals from the foregoing portions
of the judgment
The judgment is based upon certain findings of fact made by the trial court upon the
evidence offered at the trial, and no complaint is now heard that this evidence does
not fuUy support these findings. It therefore
follows that the merit of this appeal presents'
itself upon a consideration of those findings
and the decree based thereon.
These findings
of fact are fuU and in detail, and, for present
purposes, we deem it sufficient to state the
general tenor and effect of some of them, (1)
The court finds that on or about the 8th day
of October, 1874, H. Weinstock and D. Lubin
entered into a copartnership imder the firm
name and style of Weinstock & Lubin, of the
city of Sacramento,
and, as such partners,
engaged in the business of dealing in wearing
apparel for men, women, and children, and
that said Weinstock & Lubin selected as the
name of their place of business "Mechanics'
Store," and designated the same by that appeUatlon, by which name their said store
thenceforth
was continually knovm; that, in
the management and conduct of their business,
they fixed a price upon each and every article carried by them In the stock of said store,
and marked the said prices In figures upon
each article, and sold such articles at the
prices so marked, and never deviated therefrom; and they advertised the said method
of doing business extensively throughout the
entire Pacific coast by means of newspapers,
etc., by means whereof their said method of
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doing business became widely known to the
trade and public throughout the entire Pacific
coast, and by reason whereof it became and
was well knovsm to the trade and public in
California and the other states and territories
of the Pacific coast that at the store of said
Weinstock & Lubin only one price was charged for goods sold therein, and that no deviation from said price was permitted.
(2) That,
by care, attention, skill, and strict adherence
to business and the rules as aforesaid,
this
plaintiff has materially increased the volume
and importance and value of said business,
and enhanced the good will thereof, and the
said plaintiff has established for the said store
and business throughout the said states and territories a wide and honorable reputation, and
thereby said business has become extensive
and valuable and profitable,
and the public have become accustomed to plaintiff's said
method of doing business, and have been induced to rely, and do rely, upon the good faith
of the plaintiff in managing and conducting
its business in the manner aforesaid, and by
reason thereof have been induced to bestow
and do bestow upon the plaintiff their custom,
trade, patronage, and business.
(3) That on
or about 1885 the defendant,
who had previously been engaged in business elsewhere,
and was without any established reputation
of his own, and whose business was unknown
to the trade and general public, removed his
business from the place he then occupied to
the premises on the east of and near the
premises of this plaintiff; and the defendant
then and there engaged In a similair line of
trade as this plaintiff, and ever since then he
has maintained and conducted, and stiU maintains and conducts, the said store at said
place, and carries on the said business therein;
and Tie named his store in the year 1887 or

thereabouts the "Mechanical Store." (4) Thai
the defendant, well knovnng the foregoing
facts, and contriving, intending,
and designing fraudulently to injure this plaintiff, and
to obtain undue advantage of plaintiff, and
to deprive the plaintiff of its business, and
fraudulently and unlawfully to increase his
own business, and to pirate and make use of
and appropriate to himself the good will of
the plaintiff's business, and the said reputation and honorable esteem and confidence that
the plaintiff enjoyed in the minds of the people of the Pacific coast, and in order to create
confusion In the public mind, and to take advantage of the standing that the plaintiff by
its aforesaid acts had acquired in said territory, and fraudulently designing to deceive
the public and people Intending to trade with
the plaintiff, and to divert the custom of the
plaintiff to himself, and to deprive the plaintiff of its customers and of the trade, and to
Induce the people to trade with the defendant under the belief that they were trading
with the plaintiff, and for the purpose of deceiving plaintiff's customers and persons intending to trade with plaintiff into believing
that the defendant's store was that of the
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plaintiff, ana thereby Inducing them to enter
to trade with said
said store of defendant
defendant, to his profit, and in order to carry
out his fraudulent and corrupt designs as
aforesaid,— the defendant has persistently carried out a system of deceit and misrepresentations concemiafi Ms store and its ownership,
in connection with plaintiff's store and business, as follows: That in 1891 plaintiff, at Its
place of business, erected a store, the front
of which is of peculiar architecture, containing arches and alcoves, of which there was
none other similar in the city of Sacramento;
Ithat afterwards the defendant, at his said
\place of business, and adjoining plaintiffs
ptore, erected a building which, so far as the
st or lower story is concerned, was and Is
bimilar in architecture in every respect to the
^tore of plaintiff, so much so that passers-by
vere liable to go Into the store of defendant
thinking that they were entering the store of
plaintiff, and that customers of plaintiff in
many instances did so enter the store of defendant thinking they were in the store of
plaintiff; that defendant had no sign inside
of his store or on the outside of his store by
which customers could for themselves ascertain the true proprietorship thereof; that the
building exactly
erection of the defendant's
the same as plaintiff's building in every particular, and the adoption of the use of the
words "Mechanical Store," and the absence
of any name or sign upon or in defendant's
store designating the true proprietorship of
store, were all done by the dedefendant's
fendant for the purpose of deceiving the public, and more especially plaintiff's customers,
and enticing and pirating and securing the
patronage of said customers from plaintiff to
defendant (5) That, by the aforesaid means
the defendant has diverted from the plaintiff
a large part of plaintiff's trade and custom;
has induced many persons to trade with the
defendant who otherwise would have traded
with the plaintiff; has sold large quantities
of goods in his said store to persons who, but
for said acts of defendant, would have purchased said goods of the plaintiff; has deprived the plaintiff of a large share of its legitimate profits; has injured the business and
reputation of the plaintiff; has impau-ed the
confidence of the public in the plaintiff and its
method of doing business;
and has deprived
the plaintiff of a large number of its customers and patrons.

The foregoing chapter of facts makes interesting reading, and we first turn our attention to that portion of the judgment restraining defendant from the further use of
the words "Mechanical Store" as a designation of his place of business. We see but
little difficulty in arriving at a conclusion
upon this branch of the case. Defendant
assails the judgment in this pai-ticular with
but a single weapon.
He insists that the
words "Mechanics' Store" are not the subject of trade-mark, and that, therefore, plaintiff can have no exclusive right to them.

As we view the picture

presented

by

the

findings of fact, the question as to what
may or may not be the subject of trade-mark
Is not the problem to be solved. That these
words are of a kind that may be used as a
trade-name
we have no doubt, and, having
established that fact, we are required to
pursue the investigation no further. That
certain names and designations
which may
not become technical or specific trade-marks
may become the names of articles or of
places
of business, and thereby the use
thereof receive the protection of the law,
cannot be doubted, for the cases everywhere
recognize that fact. The learned judge said
In Lee v. Haley, 5 Ch. App. 155: "I quite
agree
that they [the plaintiffs] have no
property right in the name, but the principle upon which the cases on this subject
proceed is not that there Is projmrty In the
word, but that it Is a fraud on a person who
has established a trade, and carried it on under a given name, that some other person
should assume the same name, or the same
name with a slight alteration, in such a way
as to induce persons to deal with him In the
belief that they are dealing with the person
who has given a reputation to the name."
A similar doctrine is declared in Manufacturing Co. V. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226, and also in the
late case of Coats v. Thread Co., 149 TJ. S. 562,
This court said in Pierce v.
13 Sup. Ct 966.
Guittard, 68 Cal. 71. 8 Pac. 645: "We are
of opinion that it is not necessary to decide whether the plaintiff's label, with the
accompanying words and devices, constituted
a trade-mark, and, as such, the exclusive
property of the plaintiff, for the reason that
it is a fraud on a person who has established
a business for his goods, and carries it on
under a given name or with a particular
mark, for some other person to assume the
same name or mark, or the same with a
slight alteration, in such a way as to induce
persons to deal with him in the belief that
they are dealing with a person who has
given a reputation to that name or mark."
The same general principle is also recognized
and approved in Schmidt v. Brieg, 100 Cal.
672, 35 Pac. 623.
While in these two cases
the fact appears that the defendants were
selling an inferior article, and thereby deceiving and defrauding the public, it is not
apparent that such fact was a necessary eleNeither do
ment in pointing the judgment.
we consider It so upon principle; and in cases
without number, restraining defendants from
trespassing upon the good will of plaintiff's
business, such fact was an element foreign
to the litigation. It may be said that the
adjudged cases for relief are based solely
upon the ground of loss and damage to the
tradesman's business, by unlawful competition. In Levy v. Walker, Cox, Man. TradeMark Cas. No. 639, the learned judge declared: "The court Interferes sole^ for the
purpose of protecting the owner of a trade
or business from a fraudulent invasion of
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that business by somebody else. It does not
interfere to prevent the -world outside from
being misled into anything."
While our statutes attempt to deal with
trade-marks, and provide for the filhig thereof with the secretary of state, with accompanying affidavits, etc., yet trade- names are
e qugJUy p rotected upon analogous'''princ'lple3
oIlaw!""35id that the words ''Mechanics*
S!Me**"lnay
be made a trade-name, and the
user thereof become entitled under the law
to protection from pirates preying upon the
Bea of commercial trade, we have no doubt.
W e thlnkjth e defendant should b g_restralned
from tne
^'^M^ jyprfls ^^eclianical
Store.*'' Th'e' court has declared tfie fact to
be,-''SBa it is not challenged by defendant,
that these words were used as a designation
of his store for the purpose of deceiving the
public, and especially plaintiff's customers,
and thereby securing the advantages and
benefits of the good wlU of plaintiff's business. To say that such conduct upon the
part of defendant is unfair business competition is to state the fact in the mildest
In Celluloid Manuf'g Co. v. Celloterms.
nite Manuf'g Co., 32 Fed. 97, Justice Bradley, of the supreme court of the United
States, in speaking to the question of similarity in name, said: "It was not identical
with the plaintiff's name. That would be
too gross an Invasion of the complainant's
rights. Similari ty , not id entity, is the usual
re eourse . when one party see KS to oenffif
hlms^ byT Se gooSTame 'STSnotner. WBaF
'^milarity is^suffcient to effect the "oBject has
to be determined in each case by its circumWe may say, generally, that a simstances.
ilarity which would be likely to deceive or
mislead an ordinary unsuspecting customer,
is obnoxious to the law." In this case the
trial court determined that there was a sufficient similarity In the names to deceive the
pubUc;
that the defendant adopted the
name for the purpose of deceiving the public and securing plaintiff's business; and
that such results had followed.
These things
being true, the decree must go against him.
The remaining branch of the case presents
a novel and original proposition of. law.
In
its facts we apprehend no case like it can be
found, either in this country or England.
The decree orders the defendant to place,
both upon the outside and inside of his store,
a sign, plainly legible to customers and passers-by,
indicating his proprietorship;
and,
while the power of the court to issue mandatory Injunctions In many cases must be conceded, yet cases where such power has been
exercised have generally involved matters of
nuisance, or at least cases where courts have
ordered the subject-matter of the litigation
to be placed in its original condition; as, for
instance, the removing of obstructions to ancient lights. But let us for a moment turn
our attention to the facts of this case. The
store of plaintiff was known as the "Mechanics' Store." By various kinds of advertising,
H.& B.E<}.(2d BM.)— 50
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and attention, honesty, and skill In the cao^
duct of the business. It Increased the volume
thereof and enhanced
its good will, and
throughout the Pacific coast established for
It a wide and honorable reputation as a fair
and reliable house with whichi to deal.
Plaintiff erected a store building of peculiar

architecture, there being none like it in the
city of Saa-amento;
and defendant thereupon
erected a store building, immediately adjoining that of plaintiff's, in every respect of similar architecture. It further appears that defendant erected this particular kind of building for the purpose of deceiving the public,
and securing the patronage of plaintiffs customers; and for the same purpose he refrained from placing any sign in or upon the
buUding Indicating the proprietorship of the
business,
or designating it In any way so
that it might be distinguished from the store
of plaintiff. And, by reason of these acts of
defendant, many of plaintiff's customers were
deceived into purchasing goods in defendant's
store, believing that they were trading In
plaintiff's store; and defendant thus diverted
from the plaintiff a large part of its trade
and custom, and thereby Injured its business
and curtailed the value of its good will. Upon this bald statement of facts, it caimot be
gainsaid that defendant has done the plaintiff wrong; _and_it_Js^^d that f or every ^
wt08gjthere_is^a_remedyr~The8e'^acts
ceF
talnly indicate a case of unlawful business
competition, and courts of equity have ever
been ready to declare such things odious.
It
Is strange If plaintiff may be deprived of the
fruits of a long course of honest and fair
dealing In business by such wicked contrivances, and, upon appeal to the courts for relief, should be told there was no relief. This
cannot be so, for the whole law of trademarks, trade-names,
apetc., is recognized,
proved, and enforced for the very purpose of
protecting the honest tradesman from a like
loss and damage to that which threatens this
plaintiff;
and the fact that the question |
'
comes to us in an entirely new guise, and
that the schemer has concocted a kind of deception heretofore unheard of in legal jurisprudence, is no reason why equity is either
It
unable or unwilling to deal with him.
has been said by some judge or law writer
that "no fixed rules can be established upon
which to deal with fraud, for, were courts
of equity to once declare rules prescribing the
limitations of their power In dealing with it,
the jurisdiction would be perpetually cramped and eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive."
By device, defendant is defrauding plaintiff
of its business.
He is stealing Its good wUl,
—a most valuable property,—only secured aft- /
er years of honest dealing and large eipendi- j
tures of money; and equity would be impotent, indeed, if it could contrive no remedy
for such a wrong.
The fundamental principle underlying this
entire branch of the law is that no man has
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the right to sell his goods as the goods of a
rival trader. Mr. Browne, in his work upon
Trade-Marks, declares the wrong to be, "not
in imitating a symbol, device, or fancy name,
for any such act may not involve the slightest turpitude; the wrong consists in unfair
means to obtain from a person the fruits of
his own ingenuity or industry,— an injustice
that is in direct transgression of the deca»
•
•
logue, 'Thou Shalt not covet
anyAthing that Is thy neighbor's.'
The most detestable kind of fraud underlies the filching
I
/ pf another's good name. In connection
with
'
We think the principle -may be
pafllcklng."
broadly stated that when one tradesman resorts to the use of any artifice or contrivance
for the purpose of representing his goods or
his business as the goods or business -of a
rival tradesman, thereby deceiving the people
by causing them to trade with him when
they Intended to and would have otherwise
traded with his rival, a fraud Is committed,
—a fraud which a court of equity will not allow to thrive. In Howard v. Henrlques, 3
Sanf. 725, the court, In speaking of the competitor In business, said: "He must not by
any deceitful or other practice impose on the
public, and he must not by dressing himself in
another man's garments, and by assuming
another man's name, endeavor to derive
that man of his own ' Individuality and of
the gains to which by his industry and skill
he is fairly entitled."
It may well be said
that the defendant, by duplicating plaintiff's
building, with Its peculiar architecture and
Immediately adjoining, entering into the
same line of business, with no mark of identification upon his store, has dressed himself
In plaintiff's garments; and, having so dressed himself with a fraudulent Intent, equity
will exert Itself to reach the fraud In some
way -'^'In 'the~leading case of Liee~vr Haley,'
supra, the whole question Is condensed by
the final conclusion of the court Into the
principle of law "that It Is a fraud on the
part of a defendant to set up a business under such a designation as is calculated to
lead and does lead other people to suppose
that his business is the business of another
person." If the same evil results are accomplished by the acts practiced by this deby
fendant which would be accomplished
an adoption of plaintiff's name, why should
equity smile upon the one practice and frown
upon the other? Upon what principle of law
can a court of equity say, "If you cheat and
defraud your competitor In business by taking his name, the court wiU give relief
against you, but, if you cheat and defraud
him by assuming a disguise of a different
your acts are beyond the law?"
character,
Equity will not concern itself about the
means by which fraud is done. It is the re.
suits aristQg from the means— it is the fraud
itself— with which it deals.
The foregoing principles of law do not apply alone to the protection of parties having
trade-marks
and trade-names.
They reach

away beyond that, and
where fraud Is practiced
the trade of a rival dealer;
as many and as various

apply to all cases
by one In securing
and these ways are
as the ingenuity of
the dishonest schemer can invent
In Glenny
V. Smith, reported in the Jurist of 1865 (page
965), the Cburt held:
"Where a tradesman, in
addition to his own name upon his shop front,
placed upon his sunblind and upon his brass
plate the words 'From Thresher & Glenny' (in
whose employment he had been), the court, being of opinion that this was done In such a
way as to be likely to mislead, and there being
evidence that persons had been actually misled,
granted an Injunction to restrain such a use
of the name of the firm Ttiresher & Glenny."
In Knott V. Morgan, 2 Keen, 213, the "London Conveyance Company" had its omnibuses
painted green, and its servants clothed In the
same colors. Another adopted the same name,
and likewise Its vehicles were so painted and
its servants so clothed.
It was conceded that
plaintiff could have no exclusive propertynght
in any "ftf these things, buttfie coufTTSsuea "

itsTSjIJneEicSniseiaMng f liarpIainHSrBM-"ar
upon this court to restrain the defendant from fraudulently using precisely the
same words and devices which they have taken for the purpose of distinguishing their property, and thereby depriving them of the fair
profits of theh: business by attracting custom
on the false representation that carriages really

flghttoeall

the defendant's belong to and are under the
management of the plaintiffs."
The author,
by a note, approves the doctrine here declared,
saying: "There was an obvious attempt to
trade upon the plaintiff's reputation,— a constructive fraud,— coupled with pecuniary loss,
which was made the ground for the issuance
of a broad Injunction." The same principle is
reiterated by the same learned judge in Croft
V. Day, 7 Beav. 84, in the following words:
"It has been very correctly said that the principle of these cases is this: Tliat no man has a
right to sell his own goods as the goods of another.
You may express the same principle In
a different form, and say that no man has a
right to dress himself in colors, or adopt and
bear symbols to which he has no peculiar or
exclusive right, and thereby personate another
person, for the purpose of Inducing the public
to suppose either that he Is that other person
or that he is connected with and selling the
manufacture of such other person while he is
really selling his own.
It Is perfectly manifest that to do these things is to commit a
fraud, and a very gross fraud."
In the very
recent case of Coats v. Thread Co., 149 U. S._
566, 13 Sup. Ct. 966, the court said:
"There
can be no question of the soundness of the
plaintiff's proposition that, irrespective of the
technical question of trade-mark,
the defendants have no right to dress their goods up In
such manner as to deceive an intending purchaser, and Induce him to believe he is buying those ot the plaintiffs. • • • They have
no right by imitative devices to beguile the
public into buying their wares under the im-
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decision of the trial court In effect ordered defendant to place signs both Inside and outside
his building, showing to the world the proprietorship thereof.
We think this decree holds |
defendant to a rule too strict, in that it requires the proprietorship of tie store to be
shown. In this particular we thinls the decree
should be modified so as to require that the
defendant. In the conduct of this business, shall
distinguish hiSrffM''^ business from that in
which the plaintiff is carrying on its business,
in some mode or form that shall beta sufficient
Indication to the public that it is a different
place of business from that of the plaintiff.
For the foregoing reascm, the judgment In this
respect only Is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the trial court to modify
the same, as heretofore suggested; and thereupon It Is ordered that said judgment stand
Appellant is to pay the costs of this
affirmed.
appeaL

We concur:

i^Sl

HARRISON, J.; VAN FLEET,

'^iJUj^^<^-^J<

«t.

presslan they are buyliig those of their rivals."
To the same point, see System Co. v. Le BoutUlier (Super. Ct.) 24 N. Y. Supp. 890; Appolinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18; Burgess
3 De Gex, M. & G. 896; Von
V. Burgess,
Mumm V. Frash, 56 B'ed. 830.
Having decided that defendant's acts constitute a fraud upon plaintiff, and that a court
of equity will administer relief, the question
then presents Itself, what shall he the form of
How may the court reach the
the decree.'
wrong Y The defendant had the right to erect
his building, and erect it in any style of architecture his fancy might dictate. He had the
right to erect It in the particular locality where
it was erected. He had the right there to conduct a business similar to that of plaintiff.
He had a right to do all these things, for, of
themselves, they did not offend against equity;
but when they were done with a fraudulent
intent, when they were done for the purpose
of tolling away the customers of plaintiff, by
a deception, a fraud is practicetd, and equity
will do what it can to right the wrong. The
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PURVINES

et al. v.

(37 N. E. 705, 151

HARRISON.
III. 219.)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1894.
Sangamon county.
Bill by Frances A. Harrison against FranComplainant obces Purvines and others.
tained a decree. Defendants bring error.
Affirmed.

Error to circuit

court,

Gonkling & Grout, for plaintiffs in error.
Wm. J. Butler and Connolly & Mather, for
defendant in error.

MAGEUDER, J. This Is a biU ffied on
July 18, 1890, by the defendant in error, Frances A. Harrison,

the mother of Peyton Asbury Purvines, deceased, by a former husband, against Frances Purvines, the minor
daughter and only child of said Peyton Asbury Purvines, deceased; Samuel H. Claspill,
the guardian of said minor; Alfred B. Purvines, the administrator of said deceased;
and Edward Wyatt, a tenant occupying the
premises hereinafter referred to imder a lease
from the complainant in the bill. The bill is
filed for the purpose of reforming a deed of
about 60 acres of land, executed by the defendant in error to her son, said Peyton A.
Pmrvines, in his lifetime.
The deed sought
to be reformed bears date January 31, 1889,
was aclmowledged August 30, 1889, and recorded on September 2, 1889.
It is a warranty deed, and conveys about 60 acres of
land in Sangamon county to the grantee.
The bill alleges that it was the intention of
the complainant and her deceased son to insert words in the deed reserving to her a
life estate in the land, so that she could have
the use of it, and the rents from it, as long
as she lived; but that, by the mutual mistake ot the parties to the deed, and by an
oversight on the part of the scrivena: who
drew it, such reservation was unintentionally
omitted from the deed.
The prayer of the
bill is that the deed be reformed by inserting therein a reservation of the life estate to
the grantor.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor, who answered; and
answers denying the allegations of the biU
were filed by said guardian and tenant, to
which replications were filed.
After proofs
taken and hearings had, the circuit court
rendered a decree finding the allegations of
the biU to be true, and directing that the
deed be reformed in the respect mentioned,
and that such reformation take effect as of
the date of the deed, and that the rents and
profits of the land after that date should belong to the complainant.
Evidence was introduced showing that an
inquisition as to the insanity of the complainant was had in the county coxurt of said county, and a verdict of the jury was retiu^ed
therein on January 25, 1892, finding her tot)e
an insane person; and thereafter her insanity was suggested in the present suit, and one
B. F. Irwin was appointed to prosecute the
same as next friend.
Application had beea

previously made to the court, In March, 1890,
for the appointment of a conservator for defendant in error as a distracted person, but
upon the trial of the Issue whether she was
a distracted person verdict had been returned
in her favor. Some evidence was introduced
tending to show that when she made the deed
her mind had begun to fail, and she showed
signs of absent-mindedness
not theretofore
noticeable in her. Her son, Peyton A. Purvines, had been divorced from his wife before he died, and his habits up to the time of
his death were those of a very intemperate
man.
There is no evidence, however, that he
practiced any fraud upon his mother in order
to obtain the deed. He lived vrith her at
that time upon a farm of 80 acres, owned by
her, and the consideration as expressed in the
deed is "one dollar, and natural love and affection." He died unmarried and intestate
on February 22, 1890, leaving, as his only
child and heir at law, the minor plaintiff in
error, Frances Purvines.
After a careful examinatiog.fiJ_the evidence, we ilijSE'that Both
parties^xecutea~the deed" under a common
or mutual mistake, and did what neither of
them intended to do.
Warrick v. Smith, 137m. 504j 27 N. E. 709. To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the
ground of mistake, it is necessary — Firs t , that
the mistake s hould be one of ^act, and not of
::EsnSreM vT Sfdv^lS m. lOe); second,
that the mistake should ■b e proved by clear
afld "BonvhicifflgrMiaSnce
^"Pom. "Eq. Jur.
862); third, that the mistake s hould be mutual and common to""bo<£"i)arti!es"to the'instr^
inent (Sutherland t." Sutherland. 69 111. 481)7
A mistake of law Is an erroneous conclusion
as to the legal effect 6f known facts.
Hurd
V. Hall, 12 Wis. 113.
The construction of
words is a matter of law. Sibert v. McAvoy,
supra.
Where parties Instructed an officer
to prepare a quitclaim deed for their execution, but he drew a deed containing language
which amounted in law to a covenant of title
in fee, and they signed the deed knowing that
such language was in it, they were held to
have been mistaken in the law,— that is to
say, in the legal effect of the language used,—
and in the legal consequences of retaining
such language in the deed. Gordere v. Downing, 18 HI. 492. Mistake of fact has been defined to be a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person
making the mistake, and consisting in an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact,
past or present, material to the contract, or
belief in the present existence of a thing ma^
terial to the contract which does not exist, or
in the past existence of a thing which has not
existed.
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 839.
It is manifest that the mistake in the present case was
one of fact, and not one of law, because it
had reference to the accidental omission from
the deed of words which were intended to ba
inserted ther^n; that Is to say, words reserving to the grantor a life interest
In Sibert
v. McAvoy, supra, we said: "It is where par-
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intended to Insert words in a contract
which were by accident omitted that equity
can reform the contract by inserting them.
* * * The insertion of words is a matter
of fact It is for mistaJ^es of fact alone
Nor can
that contracts may be reformed."
it be said in this case that the mistake occurred on account of any want of reasonable
diligence to ascertain the facts, or on accoimt
of any neglect, amounting to a violation of
Where
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 856.
legal duty.
the relation of the parties is one of confidence, such as that which existed here between mother and son, and where a party
executing the contract has a failing or weak
mind arising from suffering or old age, the
same degree of vigilance and care is not exor repected or required as is expected
quired in the ordinary dealings of men with
Day v. Day, 84 N. O. 408. In
one another.
Day V. Day, supra, a deaf and aged father
made a deed to his son, in whom he reposed
confidence, conveying a tract of land in fee,
but omitting, either by mistake or contrivance of the son, under whose direction the
deed was drawn, to reserve a life estate to
the grantor; and It was held that an equity
arose in favor of the father to have such instrument reformed in accordance with the
original intention of the parties. Counsel for
plaintiffs in error daim that the evidence
does not show want of mental capacity in the
defendant in error, or want of capacity on
her part to understand the ordinary affairs
of life. This may be true. The proof shows
merely a weakening of the mental powers,
growing out of domestic trouble, and grief
for the recent death of her aged parents.
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This proof was not Introduced for the pur-

of showing such insanity as would
avoid the deed; but in a proceeding to reform the deed it tended, in connection with
the relations of the parties and other attending circumstances, to excuse any apparent
want of care in examining the phraseology of
the deed. We tJiink that the proof of a
mutuaLj^take was clear and convincing.
The burden of proof was up6n~the complainant, but the defendants offered no testlmohy
'whatever to contradict her witness. Some
time after the deed was executed the deceased applied for a loan of money to be secured by mortgage upon his interest In the
land. He then discovered for the first time
that his mother's life estate had not been reserved in the deed. There is abundant evidence, given by quite a number of witnesses,
that he admitted the mistake, and stated that
it was the intention and agreement to retain
a life estate for her in the deed, and that he
intended to correct the mistake.
He died,
however, without doing so. These dedarations, made many times, and challenged by
no opposing evidence, were admissions against
his own interest. It is well settled that parol
proof may be received to show a mistake in
a written instrument. McLennan v. Johnston, 60 m. 306.
For the reasons here stated, and deeming it unnecessary to enter into
a detailed discussion of the evidence, we
think that the decree of the drcuit court was
correct, and it is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
pose

PHILLIPS, X, having heard this case in
the circuit court; took no part here.
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Appeal from an order of tlie general term
the supreme court in tlie Sixtli district,
affirming a judgment of tlie special term in fa; vor of the plaintiff.
The action was brought for the reformation
S
of a deed executed by the plaintiff, he claiming that a reservation of certain timber had
^
been omitted, through mistake on his part;
and also for an accounting by the defendant
for timber taken from the premises conveyed.
An account was ordered to ascertain the
value of the lumber taken since March 10,
1851.
The referee found the value at $2,-

of

'

041.72.

Upon the coming in of the referee's report.
Judgment was entered for the plaintiff that
the deed be reformed and corrected, and that
he have judgment for the value of the timber removed by the defendant.
This judgment was affirmed by the general term in the
Sixth district, and the defendant appeals to
the court of appeals.
The facts appear from
the opinion of the court.

E. H. Benn, for appellant
for respondent
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It will

sider in detail the fifteen points presented by
the appellant, and so ably argued by his
counsel.
The discussion of a few of them wiU
settle principles that may serve to decide the
case.

The complaint. In substance, alleged that on
the 28th of May, 1846, the plaintiff was the
owner of one hundred and ten acres of land,
being lot No. 4; that on that day he sold the
same by executory contract, with the timber
thereon, to T. & T. Trevor, for $17 per acre.
That on the 7th day of December, 1846, he
was the owner of lot No. 5, containing one
hundred and forty-one acres, and then entered
into an agreement with the same parties, by
which they imdertook to cut the timber standing thereon, manufacture the same into boards
and planks, and to give the plaintiff one-half

\
,

of the lumber thus manufactured.
Certain
other details were provided, which it is not
necessary to specify. At the same time, the
plaintiff entered Into an executory contract
with the same persons, for the sale of the one
hundred and forty-one acres, at $4 per acre.That these two pieces of land were of the
same value; that the timber growing on the
latter piece was of the value of $5,000, and
that such timber, in the understanding of
the parties, was reserved to the plaintiff by
the manufacturing contract mentioned,
and
that the price of $4 per acre was for the land
simply, the timber reserved to the plaintiff.
That after proceeding for some time in the
manufacture of the lumber, the purchasers
became embarrassed,
and the defendant took
their place in the contract, and without new

further negotiations, a calculation was
made of their payments, the balance found
due paid by the defendant and an absolute
deed of the two pieces of land, without reservation of the timber, made by the plaintiff
to the defendant

That the defendant well knew all of the
facts in the complaint recited.
The plamtiff
then avers "that through and by mistake he
failed to insert in the said last-mentioned deed
(of the one hundred and forty-one acres) any
reservation of the timber mentioned and embraced in the contract secondly above mentioned;" and also avers demand and refusal
to amend. The prayer Is that the deed may
be corrected, so as to be made to contain a
reservation of the timber, and that the plaintiff may have an accounting as to the timber
taken and removed by the defendant.
The judge found that there was an error
and mistake on the part of the plaintiff, as
averred by him. He found also that there i
was no mistake on the part of the defendant,
but that he weU. understood the plaintiff's error. He knew that the timber was not reserved, and he knew that the plaintiff supposed and understood
that it was reserved.
He received the deed, failing to correct the
plaintiff's error, but Intending to reap the
profits of it. He knew that he received of
the plaintiff's estate $4,000 or $5,000 more
than the plaintiff intended to give him, or than
he supposed he had given him. The mistake
was unilateral; on the part of the plaintiff
only. On the part of the defendant there was
no mistake, but something worse.
It was a
fraud, as palpable as if he had made afBrmative representations
to induce the error; as
gross as if he had put his hands in the plaintiff's pocket and feloniously abstracted his
money.
1 Story, Bq. Jur. §§ 187, 137, 140, 147,
152, 153, 167, 168, 191, 214r-217; Waldron v.
Stevens, 12 Wend. 100; Wiswall v. Hall, 3
Paige, 313; HiU v. Gray, 1 Starkie, 434; 2
B. O. L. 167.
The point here arises, can there be a judg-H
ment to reform the contract, there not being U
a mutual error, but error on one part and I
fraud on the other?
It is laid down in many authorities reported and elementary works, that there must be
a mutual error, to authorize this interposition
of a court of equity.
See Story, Bq. Jur.
§ 155; Story v. Conger, 30 N. Y. 673; Nevius
V. Dunlap, 33 N. Y. 676; Lyman v. United
States Ins. Co., 17 Johns. 376. The cases where
this general statement Is made are very numerous, and it is well said that to exercise this
power, where one party only has been in error
and the other has correctly understood it
would be making a new contract for the parties, and would be doing injustice to the party
who made no mistake.
On this point two dis1st Those cases
tinctions may be noticed.
win be foimd to have In them the element of
the honesty on the part of the one correctly
understanding the contract. Where two parties enter into a contract, and an error la
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claimed by one party to exist on an important
point, which Is claimed to be correct by the
other party, It cannot be amended, as against
the party correctly understanding it, he acting
in good faith, and supposing the other to have
understood the contract as he did. This rule
does not apply where there is fraud. Either
fraud or mutual mistake wiU authorize the
See authorities supra; De PeyI reformation.
'
ster V. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 582; and Gillespie
V. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585; Barlow v. Scott,
24 N. Y. 40; Rider v. Powell, 28 N. Y. 310.
In his supplementary points the appellant expressly concedes this proposition.
2. This is the consummation of an existing
contract, about the terms of which there was
This contract it was attempted
no dispute.
to perform. There has been a failure to perform it, by the misunderstanding, on the part
of the plaintiff, of the effect of the instrument
A ref, by which performance was attempted.
'
ormation is permitted in such case, although
; the mistake be not mutual.
See the cases before cited, and Coles v. Bowne, 10 Paige, 534.
The result of the cases justifies a reformation of a contract, when there is either a mutual mistake, that is, a mistake common to
both parties, or when there is fraud. In his
complaint, the plaintiff has simply stated the
facts on which he claims relief. After setting forth the facts, he adds, that by mistake,
he failed to insert in the deed a reservation of
the timber. He does not charge that it was a
mistake common to both parties. Nor does he
He gives no
charge it to have been a fraud.
The
name to the conduct of the defendant.
facts, as found by the referee, and the judgment rendered by him, are in conformity to
They estabthe aJlegations of the complaint
\■ lish, not a mutual or common error, but an
error on the part of the plaintiff and fraud on
the part of the defendant.
The defendant, by the judgment of the court
upon the facts, occupied the place of the original contractors and undertook to perform
their contract. This was the finding of the
judge, and the evidence, with the circumstanThe fraud was in
ces, justified this finding.
the deceitful performance. If the judgment of
the court below is carried out, he will not be
made a party to a new contract, which he
He did assume
would never have assumed.
He therefore became
the original contract
bound by it. When the court now compel him
to abandon his fraudulent contract, he is reHe has no
mitted to the original agreement.
ground therefore to say that by being convicted of a fraud, he is compelled to enter
into a new contract. Nor is he to be relieved
by the rule that a party seeking to be relieved
from fraud, must be ready, prompt and eager
When a party
in his demand for redress.
seeks to rescind a contract, on the ground of
fraud, he must undoubtedly be prompt and
ready in his disaffirmance. He has the elecI
If he elects the
1 tion to affirm or disaffirm.
He is not per1 latter he must do it at once.
advantages.
\ mitted to hesitate and balance
Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio, 69; Beers v. Hen-
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drlckson, 6 Rob. (N. T.) 54; Tomllnson v.
Miller, •42 N. Y. 517.
In the present case the party does not ask
to have the contract rescinded.
He does not
seek to have it declared void. On the contrary
he insists that it is valid. He asks that it
may read exactly as the parties originally
agreed, and that all its parts may be completely performed. In such case the rule is that
the party must show himself ready and eager
for its performance. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 776.
The plaintiff has given sufficient evidence of
his readiness and eagerness to perform. If
there has been an unreasonable delay in seeking relief, the court wUl refuse it Id., and 1
Fonbl. Eq. bk. 1, c. 6, § 2, note e. It is a
question of discretion in the court whether
under all the circumstances of time, repeated
applications and refusals, the condition,
knowledge, expectations and hopes of the parties, the relief should be granted.
There is no
positive or rigid rule, like that existing in the
case of an attempted rescission.
am satisfled with the decision on this point of the court
below, and the judge trying the cause. 1
Story, Eq. Jur. § 529; Bidwell v. Insurance
Co., 16 N. Y. 263.
The court having jurisdiction of the cause to
amend the contract, thereby acquired the right
incidentally to give relief in damages, or in
such mode as justice required. Rathbone v.
Warren, 10 Johns. 587; Kempshall v. Stone,
5 Johns. Ch. 193; Woodcock v. Bennett, 1
Cow. 711; Bidwell v. Insurance Co., 16 N.
Y. 263; Story, Eq. § 794; Rundle v. Allison,
34 N. Y. 180.
The defendant contends further, that no
damages can be recovered by the plaintiff for
timber that was cut more than six years before the commencement of the action. The
argument of the defendant's counsel is that
the reformation of the deed is merely a means
by which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the timber taken, and that its correction is simply a part of the evidence to authorize him thus to recover; that his claim
is therefore a legal one and cannot extend
back beyond six years. The authorities cited
by the defendant do not sustain this position.
The most plausible Is that of Borst v. Corey,
15 N. Y. 505, which was an action to enforce
in equity a lien for the unpaid purchase-money
of land. The court held that the action could
not be sustained, for the reason that the debt
sought to be enforced was barred by the statute of limitations. The debt they held to be
the principal, the lien the incident, and the
principal being ended the Incident could not
be enforced. At the same time the court con^
ceded that where a mortgage was given to sfri
cure the payment of a simple contract debt,\
the lapse of six years was no bar to an action s'
The authority of
to foreclose the mortgage.
Mayor v. Colgate, 12 N. Y. 140, was conced- •
ed, where an assessment was attempted to be
enforced more than six years after the assessIn the
ment had become due and payable.
present case the question is not what action
can be sustained after the deed is reformed,
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Dut what action could have been sustained be-

fore Its reformation? The reformation had
not occurred when the suit was commenced,
and the right of the parties was determined
by the unreformed deed. That deed conveyed
to the defendant without reservation, the one
hundred and forty-one acres In question. It
carried with It complete title to the trees.
The plaintiff could not have sustained an action for their conversion.
He would have
been told that defendant had a legal title. The
f reformation of the deed In the present case
is the principal and not the incident.
Dam'
ages are the incident, not the principal. It is
""
the title which the judgment of reformation
gives that warrants the claim for damages;
not the claim for damages that creates the
legal title. Complete justice and nothing more
is done by the judgment in this respect as It
stands.

The defendant also Insists that In the view
that the recovery against the defendant is
sustained upon the ground of fraud and not
of mutual mistake, the cause of action is barred in six years from the discovery of the
fraud. He further says that the judge has
expressly found as a fact that the cause of
action has not accrued within six years from
have looked
the commencement of the suit.
through the testimony carefully, and do not
find any evidence that the plaintiff discovered
upon him as early as
the fraud perpetrated
six years before the commencement of the
suit. He did undoubtedly discover his own
error soon after its occurrence, and applied
to the defendant's agents for its correction.
He says that "he had confidence In them and
expected all would have gone on as though it
had been reserved." In other words, he had
discovered his own mistake and believed It
to be a mutual mistake, which the defendant
would willingly rectify. He says further of
"He seemed willing to
the defendant's agent:
They proposed leaving it out.
do something.
They never told me could not have the timber. They always gave me to understand that
they would settle It in some way. They always gave me to understand that they would
do something about it. Neither of them ever
told me
should not hav€ so given the deed,
if I did not mean to part with the timber."
This evidence does not show a knowledge of
the fraud. It does not show the plaintiff's
'
knowledge that the defendant knew, when he
took it, that the deed conveyed the absolute
ownership of the trees, and that the plaintiff
was ignorant of that fact, but supposed the
trees were reserved, and that the defendant
failed to correct his error. It does not even
show that he supposed the defendant meant
to insist upon retaining the benefits of the error. It shows rather that the plaintiff was
constantly deluded with the idea that the mistake would be corrected.
The judge has not
found that the plaintiff discovered the fraud
within more than six years before suit brought,
and there was no evidence on which he could
have been justified in so finding.

I

I

I

I

When the cause of action accrued in this
Is a question of law. It was either
when the transaction occurred or when the
fraud was discovered.
The judge has found that the cause of action did not accrue within six years before
suit brought. He states, in his opinion, that
the action being to reform the contract, and
the accounting being incidental, the action '
falls under the ninety-seventh section of the
Code, which requires it to be brought within
He fixes the
ten years after action accrued.
occurrence
of the transaction as the time
from which by law the statute begins to i
'
run. The defendant now asks us to hold
this as a conclusive finding of fact, that the
fraud was discovered more than six years
This we cannot do.
before
suit brought
Upon the theory that the running of the
statute begins with the date of the occurrence more than six years had elapsed, and
such was the theory of the judge trying the
cause. On the theory that It runs from the
discovery of the fraud, there is no such finding, nor Is there evidence to prove it. All'
presumptions are in favor of the judgment,
and the contrary must be taken to be the
fact.
have thus considered the most important
of the questions raised by the appellant.
There are several other objections stated in
the points, which I have also examined.
They furnish no valid ground for asking a
reversal of the judgment
A majority of the court concur In the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. A
majority of the court do not concur with me
on the question of damages, and are of the
opinion that the recovery of damages for a
period exceeding six years prior to the comThe
mencement of the suit was erroneous.
judgment of the court will therefore be, that
the judgment of the general term be affirmed, without costs of the court of appeals to
either party, provided that the plaintiff shall, >
within thirty days after the entry of this order, serve on the defendant's attorney a ,
stipulation, deducting from the judgment of
April 6, 1863, the sum of $2,407.45 as of that '
If such stipulation be not served, then
date.
the judgment shall be reversed and a new
trial ordered, with costs to abide the event
In case the attorneys do not agree as to the
details of the judgment, the same can be settled before one of the commissioners.
case

I

I

cannot conEARL, O. (dissenting). As
cur with my brethren in this case, I will
briefly give the reasons for my dissent.
No mistake is alleged In the contracts, and
no reformation of them Is claimed. And under no allegations or proof could the contracts be reformed, as a cause of action, for
such purpose, would be barred by the statute of limitations.
If, as claimed by the plaintiff In his complaint, and by his counsel on the argument
before us, the deed was given in pursuance
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and In fulfillment of the contracts, then there
can be no reformation of the deed, as It Is

in precise conformity to the contracts. If
the two contracts of December 7, 1846, are
construed together, they must be read as if
embodied in one; and the timber is not reserved, and the contract does not provide for
any reservation in the deed.
The vendees
were to get out certain lumber upon shares,
The
and were to pay $4 per acre besides.
contract in reference to the lumber was a
binding contract and, if performed as the
parties contemplated, it would be fully performed before the deed was required to be
given; and such was manifestly the intention of the parties, and hence no provision
was made for any reservation in the deed.
The deed was given without any mention of
the lumber, and hence the only claim the
vendor could thereafter have, upon the lumber contract, was to sue for damages on account of its non-performance.
The only contract the defendant ever made
or Intended to make, as found by the referee,
He
is that which Is embodied in the deed.
never Intended or was willing to take a
deed with any reservation in it. What right
then has a court of equity to reform the deed,
so as to give him such a deed as he was
There was never a
never bound to take?
time when, by action for specific performance, he could have been compelled to take
a deed with a reservation, and the court has
Qo right to compel him to take such a deed
by the reformation of the one he did take.
If by fraud or mistake on his part, the
plaintiff was induced to give this deed, the
only relief he could have was to set aside
the deed; and to obtain this relief, it was
his duty, on the discovery of the fraud or
mistake, to proceed promptly and not ratify
the deed by taking the money on the note
given for the purchase-price, after he discovered the mistake or fraud.
As I understand the opinion In which my
brethren have concurred, it sustains the relief granted to the plaintiff, upon the ground
of fraud, and yet the complaint does not in
any way intimate even that the defendant
was guilty of any fraud, nor does It allege
that the defendant used any artifices to procure the deed to be drawn with the reservation omitted, or that he knew it was omitted.
The charge of fraud should have been distinctly made in the complaint, so that the defendant could have taken issue upon It.
And it does not appear that any claim was
made, at the trial, that the defendant was
guilty of fraud, and the case was manifestly
not tried upon any such theory. The judge
at special term did not put his decision upon
If he had, he would
the ground of fraud.
certainly have decided against the plaintiff,
under his finding as to the statute of limita"That within a month
tions, as follows:
said deed, the plainof
execution
after the
tiff discovered said mistake, and shortly
thereafter applied to the defendant to cor-
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rect the same, which he neglected and refused to do; but proceeded to cut large quantities of said timber and appropriate the
same to his own use; that the cause of action
for which this suit is brought has not accrued to the plaintiff within six years before
the commencement
of this suit."
The learned judge evidently proceeded and
granted reUef upon the ground that the scrivener made a mistake in drawing the deed,
and this was the ground upon which the general term placed its decision of affirmance.
The cause of action for the mistake was not
barred by the statute of limitations, because
the action was commenced within ten years
from the time the alleged mistake occurred.
A cause of action, for such a fraud as is
now alleged In this case. Is deemed to accrue,
when the aggrieved party discovers the facts
constituting the fraud, and it is barred in six
years from that time. Code, § 91. All the
fraud, if any, that was perpetrated in tliis
case was in procuring and taking the deed
without the reservation, and this was discovered, according to the finding of the judge,
more than nine years before the suit was
commenced, and hence I cannot be mistaken
In saying that relief was granted at Special
Term upon the ground of mistake alone, and
not of fraud.
And stiU further, the counsel for respondent in his argument before us, did not claim
to sustain the judgment below upon the
ground of fraud, but upon the ground of mistake alone.
Hence under all the circumstances I cannot
consent to uphold this judgment, or any part
of it, upon the ground of fraud, against the
decisions of both courts below, the claims of
plaintiff's counsel, and the explicit finding of
the judge at special term, that the cause of
action for fraud was barred by the statute of
It was the duty of the plaintiff
limitations.
to show that he discovered the fraud within
of the
six years before the commencement
suit, and there can be no pretense that he
gave. any evidence to show this.
I concur with my brethren In holding that
In any view of the case the plaintiff could recover only for timber cut within six years before the suit was commenced.

For affirmance, as modified: LOTT, C. C,
HUNT and LEONARD, CO.
For reversal: EARL and GRAY, CC. not

and

voting.

Judgment affirmed without costs to either
party in the court of appeals, provided the
plaintiff within thirty days after the entry
of this order, serves on the defendant's attorney a stipulation reducing the judgment
$2,407.45 and Interest from the date of the
judgment, April 6, 1863. If such stipulation
be not served, then the judgment is reversed
and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the
event.

Judgment

affirmed.
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TOWN OF VENICE v. W0013IIUFF.
(62 N. Y. 462.)

upon the title of the plaintiff" to real estate.
Under the chancery system, where a bill of
discovery was necessary to estaMish a deCourt of Appeals of New York. 1875.
fense, the court having acquired jurisdiction
Action by the Town of Venice against Dor- of the case for the purpose of discovery,
cas Ann WoodrufC and others for the cancelmight proceed and award relief, but this
lation of certain bonds. From a judgment of ^ound of jurisdiction no longer exlats. It is
the Supreme Court affirming a judgment for true that the jurisdiction of the court of
chancery has been asserted to decree the surdefendants entered on report of referee,
Affirmed.
plaintlfC appeals.
render of every instrument which ought not to
enforced, whether void at law or not, and
The bonds in question were issued by the Be
whether void from matter appearing on its
railroad commissioners and supervisors of the
face, or from matter which must be estabtown pursuant to the authority of Laws
by extrinsic proof. Hamilton v. Cumlished
1852, c. 375, to pay for stock of the Lake Onmings, 1 Johns. Ch. 520-522, 523. But Chantario, Auburn & New York Railroad Comcellor Kent in the case cited, in asserting this
pany. The assent of two-thirds of the taxjurisdiction recognizes the necessity of showpayers of the town, required by the act, was
ing strong grounds for the exercise of the
not obtained when the bonds were issued. A
power, and endeavors to reconcile the appafew of the bonds were sold for cash, but the
rently conflicting English authorities by adrest were transferred directly to the railroad verting
to the general principle that the exin payment of the stock subscribed for. Deercise of the power is to be regulated by
fide
holders
bonds
bona
of
the
fendants are
of
sound discretion, as the circumstances
directly delivered to the railroad.
the Individual case may dictate, and that a
RAPALLO, J. The referee has found that resort to equity, to be sustained, must be
all of the bonds, which the plaintiff seeks by expedient either because the Instrument Is
this action to have delivered up and can- liable to abuse from its negotiable nature;
celed, were made and issued without the or because the defense not arising on its
requisite consent of two-thirds of the tax face may be difficult or uncertain at law;
payers of the town. That fact, according to or from some other special circumstances
'"
peculiar to the case, and rendering a resort
the decisions of this court, rendered the bonds
And it Is now well
to equity highly proper.
void, even in the hands of bona fide holders.
Starin t. Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439; established that equity will not interpose to
People v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 114, 36 N. Y. 224. decree the cancellation of an instrument,
It was further held in these cases that the the invalidity of which appears upon its face.
burden of proving the requisite consent of Story, Eq. Jur., § 700, a.
There must exist some circimistance
esthe tax payers rested upon the party seeking
to enforce payment of the bonds, and that tablishing the necessity of a resort to equity,
the affidavit directed by the act under which to prevent an Injury which might be irreparable, and which equity alone is compethe bonds purported to be Issued, to be filed
tent to avert. If the mere fact that a deof
the
with the consent, was not evidence
requisite consent. It is therefore settled by fense exists to a written instrument were
the adjudications of this court that no re- sufficient to authorize an application to a
court of equity to decree its surrender and
covery can be had in an action upon these
bonds, without affirmative extrinsic proof of cancellation. It Is obvious that every conThe fact being found troversy in which the claim of either party
the requisite consent.
that such consent was not given, it is clear was evidenced by a writing could be drawn
to the equity side of the court, and tried in
that a perfect defense to the bonds exists,
should an action be brought upon them in the mode provided for the trial of equitable
actions, instead of being disposed of in the
any court of this state, either by the present
holders of the bonds, or by any person to ordinary manner by a jury.
Whether therefore the question be regarded
whom they may be transferred.
as one of jurisdiction or of practice. It is esUpon this state of facts the question arises,
whether an equitable action can be main- tablished by the later decisions that some
tained by the town to restrain the holders of special ground for equitable relief must be
shown, and that the mere fact that the Inthe bonds from suing upon or transferring
strument ought not to be enforced Is insuffithem, and to compel the surrender and cancient, standing alone, to justify a resort to
cellation of the instruments.
The cases in which a court of equity exer- an equitable action. Grand Chute v. Winecises its jurisdiction to decree the surrender gar, 15 Wall. 374; Mintum v. Farmers' Loan
and cancellation
of written instruments are, 6 Trust Co., 3 N. Y. 498; Perrine v. Striker,
in general, where the Instrument has been 7 Paige, 598; Morse v. Hovey, 9 Paige, 197;
obtained by fraud, where a defense exists Field V. Holbrook, 6 Duer, 597; AUertoa v.
which would be cognizable only in a court of Belden, 49 N. Y. 373; Reed v. Bank of New-

equity, where the instrument is negotiable,
and by a transfer the transferee may acquire
rights which the present holder does not possess, and where the instrument Is a cloud

burgh,

In

1

Paige,

215,

218.

the present case m so far as the Invalidity of the bonds results from the want
of consent of the tax payers, there Is no
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ground whatever shown for resorting to an from that of the court which Is asked to en; equitable action. Not only is the want of join the transfer, is sufficient to justify the
interference asked. The wrong sought to be
. the consent a perfect defense at law, but the
by such a proceeding is not any
onus of proving the consent is upon the prevented
party seeking to enforce the bond; and the wrongful act of any party, but a decision of
court cannot assume that he will be able to another court. The facts of the case and the
establish a fact that does not exist, and of abstract rights of the parties are not changed
which there is no documentary evidence. If by the transfer. The greatest effect it can
it be said that the town may by delay lose have is to enable a transferee to sue in a i
evidence now existing, which would be avail- 1 court to which the present holder could not
able to meet and rebut false testimony, one resort.
This, in general, would not be redecisive answer is that the statutes now pro- garded as any wrong which a court of equity I
vide a summary mode of perpetuating testi- would restrain.
If it is a wrong in this
mony in all cases, and an action is not neces- case it must be on the assumption that the
sary for that purpose.
The case Is analogous federal court will render a decision at varito those of Field v. Holbrools, 6 Duer, 597, ance with the decision of this court.
I am
of opinion that such an apprehension is not
and AUerton v. Belden, 49 N. Y. 373.
It is urged that the action should be sus- a legitimate ground for the action of a court
tained for the purpose of preventing a trans- of equity in restraining a transfer or difer of the bonds to a bona fide holder. This recting the cancellation of the instrument.
court has held that such a transfer could There is no finding that the present holders
are not bona fide holders of the Donds. As
not prejudice the plaintiff, as the defense
would be available even against a bona fide the judgment entered upon the report of the
Starin v.' Town of ©enoa, 23 N. X. referee was in favor of the defendants it
holder.
439.
But it is said that although such is could not be disturbed unless facts were
the rule in this state, a different rule has found showing that the conclusions of law
in the courts of the United were erroneous.
been adopted
We have held over and over
again that the facts showing error m the
States, and the bonds might be transferred
to a bona fide holder, who niight sue in those legal conclusions must be found, and that
courts.
There would be force in this argu- the appellate court will not search for them
In this case the findings
ment provided it were established in the in the evidence.
are in favor of the bona fides of the defendcase that the present holders of the bonds
In that case it ants. As to five of the bonds it is found
were not bona fide holders.
might be proper for a court of equity to that they were sold and delivered by the
prevent their subjecting the town to liability supervisor
and railroad commissioner to
But if they are Hutchinson & Murdock, who paid for them
by a transfer of the bonds.
holders,
there is no par in cash. This finding is not weakened
bona fide
themselves
justification for interfering with the right of by the further finding that the money was
transfer. In contemplation of law the trans- in the first instance advanced on a pledge
greater rights than of the bonds which was subsequently conj ferees would acquire no
'
verted into a sale. As to the twenty bonds
are possessed by the present holders.
The real purpose of the litigation seems to which were issued direct to the railroad combe to prevent a resort to the courts of the pany, the referee finds that the holders purI,
United States for the collection of these chased them without being informed that
bonds; and the question is, whether it is the they had been delivered directly to the com/
province of a court of equity in a state to pany. No fact is found impeaching the bona
interfere for the purpose of preventing a fides of the holders of any of the bonds, and
resort to the federal courts for the enforce- therefore it does not appear that any transfer
ment of obligations on the ground that they of them can be made which will confer upon
may be held in those couits to be valid, the transferees any greater equities than are
while according to the decisions of the state possessed by the present holders.
The fact that twenty of the bonds were
courts the same obligations are held to be
void. I apprehend that the power of a court delivered directly to Ihe railroad company inof equity to decree the surrender and can- stead of being sold by the railroad comcellation of instruments has never before missioners, is relied upon as a ground for
to or exercised for such a granting relief as to those bonds. In the
been appealed
Equity will interfere to control the case of People v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 124, 125, it
purpose.
action of parties and restrain them from seems to be considered that this fact would
transferring negotiable obligations, on the not constitute a defense, even in the state
ground that it is against conscience to al- court, as against a bona fide holder of the
low them to create in their transferee a right bonds. But to entitle the town to aifirmaor equity which they themselves do not pos- tive equitable relief on that ground, it should
sess. But where the effect of a transfer is have been made to appear that the defendnot to change in any respect the rights or ants were not bona fide holders; which, as
equities of the parties, I am not prepared has already been shown, the plaintiff has
to hold that the allegation that the transferee failed to do.
Another ground urged in support of the
might resort to a tribunal in which a rule of
claim to equitable relief is, that it is necesdecision prevails, or may prevail, difCering
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which they might bring separate suits Is sufficient to justify a court of equity In entertaining an action by the debtor to compel
them to litigate their claims in an action in
the form which be selects.
Under any circumstances,
I am Inclined
to concur with Judge Talcott, in the opinion,'
that a court of equity would not interfere!
affirmatively to relieve the plaintiff against\
these bonds, except upon condition that
had received for them.
surrendered
what
The relief sought is discretionary with the
court; and the plaintiff is not entitled to
as matter of absolute right. Actions of this
class are In that respect governed by the
same rules which apply to actions for specific performance; and relief wUl never be
granted except upon equitable terms, where
such as to call for the Imposition
the case
692, 693, 696,
of terms. Story, Bq. Jur.,
and cases cited section 742. But the reasons
deem sufficient to sustain the
before given
conclusion of the referee dismissing the com§§

is

plaint.
There is great doubt whether the defense
of the statute of limitations is available In
this case. In respect to the limitation of
time it is analogous in principle to an action
to remove a cloud upon the title to land; and
in such cases
do not understand the rule to
be that the statute runs from the time the
See Miner v. Beekcloud was first created.
man, 50 N. Y. 338; Hubbell v. Medbury,
53 N. Y. 99; Arnold v. Hudson R. R. Co.,
55 N. Y. 661.
On the ground that the facts of the case
are insufficient to justify the Interposition
of a court of equity to decree the surrender
and cancellation of the bonds, or to restrain
their transfer, so much of the judgment as
Is appealed from should be affirmed, with

I

sary for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of suits; and the case of New York
& N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. T. 592,
and 34 N. Y. 30, is referred to as an authority in point. But that case was essentially different from the present. There the
defendants all claimed shares in the same
corporation, which had authority to issue only
a limited number; shares had been issued
in excess of that limit, and some of them
must be rejected.
The spurious shares were
held to be a cloud upon the title of the holders of the genuine shares, and the corporation was held to be the proper representative
of the genuine stockholders to seek the interposition of the court to remove that cloud.
Here was a solid ground upon which the
plaintifC could found its application for relief.
The plaintifC having this standing in court, it
was held that all the alleged spurious shareproperly joined as defendholders
were
ants. But jurisdiction was not entertained
on the sole ground that the holders of spurious shares were numerous.
In the present
case there is no question of any cloud upon
the title. The plaintiff seeks to have canpvirportceled certain written
instruments
ing to be obligations for the payment of
money, which are held by various independent owners.
If it fails to make out a case
which would sustain an action for that purpose against any one of them alone, the
mere fact that there are several such holders is not of itself sufficient ground for entertaining the suit. If the facts were such
as would have sustained the action against
one person had he been the holder of all the
bonds, then the case of the New Haven Railroad Company would be an authority In
favor of the position, that if there were several holders all might be joined as defendants. But it does not support the position,
that the mere fact that numerous independent parties hold separate instruments upon

I
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costs.

All

concur;

CHURCH,

Judgment affirmed.

O.

J.,

not sitting.
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If not
wholly, of the claim upon Mexico, and that
he claimed that fund as receiver for the
purposes of that appointment.
Clark answered the bill.
He denies that the proceedings against him in the courts of the /|
state of New York created any lien In behalf i
of Camara, or the receiver, upon the fund I
In controversy.
He admits that no part of /
his property ever came into receiver's hands,
under those proceedings, and that he had the
claim upon Mexico whilst the suits were
pending against him, and when the receiver
was appointed under Camara's creditor's
bill; but that all the evidences and papers
In support of his Mexican claim were then
In the public archives at Washington.
He
also states, that the board of commissioners
under the act of congress of March, 3, 1849
(9 Stat. 393, 992), entitled "An act to carry
Into effect certain stipulations of the treaty
between the United States and the republic
of Mexico, of the 2d February, 1848," had
made an award in his favor for the sum of
?S6,78e.29, which sum was then In the hands
of the secretary of the treasury of the United States.
He then alleges that being a .
resident of the state of New Hampshire, he j
filed In the clerk's office of that district, on
the 28th January, 1843, his petition to be
|
declared a bankrupt That he had been declared a bankrupt on the 22d March follow- I
ing, pursuant to the "Ant to establish a uni- i
form system of bankruptcy throughout the '
United States," passed August 19, 1841 (5
Stat 440). He then recites that there had
been attached to his petition In the bankrupt's court a schedule of his property,
rights, and credits of every kind and description, in which his Mexican claim had
been stated; and that It was upon that
claim the commissioners had awarded to him
the sum before mentioned. He declares
that, under the decree of the court In bankruptcy, one John Palmer had been appointed
assignee; and that, having given his bond
in compliance with the order of the court,
he was vested, as assignee, in virtue of the
operation of the bankrupt law, of all the
defendant's property, for the benefit of his
creditors, including the Mexican claim. It
is also stated in his answer, that notice of
all the proceedings in his matter of bankruptcy had been published in the leading
newspapers of New Hampshire, and that
the name of Juan de la Camara, and his
residence, was placed among the list of his
creditors attached to his petition to be declared a bankrupt And he avers tbat all
of his creditors had had notice of the proceedings in bankruptcy.
That neither Camara nor any other creditor had filed or made
any objections to those proceedings, or to the
action of the assignee, until after the award
had been made upon the Mexican claim.
It Is not necessary, for the purposes of
this opinion, to state the defendant's recital
of the sale of his effects by Palmer, the asThat his effects consisted principally,

How. 322.)

Lawrence

&

WAYNE, J., delivered the opinion of the
court.
We learn from the record of this case that
Juan de la Camara recovered a judgment
tn the supreme court of New York, against
Ferdinand Clark, for $4,688.49, with interest
at seven per cent; that a fieri facias was
issued upon the judgment, and that there
was a return upon it of "no goods, chattels,
or real estate of the defendant to be levied
upon." Upon this return, Camara filed a
creditor's biU, before the chancellor of the
First circuit in the state of NeV York, setting
out his judgment and the return upon the
fieri facias, in which he seeks, under the
laws of that state, to subject the equitable
assets and choses in action of Clark to his
judgment; and he asks for a discovery of
them from Clark, for an injunction, and the
appointment of a receiver.
Notice of this
proceeding,
and of the action upon it were
served upon the solicitor of Clark, and the
blU of complaint was taken as confessed,
upon the defendant's default in not answerBooth, the present complainant, was
ing.
appointed receiver on the 3d August, 1842.
Clark had been previously enjoined under
the proceeding from making any disposition
of any part of his estate, legal or equitable.
Thus matters stood from the time of the receiver's appointment, in 1842, until June,
1851.
Then Booth, as receiver, reports that
no effects of Clark had come to his knowledge, except a claim upon Mexico, which had
been adjudged to Clark by the United States
commissioners, under the treaty with Mexico; and that, as receiver, he was contesting It; and he asks from the court authority
to proceed for that purpose, which was
granted. Such is an outline of the case In
New York, containing every substantial part
of It
We will now state the proceedings of this
fluit at the instance of the receiver, In the
circuit court of the United States for the
District of Columbia, from the decision of
which, dismissing the receiver's bill, it has
been brought to this court for revision.
On the 29th May, 1851, Booth, the receiver,
filed his bill in the circuit court for the District of Columbia, reciting so much of the
proceedings of the New York courts as was
•deemed necessary to support his suit. He
declares that Clark, when the original suit
was instituted against him by Camara, and
from that time until after he had been apin New York.
3>ointed receiver, had resided

797

798

BECEIVERS.

slgnee; his purchase of them, Including the
Mexican claim, or the rights claimed by
the defendant under his purchase, all relating to the same having been fully acted upon by this court at this term, in the case of
Ferdinand Clark v. Benjamin O. Clark and
W. H. Y. Hackett We state, however, that
Palmer, the original assignee in Clark's bankruptcy, having died, he had been succeeded
by the appointment of Hackett as assignee.
This suit, then, is substantially between
Hackett, as the assignee of Clark in bankruptcy, and Booth, the receiver under Camara's creditor's bill; that it may be determined by this court, which of them has the
official right to the Mexican fund, for the
distribution of it between the creditors of
Clark, or whether Booth, as receiver, shall
have from that fund a sufficient sum to pay
Camara's entire debt, leaving the residue of
it for distribution between Clark's other
creditors.
It appears also from the record that Booth,
the receiver, took no steps to execute his
official trust, from the time of his appointment in 1842, until 1851, after the award of
the Mexican claim had been made in Clark's
favor. And, also, that the court of chancery, acting upon the creditor's bill brought
by Camara, had not been applied to, either by
Camara or by the receiver, for any order upon Clark in personam, to coerce his compliance with its . injunction and decree.
Upon this statement of the case, we will
now consider it. There is no dispute concerning the regularity or binding operation
of the judgment obtained by Camara against
Clark.
None in respect to the proceedings
under the creditor's bill. The leading point
In the case is the effect of the proceedings
under the last, to give a right to the receiver,
[
: In virtue of a lien which he claims upon the
; property of the debtor, to sue for and to
: recover any part of it, legal or equitable,
i without the jurisdiction of the state of New
In other words, as an officer of a
York.
court of chancery, for a particular purpose,
will he be recognized as such by a foreign
judicial tribunal, and be allowed to take
from the latter a fund belonging to a debtor,
for its application to the payment of a particular creditor within the jurisdiction of
the. receiver's appointment, there being other
creditors in the jurisdiction in which he
now sues, contesting his right to do so. Or
can he as receiver claim, in virtue of a decree upon a creditor's bill given in one jurisdiction, a right to have the judgment upon
which the creditor's bill was brought, paid
out of a fund of a bankrupt debtor In a foreign jurisdiction; because his appointment
preceded the bankrupt's petition.
It is urged that the receiver in this case,
by the decree of the court in New York, was
j
entitled officially to the entire property of
■ Clark, real, personal,
or equitable, both wlth/ in and without the state of New York.
That
he could, as receiver, maintain any action

for the property and rights of property of
the debtor which the latter could have done.
That the fund now in controversy was a
chose In action, belonging to the debtor when
the receiver was appointed, and, though not
within the state of New York, that it followed the person of the owner and passed to the
receiver, because the owner was domiciled
in New York.
And it was also said that,
having such official rights or liens upon the
property of the debtor, the comity of nations
would aid him in the assertion of them in
a foreign tribunal.
The counsel for the receiver cited from the reports of the state of
New York several cases in support of the
foregoing propositions.
We have perused
all of them carefully, without having been
able to view them altogether as the learned
counsel does. Whatever may be the operation of the decree in respect to the receiver's
powers over the property of the debtor within the state of New York, and his right to
sue for them there, we do not find any thing
in the cases in the New York reports showing the receiver's right to represent the creditor or creditors of the debtor in a foreign jurisdiction. It is true that the receiver in this case I
is appointed under a statute of the state of
New York, Jbut that oMymakeg.,^imjin_^S;
'
cer of the courf 'f oi: TffaFs^ferHeTs'a rep"fesenEatlTe of the court, anf may, by its direction, take Into his possession every kind
of property which may be taken In execution, and also that which Is equitable, if
of a nature to be reduced into possession.
But it is not considered in every case that
the right to the possession is transferred by
his appointment; for, where the property
Is real, and there are tenants, the court is
virtually the landlord, though the tenants
may be compelled to attorn to the receiver.
Jeremy, Eq. Jur. 249. When appointed, very
little discretion is allowed to him, for he
must apply to the court for liberty to bring
or defend actions, to let the estate, and In
most cases to lay out money on repairs, and
he may without leave distrain only for rent
In arrear short of a year. 6 Ves. 802; 15
Ves. 26; 3 Brown, Ch. Cas. 88; 9 Ves. 335;
1 Jac. & W. 178; Morris v. Elme, 1 Ves. Jr.
139; Id. 165; Blunt v. Cllthero, 6 Ves. 799;
Hughes V. Hughes, 3 Brown, Ch. Cas. 87;
5 Madd. 473.
A receiver is an Indifferent person between II
parties, appointed by the court to receive]
the rents, issues, or profits of land, or other
thing in question In this court, pending the
suit, where it does not seem reasonable to I
the court that either party should do It.
Wyatt's Prac. Reg. 355. He is an officer of
the court; his appointment Is provIsionaL
He is appointed in behalf of all parties, and
not of the complainant or of the defendant
only. He is appointed for the benefit of all
parties who may establish rights In the
cause.
The money In his hands Is In custodia legis for whoever can make out a title
to It. Delany v. Mansfield, 1 Hogan, 234
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Is the court itself which has the care of
j
The receiver is but
I the property in dispute.
the creature of the court; he has no powers
except such as are conferred upon him by
the order of his appointment and the course
and practice of the court.
Verplancls v. Insurance Co., 2 Paige, Ch. 452. Unless where
he Is appointed under the statute of New
Torli, directing proceedings against corporations (2 Rev. St. 438), and then he is a standing assignee, vested with nearly all the
powers and authority of the assignee of an
insolvent debtor. Attorney General v. Life
& Fu-e Ins. Co., 4 Paige, Ch. 224.
In the
case just cited. Chancellor Walworth says,
that the receiver has "no powers except such
as are conferred upon him by the order of
his appointment and the course and practice
of the court." In the statement which has
been made of the restraints upon a receiver,
we are aware that they have been measurably qualified by rules, and by the practice of the courts in the state of New York,
as may be seen In Hoffman's Practice;
but
none of them alter his official relation to the
court, and, so far as we have investigated
the subject, we have not found another instance of an order in the courts of the state
of New York, or in the courts of any other
state, empowering a receiver to sue in his
own name officially in another jurisdiction
for the property or choses in action of a
judgment debtor. Indeed, whatever may be
the receiver's rights under a creditor's bill,
to the possession of the property of the debtor in the state of New York, or the permissions which may be given to him to sue for
such property, we understand the decisions
of that state as confining his action to the
state of New York.
Such an inference may be made from several decisions.
It maj- be inferred from
what was said by Chancellor Walworth, in
Mitchell V. Bunch, 2 Paige, Ch. 615. Speaking of the property which might be put into
the possession of a receiver, and of the power of a court of chancery to reach property
out of the state, he declares the manner in
which it may be done, thus: "The original
and primary jurisdiction of that court was
in personam merely. The writ of assistance
to deliver possession, and even the sequestration of property to compel the performance of a decree, are comparatively of recent origin.
The jurisdiction of the court
was exercised for several centuries by the
simple proceeding of attachment against the
• bodies pf the parties to compel obedience
to
Although the propr its orders and decrees.
/ erty of a defendant is beyond the reach of
the court, so that it can neither be sequestered nor taken in execution, the court does
not lose its jurisdiction in relation to that
property, provided the person of the defendBy the orV ant is within the jurisdiction.
dinary course of proceeding, the defendant
/ may be compelled either to bring the propwhich the defendant
I erty In dispute, or to
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claims an equitable title, within the jurisdiction of the court, or to execute such a
conveyance or transfer thereof as will be
suflicient to vest the legal title, as well as
the possession of the property, according to
the lex loci rei sitoe."
It is very obvious,
from the foregoing extract, that up to the
time when Mitchell v. Bunch was decided,
in the year 1831, it had not been thought
that a court of chancery in the state of New
York could act upon the property of a judgment debtor in a creditor's bill which was
not within the state of New York, but by
the coercion of his person when he was
within the jurisdiction of the state; and
that it had not been contemplated then to
add to the means used by chancery to enforce Its sentences, In respect to property
out of the state of New York, the power to
a receiver to sue in a foreign jurisdiction for
the same'. It is true that the jurisdiction of
a court of chancery In England and the
United States, to enforce equitable rights.
Is not confined to cases where the property
Is claimed in either country, but the primary
movement in the chancery courts of both
countries to enforce an injunction, is the attachment of the person of the debtor, where
he is amenable to the jurisdiction of the
court.
1
We find in the second volume of Spence on
the Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in
England (pages 6, 7), this language: "When,'
therefore, a case Is made out against a per-:
son resident within the jurisdiction of the
court. In respect to property out of it, but
within the empire, or its dependencies,
which would call for the interference of
the court of chancery if the property were
situate In the country, the court, as it had
the power, has assumed the jurisdiction,'
when such an interference is necessary to
the ends of justice, of enforcing the equitable rights of the parties to or over property
out of its jurisdiction, by the coercion of
the person and sequestration of his property
here, in the same manner as it would have
done had the property been situate In this
country." And Sir John Leach said: "When
parties defendants are resident in England,
and are brought upon subpoena here, the
court has full authority to act upon them
personally, with respect to the subject of
the suit, as the ends of justice require, and
with that view to order them to take or to
omit to take any steps or proceedings in any
other court of justice, whether in this or
This court does not
in a foreign country.
pretend to any Interference with the other
It acts upon the defendant by
courts."
punishment for his contempt, for his disobedience of the court. The court of chancery has no power directly to affect property out of the bounds of Its jurisdiction.
Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 544; 2 Spence.
We believe such to be the proper course, in
chancery, in cases of injunction, and that its
jurisdiction, by injunction, rests entirely on
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Such, however,
the coercion of the person.
was not the course pursued in this case,
though the debtor was then a resident of
the state of New York, and amenable to the
of the court. No motion was
made to force Clark to comply with the injunction which Camara had obtained under
the creditor's bill. The matter was allowed
([jurisdiction
to rest for seven years, Camara being aware
that Clark had a pecuniary claim upon the
republic of Mexico, at least as early as in
the year 1843.
The receiver during all that
time took no action. His first movement is
an application to be permitted to sue for the
fund in the hands of the government, which
had been awarded to Clark by the commissioners under the treaty with Mexico. Permission was given lo sue. He has brought
his bill accordingly, and it directly raises
the question, whether he can, as an oflacer
of the court of chancery in New York, and
in his relation of receiver to Camara, be
permitted to sue in another political jurisdiction.
We have already cited Chancellor Walworth's opinion as to the course which is to
be pursued in New York upon an injunction
in a creditor's bill.
Mr. Edwards, in his
excellent work on Receivers in Chancery,
after citing the language used in Mitchell v.
Bunch, says: "Still, the difficulty remains
as to a recognition of the powers or officers
of the court, by persons holding a lease upon
the property, especially realty, out of the
jurisdiction.
Then in Malcolm v. Montgomery, 1 Hogan, 93, the master of the rolls observed, that a receiver could not be effectually appointed over estates in Ireland, by
the English court of chancery, in any direct
.proceeding
for the purpose; and that attempts had often been made to do so by
serving orders made by the English court of
chancery, but that they had failed, because
the English court of chancery has no direct
means of enforcing payment of rent to its
receiver, by tenants who reside in Ireland.
The attorney-general and another counsellor
also said, that to their knowledge such at-'
tempts had been frequently made, but had
been uniformly given up as impracticable.
A conflict might also arise between the receiver out of the jurisdiction and creditors,
and also other persons out of the jurisdiction. The comity of nations and different
tribunals would hardly help a receiver."
We also infer, from the case of Storm v.
Waddell, 2 Sandf. 494, that the receiver's
right to the possession of the property of a
debtor in the state of New York, and hfs
right to sue for property there, is limited to
that jurisdiction.
The chancellor, in the
last case mentioned, after having given an
epitome of the cause of proceeding in a creditor's bill, and speaking of equitable interests and things in action belonging to the
debtor,
without regard to the injunction,
says: "The property of the defendant is subjected to the suit, wherever It may be, If

the receiver can lay hold of It, or the complainant can reach it by the decree.
The
injunction, when served, prevents the debtor

from putting it away or squandering it." This
language indicates the receiver's locality of
action.
Taken In connection with that of
Chancellor Walworth, in Mitchell v. Bunch,
it shows that the receiver's right to the i
possession of the debtor's property is limited
|'
to the jurisdiction of his appointment,
and ?
that he has no lien upon the property of the 'f
debtor, except for that which he may get !
the possession of without suit, or for that '
which, after having been permitted to sue
for, he may reduce into possession In that
way. Our industry has been tasked unsuccessfully to find a case in which a receiver
has been permitted to sue in a foreign jurisdiction for the property of the debtor.
So far as we can find, it has not been allowed in an English tribunal; orders have
been given in the English chancery for reto execute their funcceivers to proceed
tions in another jurisdiction, but we are not
aware of its ever having been permitted by
the tribunals of the last.
We think that a receiver has never been
recognized by a foreign tribunal as an actor
in a suit
He is not within that comity
which nations have permitted, after the manner of such nations as practise It, in respect
to the judgments and decrees of foreign tri-.
bunals, for all of them do not permit It in the
same manner and to the same extent, to
make such comity International or a part of
the laws of nations. But It was said that receivers in New York are statutory officers,
as assignees in bankruptcy are.
That being
so, he had, as assignees in bankruptcy have
upon the property of the bankrupt, a hen upon the property of a judgment debtor, under
an appointment in a creditor's bill. But that
cannot be so. An assignee in bankruptcy
In England, and in this country when It had
a bankrupt law, is an officer made by the
statute of bankruptcy, with powers, privileges, and duties prescribed by the statute,
for the collection of the bankrupt's estate
for an equal distribution of It among an of
his creditors.
In England, the property of the bankrupt
is vested In the assignees In bankruptcy by
legislative enactment.
Where commissioners
have been appointed. It is imperative upon
them to convey to the assignees the property of the bankrupt, wherever it may be
or whatever it may be, and It is done by
deed of bargain and sale, which is afterwards enrolled.
It vests the assignees with
the title to the property from the date of
the conveyance,
it having been previously
vested in the commissioners for conveyance
by them to the assignees.
As to the bankrupt's personal estate, the statute looks beyond the debts and effects of a trader within the kingdom, and vests them in the commissioners in every part of the world. The
last Is done in England, upon the principle
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that personal property has no locality, and
is subject ta the law which governs the person of the owner. As by that law the property of a bankrupt becomes vested in the
assignee, for the purposes of. the assignment,
his title to such property out of England
is as good as that which the owner had, except where some positive law of the country, in which the personal property is, forbids it. CuUen, 244.
In claiming such a recognition of assignees
in bankruptcy from foreign courts, England
does no more than is permitted In her courts,
for they give effect to foreign assignments
made under laws analogous to the English
bankrupt laws.
Solomons v. Ross, 1 H.
Bl. 131, note; JoUet v. Deponthieu, Id. 132,
note. But such comity between nations has
or universal.
not become International
It
was not admitted in England until the middle
of the last century in favor of assignees in
bankruptcy.
Lord Raymond decreed it in
1811, In the case of a commission of bankSir Jos§ph Jeliyll, In
ruptcy from Holland.
1715, said, the law of England takes no notice of a commission In Holland, and therefore a creditor here may attach the effects
in the city of London, and proceed to condemnation.
3 Burge, 907.
Lord Mansfield,
in Warring v. Knight, (sittings in Guildhall,
after Hilary term, Geo. HI.) Cooke, Bankr.
Law, 200, 3 Burge, 907, ruled, that where
an English creditor proceeded subsequent to
an act of bankruptcy, by attachment in a foreign country, and obtained judgment there
and satisfaction by the sale of the debtor's
personal property, the assignees in an action
In England could not recover from such creditor the amount of the debt which had been
remitted to him. Again, his lordship ruled,
that the statutes of bankrupts do not extend
to the colonies or any of the king's dominions out of England, but the assignments under such commissions are, in the courts
abroad, considered as voluntary, and as such
take place between the assignee and the
bankrupt, but do not affect the rights of any
other creditors.
So the law stood in England until the case
of Polliott V. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 123, when
Chancellor Northlngton stimulated it Into a
larger comity, by giving effect to a claim
to the creditors of a bankrupt in Amsterdam
over an attaching creditor in England, who
had proceeded after the bankrupt had been
declared to be so, by the proper tribunal In
Amsterdam. England had just then become
the great creditor nation of Europe, and of
Her Interher provinces in North America.
est prompted a change of the rule, and her
courts have ever since led the way In extending a comity which had before been deThe judicial history of the
nied by them.
until the comity In favor of aschange,
signees became In England what It now is,
,is given in 3 Burge, c. 22; Bankr. Laws,
Inclusive, and from 912-929.
906-912,
886,
It may now be said to be the rule of comity
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 51
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between the nations of Europe; but it has
never been sanctioned in the courts of the
United States, nor In the judicial tribunals
of the states of our nation, so far as we

know, and we know that It has been repeatedly refused In the latter. Our courts,
when the states were colonies,
had been
schooled, before the Revolution, In the earlier doctrines of the English courts upon the
subject. The change in England took place
but a few years before the separation of the
two countries.
That comity has not yet reached our courts.
We do not know why It should do so, so
long as we have no national bankrupt laws.
The rule which prevailed whilst these states
were colonies still continues to be the rule
In the courts of the United States, and It is
not otherwise between the courts of the
states.
It was the rule In Maryland, before
the Revolution.
It is the rule still, as may
be seen In Birch v. McLean, 1 Har. & McH.
286; Wallace v. Patterson, 2 Har. & McH.
463. An assignment abroad, by act of law,
has no legal operation in Pennsylvania. We
find from McNeil v. Colquhoon, 2 Hayw. (N.
C.) 24, that it has been the rule in North
Carolina for sixty years. South Carolina has
no other.
1 Const.
(S. C.) 283; 4 McCord,
519; Taylor v. Geary, Kh-by, 313.
In Massachusetts,
the courts will not permit, an
assignment in one of the states, whether it
be voluntary or under- an insolvent law,
to control an attachment in that state of the
property of an insolvent which was laid after
the assignment, and before payment to the
assignees.
The point occurred recently in the
circuit court of the United States for that
district. In the case of Betton v. Valentine,
1 Curt. 168; and It was ruled that the assignee of an Insolvent debtor, appointed under the law of Massachusetts, does not so
far represent creditors In the state of Rhode
Island as to be able to avoid a conveyance
of personal property In the latter state, good
as against the Insolvent, but invalid as
against creditors, by the law of Rhode Island.
In New York, the "ubiquity of the operation
of the bankrupt law, as respects personal
property," was denied In Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wend. 538. Chancellor Kent considers It to be a settled part of the jurisprudence
of the United States, that a prior assignment
under a foreign law will not be permitted to
prevail against a subsequent attachment of
the bankrupt's effects found in the United
States.
The courts of the United States wIU
not subject their citizens to the Inconvenience
of seeking their dividends abroad, when they
have the means to satisfy them under their
own control. We think that it would prejudice the rights of the citizens of the states
to admit a contrary rule. The rule, as it Is
with us, affords an admitted exception to the
universality of the rule that personal property has no locality, and follows the domicile
of the owner. This court, in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat 213, disclaimed the English
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doctrine upon this subject; and In Harrison
V. Sterry, 5 Craneli, 289, 302, this court declared tliat tlie banlirupt law of a foreign
country Is incapable of operating a legal
transfer of property in the United States.
Such being the rule in the American courts,
in respect to foreign assignments in bankruptcy, and in respect to such assignments as
may be made under the insolvent laws of the
states of the United States, there can be
no good reason for giving to a receiver, appointed in one of the states under a creditor's bill, a larger comity in the courts of
the United States, or in those of the states
or territories. On the contrary, strong rea.sons may be urged against it.
A receiver
lis appointed under a creditor's bill for one
lor more creditors, as the case may be, for
/their benefit, to the exclusion of all other
I creditors of the debtor, if there be any such,
as there are in this case. Whether appointI'
ed as this receiver was, under the statute
of New York, or under the rules and practice
of chancery as they may be, his oflicial relations to the court are the same. A statute
appointment neither enlarges nor diminishes
the limitation upon his action. His responsibilities are unaltered.
Under either kind
of appointment, he has at most only a passive capacity in the most important part of
what it may be necessary for him to do,
until it has been called by the direction of
the court into ability to act He has no extra-territorial power of oflBcial action ; none
-Wtrttih 1Mfro'art-^p^H5f*ffim"«a'n"fconfer,
with authority to enable him to go into a
foreign jurisdiction to take possession of the
debtor's property; none which can give him,
upon the principle of comity, a privilege to
sue in a foreign court or another jurisdiction,
as the judgment creditor himself might have
done, where his debtor may be amenable
to the tribunal which the creditor may seek.
In those countries of Europe in which foreign judgments are regarded as a foundation
for an action, whether it be allowed by treaty
stipulations or by comity, it has not as yet
A been extended to a receiver In chancery. In
the United States, where the same rule prevails between the states as to judgments
and decrees, aided as it is by the first section of the fourth article of the constitution,
and by the act of congress of 26th May,
1790 (1 Stat 122), by which full faith and
credit are to be given in aU of the courts
of the United States, to the judicial sentences of the different states, a receiver under
a creditor's biU has not as yet been an actor
as such In a suit out of the state In which
he was appointed.
This court considered the
effect of that section of the constitution, and
of the act just mentioned, in McElmoyle v.
Cohen, 13 Pet. 324r-327.
But apart from the
absence of any such case, we think that a
receiver could not be admitted to the comity
extended to judgment creditors, without an
entire departure from chancery proceedings,
as to the manner of his appointment,
the

securities which are taken from him for the
performance of his duties, and the direction
which the court has over him in the collection of the estate of the debtor, and the application and distribution of them.
If he
seeks to be recognized in another jurisdiction,
it is to take the fund there out of it, without
such court having any control of his subsequent action in respect to it, and without
his having even official power to give security to the court, the aid of which he seeks,
for his faithful conduct and official accountability. All that could be done upon such an
application from a receiver, according to
chancery practice, would be to transfer him
from the locality of his appointment to that
where he asks to be recognized, for the execution of his trust in the last, under the
coercive ability of that court; and that it
would be difficult to do, where it may be asked to be done, without the court exercising
its province to determine whether the suitor,
or another person within its jurisdiction, was
the proper person to act as receiver.
Besides, there is much less reason for allowing the complainant in this case to be recognized as receiver for the fund out of the
state of New York, and in this jurisdiction,
even if the practice in chancery in respect
to receivers was different from what we
have said it was.
The remedies which the
judgment creditor in New York had under
his creditor's bUl against his debtor, were not
applied as they might have been in that
state, according to the practice in chancery
in such cases. When Clark had been enjoined under the creditor's bill, and the receiver had been appointed, both judgment
creditor and receiver knew at the time,—
certainly, as the record shows, in a short
time afterwards,— that Clark had a pecuniary
claim upon the republic of Mexico. No attempt was made, according to chancery practice, to coerce Clark by the attachment, of
his person under the injunction, to make an
assignment of that claim for the payment of
Camara's judgment
It cannot be said that
Clark had not property to assign, and that
it was therefore unnecessary to attach him.
That would make no difference; for whether
with or without property, he might have
been compelled
to make a formal assignment, even though he had sworn that he had
none.
It was so ruled in Chipman v. Sabbaton, 7 Paige, 47, and In Fitzburgh v. Bveringham, 6 Paige, 29.
There was a want of vigilance in this matter, which does not make any equity which
he may have in New York upon Clark's property, superior to that of Clark's creditors,
who are pursuing the funds in this district
Nor, according to the rule prescribed in the
United States, that personal property has no
locality on account of the domicile of the
owner, to transfer it under a foreign assignment, can the receiver have in this case any
thing in the nature of a lien to bind the
'
property of Clark not within the state of

i
;
'
i
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New York. When we take Into consideration
also the origin of the fund In controversy,
the manner of its ultimate recovery from
Mexico, the congressional action upon It, In
it, after the
every particular,
to secure
awards were made, to those who might be
entitled to receive It; the jurisdiction given
to the circuit court of this district, with an
appeal from its decision to this court, upon
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the principles which govern courts of equity
to adjudge disputes concerning It, and that
such cases were to be conducted and governed In all respects as in other cases in equity,
we must conclude that the complainant in this
case, as receiver, cannot be brought under
the rule prescribed for our decision.
We
concur with the court below In the dismission of the bill.
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DAVIS

V.

GRAY,

organized in reliance on the grants, and
especially on the reservation, and duly ac-

was

(16 Wall. 203.)
Supreme

Court of the United States.

Dea,

1872.

Appeal from the circuit court for the Western district of Texas, the case being thus:
The state of Texas had at the times hereinafter named, certain public lands. A general land office was established at the capital of the state for the registration of titles
and surveys, and the lands were divided
when surveyed into sections of six hundred
and forty acres each. One Kuechler was
the chief of this office, under the title of the
"commissioner
of the general land office."
All certificates for the public lands were issued by this commissioner; and all patents
were issued vmder the seals of the state
and the general land office, and were required to be signed by the governor and countersigned by the said commissioner. These
certificates were evidences of obligation on
the part of the state to grant and give -a
patent to the, holder for a certain amount
therein mentioned of the vacant and unreserved public lands of the state; when the
certificates are located and surveyed, and the
surveys returned to the commissioner and
approved by him, a patent, conveying the
fee, is executed as above mentioned.
In and about the year 1856, and for many
years thereafter the state of Texas, though
of great extent, was, as it still is, sparsely
inhabited, while its public domain was far
from markets, and without connection with
the more settled parts of the country; and
it was greatly to the interest of the state
to attract immigration and capital. To produce this result it became the settled policy
of the state to make grants and reservations
of public lands to corporations, conditioned
upon the construction of certain amoimts of
In pursuance
railroad within certain times.
of this policy the Memphis, El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company, was incorporated
February 4th, 1856, by the state of Texas,
to build a railroad across the state from
the eastern boundary to EI Paso, with a land
grant of 16 sections to the mile; certificates
for 8 sections per mile to be issued on the
grading of successive lengths of road, and
8 more per mile upon the complete construction of the same;
and a reservation was
grarited of the alternate or odd sections of
land for eight miles on each side of the road,

within which the company should have an
exclusive right to locate its certificates,
while it also had the privilege to locate said
certificates on any other unappropriated publie lands.
This reservation, of course, was of the
greatest value, as it enabled the company
to reap the advantage
of the enhancement
01 price which the construction of the road
by them would cause in the lands along the
Ime.

In the

same

year of

1856

the company

cepted

the

same.

There were certain conditions precedent
to the vesung of the charter, land grant,
ana reservation; but they were all complied with, and at a cost to the company
for surveys of over $100,000. These and
surveys resulted, for the comsubsequent
pany, in the official designation of the road line
and the center line of the reservation for some
800 miles, and the "sectionizing" and numbering of the odd sections of land in said reservation in a belt of country some 250 miles in
length and 16 in width; and for the state
in the surveying and mapping of the same
belt of country and the "sectionizing" and
numbering of the alternate or even sections
for the benefit of the state. The company
also graded some 65 miles of road westerly
from Moore's Landing, in Bowie county, and
was interrupted in the work of construction
by the rebellion and so-called "secession" of
Texas; but resumed work after the war, and
graded between 20 and 30 miles further,
from JefCerson in Marion county, in the direction of Moore's Landing.
There were certain conditions subsequent
annexed to the charter, viz.: That if the
company should not have completely graded
-not less than 50 mUes of their road by the
1st of March, 1861, and at least 50 miles
additional thereto within two years thereafter, then the charter of said company
should be mill and void. The first 50 miles
were graded within the required time; the
second 50 miles have never been graded.
Within two years after the performance of
the ifirst

condition,

however,

the

legislature

of Texas, by act "for the relief of railroad

companies," approved February 11th, 1862,
enacted, that the failure of any chartered
railroad company to complete any section,
or fraction or a section, of its road as required by existing laws, should not operate
as a forfeiture of its charter, or of the lands
to which the said company would be entitled
under the provisions of an act entitled "An
act to encourage the construction of railroads
in Texas by donation of land," approved
January 30th, 1854; provided that the said
company should complete such section, or
fraction of a section, as would entitle it to
donations of land, tmder existing laws, within two years after the close of the war between the Confederate States and the United
States of America.
Within the two years
after the close of the war, the provisional
legislature, by act of November 13th, 1866,
enacted, "that the grant of 16 sections of
land to the mUe to railroad companies heretofore or hereafter constructing railroads in
Texas shall be extended, under the same restrictions and limitations heretofore provided
by law, for 10 years after the passage of
this act;" and by article 12, section 33, of
the present constitution of Texas, while declaring that the legislatures which sat from
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March 18th, 1861, to August 6th, 1866, were
without constitutional authority, yet enacted
that such declaration should not affect, prejudicially, private rights which had grown
up under such acts, and that though the legislature of 1866 was only provisional, its
acts were to be respected,
so far as they
were not In violation of the constitution and
laws of the United States.
By act of July 27th, 1870, the Southern
Transcontinental Railroad Company was inand it was enacted, in terms,
corporated,
that it might "purchase the rights, franchises, and property of the Memphis, El
Paso & Pacific Railroad Company, heretofore
incorporated by the state."
The laud grant was limited to fifteen years
from the 4th of February, 1856, but thia
time had not yet expired, and by an act of
November 13th, 1866, for the benefit of railit was enacted, that this
road companies,
grant of 16 sections of land to the mile to
railroads theretofore or thereafter constructing railroads in Texas, should be extended
under the same restrictions and limitations
theretofore provided by law, for ten years
after the passage of this act.
The land reservation was conditioned upon certain surveys: (1) It was to be surveyed
from the eastern boundary of Texas, as far
as the Brazos river, within four years from
March 1st, 1856. (2) The centre line of the
reserve was to be run and plainly designated
from the Brazos to the Colorado within
fifteen months from February 10th, 1858.
surveyed
(3) The whole reservation was to be
within ten years from February 10th, 1858.
(4) The company was to have a connection
with some road leading to the Mississippi
river or the Gulf of Mexico, within ten years
from February 10th, 1858. The first and
second of these conditions were fulfilled vrithin the times limited. The legislature, by act
approved January 11th, 1862, enacted that
"the time of the continuance of the present
war between the Confederate States and the
United States of America shall not be computed against any internal improvement company in reckoning the period allowed them in
their charters, by any law, general or special,
for the completion of any work contracted by
them to do."
This act the company considered extended
the time for the performance of the third and
fourth conditions till the 10th of June, 1873.
In the years 1867 and 1868 the company
executed two series of bonds, known as land
grant bonds, amounting in the aggregate to
the par value of $10,000,000 In gold, and
also executed and delivered to one Forbes
and others, trustees as aforesaid, two mortgages to secure said bonds, by one of which
they mortgaged aU lands actually acquired
or thereafter to be acquired by said company by grading, constructing, and equipping
the first 150 miles of the road of said company, from Jefferson in Marion county to
Paris in Lamar county, and by the other of
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which they mortgaged the like property for
the second 150 miles, from Paris to Palo
Pinto in Palo Pinto county. These bonds
were put on the bourse in Paris, France, and
sold for value to the extent of $5,348,700 of
their par value, mostly in small lots, and to
The grants, guarpersons of limited means.
antees, and assm-ances by the state of Texas
to said company of the said franchises, and
especially of said land grant and land reservation, were recited in said mortgages, and
were also announced and repeated to the
purchasers personally, and by advertisement
and prospectus, and the purchasers took the
bonds relying on said grants, and upon the
exclusive right of the company to locate certificates within the territory so reserved.
The bonds not being paid the circuit court
for the Western district of Texas, on motion
of Forbes, trustee under the mortgage, on
the 6th of July, 1870, enjoined the railroad
company from disposing of any of its effects,
and put the road into the hands of one John
A. C. Gray, as receiver: "To taJie possession of the moneys and assets, real and personal; roadbed, road, and all property, whatsoever, of the said Memphis, El Paso &
the
Pacific Railroad Company, wheresoever
same may be found, with power under the
special order of the court, from time to time
to be made, to manage, control, and exercise
all the franchises, whatsoever, of said company, and, if need be, under the direction of
the court, to sell, transfer, and convey the
and other property of said
road, roadbed,
company, as an entire thing," &c.
On the 20th of January, 1871, it was fur"That the said
ther ordered by the court:
John A. C. Gray, receiver, as aforesaid, be,
and he is hereby, authorized and empowered
to defend and continue all suits brought by or
El Paso & Paagainst the said Memphis,
cific Railroad Company, whether before or
after the appointment of said receiver, and
whether in the name of said company or
otherwise; defend all suits brought against
him as such receiver or affecting his receivership, and to bring such suits in the name
of said company, or in the name of said receiver, as he may be advised by counsel to
be necessary and proper in the discharge of
the duties of his office, and for acquiring,
securing, and protecting the assets, franchises, and rights of the said company and
of the said receiver, and for securing and
protecting the land grant and land reservation of the said company."
In November, 1809, the present constitution of Texas was adopted, and was approved
The fifth and sixth [seveiith]
by congress.
sections of this constitution are as follows:
"Sec. 5. All public lands heretofore reserved for the benefit of railroads or railway companies shall hereafter be subject to location
and survey by any genuine land certificates."
"Sec. 7. All lands granted to railway comwhich have not been alienated by
panies
said companies in conformity with the terms
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of their

respectively and the laws
charter
of the state imder which the grants were
made, are hereby declared forfeited to the
state for the benefit of the school fund."
The constitutional convention which framed this constitution passed an ordinance to
the effect that all heads of families actually
settled on vacant lands lying within the
Memphis & El Paso Railroad reserve, shall
be entitled to and receive from the state of
Texas 80 acres of land, including the place
occupied, on payment of all expenses of survey and patent; and that all vacant lands
lying within said reserve are declared open
and subject to sale to heads of families actually settled on or who may actually settle
on said reserve, at the price of one dollar
per acre; and that said vacant lands within
said

reserve shall be open to pre-emption

set-

tlers, and subject to the location of all genuine land certificates.
There were in 1869, and were on the 20th
of January, 1871, when Gray was ordered
by the coiirt to bring such suits in the name
of the company as he might be advised by
counsel were necessary and proper In the
discharge of the duties of his office, a great
number of land certificates outstanding and
unlocated In Texas. Since the passing of
the said ordinance, and the adoption of the
said constitution, many hundreds of the holders of certificates other than those issued to
the company had located their certificates
on the sections reserved to the company, had
returned their surveys and locations to the
of the general land office, and
commissioner
had applied for patents on the same. Before
1870,
Commisthe 19th day of September,
Davis, prosioner Kuechler and Governor
fessing to act under the said constitutional
On the
issued 2 of such patents.
provisions,
19th of September, 1870, the receiver filed a
against issuprotest with the commissioner
ing any further patents for lands reserved to
the company, but the commissioner and governor disregarded the protest and issued 32
the
additional patents within the reserve;
whole of the land thus patented amoimting
to nearly 20,000 acres.
Hereupon on the same 20th of January,
1871, Gray, who was a citizen of New York,
filed a bill in the court below against one
Davis, governor of the state of Texas, and
Kuechler, already mentioned as commissionThe biller of the land office of the state.
averring that "the Memphis, El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company" is "a corporation
created by and existing under certain statutes
of Texas," already referred to, and that it
hid done "all acts and things necessary to_
the full and complete vesting, securing, and
preserving of the franchises, rights, and privileges granted thereby"— set forth a history
much as above given.
It averred that the
company was Insolvent, and could not continue the construction of the road, and that
the holders of said bonds would necessarily
be remitted to the security of the mortgages;

that the said security was worthless unless
the receiver, under order of court, should be
able to sell the franchises and property of
said company to some party or parties who,
by constructing the road, should acquire the
lands referred to in the mortgages, and hold
the same subject to the lien of them.
It set
forth that the general laws of Texas authorized to the fullest extent the conveyance of
the franchises of a railway company by ^ale
under execution or foreclosure; and that by
act of July 27th, 1870, the Southern Transcontinental Railroad Company was created,
and, as before mentioned, was expressly authorized by its charter to "purchase the
rights, franchises, and property of the Memphis, El Paso & Pacffic Railroad Company,
incorporated by the state;" that
heretofore
Company
the Southern Transcontinental
stood ready to do this, and to devote the
lands to be acquired by the exercise of said
Memphis & El Paso franchises to the settlement of the land grant mortgage debt,
provided the receiver could convey the charter, the land grant, and the grant of the
land

reservation

imimpaired

and

in. full

force.

It set forth further, that the receiver, on
for a transfer of the franchises
negotiating
of the company, foimd that the marlcet for
them was peculiar,' In the following respects:
It was limited, as the franchises are only of
use or value to those who desired and were
able to construct the road; it depended in
of and
great measure upon the reputation
in the enterprise, and a belief
confidence
among capitalists, outside of the state of
Texas, that the state could and would have
to abide by the grants contained in the charter; that it depended peculiarly and essentially upon the preservation of the land
grant and land reservation, inasmuch as the
country through which the road was to be
built was sparsely inhabited, without cities

or towns to furnish local traffic; that Texas
lands at a distance from raUroads were of
but nominal value compared with lands
along the line of the roads, and that the
Southern Transcontinental Railroad Company, to whom the receiver chiefly looked as a
purchaser, already had the right of way
across the state and parallel with the route
of the Memphis & El Paso charter, following "as near as might be practicable the old
survey of the Memphis & El Paso road;"
making the mere right of way of the latter
of comparatively little value without the
lands and the reservation.
It asserted that the acts of the governor
and commissioner of the land office, in executing and causing to issue patents for the
reserve, were, and their continuance would
be, irretrievable destruction of that portion
of the franchise of the company which consisted of the right to have the odd sections
of the reservation devoted exclusively to the
location and patenting of the company's certificates, would destroy all confidence in the
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other grants of the company, as well as in
the grant of the reservation, and render the
franchise of the company valueless in the
hands of the receiver, doing irreparable injury to the interests committed to his charge.
It set forth further that the Southern
Transcontinental Company asserted and insisted to the receiver, that unless the said
acts were judicially declared unlawful, and
perpetually restrained, the said franchises
would be valueless to them, and that they
would not carry out the purchase of the
same.

[It was an admitted fact in the

case, that
Memphis, El Paso & Pacific Railroad
Company had never sectionized or numbered
the land reservation of the same west of
Brazos river, or any portion of said reservation west of said river; and that no work
had been done on the road of the said company before or since the year 1861, either
by grading or otherwise, except those as already affirmatively stated and set forth.]
The bill further asserted that the charter
of the company was a contract between the
state and the company, which contract was
now in the hands of the complainant as receiver, and under direction of a coiu:t of
equity, to be used for the benefit of the creditors of the company; that the said provisions of the constitution of Texas and the
said ordinance of convention impaired the obligation and value of the said contract, and
and
also of the said contracts of mortgage,
were in so far contrary to article 1, § 10,
of the constitution of the United States,
which declares that "no state shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts,"
and were in so far null and void; and that
the acts of the governor of the state and
commissioner of the land office, in issuing
such patents, were without authority of law,
and illegal, and that any repetition of the
The
same should be perpetually restrained.
bill prayed an injunction accordingly.
As a reason for confining the bill to the
two defendants named, an amendment to
the hUl alleged that the complainant had
applied at the general land office of Texas,
to have the number and names of the parother
ties who had located land certificates
than those issued to the Memphis, El Paso
& Pacific Railroad Company, on lands within and forming a part of the land reservation of the said company, and to obtain a
list of the same; that he had been informed,
on making such application, and by the defendant, Kuechler, the commissioner of the
general land office, that the number of the
same was very great, to wit, many hundreds,
and that a list could not be furnished without great time and labor. The amendment
further alleged that parties were constantly
making locations and surveys of land certificates as aforesaid on the lands of said
reservation; and that parties who had made
months
such locations and surveys had
allowed them by law, after making the same,
the
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before they were required to make returns
thereof to the commissioner
of the general
land office, and that the complainant was
consequently unable, and never would be
able, to obtain a correct list of such parties.
To this bill the defendants demurred:
(1) Because it did not appear from it that
the defendants, or either of them, had any
direct or personal Interest in the lands which
were the subject-matters of this suit; but
on the contrary that they were sued in
their official capacities only; and that the
lands were a part of the public domain of
the state of Texas, which was not and
could not be made a party to this suit.
(2) Because it did not appear that while
under the amendment 11 to the constitution
of the United States [which declares that
"the judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity commenced or prosecuted
against onfe of the United States by citizens
of another state, or by citizens or subjects
of a foreign state"], the court could have
as between the complainant
no jurisdiction
and the state of Texas, jurisdiction existed
in a suit against two of the officers of said
state in their official capacity alone, to decree portions of the constitution of the state,
which had been accepted by the congress
of the United States, and which the defendants were sworn to obey, void.
(S) Because it did not appear that the bill
was founded on fraud, accident, mistake,
trust, specific performance, or any ground
or that the same set
of equity jurisdiction;
out any equity against the defendants whatever; on the contrary, it appeared that the
bUl was brought to have sections 5 and 7
of article ten of the constitution of the state
of Texas decreed void.
(4) Because it did not_ appear that the
complainant, being an officer of the com't,
had a right to sue the defendants therein,
nor that the court could have jurisdiction
as between the complainant, though a citizen of the state of New York, and the defendants, as citizens of the state of Texas,
in either their respective official or individual capacities.
the "act incorporating the
(5) Because
Memphis, El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company," and the other acts referred to in
the bill, did not amount to a contract between the state of Texas and the company.
(6) Because it did not appear that any
designated third person or persons was or
were about to have a patent granted him or
them by the defendants, and that such third
person or persons was or were sought to be
made a party or parties, nor that said bUl
was not too vague and indefinite.
(7) Because it did not appear that the creditors not specified of the company were made
parties thereto, nor that the persons not specified applying for patents on locations of certificates, within the limits of the lands that
were reserved, were made parties thereto; all
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of whom, according to the hill, had equities
that ought to be aetermined in this suit, and
hence were necessary and proper parties to
this suit.
(8) Because it did not appear that the complainant had any equities that he was not
bound to have litigated against such third persons not specified, and also against those not
specified who had located certificates
within
the limits of the lands that were reserved, before he would have a right (which was not
conceded) to invoke any action by means of
a bill in a court of equity, In case such a court
might have jurisdiction.
The demurrer was overruled, and, no answer
being filed, a decree pro eonfesso was taken
for the complainant, and on the 16th of February, 1871, a final decree was granted In accordance with the prayer of the hill, to the
following effect:
"That In July, 1870, and at
of Gray as rethe time of the appointment
ceiver, and at the date of the decree, the company was duly possessed of the franchise and
right of and to the land grant and land reservation of the company; that the said right
and the franchise of the company were unimpaired, and In full force and virtue; that the
provisions of the constitution of Texas, and of
said ordinance of convention, so far as they
impaired, or purported to Impair the said charter, land grant, or land reservation, were contrary to the provisions of article 1, section 10,
of the constitution of the United States, and
were In so far, null and void; and that the
enjoined
be perpetually
defendants
should
from Issuing, or causing or permitting to issue, any patent of the lands of the odd sections of said reservation, except on the certificates granted to the company, or Its assigns."
From this decree appeal was taken by the
defendants to this court.

T. J. Durant and G. F. Moore, for appellants.
B. R. Curtis, J. A. Davenport, and C. Parker,
for appellees.
SWAYNE, Justice. This Is an appeal In
equity from the decree of the circuit court of
the United States for the Western district of
Texas. The appellee was the complainant in
The defendants demurred to
the court below.
The
the bin. The demurrer was overruled.
stood by it. A decree as prayed
defendants
for was thereupon rendered pro eonfesso for
The defendants removed the
the complainant.
case to this court by appeal, and It Is now before us, as It was before thp court below, upon the demurrer to the bill. This brings the
whole case as made by the bill under review.
The facts aveiTed, so far as they are material,
are to be taken as admitted and true.
We
shall refer to them accordingly.
The question
presented for our determination Is, whether
the circuit court erred In overruling the demurrer. The appellants
having elected not to answer, the decree for the complainant followed
as of course.
At the outset of our examination of the

case, we are met by Jurisdictional objections
as to the parties— both complainant
and defendants—which, before proceeding further,
must be disposed of.
We will consider first,
those which relate to the complainant, and
then, those with respect to the defendants.
The complainant was appointed to his office
of receiver, in the suit In equity of Forbes and
Ea Paso & Paothers against the Memphis,
cific Railroad Company, a corporation created
by the state of Texas. The suit was in the
same court whence this appeal was taken. In
that case, on the 6th of July, 1870, It was,
among other things, ordered and decreed, that
should be enjoined from disthe corporation
posing of any of its effects, and that John A.
0. Gray, the complainant In this suit, should
be, and he was thereby "appointed receiver;
to take possession of the moneys and assets,
roadbed,
road, and all
real and personal;
property whatsoever, of the said Memphis, Bl
Paso & Pacific Railroad Company, wheresoever the same may be found, with power under the special order of the court, from time
to time to be made, to manage, control, and
exercise aU the franchises, whatsoever, of said
company, and. If need be, under the direction
of the court, to sell, transfer, and convey the
road, roadbed, and other property of said company, as an entire thing," &c.
On the 20th of January, 1871, It was further ordered by the court "that the said John A.
C. Gray, receiver as aforesaid, be, and he is
hereby, authorized and empowered to defend
and continue all suits brought by or against
the said Memphis, Bl Paso, and Pacific Railroad Company, whether before or after the appointment of said receiver, and whether In
dethe name of said company or otherwise;
fend all suits brought against him as such reand to
ceiver or affecting Kis receivership,
bring such suits In the name of said company,
or In the name of said receiver, as he may be
advised by counsel to be necessary and proper in the discharge of the duties of his office,
and for acquiring, securing, and protecting the
assets, franchises, and rights of the said company and of the said receiver, and for securing and protecting the land grant and land
reservation of the said company."
It Is to be presumed the receiver filed this
bill, as it Is framed In accordance with the
12
Bank v. Dandridge,
advice of counsel.

Wheat. 70.
The authority given by the decree Is ample.
Still the question arises whether It was
competent for him to proceed In his own name
instead of the name of the company whose
rights he seeks by this bill to assert. A receiver Is appointed upon a principle of justice
for the benefit of all concerned. Every kind
of property of such a nature that, if legal. It
might be taken In execution, may. If equitable,
be put into his possession.
Hence the appointment has been said to be an equitable exHe is virtually a representative of
ecution.
the court, and of all the parties In interest In
the litigation wherein be is appointed.
Jer-
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emy, Eq. 249; Davis v. Duke of Marlborough,
2 Swanst. 125; Shakel v. Duke of Marlborough, 4 Madd. 463.
He is required to take
possession of property as directed, because It
Is deemed more for the Interests of justice that
he should do so than that the property should
be in the possession of either of the parties in

Wyatt Prae. Reg. 355. He
the litigation.
is not appointed for the benefit of either of
the parties, but of aU concerned.
Money op
property in his hands is in eustodla legis. In
re Colvln, 3 Md. C!h. Dec. 278; Delany v.
Mansfield, 1 Hogan, 234. He has only such
power and authority as are given him by the
court, and must not exceed the prescribed limBank v. "White, 6 Barb. 589; Verplanck
its.
V. Insurance Co., 2 Paige, 452.
The court
win not allow him to be sued touching the
property in his charge, nor for any malfeasance as to the parties, or others, without its
consent;
nor will it permit his possession to
be disturbed by force, nor violence to be offered to his person while in the discharge of
his official duties. In such cases the court will
vindicate its authority, and, if need be, will
punish the offender by fine and imprisonDe Groot v. Jay, 30 Barb.
ment for contempt.
483; Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves. 335; Russell v.
Railroad Co., 3 Macn. & G. 104; Parker v.
Browning, 8 Paige, 388; Noe v. Gibson, 7
Paige, 513; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 833, A. & B.
The same rules are applied to the possession
2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1433.
of a sequestrator.
Where property in the hands of the receiver
is claimed by another, the right may be tried
by proper issues at law, by a reference to a
master, or otherwise, as the court in its discretion may see fit to direct. Empringham v.
Short, 3 Hare, 470.
Where property, in the
possession of a third person, is claimed by
the receiver, the complainant must make such
person a party by amending the blU, or the
receiver must proceed against him by suit in
the ordinary way. 8 Paige, 388; Noe v. Gibson, 7 Paige, 513; 2 Story, Bq. Jur. supra; 2
Jae. & W. 176; 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1433.
After tenants have attorned to the receiver,
he may distrain for rent in arrear in his own
2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1437. In a suit
name.
between partners he may be required to carry
on the business, in order to preserve the goodwill of the establishment, until a sale can be
Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479.
effected.
Here the property in question is not In the
The possesof the defendants.
possession
He
sion of the receiver has not been invaded.
has not been in possession, is not seeking possession;
and there Is no question in the case
relating to that subject. But the order of the
court expressly requires the receiver to secure and protect "the assets, franchises, and
rights," and "the land grant and reservation
of said company." He Is seeking to perform
that duty by enjoining the appellants from
doing Illegal acts, which the bill alleges. If
done, would render the rights and title of the
company to the Immense property last men-
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tioned,
of greatly diminished value, If not
wholly worthless.
We think it is competent for him to perform this function in the mode he has adopted. The decree, in the case wherein he was
appointed, expressly authorizes him to sue for
that purpose in his own name. The order was
made by a court of adequate authority in the
regular exercise of its jurisdiction. No appeal
has been taken, and the order stands unreversed.
This bill is auxiliary to the original suit.
Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 451; Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 327. It is analogous to a petition by a receiver to the court to protect
his possession from disturbance, or the property in his charge from threatened injury or
destruction. No title in the receiver is necessary to warrant such an application, or the
administration by the court of the proper
remedy.
There can be no valid objection to
the receiver here, in analogy to that proceeding, maintaining this suit.
In the progress
and growth of equity jurisdiction it has become usual to clothe such officers with much
larger powers than were formerly conferred.
In some of the states they are by statutes
charged with the duty of settling the affairs
of certain corporations
when insolvent, and
are authorized expressly to sue in their own
It is not unusual for courts of equity
names.
to put them in charge of the railroads of companies which have fallen into financial embarrassment, and to require them to operate
such roads, until the difficulties are removed,
or such arrangements are made that the roads
can be sold with the least sacrifice of the inIn all such cases
terests of those concerned.
the receiver is the right arm of the jurisdicAs regards the statutes, we see
tion invoked.
no reason why a court of equity, in the exercise of its undoubted authority, may not accomplish all the best results intended to be
secured by such legislation, without its aid.
A few remarks will be sufficient to dispose
of the jurisdictional objections as to the ap-

pellants.
In Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat 738, three
things, among others, were decided:
(1) A circuit court of the United States, In a
proper case in equity, may enjoin a state officer from executing a state law in conflict
with the constitution or a statute of the United States, when such execution will violate
the rights of the complainant.
(2) Where the state Is concerned, the state
should be made a party, If It could be done.
That It cannot be done is a sufficient reason
for the omission to do It, and the court may
proceed to decree against the officers of the
state In all respects as if the state were a
party to the record.
(3) In deciding who are parties to the suit
the court will not look beyond the record.
Making a state officer a party does not make
the state a party, although her law may have
prompted his action, and the state may stand
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behind him as the real party In Interest.
A
state can be made a party only by shaping the
bill expressly with that view, as where individuals or corporations are intended to be put
in that relation to the case. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Bank v. Knoop, 16 How.
369; Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Trust Co.
V. Debolt, 16 How. 432; and Bank v. Debolt, 18
How, 380,— proceeded upon the same principles, and were controlled by that authority,
with respect to the jurisdictional question arising In each of those cases as to the defendant.
In Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, a
writ of mandamus was issued to the proper
representative
of the state of Arkansas to
compel him to receive the paper of the Bank
of the State of Arkansas in payment of a judgment which the state had recovered against
the relator. The bank was wholly owned by
the state, and the claim was made under a
clause in the charter which had been repealed. Judgment was given against the respondent.
The question of jurisdiction does not
In Ourran v.
appear to have been raised.
Arkansas, 15 How. 304, it appeared that the
A creditor's bill
bank had become insolvent.
was filed to reach its assets. The objection
was taken that the state could not be sued.
This court answered that the objection involved a question of local law, and that as the
state permitted herself to be sued in her own
tribunals, that was conclusive upon the subject. According to the jurisprudence of Texas, suits like this can be maintained against
the public officers who approyrlately represent
her touching the Interests involved in the controversy.
Ward V. Townsend, 2 Tex. 581;
Cohen v. Smith, 8 Tex. 51; Commissioner General Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471; McLelland V. Shaw, 15 Tex. 319; Stewart v. CrosIn the application of this prinby, Id. 547.
ciple there Is no difference between the governor of a state and officers of a state of
lower grades. In this respect they are upon a

footing of equality.
Whitman v. The Governor, 5 Ohio St. 528; Houston & G. N. R.
Co. V. Kuechler, Sup. Ct Tex., not yet re,
ported.
[36 Tex. 382].
A party by going into a national court does
remedy of
not lose any right or appropriate
which he might have availed himself in the
The wise
state courts of the same locality.
policy of the constitution gives him a choice
of tribunals. In the former he may hope to
escape the local influences which sometimes
disturb the even flow of justice. And In the
regular course of procedure, if the amount involved be large enough, he may have access
to this tribunal as the final arbiter of his
rights. Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236. Upon the grounds of the jurisprudence of both
the United States and of Texas we hold this
bill well brought as regards the defendants.
It is Insisted that the corporation, on behalf of which this suit was instituted, has
ceased to exist.
The bill avers that "the Memphis,

El Paso

•
•
•
& Pacific Railroad Company"
is
"a corporation created by and existing under
certain statutes of the state of Texas hereinafter set forth," and that withm the times
limited by the charter and extended by other
acts the company
"did all acts and things
necessary to the full and complete vesting, securing, and preserving
of the franchises,
rights, and privileges granted thereby."
The
demurrer admits the truth of these averments
unless they are inconsistent with the statutes
which bear upon the subject.
The corporation was created by an act of the legislature
By
of Texas, approved February 4th, 1856.
the first section certain parties are named and
created a body politic and corporate, alid the
general powers inherent in all such bodies are
formally given.
The second gives the right
on the
to construct a railway, commencing
eastern boundary of the state, between Sulphur Fork and. Red River, at the western
terminus of the Mississippi, Ouachita & Red
River Railroad, or of the Cairo & Fulton Railroad, and running thence westerly to the Rio
Grande, opposite to or near the town of El
Paso. The twentieth section declares that
no rights shall vest under the charter until a
certain amount of stock therein named shall

have been subscribed, and the percentage preThis
scribed shall have been paid upon it.
requirement
Is covered by the averment in
the bill that the company had done everything necessary to secure the vesting of all
the franchises given to it. We do not understand that there is any controversy on this
All the other conditions prescribed,
subject.
Involving the existence of the corporation,
They are found in
are clearly subsequent.
section of the charter, in the
the fourteenth
first section of the act of February 5th, 1856,
and in the third section of the act of February 10th, 1858.
To any argument drawn
from these provisions there are two conclusive

answers:
(1) There has been no judgment of ouster
and dissolution. Without this they are inoperative.
they
To make them effectual
must be grasped and wielded by the proper
judicial action.
See Aug. & A. Corp. § 777,
and the authorities there cited.
(2) The offences and punishment denounced have been condoned and waived by the
subsequent action of the legislature. The act
of March 20th, 1861; the act for the relief of railroad companies, approved January
11th, 1862; the act for the relief of companies incorporated for purposes of internal
improvement, approved February 18th, 1862;
and the third section of the "Act to incorporate the Transcontinental Railroad Company," of the 27th July, 1870, each and
all have that effect The section last mentioned authorizes the company therein named to "purchase the rights, franchises, and
property of the Memphis, El Paso & Pacific
Railroad Company, heretofore incorporated
by this state." This is a clear affirmation,
by implication, of the existence of the cor-
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poratlon, and of the possession of the rights,
franchises, and property conferred by its
-charter.
What is implied is as efEectual as
what is expressed.
U. S. v. Babbit, 1 Black,
57.
These considerations are so clearly concliisiTe, that it is needless to advert more
particularly in this connection to the legislation in question, or to pursue the subject
further. There is no warrant for the proposition that the corporation had ceased to
■exist

The heart of this litigation lies in the Immense land grant which is in controversy between the parties.
The objections we have

considered are only outworks thrown up to
prevent the conflict from reaching that point.
It is insisted that the rights of the company
touching the entire reservation have become
forfeited.
The fifteenth section of the charter provides as follows: "All the vacant lands within eight miles on each side of the extension
line of said road, shall be exempt from location or entry, from and after the time when
such line shall be designated by survey, recThe lands hereby reognition, or otherwise.
served shall be surveyed by said company
at their expense, and the alternate or even
for the use of the state.
•sections reserved
And it shall be the duty of said company to
furnish the district surveyor of each district
through
which said roadway runs, with a
map of the track of said road, together with
as may be necessary to the
-such field-notes
proper understanding and designation of the
same."

There are other provisions prescribing various details not necessary to be particularly
stated or considered.
A proviso in the seventeenth section declares that no title shall be permanently
vested in the company or their assigns for
land granted for the grading as contemplated
by the act, until twenty-five miles of the
road shall have been completed and put in
running order.
The proviso in the twentieth
section of the charter, that no rights shall
vest under it until the condition therein prescribed is complied with, has already been
considered. Conditions of forfeiture of the
lands granted are prescribed in this and subThey are found in the foursequent acts.
teenth section of this act; in the first and
fourth sections of the supplemental act of
the same date; and In the third and fourth
sections of the act of February 10th, 1858.
These conditions will be considered hereafter.
The act for the relief of internal Improvement companies of February 18th, 1862, declared that the time of the continuance of
the war between the Confederate States and
the United States should not be computed
against any internal improvement company
in reckoning the period allowed them for the
completion of any work they had contracted
to do.

The act of January 11th,

1862,

for the relief
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of railroad companies enacted that the failure of any chartered railroad company of
the state to complete any part of its road,
as required by existing laws, should not operate as a forfeiture of its charter or of the
lands to which the company would be entitled, under the provisions of the act entitled "An act to encourage the construction
of railroads in Texas by donations of land,"
approved January 30th, 1854, and the several
acts supplementary thereto, provided the
company should complete such portion of
its road as would entitle it to donations of
land under existing laws within two years
from the close of the war.
The act for the benefit of railroad companies of November 13th, 1866, declared that
the grant of sixteen sections of land to the
mile to railroad companies
theretofore, or
thereafter, constructing railroads in Texas,
should be extended under the same restrictions and limitations theretofore provided
by law, for ten years after the passage of the
act.
These several acts are valid. See the
33d section of the constitution
of Texas of
1869, and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.
By an act approved July 27th, 1870, the
Southern Transcontinental Railroad Company
was incorporated.
It was declared that the object of the
company thus created was to construct and
establish a railway line and telegraphic commvmication from the eastern boundary of the
state of Texas, "and thence as near as practicable to the route of the Memphis, El Paso
& Pacific Railroad Company, to, or near,
the town of El Paso."
It was enacted that
"the main line of said road shall follow, as
near as may be practicable, the old survey
of the Memphis & El Paso road." It was
further enacted that "the said company, hereby incorporated, may purchase the rights,
franchises, and property of the Memphis,
El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company, heretofore incorporated by this state," as before
mentioned.

The first section of the ordinance of 1869
declared that aU heads of families settled
on vacant lands lying within the Memphis
& El Paso railroad reserve, should be entitled to receive from the state of Texas
eighty acres of land, including the place occupied,
upon payment of the expenses of
survey and patent.
By the second section it was declared that
all the vacant land within the reserve was
setopen to sale to settlers and pre-emption
tlers, and subject to the location of land
certificates. The third section declared that
the company had forfeited its right- to the
land, and that certain certificates having been
issued to the company and patents issued
thereon, it was made the duty of the attorneygeneral to institute legal proceedings to have
such certificates and patents cancelled.
In November, 1869, the present constitution -of Texas was adopted.
It was subsequently approved by congress.
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Sections
as follows:
"Sec. 5.
served for
companies
cation and

5 and 7 of this

constitution are

All public lands heretofore rethe benefit of railroads or railway
shall hereafter be subject to losiu-vey by any geniune land cer-

tificates."

"Sec. 7. All lands granted to railway companies which have not been alienated by
said companies in conformity with the terms
and the laws
of their charter respectively,
of the state under which the grants were
made, are hereby declared forfeited to the
state for the benefit of the school fund."
This summary gives a view of the statutory and constitutional provisions necessary
in disposing of the questo be considered
tion before us.
On the 20th of June, 1857, the company
filed in the land office at Austin surveys
showing the line of the road from the eastern
boundary of the state to El Paso, which line
was officially recognized by the commissionBy
er of the general land office of Texas.
had
the 1st of March, 1860, the company
and numbered all the
surveyed, sectionlzed,
sections and fractional sections of the vacant lands within the reservation, from the
eastern boundary of the state to the crossing
of the Brazos, of which due retmns were
and by him acmade to the commissioner,
By the 10th of May, 1859, the comcepted.
pany had. marked and designated the central
line of the road from the Brazos to the
Colorado,
and made proper returns to the
by whom they
office of the commissioner,
The lands granted to the
were accepted.
company thereby became defined and officially recognized as such along the whole extent

of their line.
In doing this work the company

surveyed,
numbered, and mapped each alternate or even
section of public lands for two hundred and
fifty miles in length, and sixteen miles in
It
width, in behalf of the state of Texas.
was of great benefit to her, and is reported
to the receiver to have cost the company more

than $100,000.

By consent of parties the bill was amended
nunc pro tunc in three particulars. The complainant admitted that no land within the re-

serve had been surveyed, sectionized, or numbered west of the Brazos river, and that no
work had been done on the road before or
since 1861, except as averred in the bill. He
averred that he applied to the general land
office for the number and names of those who
other than such as
had located certificates
were issued to the company upon lands vrithin
and that Kuechler, the dethe reservation,
fendant, answered that the number was very
great, amounting to hundreds, and that a list
could not be furnished without great time and
labor.
He averred further that parties were
constantly locating certificates and making surveys within the reservation,
and that they
were allowed a specified time to make their

returns, so that it was impossible for him to>
obtain a full list of such parties.
The company commenced work withia one
year from the 1st of March, 1856, and before
the 1st of March, 1861, had completely graded
more than fifty miles of Its roadway, beginning at the eastern boundary line of the state
and extending
west in the direction of El
Paso. See section 3 of the act of February
10th, 1858.
We do not understand that up to that time
there was a Ijreach of any condition touching
the existence of the corporation or its right to
Before that
the lands within the reservation.
time the tracts east of the Brazos covered by
the grant were definitely fixed by the surveys
which the company had made. The title of
the company to those west of the Brazos,
though the sections were not designated, was
equally valid. The good will of a lease which
the landlord is in the habit of renewing is
property, and rights growing out of it, whether
by contract or otherTvise, will be protected and
Phyfe v. Warenforced by a court of equity.
See, also, Amour v. Alexdell, 5 Paige, 268.
ander, 10 Paige, 571.
The rights of the company west of the Brazos were of a much more substantial character
than those which were the subjects of judicial
action In the cases cited.
The real estate of a corporation is a disBut the right
tinct thing from its franchises.
to acquire and sell real estate is a franchise,,
and the right to acquire the particular real
estate designated In the charter of this company, and here in question, is withui that
category.
It might, therefore, well be doubted whether this right could be taken from the
proceeding
company without an appropriate
instituted for that purpose, and prosecuted to
Judgment by the state. But the view which
we take of the case renders it unnecessary to
pursue the subject.
We will recur to the conditions of forfeiture
touching the land grant, and consider them irrespective of that point.
The provisions tot
section of thethat effect, in the fourteenth
charter, are expressly superseded by those In
act of
the first section of the supplemental
February 5th, 1856.
The fourth section of
These
that act prescribes a further condition.
provisions again are superseded by the third
and fourth sections of the amendatory act of
February 10th, 1858.
The conditions prescribed by the last-named act are:
the reserve as far as the
(1) To survey
Brazos river, within four years from the 1st

of March, 1856.
(2) To run and designate the centre line of
the reservation from the Brazos to the Colorado, within fifteen months from the 10th of
February, 1858.
(3) To survey the whole reserve within ten
years from February 10th, 1858.
with some road
(4) To have a connection
leading to the Mississippi or Gulf of Mexico
within ten years from February 10th, 1868.
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(5) That the company shall have finished
•and In running order at least twenty-five miles
•of their road within one year after it is con-

nected with certain other roads mentioned in
the act, and at least fifty miles every two
jears thereafter nntil the road is completed.
(6) That the right to acquire lands from the
state by donation shall cease at the expiration
of fifteen years from February 10th, 1858.
The two first conditions
were performed
within the time prescribed.
These points are
covered by the averments
of the bill. The
time limited for the performance
of the third
and fourth is extended from February 10th,
1868, to June 10th, 1873, by adding the time
of the continuance of the war, according to
the act of February 18th, 1862, before referred
to.
When the bill was filed- there were no
such roads as those mentioned
in the fifth
condition with which a connection
could be
formed.
The fifteen years limited by the sixth
condition expired February 10th, 1873. The
period that elapsed during the war is to be
added.
That extends the time so much further.

The title of the company is therefore unaffected by the breach of any condition annexed to the grant.
But suppose there had been such breaches,
as is insisted by the counsel for the appellants,
the result must still be the same.
Except as to a small portion of the land In
question the legal title is yet in the state.
Whatever may be the right of the company
it is whoUy equitable In its character.
With
a few exceptions, which have no applicability
in this case, the same rules apply in equity to
equitable estates as are applied at law to legal
They are alike descendible, devisaestates.
ble, alienable, and barrable. Jickling, Estates,
17; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 281.
There is wide distinction between a condition precedent, where no title has vested and
none is to vest until the condition is performed, and a condition subsequent,
operating by
way of defeasance.
In the former case equity
can give no relief.
The failure to perform is
an inevitable bar.
No right can ever vest.
The result is very different where the condition is subsequent.
There equity will interpose and relieve against the forfeiture upon
the principle of compensation, where that principle can be applied, giving damages, if damages should be given, and the proper amount!
Wells v. Smith, 2 Edw.
can be ascertained.
Ch. 78; see, also, as to the principle of compensation, Beaty v. Harkey, 2 Smedes & M. 563.
By the common law a freehold estate could
not be created without livery of seizin, and it
could not be determined without some act in
pals of equal notoriety. Conditions subsequent
are not favored in the law (4 Kent, Comm.
129), and when they are sought to be enforced
in an action at law, there must have been a
re-entry, or something equivalent to it, or the
The right to sue at law for
suit must fail.
The action must
the breach Is not alienable.
be brought by the grantor or some one in priv-
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ity of blood with him. NicoII v. Raih:oad Co..
N. Y. 121; Ludlow v. Eaih-oad Co., 12
Barb. 440; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488.
In Dumpor's Case, 4 Reports, 119, it was decided that a condition
not to alien without
license is finally determined by the first license
12

given.

Here the controlling consideration
is, that
the performance
of all the conditions not performed was prevented by the state herself.
By plunging into the war, and prosecuting it,
she confessedly rendered it impossible for the
company to fulfil duriug its continuance.
This
is alleged hi the bill, and admitted by the de-

murrer.
The rule at law Is, that if a condition subsequent be possible at the time of making it,
and becomes afterwards impossible to be complied with, by the act of God, or the law, or
the grantor, the estate having once vested, is
not thereby divested, but becomes absolute.
Co. Litt. 206a, 208b; 2 Bl. Comm. 156; 4 Kent,
Comm. *130.
The analogy of that rule applied
here would blot out these conditions.
But this
would be harsh and work injustice. Equity
vrill, therefore, not apply the principle to
that extent.
It will regard the conditions as
If no particular time for performance were
specified.
In such cases the rule is that the
performance must be vrithin a reasonable
time. Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick. 528; 4
Kent, Comm. *125, 126; Com. Dig. tit. "Condition G, 5." We are clear in our conviction
that, under the circumstances,
a reasonable
time for performance had not elapsed when
this bill was filed. As the state, by the act
of July 27th, 1870, created the Southern
Transcontinental Railroad Company, and authorized that company to "purchase the
rights, franchises, and property of the Memphis, El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company,"
it will be but right to allow a reasonable
time for that purchase to be made, if such
an arrangement can be effected, and for the
vendee thereafter to perform all that was
Incumbent upon the Memphis, El Paso &
Pacific Railroad Company by its charter and
the supplementary and amendatory acts.
If
that arrangement cannot be made, the latter company will have the right to provide
othervpise for the fulfilment of its obligations
to the state within such time, and thus consummate Its Inchoate title to the lands within the reservation. Either will be in accordance with the principles of reason and
justice, and within the spirit of well-considWalker v. Wheeler, 2
ered adjudications.
Conn. 299; Beaty v. Harkey, 2 Smedes &
M. 563; Moss v. Matthews, 3 Yes. Jr. 279;
2 Vctu. 366; 1 Vern. 83; 3 Brown, Ch. 256;
Taylor v. Popham, 1 Brown, Oh. 168; 1 Bac.
Abr. 642; 1 Madd. Ch. Prac. 41, 42; Bank v.
Smith, 3 Gill & J. 265.
Both parties will thus be put in the same
situation, as near as may be, as if the breachNeither wiU be subes had not occurred.
jected to any serious hardship.
The state,
by her own acts, has lost the benefits of an
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earlier completion of the work. The company has lost the Income which it might
have enjoyed, and has doubtless been thrown
into embarrassments it would have escaped.
The circumstances do not call for a severe
application of the rules of law upon either
side.

Breaches of such conditions may be waivby the grantor expressly
or In pais.
Dumpor's Case, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. Bq. 85,
Am. note. Such waiver is expressed in the
statutes relating to the subject, to which we
have referred, except the act creating the
Transcontinental Company, and there it exists by the clearest implication.
That the act of incorporation and the land
grant here in question, were contracts, is
too well settled in this court to require discussion.
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 137;
New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 166; Dartmouth College V. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518;
Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369. As such, they
were within the protection of that clause of
of the United States which
the constitution
declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The ordinance of 1869, and the constitution adopted in that year, in so far as they concern
the question under consideration, are nullities, and may be laid out of view. Von
HofEman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535.
When a state becomes a party to a contract,
as in the case before us, the same rules of
law are applied to her as to private persons
When she or her
under like circumstances.
representatives are properly brought into the
forum of litigation, neither she nor they can
assert any right or immunity as incident to her
political sovereignty.
Curran v. Arkansas, 15
How. 308.
A case more imperatively demanding the
exercise of jurisdiction in equity could hardly be imagined than that presented in this
bill. Should the interposition invoked be
refused, doubtless the reservation would
adverse
speedily be thatched over with
claims. A cloud would not only be thrown
upon the title of the company, but the time,
litigation, labor, and expense involved in the
vindication of its rights, would very greatly
lessen the value of the grant and materially
ed

delay the progress of the work it was Into aid. The injury would be irrepar-

tended
able.

It

is the peculiar

function

of a court

of equity in a case like this to avert such
results.
it has been insisted that those holding adverse claims should have been brought into
the case as parties. They are too numerous for that to be done.
An applicatioii was
made to one of the defendants for a list of
their names, and it was not given.
The important questions which have arisen between the appellants and the company can
all be properly determined without the presence of other parties than those before us.
The parties referred to are sufficiently represented for the purposes of this litigation by
the governor and the commissioner of the
general land office. We feel no difficulty in
disposing of the case as It Is presented in the
record.

There are other points, ably maintained
by the learned counsel for the appellants, to
which we have not adverted. They are sufficiently answered by what has been said. It
would extend this opinion unnecessarily, and
could

serve no useful

purpose,

specifically

consider them.
The circuit court decided correctly.
decree appealed from is affirmed.

to

The

Mr. Justice HTTNT did not hear the argument in this case and did not participate
in its decision.
Mr. Justice DAVIS, with whom concurred the CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting, said:
am constrained to enter my dissent to the
opinion and judgment of the court in this
case, for the reason that this suit, although
in form otherwise, is in effect against the
state of Texas. The object which it seeks
to obtain shows this to be so, which is to
deprive the state of the power to dispose,
in its own way, of its public lands, and this
object, by the decision just rendered, is accomplished. In my judgment the bill should
have been dismissed, because the state is
exempt from suit at tne instance of private
persons, and on the face of the bill it is
apparent that the state is arraigned as a defendant.

I

KECEIVERS."
In

re

FLOWERS

et aL

{1 Q. B. Div. 14.)
Court of Appeal.
Oct 30,

1896.

Appeal from an order of a registrar In
bankruptcy dismissing a petition for a receiving order presented against the debtors.
The debtors were a firm consisting of five
members, some of whom, being desirous of
dissolving partnership, commenced an action
In the chancery division, and in that action
a receiver and manager was appointed. The
members of the firm thereupon ceased to attend at the place of business, and the business was carried on by the manager. The
petitioning creditors, who had previously
brought an action against the firm, -obtained
judgment and issued a bankruptcy notice,
which was served on four out of the five
partners. The fifth partner could not be
found, and the notice was thereupon served
on the receiver and manager at the place of
On objection that no proper servbusiness.
ice of the notice had been effected, the registrar dismissed the petition.
The petitioning creditors appealed.

F. Cooper Willis, for petitioning creditors.
Muir Mackenzie, for debtors.

I

am of opinion that
LORD ESHER, M. R.
come
this appeal should be dismissed, and
to that conclusion upon what I consider to be
the true construction of rule 260. As to the
position of the receiver appointed by the
court, he is the officer and servant of the
court, and not of the partners. As I pointed
out in the case of Burt v. BuU (1895) 1 Q. B.
276, only the court can dismiss him, or give
him directions as to the mode of carrying on
the business, or interfere with him If he Is

I
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not carrying on the business properly, and
he is in no sense the servant of the partnership.
On the true construction of rule 260,
I think there is a necessary implication that
the person described in the rule as having
the control or management of the business
must be a person having authority from the
partners, and acting as their agent, and that
consequently the rule does not apply to a receiver and manager appointed by the court,
and deriving his authority from that appointment, and not from the partners. The service was therefore ineffectual, and the registrar was right in dismissing the petition.

LOPES, L. J. I am of the same opinion.
The material words of rule 260 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1890, are, "any person having
at the time of service the control or manageI
ment of the partnership business there."
agree with the master of the rolls that these
words Imply a person having the control or
management of the business for and on account of the partners, and Indicate some one
In the position of an agent or servant. Having regard to the fact that the person served
in this case did not stand in any such relationship to the partners, but was a receiver
appointed by and responsible to the court, I
think the decision of the registrar was right
RIGBT, L. J. A receiver and manager appointed by the court is certainly not the agent
of the parties; but, admitting that to the
fullest extent, I do not know that, if I had to
should have
decide this case sitting alone,
arrived at the same conclusion as the other
members of the court, from which, however,
do not dissent.
Appeal dismissed.

I

I
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SEMPLB

V.

FLXNN

Alfred Hugg, for complainant
drickson, for defendant.

et aL

(10 Atl. 17T.)
Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

June

30,

1887.

BUI for relief.
On December

5, 1885, Semple and James
D. Flynn entered into an agreement for the
purpose of carrying on the saloon and restaurant business at Mount Holly, New Jersey.
Semple was to furnish the money to
buy the necessary fixtures and chattels with
which to run the business, while Flynn was
to take charge of and conduct the business;
it being run in his (Flynn's) name. Out of
an
the proceeds arising from the earnings
equal division was to be made between the two.
Semple bought the fixtures for $1,200, paying $850 in cash, and giving a chattel mortFlynn agreed
gage of $350 for the balance.
to pay $250 to Semple, and take up the $350
Flynn paid
mortgage in the spring of 1886.
Semple the $250, and took up the $350 mortgage, giving a $300 one In place of it, and,
according to the charge of the complainant,
has refused to cancel or pay off the $300
In November last, Flynn refused
mortgage.
The complainto further divide the profits.
ant also charges that the defendant fraudin
ulently, and without any consideration,
February, 1887, gave a second chattel mortgage on the fixtures to his brother John J.
Flynn for the alleged securing of the payThe bill asks for an accountment of $500.
ing since last November, the appointment of
B receiver to continue the business imtil the
complainant is paid the money he advanced,
and the restraining of the selling or transferThe defendant
ring of the second mortgage.
denies part of the agreement respecting the
payment of the chattel mortgage, and also
claims that the $a50 advanced by Semple
was loaned to him, and that he has since
paid Semple the amount in full; that the
mortgage was given to his brother to secure
The
moneys advanced by the said brother.
cause was heard on bill, answer, and proofs,
on motion for receiver and preliminary injunction.

I

C. E. Hen-

BIRD, V. C. In this case
am asked to
appoint a receiver to take possession of goods
and of a business which the complainant
claims are held and used in partnership.
I cannot advise such appointment
1. It is not at all established
by. the proofs,
by way of affidavits, that there Is or ever
was a copartnership.
There are many circumstances tending to show that a partnership was never intended.
2. If there ever was a copartnership,
the
from several circumstances,
presumption,
is
that it was broken and abandoned according
to its original terms, and such settlement had
as to preclude the complainant from any further claim on the goods or interest in the
business as a partner.
3. These things being so, no sufilcient cause
appears to justify the court in taking the
goods, and the business, too, out of the hands
of the defendant to whom It was originally
committed,
when so to do would totally destroy the business, and that necessarily, ■because such business is carried on under a
license, which, of course. Is personal to the
defendant,
and cannot be delegated nor assigned nor committed to the care of a reBefore the court will
ceiver by any court
take a step which will work such results, it
must be reasonably certain that the allegations upon which relief depends are true.
4. But
will advise an injunction restraining the defendant from selling, assigning, or
Incumbering any of the goods, chattels, or
fixtures now in use In said business, or the
said business itself, or the good will thereof,
—not, however, to restrain him from managing and carrying on said business In the ordinary way in which he has heretofore been
carrying it on during the continuance of the
alleged copartnership. I feel justified, under
the proofs. In going thus far in the interests
This
of the complainant, but no further.
will preserve the present status until final
hearing.
Costs to abide final decree.

I
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HARDWARE

CO.

v.

WAIBEL

et al.
(47 N. W. 814, 1 S. D. 488.)
Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Jan. 30,1891.

Appeal from district court, Beadle county.
Mouser & Vollrath, for appellant
A. B.
Melville and E. H. Aplin, for respondents.
CORSON, P. J.
On March 1, 1889, the
plaintiff filed its verified complaint In the' district court, in which it is alleged, in substance,
that it is engaged in the wholesale and retail
hardware business in the city of St. Louis;
that it has a large amount of capital invested
in its said business, several hundred clerks,
and about 90 traveling salesmen engaged in
selling its wares and merchandise in nearly all
the states and territories; that it has prepared and published,
at great expense, an illustrated and printed catalogue containing about
1,500 pages, for distribution among
its customers; that it has invented arid prepared, at
a cost of many thousand dollars, a secret code
or system, represented by letters, figures, and
characters, showing the cost and selling price
of its many articles of merchandise,
which is
marked in such of its catalogues as are intended for use in its said business by its traveling salesmen, and which said secret code
or system is not marked in the catalogues distributed to its customers;
that in January,
1887, it employed one Frank Meech as one of
its traveling salesmen, and intrusted to him,
containing its
as such, one of its catalogues
said secret code or system of letters, figures,
and characters
marked therein, with the key
thereto; that in his business as snch traveling
salesman said Meech frequently visited the
city of Huron, in Dakota, and made sales of
goods to the defendants, who were customers
of plaintiff, and engaged in the hardware business; that during the year 1888 the defendants, in collusion with said Meech, who still
continued in the employment of plaintiff as
wrongfully
and
traveling salesman,
such
fraudulently obtained from said Meech the
said privately marked catalogue, containifig its
secret code or system of letters, figures, and
characters, showing the cost and selling price
of its said wares and merchandise, with the
key thereto, and copied the same therefrom
into one of plaintiff's catalogues that had been
furnished to defendants as customers of plainthereby wrongfully
tiff, and that defendants
and fraudulently became possessed of a knowledge of plaintiff's said secret code or system,
and a copy of the same; that plaintiff, upon
ascertaining said fact, demanded of defendants the said copy of its secret catalogue so
wrongfully and fraudulently made by them,
and that on or about February 19, 1889, defendants returned to plaintiff said marked
copy, but before doing so they fraudulently
and wrongfully copied said secret code or system into one of plaintiff's said catalogues it
had furnished to Shefier Bros., also customers
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 52
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of plaintiff, from whom defendants had obtained it, and that said defendants now retain
said last-mentioned
or Shefier copy, refuse to
return same to plahitlff, and threaten to make
known said secret code or system, with the
key thereto, to customers of plaintiff, to the
great damage and injury of plaintiff; that to
invent and prepare a new code or system will
cost the plaintiff several thousand dollars, and
require at least six months' time, and that during such change of system plaintiff will be
greatly embarrassed in the transaction of its
business.
An injunction, receiver, etc., ara
prayed for.
On filing the complaint, and two supporting
affidavits,

the court

granted

ex parte

a tem-

porary injunction, and appointed a receiver, to
whom defendants were required to deliver said
(Shefier) copy of the catalogue alleged to have
been copied by them from the former copy
returned to plaintiff.
On April ISth the defendants moved the court, upon the affidavit
of defendant Donaldson, pleadings, proceedings, etc.. In the case, to vacate said order
made March 1st. The court on the bearing refused to vacate said order, but made an order
modifying it by directing that receiver to return said (Shefier) copy of catalogue to defendants.
From so much of said order of
April 18th as required the receiver to return
said copy of catalogue to defendants, plaintiff
appeals to this court, and assigns such modification of the original order as error.
The appointing or refusing a receiver isi
within the sound judicial discretion
of the
court to which application Is made, and this
Ms \
court will not interfere with the exercise of
this discretion by the lower court when the
evidence is conflicting, unless this court is
satisfied such lower court has abused its disMays V. Rose, Freem. Ch. 703; Chicretion.
cago & A. O. & M. Co. V. United States P.
Co., 57 Pa. 83; Whelpley v. Raikoad Co., 6
Blatchf. 271; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 831, 832;
High, Rec. §§ 7-25; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1331.
Was there, then, a substantial conflict in the
evidence upon the material facts in this case?
and, if there was such conflict, was there an
abuse of discretion by the court?
The respondents contend that the affidavit of Donaldson denies all the equities of the bill relating
to the Shefler catalogue, and invoke the rule of
courts of equity applicable to injunctions, that,
when the equities of the bill are denied by
the answer,
the injunction will be denied.
Anderson v. Reed, 11 Iowa, 177; Stevens v.
Myers, Id. 184. But that rule does not apply
to this case, for the reason that the receiver
was appointed, not upon the complaint alone,
but upon the complaint and supporting affidavits, and upon the hearing additional affidavits were read on the part of the plaintiff;
and the rule itself Is subject to many qualifications and exceptions not necessary now to
be noticed.
This affidavit will therefore be
considered as the other affidavits in the case.
The only evidence introduced on the part
of the defendants on the hearing was the affi-

iel
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davit of defendant Donaldson, before reftoed
to.
This aflBdavit, while It denies each and
every allegation
in the complaint in general
terms, does not deny the various allegations
of the complaint and supporting affidavits in
that dear and specific manner that entitles it
to much weight in a court of equity.
It is
evasive and unsatisfactory, and leaves upon
the mind the impression that, while there Is
an attempt to deny the allegations of the complaint and supporting affidavits, there is a
want of good faith on the part of Donaldson,
and an effort on his part to conceal the real
facts in the case. All the material facts stated in the complaint were fully sustained by
affidavits introduced and read in evidence on
the part of the plaintiff. That defendant Donaldson did. In collusion with Meech, plaintiff's
traveling salesman, wrongfully and fraudulently obtain from said Meech the secret catalogue Intrusted to him by the plaintiff, and
make a copy of the same, and that he did in
the same manner obtain the key to the same,
and did thereby become possessed of a knowledge of plaintiff's secret code or system to
which he was not entitled, is proved by too
clear ajid satisfactory evidence to admit of
any doubt. That he did return to plaintiff the
first copy so made is admitted. The only question remaining is, did Donaldson, before returning the said marked copy, make a second
copy therefrom in the Shefier catalogue now
After a careful examination
in controversy?
I of the evidence, we think there cannot be
It may be
much doubt upon this question.
true that there were some slight changes made
in the letters, figures, and characters used by
plaintiff to represent the cost and selling
prices of plaintiff in the Shefier copy, but we
think It Is equally true that In the changes
made, if any, defendant Donaldson had so arranged them that he preserved, in substance,
H. P. Hnckins says
the plaintiff's system.
in his affidavit that he Is one of the traveling
salesmen of plaintiff, and is fully acquainted
with the private and secret code of plaintiff,
represented by letters, figures, and characters
showing the cost and selling prices of plaintiffs goods, and the key thereto, and that he
had examined the Shefier catalogue in the
hands of the receiver, and that the basis of
the prices marked therein Is throughout the
said cost price to plaintiff, and that It would
for any one to have
have been impossible
marked the said Shefier catalogue with the
prices marked, and the explanatory remarks
therein contained, unless the person who so
marked the same had access to and copied
In
from one of plaintiffs private catalogues.
connection with this testimony are to be considered the efforts made by Donaldson to obtain one of plaintiffs catalogues from some
one of plaintiff's customers before he returned
to it his own marked" copy.
After efforts by
himself and through his confederate, Meech,
he obtained one from George C. Shefier, who
says, in his affidavit, that he first loaned to
Donaldson his catalogue on February 15, 1S89,

and that when, soon after, he requested Donaldson to return it, he replied:
"I have marked the price of my goods in the catalogue, but
am expecting a catalogue from the Simmons
Hardware Company every day, and as quick
as it comes I wlU express It to you." It is true
he couples the admission that he had marked
the Shefier catalogue with the qualification
that he had marked the price of his own
goods in it, but this Is not inconsistent with
the fact that he had marked the prices contained in plaintiff's secret catalogue, as he was
a customer of plaintiff, and was then in pos- ,
session of a copy made from one of plaintiff's .
catalogues intrusted to Meech; and he subse-j
quently took great pains to obtain a bill of I
sale of this catalogue from Shefier.
Whyj
these efforts and this haste to get another
catalogue before he returned the first copy
marked by him, if he did not require it in
which to make another copy? We are of the
opinion that there is no substantial confiict Inj
the evidence, and that upon the facts the court I
below should have retained the catalogue in I
question in the hands of the receiver.
|
It is contended on the part of respondents
that the catalogue in controversy was the absolute property of defendants,
and that the
court, under ttie established rules of equity,
was not authorized to take it from them, and
place it in the hands of a receiver.
It may
be conceded, as claimed, that the Shefier catalogue in its original condition was the absobut the catalogue
lute property of defendants;
in controversy had been changed from its original condition by the defendants by incorporating therein the private code or system invented
and prepared at great expense by the plaintiff.
The original catalogue was of itself of but
trifling value, but with the private code or
system of plaintiff marked therein it was of
great value.
That such a code or system as
was invented and used by plaintiff in Its business, and described in its complaint, was
its^
property. Is well settled, both at common law
and under our own Code. Section 2676, Comp.
Laws.
It was the product of the skill and
labors of the plaintiff, and as such is property,
and Is entitled to the protection of the law;
and when the injury threatened would be irreparable, and the remedy at law is inadequate, a court of equity vrill Interfere to preobtained
vent a party who has vreongfully
possession of the secret from using It or disAnd when, as in this case,
closing It to others.
a party has not only obtained knowledge of
the secret code or system, but has wrongfully
made a copy of the secret system, a court of
equity wlU, In furtherance of justice and to
prevent the party from fraudulently making
a disclosure of the secret, not only enjoin him,
but will, we apprehend, take into Its possession, by means of a receiver, who is an officer
of the court, such copy, so wrongfully made,
to prevent fraud; and if on the trial the facti
alleged are established the court will be authorized to place such copy in the hands of the
plaintiff, or at least see that plaintiffs secret
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marks therein shall be erased or canceled.
This accords with the spirit, if not with the
letter, of onr Code.
See sections 3213-3221,
Comp. Laws.
These sections embody the rules
of the civil law upon the doctrine of accessions
to personal property, except perhaps section
3219, which Is a rule of the common law.
Silsbury V. MeCoon, 3 N. Y. 379. That courts do
not hesitate to grant injunctions in such cases,
Is well settled by the adjudged cases.
In
ToTatt V. Whiyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394, the court
granted an injunction against one who had obtained a knowledge of a secret by a breach of
In Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, the
trust
court restrained the defendants
from using a
a medicine, surreptisecret in compounding
tiously obtained.
In Peabody v. Norfolk, 98
Mass. 452, the court held that an injunction -to
restrain a party from communicating a secret
imparted to htm in the court, of his business,
See 2 Story, Bq. Jur. | 952. The
was proper.
court was therefore clearly right in granting
and continuing the temporary injunction, and,
this being so, we' are unable fo see any legal
reason why the court should not have retained
in the hands of the receiver the marked cataThe powlogue in controversy in this action.
ers of courts of equity over property, the title
to which is Involved In litigation. Is broad and
comprehensive, and its power to take intoi its
possession, through its receiver, any property
that Is the subject of litigation, Is ample and
unquestioned.
The contention of defendants that, as they
were the ovmers of the catalogue of trifling
value, into which they have copied plaintiff's
valuable secret code or system, it cannot be
taken Into Its possession by a court of equity
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through Its receiver, and held pendente lite,
we cannot assent to. One of the grounds upon!
which a receiver will be appointed is that there
Is no other adequate remedy.
In this case the
remedy by Injunction Is not adequate to accomplish the ends of justice. The plaintiff, by
Its complahit and affidavits, shows that its
business extends over a large number of states
and territories, tn which it has many customers. Enjoining a party, therefore, from using
or communicating the plaintiff's secret code or .
system, whUe effective so long as the defend1
ants are within the jurisdiction of the court,}
would yet be of little efficacy in case defend- 1
ants should go beyond the jurisdiction of the\
court, and take with them the copy, where
they might use this secret by communicating
|
It to plaintiff's customers, to the irreparable |
Injury of the plaintiff. The flexible nature of
the equitable jurisdiction of courts of equity
enables that court to so mould and administer
its remedies as to prevent such fraudulent and
vrrongful use of the catalogue In question, by
at once placing It vyithin the control of the
court, and thus placing It beyond the power of
the defendants to make any improper disposition of It pending the suit, by taking it beyond
We are clearly
the jurisdiction of the court;
of the opinion that under the established jurisdiction of courts of equity the power exists in
that court to take into its possession this catalogue, and we think under the evidence it |
was clearly the duty of the court to do so,
and that its modification of its order of March
1st was an abuse of its judicial discretion.
The modified order, so far as It directed the
return of the catalogue to defendants. Is reAll the judges concurring.
versed.
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In

re

SCHUYLER'S STEAM TOWBOAT CO.
(32 N. E. 623,

136 N. Y. 169.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 29, 1S92.

Appeal from supreme court, general term.
Third department.
Proceeding for the dissolution of the Schuyler's Steam Towboat Company.
From an order of the general term (19 N. Y. Supp. 565)
affirming an order granting an injunction restraining the further prosecution
of suits
brought in the United States district court,
Michael J. Moran and others appeal.
Affirmed.

Carpenter & Mosher (Joseph F. Mosher, of
James W. Baton,

counsej), for appellants.
for respondent.

J. A receiver of the property
effects of the above-named
corporation
■was duly appointed
by a special term of the
supreme court of the state sitting at Albany
on the 31st of July, 1891, and the order appointing him was filed and entered in the
proper cleric's office August 1, 1801, at 11
a. m. The receiver executed his bond, and It
was duly approved August 3, and filed in the
clerk's office August 4, 1891.
The proceeding was one for the voluntary dissolution of
a corporation,
and the distribution of its
property and assets among those entitled to
I receive
the same.
Intermediate the time
when the receiver was appointed and the
■ execution
and filing of his bond, and In the
I afternoon
of August 1st, a Mr. Moran, in
his own behalf and in behalf of other cred'
Itors of the corporation, libeled several vessels which were the property of the corpora1 tion, by filing libels in the United States dis/trlct court for the Eastern district of New
I York,
and upon process issued from that
) court the marshal took possession
of such
f vessels.
When Moran instituted his proceedings he says he had been informed that application had already been made for the appointment of a receiver, but he was not Informed, and did not know, that one had been
appointed.
Finding the marshal In possession of the vessels, and as he refused to give
up such possession,
instituted
the receiver
these proceedings
to restrain the libelants
from further steps in the United States district court.
The courts below have granted
the order restraining further proceedings, and
the other parties have appealed here.
The
courts below have held that by the proper
presentation
of a petition to a state court,
praying for the dissolution of the corporation,
and by the appointment of a receiver upon
due notice of the application to the attorney
general, the court acquired jurisdiction of the
subject-matter
of the proceeding,
and took
the property of the corporation Into the custody of the law for the purpose of due administration; and that, having thus acquired
jurisdiction of such subject-matter and taken
the property into the custody of the law, alPECKHAM,

and

\

though

the receiver
had not actually and
physically seized and taken it into his manual possession, the state court acquired the
exclusive jurisdiction and right to take such
possession and make a final decree; and that
the libelants acquired no rights under their
process, and should not be permitted to further proceed in the district court. The libelants, on the other hand, contend that this i£
a question of jurisdiction over the particular
property,
and that court obtains it which
through Its process and officer first actually
seizes and takes possession of the property
itself; and that, although the receiver may
have had a prior right to take possession, it
was not exercised before actual possession
was taken under the process from the United
States court, and hence the first manual possession must determine the question of jurisdiction.
We think the contention
of the
libelants ought not to prevail. The question
of the effect of the appointment of a receiver
upon the title to the property of the person
or corporation for which he was appointed is
In Mann v. Pentz, 2 Sandf.
not a new one.
Ch. 257, it was said that when the appointment of a receiver was completed the title
to all property and effects which were subject to the order vested in him. To the same
effect are Porter v. Williams, 9 N. Y. 142148, and Van Alstyne v. Cook, 25 N. Y. 489The appointment of receiver Is complet496.
ed at the furthest by the filing and entering
of the order appointing him, although before
he proceeds to the discharge of his duties he
may he directed to execute and file a proper
bond.
When that is done, he can take actual, manual possession of the property, and
his title relates back to the time of his apIn re Christian Jensen Co., 128
pointment.
N. Y. 550, 28 N. E. 665, and cases cited by
Earl, J. In Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch.
494, it was said that property that was liable
to levy under execution at law could not be.
levied upon subsequent to an order appointing a receiver, as such order was equivalent
to an actual levy upon the property.
think
the proposition involved in this case has been
held adversely to the claim of the libelants
by the decision In Re Christian Jensen Co.,
supra.
The receiver was there appointed
March 10th, his bond filed March 11th, and
on March 12th he took possession of some of
the property of the corporation. On the 11th
of March, intermediate the appointment and
qualification of fhe receiver, certain parties
commenced an action against the corporation,
and sued out process in replevin in a New
York district court, and under it took possession of certain property, which was then In
the possession of the corporation.
On the
same day an action against the corporation
was commenced in the New York common
pleas to recover a money judgment,
and a
warrant of attachment vras issued, and the
sheriff on the same day attached some of the
property of the corporation.
The receiver
then asked for an order restraining the fur-

I

RECEIVERS.
ther prosecution of these actions, and, after
hearing, the order was granted permanently
restraining such proceedings.
At the same
time the court directed the sheriff, who had
seized under Ids process in replevin certain
property in the possession of the corporation,
to surrender the same to the receiver.
Some
question was made as to the right of the corporation to the possession of the property taken in replevin, hut upon the facts it was held
the receiver was entitled to possession, and,
if any question arose as to whether the property seized under the replevin writ actually
belonged to the corporation at the time of the
appointment of the receiver, that question
might be inquired of by some action or proceeding against the receiver,
commenced
or
taken with leave of the court.
What was intended to be asserted was that the appointment of the receiver vested the property of
the corporation in him, although he was to
thereafter qualify by giving a bond; and
that, the title being in him, and the property
in the custody of the law, no other court
could obtain jurisdiction
over the property
after such appointment, even under process
upon which possession was taken prior to the
qualifying of the receiver.
A diA srent rule does not prevail because
one court is a state and the other a United
States court.
It is a question of jurisdiction
in each case, and the same principles apply
in both. The same rale obtains whether one
court is of common-law or equitable jurisdiction and the other is a court of admiralty, although the nature of the jurisdiction of these
Mr. Chief Justice
courts is so different
Taney, in his dissenting opinion in Taylor v.
Carryl, 20 How. 583-600, endeavored to establish that such a difference in the nature of
the jurisdiction of common-law and admiralty courts over the vessel which was attached
and libeled ought to make a difference in the
decision to be made.
The jurisdiction of the
district court of the United States in that
case was invoked for the purpose of collecting seamen's wages by the enforcement of
the maritime lien upon the vessel given for
that class of services, and it was said that
authorities
such lien is by weU-establlshed
prior and paramount to all other claims on
the vessel, and must he first paid, and that
by the constitution and laws of the United
acting as courts
States the district courts,
of admiralty, were the only courts which had
jurisdiction over such lien or that were authorized to enforce it, and that, it was the
duty of that court to do it The chief justice
then argued that, as the attachment of the
vessel under the state laws and by process
from the state court only bound the interest
of the ovraer, while the maritime lien upon
the vessel bound the res itself, the court
which had jurisdiction only of a subordinate
and inferior interest should not be able, by
to close all
virtue of such an attachment,
proceedings to enforce the paramount lien for
wages for 12 months, as by the laws of the
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state that period or more might elapse between the seizure of the vessel imder the attachment and its sale or release from the
process.
The case was decided upon what a
majority of the court held was no new principle, and it was solved by the application of
what was said to be a principle that was
comprehensive,
and just, and equal, and opposing no hindrance to the efficient administration of judicial power.
The jurisdiction of
the state court was upheld, notwithstanding
its limited character, and that of the admiralty court was denied, although it was the sole
court where the lien of the seaman for his
wages could be originally enforced against
the vessel itself.
The case shows that the
fact that the different courts in the Christian
Jansen Co. Case, supra, were courts of the
same state, and of concurrent jurisdiction, is
immaterial, and the same rule would hold if
one court were a state and the other a United States tribunal.
The cases cited by the counsel for these appellants do not involve the question as to the
effect of the appointment of a receiver in an
action or proceeding where the court has obtained jurisdiction by the proper service of
papers.
This court has held that the effect
is, in a case of this kind, to take the property of the corporation into the custody of
the law, and that the court has power to preserve and protect it. As was said in Heidritter V. Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S. 305, 5 Sup. Ct
Rep. 135: "When the object of the action requires the control and dominion Qt the property Involved in the litigation, that court
which first acquires possession, or that dominion which is equivalent, draws to itself
the exclusive right to dispose of it"
That
dominion was acquired by the order appointing the receiver in this proceeding.
The
same principle was declared in Union Trust
Co. V. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. E. Co., 6 Blss.
197; Steele v. Sturges, 5 Abb. Pr. 442; Railroad Co. V. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1, 16 S. W. 647.
apply upon a motion
Different considerations
to punish as for a contempt an alleged interference of a third person with property in regard to which a receiver may have been appointed, but which he has not yet taken actual possession of. In the case of Bank v.
Schermerhorn, 9 Paige, 372, the chancellor readversed the decree of the vice chancellor
judging the appellants to be in contempt, because the facts were not sufficient to enable
the chancellor to judge whether the parties
were or were not in contempt.
The question
was one of procedure,— whether it was proper to proceed as for a contempt for the purpose of enforcing the actual delivery of property to the receiver.
The court held such
was improper where the receiver
proceeding
had never had actual possession, although his
right to pos.session flowed from the order appointing him. The question now before the
court was neither Involved, discussed, nor deA party might not
cided in the case cited.
in taking control of
be guilty of contempt
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property not actually seized by the receiver,
and while such party was In Ignorance that
a receiyer had been appointed;
and yet the
property thus Interfered with may notwithstanding have been in the custody of the law,
and jurisdiction over It may unquestionably
have existed In the court which appointed the
receiver.
Onr decision here does not affect

the legal rights of the libelants In the vessels
In question.
The receiver will be obliged in
this proceeding to distribute the proceeds arising from a sale of the property among the
creditors of the corporation, as their priority
of rights may appear and be held valid.
We think the order was right, and It must
be affirmed, with costs.
All coocnr.

.s^J^::>
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ST. LOUIS, K. & S. R. CO. et al. v. WEAR,
Judge.
(36 S. W. 357, 135 Mo.
Supreme

Court of Missouri.

230.)

June

15,

1896.

Application by the St Louis,
In banc.
Kennett & Southern Railway Company and
others for a writ of prohibition agaiust Judge
Wear, judge of the circuit court. Writ
granted.
The proceeding before Judge Wear was up-

on a petition in which Mr. Kerfoot was named as plaintiff, and the "St. Louis, Kennett &

Southern Railroad Company, a corporation,
and Louis Houck, B. F. Blomeyer, L. B.
Houck, Theophllus Besel, and E. S. MeCarty, as directors In said railroad company,
and the Pemiscot Railroad Company, a corporation, and RobMt G. Ranney, Leo Doyle,
Robert T. Giboney, and John R. Jeannln, directors LQ said railroad company, and Louis
Houck," defendants. The substance of that
petition (according to the statement of the
counsel for defendants in the supreme court,
which statement is regarded as suflaclently
full for the purposes of the prohibition case)
is as foUows:
"On the 17th of March, 1890, there was organized under the laws of this state the St
Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company, with a capital of $180,000, divided into
1,800 shares of the par value of $100 each, designed to be constructed and operated from
Campbell to Kennett, Dunklin county, Missouri,— a distance of 19 miles.
Of this stock,
A. J. Kerfoot held, and still holds, 108 shares,
Harry H. Ferguson,
and B. S. McCarty,
Melvin L. Gray, and George Denison, respectively, held 108 shares. Prior to the
day of July, 1891, all the shares of the other
stockholders in said company were purchased
by said A. J. Kerfoot and B. S. McCarty. On
July 8, 1891, said Kerfoot and McCarty entered into a contract with relator Louis
Houck, by the terms of which said Houck
agreed to transfer to said Kerfoot and McCarty ten interest-bearing extension bonds of
the Cape Girardeau SouthwestCTn Railway
Company, each for $1,000, which were represented to be worth »Vioo of their face value,
and also to organize a construction company
for the purpose of making a connection between the said railroads at the town of Campbell, said connection being of the approxiOf the stock of
mated length of 30 miles.
said construction company, said Kerfoot and
McCarty were to receive 49 per cent, and on
the construction of said connection, said Kerfoot and McCarty were to be superintendent
and general manager, respectively, at salaries
of not less than $175 per month. By the
terms of this contract one-half of the real estate belonging to said St Louis, Kennett &
Southern Railway Company at Kennett was
to be transferred to said Kerfoot and McCarty. In consideration of the foregoing, said
Kerfoot and McCarty were to transfer to said

Houdt
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300 shares of their stock In said railroad company, on the completion of the contract aforesaid. After the above terms of
said contract had been agreed on and set
forth therein, additional stipulations were inserted by said Houck in said contract, without the knowledge and consent of said Kerfoot and McCarty, to the effect that in no
event was said Houck to be personally responsible for the fulfillment of said contract,
and that If said contract should not be kept
on his part such failure should not affect in
any wise the said contract, and that 1,360 additional full-paid shares of stock in said company should be issued to said Houck, and
that the 240 shares of said Kerfoot and McCarty should be considered full paid. While
the bonds above referred to were by said
Houck transferred to said Kerfoot and McCarty, not only were they not of the value
represented by said Houck, but of no value
whatsoever; and while said construction company was organized, and certain certificates
of its stock transferred to said Kerfoot and
McCarty, the purpose of its organization —
the construction of a connection between the
aforesaid
railroads— was not only never accomplished, but never attempted to be carried out, and said certificates are consequently of absolutely no value. Shortly after the
transfer of the 300 shares of the stock of the
St. Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company by said Kerfoot and McCarty to said
Houck on the faith of the performance of the
terms of said contract by said Houck, said
Houck held a meeting of the pretended shareholders holding shares in excess of those held
by said Kerfoot and McCarty,— to whom no
notice of said pretended meeting was ever
given, or attempted to be given, and of
which they had no knowledge or information,
— whereat said pretended shareholders did attempt and pretend to issue to said Houck
1,360 additional shares of stock of said railroad company.
This action of said pretendKerfoot, claims
ed shareholders, respondent,
to be fraudulent, lUegal, and void, against
which he has protested, and now protests,
and in afSrmance of which be has done and
will do nothing. By reason of the aforesaid
facts, it is claimed that the consideration for
the transfer of said stock to Houck has failed,
and was only brought about by the false and
fraudulent representations of said Houck,
with the intent to cheat and defraud said
Kerfoot and McCarty.
"It is also charged in said petition: That,
having thus fraudulently obtained control of
said railroad, said Houck and the other relators have mismanaged, and been guilty of
gross negligence and misconduct In ttieir
trust capacity as directors, officers, etc, and
fraudulently combined to cheat and defraud
respondent, Kerfoot, and to render his shares
of stock valueless, etc., together with those
of other of the stockholders. That the other
relators, as directors of said, company, are
under the influence and control of said relator
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HoucK, ana conrorm tneir actions to accomplish his fraudulent and illegal purposes,
and to carry out h^ unlawful designs.
That
said Louis Houck Is the principal shareholder
in a company organized to construct a railroad through the counties of St GeneTieve
and Perry, in the state of Missouri, -which
said road is located many miles from the St.
Louis, Kennett & Southern, and that, being
entirely without credit, said Honcli has nsed
in the construction of said road divers
funds belonging to said St. Louis, Kennett
& Southern Railroad Company, without- any
authority so to do from the stockholders and
directors of said company, although with
the pretended authority of said board of directors. That said Houck is also the principal
stockholder in a certain railroad in process
of construction through Scott county, Missouri, and' In the construction of this road
said Houck has illegally and fraudulently,
in like manner and to like ends, appropriated the funds of said St Louis, Kennett &
Southern Railroad Company. That on or
about February 15, 1892, the Pemiscot Railroad Company was organized, — and constructed during the year 1894,— of which said
Houck was the real and substantial owner.
That in the construction of this road said
Houck wrongfully and fraudulently appropriated certain of the funds of said St. Louis,
Kennett & Southern Railroad Company, in
the manner and with the purposes as aforesaid. That on the 22d day of April, 1895,
said Houck, in furtherance of his said designs to destroy the value of said Kerfoot's
stock, and of the property of said St Louis,
Kennett & Southern Railroad Company,
caused the said pretended
stockholders of
said company to adopt a contract attempted
to be entered into between the directors of
said last-named companies, whereby the two
said railroads should be consolidated into
one road.
Of none of these proceedings was
said Kerfoot notified, and of none of which
did he have any knowledge or information,
nor did he in any manner participate therein.
Under this pretended contract of consolidation, the stock of the two companies
was to be called in, and new stock in the
consolidated company issued in lieu thereof.
That said contract was submitted to a pretended meeting of said shareholders of the
St. Iiouls, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company, and the minutes of said meeting purport to show that said contract was adopted
by ar majority of its stockholders, all of
which is false. That a copy of said minutes,
and also the minutes of a similar meeting
of thS shareholders
of said Pemiscot Railroad Company, showing a like pretended
ratification of the same contract, have been
filed in the office of the secretary of state of
the state of Missouri.
The said attempted
consolidation was fraudulent and void, in
that it was not effected in conformity with
the laws of the state of Missouri, and with
a fraudulent intent and purpose, and because

no notice »f said meeting was given said
Kerfoot, who was not present thereat, although In the copy of the minutes of said
meeting on file with the secretary of state he
is falsely represented as voting in favor of
said consolidation. That the terms of said
contract of consolidatioh were not carried
out by said Houck, or the other relators.

That the earnings of said company are not
sufficient to discharge its accruing obligations,
and that the salaries and wages of its employes have not been paid for the last six
months, and that it Is now in debt to Its
said employes to the extent of many thousand dollars. That by reason of the acts
aforesaid said company is unable to secure
supplies needed In the operation of the road.
That the rolling stock and other properties
are in need of repair and replenishing, which
the relators have failed and refused to have
done.
That no provision has been or is now
being made for the extinguishment of the
outstanding debts and bonds hereafter to accrue.
That said Houck on the 2d day of
December, 1895, did remove respondent, Kerfoot, from his position as superintendent of
said road, and did appropriate his salary to
himself, through one of the relators, his
kinsman Louis B. Houck. That the said
Pemiscot Railroad Company is, and was at

the time of the attempted consolidation
aforesaid, hopelessly insolvent
That its
debts have not been i>aid, except such as
were paid out of the earnings of the St.
Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company as aforesaid, and that said attempted
consolidation was but a part of the plan of
said Houck to secure and absorb both properties.
That by reason of all of which the
said St Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad
Company has become greatly embarrassed
financIaUy, and that a continuation of such
acts of mismanagement will bring about
the Insolvency and bankruptcy of said corporation.
"The prayer of the bUI is that relators, as
officers of said company, be restrained from
diverting further amounts of money from
the treasury of said company; that they be
suspended from office as directors, etc, and
tiiat a new election be ordered to be held to
supply the vacancy thus to be created; that
an accounting be had with respect of the
funds diverted as aforesaid; that a decree
be rendered annulling said pretended consolidation, and restoring the funds' so diverted from the treasury of the St. Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company; that
said 300 shares of stock, or their proportionate interest therein, transferred by said Kerfoot and McCarty, be restored to them, and
that said contract under which the transfer
was made be annulled, for reasons aforesaid;
that said issuance of the 1,360 shares of
stock be annulled and canceled, for the reasons before mentioned; and that said Houck
be required to account for the benefits that
have accrued to him by reason of the trans-
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fer of said 300 shares of sto(^, and the issuance of said 1,360 shares; and that he be
ordered to pay one-half of the same to said
Kerfoot An ofCer ie made to return to said
Eouck one-half ef the shares of stock in the
eonstrnction company before mentioned, and
Hke offer with resi)ect of said extension
bonds. The petition then asks for the appointment of a receiver pending the determination of the issues tendered, in order to
prevent the misappropriation, and to insure
the preservation of the properties involved."
The order of Jndge Wear, appointing the
receiver, is as follows:
"State of Missonri, County of Dunklin— ss.:
In the Carcuit Court, July term, 1896. A. J.
Kerfoot, Plaintiff, v. The St. Louis, Kennett
Railroad Company,
a Corpora& Sotithem
tion, and Iiouis Houck, E. F. Blomeyer, U
B. Houck, Theophilus Besel, and E. S. Mccarty, as Directors in said Railroad Company, and the Pemiscot RaUroad Company,
a
Corporation,
and Robert G. Ranney, Leo
Doyle, Robt. T. Giboney, Louis Houck, and
John R. Jeannin, Directors in Said Railroad
Company, and Louis Houck, Defendants.
In
Vacation. Order of Appointment of ReceivNow, on this 11th day of April, 1896,
er.
comes A. J. Kerfoot, and presents to me,
John G-. Wear, judge of the circuit court of
Dunklin county, Missouri, in vacation, at
chambers, in the city of Pedlar Bluff, in the
county of Butler, in the state of Missouri, a
certified copy of his petition filed in the office
of the derk of the said circuit court of said
DunJdin county, in a certain cause entitled
above; and with it he presents I^ motion,
verified by his affidavit, by which he asks
the appointment of a receiver of the real
and personal property of the said defendant
corporations named above, which said motion is hereto attached. And the said John
having heard
O. Wear, Judge as aforesaid,
said motion, and having duly considered the
same, together with the facts offered in connection therewith, does hereby order that
Samuel W. Fprdyee, of the city of St. Louis,
Missouri, be, and he is hereby, appwnted as
receiver of all and singular the real and personal property, wherever situate, of the said
St Louis, Keimett & Southern Railroad Company, and of the said Pemiscot Railroad
Company, and that he shall immediately
qualify aa such^ by giving bond for the faithful performance of his duties as such receiver, in the sum of twMity-five thousand dollars, and that after his qualification as such
receiver, having duly taken, the oath prescribed, he shall proceed to the county of
Dunklin, and to the county of Pemiscot, in
the state of Missouri, and shall take charge
of the said property of the said railroad companies, including the rolling stock, the depots, books, and papers of the said companies, and that he shall then take an inventory of all of the said property so taken
of by him; that he shall manage
charge
carefully and
tt>e said raiLc.>ad properties
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that he shall continue to fulfill
and perform all of the existing contracts of
the said raUroad companies until the further
order of the court in the premises; that he
shaU discharge all of the current expenses
of the management as such receiver out of
the earnings of the said roads while they
are in his hands or custody; that he shall
keep an accurate and exact account of the
expenses and of the income of the two said
railroads, the one extending from CampbeU, Missouri, fo Kennett, Missouri, and the
other extending from Kennett, Missouri, to
Caruthersville, Missouri, preserving the said
expenses and income sepaiate in all of the
transactions of himself as such receiver, and
that he shall keep and maintain the said
properties in good condition until the further
order of the said circuit court of Dunklin
county, or the judge thereof in vacation;
and that he make a full report of his acts as
such receiver to the next term of said court,
unless ordered to do so before that date. It
Is further ordered that each and every agent
and employe of the said defendant railroad
companies named above, whether regarded
as the employes of the said companies as one
corporation, or as two separate corporations,
shall, upon the demand of said Samuel W.
Fordyce, after his qualification as such receiver, immediately yield to said receiver
the possession and control of all the property, books, and accounts of the said defendant railroad companies or company, and the
said Louis Houck and the other defendants
named as the officers and directors of said
defendant companies are hereby ordered to
turn over and deliver to the said receiver
aU of the books and papers of the said company or companies which pertain in any wise
to the management and business of the said
company or companies.
It is further ordered
that in the event that any such employe of
said company or companies shall fail or refuse to so deliver to said receiver the property in his said care and custody, or should
said defendants fail or refuse to so deliver
to said receiver the books, papers, or other
property of the said defendant company or
companies, the said receiver shall at once
report the person so failing or refusing to
the undersigned judge for his further orders
in that behalf.
The said defendants and
their employes are hereby enjoined and forbidden from in any manner interfering with
the said possession of the said receiver aftdiscreetly;

er he shall have obtained the possession of
the said property hereby ordered into his
hands, until the further orders of the said

court, or of the judge thereof in vacation.
is further ordered that this order be filed
In the office of the clerk of said court of said
Dunklin county, and that a certified copy
thereof be furnished the said Samuel W.
Fordyce, as such receiver, and that a dulycertified copy thereof be served upon the defendants named above. It is further ordered
that the said defendants be notified to a,p-

It
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pear before me, the undersigned Judge of
the circuit court, at the next term of the circuit court, in the county of Dunklin, in the
state of Missouri, then and there to show
cause. If any they can, why the appointment hereby made should not be continued,
and the property liept by the said receiver,
pending a hearing upon the merits of this
controversy, and until the said defendants
may be heard upon the merits thereof. And
the service of a duly-certified copy hereof
shall be deemed sufficient service of the said
notice.
Done at chambers in the city of Poplar BlufC, in the county of Butler and state
of Missouri, this 11th day of April, 1896.
John G. Wear, Judge."
The writ Issued by Judge Wear for the
seizure and delivery of the prop«ty of the
railroad company is as follows:
"State of Missouri, County of Dunklin— ss.:
In the Circuit Court, to July Term, 1896. A.
J. Kerfoot, PlalntlfE, v. The St Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company, a Corporation, and Louis Houck, E. F. Blomeyer,
L. B. Houck, Tbeophilus Besel, and B. S.
McCarty, as Directors in said Railroad Company, and the Pemiscot Railroad Company, a
Corporation, and Robert G. Ranney, Leo
Doyle, RobL T. Giboney, Louis Houck, and
John R. Jeannin, Directors in said Railroad
Company, and Louis Houck, Defendants.
To W. G. Petty, Sheriff of Dunklin County,
Whereas, it appears to me, John
Missouri:
G. Wear, judge of the circuit court of said
Dunklin county, Missouri, sitting in chambers,
in vacation, by the report of S. W. Fordyce,
whom I did on the 11th day of April, 1896,
api>oint as receiver of all of the property of
the said St. Louis, Kennett & Southern
Railroad Company, and of the said Pemiscot
Railroad Company, which report is duly verified, that the said Samuel W. Fordyce did
on said 13th day of April, 1896, proceed to
the town of Kennett, In said Dunldin county, Missouri, and did then and there cause
to be served upon one Louis B. Houck, whom
of
he found in the charge and management
the said property of the said railroad comnamed above, a dulypanies or company
certified copy of my order made in the
above-entitled cause, appointing him, the
said S. W. Fordyce, as such receiver, and
that he did then and there demand of the
said Louis B. Houck the possession and
custody of the property of the said railroad
companies or company, and did demand that
the said Louis B. Houck relinquish the possession and control thereof to him, the said
receiver, and that said Louis B. Houck did
then and there fail and refuse so to turn
over and deliver to said receiver the possession and control of the said railroad or railroads, and of the said property of the said
railroad company or companies, and did then
and there fail and refuse to relinquish the
said possession
and control thereof; and
that the said Louis B. Houck did vdllfully
Tiolate the commands of my said order of

appointment of the said Samuel W. Fordyce

Tliis is, therefore, to comas such receiver:
mand you that you do forthwith summon
the power of the said county of Dunklin, If
necessary, and that you proceed to the property of the said railroad company or companies named above, and to its railroad office
or offices, wherever situate or found in your
county, and that you put and place the said
Samuel W. Fordyce, as such receiver, in
charge, custody, and possession thereof, and
that you dispossess therefrom, and from
every portion or part thereof, the said Louis
B. Houck, or any other official or employs
or agent of the said Louis B. Houck or of
the said railroad companies named above, or
of any defendants named herein above; tnat
you take and deliver to the said receiver all
of the engines and cars and other equ^
ments of the said railroad or railroads, all
of its books and papers, its tickets and other
property, its deiwts and ticket
movable
offices, and every other property of every
description.
You are further commanded
that you immediately take into your custody
the body of the said Louis B. Houck, and
him safely keep, so that you have him, the
said Louis B. Houck, before me, at cliambers, in the city of Poplar Bluff, in the county of Butler and state of Missouri, on
Thursday, April 16, 1896, then and there to
show cause, if any he can, why he should
not be committed to the common jail of said
Dunklin county for his disobedience of my.
said order of appointment of said receiver.
And you are further commanded that if any
other person shall attempt to obstruct the
full and free execution of the above order,
or to aid or assist in the attempt to remove
any of the said property from the said county
of Dunklin, except by orders of the said receiver, you shall, by virtue hereof, arrest each
and every such person, and have him or them
before me at the time and place designated
above, then and there to be further dealt
with according to law. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, at chambers, in the town of Bloomfield, in the county
of Stoddard and state of Missouri, this 14th
day of April, 1896.
John G. Wear, Judge of
the Circuit Court of Dunklin County, Missouri."
The return of the sheriff upon the above
writ follows:
"Executed the within writ in the county
of Dimklin and state of Missouri on the 14:th
day of April, 1896, by placing S. W. Fordyce, as receiver, in charge of the depot and
all of the property of the above-named
company or companies which were at that
time at the town of Kennett and In said
county, including one engine and two passengM coaches, which were afterwards taken
away by L. B. Houck, and carried eastward
Into Pemiscot county, Missouri.
did further on the 15th day of April, 1896, put the
said receiver in charge of all the remainder
of the property of the said companies or com-
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The plaintiffs are the St. Louis, Kennett &
Southern Railroad Company, Louis Houck,
and a number of other shareholders in said
company.
The defendants are the learned
circuit judge <rf the Twenty-Second circuit,
and Messrs. Kerfoot and Pordyce, plaintiff
and recover in the proceeding before the
Judge. The object of the action Is to obtain
a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of certain orders entered by the judge
in vacation of the court. Copies of those orders will be printed in the official report
The claim of plaintiffs here is that the
orders are void, because made withottt jurisdiction, or, at least, that they are in excess
of any jurisdiction which the circuit judge
might properly ex^cise tn the proceeding as
it then stood. In response to a preliminary
rule in prc^bition, defendants made separata
returns, and plaintiffs replied thereto.
It
will not be necessary to state the terms of
those pleadings at any great length. The
facts on which the result of the action in
this court depends are few, and need not be
obscured by elaboration of the minor features of the controversy. Those facts are
also admitted by the pleadings. The old St.
Louis, Eennett & Southern Railroad ConK
pany (which we shall call the "Old Kennett
Rioad" for a short name) was incorporated in
1890 to operate a railroad, about 19 miles
long,
between Campbell and Kennett, In
Dunklin county.
A new company of the
same- title was formed In 1895 by an alleged
consolidation of the old Kennett road and
the Pemiscot Railroad Company, which had
been organized in 1892 to extend the railroad
The latter
from Kennett to Caruthersville.
place is In Pemiscot county, on the Mississippi riv^. The validity of that consolidation is attacked in the petition filed in the
The ostensible public
case on the circuit.
evidence of the consolidation is the certificate issued by the secretary of state of Missouri, proclaiming a compliance with the
statutory requirements In regard to the
imion of such corporations. Rev. St 1889,
The property formerly owned by
§ ^67.
the two old companies was In custody of the
new Kennett road, which operated a line,
about 44 miles in length, from Campbell to
Caruthersville (via Kennett), when Kerfoot's
petition was filed. For the purpose of the
hearing In this court, the version which that
petition gives of the dealings between Kerfoot, Houck, and the companies will be ac-
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This action is original in the supreme court
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M. R. Smith, for plaintiffs.

cepted as reliable; In determining the propriety of the proceedings which followed.
The statements of that petition need not be
repeated.
They will be referred to as occasion requires. An ex parte application for
the appointment of a receiver was made to
the circuit judge, in vacation, on representations additional to the petition. The sub-A
stance of those representations Is that If \
such appointment were not made the property of said railway companies would "be (
wasted pending the determination of thej
said litigation," and the rights of the plain-;
tiff "suffer irretrievable Injury," etc.
The
application excused the want of notice therei
of to defendants on the ground "that the
givmg of the said notice would tend to de^
feait the object sought to be obtained by the;
said appomtment in this, to wit: that thai
said Louis Houck Is In exclusive charge of
all of the books showing the condition
the affairs of the said companies, and has
persons in charge of the various c^ces and
property of the road, who are entirely under
his control; that the said Louis Houck would
so handle and dispose of the books and property of the said companies that the order
of appointment of a receiver. If made upon
notice, would not avail, and would not be
obeyed; the books and movable property of
the said c(HnpanIes would be removed from
the said counties In which said property is
situate, and would be removed from the
state, so that the said processes of the said
court would not be effectual to compel the
delivery thereof to the receiver which might
be appointed"; "that by the removal of the
said books of the said companies the object
of the appointment of such receiver would
be frustrated, and his performance of his
Bald duties would be made difficult, if not
impossible; that all of the said defendants,
directors in the said corporations, are under
the control of the said defendant Louis
Houck";
and "that. If the said defendants
reshould have notice of this application for
ceiver, they would resort to various tricks
and devices to delay this proceeding, and in
the meanwhile to further wreck said property; that the said defendants now are plotting to deprive this plaintiff of his property
Interest in the St. Louis, Kennett & Southem Railroad Company, by means of a fictitious and fraudulent assessment upon his
said stock; and that the giving of the said
notice would have the effect to destroy the
benefits sought In the appointment of the
The circuit judge granted
said receiver."
the application, without notice to defendvacation order, at Poplar
ants, and made
Bluff, in Butler county, the terms of which
are s^ forth at large In the statement acThe main features
comi>anying this opinion.
of the order are that Mr. Fordyce was appointed receiver of all the real and personal
property of defendant companies. He was
directed to Immediately qualify, by giving
bond, etc, and then to take charge of all
a

pany In my salfl county. Saifl Louis B.
Houck was not arrested as ordered above,
because he left the said county of Dunklin.
W. G. Petty, Sheriff of Dunklin County,
Mo."
Other necessary facts appear In the opinion of the court.
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the real and personal property of said companies, "including the rolling stoclt, the depots, books and papers, of the said companies'*; to "manage the said railroad properties carefully," and "continue to fulfill and
perform all of the existing contracts of the
said railroad companies until the further
order of the court in the premises"; to keep
accounts, make reports, etc. The order further directed defendants to deliver all said
property to said receiver, and enjoined them
from interfering with the possession of the
latter. TTie defendants were further ordered
to appear before the judge "at the next term
of the circuit court in the county of Dunklin," then and there to show cause why the
receivership should not be continued "pending a hearing upon the merits." This order
was dated April 11, 1896. The next term
of the Dunklin circuit court, as appointed by
law, will begin on the second Monday (the
Sess. Laws 1892, p. 13,
13th) of July, 1896.
An ordinary summons to defendants
{ 50.
to appear and answer the petition in the
cause at the opening of the July term of
the circuit court of Dunklin county was
issued on the 10th of April, 1896. Mr. Fordyce, at the time of his appointment as receivei-, was president of the St Louis Southwestern Railroad Company, popularly known
as the "Cotton Belt" route. It is alleged in
the petition for prohibition in this court that
the latter is "a competitive railroad company, whose iwllcy has ever been hostile te.
relaitor railroad company, for the reason
that it occupies the same teiTltory for business," and that the connection of the Kenr
nett road with the Mississippi river secures
to the people of Dunklin and Pemiscot counties advantages of competition between that
road and the Cotton Belt. There is no denial of these allegations in the return of any
of the defendants to the preliminary rule In
aiis court, and like statements as to the
roads being in competition appear in the
The above recital
replies to the returns.
shows the substance of the charges on that
poinst "When Mr. Pordyce, in obedience to
the order for his appointment, demanded
possession of the Kennett road, the oflBcers
in charge of the property refused to deliver
It. That demand was the first actual notification given to them of the receivership.
After the refusal to turn over the property,
an application was made to the circuit judge
for further action, whereupon he issued the
writ or warrant of date April 14, 1896, to
the sheriff of Dunklin county, directing him
to summon the power of his county to pat
the receiver In pos8essi<»i of the property of
the two railroad companies, and to dispossess any official of said companies. The
warrant Is recited In full In the statement
accompanying the opinion. But it may be
properly noted here that tibe warrant was
leetied tn Stoddard county. It directed the
arrest of Louis B. Houck, and that he be
produced before the circuit judge, at ehaxo-

Bluff, Butler
bers, in the city of Poplar
county, April 16, 1896, to show cause why
he should not be committed to jail for disof the order appointing the reobedience
ceiver.
Under the last-described writ, the
sheriff put Mr. Fordyce, as receiver, into
of the property of the Kennett
possession
railroad in Dunklin county, and otherwise
returned the order unexecuted, for the reasons appearing in his return. At that stage
of the case the application for a prohibition
was presented to the supreme court, and a
preliminary rule issued.
1. It is urged by defendants that prohibition is not applicable to the situation existing on the circuit in the receivership case,
and that no review can occur at this time
as to the propriety of the disputed orders.
But, if those orders were beyond the legitimate authority of the judge, the enforcement
of them may be prohibited. Morris v. Lenox
The fact that the suit in
(1843) 8 Mo. 252.

the circuit court invokes the equity powers
thereof does not preclude the use of a prohibitory writ to keep the judicial action within the limits marked by law. A court of
equity, no less than a court of law, may
be called back within the boundaries of its
rightful jurisdiction by the process of prohibition. Where a court or judge assumes to
exercise a judicial power not granted by law.
It matters not, so far at coucems the right
to a prohibiticm,
whether the exliibiticwi of
power occurs in a case which the court is
not authorized to entertain at all, or Is merely
an excessive and unauthorized application of
judicial force in a cause otherwise prt^erly
cognizable by the court or judge In question.
State V. Walls (1892) 113 Mo. 42, 20 S. W.
883; In re Holmes (1895) 1 <4. B. 174. Prohibition, however, will not ordinarily be granted where the usual modes of review by appeal or writ of errcw fnrnleh an adequate and
efficient remedy for the correction of an Injury resulting from the unauthorized exerBut where those \
power.
cise of judicial
remedies are inadequate to the exigency of
the situation. In a particular case, a supervising court may properly interfere by the
remedy now asked. If the orders in the Ketfoot suit were in excess of the jurisdiction
of the learned judge who entered them, and
If they have resulted in the seizure of a large
part of a railroad line, and its detention from
those entitled to— and whose duty requires
of
them to— operate it for the convenience
the public, the case is one which would perant, If not demand, the application of a writ
of prohibition to eerrect the wrong compbUited of. The remedy of prohibition affords opportunity for a direct attack upon
proceedings questioned upon the point of
JHTisdietioa. If the facts shown by a rewwd
reveal an imwaiTsuited application of judicial
power, causing an Immediate aitd wrongful
invasion of rights of property, the wilt of
prohibition may go to check the execution of
any unfinished part of the extrajurisdictional.
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programme that may have been outlined.
Sometimes the writ may be so shaped as to
undo the steps that have been taken in such
a programme. To justify the use of the writ, it
is not essential that the proceedings in dispute ^ould be so entirely void as to warrant
a declaration of nullity upon a collateral inquiry. The statute governing proceedings in
prohibition makes no change in the ancient
law on these points. Laws 1895, p. 95.
2. The plaintiffs in this court contend that
the learned judge had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for the railroad company upon
the showing made by the petition of Kerfoot,
and that the order of appointment is therefore a nullity. It is true that there are precedents declaring that, in the absence of
statutory authority for so doing, the property of a solvent and going corporation
cannot rightfully be taken from the control
of its officers at the suit of a mere creditor
at large, and be placed in the hands of a receiver, on account of mismanagement merely, or to secure the performance of some
engagement of the company, even in regard
Some decisions have gone so
to its shares.
far as to correct, and even to prohibit, such
as entirely beyond the general
proceedings,
jurisdiction of courts of equity. Port Huron
& G. R. Co. ▼. Judge of St Clair Circuit
31 Mich. 456; Iron Ca v. Wilder
(1875)
Mason v.
(1892) 88 Va. 942, 14 S. B. 806;
Supreme Court of Baltimore City (1893) 77
Md. 483, 27 Atl. 171; In re Binghamton General El. Co. (1894) 143 N. Y 261, 38 N. E.
297; People v. Weigley (1895) 155 lU. 491, 40
N. B. 300; State v. Superior Court of Pierce
County a895) 12 Wash. 677, 42 Pac. 123;
Fischer v. Superior Court of San Francisco
But in view
(1895) 110 Cal. 129, 42 Pac. 561.
of the other serious and sufficiently difficult
involved in the case at bar, and
question
the desirability of prompt announcement of
tJie conclusion that has been reached, we shall
not now stop to investigate the soundness of
plaintiffs' contention above stated.
3. A power to ^point receivers is expressly conferred upon judges of trial courts in
vacation l^ section 2193, Rev. St. 1889,
which greatly broadened the terms of the old
law (Gen. St. 1865, p. 678, § 52) under which
State V. Gambs (1878) 68 Mo. 289, was deWe shall not be obliged to consider
cided.
whether the judge might not appoint a receive In vacation by virtue of Inherent
power in the circuit court to make such an
order, for in the instance under review the
order was made in another county than that
in which the petition for a receiver had been
filed. The inherent as well as the express powers of a court must be exercised
of that
within the territorial jurisdiction
enlarges
the
field
law
positive
court, unless
of their nae. But, whrare a judicial power
is given by statute to a judge in vacation, he
may exert that power (at least within his
in the county where
circuit) out of as weU as
the cause is pending, unless there is some-
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thing In the statutory authority to forbid such
action. It may be conceded for the present,
without examining the proposition closely,
that the power given to the judge to appoint
a receiver carries vrith it, as a necessary incident, a power in his court. It not in thel
judge personally, to enforce obedience to
orders made
within the ambit of that
power, and in accordance with established
principles of law governing the exertion\
of such a power. (As to the mode of
applying that power we shall have more
to say in the next section of this opinion.)
But the judicial authority to deal with property by means of a receivership is not unlimited or absolute. Harris v. Beauchamp'
By a very late statute"
[1S94] 1 Q. B. SOL
of Missouri an appeal may be taken from any;
order "refusing to revoke, modify or changef j
an interlocutory ordsr appointing a receiveiij
at receivers."
The same statute further'
provides for a very summary determlnatioH
of such appeals, and tac that reason directs
that they shall, on motion, be advanced on
the appellate docket.
Laws 1895, p. 91,
amending Rev. St 1889, §2246.
The pur^
pose of this enactment is to moderate the
hardships resulting from the long continuance of receiverships granted on insufficient
grounds, when no review of interlocutory appointments was permissible. The reports of
court proceedings in the United States prior
to the passage of that act afforded illustrations of the injuries possible from erroneous
judicial action in the matter of receiverships,
—injuries for which the law seemed to
The right to a
afford no adequate redress.
summary review of an interlocutory order
maintaining a receivership Is clearly given
It is a valuable and
by the statute cited.
substantial right The administration of the
law must conform to the intent of the legislature in regard to it Andrews ▼. National
Foundry & Pipe Works (1894) 18 TJ. S.
Ak). 458, 10 C. C. A. 60, 61 Fed. 782. It is
noticeable that a prompt review is allowed
by the act of 1895 only where the order continues, not where it dissolves, the receivership. Thus the statute is plainly aimed at
the possible abuse of maintaining a receiver^
ship (without just grounds) beyond a period
required for an investigation of its correctIf the purpose of the new law Is kept
ness.
in view and effectuated, the procedure in
such cases must be shaped so as to permit a
^eedy review of interlocutory orders appointing receivers in vacation as well as in
term. Otherwise such orders, in many parts
of Missouri, might stand for nearly half a
year without the possibility of even a first
review, under the existing law in regard to
terms of court Laws 1892, p. 10, §30 and
following.
In other states where statutes \
allow appeals from Interlocutory Injunction j
etc., tt j
orders, appointments of receivers,
has been hrfd that the appeals may be taken
Griffin v. ;
In vacation as well as in term.
etc, Ooi. I
Montana,
201;
Ala.
9
Bank (1846)

i
i
\
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further continuance of the receivership.
What Is such reasonable time will depend on
the circumstances of each case. But we
have no doubt that three months is beyond
(and very far beyond) any reasonable day
for the showing of cause. The statute allowing appeals from Interlocutory receivership orders must be given due force.
It
contemplates that an early opportunity shall
be allowed to combat and, If desired, to
review, the appointment
The courts must
yield to that obvious purpose, and permit no
receivership to stand without a simimary
opportunity to review the equity of it.
When a judge in vacation deems the exl-^
gency sufficiently great to warrant an ex
parte order for a receivership of property,
such as that in question here, he should by
the same order appoint a very early da,y for
the showing of cause against the order by
defendants, so that the latter may then have
opportunity for the motion to vacate which
the statute permits. Our law confers. Indeed, power to appoint a receiver In vacation, but It also allows an appeal from an
order refusing to vacate an Interlocutory appointment. A reasonable construction of the
latter act would appear to permit in vacation
a motion to revoke the appointment in vacation; otherwise «ie of the chief remedial
objects of the appeal statute on this subject
would be frustrated. It has been held by f
some courts that a power to do a certain ■
judicial act out of term implies a power to
[
undo that act If justice appears to require!
that move.
Railroad Co. v. Sloan (1877) 31 i
Ohio St 1; Walters v. Trust Co. (1892) 50*
'
Fed. 316.
We hold that the learned judge's >
order in the case on the drcnit was In excess
of the limitations on the power of appointment without notice, which we think the law
Imposes by the clearest Implication.
4. But another patent infirmity Is noticear
ble in the proceedings In question. Had the
first order fixed a reasonable date to show
cause against it the question of the jurisdictional validity of the second order (the order
to the sherifO would demand serious attention. That order was made after the refusal
of the superintendent of the new Kennett
road to surrender possession to the receiver.
The petition itself gave notice that the pn^
erty over which the receivership was sought
to be established was in possession
of the
new company by virtue of the alleged consolidation.
The old Kennett Company and
Its directors were parties defendant in the petition. The new company was not a party to
It for the list of directors shows that only
the old company was pointed out as defendant The receivMship asked of and granted
by the court reached for the property of the
old Kennett C!ompany, and of the Pemiscot
Railroad Company. "The directions to the receiver exhibit that meanii% of the order quite
clearly. Then
was evidently beycmd the
seizure
IMJwer of the learned judge to order
of property in the possession of the new com!

j'.

a
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V. Helena, etc, Co. (1887) 6 Mont 416, 12
Pac. 916; Railroad Co. t. Dykeman a892)
Such rulings ap133 Ind. 56, 32 N. B. 823.
pear necessary to conform to the plain design
of the legislation on that subject The new
provisions In this state most clearly import
that persona whose possession is to be invaded by a receivership shall have at least
a prompt and fuU opportunity for a hearing
(both preliminary and by appeal) as to the
justice and equity of such a drastic remedy.
Keeping the purpose of the new statute in
mind, how must we regard the orders of the
learned circuit judge in the Kerfoot suit?
The appointment of the receiver was made
without notice to, or any hearing of, the
They had no opportunity to
defendants.
offer the facts which they assert, tending to
prove that the demand for any sort of receivership was without foundation. The
learned judge's order fixed a time, three
months distant, at which they might show
cause why the reeMversliip "should not be
continued, and the property kept by the said
receiver, pending a hearing upon the merits."
The details of the order plainly contemplate
that meanwhile the railroad was to be operated and managed by the recelvw; at least
until the next term of court, then three
months off. The receiver was directed, for
Instance, to perform existing contracts "until
the further order of the court"
The whole
framework of the order suggests that the
receivership was established for at least a
The facts which justify
rfhree-months term.
' the appointment of a receiver, without notice
! to the party whose pr-ssession is disturbed,
'
Nothing but the
at best
are exceptional,
'plainest showing of an Imperative necessity
for such an order, to prevent a failure of
justice, should move a court to grant a motion to that end, though there Is no hard and
fast rule, that we can give, prescribing when
the discretionary power to make such an
order may or may not be used. But of this
proposition we feel sture:
that under our
existing law no temporary receivership can
rightly be set up, to last three months,
without affording first a hearing to the party
whose possession of property Is determined
by such an order.
If the court had been in
session, so as to permit immediate application to modify the order, the relief then possible might affect the applicability of a
prohibitory writ But the facts here are
r different
In vacation, at least a party
should not be obliged to hunt up the judge
for a correction of an order made in excess
of his power in the premises.
The right to
appoint a temporary receiver in vacation is
limited by the necessity from which alone
the right to make such appointment springs.
Larsen v. "Winder (1896; Warfu) 44 Pac.
123.
No court in Missouri may, without
notice, declare a receivMBhlp, pending suit
for a longer time than is fairly and reasonably requisite to allow the defendant whose
possession is invaded, to show cause against

a
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pany wlttiont at least glying the latter an opportnnlty to show cause against the proposed
By that order the learned judge virorder.
tually decided that the transfer to the new
company was invaUd, and the union of the
two old companies merely nominal. That
ruling was made without any but an ex parte
bearing, as against a stranger to the case in
court. The order to the sheriff was in the
nature of a writ of assistance, as known to
the chancery practice.
Such a writ could not
rightly be issued, even on a final decree (and,
for stronger reason, not upon an ex parte interlocutory order), as against one not a party
to the STUt, without a chance to the latter to
show cause against the order therefor. People V. Rogers (1830) 2 Paige, 103; Howard v.
Railroad C!o. (1879) 101 U. S. 848; State v.
Ball (1892) 5 Wash. 387, 31 Pac. 975. The
summary writ, issued from another county,
to seize the property and deUvrar it to the receiver, was beyond the jurisdiction
of the
learned judge, so far as it concerned or affected the rights of the new Kennett Company; and, as to the latter company, the effect of the writ should be checked by the prohibition now invoked.
5. The fact that no objection was made on
the circuit to the want of jurisdiction is no
barrier to a prohibition, where the order complained of was entered In vacation, ex parte,
and the defect of jurisdiction appears on the
face of the papers. Nor can the want of an
exception to the objectionable order have any
weight where no c^portunity to except was
bad by reason of the ex parte nature of the
order.
6. Assuming
that the learned judge was
without jurisdiction to require the immediate
delivery of the property of the new Kennett
Company to the receiver without a hearing,
then the disobedience of the order by Mr.
\H,
Hont^ as superintendent of that company,
\jnivolves no contempt. It Is always permissible to show, upon process .for contempt, that
the order disobeyed was beyond the jurisdiction of the authority from which it emanated.
If that showing is successfully made, no
punishable contempt has been committed. Tn
re Sawyer (1888) 124 U. S. 200, 8 Sup. Ct
482; Smith v. People (1892) 2 Colo. App. 99,
29 Pac. 924; Schwartz v. Barry (1892) 90
Mich. 267, 51 N. W. 279; State v. Winder
0896; Wash.) 44 Pac. 125.
7. It Is mslsted by the plaintiffs
In thler
court that the action of the learned circuit
Judge was void because the appointee named
88 custodian of the pre^ierty could not lawfully be appointed receiver of their railway
line. Tlie constitution declares that: "No
raOroad or other ccap<>ratlon, or the lessees,
purchasers or managers of any railroad corIn any way control,
poration, shall • • •
any railroad corporation owning or having
Tmdo: its ecmtrol a parallel or competing line;
nor shall any officer of such railroad corporation act as an officer of any other railroad coi^
poration owning or having the control of a
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parallel or competing line. The question
whether railroads are parallel or competing
lines shall, when demanded, be decided by a
jury, as in other civil Issues." Const. 1875,
art 12, § 17. Two aectlons of the statute law.
In furtherance of the purpose of the organic
law quoted, are as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any railroad company, corporation
or individual owning, operating or managing
any railroad in the state of Missouri, to enter
Into any contract, combination or association,
• * • or
in any way whatever to any degree exercise control over, any i-allroad company, corporation or Individual owning or
having under his or their control or management a parallel or competing line in this
state,
but each and every such railroad,
whether owned, operated or managed by a
company, corporation or individual, shall be
run, operated and managed s^arately by its
own officers and agents, and be dependent for
Its support on its own earnings from Its local
and through business In connection with other
roads, and the facilities and accommodations
it shall afford the public for travel and transportation under fair and open competition."
Rev. St. 1889, § 2569. "It shall be unlawful
for any officer of any railroad company or corporation, or any individual owning, operating
or managing
any railroad in this state as
a common carrier,
to act as an officer of
any other railroad company or corporation
owning,
operating
or managing,
or having
the control of a parallel or competing line,
and the question whether raih'oads are parallel or
competing
lines
shall
be decided
by a jury, when so demanded."
Id. §
2570.
At various pohits In the state statutes concerning railroads, receivers are menti(Hied among other managing operators of
such lines.
Rev. St 1889, §§ 2631, 2644, 2645. \
So that it Is obvious that the president of
parallel or competing raUroad, however high
[
his business quali&catlcms, is not eligible tow
appointment as receiver of the competing rail- /
way line, in Missouri.
The fact Is alleged in '
this court that Mr. Fordyce is the president
ot the Cotton Belt Route, and that it Is a railway In competition with the new Kennett
road. The fact stands admitted by the pleadings here, in their foresent form. But, to
make it available as the groundwork of a iffoMbition, the fact should appear in some way
In the proceedings on the circuit. It does not
appear In the record of those proceedings.
Nor does It appear that the learned circuit
Judge was aware of the fact when the appointment was made.
Hence we are not called upon to say whether or not the fact would
furnish of Itself a cause to prohibit the execution of the order of anointment.
8. The summary order for the seizure of the
I»operty In imssession of the new Kennett
road was, we think, in excess of the rightful
power of the learned circuit judge In vacation. We hence consider that the rule In
prohibition should be made absolute, and direct that judgment for a peremptory writ be
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entered, ^rohiUting the rticnit judge frxMn
enforchiS any order heretofore made In the
Kerf oot case, under which said receiver has
taken possession, or is attempting to talce possession, of some part of the railway or other
property of the St Louis, Kennett & Southern
Railroad Company, or of the Pemiscot Railroad Company,
and prohibiting him from
making any order (upon the priding petition
of said Kerfoot in said cause) directing or
permitting any receiver to take possession of
any property of said companies without first
allowing the presoit St Leois, Kennett &

Southern Railroad O^pany an omMrtunity
to be duly heard; and by the writ the said receiver will be pndiibited from attempting to
take or hold possession of any property of
said railroad c(Hnpanies by virtue of said order, and the receiver will further be ordered
to restore forthwith any and aU property of
the new Kennett road tliat may be in his possession by reason of his said receiversMp.

BRACE, C. J., and GANTT, MacPARLANE, BURGESS, and ROBINSON, JJ., conSHERWOOD, J., dissents.
cur.
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(34 S. E. 828, 47 W. Va. 70.)
Sitpreme

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Nov.

28, 1899.

Appeal from circuit covirt, Tyler county; B.
H. Freer, Judge.
Bill by J. M. Ohilders and another against
S. H. Neely.
Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Reversed.

F. L. Blackmarr, for appellant Robert MoEldowney and G. M. McCoy, for appellees.
a

BRANNON, J. Childers and Ramey filed
bill in equity in the circuit court of Tyler

against Neely, praying that a partnership between them be dissolved, an account taken "of
all its accounts, dealings, and transactions
whatever," and that a manager be appointed
to take charge of the property. The business
was oil production. Neely admitted the Joint
enterprise, but denied the partnership; and he
joined in request for account, and did not resist a dissolution, if a partnership. The decrees made a partial account, decreed its balance against Neely, and denied him further
participation in the partnership, and he a.ppealed.

This case raises an Interesting and impwtant subject in this mining state; that is,
whether, and when, joint tenants or tenants in
common, jointly operating for oil, are partThe bill asserts a
ners, or merely co-owners.
while Neely denies it; asserting
partnership,
that it is a case, not of partnership, but coownership.
In two leases of town lots for oil and gas
purposes, Childers owned a one-fourth interest; Ramey, a three-eighths interest; Neely, a
They were so far joint'
three-eighths interest
They agreed to develop the lots for
tenants.
oil, but made no written articles of partnership,— in fact, no oral express formation of a
partnership. They simply, by an indefinite
understanding,
agrfeed to develop their common property, each giving his skill, paying his
share of outlay proportionate to his ownership, and getting his share of the product proI use the word
portioned to such ownership.
"product" instead of "profits," because there
was no contract explicit on this point to distin"Partnership must
guish product from profit
of
be distinguished from joint management
Where two partproperty owned in common.
ners own a chattel, and make a profit by the
use of it, they are not partners, without some
T.
special agreement which makes them so."
Pars. Partn. § 76. Two heirs or other co-owners of a farm, jointly farming it for profit are
not partners. There Is a peculiar partnership,
called a "mining partnership," partaking partly of the nature of an ordinary trading or general partnership, on the one hand, and partly
It is
of a tenancy in common, on the other.
an Important question to those engaged in the
oil and other mining business whether each one
is Jointly and severally liable for all the doings
of every or any other of the associates in the
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.)— 53
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venture, as In ordinary trading partnerships.
What is a mining partnership? 15 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, p. 609, says: "When tenants
in common of a mine unite and co-operate in
working it, they constitute a mining partnership." Many authorities there cited thus define it
See the California case of Skillman v.
Lachman, 83 Am. Dec. 96, and note discussing it fuUy; Lamar's Bx'r v. Hale, 79 Va,
147.
Mere co-working makes them partners,
Barring. & A. Mines
without special contract.
& M. Courts of equity take jurisdiction of
them as if general partnerships. 2 Colly.
Partn. c. 35. Of course, owners of mines, oil
leases, or farms can by agreement make an
ordinary partnership therein; but "where tenants in common of mines or oil leases or lands
actually engage in working the same, and
share, according to the interest of each, the
profit and loss, the partnership relation subsists between them, though there is no express
agreement between them to be partners or to
Duryea v. Burt, 28
share profits and loss."
Cal. 560. The presumption in such case would
be that of a mining partnership, rather than
an ordinary one, in absence of an express
agreement forming an ordinary general partPerhaps the case of Bank v. Osnership.
borne, 159 Pa. St 10, 28 Atl. 163, and other
cases in that state cited in Bryan, Petroleum
& Natural Gas, 283, would Justify the inference that the parties operated as tenants in
common;
but the current of authority elsewhere recognizes the inference of mining partnerships.
That state does not recognize such
Justice Field said in Kahn v.
a partnership.
Smelting Co., 102 U. S. 645, 26 L. Ed. 266;
"Mining partnerships, as distinct associations,
with different rights and liabilities attaching
to their members from those attaching to

of ordinary partnerships, exist In
Indeed, without them
all mining communities.
successful mining would be attended with difmuch greater
ficulties and embarrassments
One leading distinction bethan at present"
tween the mining partnership and the general
one is that the general one has, as a material
the delectus perelement of its membership,
sonee (choice of person), while the other has
Those forming an ordinary partnership
not.
select the persons to form it always from
fitness, worthiness of personal confidence; but
we know such is not always or often the case
It is because of this delectus
in oil ventures.
personse that the law gives such wide authority of one member to bind another by conOne is the
tracts, by notes, and otherwise.
Hence, when one
chosen agent of the other.
member dies or is bankrupt, or sells his interest to a stranger, even to an associate, the
partnership is closed, one chosen member Is
gone, the union broken, because he may have
been the chief dependence for success, and the
newcomer may be an unacceptable person, who
would entail failure upon the firm. In the
mining partnership those occurrences make no
dissolution, but the others go on; and, in case
a stranger has bought the interest of a memmembers
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ber, the stranger takes the place of him who
sold his Interest, and cannot be excluded.
If death, insolvency, or sale were to close up
vast raining enterprises, in -which many persons and large interests participate, it would
From the
entail
disastrous consequences.
absence of this delectus personae In mining
companies flows another result, distinguishing them from the common partnership, and
that Is a more limited authority in the individual member to bind the others to pecuniary liability. He cannot borrow money or
execute notes or accept bills of exchange
binding the partnership or its members, unless it is shown that he had authority; nor
can a general
or manager.
superintendent
They can only bind the partnership for such
things as are necessary in the transaction of
and are usual in
the particular business,
Charles v. Eshleman, 5 Colo.
such business.
107;
Sldllman v. Lachman, 83 Am. Dec.
96, and note;
McConnell v. Denver, 35 Cal.
365; Jones v. Clark, 42 Cal. 181; Manville
V. Parks, 7 Colo. 128, 2 Pac. 212; Congdon V. Olds, 18 Mont 487, 46 Pac. 261; Judge
V. Braswell, 13 Bush, 67; Waldron v. Hughes,
In fact, it is a
44 W. Va. 126, 29 S. B. 505.
rule that a nontrading partnership, as distinguished from a trading commercial firm, does
not confer the same authority by implication
on its members to bind the Arm; as, e. g. a
partnership to run a theater or other single
enterprise only.
Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn. 53,
22 Atl. 681; Deardorf's Adm'r v. Thacher, 78
Mo. 128; Smith, Merc. Law, 82; T. Pars.
Partn. § 85; Pooley v. Whitmore, 27 Am. Rep.
A mining partnership is a nontrading
733.
partnership, and its members are limited to
expenditures necessary and usual In the parBates, Partn. § 329.
Memticular business.
holding the mabers of a mining partnership,
jor portion of property, have power to do what
may be necessary and proper for carrying on
the business, and control the work, In case all
cannot agree, provided the exercise of such
power is necessary and proper for carrying on
the enterprise for the benefit of all concerned.
Dougherty v. Creary, 89 Am. Dec. 116.
settle much of this case.
These principles
The demurrer was properly overruled, because
there was a partnership, and equity only has
jurisdiction to settle partnership accounts.
5
Am. & Eng. Dec. Eq. 74; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc.

Law,

1273.

Neely excepted to the commissioner's report
of settlement because of the allowance to
Ramey of an expenditure advanced by Ramey
of $369.75, as excessive, and because for repairs on two boilers without his consent. If
the parties were mere joint tenants, consent
would be necessary.
Ward v. Ward's Heirs,
40 W. Va. 611, 21 S. E. 746, 29 L. R. A. 449.
But, being partners, as above stated, a partner has power to order necessary repairs.
Besides, Ramey owned a majority interest.
The boilers were burnt badly, and It seems
that this outlay, though large, is proven, and
was necessary and usual In such a business,

if unattended with other circumstances,
would be clearly allowable under principles
above stated.
The commissioner reports that
the injury to the boilers cajne from neglect of
and,

the pumpers;
but much evidence tends to
show that Ramey, without consent of Neely,
removed the boilers off the ground owned by
the firm, upon a lease of Ramey and Childers,
in which Neely had no Interest, and used them
with another boiler In boring and operating
wells thereon in connection with these wells
of the firm, in Neely's absence, and put too
much work upon them, with inadequate supply of water, which, likely, by heavy firing,
If this Is
caused the burning of the boilers.
so, how can Ramey expect pay for this outlay? Would so serious an injury have occurred to the boilers had this improper use of
them not been made? We cannot say so with
certainty, but it seems not likely. Ramey has
no just claim to be repaid expenditure for repairs caused by himself,— the diversion of the
firm property to his own work, from the work
of the firm. Losses from neglect of duty or
bad faith of a partner, or breach of duty, or
agreement, or Imbreach of a partnership
proper diversion of its property to purposes
foreign to its business, wiU be charged to him,
17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law,
in accounting.
1217; 1 Colly. Partn. S 312; Story, Partn. §
169;
T. Pars. Partn. f 151. Ramey does not
deny such use.
The exception
for the $239.75 allowed
Ramey for three-eighths of expense seems not
The
well taken, and was properly overruled.
commissioner reports that Neely should be allowed nothing for such use of the boilers for
business of Childers and Ramey outside the
legitimate firm business, yet allows him $100
therefor.
We are unable to say that such sum
is not correct in amount, and will have to sustain the commissioner as to it.
Neely excepted because the commissioner
reported that he was not entitled to any allowance on the claim made by Neely, that by
reason of the use of the firm's boilers in boring and operating wells of Childers and Ramey on adjoining leases owned by them, ia
which Neely was not interested, the two wells
of the firm, which had been bored before the
others were, and were paying wells, were
often shut down and unproductive, while those
other wells were going on, and that by reason
of want of water and steam, and the inadequacy of the engines to run all the wells, five
or six in number, the production of the firm's
The commissioner says
wells was diminished.
injury
that Neely suffered no appreciable
thereby.
If hijured at aU, It was appreciable,
and to be estimated.
Ramey states, in short,
that Neely was not entitled to a cent on this
score. Neely's evidence is distinct that he was
there numerous times, and found these two
wells still. He swears to a large loss from
evithis cause.
He furnishes
considerable
dence to sustain him in some loss from this
score, and it seems that equity should make
some compensation for It. There is evidence
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abundant cause, and the evidence shows
abundant cause, of dissolution.
The bill charges that the plaintiffs and Neely made
settlement to
certain date, but that they had
been unable to get Neely to make a settlement since then; that he was violent and
abusive, had threatened
them with violence,
and declared he would have nothing more to
do with them; that he would not contribute
to expenses; that bills remained unpaid; and
that because of the unsatisfactory condition
of the business, and the "disagreements, dissensions, and disaffections between the partners, the property and business were suffering." The evidence shows these disagreeThus,
was plain
ments and dissensions.
that the business was hopeless of success and
prosperity, and the interests of all parties demanded absolute dissolution at the hands of
the law. Reconciliation, harmony, and success were utterly beyond hope.
17 Am. &
Therefore the court
EJng. Enc. Law, 1104.
should have decreed dissolution absolute, and
directed an account of the partnership, and
wound It up. But It decreed no dissolution,
but, on the contrary, suffered the partnership
still to subsist, and, indeed, go on in the sole
of Ramey, excluding
hands and management
Neely therefrom, and decreed that the settlement by the commissioner should only apply
open to future account.
to Its date, leaving
The decree perpetuated the injunction, forever
prohibiting Neely from participation in the
business, and provided that when he should
pay $487.15 found due from him, and costs,
the Injunction should cease. That excellent,
very late work, containing the leading late
decisions in equity in America and England,
the American and English Decisions In Equity,
collecting decisions
notes
with elaborate
p. 52), lays down the rule that
(volume
equity can only entertain jurisdiction for an
final decree in
account when it can make
the suit; citing Randolph's Adm'x v. Kinney,
Rand. 394. That work (page 109) says, "As
a general rule, a bill for accounting between
partners which does not also seek a dissolution of the partnership will not be maintained;" citing cases,— among them, Coville v.
Gilman, 13 W. Va. 314, in which Judge Green
fully sustains this position. T. Pars. Partn.
Lindl. Partn. 948. If ever there were
206;
cases which, by bill and proof, called for dissolution and final account, not partial, this is
one. And, besides the showing of bill and
proof, a petition for rehearing alleged that
Ramey had sold the boilers. The evidence so
This would charge Ramey to credit
shows.
of Neely. There was partnership property In
Ramey's hands.
There could only one adequate relief be given,— dissolution, sale of the
property entire, and full account But no provision was made for dissolution, sale, pr full
account, —only
partial setUement and decree against Neely for the sum found by it.
The bill alleged that the property could not
be divided In kind. If the injunction applied
to property belonging to the firm, on which
a

It

it

a

{

§

2

if

It

It

is

it

Is

i

It,

that Ramey, when asked why the wells were
shut down, said that he had a larger Interest
In the other wells. Ramey (having bought out
Childers' interest, and Neely being absent almost all the time of operation)
had sole
charge.
The commissioner bases his opinion
of no Injury to Neely from pipe-line reports,
which are not before us; but It does seem
from the evidence that the firm business was
neglected, and loss to It accrued therefrom to
an appreciable
extent, for which some compensation should be made.
It is difficult to
say what should be allowed on this account.
It being a thing of only approximate estimate;
and still it seems an allowance should be
made, as Ramey is claiming for outlay, and
himself controlled the business.
When this suit was brought, OhUders and
Ramey obtained tn it an Injunction enjoining
the pipe-line companies transporting the firm's
oil from paying Nedy for his share of the oil
to which he was entitled under his division orders, and joining Neely from any further
participation In the partnership, and from selling his share of the oil; thus taking from him
leaving
the wells and their proceeds, and
Ramey in sole charge of them.
Neely complains that the court refused to dissolve this
injunction. His counsel says there was no
right to
as the biU charged no Insolvency.
The bm, however, did charge that Neely had
failed to contribute his part of the expense of
the business, and that Ramey and Childers
and that
had made large outlays therefor,
Neely had refused to make settlement, and
was largely Indebted to his associates from
the transactions of the partnership. This justifies the Injunction, if the oil of Neely were
in advancing for
social assets, as partners,
expenditures
for the partnership, have a lien
SkiUon partnership property for advances.
man v. Laehman, 83 Am. Dec. 109; Duryea ▼.
402, note.
Burt, 28 Cal. 570; T. Pars. Partn.
only on partnership property,
But this lien
is the law that if
while distinctly such; for
there is a separation or division of the properno lien. If two partty, or part of It, there
ners consign goods for sale, and direct the
consignee to carry the proceeds to the account
is done, neither partner has
of each, and
any lien on the share of the other in those
would have been otherproceeds, though
they had remained part of the comwise
Colly.
683;
Lindl. Partn.
mon property.
Now, these partners
108, note.
Partn.
agreed to have division orders when they began business (that Is, the pipe lines to give
each a certificate of his share of the oil comproduct of the
mitted to them, which was
wells); and this effected a separation of that
product, mailing each one's share his several
from the social propproperty, and severing
There
was such at any moment.
erty, if
being no lien, there was no justification for
It perhaps disabled Neely
the Injunction.
from payuig as the bill demanded of him.
There Is another error in the proceeding.
The bUl demanded a dissolution. It showed
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lien rested for the other partners, It would
it until final account
be proper to continue
and decree. Eobrecht v. Robrecht (this term)
34 S. E. 801.
But Neely's share of the oil
do not see
was his separate property. And
why he should, without cause, be excluded
from participation, letting Ramey have sole
control.
A receiver, impartial between them,
"If
was proper, under the circumstances.
no dissolution Is sought, a receiver and manbut, with a view
ager will not be appointed;

I

to a dissolution or winding up, a receiver and
manager will be appointed. If there are any
such grounds for appointment as are proper
in other cases, or if the partners cannot agree
until sold."
OoUy.
to working the mines
Partn. § 381. Therefore we dissolve the Injunction, reverse the decree, overrule the demurrer to the bill, and remand for further
proceedings as herein indicated, and further
courts of
according
to principles governing
equity In such cases.
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FECHHBIMER
(37

et al. v.
Fed.

BAUM

et al.

167.)

Circuit Court, S. D. Georgia,

W. D.

January

3, 1889.

In equity. Motion for an injunction and
appointment of a receiver.
The bill before the chancellor was filed by
the plaintiffs, residents and citizens of Ohio,
against Baum & Bro., a firm doing business
at Tocmsboro, Irwinton, and Dublin, in this
district, to assert the right to an injunction
and the appointment of a receiver given by
the law of Georgia.
Code, § 3149a,
This
section provides: "In case any corporation,
not municipal, or any trader or firm ot traders, shall fail to pay at maturity any one or
more matured debts, payment of which has
been properly demanded of such debtor and
by him refused, and shall be insolvent, it
shall be in the power of a court of equity,
under a creditors' bill, to which one or more
of the creditors who have matured debts unpaid shall be necessary parties, to proceed to
collect the assets, real and personal, including choses in action and money, and appropriate the same to the creditors of such traders, firm of traders, or corporation."
The averments of the bill made and sworn
to conform to the requirements of the statute
in all respects; and so far as they indicate
the existence of matured debts due by the
defendants to the plaintiffs, the demand for
payment, its refusal, and the insolvency of
the defendants, the averments are not denied.
In addition, the bill alleges other facts
not less important to the Jurisdiction in equity. They are that on May 21, 1888, the
defendants, Baum & Bro., made a statement
to Bradstreet's
Mercantile Agency, which
showed a condition of prosperous solvency
upon their part, which statement Is appended as an exhibit to the bill; that plaintiffs,
in the usual course of business, had knowledge of that statement, believed it to be true,
and IcQew this before their merchandise was
sold to the defendants; that the defendants
owe $160,000; have made many fraudulent
assignments and preferences; that some of
these are given to favored creditors, upon
the goods of the plaintiffs not yet paid for;
that the plaintiffs' debts were created for a
large stocls Of clothing, part of which Is yet
in possession of the defendants; that the
purchase was made by the defendants with
the deliberate intention not to pay therefor,
and with no reasonable expectation that the
defendants would be able to pay; that the
sales are void, and that the title did not pass;
that the statement made to the Bradstreet's
Mercantile Agency as to the standhig and
'.ondition of the firm was made with intent
to deceive the public, and especially the plaintiffs, and was a part of a scheme to defraud
creditors who would extend credit; that the
fraudulent preferences amount to $70,000,
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which Is larger than the annual amount handled in business by the defendants.
The prayer is for an injunction and receiver, and that goods purchased by defendants
from plaintiffs be liept separate for the benefit of plaintiffs, and for a general judgment,
and for general relief. The temporary injunction was granted upon consideration of
plaintiffs' bill, and thereupon plaintiffs filed
an amendment thereto.
This prayed that H.
M. Comer & Co., a firm of cotton factors of
this district, be made parties; that the preferences to Comer & Co. are void, (they consist
of certain mortgages to secure an alleged
Indebtedness
of $35,000, given upon stock
worth $43,000;) that in addition to these
mortgages
the defendants
have transferred
and assigned to H. M. Comer & Co. notes
and accounts in a sum largely in excess of
Comer's demand; that on August 22d these
accounts were worth $50,000, and plaintiffs
charge on information and belief that these
transferred choses in action have been increased by other transfers to $75,000; that
since the mortgage and preferences were given, the defendants, Baum & Bro., have paid
to Comer & Co. $18,000, which reduces their
demand to $17,000, and yet Comer & Co. hold
as collateral and otherwise in mortgages on
real and personal property the full sum of
$100,000 to secure this debt.
This was stated
on the hearing, without objection, to be $24,600, and the chancellor, for the present, assumes that to be correct.
The bill alleges that the transactions between Comer & Co. and the defendants were
the result of a fraudulent confederacy to
hinder and delay creditors, and to compel
them to accept a smaU pittance in full satisfaction of large debts; that the demands
of Comer & Co. should not be paid by the
proceeds arising from the sale of the merchandise of plaintiffs and other creditors, not
yet paid for; that Comer & Co. had actual
notice of the defendants'
insolvent condition
at the time of certain payments made to
them from such proceeds.
The amendment
further alleges that, prior to the insolvency
of the defendants,
or at some other time,
Comer & Co. obtained from the defendants
an agreement in writing that when the defendants should become weak or insolvent
that they would execute and make to Comer
& Co. a mortgage covering their entire property, and should assign to them all of their
notes, accounts,
and choses in action; that
said mortgages and preferences were given
In pursuance of said agreement; that Comer
& Co. permitted the defendants to retain possession of the notes and accounts and choses
In action transferred to him; that the large
amount of assets In the hands of Comer &
Co., over and above their lawful demand,
win be sacrificed to the injury of plaintiffs;
that the defendants bought a large stock of
goods on credit, with the intention not to pay
for them, and to defraud creditors. The
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prayer is that Comer & Co. be required to
produce tlie said agreement on the hearing,
and that they be enjoined from proceeding
to foreclose the mortgage or mortgages, and
that they be enjoined from collecting the
notes and accounts, or from any way interfering with the assets of the defendants, and
that a receiver be appointed to talie charge
of all such assets for the benefit of the creditors. The bill expressly waives discovery.
In reply to the motion for injunction, etc.,
the defendants Baum & Bro. deny, in their
answers, that plaintiffs' debt was contracted after the financial statement was made;
that they gave the statement of the 21st of
May, yielding to the solicitation of the Bradstreet Company; that there were no mortgages or liens at the time the statement
was made; that the statement appended to
the bUl itself is erroneous; that their dealings have been honorable and successful up
to the time of this failure; that their failure
is a thoroughly honest failure; that they have
not made any preference upon which suspicion or doubt can be cast as to its entire
good faith; that their creditors have given
uniform evidence of their entire and unintegabated confidence in the defendants'
rity; that they have paid large amounts to
their creditors, and have drawn out nothing
from their business except for the necessary
support of their families; that the mortgages
were given to secure bona fide debts; and
that, if a receiver is appointed, the loss in
winding up the business will be so great that
the creditors will get nothing.
H. M. Comer makes answer by affidavit.
He states that on the 10th day of March,
he took the agreement
to the court
1888,
shown, which was referred to in the bill.
This had been done every year previously.
It was taken in entire good faith, to protect
He gave
the advances that deponent made.
the creditors knowledge of it on the 3d of
December,
and never attempted to conceal
It. He denies utterly fraud and confederacy.
That in his preferences defendants reserved
He never
no right or benefit to themselves.
had any reason to suspect fraud on the part
of the defendants.
That in the spring and
summer of 1888, before he knew defendants
they sent to him notes
were embarrassed,
and accounts of the face value of $43,263.45,
as collateral for about $27,000 then due.
These notes and accoimts he sent to the defendants to collect for him. This collateral
was more valuable than that obtained in
Then the debt was increased,
November.
and Comer & Co. took by transfer the notes
and accounts referred to.
Another affidavit
was presented by H. M. Comer.
It recites
that his firm are cotton factors and commission merchants in the city of Savannah;
that they have been the factors of Baum &
Bro. and Baum & Co., the defendants, for
five years; that they would make advancements in the spring and summer with the
understanding that they were to be paid ofC

In the fall and winter; that the business
has been large, and the statement taken from
his books is attached.
It shows an indebtedness of $43,078.23, subject to credits from
Baum & Bro.; also amounts due by the concerns at Dublin and Irwinton, all subject
to a credit of 521 bales of cotton, which,
estimated
at $38 per bale, leaves Bamu &
Bro. indebted to H. M. Comer & Co. $24,661.07.
This indebtedness is secured by a
mortgage on real and personal property, dated November 13, 1888, by a mortgage on the
personalty, dated November 17, 1888, by certahi notes and accounts transferred by the
Batmis to deponent's firm. This security was
given for the sole purpose of securing the
debt.
He denies that the charges of the bill
were true.
Upon the hearing, several creditors were
among
made parties plaintiff by intervention,
them, H. P. Claflin & Co., New York, whose
debt is $11,986.16; A. Gibian, about $1,600;
S. Waxelbamn; Culver, Moore & Culver and
others.
On the hearing plaintiffs put in evidence this statement of Baum & Bro. to their
3d, which is as
creditors,
made December
follows:

STATEMENT.

Liabilities.
Amount secured claims
Amount unsecured claims

$69,625SO
81,27761
n50,90S 44

Total liabilities
Assets.
at Toomsboro

$18,09536
Merchandise
17,900 45
Mercbandise
at Dublin
6,540 00
Merchandise
at Irwinton
Real estate, mules, horses, etc. . 7,166 00
Total notes and ac$105,15092
counts
lor worthless
Deduct
72,310 S4
and doubtful claims..
Notes

value

Cash

and

accounts

at

actual

on hand

32,840 38
1.385 00

Total available assets
Recapitulation.
$83,92619
Total available assets
^ 69.625 80
Deduct for secured claims

83,926IS

Leaving balance
Amount of unsecured

14,30039
81,27764

claims

Also the affidavit of Albert

M. Holstein,

agent of plaintiffs, which proves the account
and demand of the plaintiffs, and states that
it was made on the faith of the statement to
This
Bradstreet, made by the defendants.

showed that the defendants were entirely
solvent The statement is as follows:
"88

Exhibit A.
"[Late Report]

"Executive Offices, 279, 281, 283, Broadway,
New York.
"Bradstreet' s.
"No. 82 West Third Street
"Cincinnati, July 19, 1888.
Give us in
Bradstreet Company:
confidence, for our exclusive use and benefit
in our business, under our agreement with
you, such information as you may have or
may be able to obtain concerning the re
"The
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character,

reputation,

credit,
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and generally put up planters' notes as collateral. They are reputed to own real estate
"Name— N. B. Baum & Bros.
worth five to eight thousand dols. Would
"Business— Gen. Store, i July 20, I
be difficult to give correct estimate of their
"Street and No.
I 1888.
J
net worth, but it is the general belief that
"City (or P. O. Address)— Toomsboro.
the firm is estimated worth fully twenty
"County— Wilkinson.
thousand dollars, or more. They are of good
"State— Ga.
character, and steady habits, and of fine busi"Signature of M. & L. S. F. & Co., Subness ability.
Appear to do nearly all the
scriber.
business that Is done at this point, and are
"2402— P. O. Address.
generally prompt in meeting their obligations,
"icy Information will be furnished upon the
and are quoted in good credit
proper filling up of this blank and the signa"May 21st 1888.
ture of the subscriber.
Bradstreet's.
10-19-1888.
"[Indorsed:]
"2-13-S-lOm.
To M. & L. S. Fechheimer & Co. The cor^rectness of this report is not guaranteed; but
"Inhibit B.
having been obtained by us in good faith—
"Baum, N. B. & Brc, Toomsboro, Ga., Wilfrom authorities deemed reliable — it is transkinson county.
mitted to you in strict confidence for your
"A. W. Baum, aged 36 years, and married. exclusive use and benefit and in accordance
"N. B. Baum, aged 39 years, and married.
with the terms of the contract existing be"States: Began business in 1875 in a smaU
tween us. Respectfully,
way, and have been quite successful. As
"The Bradstreet Co.
per inventory taken January 15, 1888, our
"State of Ohio, Hamilton County, ss.: Bestatus is as follows:
Stock of merchandise,
fore me personally appeared Levi O. Goodale,
who, being duly sworn, says that he is the
nineteen thousand dols.; bonds and stocks,
par value, twenty-one thousand dollars; marsuperintendent of the Bradstreet Co. Mercanket value, twelve thousand dollars; notes
tile Agency, oflSce at 82 West Third street
thirty-five thousand dollars;
Cincinnati, Ohio. That on July 19, 1888, they
and accounts,
real estate, town property and lands, ten
received a ticket of inquiry from M. & L. S.
thousand dollars; making total assets of the Fechheimer & Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio, asking
firm, seventy-six thousand dollars.
Liabili- for information concerning the responsibility,
character, reputation, credit, etc., of N. B.
ties:
Borrowed money for the year 1888,
twenty-four thousand dollars; mercantile and Baum & Bro., whose post-offlce address was
Toomsboro, Ga. Said ticket of inquiry is
other Indebtedness,
twelve thousand doUars;
attached hereto, made part hereof, marked
total liabilities, thirty-six thousand dollars.
'Exhibit A.' That on the 20th day of July,
Net: Forty thousand dollars. We have a
1888, we made a report in answer to said inbranch store at Irwinton, Ga. The business
quiry, an exact copy of which answer is atthere is rim under the style of 'Baum & Co.'
tached hereto, made part hereof, marked 'ExStock on hand there, two thousand dollars;
hibit B.' We obtained this information in
four thousand dollars;
notes and accoimts,
the regular coiu:se of our business, and for
cash, five hundred dollars; total, sis thousand
our company in that section of Georgia in
five hundred dollars; and owe three thousand
which the business of N. B. Baum & Bro. is
dollars. After allowing for shrinkages, bad
located.
Levi C. Goodale.
debts, etc., consider ourselves worth fully
"Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my
dollars,
over liabilities.
thirty
thousand
presence, this 19th day of December, 1888.
There are no mortgages or liens on any of our
"William S. Littie,
property, either real or personal. Our stock
"Notary Public, Hamilton County, Ohio."
is Insured for thirteen thousand dollars; fixWhen we bortures, two thousand dollars.
R. W. Patterson, one of the solicitors for the
row money from banks we deposit our bonds
plaintiffs, testifies that he was present at
and stocks as security. From our cotton facthe meeting of defendants' creditors on Detors we borrow on farmers' notes as collatercember 3, 1888.
Baum offered to unsecured
Do an annual
al, give no other security.
creditors 12% per cent of their claims in 30
business of seventy-five to eighty-five thouIn addition to the above we days' time, and 12% per cent, additional in
sand dollars.
12 months, neither secured.
Subsequentiy insell 5 or 6 hundred tons of fertilizers per annum, which we buy outright Give notes for quiry was made by Mr. H. M. Comer if the
offer would be accepted if he (Comer) would
the same, payable in fall. To only one comguaranty the first 12% per cent Some of
pany do we give farmers' notes as collateral.
At this point we cleared ten thousand dollars the creditors, and among them the plaintiffs,
declined to accept C. H. Cohen, attorney
on guano alone.
"The Mercantile News Agency states: We for H. P. Claflin, testified that on November 23d he called on the defendants at Toomslearn they carry an average stock of about
boro;
that N. B. Baum told him that he
fifteen thousand dollars, and do a large busihad been under contract to Mr. Comer for
ness, sell largely on credit, and consequently
Said to borrow
some time to give the Comers a mortgage
have considerable due them.
they demanded it, and he felt comin
use
their
whenever
money
to
business.
considerable
etc.,

of
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to do as he had previously agreea,
which deponent understood was to give the
mortgage upon all his assets, including the
goods that deponent's clients had but recently sold him. This witness proves the account
of H. P. Claflin & Co. in the sum of $11,pelled

986. IG.

R. W. Patterson,

J.

W. Lindsay, and

a

H.

Ckihen testify that they heard H. M. Comer
state before the meeting of creditors that he
bad an agreement with N. B. Baum, ot the
defendants,
to the effect that Baum would
execute a mortgage to him upon whatever assets he had, and that on this agreement Comer had made him advances, and that the
agreement had been in force for as much as
Deponents
a year prior to that time.
fur-

ther say that they heard N. B. Baum, at the
creditors' meeting, state that he was insolvent at the time he made his statement to
Bradstreet's agency, in May of the present
year, although he did not know it at the time.
C. A. Turner testified by affidavit that,
after the deputy-marshal had closed the store
of the defendants at Toomsboro, he heard N.
B. Baum say in a conversation with deponent that he had in his possession the
notes, accounts, and assets of Baum & Bro.
and Baum & Co., which had prior to that
time been turned over to H. M. Comer & Co.,
of Savannah. The bills for most of the plaintiffs' goods sold to Baum were dated on August 6th, August 10th, August 13th, and a
renewal note was taken on October 9, 1888.
It was shown by the evidence that this was
the manner in which the .goods were sold:
The traveling agent of the plaintiff took the
order in July, subject to ratification by the
This inhouse, on inquiry as to solvency.
quiry was made to Bradstreet. The goods
were not shipped unless the reply was satisfactory. The sales were not completed until
the goods were sent.
For the defendants the following evidence
was submitted: The agreement entered into
between N. B. Baum & Bro. and Baum & Co.
and H. M. Comer & Co., dated March 10, 1888.
It recites that for and in consideration of certain advances to the amount of $18,000, as
evidenced by five promissory notes for $3,200
each, signed by N. B. Baum & Bro., and indorsed by Baum & Co., and payable at the
office of Comer & Co., as follows, respectively, on September 15th, October 1st, November 1st, and November 10th; and one note
for $2,000, signed by Baum & Co., and Indorsed by Baum & Bro., due October 20th next.
"Now, in order to secure these and any other
sum that may hereafter be due them, we
agree to deposit with them as collateral security, notes and mortgages of good planters
and others to whom we sell goods, in amount
equal to at least two dollars for every one
dollar due by us to the said Comer & Co. We
also agree to transfer to them as additional
security our insurance policies on our buildtags and stocks of goods; and we further obli-

gate and bind ourselves to give said H. M. Comer & Co. a first lien or mortgage upon all our
stocks of goods and real estate, in case we
shall at any time become financially embarrassed while indebted in any way to them, or
in case our said notes above described are not
paid promptly at maturity. It is also understood and agreed that all drafts drawn, or
money advanced upon account or otherwise,
over and above the eighteen thousand dollars
herein named, shall be paid out of the proceeds of cotton shipments first and before
said proceeds are to be applied to said notes;
in other words, only credit balances as may
appear from open account are to be paid on
said notes unless by consent of said H. M.
Comer & Co. in writing.
It is understood
and agreed that 8 per cent, per annum vrill
[Signed]
be charged on all advances,
etc.
N. B. Baum & Bro., and N. B. Baum & Co."
The mortgage dated the 17th day of November, to secm-e the payment of $38,000,
including the five notes before mentioned and
three other notes for $5,000 each, dated October 12, 1888, and due at various dates until December 10, 1888, and one note for
$5,000,
due January 12, 1888, and one note
dated March 10, 1888, for $2,000, signed by
Baum & Co., indorsed by Baum & Bro., payable October 20, 1888, upon 150 half rolls of
bagging, 100 bundles cotton ties, 100 sacks
salt, all in the planters' warehouse at Dublin; and also all goods, merchandise,
dry
goods, groceries, etc., stored ta the store of
L. C. Perry & Co., at Dublin, 6a.; also, a
mortgage made 13th of November,
1888, to
secure $30,000, betag apparently the same
notes just mentioned, and given upon certain
lots of land situated in Toomsboro, and upon which is erected store-houses;
and also
certain stocks of general merchandise ta said
store, describing them particularly;
and also
all such articles and things as may be hereafter placed in such stock; also the stock
in the store at Dublin, more particularly describing it, with the same provision as to
future acquisitions; also a lot of land, onehalf acre in Irwinton,
with
store-house
thereon, and also the stock of goods thereThe mortgages comprehend all
to contained.
the safes, show-cases, and ' fixtures of every
kind in said three stores.
Numerous affidavits were presented as to the policy or Impolicy of granting the prayer of the bill for
the appointment of a receiver, and an affidavit to sustain the good character of H. M.
Comer.— in the opinion of the court a deposition altogether superfiuous.
Other portions of the testimony are not material or
necessary to the proper determination of the
After a full hearing and exhaustive
cause.
argrument on Friday last the court took time
to consider, and has reached the followmg

conclusions:
Patterson & Hodges, for plaintiffs. Hill &
Harris and Denmark & Adams, for defendants.
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SPEER,

J.

(after

stating

the

facts

as

Baum & Bro. and Baum & Co., two
above).
firms composed of the same individuals, are

traders, in the meaning of the statute of tWa
state quoted ahove.
That they are Insolvent
it is conceded.
The plaintiffs are creditors,
whose demands,
as the court is at present
advised, are within the class provided for in
the statute

above

quoted,

(Code Ga. § 3149a,)

giving, in certain cases, the equitable right
to the extraordinary remedies applied for.
This right of the creditor to put the debtor's assets, when the latter is an insolvent
trader, in the hands of a receiver, is peculiar
to the law of this state.
It has no existence
in the general jurisprudence of equity which
obtain in these courts. It is now settled,
however, that the courts of the United States
may administer an equitable right granted
by the law of the state in suits of which,
from other reasons, they have jurisdiction.
It was urged in argument for the defendant
that the creditors, v?ithout a judgment at
law, have no right to apply In equity for the
appointment of a receiver. That this is a
general rule in undeniable, but there are exceptions to it, and one of these exceptions ot
apparently clear distinctness is where the
law-making power has enacted in terms that
the debt need only be mature, with payment
as is the law in
and refused,
demanded
Georgia.
It is true, also,— as held in this
circuit, in Jaffrey v. Brown (C. C.) 29 Fed.
477,— that a party not intending to pay, by
inducing one to sell him goods on credit
through the fraudulent concealment of his
insolvency and of his intent not to pay for
them, is guilty of a fraud, which entitles the
vendor, if no innocent third party has acquired an interest in them, to disaffirm the
See, also,
contract, and recover the goods.
Crittenden v. Coleman, 70 Ga. 295; Donaldson V. FarweU, 93 U. S. 633; note to Jaflfrey
V. Brown (O. C.) 29 Fed. 485, and authorities
The remedy at law must be quite as
cited.
complete as that in equity to defeat the powId.
er of equity to proceed.
The demurrer filed to the bill, while not
finally overruled, is not deemed sufficient, as
the court is at present advised, to defeat the
relief sought by the bill, should that relief
The chancellor has given very
be granted.
anxious thought and careful inquiry to the
ascertainment of his duty in the premises.
It is true that the prayers of the bill seek
to obtain perhaps the most vigorous and farreaching action In the power of the court—
action which should not be taken in cases of
this character, except In the presence of
On the
plain fraud or irreparable injury.
other hand, the statements of the defendants
themselves show the most utter Insolvency,
and a failure to comply with their duty to
their creditors, which evinces either neglior
of the most flagrant character,
gence
and
decided.
marked
less
scarcely
fraud
Upon the 21st of May, whatever may have
pubUcation,
been the motive which led to the

it is undeniable that the defendants
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gave to

the mercantile community, by means of a
usual and widely known commercial news
agency,
a statement which shows remarkable solvency, and indeed prosperity, for
their section of the country.
"Our total
assets," they said, "are seventy-six thousand
dollars; our liabilities, thirty-six thousand
dollars, net After aUowiog for shrinkages,
bad debts, and so forth, we consider ourselves worth fully thirty thousand dollars
over liabilities, etc. There are no mortgages
or liens on our property, either real or personal.
Our stock is insured for thirteen
thousand dollars. When we borrow money
from bank we deposit our bonds and stocks
as security.
When we borrow money from
our factors we give farmers' notes as collateral; give no other security." In a little
more than six months we find this firm in
debt $150,903.44, with total assets of $83,926.19, leaving debts to the amount $66,In other words,
976.25, altogether hopeless.
ta a half year there had been a change for
the worse in their condition of nearly $100,000,— if their respective statements to Bradand to their creditors is reliable.
street's
For this startling transformation of their
condition they offer neither explanation nor
There had been no disaster from
excuse.
flood or fire, no epidemic, none of those extraordinary circumstances which at times
cause the stoutest busuiess houses to tremIn May there is an indebtedness of
ble.
thirty-six thousand, in December a debt of
In May
one himdred and fifty thousand.
in
there are neither liens nor mortgages,
December they approximate seventy thousand dollars. In the spring creditors were
assured of prompt payment, in the fall they
are met by hopeless Insolvency; and yet the
court is asked to consider this an innocent
and unavoidable failure, and this, too, in the
absence of a syllable of proof to accoimt for
What makes it more remarkable Is that
it.
the business was conducted in quiet villages,
where all
a rural population,
and among
legitimate trade was marked by careful purchases and conservative transactions; where
every p^rehaser is personally known to the
merchant,—his solvency and disposition or
ability to pay debts as familiar as houseBut this is not all. In the
hold words.
proclamation of Baum & Bro. to the business community of the country, they say
"there are no mortgages or liens upon our
At that moment it was all in.
property."
cumbered with a secret obligation which a
court of equity in a proper case would declare to have all the effect of a mortgage.
In less than six months every cent* s worth
of their stock or other assets, whether paid
for or not, is shingled with mortgages, made
In
in pursuance of that covert stipulation.
the presence of such facts as these It would
seem futile to urge upon the court the considerations of business capacity and business
Integrity and mercantile popularity, which
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form so large a part of the defendants'
showing. "We give to ovir factors no securIty save farmers' notes."
As that public
pledge was being made their contract was
in existence, not only to give two dollars for
one, in notes and choses in action, for everj
dollar obtained from their factors, but to
give mortgages which are undeniably other
and very different security. "Our stock is
insured for $13,000," said they to Bradstreet's,— they did not say the policies had
been pledged to H. M. Comer & Co., and out
of the reach of other creditors.
It would seem superfluous to analyze the
•widely variant statements of the defendants,
and it requires no elaborate inquiry to ascertain the law controlling the rights of the parties with such facts before the court.
The
statutes of the state are sufficiently explicit
Suppression of a fact material to be known,
and which the party is under an obligation to
communicate,
constitutes fraud.
The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties, or the peculiar
circumstances
of the case. Code Ga. § 3175.
Can it be doubted that the fact that the defendants were under a written obligation to
execute mortgages upon their entire stock and
all their other property, was "material to be
known" by those giving them credit?
Can it
be doubted that when the Baums undertook to
give to Bradstreet's, for the information of the
business world, a statement of their assets,
liabilities, and methods of borrowing money,
that the obligation
was upon them to communicate the truth?
Will the most credulous
believe for a moment that Fechhelmer
& Co.
would have given them credit for $4,000; that
Claflin & Co. would have given them credit
for $11,000,— had they known the existence and
the nature of their obligation to Comer? We
think not. The statements of such mercantile
agencies as Bradstreet's are intended to influence the action of merchants and others who
give credit.
It is well understood that the
mercantile community relies largely upon such
statements, and the persons giving them are
under the weightiest obligation, which will be
enforced
in foro conscientise, to speak the

truth.
If there has been deliberate suppression
of a vital fact in a statement of this character,
which does mislead, it is a fraud upon the
person misled, which a court of equity will
redress, If possible.
Again, "misrepresentation
of a material fact, made willfully to deceive,
or recklessly without knowledge, and acted on
by the opposite party, or. If made by mistake,
and innocently, and acted on by the opposite
party, constitutes legal fraud."
Code Ga. {
.3174.
See, also, section 2634.
Now, It appears from the evidence of Messrs.
Patterson,
Lindsay, and Cohen that N. B.
Baum admitted Iti thehr presence and hearing
that he was insolvent at the time the statement to Bradstreet was made, although
he
there asserted a net worth, above all liabilities
and doubtful assets, of fully $30,000, but that
he did not then know his Insolvent condition.

Conceding, therefore, that this statement "was
honest, it is none the less fraudulent in contemplation
of these provisions of the Code.
It follows that, even in the absence of the Insolvent traders' act, before quoted, the plaintiffs would be entitled to the relief they seek
if it can be made to appear that there is a
prospect of redressing their wrongs thereby.
Much more, then, are they so entitled under
the provisions of that act.
It is said, however, for the defendants, that the liens created
by Baum & Bro. to Comer and others will exhaust the assets, and that the imsecured creditors can get nothing through the action of a
receiver, however vigilant he may be. But the
defendants themselves admit that the assets
amount to about $86,000 more than the preferences he has given.
It is true that he states
that $72,310.54 of notes and accounts
are
worthless and doubtful, but the coin-t is not
Inclined to accept this statement as flnal. It
would be very remarkable
if his doubtful
debts In December should be as much as his
total assets in May. A diligent receiver will
collect many of those claims, or the court wUl
know the reason why. Besides, by the same
statement there is a balance of $14,300.39 to
be divided
among the imsecured
creditors.
This is itself no mere bagatelle.
We have
known original suits to be brought for less.
But perhaps more important than either of
these is the fact that Comer & Co., who only
claim $24,671.07 as thei sum of their demands
against the Baums, have now in their possession $50,000 worth of good notes and accounts, and mortgages on $49,000 worth of
property consisting of merchandise and other
personalty and certain realty.
However valid
iliay be the demand of Comer & Co., when it
is paid they will not be permitted to retain a
dollar in excess of their proven claims.
It is
true that by the law of Georgia, section 1953,
"a debtor may prefer one creditor to another,
and to that end he may bona flde give a lien
by mortgage or other legal means, or he may
sell in payment of the debt, or he may transfer negotiable papers as collateral security, the
surplus in such cases not to be reserved for
his own benefit or that of any other favored
creditor, to the exclusion of other creditors."
The large surplus conveyed to Comer & Co. to
secure their debt they hold as trustees for the
creditors of the defendants, the Baums. Besides, the balance which Comer & Co. present
is ascertained by estimating
more than 500
bales of cotton shipped to them at $38 a bale.
They have turned over notes and accounts of
the insolvent firm to one of its members for
collection.
This will not be permitted.
The
Insolvent debtor who has failed under such
circumstances
is not the best custodian for
convertible assets of this character.
This investigation
has satisfied the court
that this is a suit where it is manifestly the
duty of the chancellor to make the orders
prayed for. A receiver will be appointed, and
Comer & Co., who are
an injunction granted.
now formally made parties defendant to the

843

EEOEIVERS.
bill, will be required to make proof of their
account, and if found just and true and a
valid lien,, as it now appears to be, it will be
paid in fuD if the funds are suflflcient. This Is
true of other debts of superior dignity, and the
remainder of the fund in the hands of Comer
& Co. and elsewhere within the reach of the

will be apportioned to the creditors.
The court will appoint receivers of undoubted
qualifications, who vrill at once talse possession
of the assets of the insolvent firm, and as fast
as collected pay the funds into the registry
of the court, and the cause will proceed with
court

the utmost

expedition.
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OGDEN CITY v. BEAR LAKE & RIVER
WATERWORKS & IRRIGATION 00. et al.
(55 Pac. 385,
Supreme

18

Utah, 279.)

Court of Utah.

Dec. 5, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Salt Lake county; Ogden Hiles, Judge.
Action by Ogden City against the Bear
Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Company, Bear River Irrigation & Ogden WaterJudgment for
works Company, and others.
plaintiff, and defendant Bear River Irrigation
Company appeals.
Waterworks
Sc Ogden
Modified.
Harkness, Howat,
Bradley &
Bennett,
Richards and Rogers & Johnson, for appellant. E. M. Allison, Jr., C. C. Richards, and
J. H. Macmillan, for respondents.

That the compensation to the receiver and
to Griffin were customary and reasonable for
their time and services, and that the charges
for the stamp and publication were reasonable, no question is made.
The sole question
Is, was it error to order their payment out
of the fund? It appears the receiver was
appointed
on the application of the plaintiff, and over the objections of the appellant,
and that it would not have been necessary to
incur the Items of compensation to the receiver, or to Mr. Pl«"ce, or for the stamp
or publication, had the property remained in
appellant's hands and the bu^ness under Its
control.
The appellant was wrongfully de- f
prived of the possession of Its property, and
of the control of Its business without its con- \
It,
sent, upon the petition of the plaintiff.
would be inequitable to require the appellant \
to pay the extra expense of conducting
its j
business caused by the erroneous order ob- j
We understand thetalned by the plaintiff.
rule supported by the weight of authority is
that when a receiver is appointed on the
application of one of the parties, and takes
possession,
and the appointment Is afterwards set aside because erroneous, and theproperty is returned, all expenses incurred In
additional
consequence
of the appointment,
to those that would have been necessary had
with such oppositethe property remained
party, ought not to be paid out of the fund,
but by the party at whose Instance the apThe expenses incur-'
pointment was made.
red by the receiver that would have been \
necessary for the appellant to incur had itfr—jL
remained In the possession of Its property,
and In the control of its business, were prop
erly paid out of the fund, but such as It
would not have been necessary for it to
incur should be charged to the party procurIng the order.
Such expenses should be regarded as Incurred In consequence of an erWeston v. Watts, 45
ror at his Instance.
Hun, 219; City of St. Louis v. St Louis Gaslight Co., 11 Mo. App. 237; Bank v. Bayne,
140 N. Y. 321, 35 N. E. 630; Moyers v. Coiner, 22 Fla. 422; French v. Glfford, 31 Iowa,

ZANB, C. 3. This Is an appeal by the
Bear River Irrigation Sc Ogden Waterworks
Company, a defendant, from the order of
of
the court below approving the report
Thomas D. Dee, receiver, and allowing the
various items thereof, and ordering them to
As to the
be paid out of funds In his hands.
motion of plaintiff to dismiss this appeal for
the reason, as alleged, the order appealed
from was not a final judgm«it, we are of
the opinion the order requiring the compensation to the receiver and I. N. Pierce, and
the payment to Griffln and the Ogden Standard, out of funds in the receiver's hands, was
final, and therefore appealable, and we therefore overrule It.
It appears from the record that Mr. Dee
was appointed receiver pendente lite of the
waterworks system tn Ogden City on January 17, 1898, on the application of plaintiff,
Ogden City;
that he immediately qualified
and took possession and charge of the sysand
tem and its buildings, and managed
operated it u'ntil April 20, 1898; that the order appointing him receiver was reversed by
this court, with directions to the lower court
to order a return of the property to the appellant, which was done; that on April 27,
428.
1898, Dee filed his report as such receiver,
We hold that so much erf the order appealshowing a collection of water rents to the
ed from was erroneous as authorized compenamount of $11,247.07, and that he had dissation to the receiver and to I. N. Pierce, and
bursed $1,266.45 fpr labor, $148.53 for mathe Items for a stamp and for the publicaterial, and $90.50 for general expenses, and,
tion of notice, out of the fund. Such exin addition, he asked the court to allow him
penses should have been taxed against the
as
plaintiff. The remainder of the order is af$750 out of the funds as compensation
receiver; and to I. N. Pierce, as inspector,
The cause is remanded to the court
firmed.
$219.80; and S. 6. Griffin, for a stamp, $3.25;
below, with directions to tax the expenses
and the Ogden Standard, for advertising,
In accordance
with this opinion, and to so
To the allowance of these last four
$14.00.
order them paid; costs of appeal to be taxeditems the appellant objected, and it assigns
against plaintiff.
the order of the court allowing them and ordering their payment out of the fund as eryAt BARTCH and MINER, JJ., concur
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WHITNEY

V.

HANOVER NAT. BANK

et al.

(two cases).

SAME

V.

BANK OF GREENVILLE

(15 South.
Supreme

et al.

33, 71 Miss. 1009.)

Court of Mississippi.

April

9, 1894.

Appeal from chancery court, Washington
county; W. R. Trigg, Chancellor.
Proceedings between George Q. Whitney
and the Hanover National Bank and others
relative to the funds of the Bank of Greenvlllft
From three adverse decrees, Whitney
appeals. Affirmed.
Nugent & Mc Willie and S. H. King, for apYerger & Percy, for appellees.

pellant

CAMPBELL, O. J. These three cases
were argued and submitted together, and
will be so considered. Their history is this:
The Bank of Greenville was found to be insolvent, and came to a stop, on the 22d day
of December, 1891, when the directors, headed by the president, applied, by petition to
the chancellor, to take charge of the assets
of the bank, by appointing a receiver to collect and manage its affairs.
The chancellor
appointed the president of the bank receiver, and, on his application, enjoined all perby suit against it
sons from proceeding
The receiver appointed entered upon his duties as designated, and continued until he
resigned, on the 6th of July, 1892.
On the
11th July, 1892, the Hanover National Bank
and other creditors of the Bank of Greenville exhibited their bUl, In the chancery court
in which the receiver had been appointed,
against the Bank of Greenville, and averred
the foregoing facts, and that since the 22d
December, 1891, the officers and directors
of the bank had ceased to manage it, and
that its affairs had been managed wholly
Dy Pollock, as receiver, who had collected
a large sum of money due said bank, and
that the appointment of another receiver
was necessary for the preservation of the
assets of the bank and the protection of the
rights of Its creditors; with other specific
allegations, designed to show the necessity
for the immediate appointment of a receivUpon due notice to the defendant a reer.
ceiver was appointed in this proceeding on
the 18th July, 1892, and the former receiver
was directed to deliver to him all the assets
of the bank in his hands. On July 23, 1892,
George Q. Whitney and others, creditors of
the Bank of Greenville, united in a bill
against the bank and G. D. Thomas, who
had qualified and was acting as receiver by
virtue of his appointment on July 18th, and
against other defendants, tat said chancery
court. This bill set forth the suspension of
the bank on the 22d December, 1891, and
the appointment by the chancellor of Pollock
as receiver on the application of the president and directors of the bank, and that Pollock took exclusive control of all the assets
of the bank, and acted as receiver, but that
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defendant Thomas, at the time of exhibiting
said bill, claimed to be receiver of said bank
by virtue of an appointment by the chancellor of said court; that the application
to the chancellor on December 22, 1891, and
all the proceedings had, including the procurement of the appointment of Thomas as
receiver, were devices to hinder, delay, and
defraud creditors, and "Invalid and void."
Discovery was sought by the bill as to all
the assets of the bank, of whatever kind,
and a lien upon them prayed to be established from the date of filing the bill, and
their appropriation to the demands of the
complainants.
The Bank of Greenville interposed a plea to this bill of the proceeding by the Hanover National Bank et al. v.
Bank of Greenville, and the appointment in
that case of Thomas as receiver, and that he
had qualified as such, and was in possession of the assets of the bank under that
appointment, and relied on this plea as a
bar to the bill filed 23d July, 1892.
The
plea was set down for hearing upon its sufficiency, and was sustained, and the bill dismissed.
From that decree an appeal was
taken, and case No. 7,460 on the docket of
this court is that appeal.
On October 4, 1892, George Q. Whitney
petitioned the chancery court of Washington coimty, in which these cases were pending, and which had been consolidated, setting forth that he was a creditor to a large
amount of the Bank of Greenville, and had
recovered judgment for a large sum against
It In the court of the United States at Vicksburg, Miss., July 28, 1892, which had been
duly enrolled, and, he claimed, was a paramount lien on all the assets of said bank,
notwithstanding all the various proceedings
in the said chancery coin-t, which are set
forth with detailed particularity, and denounced as void, and no obstacle In law to
the application of the assets of the bank to
the claim of the petitioner, who prayed to
be allowed to be made a party defendant
At the same time he presentto said cause.
ed a petition and bond for removal of said
cause. In which he prayed to be made a defendant, to the United States court at Vicksburg.
The complainants in the cause In
which Whitney sought to Intervene as a defendant opposed his application, and it was
denied by the court, and from this he appealed, and that appeal Is contained in No.
7,459 on the docket of this court.
Defeated in his effort to be made a defendant as stated, Whitney made an abortive effort to have the United States court
at Vicksbm-g take charge of his suit, and
enforce his claim to be paid out of the assets of the Bank of Greenville in preference
to other creditors; but with that we have no
concern, and state the fact historically only,
being in the record before us. On February
6, 1893, Whitney, who had been baffled In
all his efforts to obtain payment as a creditor entitled to precedence out of the assets
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of the Bank of Greenville, exhibited an original bill in the chancery coiirt of Washington

county against the complainants in the bill
of the Hanover National Bank and others
against the Bank of Greenville, exhibited
July 11, 1892, and the Bank of Greenville
and W. A. Pollock, receiver, and G. D.
In this bill is narrated
Thomas, receiver.
with detail the history of the dealing by and
with the bank from the time of Its suspension and taking refuge from creditors in the
chancery com-t to the filing of this bUl, which
also relates the persistent, but ineffectual, efforts of the complainant, in state and federal
courts, to secure recognition of his right, as
claimed, to be first paid out of the assets of
the Bank of Greenville. It assails the action of the chancery court of Washington
county as void for want of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter dealt with, and seeks to
vacate all orders that stand in his way, and
the payment of his as a preferred claim out
of the effects of the bank. The bill seeks Injunction, which was obtained.
This bill was
answered, and most of its allegations admitted, but the claim made by it to the right of
the complainant to priority of payment out
of the assets of the bank was denied.
A motion was made to dissolve the injunction, and
some affidavits were taken, and some facts
were agreed on for the hearing of the motion
to dissolve, and it was agreed that the case
should be heard on the motion to dissolve,
and for final decree on such hearing.
The respondents gave notice of a claim for damages
to be allowed on dissolution of the injimction
to amount of $2,500 for attorney's fees In defense of the suit.
The case was heard in accordance with the agreement, and a decree
was made dissolving the injunction, dismissing the bill, and awarding damages against
the complainant in the sum of $2,000 as attoriiey's fees, the decree reciting that the court
had heard testimony in open court as to the
attorney's fees, and taxed the costs against
the complainant,
who appealed, and this is
No. 7,749 of the docket of this court
From this complete but succinct history of
this Litigation, as disclosed in voluminous
form in the' three cases before us; It is apparent that the only question presented for decision by the appeal in No. 7,459 is as to the
propriely of the action of the court in refusing to permit Whitney to intervene as a defendant in the case of Hanover National
Bank et al. v. Bank of Greenville, against the
objection of the complainants, who protested
earnestly against it The court did right in
this refusal. "No such practice is known in
equity as making a person a defendant to a
suit upon his own application over the objec1 Danlell, Oh. PI.
tion of the complainant"
& Pr. 287, note 2, and cases cited; Stretch
V. Stretch, 2 Tenn. Ch. 140,— where the subject is fully treated, and the action of the
court in the case before us is fully vindicated
on principle and authority.
The question presented by cases 7,460 and

7,749 is whether the chancery court of Washington county was so wanting In jurisdiction
of the case of Hanover National Bank and
others exhibited against the Bank of Greenville, July 11, 1892, as to render its action in
the case void, and liable to be assailed collaterally, and treated as a nuUlty, whenever
and however called in question; for, if it be
conceded that the action of the court was erroneous, unless It was void, the fact that It
had assumed jurisdiction, and taken control
of the assets of the Bank of Greenville, and
appointed a receiver in the case, was an answei' to the original bUl exhibited by WhitQey and others on the 23d July, 1892, and
likewise to Whitney's blU of February 6,
1893.
We regard the action of the chancellor on the 22d December, 1891, appointing a
receiver on the ex parte application of the
directors of the bank, and his subsequent acas
tion in pursuance of that appointment,
utterly void, and of no legal effect It
could
be assailed collaterally, and disreThe
garded with Impunity, by anybody.
proposition that an insolvent debtor can take
refuge In a chancellor's decree on his or its
own application, and obtain protection asainst
pursuing creditors, who may be enjoined
from pursuing their ordinary remedies, is
without foundation. We cannot account for
of
the mistake fallen into in the proceeding
December 22, 1891, and all that was done under it, except by supposing that what is provided for by statute in other states was considered admissible in the absence of statute
In this state.
The suit of Hanover Bank et
aL V. Bank of Greenville, instituted July 11,
1892, is evidence of the fact that it was considered necessary to strengthen the grasp of
the chancery court on the assets of the bank,
and that it was a timely proceeding for the
purpose of the complainants tn that suit, for
it results from what we have said that all
that went before was of no legal validity;
and, but for that suit, there would have been
no barrier to his proper proceeding by any
creditor, the Injunction issued to the contrary notwithstanding. But, if the court was
not wholly vrtthout jurisdiction In that suit.
It was inadmissible to inject Into it other
suits, as sought to be done by the bUl of July
23, 1892, and that of February 6, 1893.
The question, then, is as to the case of
Hanover Bank et al. v. Bank of Greenville,
begun by original bUl July 11, 1892.
Was
the action of the court as to that case void?
It is to be observed that the bill in that case
is not one to seciu:e any priority or advantage to the complainant In it, to the injury of
other creditors, but it is for all creditors of
the Bank of Greenville, as shown by Its
prayer for the appointment of a receiver to
preserve and collect the assets, and distribute the money among aU the creditors, according to their rights as ascertained.
There
was no time when Whitney could not join in
this suit as a complainant, or assert his
right of priorily as claimed, if he had chosen
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to do so; but his persistent effort -was to obtain priority over other creditors and secure
full payment, if the assets were sufficient;
and he was iinwilling to make common cause
with all creditors, but, asserting the voidness
of all the proceedings In the chancery court
as to these matters, he sought, as he had a
right to do, to obtain precedence as a creditor by getting judgment against the bank,
and enforcing it He got judgment, and, if
that entitled him to be paid out of the bank's
assets In the hands of the receiver, he might
have propounded his claim of priority In the
chancery court, and demanded Its recognition and payment by an order therefor, but
he maintained his attitude of asserting the
nuUity of all the proceedings in this matter
of the chancery court, and attacked them as
void; and the maintenance of his bUl of
February 6, 1893, depends on maintaining the
legal proposition on which it rests. His
learned counsel has been not only persistent,
but consistent, in the many methods employed to obtain for his cUeat an advantage
over other creditors.
It remains to be stated
whether or not he shall succeed In securing
the reward of his Industry in behalf of his
By his bill of February 6, 1893, he
client
has pursued the proper course to obtain an
adjudication of the question on which the
claim made by his client depends.
This bill
attacks the validity of the proceedings in the
chancery court in the case of Hanover Bank
et al. V. Bank of Greenville, on the ground
that it Is not the province of a court of chancery to dissolve a corporation, or interfere
with the exercise of its franchise, or displace
its officers, or appoint a receiver, or otherwise exercise jurisdiction over It, at the instance of creditors who have no judgment
against It In this case there was no Interference by the court with the bank or its
franchise, and the performance of the ordinary functions of its officers.
There was no
attempt to dissolve or restrain the corporation.
Its directors had volimtarily surrendered Its assets to the keeping of the chancellor, and ceased to perform their duties as
to them.
The chancellor had accepted the
trust, and designated a receiver to take
charge of these assets, and care for them,
and had enjoined all creditors of the bank
from suing it, and had proceeded in the administration of the trust he had accepted, as
If there had been a creditors' bUl; and, although this feU little short of being a mere
farce, saved from it only by the seriousness
of the performance with judicial gravity, In
good faith, it was, nevertheless, the condition In which the complaining creditors found
the affairs of their debtor on the 11th July,
1892, when they instituted thedr suit representing the deplorable conditions existing,
and prayed the Interference of the chancery
court to take charge of the assets of their
debtor, the bank, thus abandoned by It, and
smrendered to the chancellor, who, though
without authority to receive them, had yet
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taken control of them as if he did have the
right to receive them, and had been dealing
with them accordingly. The bill urged the
necessity for the immediate appointment
of a receiver for the preservation of the
assets of the bank, which had suspended,
and ceased to care for them since December
22, 1891.
It is true that none of the complainants was a judgment creditor of the
bank, and none had a specific lien on the
assets of the bank.
Yet these assets constituted a trust fund. In a general sense, for
the payment of the creditors of the bank,
and, having been abandoned by the managers of that corporation, and transferred
to the chancellor, who was dealing with
them as of right, when he had no more legal
authority over them than a private individual, who might have found them, if it may
be said that, under these circumstances, it
was erroneous for the chancellor to entertain
the suit of general creditors of the bank,
and appoint a receiver, it certainly cannot
be maintained that this proceeding was
wholly unauthorized and void, so as to be
subject to collateral attack for want of jurisdiction to entertain the suit Vanfleet,
Collat Attack, § 100; Brown v. Iron Co., 134
U. S. 530, 10 Sup. Ct 604; Mellen v. Iron
Works, 131 U. S. 352, 9 Sup. Ct 781; Graham
V. Kaih:oad Co., 102 V. S. 148; Goodman v.
Winter, 64 Ala. 410; Barbour v. Bank, 45
Ohio St 133, 12 N. B. 5; Bouse v. Bank,
46 Ohio St 493, 22 N. E. 293.
Many other books might be referred to In
support of the proposition asserted, but, if
the doctrine announced did not prevail elsewhere, there can be no doubt as to the law
By sechere since the constitution of 1890.
tion 160 of that instrument, "In all cases
where said com-t [chancery] heretofore exercised jurisdiction, auxiliary to courts of
common law, it may exercise such jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, although the
legal remedy may not have been exhausted,
or the legal title established by a suit at
law." This Is In harmony with the scheme
of the constitution reversing the former relations of the courts, in which the circuit
court possessed general jmrisdictlon, and was
the repository of the power to administer
legal remedies, and the chancery coiu-t had
jurisdiction of certain designated matters,
and where there was not a full, adequate,
and complete remedy at law. Now the circuit court has original jurisdiction "in all
matters, civil and criminal, in this state, not
vested by this constitution in some other
A residuary grant is
comi:." Section 156.
thus made to the circuit court This manifests the policy of enlarging the domain of
chancery, and limiting that of the court of
law. What may be the effect of the provisions mentioned In widening the scope of the
comrts of chancery cannot be determined
now, and is not necessary to be decided; but
that they will be influential In considering
the class of cases In which chancery coiu-ta
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Is undeniable.
may entertain Jurisdiction
Wlien we look to section 147 of the constitution, all doubt as to the proper resolution
of the question presented by this case vanishes. Because of that section, error is not
predicable of "any error or mistalie as to
whether the cause in which it was rendered
was of equity or common law jurisdiction."
"No judgment or decree in any chancery or
circuit court, rendered in a civil cause, shall
be reversed or annulled on the ground of
want of jurisdiction to render said judgment or decree, from any error or mistake
as to whether the cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common law jurisdiction," is the mandate of the fundamental
law, and sweeps away all distinction between equity and common-law jurisdiction,
after it has been entertained, in a civil cause
in the chancery or circuit courts. It may
be an action of crim. con., or for libel or
slander, or trespass, or any other civil cause
in the chancery court, or an equity matter
in a court of law; if entertained there, error
is not predicable, and the decree or judgment shall not be annulled for want of jurisdiction. The chancellor or circuit judge
conclusively and finally settles the question
of jurisdiction, as between equity or common-law jurisdiction, of the particular case;
for It would be the height of absurdity to
bold that, while error may not be afiSrmed

of It, such Judgment or decree Is void. The
reason we do not apply the provisions of the
constitution mentioned to the matter of December 22, 1891, and uphold It, and what
followed, is that it was not a cause. There
was no suit or action, and no parties plaintiff
and defendant, but a mere ex parte surrender by the bank to the chancellor of its affairs, for which there is no authority In law;
and therefore the constitution does not apply, but relates to a civil cause, as properly
understood,
and not to all that a chancellor
or judge may do. The case of Hanover National Bank et al. v. Bank of Greenville Is
a suit regularly begim by bill against a defendant, and regularly proceeded with to a
final decree; and, while we will not be understood to hold that there was even error
in the action of the chancellor,— -which question Is not before us for decision, — ^we are
sure his action cannot be held void or annulled, and that disposes of cases Nos. 7,749
and 7,460.
The decree allowing $2,000 for damages In
the way of attorney's fees Is complained of,
but, as the evidence on which the chancellor
decided this sum to be reasonable was not
put In the record, and is not before us, we
cannot disturb the decree for this. The result is that the decree In each of the three
cases hereinbefore mentioned must be affirmed.
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STATE

ex rel.

INDEPENDENT DIST. TEL.

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SILVER BOW COUNTY et al.
CO. et al.

V.

(39 Pac.
Supreme

316, 15 Mont. 324.)

Court of Montana.

Feb.

18,

1895.

Certiorari by the state of Montana ex rel.
the Independent District Telegraph Company, the Citizens' District Messenger &
Bnrglar-Alann Telegraph Company, and G.
A. Lauzier against the Second judicial district court of the state of Montana in and
for the county of Silver Bow, and the judges
presiding, to review the action of such court
in appointing a receiver for the two corporations. Dismissed.
This Is a writ of certiorari directed to the
district court to review its action in appointing a receiver of the properties of two of the
relators, viz. the Independent District Telegraph Company and the Citizens' District
Messenger & Burglar-Alarm Telegraph Company, it being claimed by the relators that
the district court acted in that matter without jurisdiction.
The receiver was appointed in an action entitled as follows:
"H. L.
Haupt and E. A. Nichols, trustee. Plaintiffs, V. Independent District Telegraph Company, Citizens' District Messenger & Burglar-Alarm Telegraph Company, Fred B.
Puddington, H. Sommers, John O'Rourke,
Thomas D. Butterfleld, G. A. Lauzier, Alex.
Johnston, and John Doe (whose true name
The appointIs nnknown), D^endants."
ment was made upon the complaint in that
case and upon affidavits filed. The following
facts appear from the complaint:
Each of the companies defendant In the
case in the district court (and who are relators here) is a corporation organized under the laws of this state. The plaintiff
Haupt is owner of 76 shares of the stock of
Company. The plaintiff
the Independent
Nichols, as trustee, is also owner of 76
shares of said company. The Independent
Company Is the owner of a franchise from
the city of Butte permitting it to carry on
the district messenger business, and granting to the company the use of the streets
and alleys of the city for the purpose of
said business. The Citizens' Company owns
a similar franchise.
On May 1, 1892, the
said two companies entered into an agreement by which they should put their respective stocks, franchises, and property into a common business, to be carried on by
officers and agents to be appointed by the
two corporations jointly. This agreement
was to run for 20 years. All moneys earned
should go Into a general fund, and be In
After
the hands of a general treasurer.
paying expenses, a reserve fund of $500
was to accumulate in the hands of the treasurer. After paying expenses and the accumulation of this reserve, the profits were
to be paid by the general treasurer to the
H.& B.E(j.(2d Ed.)— 54
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respective corporation treasurers In the proportion of five-ninths to the Independent
Company, and four-ninths to the Citizens'
Company, to be distributed by the said respective companies as dividends on their
stock. Thereupon the general manager and
general treasurer were elected to carry on
this joint business. The reserve fund of
$500 was accumulated. The business was
carried on until June 1, 1893. At that date
the stockholders Sommers, Lauzier, Butterfield, and O'Rourke united together and obtained a majority of the stock of each company. After obtaining this stock, those
stockholders united and conspired together
to manage and conduct the combined corporations for their Individual benefit, and
to exclude from the management, profits,
and benefits the plaintiffs Haupt and Nichols. Since that time said plaintiffs Haupt
and Nichols have been entirely excluded
from the profits, management,
and benefits
of said corporations and the combination of
the corporations. From the time said association of the two corporations was formed until said Sommers, Lauzier, Butterfield,
and O'Rourke obtained control of the said
combined business, there was paid to the
treasurers of the said corporations $500 a
month, to be distributed by them as dividends on the stock of the corporations.
That, when said Sommers and others obtained control of the said associated corporations, there was in the hands of the general treasurer said reserve fund of $500, and
also cash in the sum of $1,000, and also
interest on the reserve fund of $25. That
this total sum of $1,525 was turned over to
Lauzier, the general treasurer elected by his
friends Sommers, Butterfield, and O'Rourke.
That the current expenses which then remained unpaid did not exceed $300, and that
there was therefore $1,225 available as a
dividend to be paid to the stockholders.
That, ever since said Sommers and others
obtained control as aforesaid, they have refused to give the plaintiffs any account of
the profits of the association, and have refused to pay any dividends on the stock.
Plaintiffs allege, on Information and belief,
that, since the Sommers control obtained, —
that is, since June 1, 1893,— the net profits
of the associated corporations have been
$500 per month, and that said Sommers,
O'Rourke, Butterfield, and Lauzier, instead
of paying those profits as dividends, have
converted the same to their own use. On
February 9, 1894, the officers elected under
the Sommers management executed to Fred
B. Puddington three promissory notes, payable each in nine months, for the sums, respectively, of $5,000, $2,000, and $2,000, bearing interest at the rate of m per cent, per
month. That said Sommers management,
also as security for said notes, executed to
said Puddington a chattel mortgage upon
the franchises and all the property of said
corporations.
That said notes purported to
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be given for the purchase price of a certain
franchise granted by the city of Butte to
said Puddington,— a franchise to erect and
maintain a district messenger and burglaralarm telegraph system in the city of Butte.
That said franchise was granted by the city
subject to certain conditions precedent The
complaint then sets out those conditions, and
then alleges that none of those conditions
were fulfilled.
The complaint alleges that
said Puddington's franchise is forfeited and
void, and was forfeited and void at the time
of the pretended sale of the same to the two
said companies and the execution of said
notes and mortgage.
The complaint fmther
states that said Sommers and others, at the
time of said pretended sale, weU knew that
the Puddington franchise was forfeited and
void and was of no value whatever. It is
further alleged that said Sommers, Lauzier,
Butterfield, and O'Rourke conspired together to defraud the plaintiffs, and to obtain
possession of the plaintiffs' stock, and all interest in the Independent Company, and of
the said combination of the two companies;
and that in fact they executed said mortgage
and notes without any consideration, and for
the purpose of bringing about the sale of
said property and franchises of the said
companies, and of foreclosing all Interest of
the plaintiffs therein. The complaint further alleges that unless the negotiation of the
said notes is restrained, and the notes and
mortgage declared fraudulent and void, aU
the property of the Independent Company
will be sold under the mortgage, and plaintiffs will be deprived, of their interests in the
said corporation. The complaint prays for
several items of relief, among them that said
Fred B. Puddington, and all persons claiming under him, may be enjoined from negotiating said notes or mortgage, or from collecting or foreclosing the same, or from interjferlng in any manner with the properties or
franchises of the said companies, and that
said mortgage and notes be adjudged null
and void.
In addition to the allegations made In the
complaint, a number of affidavits were filed
and used on the hearing. One Le Clare deposes that he heard John O'Rourke and O.
A. Lauzier, two of the defendants in the district court, conversing about the business of
the said district messenger companies, and
that O'Rourke said "that it they [meaning
himself, Butterfield, Lauzier, and Sommers]
would stand together, they would do that
Dutch outfit up [referring to the Shultzes
and the other stockholders]." H. A. Neldenhofer deposes that from December, 1890,
to February, 1892, he was manager of the
Independent Company, and that all that
time monthly dividends were paid to its
stockholders amounting to $750 per month,
excepting during the time when there was
an opposition company, and that those dividends were net profits.
This affiant also
states that after the combination was made

between the two companies they paid dividends of $500 a month.
Seth B. Smith, another affiant, stated that, prior to the time
when Sommers and his party obtained control of the combined corporations, he (affiant) was treasurer of the combination. He
testifies In his affidavit rather fully about
the formation of the combination between
the two companies.
He testified that the
reserve fund above mentioned, of $500, accumulated in the hands of the treasurer;
that finally Sommers and his party bought
the affiant's stock, and he retired from the
management;
that he turned over to the
new management all the funds in three different checks of $911.80, $107.94, and $14.25;
that at that time there were expenses outstanding and unpaid of only $400; that when
he retired he was just preparing and ready
to declare a dividend of $500, but he was instructed by the Sommers party not to pay
said dividend; that while affiant was treasurer of the company he paid dividends to
the stockholders of about $500 a month.
Carl Shultz and his wife, Mary Shultz, each
made an affidavit in which they testify as to
Lauzier's and Butterfleld's negotiations for
the purchase of affiants' stock, and threats
that if they did not sell that they (Lauzier
and Butterfield) would freeze out said affiants. Haupt, one of the plaintiffs, also
makes an affidavit that for more than n
year after the combination of the two companies he received monthly dividends on his
stock of 50 cents per share.
This affiant
also alleges, on information and belief, that
the combined corporations keep two sets of
books, one of which sets of books shows the
actual receipts and disbursements and the
net profits of the association, and the other
set of books does not show the correct accounts of the said corporations, but is kept
for the purpose of deceiving and misleading
stockholders who have been excluded from
the management and participation in the
management
of said business; that, since
the Sommers party obtained control of the
business, affiant has received no dividends
on his stock, although thenj have been large
profits. This affiant then sets forth the execution of the Puddington notes and mortgage.
He also sets forth the facts showing
that the Puddington franchise which he (Puddington) purported to sell to the companies
for $9,000 was absolutely void and worthless.
One of the employes of the combined
corporations testifies to hearing Butterfield
say that the business was good and paying
as weU as any business in town.
An answer was filed by the defendants,
and also some affidavits. It is not necessary to recite the contents of these papers,
for on the writ of certiorari In this court the
question of the discretion of the lower court
In appointing a receiver is not under review.
After hearing argument In th& district court
as recited in its order, the court found that
the plaintiffs w^e entitled to the appoint-
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ment of a receiver pendente lite. It was
therefore ordered that A. H. Barrett be appointed receiver pendente lite of the franchises, plants, business, books, and accounts,
and of all other property belonging to the
said two corporations, for the purpose of
managing and conducting said business;
and he was by the order authorized and directed to take possession of the said premises, franchises, plants, and all property,
books, and accounts, of any nature whatsoever, belonging to the said corporations, and
to manage and control the same during the
pendency of this action, and for that purpose to take care of and manage and control
the said property and business, and to pay
aU debts and obligations, and collect all
moneys due to the said corporations. It was
ordered that the receiver give a bond, with
sureties, in the sum of $10,000. Upon the
appointment of the receiver, the said G. A.
Lauzier made an application to this court
upon behalf of himself, and purporting to be
also on behaif of the two district telegraph
companies, asking for a writ of certiorari to
review the action of the district court in appointing a receiver.
The application, of
course. Is made upon the ground that the
district court had no jurisdiction to make
the appointment. That is the point discussed and decided in the opinion below.
& Wapleton and John W. Cotfor relatoBS. Geo. Haldorn and Oliver
M. Hall, for respondents.
Robinson

ter,

DE WITT, J. (after stating the facts). The
question in this case is simply whether under
the facts, as recited In the statement above,
the district court had Jurisdiction to appoint
a receiver. State v. Judge of- Second Judicial

Dist Ct, 10 MoHt 401, 25 Pac 1053. See,
also, French Bank Case, 53 Cal., at page 550.

There is here no question of the court's discretion under consideration. The relators in
this application rely very largely upon the
decision in the French Bank Case, but we
think that the case at bar is distinguishable
from that case In many respects, and, in order to make the distinction apparent, we
quote as follows from the California case:
"Irrespective of the effect of the fifth subdivision of section 564 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which wiU be presently considered, there Is no Jurisdiction vested In courts
of equity to appoint a receiver of the property of a corporation In a suit prosecuted by
a private party. This Is only to say that
there is no Jurisdiction vested In these courts
In such a case to dissolve a corporation; for
the power of a receiver, when put In motion,
of necessity supersedes the corporate power.
Jt necessarily displaces the corporate management, and substitutes its own, and assumes,
in the language of the order under review,
to do all and everything necessary (In the
Judgment of the receiver, under the advice of
the court) to protect the rights of the cred-

S5t

itors and depositors of said corporation.' This
precise question was brought directly under
consideration here In the case of Neall v.
Hill, 16 Cal. 145, where, in a suit brought by
a stockholder, a receiver had been appointed
by the district court to take possession of the
property of the Gold Hill & Bear River Water Company, a corporation existing under
the laws of this state. The opinion In that
case, rendered by Mr. Justice Cope, and concurred In by the whole court, after referring
to the adjudicated cases in England and in
this country, uses this language: 'This decree. If permitted to stand, must necessarily
result In the dissolution of the corporation;
and In that event the court will have accomplished. In an indirect mode, that which, in
this proceeding, it had no authority to do
directly. It Is well settled that a court of
equity, as such, has no Jurisdiction over corporate bodies for the purpose of restraining
their operations or winding up their concerns.
We do not find that any such power
has ever been exercised in the absence of
a statute conferring the Jurisdiction.* Of
course, it Is not to be doubted that the trustees of a corporation, the persons who constitute its direction, and from time to time
exercise the corporate authority in the management of Its affairs, are subject to the control of courts of equity; or, as observed by
Chancellor Kent, that the persons who from
time to time exercise the corporate powers
may, in their character of trustees, be accountable to this court [the court of chancery]
for a fraudulent breach of trust; and,' he
adds, to this plain and ordinary head of
equity the Jurisdiction of this court over corporations ought to be confined.' Attorney
General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 388.
And In exercise of these admitted equity
powers of the court, referable to the wellknown grounds upon which its Jurisdiction
ordinarily proceeds,
embracing the cognizance of fraud, accident, trust, and the like,
the rights of natural persons. Injured or put
at hazard through corporate proceedings unauthorized by law, will find ample protection and redress. But, even In such a proceeding as that, the trustees must, of course,
be made parties defendant; and It will be
observed, upon looking at the complaint of
Gallagher In this view, that It Is not substantially sufficient In its scope to put the
equity powers of the court In motion for
any purpose. The corporation Itself being
the sole party defendant, the trustees—those
persons upon whom the management of its
affairs Is devolved—are not parties, nor is
any relief sought against them personally.
That there Is no inherent power In the district courts, as being courts of equity, to
appoint a receiver In such a case as that
presented by the complaint of Gallagher,
is therefore apparent, both upon principle
and authority."
In the California case an Important element In the decision, as it appears, was that

852

RECEIVERS.

the appointment of the receiver acted as a
dissolution of the corporation. In the case
at bar no such result Is intended by the order appointing the receiver, or is accomplished by that order. It Is true that the
complaint in the case in the district court
asks for a dissolution of the corporation, but
whether such relief may be granted in that
action is not now before us for review.
The complaint also asks another relief, as
set forth in the statement, namely, that the
negotiation of the notes described be restrained, that the foreclosure of the mortgage be prohibited, and that the notes and
mortgage be declared null and void. While
the determination of these matters is pending in the action, the receiver is to act. His
appointment is pendente lite only, and he
Is authorized to do only those acts which
are peculiarly pendente lite. Again, in the
French Bank Case, one ground of the decision was that the action was against the
corporation only (see page 546 of the decision), and not against the malfeasing trustees; that Is, the "persons upon whom the
management
of its affairs Is devolved" (at
page 551).
But in the case at bar the managing officers of the corporation are joined
as defendants, and their unlawful acts are
sought to be set aside, and their future
wrongful conduct enjoined. The receiver Is
not to wind up the corporation under his
appointment. He is simply to manage the
affairs of the same while charges of the
most outrageous frauds by the managers
and controllers of the corporation are being
Investigated in the trial of the action. We
are fully aware of the reluctance of courts
of equity to Interfere by receivership In the
management of corporations, or to take that
management from trustees elected by the
shareholders. It is said In Morawetz on
Private Corporations (section 281) as follows:
"A court of equity will grant all relief to a
shareholder which the nature of his case
may require. But it has always been a settled principle that no Interference with the
management
of a corporation can be justified, unless such interference Is absolutely
necessary to the attainment of justice. The
reason of this rule is obvious.
The officers
of a corporation are generally elected by a
vote of the shareholders.
Every shareholder has a voice in their appointment, and may
insist that they shall represent the corporation when duly appointed. If an officer is
guilty of a breach of duty, he may in many
cases be removed by act of the corporation;
but no minority of the shareholders have
any authority to restrain his action, or remove him and appoint another officer in his
place.
Nor can a court of chancery interfere at the suit of a portion of the shareholders, and remove an offending officer, or
even enjoin him generally from acting for
the corporation, unless this be essential to
the protection of the corporate rights; as,
for example, where the directors have con-

spired to defraud the corporation, or have
otherwise shown themselves to be totally
unfit to be Intrusted any longer with the
management of the company's affairs. The
court must ordinarily confine Its remedy to
the redress of the specific wrongs which
have been charged."
But the case before us Is not an ordinary
one, and perhaps it may be doubted that
many such histories of fraud will be found In
the conduct of human affairs.
It is difficult
to imagine a case more thoroughly saturated
with fraud than this which was presented
to the district court on the application for
the appointment of a receiver.
Four shareholders of two small corporations, which were
paying handsome dividends, obtained control of the majority of the stock, and elected
their own officers.
These four conspirators.
Instead of paying $500 a month dividends
which the corporations were earning, proceeded to put that money Into their own pockThey kept false books to deceive the
ets.
They pretended to buy for the
shareholders.
an absolutely worthless francorporations
chise, when they already owned two good
and valid franchjlses, which were more tloan
They gave the
ample for the same purpose.
corporations' notes for this worthless franchise, and mortgaged all of the property of
the corporations for the purpose of having
the mortgage foreclosed, and the property of
It Is needless to
the corporations wiped out.
They are all set
enlarge upon these facts.
forth In the statement preceding this opinion.
This is a story of wrecking and robbing that would make a pirate of the Spanish
main exclaim, in the language of Lord CUve,
"X am surprised at my own moderation."
Is not interference here absolutely necessary,
as Morawetz says, to the attainment of justice? Again Morawetz remarks, as quoted
above, the eovrt of chancery will not interfere
at the suit of the shareholders unless this
be essential to the protection of the corporate
rights. We can scarcely conceive of a case
where It would be more essential than it Is
here, for the protection of the corporate
rights, for, if the interference is not had, the
corporate property will be swept away from
the corporations Intothe grasp of the consplratwTs; and, while the investigation Into the
acts of the Sommers-O'Rourke party is being made by the court, should the court allow
this same band of marauders to remain in
possession of the corporations and their property, and continue to convert the assets to
their own use, and exercise th^ own pleasupon them?
ure as to the trusts imposed
To allow such a proceeding, it seems to ns,
would shock the conscience of the most inthat
different court. Our statute provides
"a receiver may be appointed by the court
in which an action is pending, or by the
•
•
•
judge thereof:
Sixth. In aU othheretofore
have
er cases where
receivers
been appointed hy the usages of courts of
We are of
equity." Code Civ. Proc. § 229.
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opinion that the decisions ol the courts sustain the doctrine of the powers and the
usages of courts of equity in such a case as
that which was made in the showing before
the district court We note the following
language from a very recent decision (January, 1894) of the Kansas supreme court.
While the Kansas statute is broader than
om-s, and the case of In re Lewis, 52 Kan.
660, 35 Pac. 287, is decided largely upon the
statute of that state, still the. following remarks of the Kansas court are valuable, as
is also the collection of authorities appended
to the decision. We extract from the opinion
"By the averments of the petias follows:
tion, it would appear that all the officers of
the corporation have conspired together to
divert its business to another company, and
to absorb its earnings and assets, and appropriate the same to their own uses.
Under those circumstances, it would be useless
to apply to the officers to bring an action
against themselves,
and in such cases the
law permits the appointment of a receiver
at the instance of a stockholder. In most
cases of this character no other adecLuate
remedy exists. The appointment of a receiver is not necessarily a proceeding to dissolve a corporation, nor wUl it necessarily
result in its extinction.
The property and
assets of the corporation, which are being dissipated and fraudulently absorbed, will be
and rightfully applied under the
preserved
supervision of the court, and may be restored
to the officers of the corporation when there
has been a change of officers, or when it is
deemed prudent and safe to restore the property and affairs of the corporations to its
duly-constituted
officers.
First Nat.
See
Bank v. United States Tile Co., 105 Ind. 227,
4 N. E. 846; Pike Co. v. Hammons, 129 Ind.
Order of Iron Hall v.
368, 27 N. E. 487;
Baker (Ind. Sup.) 33 N. E. 1128; Haywood
V. Lumber Co., 64 Wis. 639, 26 N. W. 184;
Consolidated Tank-Line Co. v. Kansas City
Varnish Co., 43 Fed. 204; Mor. Priv. Corp.
{ 281; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1334; High, Rec.
313; Spel. Priv. Corp. § 1001; 20 Am. &
Eng. En& Law, 272." We also find it stated
in High on Receivers as follows: "It has
already been shown that in most of the
states of this country the general jurisdiction of courts of equity over corporations has
been enlarged to the extent of authorizing
the appointment of receivers in behalf of
creditors and shareholders." Section 313.
The supreme court of Michigan (October,
1892), in Miner v. Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 5S N.
W. 218, after reviewing the history of a fraud
which perhaps is worthy to be ranked with that
"The present case
of the case at bar, says:
gross
abuse of trust.
of
instance
furnishes an
Must the cestui que trust be committed to
the domination of a trustee who has for seven
The
years continued to violate the trust?
good
majority
the
utmost
the
of
requires
law
faith in the control and management of the
It is of the
corporation as to the minority.
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essence of this trust that it shall be so managed as to produce for each stockholder the
best possible return for his investment.
The
trustee has so far absorbed all returns. What
Is the outlook for the future?
This court, in
view of the past, can i^ve no assurances.
It can make no order that can prevent some
other method of bleeding this corporation, if
it is allowed to continue.
Lorman be removed, who shall take his place? He has
the absolute power to determine.
Once deposed, he may elect a dummy to fill his place.
There are practically but three persons con-

If

cerned. Miner, Lorman, and Lorissa Carpenter, and she has for seven years, in fraud
of complainant's rights, been paid a dividend
to secure her acquiescence.
Who has any
right to complain if ample and complete justice is awarded to Miner?
Who shall be permitted to stand between him and an adequate remedy?
This corporation has utterly
failed of its purpose, not because of matters
beyond its control, but because of fraudulent

mismanagement and misappropriation of its
Complainant has a right to insist
funds.
that it sliall not continue as a cloak for a
fraud upon him, and shall not longer retain
his capital, to be used for the sole advantage
of the owner of the majority of the stock,
and a court of equity wUl not so far tolerate
such a manifest violation of the rules of natural justice as to deny him the relief to which
his situation entitles him.
think a court
of equity, under the circumstances of this
case, in the exercise of its general equity
jurisdiction, has the power to grant to this
complainant ample relief, even to the dissolution of the trust relations. Complainant
is therefore entitled to the relief prayed. A
receiver will be appointed, and the affairs of
this corporation wound up." In the Midiigan case the decision went to the winding up
of the corporation, but in the case before us
the receiver is only to hold until the charges
of fraud are investigated. The Michigan decision is an able discussion of the powers of
the court of equity in this rvjspect, and a valIt may be said
uable review of decisions.
here, as was said in the Michigan case, that
the corporations have utterly failed of their
purpose, not because of matters beyond their
control, but because of the fraudulent mismanagement and misappropriation of their
funds. An equal if not greater mismanagement and misappropriation has been done
by the officers of the corporations who are
here made defendants, and whose acts are
sought to be restrained and set aside and
declared null and void. We also find the
same general subject mentioned In the following language in Waterman on the Law
of Corporations (volume 2, § 356): "The power to appoint a receiver is necessarily inherent in a court which possesses equitable
It Is exercised when an estate
jurisdiction.
or fund Is In existence, and there is no competent person entitled to hold it; or the person so entitled is in the nature ot a trustee,
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and is misusing or misapplying the trust; or
the property is about to be removed beyond
the reach of the court; and, generally, when It
is necessary to secure rights and prevent a
failure of justice. The property is thus placed
m tne hands of an officer of tne law la oraer
that it may be under the protecting care and
control of the court, and be delivered unimpaired to the persons to whom it Is legally
ascertained to belong." See, also. Ranger v.
Cotton-Press Co., 52 Fed. 611; Mor. Prlv.
Corp.

§ 642.

Upon questions of equity jurisdiction, aid
is always found in the records
of the
courts of chancery of New Jersey, and from
a decision rendered in May, 1894, by that
learned covart, we quote as follows: "The
power of this court to appoint a receiver of
a corporation, either because it has no properly constituted governing body, or because
there are such dissensions in its governing
body as to make it impossible for the corporation to carry on its business with advantage to its stockholders,
think must be regarded as settled;
but
think it is equally
Well settled that this power is subject to certain limitations, namely. It must always be
exercised with great caution, and only for
such time and to such an extent as may be
necessary
to presei^e the property of the
corporation, and protect the rights and interests of its stockholders.
As soon as a lawfully constituted and competent governing
body comes into existence, whether it is
brought into existence by an adjustment of
the dissensions or by the election of a new
body, and such body is ready to take possession of the property of the corporation, and
proceed in the propa* discharge of its duties,
the court must lift its hand and retire. This
is the doctrine, as understand it, which was
laid down by Vice Chancellor Malins in
Featherstone v. Cooke, L. R. 16 Bq. 298, and
Auxiliary Co. v. Vickers, Id. 303, and which
was approved by Chancellor Runyon in Binstein V. Rosenfeld, 38 N. J. Bq. 309, and by
Chancellor McGill In Archer v, Waterworka
Co., 50 N. J. Bq. 33, 24 AtL 508." Bdison v.

I

I

I

Phonograph Co., 29 AtL 197.
It Is true, of
that the power must be exercised
with great caution, but we are of the opinion that the most scrupulous caution would
not cause a court to hesitate In the matter
which was before the district court Furthermore, the district court did not go any further in the appointment than was necessary
to preserve the property of the corporations,
and protect the rights and interests of its
stockholders, as was stated in the New Jersey case.
It does not seem necessary to go
further in this discussion. The facts of this
case will not afford a precedent in the future for any imprudent or unauthorized appointment of a receiver for corporations, or
the unwise withdrawal of the business of a
corporation from the management of its dulyThe
elected and lawfully acting trustees.
case is a precedent only as to its own facts.
Here the objects of the existence, and, initself, of the
deed, the practical existence
corporations, are being totally destroyed by
the unlawful (not to use a stronger term) acts
of its managers; and one object, at least, of
the action in the district court, is to set aside
and prevent such unlawful acts of such managers, and the action itself is against such
unlawfully acting persons.
If they are allowed to go on in their course which they
are pursuing, the corporations are to be totally wrecked, their funds are to be embezzled, and their property is to be taken from
them by a fraudulent conspiracy of the managers, whose position is one of trust towards
the plaintiffs In the action in the district
court.
Under such a vigorous showing of
facts, we believe that the decisions of the
courts of equity uphold the powers and
usages of those courts to interfere by a receivership. See the cases cited In this opinion and the cases referred to in those citations. We are th^efore of the opinion that
the writ of certiorari must be dismissed, and
It Is so ordered.
Dismissed.
course,

PEMBERTON,
cur.

C.

J.,

and HUNT,

J.,

con-
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BANK OF DETROIT v. KENT
CIRCUIT JUDGE.

NAT.

(5 N. W. 627, 43 Mich. 292.)
Supreme

Court of Michigan.

April

14, 1880.

Mandamus.
Morris & UU, for the writ. Jacob Ferris
and Blair, Kingsley & Klelnhaus, against.

COOLEY, J. The application for a mandamus in this case brings under review questions of the validity and propriety of the order appointing a receiver.
The bill was filed
The mortto foreclose a chattel mortgage.
gage was by Hebbard & Graff, merchant
millers of Grand Rapids, to Philip M. Graff,
and bore date March 17, 1880. The purpose
was to secure the mortgagee for having become accommodation indorser for the mortgagors on a large amount of commercial paper.
The mortgage covered "all the flour, wheat,
com, oats,- bran and feed owned by the parties of the first part, and situated in the city
of Grand Rapids, Michigan, whether on the
track, or in the mills or warehouses,
or In
the elevator at Berlin, Ottawa county, Michigan; all the barrels, sacks, bags, tools and
office furniture and fixtures, including safes,
situated in and about and used in connection
with their two mills, being three large teams
and larries, two pairs of large sleighs and
one light delivery wagon, and the blankets
Also the engine and
used with said teams.
boiler used in the Valley City Mills, and put
in by Hebbard & Graff since their lease of
the same, and the shafting and pulleys used
by them in connecting the engine with the
miU and machinery. Also all the wheat, corn
and oats which may be purchased by the
parties of the first psit and delivered to them
in the city of Grand Rapids, either on the
track, in store or in their mills, and all flour,
feed and bran manufactured by them while
any portion of the debts secured by this mortgage remains unpaid."
The mortgage reserved to the mortgagor
the privilege of making sales in the ordinary
and provided that
course of their business,
"in case of the non-payment of the said notes,
or any of them, at maturity, by the party of
the first part, or if the party of the second
part shall at any time deem himself insecure,
he, • • • whether the party of the second
part shall have paid anything on said notes or
not, is hereby authorized to enter upon the
premises of said party of the first part, or any
place or places where the said goods and chattels, or any part or portion thereof, may be,
and take possession thereof, and sell and dispose of the same at private sale or public
auction, • * ♦ whether any of such notes
have matured or not, and apply the proceeds
thereof to the payment of said notes as fast
as they mature."
A bill to foreclose this mortgage was filed

855

the day after its date. It was alleged therein that one of the notes, the payment of
which was secured by the mortgage, was long
past due, and that another became due March
17, 1880, and another March 18, the day the
bill was filed, and both remain unpaid, and
that by reason thereof the whole sum secured
by the mortgage, amounting to $38,800, has
become due and payable immediately; that
by reason of disastrous speculations the mortgagors

have

become

Insolvent,

and

have

transferred to complainant the mill property
whereon they conducted their business;
that
the wheat and other unground grain described in the mortgage cannot be profitably sold
and converted into money except after being
ground; that to manufacture said grain into
flour, and other proper products,
will yield
larger returns, and be more for the interest
of all parties concerned, than to sell or dispose of the same in an unmanufactured state;
that the total value of all the mortgaged property wiU not exceed $40,000, and if disposed
of at forced or auction sale will not yield
more than $30,000, or thereabouts.
The bill
prays for the appointment of a receiver, and
nominates the law partner of the solicitor for
complainant as a suitable person to be appointed.
No persons were made parties defendant to
Late lu the
this bill except the mortgagors.
evening of March 18th, and before the bill
had been filed, it was presented to the cirand an apcuit judge, at his dwelling-house,
plication made for the appointment of a reThe mortgagors appeared
ceiver as prayed.
at the same time, by a solicitor of the court,
The cirand consented to the appointment
cuit judge, apparently looking upon the case
as an amicable proceeding. In which all parties concerned were working in harmony to
preserve and dispose of the property for the
benefit of aU, made the appointment prayed
for.
The appointment purports to be one
made in open court, but the court was not in
session at the time, and the bill not being
The
then filed, there was no cause pending.
order of appointment directed the receiver to
proceed to manufacture the grain mortgaged
into flour and other proper products, and to
sell in the usual course of trade and on credit
It soon appeared that the proceeding was
far from being an amicable one, except so
far as the mortgagors and mortgagee were
At the very time the mortgagee
concerned.
was having his bill for foreclosure prepared
and obtaining his order for a receiver, other
parties were suing out writs of replevin for
One of these
some portions of the property.

parties was William B. Ledyard, by virtue
of whose writ the wheat in the Orescent
Mills, previously operated by the mortgagors,
was seized an hour or so before the order
Another
appointing a receiver was made.
was by Euphrasia Aldrich, who replevied a
quantity of wheat at or about the time when
Another was by the
the order was made.
Merchants' & Manufacturers' Bank of De-
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The circuit coiirt appears to liave come
to the conclusion that the writ of this plaintiff was not served until the receiver had become possessed of the property in dispute,
■which could not have been earlier than about
10 o'clock on the night of March 18th, that
being the hour when his bond as received was
filed.
On March 19, 1880, the receiver petitioned
the circuit court in chancery for an order
restraining the several plaintiffs in the replevin suits from proceeding further therein.
A hearing was had on this petition, and its
prayer was granted so far as the suit by the
bank was concerned, and detiied as to the
The bank, however, was grantother suits.
ed leave to bring an action of trover to recover the value of the property described in
its writs. The receiver was, by the same order, required to deposit in bank the net proceeds of sales of the property made by him.
Both the receiver and the bank appealed from
this order.
of the receiver was from
1. The appeal
those parts of the order which refused an injunction against the Ledyard & Aldrich suits.
The order in that regard was not a "final order," and was therefore not appealable under
Wing v. Warner, 2 Doug. 288;
the statute.
Caswell V. Comstock, 6 Mich. 391; Boing v.
Coats, 17 Mich. 411; Spencer v. Steams, 28
Mich. 463. These appeals must therefore be
troit.

dismissed.

2. The order, in so far as it enjoined the
bank from interfering by suit with the possession of property to which the bank claimed title, inasmuch as it finally took from the
bank a legal right, was in the nature of a
Lewis v.
final order, and was appealable.
Campau, 14 Mich. 458; Barry v. Briggs, 22
Mich. 201.
was
3. The order appointing a receiver
void, for the reason that it was made when
It is perhaps
there was no suit pending.
fortunate for all parties interested that such
was the fact, inasmuch as, if it had been
legally valid, the appointment, though of a
but
person eminently fit for the position,
for the relations to the litigation through his
law partner, must necessarily at some time
have been set aside, and the longer it should
stand the greater must have been the probability of confusion in the rights of the parand of
ties growing out of his proceedings,

unnecessary costs and expenses to be borne
by some one or more of the claimants to the
property. In Ex parte Pinche, 2 Meriv. 452,
the lord chancellor refused to appoint the
solicitor to the commission as receiver of a
lunatic's estate, though it was stated that
The
no one else would accept the office.
ground of the refusal was that it might become the duty of the solicitor himself to call
the receiver to account.
So in Stone v. Wishart, 2 Madd. 63, where the parties united in
a request that the next friend of infant complainants be appointed
receiver,
the vice
chancellor said: "I cannot accede to this mo-

tion, although it is consented to. It is the
duty of the next friend to these infants to
watch the accounts and conduct of the receiver;
to be control over him. The two
characters cannot be united, they are inconsistent."
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
the law partner of the solicitor is presumptively as much interested in the proceedings
as the solicitor himself, and it would be peculiarly objectionable that he should act in
a position requiring impartiality in a case
like this, where the parties to the suit are
manifestly acting in concert, and adversely
to the Interests of other persons, who cannot
The practical result
watch their proceedings.
would be that the receiver would supervise
his own accounts.
Garland v. Garland, 2
Ves. 137.
The practice in equity does not
even permit the receiver to employ a solicitor
in the case as his own counsel, lest it might
disarm his vigilance in watching the receivRyckman v. Parkins, 5
er's proceedings.
Paige, 543; Adams v. Woods, 8 Cal. 306.
This rule may, no doubt, be departed from
by consent of all parties concerned, but this
must mean by consent of all parties concernand one
ed in the results of the receivership,
not a party to the suit may be as much concerned in these as the persons who are parties.
The present suit is an illustration.
from by the bank
4. The order appealed
was improper, in that it forbade a person not
a party to the suit from testing, in the customary common law method, the title which
is asserted to specific property, and In so doing stretched unnecessarily, improperly and
oppressively the power of the court of equity
in abridgment of the jurisdiction of the court
of law. There may be cases in which it
would be proper for a court of equity, by
means of a receivership,
to draw to Itself
the jurisdiction to try disputed titles to property; but the jurisdiction to do so is exceptional, and must be supported by circumstances which render the common law remedies
Inadequate, or for some reason unfit and unsuitable in the particular case. No such cir-

cumstances appear or are suggested here. It
was proper and just that the bank be allowed to go on with the suit in replevin, if that
and improper
seemed most for its interest,
and unjust that it should be restricted to a
suit in trover, which would be, in effect, for
net proceeds only, after the costs of a receivership, which the bank did not desire or asthe property
sent to, had been deducted.
belonged to the bank the injustice of requiring the owner to submit to such management,
manufacture and sale of it as another person
might think expedient, and to recover the net
proceeds only after the costs of a receivership
In a suit between other parties had been
wholly or In part deducted, would be too
manifest to require more than mere mention.
escape
5. It cannot
attention that the
whole scheme of giving a chattel mortgage
which would be immediately due, filing a bill

If
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In equity upon it at once, and obtaining the
appointment of a receiver, who should take
possession of the property to the exclusion of
other creditors, and go on with the business
as the mortgagors themselves
might have
done, and as the order in this ease contemplated, was an attempt, by means of the machinery of the law, to accomplish indirectly
what, without calling in the aid of the court,
could not be legally done at all.
We do not enlarge upon this aspect of the
case, as it is not necessary here; but it must
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be manifest that the parties were creating
a trust, by means of the mortgage and of a
order, which could not stand the
consent
test of the law, if made by an assignment.
It resembles very closely an attempt, by circuitous methods, to avoid a legal principle.

The order which is appealed from by the
bank must be reversed, with costs against
the complainant in the suit. What has been
said will render unnecessary any award of
the writ of mandamus.
The other justices
concurred.
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MEROANTILB TRUST CO. OP NEW YORK
V. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. et aL
(36 Fed.

Circuit Court,
Xn equity.

221.)

D. Kansas.

Bill for

Oct

foreclosure

8,

1888.

and appoint-

ment of a receiver.
Bill by the Mercantile Trust Company of
New York, trustee for certain bondholders secured by a mortgage on the property of the
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company,
against said company sind the Missouri Pacific
Railway Company, to foreclose the mortgage,
and appoint a receiver.

Alexander & Green, Thos. H. Hubbard,
J. McCook, and William N. Cromwell,
for complainant.
Shiion Steme, Charles F.
and L. B.
Beach, Jr., James O. Broadhead,
Wheat, for defendants.

John

I

BREWER, J. (orally). In this case, have
had no opportunity to write out the conclusions
to which
have come, nor, for that matter,
to arrange my thoughts in any very orderly
and systematic manner.
should have preferred to take a little further time to put in
better shape what
have to say; yet, aware
of the fact that many of you gentlemen are
from a distance, and are anxious to return
home,
concluded to waive the matter of
form and order, and state, in a crude way, my
conclusions.
Nor are these conclusions reached simply from information developed in these
few days. This bill was presented to me more
than three months ago.
have had a copy of
it in my possession since, and have taken frequent occasions to examine the stipulations of
Further than that, the newsthis mortgage.
papers have been full of many of the features
of this controversy; and the property itself,
being a property starting in my own state,
and growing up there, is, neither In itself nor
its history, a stranger.
So that many of the
facts which have been presented and discussed
are facts which were not new.
This bill was filed a few days after default
And
in the payment of interest, June last.
the first question— a vital question— is whether
for, being
this suit was prematurely brought;
a suit to foreclose, and not one for the preservation of the property, if prematurely brought,
it would finally have to be dismissed, and a
receiver ought not to be appointed ad interim.
The ground upon which the claim rests is the
fact that this mortgage or deed of trust requires a six-months delay after the default before certain proceedings — and foreclosure, it is
claimed, is one— are permissible.
The second
article provides for entry by the trustee, but
by its terms such entry cannot be tiU six
months after default and demand of payment
The third article likewise authorizes sale by
advertisement,
and that is equally limited.
At
the close of that article follows this paragraph:
"This provision is cumulative to the ordinary
remedies by foreclosure
in the courts;
and
the trustee herein, or Its successor or success-

I

I

I

I

I

ors In this trust, upon default being made as
aforesaid, may, at its discretion, and upon the
vsTitten request of the bondholders of a majority in value of said bonds then unpaid,
shall," etc.
Now, the contention Is that those words,
"upon default being made as aforesaid," being
in the last part of this article, by fair construction refer back to the entire provision in
the first part in respect to default, and include
both the happening and continuance of the default The argument rests merely on the force
of the last two words, "as aforesaid," and Is
forcibly put by counsel. That is the real question in the case, for, if this last paragraph
la article 3 were omitted, the decision of the
supreme court in the case of RaUroad Co. v.
Fosdlck, 106 U. S. 47, 1 Sup. Ct 10, would
In that case, as appears
leave no question.
from the statement, there were in the mortgage stipulations providing for entry and sale
by advertisement
six months after default
The validity of those provisions was recognized by the supreme court;
but it held that,

notwithstanding this, if by other stipulations
in the mortgage it was a security for the payaccrued,
ment of interest as it semi-annually
as well as of the principal, the trustee, or, on
his failure to act, any bondholder, might, on
the non-payment
of interest, bring suit and
Turning to this mortgage, I find
foreclose.

the same provision.
It is given as security
for the payment of the Interest as well as of
By article 2 possession is sethe principal.
cured to the railroad company,— the mortgagor,
—until default be made in the payment of
Unquestionably the
principal pr interest.
right of action at law on the coupon exists.
Unquestionably, if articles 3 smd 4 were omitted, the mere fact that this property was by
the mortgage pledged as security for the payment of coupons would permit the couponholder to come into a court of equity and enforce that pledge.
It is insisted that these articles, not excluding the jurisdiction of courts of law, not debarring a party from his right of action upon
the coupons, deprive him of a present right of
action upon the mortgage by a suit in equity
Language requiring
to enforce that pledge.
such construction should be clear.
If the parties—and it is to be assumed that they who
drafted this mortgage or deed of trust were
competent for that business —contemplated not
merely that no entry should be made, no sale
under the power until the lapse of six months
after default, but also that the coupon-holder,
having his right of action at law on the coupons, should not have a right of action in
equity, such purpose, It seems to me, would
naturally have been expressed in dear and unmistakable language, and not in that of doubtful interpretation.
In every other place that
have been able to find in this mortgage,
where a right rests upon the continuance of
the default, and that appears in articles prior
and subsequent to this paragraph,
the language is express:
"In case default shall be
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Jn payment of Interest, and shall continue for sbc months." Now, if It was intended to limit the jurisdiction of a court of equity
until after the lapse of six months from the
time of the happening of the default, it seems
to me that the draughtsman would have placed the stipulation therefor in a separate article, and would have made its meaning
so
plain that there would be no question.
We all
know in the preparation of instruments how
common the expressions
"said" or "as aforesaid" are used without any clear or definite
They are words which we use, not
intent.
thoughtlessly, but carelessly;
although
and
they are used here, yet as it is also fouud that
the continuance of the default Is not mentioned, it seems to me it is giving to those
words an enlarged and unnecessary force to
hold that they broaden the expression "making default" into "making and continuing default," as expressed in the first part of the
article. Xor is this a mere resting upon the
language of the paragraph. It opens with the
distinct announcement
that these special provisions in respect to entry and sale under a
power are cumulative to the ordinary remedies
by foreclosure; contemplating, in its opening
words, a proceeding in a court of . equity in
any case of default
Nor is it strange that
there should be special limitations upon the
two matters provided in articles 2 and 3, and
none about proceedings in a court of equity.
An entry is a speedy remedy; it runs to the
corpus of the property; it takes instant hold
of it, and takes It away from the mortgagor.
The parties may well have contemplated that,
If there was a temporary default, there should
be no such speedy interference and summary
So a sale by adseizure by the mortgagee.
vertisement—in
this case an advertisement of
eight weeks—is speedy and summary; and if,
upon the happening of a temporary default,
the trustee at the instance of a single couponholder should thus advertise and sell the property, it is obvious that great wrong might be
done; and six months' delay Is a very natiu-al
provision. But proceedings in a court of equity are not thus hasty. They are not within
the control of any coupon-holder or any trustee.
They stand advanced or delayed, as in the
judgment of the chancellor the best interests
of the property require. If it appears in any
from improper mocase that a coupon-holder,
tives, .or from a simple greed for his money.
Is willing to wreck a large property, and
comes into a court of equity upon the happening of a temporary default, it goes without
saying that the chancellor holds his hands until it becomes apparent that the property as a
Inaswhole cannot be saved to Its owners.
much as these proceedings stand upon the discretion of a court of equity, it Is not strange
that the parties were willing to leave to the
bondholders and coupon-holders an open door
Into such a court. They left an open door
into a court at law, and there is at least equal
chance, if not greater, that the freer motions
of a court of equity will afCord as full promade
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tection to the mortgagor.
These considerations, perhaps not very clearly expressed, are
the reasons which have led me to hold that
this case is withm the rule laid down in 106
V. S. 47, 1 Sup. Ot. 10, supra, and that this
suit is not prematurely brought.
That only passes from one trouble to another. The right to foreclose does not carry
with it the right to a receiver.
There are
many considerations that bear upon that
question.
Every case, of course, stands on
Its own merits. It is difficult to formulate

any rule which, briefly stated, will control
in all cases. It should appear that there is
some danger to the property; that its protection. Its preservation, the interests of the
various holders, require possession by the
court before a receiver should be appointed.
It does not go as a matter of course; and yet
it is not a matter that a court can refuse
simply because it is an annoyance.
If, looklag at the situation of the litigating parties,
and of the property, with the prospects of
the future, it should appear to a court that
they would be benefited, that their Interests
woiild be subserved by the appointment of a
receiver, why, no com't— although a matter
resting, as it is said, in its discretion —could
refuse to make the appointment.
I shall not go over all the matters that
I want to suggest some
have been discussed.
things that have impressed me. Of course,
so far as the adequacy of this secm-ity, so
far as the solvency of the corporation, is
concerned,
so far as the question whether
this is a temporary embarrassment or permanent, these facts stand out confessed, indisputable at least.
It has ceased to pay
interest on its mortgages; one, two, three,
and four have defaulted. The amount of
that interest runs considerably over a million; and the payment of interest on the
large mortgage comes due in two months.
The business of this year from the 1st of
June to the 1st of September, as shown by
the statistics, is decreasing; from the 1st ot
to the 14th there was a Blight
September
increase.
The road is not along the mala
highway of travel eastward and westward.
It is one running north and south, along
which business to-day is, as we all in the
west know, comparatively in Its Inception.
It crosses for two or three hundred miles a
territory which is occupied by Indians, and
It hag been for
furnishes little business.
years the only road that traversed that territory.
Within the last year or two, two
more roads have crossed,
and a third is
seeking to cross.
Competition between these
roads traversing that traritory, and bringing
Texas and Its commerce into relations with
Kansas, Missouri, and the north, as a matter
of necessity. It seems to me, must tend
against the Increase of earnings.
The report of the committee— a committee
appointed
by the company— tends to sho\»
that the payment of interest which has been
made prior to this year, has been largely at
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the expense of the proper repairs and imI do not mean to
provement of the road.
say that all this is absolutely conclusive on
the question, but these are matters which
my mind.
upon
have forced themselves
While it is true that—the road paying no interest since the 1st of Jirne— the revenues
have diminished by four or five himdred
thousand, the amount which is due as claimed to the Missouri Pacific for advancements,
yet the earnings must Increase largely before these back interests can be met, to say
nothing of future interests speedily maturing. That a road thus situated, some 1,600
miles in length, is burdened with a mortgage of $28,000 a mile, carries with it, to
my mind, very strong evidence that there is
probability of its ever being
no reasonable
kept in proper condition when paying the
The only way in
interest on such a debt.
which any mortgagee can get possession of
the rents and profits is through a receiver.
The law of Kansas forbids any other remIn
edy upon a mortgage than a foreclosure
the court. No possession could be had under
article 2. No sale could be made under the
power attempted to be given in article 3.
Unless
The sole remedy Is by foreclosure.
a receiver is appointed, the rents and profits
pass into the possession of the mortgagor,
to be expended by it according to its best
That is affirmed by the three
judgment.
cases of Railroad Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall.
463; Gilman v. Telegraph Co., 91 U. S. 603;
and Dow v. Railway Co., 124 V. S. 652,
Not merely that; suppose
8 Sup. Ct. 673.
pass to
should
proceeding
this foreclosure
appeal,
its
a decree, and the defendant
to
bond on appeal would be no protection
the mortgagee in respect to the rents and
profits.
That is settled in tlie case ot
Kountze v. Hotel Co., 107 TJ. S. 378, 2 Sup.
Ct. 911.
So that this litigation might proceed and continue for a long time in this
and in the supreme court, without ever giving the mortgagee a hold upon the profits,
This mortunless a receiver is appointed.
gage is a second mortgage on a large part
of the road. As such mortgagee it has, more
than any other party, an interest In reaching
after and securing those rents and profits.
The first mortgagee, having a limited amount
upon the part of the road upon which its
mortgage rests, may feel safe; for his principal and interest must be paid before the
So that the
second mortgagee can come in.
complainant has a special interest in reaching for, and as soon as possible obtaining
possession
of, the surplus earnings.
More
than that. It is perfectly obvious that the
real owners of this property are not in harmony.
The stock controls the road, but with
.?45,000,000
of bonded indebtedness-^$28,000
a mile—on the road, the real owners are the
bondholders,
and that they are not agreed In
respect to what shall be done with this property Is, I think, confessed.
For years the
property was in the management of a cer-

tain interest. That Interest was removed
last spring from the control.
It was not.
removed so long as the road was apparently
prosperous,
and paying its coupons.
When
adversity threatened it, as was natural, thosewho held Interests in the road were not satisfied with the management, and sought control.
If these gentlemen now in control
could make it a promptly paying road within a reasonable time, why, it might be expected, according to the laws of human nature, that they would remain In control; but
we all know how, when one falls and continues to fail, aU who are interested are
prone to lay the responsibility upon him,
and to seek a change.
And there Is no certainty that another year different interests
might not combine, and so the road be subject to different control.
At any rate, it is
very evident that there is no harmony—no
unity of purpose— between those who are the
Now, if It were a partnership,
real owners.
and it was apparent to a court that the partners had got into a quarrel, the very fact
of their quarrel would be a strong reason
why It should take possession of the property.
Of course that consideration has not
so much .force In respect to a corporation,
other considerations.
but it strengthens
Those are the principal reasons that have
operated on my mind, — ^the default In interest, the fact that the rents and profits can
only be appropriated In this way, the decreasing revenues, the recent construction of
parallel roads, the fact that it passes through
such a portion of territory so unprofitable,
the condition of the road as developed by this
report of the committee, and the confilct between various parties having real and substantial Interests.
Much as I should be glad
to be free from the annoyance of a receivership,—and I know something about it,—it
seems to me I should be delinquent If I refused this application. There are some minor
matters that I might refer to, yet, perhaps,
they would not strengthen anything I have
said.

I

There is one matter, however,
must notice,— the suggestion of the Missouri Pacific
that It could defeat this application, and that.
It was here In the attitude of a party to
consent upon the condition that the balance
due it was properly protected,
and that no
order should be made in reference
to the
by the receiver of the Internapossession
tional & Great Northern Railroad or its
stock.
understood
the situation to be
that this application depended on the consent of the lessee, the Missouri Pacific, and
its consent was tendered upon any such condition as that, there would be no receiver
appointed.
The rights of the lessee, as 1
look upon these two instruments, are sub>
ordinate to the rights of the mortgagee, and
it is the mortgagee whose application Is sustained, and all parties having claims of any
kind must depend upon the Inherent equity
of their claims. So far as the stock In the-

If I
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International & Great Northern Is concerned,
as well as some other assets, they are, as
stated, now under pledge, and in the possession of this complainant; perhaps, also, attached by certain garnishment proceedings.
I think the interests of the mortgagor require
that there should go an order upon the complainant not to part with that possession,
except in obedience, of course, to the process
of the courts in New York, until the ultimate rights of the parties are determined.
As to the possession of the International &
Great Northern, I doubt whether it is within the province of this court to determine
that question. It is a separate road, whose
believe,
stock,
in part has become the
property of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas
corporation; but it Is wholly situated in another circuit, and certainly at present 1 am
aot prepared to say that this court would

I

have a right to determine

whether a receiver

of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas should take

It may be
possession of that separate road.
that is a question which will have to be de-

At
termined by the judge of that circuit.
any rate,
should not at present, without
further consideration, perhaps consultation
with Judge Pardee, feel like making any order in respect to it. It is a matter in which
I shall be glad to hear counsel hereafter
upon, and perhaps
try and arrange with
Judge Pardee jointly to hear them as soon as
practical. That, I think, is about all I have
to say in reference to this matter, except as
to the receiver. If parties agree upon a receiver, of course I shall apiroint whoever you
If not, I will hear any suggesagree upon.
tions from any of the parties in Interest, and
reasons for or against any person to be named by one side or the other.
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BELDING
(71

et al. v.

N. W. 592,

MELOCHE

MS

et al.

Mich. 223.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May

28,

1897.

Appeal from circuit court, Ionia county, In
chancery; Frank D. M. Davis, Judge.
Suit by Alvah N. Belding and another
against Albert F. Meloche' and others. From
a decree for complainants, defendants Meloche
appeal.
Affirmed.
B. A. Hawley, for appellants.
Nichols, for app^ees.

McGarry &

HOOKER, J. On May 2, 1892, the complainants sold to the Meloches (two of the defendants), upon contract, a business block in
the village of Belding, at an agreed price of
?36,000, to be paid In 120 monthly installments of $300, without interest.
The contract
does not expressly state that the vendees shall
be entitled to possession, but does provide that.
In ease of default, the vendors may "elect to
consider themselves released and discharged
of and from any and all liability in any of the
covenants specified to be done and performed
by them, and aU Improvements
made by the
said parties of the second part shall be deemed forfeited as stipulated damages for the nonfulfillment of this contract; and said parties
of the first part, or their authorized agent,
may, without notice to quit or demand of possession, re-enter Into and repossess the said
premises, and the said parties of the second
part, and each and every occupant hired by,
through, or under them, to remove and put
out; it being expressly understood that such
failure of said second parties shall forfeit all
claim, either in law or In equity, which might
otherwise exist on the provisions of this contract in favor of the said parties of the second
part" The vendees made default in the payments, and this bill of complaint was filed to
At
foreclose their rights under the contract
this time portions of the building were rented,
and the biU prayed the appointment of a receiver, to receive the rents and profits of said
premises, and such receiver was appointed,
A decree of foreand has received said rents.
closure and sale was made, and, after the
sale occurred, an order of confirmation was
entered. No appeal was taken from any of the
Subsequently, the comproceedings thus far.
plainants filed their petition, alleging that on
March 9, 1896, a decree was entered for the
complainants for the sum of $6,172.44 and
costs, makUig a total of $6,648.30; that, at a
sale of the interest of the Meloches in said
the
premises,
the complainants purchased
same for $3,000, and that there was a deficiency of $3,648.30; that the final account
of the receiver, duly filed, shows a balance in
his hands at the date of the report of $2,349.36,
which, after the allowance of compensation to
and disbursements
by the receiver, woul4
leave $1,856.98, which the petition prays may
be applied upon the deficiency,
and that it be
declared that the remaining deficiency const!"

tute a personal judgment, upon which execution may issue against the Meloches.
A decree was made in accordance with the prayer
of the petition, and the defendants Meloche appealed.

It is claimed— First, that the court had no
authority to appoint a receiver to take the
rents during the foreclosure, and that the moneys collected should not be turned over to the
complainants;
second, that there should be no
decree for a deficiency against the appellants,
because, upon the trial of the case, counsel for
complainant stated that they did not care to
ask a personal decree.
Counsel base thetr first contention upon a
class of cases which hold that, under How.
Ann. St § 7^7, the mortgagee is not entitled to
the profits of land during foreclosure.
See
Wagar v. Stone, 36 Mich. 366. In that case the
court said: "The mortgagor is entitled to the
taken to
possession during the proceedings
foreclose the mortgage, and until a sale has
been made and the title of the purchaser has
become absolute; and, until the title has become
absolute upon a foreclosure of the mortgage,
an action of ejectment cannot be maintained
by the mortgagee, his assigns or representatives, to recover possession of the mortgaged
2 Comp. Laws, § 6263. Since the
premises.
passage of this act, which prevents the mortgagee from obtaining possession until he has
acquired an absolute title to the mortgaged
premises, the mortgage binds only the lands.
The rents and profits of the land do not enter
At the
Into or form any part of the security.
time of giving the security, both parties imderstand that the mortgagor will, and that

the mortgagee will not, be entitled to the rents.
Issues, or profits of the mortgaged premises
until the title shall have become absolute upUntil the
on a foreclosure of the mortgage.
happening of this event, the mortgagor has a
clear right to the possession and to the income
which he may derive therefrom; and the legislature, by the passage of this statute, contemplated that he should have such possession
and income to aid him in paying the debt. It
would be a novel doctrine to hold that the
mortgagee had a right to the profits Incident to
ownership, and yet that he had neither a legal
title, nor right to possession.
The legislature,
In depriving him of the means of enforcing
possession, Intended thereby also to cut off
and deprive him of all rights which he could
have acquired in case he obtained possession
before acquiring an absolute title. To deprive
him of this particular remedy, and yet allow
him in some other proceedings to, in effect
arrive at the same result, would be but a meaningless proceeding, and would not be securing
to the mortgagor those substantial rights
which It was the evident Intent he should
have.
We do not overlook the fact that a
contrary doctrine has been held elsewhere under a similar statute. We cannot avoid thinking, however, that for us to so hold would be
but a mere evasion of our statute."
In Michigan Trust Co. V. Lansing Lumber Co., 103
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3iich. 393, 402, 61 N. W. 668, we recognized
the validity of a contract whereby possession
by the mortgagee may precede foreclosure;
and the case of Wagar v. Stone shows that in
other states possession may be given to receivers pending foreclosure of mortgages, and the
decision In that case Is made to rest upon the
statute. The statute does not In terms apply
to equitable mortgages If we should hold this
to be one. In the Wagar Case the court said
that the object of the legislature was that the
mortgagor "should have possession to aid him
in paying the debt"; but In this case the vendee seeks to avoid the payment of the debt,
and to appropriate the fund in the hands of the
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receiver, to the exclusion of the complainants'
just claim.
Again, it is contended that the complainants
are not entitled to a personal decree for tlie
deficiency.
This claim seems to rest upon an
alleged waiver or estoppel, by what occurred
upon the hearing of the original case. It does
not appear to have been set up in the answer
to the petition, and Is said not to have been
claimed In the circuit court upon the hearing.
We do not discover that this statement is disputed.
Under these circumstances, we think
the order of the circuit court in chancery
should be affirmed, with costs; and it Is so ordered.
The other justices concurred.
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MARSHA Till

&

IliLSLET BANK
et al.

(77

CADY

v.

N. W. 831, 75 Minn. 241.)
Jan. 9,

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

ment should
1899.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county;
Charles E. Otis, Judge.
Action by the Marshall & Illsley Bank
against Frank M. Cady and others.
Judgment for plaintiff.
Defendant Cady appeals.
Affirmed.
Chas. J. Berryhill, for appellant
G. White, for respondent.

waste and preserve the property.

William

PER CURIAM. Assuming, without deciding, that an order appointing a receiver In foreclosure during the pendency of the action can
be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment
or decree, we are of opinion that, wliile the
plaintiff did not present a very strong case, yet
we could not hold that the court abused its
discretion In appointing a temporary receiver.
The affidavits presented would have justified
the court in finding that the mortgaged premises were inadequate security; that the mortgagor was insolvent; that four years' taxes
were unpaid and delinquent, for three of which
the premises bad been sold, and unredeemed;
that portions of the building on the premises
were somewhat out of repair, and that repairs
were necessary for the full preservation of the
property; and that the mortgagor was receiving rent for part of the premises, which be was
not applying to the payment of taxes or the
mailing of repairs.
There was some evidence
that the mortgagor was using a part of the
building as his sleeping apartments, and, hence,
that the premises were his homestead. While
a court should ordinarily require a somewhat
stronger showing for the appointment of a receiver of the mortgagor's homestead than In
the case of other property, yet, when a debtor
mortgages bis homestead, he subjects the property to all the ordinary legal and equitable
rights of a mortgagee, among which is the
right to have a receiver appointed when necessary to prevent waste or to preserve the property.
The same facts which would justify the
court in appointing a receiver during the pendency of the action would justify it In providing
In the final judgment that the receivership
should be continued.
As there Is neither a
"case" nor bill of exceptions,
the question
whether the evidence justified the findings is
not presented.
The findings are presumed to
have been based upon the evidence introduced
on the trial, and not upon the affidavits presented on the motion for the appointment of a
receiver during the pendency of the action.
The judgment Is sUent as to the duration of
the receivership.
No point is made on this by
the defendant; but we mention the fact in
order that It may not be Inferred that we impliedly hold that a receivership could be continued after a foreclosure
sale, or that the
rents and profits of the property could be applied towards paying the mortgage debt, or
used for any other purpose than to prevent

be affirmed.
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So ordered.
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BUCK, J.
dissent
think that the evidence quite conclusively shows that the premises are Cady'a homestead, and tills is one of
the material facts that lead me to think that
the receiver should not upon the evidence adduced, have been appointed.
When the trial
court appointed the receiver. It was done by
the court upon affidavits submitted by the respective parties.
The application therefor was
made in the month of July, 1897, but not
granted until October 29, 1897.
All of the
affidavits upon which the receiver was appointed appear in the record, and the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's affidavits are assailed and contradicted by the defendants' counter affidavit
Not only was a receiver appointed by order of
the court and therein directed to collect all
and singular, the rents, profits, and Income of
the premises, but by a subsequent order of the
court the defendant Cady was ordered, within
five days after the service upon him of the
order, to quit, siurrender, and deliver up to the
receiver said premises, and vacate the same.
It is true that the judgment appealed from is
dated November 12, 1897, and the last order
directing the defendant Cady was not made
20, 1897,
untU November
and not appealed
from. But as I regard this case, this is immaterial. The gist of the controversy is over
the right to appoint a receiver at all. Probably, if there existed a sufficient cause to appoint a receiver in the first instance, and the
case appeared to be one where ordinarily the
right of a receiver to act at aU was presented,
the appointment would carry with it the right
to the possession of the property.
It Is the
right to Invoke the aid of the court In the first
Instance, upon the case being presented, which
in my opinion is one of more than serious
doubt
Such a proceeding is an extraordinary
might say
remedy, sometimes, and perhaps
frequently, operating
harshly, and the circumstances of peril which invoke the remedy
should be established with reasonable certainty. Such appointment is not a matter of right
and should not be used where its exercise will
produce injustice, and the fact should be clearly proved.
Beach, Rec. 65-68. And this rule
ia strictly applied In mortgage cases, where it
must dearly and fairly appear that the security is inadequate, or there is Imminent danger
of waste, removal, or destruction of the property.
Id. 574.
Mere default In the payment
of the debt would not be sufficient ground for
the appointment of a receiver.
It Is true that
power to make the appointment of a receiver
is generally discretionary, yet "the judicial
authority to deal with property by means of
a receiver Is not unlimited or absolute."
Id.
2.
"It must be exercised in conformity to the
general
principles of equity jurisprudence.
The petition should, therefore, state clearly the
facts upon which the application is made, and
If this is not
also give proof of the same.
done, the relief will be denied, and the burden
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of proof Is always upon the petitioner."
567.

As

I differ from my associates, It
I should fully examine the

that
which

Id.

is proper
evidence

formed the basis for such appointment.
The only evidence presented was by
aflldavits.
The plaintiff
presented
three
which showed that the property was worth
$3,500, and one that the house alone wai
worth $1,500. The defendants presented five
affidavits which showed that the value of
the property ranged from $5,800 to $4,400,
averaging $5,220, and the affidavit of another
person states the value of the house to be
$2,500 alone.
The total average value of the
property was $4,360. This is more than $500
over the entire judgment in foreclosure, including interest and costs up to the time of
the judgment
This was all the evidence
Introduced upon the question of the value of
the premises, and I think that the plaintiff's
evidence in this respect was clearly refuted
by that of the defendants. The only evidence of waste or act of omission of duty in
this respect on the part of Cady was that of
one witness for plaintiff, who gave details
tending to show that the dwelling house
needed repairs to the amount of $400; but
no other one of plaintiff's witnesses testified
to any such fact, and this testimony is
squarely refuted by five of defendants' witnesses.
am not willing to take his testimony alone as outweighing that of all of the
others. It certainly does not, in my mind,
justify the appointment of a receiver, where
the rule is, in such case, that the injury or
Impairment of the security must be imminent Union Mut Life Ins. Co. t. Union
Mills Plaster Co., 37 Fed. 286.
I now come to the consideration of the
question that the premises were the homestead of the defendant and which he was
occupying as such, and whether a stricter
rule should not be applied in the appointment of a receiver to take possession of such
property, and apply the income, rents, and
profits thereof towards the payment of the
mortgage debt This question is one of great
importance, and, if a receiver can thus be
appointed, it will greatly disturb, if not subof thoustantially destroy, the homesteads
sands of people, especially in our cities and
villages, where the use of homesteads, and
rental therefrom, often constitute part of the
income, and frequently the only income, for
As I have
the support of the family Itself.
stated, the appointment of a receiver is a
drastic measure, and to permit it to be used
to oust a man and his family from their
home, and sequester the income, rental, and
profits thereof, is to deprive them of all the
benefits of a homestead in a most summary
manner. It certainly is a most extraordinary proceeding which authorizes such a
Waples, in his work on Homestead
step.
(page 720), says: "It is questionable whether
It is ever proi)er to take possession of a mortgagor's homestead while proceedings to fore-
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Certainly it Is not propare pending.
er practice as a general rule. An application for such appointment should always be
refused when the amount of the mortgage
debt is a subject of contention in the case."
Of course, I do not overlook the doctrine laid
flown in this court in the case of Lowell v.
Doe, 44 Minn. 144, 46 N. W. 297, where It
was held that the homestead rights of the
mortgagors are subject to the ordinary legal
and equitable rights of the mortgagees in respect to the mortgaged premises, which may
be enforced by the appropriate remedies;
citing Gen. St 1878, c. 68, | 2 (Gen. St 1894,
§ 5522), which provides that the homestead
exemption shall not extend to any mortgage
thereon lawfully obtained.
But the homestead law looks with favor upon homesteads,
for the good of society and for the protection
of f amUy life in all classes, and seeks to save
them from the rapacity of creditors, and
from destruction, so far as it can without injustice to others.
The reasons for this are
many and cogent
think that
To this end,
all steps to deprive the owner of a homestead
of the right of himself and family to occupy
and receive the benefits of it during foreclosure of a mortgage upon it should not be
permitted, or should be resorted to only in
extreme cases, and where justice would be
defeated by withholding it, and only in cases
This
reasonably clear and free from doubt.
is not such a case. It is a notorious fact
that in many Instances the receiver, in the
performance of what he claims to be his
duty, incurs large expenses, greatly lessening the assets which should go to the payment of the debt itself, and this operates to
the detriment of both parties to the action.
In other words, the benefit to the owner of
the homestead and his family, as a home and
support, might be appropriated to the support of the receiver, by way of fees and expenses, with loss to both parties to the action. Our statute provides that "a mortgage
of real estate is not to be deemed a conveyance so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the real estate
Gen. St. 1894,
without a foreclosure."
§
5861. ■This is an express statutory enactment, so far as possession Is concerned, and
the owner of the mortgage is prohibited from
taking possession of the property without
Of course, this means that no
foreclosure.
right of possession arises until the period of
redemption expires, viz. one year after foreclosure. If possession of land is wrongfully
withheld after foreclosure, and after final
decree, the court may then compel delivery
of possession to the party entitled thereto,
by order directing the sheriff to effect such
Thus, by clear and
delivery. Id. § 6073.
express statutory provisions, means are provided for obtaining possession of lands upon
But until
which mortgages are foreclosed.
such time the mortgagee has no title, and no
It is true that, notwithright of possession.
standing the law expressly exempts a homeclose
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Gen. St. 1894, § 5522, provides that
"such exemption shall not extend to any
mortgage thereon lawfully obtained"; but
this provision does not operate to deprive the
owner of the right to the possession of the
during the period of redemption
homestead
from foreclosure sale.
Now, the appointment of a receiver is one purely of an equitable origin; and whether it can, in the case of
a homestead, supersede the express statutory
enactment
which forbids possession by the
owner of the mortgage during foreclosure,
may well admit of serious doubt Equity is
not intended to operate harshly, but a doctrine which permits a receiver, upon the commencement
of a foreclosure action, to taJce
Immediate possession of the homestead, oust
the family, and receive the rents and income
Btead,

of

the property, seems unjust and a harsh
measure.
Such a right is denied in Investment Oo. V. Farrar (Iowa) 54 N. W. 361,
upon the ground that It is a violation of the
statutory rights of the mortgagor, even in a
case not involving homestead rights.
See,
also, cases cited In 2 Jones, Mortg. { 1522.
But even if the power exists to appoint a receiver to oust the owner of a homestead and
his family, and take possession of the property, and deprive them of the use and benefits thereof, and thus cut short the statutory
right of redemption,
think the facts in this
case fall far short of making this an extraordinary case which justifies such an extraordinary remedy, and that the receiver ought
not to have been appointed.
think that the
Judgment should be reversed.

I
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WIEDEMANN t. SANN
(31

Court of Chancery

et aL

Atl. 211.)
of New Jersey.

Feb. 26,

1895

Bill by Frank W. Wiedemann aglnst Annie Sann and others to foreclose a mortgage,
and for an injunction, and for appointment
of a receiver. Receiver appointed.
Gilbert & Atkinson,
Budd, for defendants.

for complainant

B.

BIRD, V. O. The bill In this case Is filed
to foreclose a mortgage of chattels given
by Annie Sann, asking for an injunction
against an attaching creditor, whose attachment issued against Charles Sann, and also
asking for a receiver. The chattel mortgage bears date January 11, 1895, and was
duly recorded on the same day. It was
given to secure the payment of $550, money
The whole of the
loaned to the mortgagor.
said loan, together with interest, is claimed
to be due to the complainant
The biU states
that on the 9th day of January, being two
days before the execution and delivery of
the chattel mortgage aforesaid, one Sarah
M. HaU procured to be issued a writ of attachment out of the circuit court of the
county of Burlington against one Charles
Sann on the demand for $650, under which
writ of attachment an auditor has been appointed, and that the said auditor has been
ordered by the said circuit court to sell all
of the said goods and chattels as perishable
property, and that the said auditor has advertised all of the said goods and chattels
for sale, in his advertisement or notice of
sale giving assurance to bidders that he wiU
sell the said goods and chattels free from
all Uens or incumbrances. The complainant having obtained an injunction restraining the auditor from selling, now asks for
the appointment of a receiver with authority to sell the said personal property.
This is resisted by the plaintiff in the attachment. It will be perceived that the
complainant claims that these goods and
chattels were the goods and chattels of Annie Sann, and that the plaintifC in the attachment claims them as the goods and
chattels of Charles Sann. Charles Sann is
the husband of Annie Sann. The complainant rests his case upon the rule laid down
by Chancellor Green in Smithurst v. Edmunds, 14 N. J. Eq. 408. The case in hand
is not like that In that case the property
which execution Creditors offered for sale
was not claimed by such creditors as the
property of another person than the mortAs to that there
gagor of the same goods.
Hence the question now
was no dispute.
before me is, can this court appoint a receiver in a foreclosure case to take charge
of and sell personal property for the purpose of preserving It, covered by the mortgage sought to be foreclosed, when that

867

same property has been attached by the
creditor of another person, as the property
of that other person, and has been advertised to be offered for sale by an auditor appointed in said attachment proceedings? In
Moore v. Diament, 41 N. J. Eq. 612, 7 Atl.
509, In the court of errors and appeals, a
question somewhat like the present was before the court. In that case Hammell confessed judgment to his creditors, who levied
upon certain goods and chattels.
Moore
filed a bill in this court, alleging that he had
been in partnership with Hammell, and that
Hammell became indebted to him as partner, and that, to satisfy such indebtedness,
Hammell had made to him a biU of sale of
all his interest in these goods and chattels,
and asked for and obtained an injunction
restraining the execution creditors of Hammell from proceeding to a sale.
A receiver
was appointed in that case, and, upon
Moore's offering to give a bond to take care
of the property, and to return it or to pay
the value thereof, except in case of unavoidable accident, such bond was accepted.
From this brief statement it will appear
that execution creditors claimed a lien upon
the property as the property of one man,—
Hammell, their debtor,—while Moore claimed it as his own individual property aosolutely, by virtue of a bill of sale made to
him by Hammell, and that a receiver was
appointed. The question involved in that
case was one of title to personal property;
Moore, the complainant claiming the title
was in himself, while the creditors of Hammell claimed that the title was in Hammell,
and that they, as his creditors, by virtue of
their judgments and executions, had a right
to sell the same.
It is claimed in this case
that the question involved is purely a question of title to personal property, strictly
legal in its nature, and can be determined
by an action ^f replevin, and. that consequently a court of equity has no jurisdiction. The case cited seems to present the
Moore filed his bill,
same characteristics.
and claimed the property levied upon by
virtue of a bill of sale, praying an injunction against such sale imder the executions
at law. Clearly, in such case, the principal
question to be decided was whether the title
In the case
was in Moore or Hammell.
now under consideration the question to be
determined is whether the title to the property named in the chattel mortgage was in
Annie Sann or in her husband, Charles Sann.
If that were all, it might well be said that
in neither case would this court be justified
But in the case
in assuming jurisdiction.
cited, if the property which Moore claimed
were to be sold by the execution creditors,
with the confiicting claims of title thereto, he
might In a variety of ways, suffer great
loss; which view is, in every sense, applicable to the case before me. In that case it
was distinctly held in the court of errors and
appeals that this court had the right to pro-
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ceed to setQe the rights of the parties by
virtue of the bond given, notwithstanding
a decree dismissing the bill of complainl^
In this case the complainant claims a lien
upon the goods and chattels by virtue of
She undoubtedly has a right
her mortgage.
to file her bill to foreclose such mortgage,
which beyond question gives the court jurisdiction.
But still the further question arises, can
this court, because it is the only tribunal
authorized to foreclose a mortgage upon
goods and chattels, appoint a receiver to
take charge of and sell such goods and chattels, when they are claimed by and under
attachment by the creditors of another person than the mortgagor, and offered for sale
by an auditor appointed in such attachment proceedmgs? There is a well-settled
rule that courts of equity have the right and
power to take possession of property about
which are conflicting claims, for the purpose
of preserving it until the rights of the respective parties thereto have been settled.
May this rule be applied to the present case?
It is evident, if the auditor makes sale of
the goods and chattels because they are perishable, they will be likely to sell for a nominal price only, and will also be likely to go
into the possession of many different persons.
The fact that the complainant makes
claim in the manner in which he does will
cast such a shadow upon the title as to deter prudent men from bidding. The fact
that they will in all probability go Into the
hands of many different persons
would
make it obligatory upon the complainant, if
it should turn out that the title thereto be
in him, to bring as many actions at law as
there are purchasers. High, Rec. § 192. "A
court of equity, appointing a receiver to
take possession of property pending a litigation concerning the rights of the parties

Is vested with the power to sell
the property In the receiver's hands, whenever such course becomes necessary to preserve the Interest of all the parties." Id.;
Crane t. Ford, Hopk. Ch. 114. When a
court of equity properly acquires Jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter
In a cause, and appoints a receiver therein,
and orders him to sell the property in controversy, such order, although irregular and
improvident, cannot be assailed or questioned In a collateral action, and such action
wUl not lie to set aside the order of sale
and proceedings thereunder. High, Rec. |
196; Libby v. Rosekrans, 55 Barb. 219;
Brande v. Bond, 63 Wis. 140, 23 N. W. 101.
It being evident that the auditor cannot
make sale of these goods except under great
disadvantage, and that, if it should ultim.ately appear that the title is In the chattel
mortgagor, and it also appearing that since
the mortgagee was justified in filing his bill
in this court, thereby acquiring jurisdiction
of the subject-matter, and the court unquestionably having the authority to appoint
a receiver, and it being the constant practice, when a receiver is appointed, to take
possession of the perishable goods and chattels which are the subject of litigation, te
make sale thereof for the purpose of preserving the value of them for the parties
who may ultimately appear to be entitled
thereto, I conclude that It is my duty to
advise the appointment of a receiver in this
case, with authority to make sale of the
The degoods and chattels in question.
fendant, the attaching creditor, offered to
A
give bonds for the value of the goods.
bond was offered and accepted In the case
of Moore v. Diament, supra, but in that case
the person who gave the bond did not propose to sell them, as in this case the auditor
I will advise accordingly.
proposes to do.

i tnereto,
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STE3TSON

V. NORTHERN
INV. CO. et al.
(70 N. W. 595, 101 Iowa, 435.)
Supreme Court of Iowa.
April 7, 1897.

Appeal from district court, Woodbury county; George W. Wakefield, Judge.
This appeal Is by the plaintiff from an order and decree entered upon a motion to discharge the garnishees. The issues and facts
appear In the opinion. Affirmed.
Shull & Farnsworth, for appellant
Joy,
Call & Joy and William Milchrlst, for appellees.

GIVEN, J. 1. AppeUees moved to strllie
the appellant's abstract, which motion was
overruled, and therefore we are to take the
facts to be as shown in the abstract, the material parts of which are as follows:
On
April 11, 1895, this plaintiff commenced three
separate actions to foreclose three mortgages
executed by the defendant company to him
to secure certain debts.
These mortgages
covered all of lots 4, 5, and 6, block 26, Middle Sioux City. Attachments were sued out
in each case, and A. C. Baker and 16 others
were served as garnishees. The answers of
these garnishees showed that they are tenants of the defendant company, occupying
premises other than that covered by plaintiff's mortgages, and that some of them occupied under verbal leases, and some under
written leases, extending to different periods
of the future. Their answers also showed
that some of them were Indebted for rents
due, and that all would become indebted in
the future under said leases.
PlaintifTs
three actions were consolidated, and formed
the present action. On the 9th day of May,
1895, T. A. Black, though not a party to this
action, filed his motion herein, supported by
his affidavit, for the discharge of all of said
garnishees except W. Chaffee, and showing
as grounds therefor. In substance, as follows: That on the 11th day of April, 1895,
In the case of Charles 0. Harrison v. The
Northern Investment Co. et al., then pending
la said court for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon the real estate occupied by said
garnishees, he was appointed and qualified
as receiver of all the property of said company involved In said action; also, that he
was appointed and qualified prior to the time
said garnishees were served with notice of
garnishment.
Charles C. Harrison, though
not a party to this action, did on the 18th
day of May, 1895, file his motion joining with
said Black in asking the discharge of said
By the record in the Case of
garnishees.
Harrison, as it appears In the abstract, it
was alleged in the petition that the Northern
Investment Company was insolvent; that
the property covered was insufficient to pay
the mortgages and taxes thereon. It was
asked, for these and other reasons stated,
that a receiver be appointed; and Mr. Baker
was appointed and qualified as receiver for
aU the property of the company described In
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the mortgage to Mr. Harrison, and ordered
to collect all rentals, Income, and profits
therefrom. It does not appear that any objections were made to the right of these persons to make such motions In this action.
The motions having been submitted, the
court says in the order complained of that
"the court Is of opinion, and doth adjudge,
order, and decree, that as to all rentals payable or accruing on or before the 11th day
of April, 1895, the said motion be, and is
hereby, overruled, and as to all rentals accruing and payable after the 11th day of
April, 1895, the said motion of T. A. Black,
receiver, and C. C. Harrison Is sustained."
Following this, it was ordered that the
amounts found to be due from the several
garnishees up to April 11, 1895, be paid to
the clerk of the court, and that upon payment the garnishees be discharged. It was
further ordered as follows: "And upon the
motion of T. A. Black, receiver as aforesaid,
time is given him until the 20th day of August, 1895, to file his petition of intervention,
claiming the funds so ordered to be paid to
the clerk aforesaid."
presents in argument three
2. Appellant
contentions, namely, that the court had no
authority to appoint a receiver under the
allegations of Harrison's petition; that Harrison and Black could not give the court
Jurisdiction to discharge garnishees by simply filing motions in this cause; they not
being parties thereto and not filing petitions
of intervention; that the garnishment of the
tenants made them liable to appellant, in
case he is successful in this case against the
company, for all rent accrued and to accrue.
That part of Harrison's petition asking a
receiver states numerous grounds, and at
such length as that we should not take space
to set them out. It is sufficient to say that
the petition shows that the rents of the
mortgaged premises are pledged for the payment of the debt, that they are not being applied, that the company is a foreign corporation; that it is insolvent, that the property
Is insufficient to paj the mortgages and overdue taxes, and other facts showing that the
rents were in danger of being 'lost to the
mortgagees. Conceding that the sufficiency
of that petition in this respect may be questioned in this case, we think it was sufficient
to warrant the appointment of a receiver.
3. Appellant does not question the right
of Mr. Black, as receiver, if duly appointed,
to intervene in this action to claim said
rents, but denies his right to do so by motion. The record falls to disclose, except inferentlally, that any such objection was
made in the lower court. The abstract was
prepared by other than the counsel now appearing, and with the view, no doubt, of not
Incumbering the abstract with more than
was actually necessary to an understanding
of the questions to be presented. Questionable as the record is as to this contention,
we will consider it. It will be observed that
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the order of the court is not final, as between these parties, as to the rents due up
to April 11, 1895.
The court, having full
jurisdiction over that fund, ordered it to be
paid into court, to be held until the rights
of these parties thereto are determined.
There has been no final order or judgment
against appellant as to that fund, and he has
nothing of which to complain. The question
as to which of these parties is entitled to
that money is not before us, and we express
no opinion thereon.
appeared than the
4. If nothing further
pendency of this action and the service and
answers of the garnishees, it might be said
that they are liable to q.ppellant, in case he
is successful in this action against the company, for rents accrued and to accrue under
their leases. The mortgage from the Northern Investment Company to Charles 0. Harrison contains the following:
"And It Is further agreed that if default shall be made In
any of the conditions of this mortgage, or In

the bond which It Is made and given to secure, that the right of possession of the mortgaged premises, with all the appurtenances
thereunto belonging, shall immediately vest
In the party of the second part, his heirs or
assigns, and he may immediately take possession of the same, and collect aU rents,
profits, and incomes therefrom, or, at his
option, may proceed by foreclosure, and shall
then be entitled to have a receiver appointed
immediately, and in vacation, for all of the
property herein described and embraced, to
talie charge of the said property, and collect
rents, incomes, and profits of the same, to
be applied upon the said mortgage
debt."
It seems to us entirely clear that under this
provision the rents accruing from said mortgaged property after the appointment of the
receiver are assets in his hands, and not
subject to garnishment by other creditors.
We do not think the court erred in either of
the respects claimed, and the order and
judgment are therefore affirmed.
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FIRST NAT. BANK OF JOLIET
ILLINOIS STEEL CO.
(51

Supreme

N. E. 200, 174

Court of Illinois.

v.

111. 140.)

June

18,

1898.

Appeal from appellate court, Second district.
Creditors' bill by the First National Bank
of Joliet against the Ashley Wire Company
and others for the appointment of a receiver,
with which was consolidated a petition by
the Illinois Steel Company, also for the appointment of a receiver. From a decree of
the appellate court (72 111. App. 640) affirming a decree In favor of the Illinois Steel
Company, the First National Bank of Joliet
appeals.
Affirmed.

This was a bill In the nature of a creditors' bill, filed December 26, 1893, by the
First National Bank of Joliet, the appellant,
against the Ashley Wire Company, a corporation In Joliet, WUl county, 111., which
for many years had been engaged In the
manufacture of barbed fence wire, wire
nails, etc. The bill alleged the recovery of
a. judgment by said First National Bank of
Joliet on the 14th day of December, 1893,
for $12,657.77, against said Ashley Wire
Company; that execution was issued and
delivered to the sheriff the same day, which
execution was returned, after demand made,
"No property found." Alleged the recovery
of a Judgment on the 8th day of December,
1893, by John Y. Brooks against said Ashley Wire Company for $11,090, upon which
execution had been Issued and levied upon
all the tangible personal property of said
Ashley Wire Company, and that the value
of such property so levied upon would ilot
exceed $5,000; that the sheriff had not sold
■aid property so levied upon, and It was not
sufficient to satisfy the said Brooks execution. Alleged the execution by said Ashley
Wire Company on the 19th day of July, 1893,
to the Illinois Steel Company, of a note for
$67,246.24, payable on or before two years
after date, with interest at 5% per cent, per
annum, payable semiannually, and secured
by a mortgage on its manufacturing plant;
that said Ashley Wire Company Is insolvent,
and for many months has suspended Its business, and its plant has remained idle; that
It has not been able for the last year to
meet Its trade obligations, and has been
seriously embarrassed In Its financial affairs;
that said wire corporation Is and remains In
the possession of Its real estate and manufacturing plant, and, while It Is not worth
said mortgage Indebtedness, Is a valuable
property, and ought not to be allowed to deteriorate in value or be greatly hazarded by
neglect or want of care; that watchmen
should be In charge. Insurance should be
kept up, and taxes paid; that all this should
be done in the Interest of said corporation,
Its stockholders and creditors generally; that
■aid corporation Is without means to protect
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and preserve said property, and keep up its
Insurance or taxes; that the tangible property levied upon is of a kind and character
so peculiar in its nature that It could not t)e
sold at ordinary execution sale, except at a
grievous sacrifice. Avers that the interests
of defendant and all its creditors demand
that a receiver should be appointed of its assets, both equitable and tangible; that said
receiver should be directed to take possession of said manufacturing plant, its books
of account, and Its equitable assets and
property. The Ashley Wire Company, John
T. Brooks, and Thomas Hennebry, as sheriff,
were made parties defendant. Although the
bill showed that the Illinois Steel Company,
of Chicago, held a first mortgage on the Ashley Wire Company plant, machinery, etc.,
and was the principal creditor, yet it was
not made a defendant to the bill. The appearance of the defendants was entered, and
on the 26th day of December, 1893, the defendants not objecting, the court appointed
George W. Bush receiver.
The order Invests
him with all the authority and power usually
granted receivers of courts of chancery, and
directs that he at once take possession of the
real estate and manufacturing plant of said
Ashley Wire Company, together with all the
machinery, tools, implements, and appliances
therewith, and constituting real
connected
estate, as part and parcel of said plant; that
he care for all such property, that it may
not be wasted or deteriorate for want of
proper care; that he keep the buildings insured In responsible Insurance companies In
a reasonable amount; and that he pay all
taxes legally levied upon such real estate.
It was further ordered that the said sheriff
turn over to the receiver all the personal
property levied upon by bim under the execution In favor of John Y. Brooks, such
sheriff to retain the execution, and the lien
of such execution is preserved upon all such
property levied upon, and the proceeds thereof levied upon by said sheriff, and turned
over to said receiver. The receiver presented a petition on February 19, 1894, as to the
payment of taxes, which states that there
was duly assessed against and levied upon
the personal property of the Ashley Wire
Company for the year 1893 $799.10 taxes,
and that he has no money with which to pay
said taxes, or the real estate taxes then due,
and prays that an order be entered authorizing him to pay such taxes, and that he may
be permitted to borrow money therefor. On
the 26th of February, 1894, an order was entered authorizing the receiver to pay the
taxes assessed upon the real estate, and authorizing the receiver to borrow money for
that purpose at such legal rate of interest
as he may be able, and to issue therefor his
receiver's certificate, which was by the order of the court declared to be a first and
prior lien upon the real estate of said Ashley Wire Company. The court denied the
prayer of the petition as to the payment of
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the personal property tax. On March 5,
1894, the Illinois Steel Company asked leave
of the court to make George W. Bush, receiver, a party defendant to a chancery proceeding, which the court granted; and on
the 7th day of March, 1894, the steel company filed a bill to foreclose its mortgage
against the Ashley Wire Company plant,
making said Ashley Wire Company, the
First National Bank of Joliet, John Y.
]ferooks, and George W. Bush, the receiver,
defendants.
On the 12th day of July, 1894,
after the commencement
of the foreclosure
proceedings,
the receiver borrowed of the
Illinois Steel Company $2,037.82, in pursuance of the court's order, for the purpose
of paying taxes, and Issued a receiver's certificate therefor. The mortgage upon which
the foreclosure proceedings were based,
against the Ashley Wire Company, was to
secure the note for $67,246.24, payable on
or before two years after date, with interest
at 5% per cent, per annum; and the mortgagor expressly covenanted to keep the buildings insured for $50,000, for the benefit of
It
the Illinois Steel Company, mortgagee.
also contained a clause authorizing the appointment of a receiver, with power to collect the rents, issues, and profits during the
period of redemption, in case of a foreclosure of the mortgage, and that such rents
and profits should be applied towards the
payment of the indebtedness.
Answers
were filed by the Ashley Wire Company and
the First National Bank, defendants. A
final decree of foreclosure was awarded the
Illinois Steel Company January 14, 1895, and
the property was sold to the said steel company for $70,000. The master reported an
unpaid balance, and a deficiency decree or
Judgment under the statute was entered for
the deficit of $5,316.50, with interest from
March, 1895, and execution was awarded
thereon.
On the 10th of April, 1895, the IIUnois Steel Company filed its petition in the
foreclosure case, setting up the decree of
foreclosure and the sale, the deficiency decree for $5,316.50, and the foregoing provision in regard to the appointment of a receiver by the court to collect rents until the
time of redemption, and asking for the appointment of a receiver. A hearing was had
June 20, 1895, and the court refused to appoint a new receiver, but extended the receivership of George M. Bush existing over
the property of the Ashley Wire Company
by virtue of an order in the case of the First
Kational Bank of Joliet, so that said receiver should stand as a receiver appointed
In the case of the Illinois Steel Company
against the Aahley Wire Company, and that
the receivership be extended to include the
property and effects of the Ashley Wire
Company; and the receiver was directed to
receive the rents, and hold the same for all
persons who should be found entitled thereto. The receiver had previously, under the
order of the court, leased the Ashley wire

plant for one year from December 1, 1894,
for $6,000, with the privilege of another year,
at the option of the lessee, on the same
terms.
The receiver collected in all for rents
and after paying the taxes and ex$12,000,
penses there was left in his hands $4,373.48.
On March 3, 1897, the petition of the Illinois
Steel Company was, by agreement of parties, consolidated with the cause of the First
National Bank of Joliet against the Ashley
Wire Co. et al., and was to be heard and disposed of as one case by decree to be entered in
the case of the First National Bank of Joliet
against Ashley Wire Co. et al. The principal
contention is over the distribution of the
balance of $4,373.48; the trial court decreeing this amount to be paid the Illinois Steel
Company out of the moneys in the receiver's
hands derived from rents, to be Indorsed on
the deficiency decree. From this decree of
the circuit appellant appealed to the appellate court for the Second district, which
affirmed the decree of the circuit court; and
from the Judgment of the appellate court
appellant has appealed to this court, and
asks for the reversal of the Judgment of the
bppellate court.
Garnsey &
George S. House, for appellant.
counsel), for appellee.

Knox (Elbert H. Gary, of

CRAIG, J. (after stating the facts). It is
first contended by appellant that the Illinois
Steel Company, the mortgagee, having obtained its decree of foreclosure and sale, and applied the proceeds, the mortgage has accomplished Its purpose, and is functus officio; that
no further rights or equities can be enforced
by the Illinois Steel Company.
The claim of
appellee is that the provision In the mortgage
authorized the appointment of a receiver by
the court to collect the rents and profits during
the period of redemption, and, as the sale under the foreclosure decree did not pay the debt,
to apply them In payment of the deficiency.
The agreement In the mortgage is as follows:
"Upon the filing of any bill to foreclose this
mortgage.
In any court having Jurisdiction
thereof, such court may appoint A. F. Knox,
or any proper person, receiver, with power
to collect the rents. Issues, and profits arising
out of said premises during the pendency of
such foreclosure suit, and until the time to
redeem the same from any sale that may be
made under any decree foreclosing this morfe
gage shall expire; and such rents. Issues, and
profits, when collected, may be applied towards the payment of the indebtedness and
costs herein mentioned and described."
Under this clause in the mortgage a lien is given,
by express words, upon the rents and profits,
and such an equitable lien a court of equity
will enforce.
Rents and profits are the subject of mortgage.
Jones, In his work on Mort-

gages (volume 1, i 140), says: "A mortgage
may be made of rents under a lease, and, although a right of entry be given the mortgagee, the mortgage la a mere security, like
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any other mortgage of real estate, and the
mortgagor remains the real owner until foreclosure and sale." In section 771 he says: "A
mortgagee has no specific lien upon the rents
and profits of the mortgaged land, unless he
has, In his mortgage, stipulated for a specific
pledge of them as part of his security."
This
was expressly stipulated in this mortgage given by the Ashley Wire Company to appellee.
Had there been no deficiency after the foreclosure sale of the AsWey Wire Company property and plant, the rents would have belonged
to the owner of the equity of redemption.
Unin the mortgage,
der the express agreement
there being a deficiency of $5,316.50 after the
sale, the Illinois Steel Company had an equitable right to have the rents and profits applied towards the payment of the deficiency
decree, from the time of the foreclosure sal«
untU the expiration of the time of redemption,
and this right might properly be enforced on
an application to the court to appoint a reThe contention by appellant in this
ceiver.
case that the enforcement of this provision
rests entirely in the sound discretion of the
The chancellor was
chancellor is not tenable.
authorized to act under this clause in the
mortgage, and appoint a receiver for the collection of the rents and profits during the period of redemption, to be applied on the defiIn the case of Oakford v.
ciency decree.
Robinson, 48 lU. App. 270, which Is similar to
the one at bar, the mortgage contained a
clause authorizing the appointment of a receiver, with power to talie possession of the
premises and collect the rents due and to become due thereon during the period allowed
for redemption, and to apply the same in payment of any deficit, should the premises prove
insufficient to pay the amount secured by the
In the decision of the case the
mortgage.
court said: "The rents and profits of the land,
as well as the land, were pledged by the mortgage for the security and payment of the
This authorized the
amount due the appeUee.
appointment of a receiver, In the discretion of
the court, without regard to the solvency of
2 Jones, Mortg. | 1516; 8
the mortgagor.
Am. & Eng. Enc Law, p. 234. And such appointment was lawfully made, though by a
Id.,
decree subsequent to the original decree.
By the appointment of the receiver
p. 239.
the appellants obtained an equitable lien on
the rents and profits of the land during the
statutory period allowed for redemption, II
necessary for the full payment of any deficiency In the security. In support of this
view, see 1 Jones, Mortg. §§ 773-775; 2 Jones,
Mortg. § 1536; High, Rec. H 643, 644; Beach,
That a court of equity has powRec. I 532."
er to appoint a receiver and grant equitable
i«llef where there are no express words In
the mortgage giving a lien upon rents and
profits derived from the property Is conceded.
In such a case, whether relief will be granted
Is dependent upon the facts and circumstances
This
at the time the application Is made.
court said ia Haas t. Society, 89 IlL 498, at
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502: "We find the decided weight of
American authority to be in favor of the proposition that the court may, even when the
mortgage does not by express words give a
lien upon the income derived from such property, appoint a receiver to take charge of It
and collect the rents, issues, and profits arising
therefrom. Such action will not be taken,
however, unless it be made to appear the mortgaged premises are an insufficient security
for the debt, and the person liable personally
for the debt Is Insolvent, or at least of very
A combination of
jquestionable responsibility.
these two things seems to be required in all
the cases we have examined, and in one or
more of the states It is held necessary still
other elements should be conjoined to these
Tested
before such procedure Is justified."
even by this requirement, if the mortgage did
not give a lien by express words, or authorize
the appointment of a receiver, the facts in the
case at bar show that the court committed no
error. The deficiency decree itself evidences
the fact that the Ashley Wire Company's property was insufficient security for the mortgage
debt, and the facts established the allegation
In the petition that the Ashley Wire Company,
Undoubtedly,
the mortgagor, was insolvent.
a court of equity exercises a certain discretion,
even where express words are used for the
purpose of giving a lien on the income of the
mortgaged property. The court must determine whether the language used in the mortgage is sufficient to give a lien on the income.
In the one case the authority arises from the
contract, the express words giving a lien on
the rents and profits; in the other, the court
exercises its equitable powers under the facts
and circumstances presented at the time the
application to appoint a receiver Is made.
Appellant also contends that the final decree foreclosing the mortgage ought to have
provided for a receiver to take possession of
the rents and profits of the Ashley Wire Company pending the redemption; that a decree
of foreclosure and sale, as to all questions
that might have been adjudicated between the
parties, is final. It could not be ascertained
until after the sale whether there would be
a deficit requiring the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents and profits during
the time of redemption. Under the decree of
foreclosure the property described in the
mortgage was sold. The rents and profits to
accrue during the period of redemption were
not sold, and no order could be entered until
It was ascertained at the foreclosure sale that
the mortgaged premises were insufficient to
pay the indebtedness evidenced by the mortIn Haas v. Society, supra. It was said
gage.
(page 506): "The necessity for the appropriation of the rents to the payment o* the mortgage debt may frequently not appear until
after both decree and sale. The amount due
Is often matter of dispute, and can only be
determined by the decree, and what the property will sell for can only be ascertained with
certainty from the result at tbe Judicial sale.
page
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an appropriation of the rents on the Inis Justified by the surrounding
facts before sale, we see no good reason why
the same and more weighty facts existing
after sale may not warrant a similar procedure.
The security, plainly, is not exhausted
by the sale, for there is a fund included in it
which is secondarily liable. It is true, the
mortgagee has elected to foreclose and sell;
but then he has pursued that remedy to the
end, and without getting satisfaction of his
debt, and he may avail himself of any just
and equitable means of collecting the residue,
—not that he may have such extraordinary
remedy in all cases of a deficit in the proceeds, but only where it is indispensably necessary for his protection, and jnist and equitable.
We hold, then, both upon the principles of equity that lie at the foundation of
the chancery court, and upon authority, a receiver may sometimes be allowed after decree
and sale, and that a mortgagee does not in
all cases exhaust his security by a forecloIt la, however, a power that
sure and sale.
the chancellor will be slow to exercise, except
in an extreme case, and to prevent palpable
wrong and injustice." The cases of Seligman
V. Laubheimer, 58 111. 124, Ogle v. Koemer,
140 lU. 170, 29 N. B. 563, and Davis v. Dale,
150 111. 239, 37 N. E. 215, cited by appellant
in support of its contention that a decree of
foreclosure and sale extinguishes the mortgage and renders the mortgage functus officio,
are decided on a state of facta entirely dlfEerent from the facts in this case. In Seligman
V. Laubheimer, after a sale for less than the
debt a junior mortgagee redeemed, and a petition was filed to order a resale to pay the
It was held
balance due the first mortgagee.
that as to the property sold the mortgage
was not operative, and a resale could not
be had.
No question of a mortgage of rents
accruing during the statutory period of redemption was involved. In Ogle v. Koemer
the facts were the same as to the mortgage,
the sale, and redemption by an assignee of a
second mortgage, who was a party, as In the
Seligman Case. The tenor of the case, as to
its application here, may be seen by the following quotation from the court's opinion
(page 179, 140 111., and page 565, 29 N. B.):
"A mortgage, or, as in this case, a deed of
trust in the nature of a mortgage, vests in
the party secured a lien upon the mortgaged
By virtue of that lien the mortpremises.
gagee is entitled to have the mortgaged property sold under a decree of foreclosure, and
the proceeds of the sale applied to the payThis is the mode
ment of the debt secured.
provided by law for the enforcement of the
Uen, and when the lien has been once enforced by the sale of the property It has, as
to such property, expended its force and accomplished its purpose, and the property is
no longer subject to it" In Davis v. Dale a
Pending foreclomortgage was foreclosed.
The property
sure a receiver was appointed.
was sold for the full amount of the debt, in-

debtedness

terest, and costs; but the receiver was continued, as appears, unnecessarily.
The court
said (page 243, 150 111., and page 216, 37 N.
E.): "The only purpose of appointing a receiver at the instance of the mortgagee or
cestui que trust under or trustee in the trust
deed is to preserve the security of the mortgage or trust deed, and apply the rents, issues, and profits, when necessary, in discharge of the indebtedness;
and it follows,
necessarily, that where the property is bid off
at the foreclosure sale for the full amount of
the decree, interest, and costs, as was here
done, the necessity for continuing the receiver ceases, and he should be discharged, and
the possession restored to the owner of the
equity of redemption.
In any event, the possession of the receiver, and his receipt of the
rents and profits arising from the property,
would be for the benefit of the person entitled to the same, so that the parties acquired
no additional right because the fund is in the
hands of the receiver." The question involved in this case, to wit, where the property
debt, and
sold does not pay the mortgage
where the mortgage has a provision that the
rents and profits may be applied towards the
payment of the Indebtedness and costs, was
not before the court in either of the cases
Here the receiver was
cited by appellant
properly appointed after the foreclosure decree and sale, as the security of the steel
by the sale.
company was not exhausted
Moreover, the necessity for the appointment
of a receiver, and the collection of the rents
and profits, and their application to the payment of the deficiency, did not appear until
after the foredoeure decree and sale.
Appellant also contends that the court erred
In directing the receiver, in its several orders,
to pay the taxes on the property of the Ashley Wire Company out of the funds in his
hands derived from rents of the real estate.
Appellant filed its bill to have the equitable
assets of the Ashley Wire Company applied
to the satisfaction of Its judgment and also
to have these taxes paid by the receiver out
of moneys collected by him. The bill alleges
that said corporation defendant Is and remains In the possession of its real estate and
manufacturing plant, and, while not worth
the said mortgage indebtedness, is a valuable
property, and ought not to be allowed to deteriorate in value or be greatly hazarded by
neglect or want of care; that watchmen should
be in charge, insurance should be kept up, and
taxes paid; that all this should be done in the
interest of said corporation, its stockholders
and creditors generally; that said corporation
is vrithout means to protect and preserve said
property, keep up its Insurance, or pay the taxes, and l8 without means to preserve, care for,
The receiver
and collect its equitable assets.
was appointed on appellant's motion, and its
own solicitor's name is recited in the order

of the court December 26, 1893, inter alia:
"That upon obtaining possession he properly
care for aU such property, to the end that
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It may not be wasted or deteriorate for want
of proper care, that he keep the buildings and
all Improvements insured In responsible In-

surance companies in a reasonable amount,
and that he pay all taxes and assessments
legally levied upon such real estate." This
order of the court has never been rescinded,
so far as the record shows.
The order of
March 11, 18^, authorizing the receiver to
pay the taxes of 1894, recites: "It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the
court that the said George W. Bush, as receiver, out of the moneys In his hands pay to
the said township collector the personal property taxes assessed against the said Ashley
Wire Company for the year 1894, being the
sum of $669.12, taking proper receipt therefor, and that said receiver in the making of
said payment, all parties In interest in open
court consenting thereto," etc. On June 20,
1895, the receiver, by appeUanf s counsel, presented his petition, and in the order of the
court directing him to pay the taxes on the
real estate the same order of consent apIn Armstrong v. Cooper, 11 111. 540,
pears.
this court said: "A decree made by consent
cannot be appealed from, nor can error properly be assigned upon It Even a rehearing
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cannot be allowed in the suit, nor can the
be set aside by a bill of review.
1
Barb. Ch. Prac. 373." Smith v. Kimball, 128
111. 583, 21 N. B. 503; Roby v. Trust Co., 166
111. 33G, 46 N. E. 1110.
These orders being
made at the request of appellant, and by consent, it cannot question their validity.
Objection is also made to the order of courS
directing the payment of the real and personal taxes for the year 1895 by the receiver.
The amount paid was $1,874.41. The order
extending the receiver on the petition of the
Illlnoia Steel Company was made June 20,
1895, authorizing him to receive the rents and
profits, to be held by him subject to the order
of court. The redemption from the sale under the mortgage foreclosure of the Illinois
Steel Company against the Ashley Wire Company expired June 9, 1896.
This money derived from rents belonged to the Illinois
Steel Company by virtue of the specific lien
in the mortgage, and, the receiver having
paid these taxes from funds belonging to apFinding
pellee, appellant cannot complain.
no reversible error in the record, and the
decree of the court appearing to be equitable,
the judgment of the appellate court Is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

decree
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CENTRAL TRUST 00. v. NEW YORK
>. CITY & N. R. CO. (ATTORNEY
GENERAL,

(18

N. E.

Court of Appeals

Intervener).

92, 110

Appeal from supreme

First

department.
On the petition
supreme court, at
county, made an
hardt, the receiver
the Central Trust

N. Y. 250.)

of New York.
court,

Oct. 2, 1888.
general

of the attorney

term.

general

the

in New York
order directing Joel B. Erappointed in the action of
Company against the New
York City & Northern Railroad Company, to
make provision for the payment of the taxes
levied on the corporate franchise of the railroad company.
From this order the receiver
appealed, and the general term (Daniels, J.,
delivering the opinion. Van Brunt, P. J., and
Brady, J., concurring)
reversed
the order.
From the order of reversal the attorney general takes this appeal.
special

term,

Charles F. Tabor, Atty. Gen., for appellant
Artemas H. Holmes, for respondents.

PECKHAM, J. The railroad company
above named was incorporated under the laws
of this state, and had its principal business
In May,
office in the city of New York.
1882, a receiver tiereof was appointed in proceedings taken to sequestrate its property by
bad
a judgment creditor whose execution
Such receiver opbeen returned unsatisfied.
erated the road from the time of his appouitment to February 3, 1885, when another receiver was appointed In the action above entitled, which is brought to foreclose certain
mortgages executed by the company upon its
property.
The first receiver turned over the
property and the possession of the road to the
receiver appointed in the foreclosure proceedings, and from the time of the appointment
of the latter up to a time subsequent to the
year ending June 30, 1886, he has operated
the road by virtue of such appointment
Taxes became due and payable under the corporation tax act of 1880, as amended by chapter 361 of the Laws of 1881, which amounted
at the time of the filing of his petition by the
attorney general. In February, 1887, to about
the sum of $8,000; being for taxes on the
gross earnings of the road as thus operated
for the years ending June 30, 1883, 1884*
No question Is
1885, and 1886, respectively.
made as to the amount of the tax in each
year, or that there is a sum in the hands of
the receiver which may be applicable to their
payment;
but the counsel for the receiver insists that the corporation is alone answerable for the taxes, and that recourse must be
had to It for the payment of the same, or to
such funds as may remain in the receiver's
hands after the claims of the mortgagees
have been satisfied; which In this case is but
another manner of stating that there Is no
way of collecting these taxes, for. If their
payment Is to be postponed to the payment
of the whole amoimt of the mortgage debt of

the company,
all of Its property will have
been wholly exhausted long before payment
in full of its mortgage indebtedness could be
made.
Various other objections were taken
to the granting of the petition of the attorney
general.
The taxes in question, having l»een levied
by virtue of the above-mentioned corporation
tax law, were taxes upon the franchise, as distinguished from the property, of the corporation. People V. Insurance Co., 92 N. Y. 328.
Upon this assumption the counsel for the receiver claims that the taxes are not made a
lien upon property by the act creating them,
and cannot, therefore, be held to be a prior
or paramount charge upon the funds In the
receiver's hands, on the groimd that they are
debts due to the state, or on the ground of
public policy. The manner of proceeding to
collect these taxes has been designated in the
act which imposes them, and Is to be found
In sections 7 and 9 of such act. By section 7
the tax "shall be collected for the use of the
state as other taxes are recoverable by law
from such corporation," etc.; and by section
9 the taxes "may be sued for In the name of
the people of the state, and recovered in any
court of competent jurisdiction In an action
to be brought by the attorney general at the
Under section
instance of the comptroller."
to collect the taxes being
7, the proceedings
the same as other taxes are recovered by law,
(not relating to those imposed on real estate,)
those proceedings would be regulated by the
Revised Statutes, as amended by chapter 45S
of the Laws of 1857.
It Is argued thai; as
proceedings to enforce the collection of taxes
thus imposed are provided for In the very act
which imposes them, such proceedings must
in all cases be taken, and that all other remeIt Is upon this
dies are absolutely excluded.
ground that the learned judge who wrote theopinion at the general term proceeded, the
result of which was to reverse these proceedings, because not undertaken pursuant to the
provision of the statute In question.
Generally speaking, the rule as thus laid down Is to
be followed, and the remedy Is confined lathe manner stated.
But In such a case as
this we think the rule is not to be applied.
When the property of a corporation Is already
sequestrated,
and a receiver appointed,
and
where in addition thereto foreclosure proceedings are pending against It to foreclose mortgages to an amount in excess of all its property, and a receiver has also been appointed
under such proceedings, and where the corporation is largely and hopelessly insolvent
and all of its property in the hands of the
receiver appointed by the court, and where
the money to pay the taxes has arisen front'
the gross earnings, and an amount sufficient
to pay them Is In the hands of the receiver,
we are of opinion that the proceedings to obtain payment of those taxes thus in the receiver's hands are not confined to those provided for by the act cited, but that a direct
application for an order on the receiver for
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their payment may be made to the court by
petition, as in this case, having made the
corporation and the receiver a party thereto.
If there are any disputed questions of fact to
be determined, the court may direct an action
to be brought, or may determine it In some
other and more summary way.
We feel more certain in regard to this
question by looldng at the proceedings which
are provided to be taken under the general
laws. They are to be instituted by petition
upon which the court may sequestrate such
part of the property of the company as shall
be necessary for the purpose of satisfying
the taxes In arrear with the costs, etc.; and
in its discretion the court may proceed further, and enjoin the company and its ofScers
from any further proceedings under the charter, in order to enforce the payment of the
But, in a case where the whole of
taxes.
the property has already been sequestrated
the sequesti-ation
under other proceedings,
provided for would not be very efiScient. Neither would an injunction *which simply enjoined the company and its officers from further proceedings under the charter be in and
of itself very efficient as against a receiver
who was operating the railroad under the
order of the court. In such case, if the injunction were granted, it would only become
effective because the court would then order
its officer, the receiver, to pay the tax, and
But
go on with the operation of the road.
it would be a farce for the court to first issue the injunction against the receiver, restraining him from operating the road until
he paid the tax, and then ordering him to pay
it for the purpose of continuing its proper
operation. The result would be that the receiver in the end would pay the tax, because he was ordered to do so by the court
The order might just as well be issued in the
first instance, without this circuitous method.
The privilege granted by the other section of
the act of 1881, to sue for the taxes in the
name of the people, in an action brought by
the attorney general at the instance of the
comptroller, would also result in the court
ordering the receiver to pay the tax, for in
no other way could the judgment for tne reIn all
covery of the tax become efCectual.
cases, therefore, the payment by the receiver
would be made by order of the court, and in
all cases the order might just as well be made
in the first instance.
We do not thinli that these provisions of
the statute should, under such circumstances,
be held to restrict the general power of the
court to direct its officer to pay those claims
which exist In favor of the state for taxes
where tha
the corporation,
upon
Imposed
claim of the state for the payment of such
taxes is, as we think, a paramount one. An
insolvent corporation In the hands of and operated by a receiver was not in the minds of
the framers of the statute when providing
for the enforcement of payment of taxes from
what may be termed a "going corporation."

It
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may be admitted that in a strict and technical sense these taxes, when first Imposed,
are not a lien upon any specffic property of
the corporation. But we are of the opinion
that the railroad, when in the receiver's
hands and operated by him, is operated under
and by virtue of the franchise which has
been conferred upon the corporation by the
state; and that when he receives the gross
earnings arising from its operation, and has
in his hands money enough to pay these taxes, the state has a paramount right to collect
them before the moneys applicable to such
payment shall be paid away by the receiver.
Having such paramount right, the court may
in its discretion listen to the petition of the
state through its attorney general, and direct
its officer to make the payment asked for.
It ia claimed, however, that when a receiver Is appointed by the court, if he operates the railroad under its order, he does so
by virtue of the equity powers of the court
conferred by the constitution; and hence that
the receiver Is not bound to pay the taxes,
although he receives all the earnings of the
company. But what does the receiver operate? Under this order of the court he takes
possession of all the property of the corporation, and proceeds to operate, that is, to run,
its trains, and to do all that was formerly
done under the direction of the board of directors.
In this way he uses the franchise
which has been conferred by the state upon
the company, and he uses it as an officer of
the court which is administering the afCairs
of the company, and through the court he
acts as the company to the same extent, pro
hac vice, as if the board of directors were operating the railroad. It is the franchise
which is being used in both cases, only in
one case it is used for the company, and sub'stantially by it, by means of its board of directors; while in the other case the same
franchise is being used, and the road is operated under it, by an officer of the court, until,
by virtue of the legal proceedings connected
with the receivership, the receiver is discharged, and the road returned to its former postaken under a
sessors, or other proceedings
reorganization, as provided by law.
The learned counsel for the receiver has cited the ease of Com. v. Bank, 123 Mass. 498,
as authority for the proposition that after a
corporation is placed in the hands of a receiver no tax of this nature can be levied upon or collected from It But the case is not
In the least analogous to the one under disIn the case in Massachusetts the
cussion.
tax was laid upon the amount of the average
of deposits in the bank for the preceding sis
months, which was held to be a tax on the
value of the franchise thus ascertained; and
It was further held that if on the day when
the tax was to be laid the bank was in the
hands of a receiver it was not liable to pay
any part of the tax, although it transacted
business during a part of the preceding six
It will be seen, however, that the
months.
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receiver was appointed under a decree of the
court perpetually enjoining the bank from dolug any further business, and the receiver
was appointed to wind up its affairs, and the
bank was at once and forever deprived of the
exercise or use of Its franchise.
The court
held that as the tax was upon the franchise,
the value of which was to be ascertained on
the day the tax was Imposed, by reference to
the amount of the average of deposits for the
past six months, if on that day the franchise
had ceased to exist, no tax could for that
reason be Imposed;
and it was wholly Imciaterial that for a portion of the preceding six
months the franchise had been in existence
and was actually used.
It thus appears that
the appointment of the receiver was one of
the steps to wind up a corporation which was,
on the day set for the imposition of the tax,
to all intents and purposes dissolved, and was
no longer In existence, and hence the decision of the court was entirely unassailable.
No such fact exists in the case before us.
The corporation was not dissolved in form
nor In substance, so far as this question Is
The franchise was in existence
concerned.
and was actually used, and no decree of disThe
solution had ever been pronounced.
agent who used the franchise was an officer
of the court, acting under its authority, instead of the board of directors; but it was
the franchise of the company which was In
In Trust Co. v. Railroad
use at all times.
Co., 117 U. S. 434, 6 Sup. Ot. 800, the supreme
court of the United States, while declining to
give preference to receiver's certificates over
mortgage bondholders under the facts In that
case, did grant preference to the claims of
The taxes were. It is
the state for taxes.
true, upon property; but the case is not authority for the proposition that if the tax Is

not a technical lien on specific property when
imposed, then no preference can be granted
In a case like this. We reiterate the statement of Porter, J., in Re Columbian Ins. Co.,
3 Abb. Dec. 239, that there Is great force in
the claim that "the state has succeeded to all
the prerogatives of the British crown, so
far as they are essential to the efficient exercise of powers Inherent in the nature of civil
government, and that there is the same priority of right here, in respect to the payment of
taxes, which existed at common law In favor of the public treasury."
We certainly have no doubt that. In a case
like this, the court can make the order, (slightly modified as mentioned below,) which was
made herein at special term, and that the
statutory remedies for the collection of taxes
of the nature herein specified are not controlling In the case of an insolvent corporation and upon such facts as are herein proved. The parties hereto both agree that, as
there is a fund applicable to the payment of
these taxes, there is no necessity for the insertion in the special term order of the provision for issuing certificates by the receiver to
raise money to pay the taxes. Without discussing or deciding the question, therefore,
whether. In case the receiver had not the
money on hand with which to pay these taxes, the coxirt would order him to issue and
sell receiver's certificates, and with the proceeds pay them, we shall modify the special
term order by striking out such a provision.
As thus modified, we think that order was
correct

For these reasons the order of the general
term of the supreme court should be reversed, and that of the special term be modified,
as already stated, and as modified affirmed,
without costs. All concur.
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FARMEJRS' LOAN

& TRUST CO.
CREEK COAIi CO.

y.

GRAPE

(50 Fed. 481.)

Circuit Court, S. D. Illinois.

May 7,

1892.

In Equity. Bill by the Farmers' Loan &
Trust Company against the Grape Creek Coal
Company to foreclose a mortgage.
A receiver
was appointed, and he now asks leave to issue receiver's certificates.
Runnells

Trust
W.

& Burry,

for Farmers'

Loan

&

Go.

J. Calhoun, for J. G. English, receiver.
Hess & Johnson, for Travellers' Ins. Co.
and other objecting bondholders.
GRESHAM, Circuit Judge.

The defendant,

a private corporation, whose chief business Is
mining and selling coal, conveyed to the complainant, in trust, lands and two coal mines
in Vermilion county. 111., to secure an issue
of bonds amounting to $500,000. An installment of interest was allowed to remain due
for more than six months, and this bill was
filed to foreclose the trust deed. Joseph G.
English, who was appointed receiver, asks for
an order authorizing him to issue receiver's
certificates not exceeding
in all $24,000,
which shall be a first lien npon the trust
property, to enable him to pay taxes now due,
amounting to $3,428.64, take up outstanding
certificates amounting to $6,400, which were
issued under an order of the Vermilion circuit
court, in a suit to foreclose the same trust
deed, and to continue the operation of the
mines.
The receiver represents that, with
additional working capital, he could operate
the mines profitably, and better protect them.
The holders of 75 per cent, of the bonds and
the corporation join In the receiver's request.
The holders of the remaining 25 per cent, reThe corporation Is insist the application.

solvent
It Is not claimed that the receiver
is without means to pay taxes, and it is chiefly to enable him to continue the operation of
the mines for anticipated profits that he desires authority to Issue certificates.
When it becomes necessary for a court of
chancery to take possession of property which
l8 the subject of litigation, by placing it in
the hands of a receiver, all expenses incident
to Its safe-keeping and preservation are properly chargeable against it; and, if there be
no Income, such expenses will be paid out of
the proceeds of the corpus before distribution
to lien or other creditors. It does not follow,
however, that because property of a private
coTroratlon or a natural person may be thus
protected and preserved before sale, that. In
order to raise money to operate It for profit,
a court may place a charge upon It in adPending a suit to
vance of existing liens.
foreclose a mortgage executed by a railroad
corporation, the road may be operated by a
receiver, and debts contracted for labor, supplies, and other necessary purposes before as
well as after the appointment of a receiver,
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may be made a first lien upon Income, and, if
that Is not adequate, upon the corpus of the
property. In the exercise of this exceptional
and extraordinary jurisdiction, which Is of
comparatively recent origin, courts have entered orders making receiver's certificates first
liens on the mortgaged property.
This has
been done, however, on grounds not applicable to mortgages executed by private corporations.
A railroad corporation Is a quasi public Institution, charged with the duty of operating Its road as a public highway. If the
company becomes embarrassed and unable to
perform that duty, the courts pending proceedings for the sale of the road will operate
It by a receiver, and make the expense incident thereto a first lien.
This Is done on
account of the peculiar character of the property.
It is generally mortgaged to secure
bonds, and persons who invest in such securities Imow that the mortgage rests upon property previously impressed with a public duty.
Private corporations owe no duty to the public, and their continued operation is not a
matter of public concern.
It Is only against
railroad mortgages that the supreme court of
the United States has sustained orders giving
priority to receiver's certificates representing
particular indebtedness, and, as already stated, then only on principles having no application to a mortgage executed by a private corporation owing no duty to the public. Fosdick V. Schall, 99 U. S. 235; Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126; Mlltenberger v. Railroad
Co., 106 U. S. 286, 1 Sup. Ct. 140; Union
Trust Co. V. lUinois M. R. Co., 117 U. S. 434,
6 Sup. Ct. 809; Wood v. Trust Co., 128 U. S.
421, 9 Sup. Ct. 131; Kneeland v. Trust Co.,
136 U. S. 89, 10 Sup. Ct. 950; Morgan's L. &
T. R. & S. S. Co. V. Texas Cent. Ry. Co., 137
U. S. 171, 11 Sup. Ct. 61.
In Wood V. Trust Co. the court said: "The
doctrine of Fosdick v. Schall has never yet
been applied in any ease except that of a
railroad.
The case lays great emphasis on
the consideration that a railroad is a peculiar
property, of a public nature, and discharging
There Is a broad disa great public work.
tinction between such a case and that of a
purely private concern.
We do not undertake
to decide the question here, but only point it
out."
In Kneeland v. Trust Co., supra, in discussing the jurisdiction of the chancellor to disthe
place the lien of a railroad mortgage,
court said: "Upon these facts we remark,
first, that the appointment of a receiver vests
in the court no absolute control over the propauthority to displace
erty, and no general
Because, In a few specvested contract liens.
ified and limited cases, this court has declared that unsecured
claims were entitled to
priority over mortgage debts, an idea seems
to have obtained that a court appointing a receiver acquires power to give such preference
to any general and unsecured claims.
It has
been assumed that a court appointing a receiver could rightfully burden the mortgaged
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property for the payment of any unsecured
indebtedness.
Indeed, we are advised that
some courts have made the appointment of a
receiver conditional upon the payment of all
unsecured indebtedness
In preference to the
mortgage . liens sought to be enforced.
Can
anything be conceived which more thoroughly
destroys
the sacredness
of contract obligations? One holding a mortgage debt upon a
railroad has the same right to demand and
expect of the court respect for his vested and
contracted priority as the holder of a mortgage on a farm or lot.
So, when a court appoints a receiver of railroad property, it has
no right to make that receivership conditional on the payment of other than those few
unsecured claims which, by the rulings of
this court, have been declared to have an
equitable priority.
No one is bound to seU
to a railroad company,
or to work for it;
and whoever has dealings with a company
whose property is mortgaged must be assumed to have dealt with it on the faith of its
personal responsibility, and not in expectation of subsequently displacing the priority
of the mortgage liens.
It is the exception,
and not the rule, that such priority of liens
can be displaced.
We emphasize this fact of
the sacredness of contract liens for the reason
that there seems to be growing an idea that
the chancellor, in the exercise of his equitable
powers, has unlimited discretion in this matof vested liens."
ter of the displacement
And further on in the same opinion the court
said: "If, at the instance of any party rightfully entitled thereto, a court should appoint
& receiver of property, the same being rail-

road property, and therefore under an obligation to the public of continued operation, it;
in the administration of such receivership,
might rightfully contract debts necessary for
the operation of the road, either for labor,
supplies, or rentals, and make such expenses
a prior lien on the property itself."
Tn the language
above quoted, there is a
plain implication that the limited power
which courts may exercise in displacing the
liens of raUroad mortgages should not and
cannot be extended to mortgages executed by
private corporations.
The court is not asked
to subvert the lien of the mortgage on the
ground that the trustee or bondholders have
got possession of anything which, in equity,
It is to enable
belongs to general creditors.
him to operate the mines for the benefit of
against the wish of part of
bondholders,
them, that the receiver desires to be invested
with authority to issue certificates which shall
be a prior lien upon the property embraced In
the trust deed. Extensive as are the powers
of courts of equity, they do not authorize a
chancellor to thus impair the force of solemn
obligations and destroy vested rights.
Instead of displacing mortgages and other liens
upon the property of private corporations and
natural persons, it is the duty of courts to
uphold and enforce them against all subsequent incumbrances.
It would be dangerous
to extend the power which has been recentiy
exercised over railroad mortgages, (sometimes
with unwarranted freedom,) on ao.'ount of
their peculiar nature, to all mortgages.
The
power does not exist, and the application is
denied.
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HANNA

et al. v.

STATE TRUST

CO. et al.

(70 Fed. 2, 16 C. C. A. 586.)

Circuit

Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Sept 23, 1895.

No. 593.
Appeal from the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Colorada
On the 1st day of November, 1889, the
Denver-Arapahoe Land Company, a Colorado
corporation, eiecuted to the appellant John
R. Hanna its trust deed on 11,320 acres of
land in Arapahoe and Douglas counties,
Colo., to secure to the appellant Rufus Clark
the payment of its promissory notes aggregating the sum of $97,000.
On the same day
the same corporation executed to . the Mercantile Trust Company of Neve York, as
trustee, a deed of trust on 4,480 acres of
land in Arapahoe county, Colo., to secure an
issue of its first mortgage bonds amoimting
to $140,000.
On the 1st day of March, 1890,
the Denver Water-Storage Company, a jOoIorado corporation, executed tb the State Trust
Company of New York, as trustee, a deed of
trust on about 1,100 acres of land in Douglas
county, Colo., together with the Castlewood
dam and reservoir, irrigating canals, ditches,
etc., to secm-e the payment of its first mortgage bonds amounting to the sum of $300,000.
Each of these deeds of trust covers
different properties, and is the first and valid
lien upon the property covered by it. On or
about the 1st day of May, 1891, the Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company was organized, pursuant to the laws of Colorado, by
the consolidation of the Denver-Arapahoe
Land Company and the Denver Water-Storage Company, and by virtue of such consolidation acquired, subject to the deeds of trust
above described, all of the property covered
by or embraced therein. Immediately after
its organization the Denver Land & WaterStorage Company executed a deed of trust
upon the entire property acquired by the consolidation mentioned, subject to the several
by the constituent
deeds of trust executed
companies, and above set forth, to the State
Trust Company of New York, as trustee, to
secure an issue of its general or consolidated
mortgage bonds to the amount of $800,000.
On the 4th day of June, 1894, the State
Trust Company of New York, as trustee in
the consolidated mortgage last above mentioned, filed its bill of complaint in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Colorado against the Denver Land &
Water-Storage Company, alleging that it had
made default, and failed to pay the taxes on
its lands or interest upon its bonds, and that
it was insolvent, and prayed for the foreclosure of its mortgage and the appointment
of a receiver. This bill admitted the priority
of the underlying deeds of trust executed by
the constituent 'companies, and that any relief granted in the suit, by foreclosure or
otherwise, must be subject to the rights and
equities existing under the prior mortgages.
H.& B.EQ.(2d E<1.)— 56
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On the day the bill was filed the Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company appeared
and answered;
admitting its insolvency, and
confessing all the allegations to the bill.
The court thereupon appointed
a receiver.
On the 24th of July, 1894, the State Trust
Company filed its amended and supplemental bill of complaint, to which the Mercantile
Trust Company of New York, and the appellants, John R. Hanna and Rufus Clark, were
made defendants. This amended blU prayed
relief as follows:
That the said Mercantile
Trust Company, John R. Hanna, and Rufus
Clark might be brought in as defendants in
tbe action, and required to set up their re
spective rights upon the real estate covered
by the deeds pf trust executed by the Denver-Arapahoe Land Company; that the respective rights of the trustees under the several mortgages or deeds of trust might be
judicially ascertained and determined by the
court; that the properties covered by the
respective deeds of trust might be marshaled, and judicially ascertained
and adjusted;
that the amounts due upon tne notes and
bonds issued under the several deeds of trust
might be adjudicated and determined; that
the said deeds of trust might be foreclosed;
that the receiver theretofore appointed in the
action might be continued as receiver of all
the property covered by each and all of said
deeds of trust; that the said John R. Hanna,
Rufxis Clark, and the Mercantile Trust Company, and the holders of any of the notes,
bonds, or securities issued under said deeds
of trust, might be enjoined and restrained
from commencing any action or proceeding
in the circuit court of the United States for
Colorado, or any other court, for the foreclosure of the said deeds of trust, and from
enforcing their said notes and bonds, or for
the collection thereof, against the Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company, or its property and effects, except in this action.
On the 16th day of August, 1894, a special
master appointed in the cause made a report,
from which it appears that the company
was endeavoring to carry on a colonization
business, and was engaged in selling small
tracts of land, for fruit raising and garden
purposes, to settlers, or those who proposed
to become settlers, or colonists; that in many
cases the company sold these tracts of land
(usually 10 acres), under executory contracts,
for small amounts of cash down, and deferred payments extending over a period of five
years, when the various purchasers were to
receive the deeds.
The company agreed to
plant these ti-acts with fruit trees, and cultivate and care for them during the five
years.
On the 16th of August the receiver
filed his petition, stating, substantially, that
the property of the Denver Land & WaterStorage Company consists of 17,000 acres of
land in the counties of Arapahoe and Douglas, Colo., and an extensive dam or reservoir,
known as the "Castlewood Dam," and a system of canals and irrigating ditches connect-
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ed therewith, and a large number of landpurchase contracts and land-purchase
notes,
referred to in the report of the special master; that the original plan of tne Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company contemplatlands; the
ed the colonization of these

amount of the land-purchase contracts and
as shown by the report of the special
master; the agreements made by the Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company
to plant
and cultivate the lands, already referred to,
and that in consideration thereof the various
purchasers have made large payments, and
have a right, in Justice and equity, to demand performance of the contracts of the
Denver Land & Water-Storage Company,
and that otherwise the fruit trees upon the
tracts sold under the planting and cultivation
contracts will die, and the paypients made
by the purchasers will be alwolutely lost;
and that, moreover, it is of vital importance
that it should collect the
to the company
balance due upon the land-sale notes and
contracts mentioned, which collection is entirely dependent upon the lieeping up of the
by the
tracts of land, and the performance
company of the contracts with the purchasers aforesaid. The petition then presents a
number of reasons and arguments why, in
certificates
the judgment of the receiver,
should be issued, and calls attention to the
default in taxes upon the company's lands,
alleged to amount to about $4,000. The particulars of the three underlying mortgages
mortgage are then givand the consolidated
en, and the receiver calls the court's attention to the opportunity which presents itself
for engaging in the colonization of the company's barren lands, if he is authorized to
to raise
issue certificates of indebtedness
funds with which to properly present the
merits and advantages of the Denver Land
& Water-Storage Company's property. On
the 15th day of September, 1894, the court
made an order, upon the receiver's petition,
which authorized the issue of receiver's certificates to pay taxes due upon the lands, and
to redeem the same from tax sales, and making such certificates a first and paramount
lien upon the property upon which the taxes
The order also contained this
were paid.
adprovision:
"(5) It is further ordered,
judged, and decreed that in addition to the
amounts which may be necessary to pay the
taxes now in arrears upon the property set
forth and described in paragraphs 2, 3, and
4 of this order, the receiver shall have, and
Is hereby granted, authority to borrow such
additional sum of money as shall, together
with said amounts for taxes, amount in the
aggregate to a sum not exceeding $10,000,
and to issue therefor his certificates of indebtedness, which said certificates of indebtedness shall be first and paramount liens
upon all the property, rights, and franchises
now owned or controlled by the said the
Denver Land & Water-Storage Company, desituated, and
fendant herein, wheresoever
notes,

subject to the Jurisdiction of this court
And said additional simis of money shall be
used and applied by said receiver for the
purpose of preserving the property of the
Denver Land & Water-Storage Company in
his possession and custody, and carrying out
and maintaining the contracts of the company now in existence, under and by which
the company has heretofore
sold tracts of
land to various parties, which said contracts
are referred to In the report of said receiver,
and for such other purposes as are set out
in said petition, with reference to the maintenance, preservation,
and protection of the
property of the company, or as the court may
from time to time direct" From this order,
John R. Hanna, trustee in the deed of trust
dated November 1, 1889, and Bufus Clark,
the beneficiary named therein, and the holder
of a large amount of the bonds secured
by the mortgage to the Mercantile Trust
Company, appealed to this court.

John S. Macbeth (Enos Miles, on the
brief), for appellants.
A. C. Campbell (A. E. Pattison and Henry
W. Hohson, on the brief), for appellees.
Before

THAYER,

CALDWELL,
Chrcuit

SANBORN,

and

Judges.

CALDWELL, Circuit Judge, after stating
the case as above, delivered the opinion of
the com-t
The precise question in this case is whether a court of chancery which has appointed
a receiver for an insolvent private corporation in a foreclosure suit brought by a second mortgagee may, against the objection of
the first mortgagee, authorize Its receiver to
issue receiver's certificates to raise money to
carry on the business of the Insolvent corporation and to improve its lands, and make
a first and paramount lien
such certificates
upon the lands covered by the first mortgage.
So far as we are advised, the power to do this
has been denied in every case in which the
question has arisen. One of the first cases
In which the question arose was Raht v. Attrill, 106 N. Y. 423, 13 N. B. 282. In that
case a hotel company mortgaged its property to raise funds to build a hotel. Before
of the hotel the corporation
the completion
became insolvent, and upon the application of
Its principal stockholder a receiver was apand upon an application and showpointed;
ing that the wages of the men who worked on
the hotel building were impaid, and that
unless paid, to burn the
they threatened,
building, the court made an order authorizing
the receiver to issue certificates, which were
declared to be a lien prior to the trust mortgage, to raise funds to pay the wages due
the laborers. A referee reported that If the
money had not been raised to pay the wages
due the men, the hotel and other property of
the corporation "would, in all probability,
have been destroyed or seriously injured."
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In

the progress of the case the mortgagee denied that the court had authority or power to
set aside the prior lien of the mortgage and
mal^e the receiver's cerUflcates, issued under
the circumstances mentioned, a first and prior
lien upon the property. The court delivered
an exhaustive opinion, covering every aspect
of the question. We quote some of its utterances.
The court said: "The lien of the
mortgage attaches, not only to the land in
the condition in which it was at the time of
the execution of the mortgage, but as changed or improved by accretions or by labor
expended upon it while the mortgage is In
existence.
.Creditors having debts created
for money, labor, or materials used in improving ttie mortgaged property acquire on
that account no legal or equitable claim to
displace or subordinate the lien of the mort* * * The act
gage, for their protection.
of the court in taking charge of property
through a receiver is attended with certain
necessary expenses of its care and custody;
and it has become the settled rule that expenses of realization, and also certain expenses which are called 'expenses of preservation,'
may be incurred, under the order of the court,
on the credit of the property; and it follows,
from necessity, in order to the effectual administration of the trust assumed by the
court, that these expenses should be paid out
of the income, or, when necessary, out of the
corpus, of the property, before distribution, or
before the court passes over the property to
* * * It
those adjudged to be entitled.
would be difficult to define, by a rule applicable in every case, what are expenses of preservation which may be incurred by a receiver
by authority of the court. It was said by
James, L. J., in Re Regent's Canal IronWorks Co., 3 Ch. Div. 411, 427, that 'the only
costs for the preservation of the property
would be such things as the repairing of the
property, paying rates and taxes which
would be necessary to prevent any forfeiture,
or putting a person in to take care of the
property.' Wherever the true limit is, we
think it does not include the expenditure authorized by the order of August 17th, and
that such an expenditure is, and ought to be,
excluded from the definition. There must be
something approaching a demonstrable necessity, to justify such an infringement of the
rights of the mortgagees as was attempted in
After referring to the cases in
this case."
which the receivers of insolvent railroad corporations have been authorized to issue certificates which were declared to be a first lien
on the property of the corporations, the court
said: "It cannot be successfully denied that
the decisions in these cases vest in the courts
a very broad and comprehensive jurisdiction
over insolvent railroad corporations and their
property. It will be found, on examining
these cases, that the jurisdiction asserted by
the court therein is largely based upon the
public character of railroad corporations, the
public interest in their continued and suc-
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cessful operation, the peculiar character and
and upon other
terms of railroad mortgages,
special grounds, not applicable to ordinary
private corporations. • • * These cases
furnish, we think, no authority for upholding
the order of August 17th, or for subverting
the priority of lien which, according to the
general rules of law, the bondholders acquired through the trust mortgage on the property of the company. It would be unwise, we
think, to extend the power of the court in
dealing with property In the hands of receivers to the practical subversion or destruction
of vested interests, as would be the case in
this instance if the order of August 17th
should be sustained. It is best for all that
the integrity of contracts should be strictly
guarded and maintained, and that a rigid,
rather than a liberal, construction of the
power of the court to subject property in the
hands of receivers to charges, to the prejudice of creditors, should be adopted."
We concur in the doctrine expressed in this
See, to the same effect. Farmers' Loan
case.
& Trust Co. v. Grape Creek Coal Co. (C. O.) 50
Fed. 481; Laughlln v. RoUing^tock Co. (C.
C.) 64 Fed. 25; Fidelity Insurance Trust &
Safe-Deposit Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co. (C. C.)
68 Fed. 623; Snively v. Coal Co. (C. C.) 69
Fed. 204; and Hooper v. Trust Co. (Md.) 32

Atl.

505,

513.

The contention of the appellees is that the
order made by the circuit court finds sanction in the cases of Wallace v. Loomis, 97 V.
S. 146; Fosdick v. Schall, 90 U. S. 235; Barton V. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126; Mlltenberger
V. Raikoad Co., 106 U. S. 286, 1 Sup. Ot. 140;

Trust

Co. V. Souther, 107 TJ. S. 581, 2 Sup.
295,— and other later cases of like character, in which receivers of insolvent railroad
corporations were authorized to Issue receivers' certificates for various purposes, which
were made a first and paramount lien on the
property of the insolvent railroad company.
But the doctrine of these cases has no application to this case. They rest on the peculiar character of railroad property and of a
railroad corporation. The distinction between
railroad corporations, which are of a quasi
public character, and purely private corporations, has been often pointed out, and need
not be repeated here. It is enough to say
that the supreme court Itself has said that
the doctrine of the cases cited has only been
applied in railroad cases. In Wood v. SafeDeposit Co., 128 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. 131, the
court said: "The doctrine of Fosdick v. Schall
has never yet been applied in any case exThe case lays great
cept that of a raikoad.
emphasis upon the consideration that a railroad is a peculiar property, of a public nature,

Ct

and discharging a great public work. There
is a broad distinction between such a case
We do
and that of a purely private concern.
not imdertake to decide the question here,
but only point it out."
The bill in this case is one to foreclose a
To such a bill the prior
second mortgage.
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mortgagees

are

not

even

necessary

parties.

Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734.
The validity and priority of tlie liens of tbe mortgages under which the appellants claimed is
distinctly admitted in the original and amended bills.
The pm^jose of filing the amended
bill making the prior mortgagees defendants
seems to have been to enjoin them from foreclosing their mortgages, and subject the lands
covered by their mortgages to a prior lien for
money borrowed to carry on the business of
the corporation
and improve its lands.
It
prays that the receiver may be empowered to
manage and operate the property of the insolvent corporation, which consists in irrigating, improving, and colonizing,
or settling,
arid lands; and,, to the end that the receiver
may not be interfered with in the conduct of
the business, it prays that the holders of all
mortgages prior to the complainants'
may be
enjoined from foreclosing
the same.
The
amended bill would seem to be founded on the
theory that a private corporation conducting
any kind of business may, when it becomes
insolvent, obtain immunity from the compulsory payment of its debts by procuring a
junior mortgagee, or some other creditor, to
file a bill alleging the insolvency of the corporation, and praying for the appointment of a
receiver with authority to manage and conduct
Upon the filing of such a bill,
its business.
it is supposed to be competent for the court,
in addition to appointing a receiver to carry
on the business of the corporation, to enjoin
its creditors, including the holders of the prior
from collecting their
liens on its property,
debts by due course of law, and to continue
such injunction in force so long as the court,
in its discretion, sees fit to carry on the busiWhen a reness of the insolvent corporation.
ceiver is appointed under such a bill, he usually makes haste, as the receiver did in this
case, to assure the court that, if he only had
some capital to start on, he could greatly benefit the estate by carrying on the business that
bankrupted the corporation.
In this case, the
its property
company
being insolvent, and
mortgaged for more than it was worth, there
was no way of raising money to set the receiver up in business, except by the court giving Its obligations, in the form of receiver's
certificates,
and making them a paramount
lien on all the property of the corporation, by
displacing the appellants' prior liens thereon.
As commonly happens in cases of this character, the receiver, the insolvent corporation,
and the junior mortgagee united in urging the
court to arm its receiver with the desired powThe corers. They ran no risk in so doing.
poration was insolvent, and a foreclosure of
the prior mortgage would leave the junior
mortgagee without any security; so that it
had nothing to lose, and everything to gain,
in experiments to enhance the value of the
mortgaged property,
so long as the cost of
those experiments was made a prior lien thereon. The effect of the proceeding was to burden the prior mortgagee with the whole cost

of the expenditures and experiments made for
the betterment of the property on the petition,
and for the benefit of the insolvent corporation
and the junior mortgagee.
The representation
is always made, in such cases, that the receiver can carry on the business much more
successfully
than was done by the insolvent
corporation.
This commonly proves to be an
error.
Raht v. Attrill, 106 N. Y. 430, 13 N.
E. 282. But, if It were true, it would afford
no ground of equitable jurisdiction, for it is
not a function of a court of equity to carry on
the business of private corporations,
whether

solvent or insolvent.
It is obvious that if the
holders of the first mortgages and the other
creditors of the insolvent corporation were allowed to proceed, in the customary and lawful
mode, to collect their debts, it would put an
end to the business of the receiver, and they
are therefore enjoined from foreclosing their
mortgages or collecting their debts. The chancery court thus assumes, in effect, all the powers and jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy
or insolvency, but without any bankrupt or
Insolvent law to guide or direct it in the administration of the estate. Its only guide is that
varying and unknown quantity caUed "judicial
discretion."
The powers claimed for a court
of equity in such cases are, indeed, much
greater than a court of bankruptcy can exercise. There never was a bankrupt court, under any bankrupt act, authorized, at its discretion, to displace or nullify valid liens on
the bankrupt's property,
or Itself to create
liens paramount
thereto.
The rights of the
citizen, lawfully acquired by contract, are under the protection of the constitution
of the
United States, and, like the absolute rights of
the citizen, are not dependent for their existence or continuance
upon the discretion
of
any court whatever.
Constitutional rights and
obligations are no more dependent on the discretion of the chancellor than they are on the
"Rights," says
discretion of the legislature.
the supreme court of the United States, "under our system of law and procedure, do not
rest in the discretionary authority of any officer, judicial or otherwise."
In re Parker, 131
U. S. 221, 9 Sup. Ct. 708. If junior lien creditors of an insolvent private corporation could
do what has been attempted in this case, every
private corporation operating a sawmill, gristmill, mine, factory, hotel, elevator, irrigating
ditches, or carrying on any other business pursuit, would speedily seek the protection of a
chancery court, and those courts would soon
be conducting the business of all the insolvent
private corporations in the country.
If it were
once settled that a chancery court, through a
receiver appointed on the petition of a junior
mortgagee, could carry on the business of such
Ihsolvent corporations at the risk and expense
of those holding the first or prior liens on the
property of the corporation, such liens would
have little or no value.
It is no part of the
duty of a court of equity to conduct the busiprivate corporations,
ness of Insolvent
any
more than it is to carry on the business of
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Insolvent natural persons.
If It may take under Its control the property ot an insolvent
private corporation, and authorize a receiver
to carry on its business, and maize the debts
incurred by the receiver in so doing paramount
liens on aU the property of the corporation,
and enjoin its credltora in the meantime from
collecting their debts, it is not perceived why
it may not proceed in the same way with the
estate of an insolvent natural person.
Without pursuing the subject further, we refer to what is said, and to the cases cited, in
Scott V. Trust Co., 10 C. C. A. 358, 69 Fed.
17.
The order appealed from is void, whether
the suit In which it was made is treated as
one tQ foreclose a second mortgage, or as a
bill in equity to administer the estate of an
insolvent corporation.
It was open to the complainant to take and execute a decree foreclosing its second mortgage, and it is good practice in such cases to require this to be done,
And if the
on pain of dismissing the bill.
complainant desired that money be spent, beyond the income of the property, in carrying
on the business of the corporation or improving the mortgaged property, it was at liberty to furnish the means for that purpose;
but It had no equity to asli that the expense
and the hazards of doing so should be saddled
on the first mortgagee, and the court had no
jurisdiction or power to place it there.
Taxes are the first and paramount lien on
all property, and must be paid. When taxes
are due on property In the hands of a receiver,
and he has no funds to pay them, the court
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authorize him to borrow money for that
and maize the obligation given for the
money so borrowed a prior lien on the property on which the taxes were due. This is not
fixing a new or additional lien on the property, or displacing any prior lien. It is simply changing the form of the lien from one
for taxes to one for money borrowed to pay
the taxes.
The order and decree of the circuit court
appealed from, which authorizes the receiver
to borrow money to "be used and applied by
said receiver for the purpose of preservhig the
property of the Denver Land & Water-Storage Company in his possession and custody,
and carrying out and maintaining the contracts of the company, now in existence, under and by which the company has heretofore
sold tracts of land to various parties, which
said contracts are referred to in the report of
said receiver, and for such other purposes as
are set out in said petition with reference to
the maintenance, preservation,
and protection
of the property of the company," and which
authorizes the receiver to issue his certificates
of indebtedness for the money borrowed for
these purposes, and makes such certificates of
indebtedness the fi*st and paramount lien "upon all the property, rights, and franchises now
owned or controlled by the said the Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company," Is void, in
so far as it makes the certificates issued by
the receiver a first and paramount lien on the
lands embraced in the mortgages of the appellants, and is therefore reversed.

will

PTu:pose,
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HOWARTH V. ELLWANGBR.
SAME
KENT.
SAME v. WOODWORTH.
(86 Fed.

v.

54.)

Circuit Court, N. D. New York.

Marcli 31,

1898.

Nob. 3,211-3,213.

At

Law.

Tried by the court.

These actions are brought against the defendants who were stoeliholders of the Traders' Bank of Tacoma, Wash., to enforce a liability created by the law of that state making them individually responsible equally and
ratably to the extent of their stock for all
debts of the bank while they remained stockThe plaintiff is a citizen of Washholders.
ington residing at Tacoma. The defendants
are citizens of New York residing at Rochester. On the 19th day of May, 1894, the plaintiff was appointed receiver of the Traders'
Bank by an order of the superior court of
Washington made in an action commenced
against said bank by Henry Hewett, Jr., and
George Browne In which it was adjudged
that the bank had suspended business and
was Insolvent.
The plaintiff duly qualified as
receiver and has since acted as such.
On the
12th of September, 1894, the court made an
order in said action permitting certain stockholders to Intervene for the benefit of themselves and all other stockholders of the bank.
On the 20th of October aU the defendants, except Chauncey B. Woodworth, were by order
of the court upon their own petition made
After applying all
parties to the said action.
the property of the bank to the payment of
its debts there remained a deficiency, which,
on March 17, 1897, was adjusted and adjudged by the court to be the sum of $131,670.
The plaintiff was thereupon directed by the
court to levy upon the stockholders an assessment of 26.34 per cent and bring suit against
who, after demand, refusthose stockholders
ed to pay.
The amounts assessed against the
were duly demanded
respectively
defendants
and payment thereof refused.

P. M. French, for plaintiff.
Charles M. Williams, for

defendant

Ell-

wanger.

M. H. McMath, for defendant Kent.
William F. Cogswell, for defendant Woodworth.

COXE, District Judge. It Is not disputed
that the defendants were stockholders of the
Traders' Bank, that the bank became insolvent, that the plaintiff was appointed receiver, that a large deficiency
was ascertained,
that an assessment was levied by the receiver upon the defendants and that all this was
done under and pursuant to the constitution
and laws of Washington and In conformity
to the orders and decrees of the superior court
of that state.
The first proposition argued by the defend-

ants is that the plaintiff, as receiver. Is not
entifled to maintain the action.
The constitution and statutes of Washington (Const,
art 12, § 11) provide: "That each stockholder
of any banking • • * association shall
be Invidually and personally liable, equally
and ratably, and not one for another, for all
the contracts, debts and engagements of such
corporation or association
accruing while
they remain stockholders to the extent of the
amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof. In addition to the amount invested
in such shares."
The courts of Washington have decided
that this liability can only be enforced by a
receiver tmder the direction of the court
Cole V. Raihroad Co., 9 Wash. 487, 37 Pac.
700; Wilson v. Book, 13 Wash. 676, 43 Pac.
939; Hardin v. Sweeney, 14 Wash. 129, 44
Pac. 138; Watterson v. Masterson, 15 Wash.
511, 46 Pac. 1041.
The practical effect of a
ruling that a receiver cannot maintain the
suit woTild be to render the law nugatory as
to all but resident stocKholders.
The Washington courts having ruled that a receiver
only can bring the suit it Is manifest, should
the federal courts and other state courts hold
that he cannot maintain the action, that the
defendants not only but all stockholders
beyond the jurisdiction of the Washington
courts will escape a liability Intended to be
tmiform and for the benefit of all the creditors. The precise question was Involved In
Sheafe v. Larimer (C. C.) 79 Fed. 921, and
was answered adversely to the defendants'
contention.
The case arose imder the same
law, and, upon the facts, was almost Identical
See, also, Schultz v.
with the case In hand.
Insurance Co. (C. C.) 77 Fed. 375, 387; Avery V. Trust Co. (C. C.) 72 Fed. 700; Pailey v.
Talbee (C. C.) 55 Fed. 892.
Again It is argued that the orders and decrees of the Washington court were not binding upon the defendants, and in support of
this view various alleged defects in the proceedings are pointed
out The defendants
Kent and BUwanger were parties to the
Washington action and are therefore In no
position to attack the judgment of the court
in a collateral proceeding.
The defendant
Woodworth was not a party. But whether
parties or not the law seems clear that the
stockholders are boimd by the order making
Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U.
the assessment.
In Sheafe v. Larimer,
S. 319, 9 Sup. Ct 739.
supra, the court says: "In this case It must
be held that it is not open to the defendant
to question the validity of the assessment order, on the ground that the stockholders
were

not personally notified of the application for
the order, or for the reason that the stockholders should not have been assessed until
the other assets of the corporation had been
wholly exhausted."
The actions are not barred by the statute
of limitations for the reason that the cause of
action did not accrue to the receiver prior to
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and that was not made until
March 17, 1897. The actions were commen■ced two months thereafter.
It follows that the plaintiff Is entitled to
■the assessment
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judgment as demanded in the complaints, respectively, with interest at the rate of 6 ppr
cent, per annum from May 18, 1897, and
costs.
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WYMAN
(77 N. W.
Supreme

V.
865,

BATON

et al.

Court of Iowa.

Jan.

20,

company In the stite of Iowa
and the state of Nebraska, to be organized in
both states separately, and after the organization to be consolidated, to be known as the
Iowa and Nebraska State Insurance Company,
for the purpose of carrying fire and lightning,
windstorm and tornado, insurance, business
to be done under the laws of both states, do
hereby subscribe and agree to pay and secure
as provided by the laws of said states the
several
sums
set opposite
our respective
names, if such an insurance
organization
is
perfected, and on demand, to the secretary
thereof, on or before the 12th day of March,
1883."
Under this subscription,
shares of
stock of $100 each were issued to the sabscribing stockholders, one-half of such shares
being issued to them in the Iowa company,
and one-half in the Nebraska company.
The
defendants paid 50 per cent, of their several
subscriptions upon the stock of the Nebraska
& Iowa Insurance Company at the time of its
organization,
as required by the laws of the
Nothing more was ever
state of Nebraska.
paid upon the stock except in the manner indicated hereafter.
The defendants In this action, who had been subscribers to the capital
company, and to
stock of the consolidated
whom had been issued the Joint certificates of
stock in the Iowa and Nebraska companies,
had surrendered their stock, and new stock
had been issued to the parties purchasing
from them. These purchasers, as the' record
shows, were in large part the original proUpon the organizamoters of the company.
tion of the company, one-half of the capital
stock subscribed being paid in cash, the promissory notes of the subscribers, payable on demand and secured, were given in payment of
the other one-half of the stock of the corporation.
Prior to 1887, these defendants had
transferred the stock issued to them, by a surrender of their stock, and reissuance of other
the company
certificates
to the purchasers;
the
accepting the surrender, and recognizing
transfer, returning the stock notes of the defendants, and accepting the stock notes of the
This was done, as
transferee In lieu thereof.
shown by the record, at a time when the corporation was solvent, and the transfers were
made and new stock issued to solvent purchasers; all being done In good faith on the
part of the corporation, the transferror, and
Practically, the entire stock
the transferees.
passed into the hands of a syndicate composed in large part of original promoters of the
corporation,
consolidated
but not including
any of these defendants.
From the date of
ceased to
these transfers, these defendants
have any connection with or control over the
corporation.
The district court entered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed.
Cor an insurance

107 Iowa, 214.)
1899.

Appeal from district court, Pottawattamie
county;
Walter I. Smith, Judge.
As a statement of facts, we bave taken the
following substantially from those made by
counsel:
This was an action brought by Albert U. Wyman, the receiver of the Nebraska
Fire Insurance Company, to enforce against
the several defendants their constitutional liability under the Nebraska statute for their
unpaid subscriptions to the capital stock of
This company was incorporatthe company.
ed on March 13, 1883, in conformity with the
laws of the state of Nebraska, under the
name of the Nebraska & Iowa Insurance
Company,
its name being subsequently,
on
February 28, 1800, changed to the Nebraska
Fire Insurance Company, under which name
it transacted business until its insolvency, in
for its dissolution
1891, when an application
by W. G. Madden, one of its stockholders, reof the plaintiff,
sulted In the appointment
first, as temporary, and then as permanent,
receiver of the corporation, and a decree adjudging the dissolution thereof.
The testimony shows that one J. T. Hart, of Council
Bluffs, was largely instrumental in the organization of the company;
that the subscribers
to its stock and the original stockholders were
citizens prominent in Omaha and in Council
Bluffs; and that when this company, the Nebraska & Iowa Insurance Company, was organized, there was organized at the same time,
mainly through the instrumentality of Mr.
Hart, anotber insurance company, called the
Iowa & Nebraska Insurance Company, and
having its principal place of business at Council Bluffs, Iowa.
The original intention oi
the organizers, as gathered from the testimony of Mr. Hart, and the contract of subscription, was to consolidate the two companies
This, however, was
after their organization.
being opernever done, the two corporations
ated separately
in each state, although the
stockholders
The
were at first the same.
Iowa corporation did business until about May
29, 1885, when it was merged into a company
known as the Western Home of Sioux City,
and went into the hands of a receiver.
The
capital of each company was $100,000, and
the certificates
of stock contemplated
subscriptions to both companies, and were signed, as appears, by ofBcers of each company.
The stock was originally issued in this duplicate or combined form. These combined certificates were subsequently canceled, and were
separately
rewritten and issued. The contract of subscriptions of the several defendants to the stock of the two companies, and
upon which it is claimed that the defendants
herein are answerable for the unpaid 50 per
aent. thereof, is as follows:
"We, the undersigned subscribers hereto, in consideration
of
3ach other's subscription
to the capital stock

B. & A. C. Wakley

and Flickinger Bros.,
& McCabe, Finley
Burke, Wright & Baldwin, Sanders & Stuart,
John Y. Stone, and C. R. Marks, for appellees.

for appellant

Harl
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GRANGER, J. It wIU be weU to repeat
that this action Is by a receiver appointed to
wind up the affairs of the Nebraslca Fire Insurance Company, on the application of one
of its stockholders, to recover from the defendants on their subscriptions to' the original
enterprise, wherein was contemplated the organization of two companies,— one in Nebraska, to be known as the Nebraska & Iowa Insurance Company, and one in Iowa, to be
known as the Iowa & Nebraslsa Insurance
Company; the two companies to be thereafter consolidated.
The first-named company
was organized under the laws of Nebraska,
and located at the city of Omaha, in that
state; and the latter under the laws of Iowa,
and located at the city of Council Bluffs, In
The consolidation was never made,
Iowa.
and the latter company was changed to that
of the Western Home of Sioux City, and its
place of business changed to Sioux City,
The Nebraska &
Iowa, about May, 1885.
Iowa Company was changed to the Nebraska
Fire Insurance Company, and continued to
operate until 1891, when the insurance department of Nebraska withdrew Its certificates authorizing the company to do business,
and, on the application of one of its stockholders, its insolvency was decreed; and the
plaintiff is now engaged in winding up Its
affairs, and this action Is in aid of that
purpose.

The action has for a legal basis a provision
constitution of Nebraska, as follows
(section 4, art. 11): "Liabilities of Subscribers
to Stock.
In all cases of claims against corporations and joint-stock associations, the exact amount due shall be first ascertained,
and after the corporate property shall have
original subscribers
exhausted,
been
the
thereof shall be individually liable to the extent of their unpaid subscriptions, and the
liability for unpaid subscriptions shall follow
the stock." Dismissing for the moment the
effect of an arbitrary legal liability, which
must be respected and enforced when linown,
there Is not, in view of the entire record in
this case, an equitable consideration favorable
The
to a recovery against these defendants.
present liabilities of the Nebraska corporation
cannot truthfully be said to have accrued In
of, or with reliance upon, the
consequence
former connection of these defendants with
the enterprise from which sprang the present
These facts are important as aidcompany.
ing in the solution of a legal proposition, urged by apflellees, to the effect that this action
cannot be maintained in Iowa, because it Is
brought by a receiver of a Nebraska corporation to enforce a provision of the law of that
state; the claim being that such a proceeding
can only be bad as a result of comity between the states, and that the basis of such
an exercise Is that the citizens of the state
granting it shaU not be thereby prejudiced or
Admitting, for the sake of arguInjured.
ment, the rule that comity controls as to the
authority of plaintiff to sue in this state, and.
of the
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as we have In effect said, the record leaves us
without doubt that its exercise should be denied, because it would be in contravention of
the rights of our citizens, and operate to their

injury.
Upon the question of the absolute right of
plaintiff to sue in this state, we are not without precedent in our own decisions; and while,
in announcing a rule, we have recognized the
fact of a conflict of authority, we are not persuaded by the argument in this case that a
change should be made, or the rule modified.
Stress is given in argument to the fact that
the order of appointment in Nebraska gives
to the receiver authority to bring suits in
other states. That authority is valuable as an
aid to secure the right to do so In the state
where the privilege is sought and is judiciously granted; but it is without efliciency to
of sanction
create such a right independent
within the state. The case of Booth v. Clark,
17 How. 321, contains a somewhat exhaustive
consideration
of the question of the right of
a receiver appointed in one state to bring a
suit for the possession of property in another
state, and It Is there said: "He has no extraterritorial power of otllcial action; none
which the court appointing him can confer,
with authority to enable him to go into a foreign jurisdiction to take possession of the
debtor's property; none which can give, upon
the principle of comity, a privilege to sue In a
foreign court or another jurisdiction, as the
judgment creditor himself might have done,
where his debtor may be amenable to the
An
tribunal which the creditor may seek."
underlying thought of the rule seems to be
that, within the jurisdiction of one's appointment as receiver, he Is amenable in his official
capacity to the courts, and he may exercise
his authority under the law of the jurisdiction; while, in a foreign jurisdiction, the law
does no more than to make the person entering it amenable to its laws, and in no way
As a citizen
recognizes the official capacity.
In a jurisdiction foreign to his residence, he
has a legal status, and is amenable to, and
may Invoke the protection of, the law. As an
officer of a court from a foreign jurisdiction,
Ke has, and is entitled to, no legal recognition,
except as the courts may. In their discretion,
grant it, because he Is without the official obligation that he assumed In his own jurisdiction, and which is essential to a proper
In Ayres v.
and safe exercise of such power.
Siebel, 82 Iowa, 347, 47 N. W. 989, we denied
the right of a trustee, appointed by the court
in Indiana, to sue and recover on a contract in
this state; and in Parker v. Lamb & Sons,
99 Iowa, 265, 68 N. W. 686, we denied such a
right to a receiver, and cited the Ayres-Slebel
In Parker v. Lamb & Sons, we quoted
Case.
approvingly from High, Bee. § 289, as fol"Upon the question of the territorial
lows:
extent of a receiver's jurisdiction and power
for the purpose of Instituting actions connectthe prevailing doeed with his receivership,
trine established by the supreme court of the
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United States, and sustained toy the weight
of authority in Tarious states, Is that the receiver has no extraterritorial jurisdiction or
power of official action, and cannot go into a
foreign state or jurisdiction, and there institute a suit for the recovery of demands due
the person or estate suhjeet to his receivership.
His functions and powers, for the purpose of litigation, are held to be limited to the
courts of the state in which he was appointed;
and the principles of comity between states
and nations which recognize the judicial decisions of one tribunal as conclusive on another do not apply to such a case, and will
not warrant a receiver In bringing an action
These
in a foreign court or jurisdiction."
authorities are broad and conclusive, and, unless we are to set them aside, are conclusive
of this case. Counsel have shown great zeal

and tact in presenting authorities more or less
In point, and we acknowledge somewhat of
a conflict, as we have done in other cases; but
the weight of authority we regard as in line
with our holdings, and we are not disposed to
Beach on Receivers (section
disturb them.
680)

states the same rule, and cites Booth

v.

Clark, supra, from which we have quoted,
and then says: "The rule thus laid down by
the supreme court of the United States has
been followed by other courts with essential
unanimity, and can hardly be said to be seriously questioned."
In Fitzgerald v. Construction Co. (Neb.) 59 N. W. 838. these authorities are approvingly cited and applied.
It remains for us to state as a conclusion that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover in the courts
of Iowa, and the Judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.
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this hearing. The recital thus given shows
that, in an order inverted from what would
he expected, we have before us a cause in
(44 Fed. 721.)
Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana. Januai? 8, which a party who has sold and delivered a
business to another, and become his agent,
1891.
and, as such agent, was in possession of the
In Equity.
property sold, sets up a possession adverse
T. J. Semmes and Bayne, Denegre & to
his principal, asks for a cancellation of the
Bayne, for complainant.
sale, and the purchaser and principal asks
W. S. Benedict and Rouse & Grant, for
that the agent shall account, shall be endefendants.
joined from asserting any claim hostile to his
Before PARDEE, Circuit Judge, and BILprincipal,— In a word, for a confirmation of
LINGS, District Judge.
Its rights under the purchase.
The immediate question before us la, what
PER CURIAM. This cause Is submitted disposition shall be made of the res, the
upon an application for a receiver. Some
business
of the bakery and manufactory,
time in May last, the defendant Klotz, and
pending this contest?
The vendor and agent
Fitzpatrick, his partner, composing the firm
asks that he be allowed to remain in ad«f B. Klotz & Co., sold to the complainant
verse possession.
The purchaser and principal asks for a receiver.
their biscuit and confectionery manufactory
It is clear that,
for the price of $259,000, and an assumption as to this provisional disposition of the res,
of the debts of B. Klotz & Co., amounting to the defendant Klotz cannot be allowed to
gain anything by his ouster of his vendee
$42,000, which It was understood and agreed
should be paid out of the income from the
and principal.
He must stand with those
equities, and none other, which existed befuture business. The visible property was
estimated to be of the value of $101,000, and
fore the ouster.
The case as to the appointthe good-will of the business to be of the
ment of a receiver must be reviewed and
value of $200,000.
determined -as if he (Klotz) had filed his bill
The price was paid In
averring possession as agent, which he askstock of the complainant's corporation, esed to have changed by a decree into a postimated to be of value at par; that is, to be
session as owner, through the cancellation
worth 100 cents on the face value. The ptu*of the sale and the lease; that is, he must
chase was completed, price paid, property delivered, the factory and good-will transferred
aver a legal title in the American Biscuit &
by Klotz & Co. to the complainant.
Klotz Manufacturing Company, which he seeks to
leased his bakery premises to complainant
have avoided and annulled. If, as in this
for the term of years, and contracted in writ- case, he seeks to do all this by reason of
fraud, and he establishes the fraud, a court
ing to become, and did become, the agent of
per of equity will not refuse to hear him.
the complainant, at a salary of $
He
year. Klotz continued to carry on the bu^- would not be estopped, for fraud vitiates and
ness as agent for the complainant down to
sets aside even estoppels.
Herm. Estop, par.
22, p. 244; Pendleton v. Rlchey, 32 Pa. 58,
some time in November, when he repudiated
the sale and the lease, erased the name of 63. But, while he is not estopped from procomplainant
from the bakery, as agent,
ceeding to set aside the sale and the lease
transferred the policies of insurance from the by reason of his agency and his obligations
complainant to himself, as an Individual, then
as trustee, he comes into coiu:t assailing and
seeking to cancel a legal title; for until that
to B. Klotz & Co., and, for and in the name
of the late firm, resumed the possession of is done his possession is that of the complainant.
Under these circumstances, until
all the property he had sold to the comthe hearing, the practice in the courts of
plainant, and the conduct of the business of
chancery is not to disturb the possession unthe bakery and the confectionery establishHe did this without resort to any der the legal title prior to the final decree,
ment.
He thereafter held pos- imless a case of monstrous wrong is establegal proceedings.
StilweU V. Wilkins, Jac. 280, reportlished.
and exsession adversely to the complainant,
cluded it from the bakery. In this state of ed in full in Edwards on Receivers, p. 28,
Lord Eldon, when a similar question was
things, the complainant filed its bill fOT an
presented, observed:
"The point that struck
Injunction, and for an account and for a reme was whether, on a bill to Impeach a sale
ceiver, against Klotz and W. A. Schall, who
for fraud, the court Interposes so strongly
was alleged to be co-operating with him In
before the hearing as to take away the posthe possession adverse to the complainant.
Klotz has filed an answer, and he, together session from persons holding It under the
with his former partner, Fitzpatrick, who effect of deeds not yet set aside by decree,"
Intervened by petition pro interesse suo, have —and he holds that "it was not the general
habit of the court" There the case was so
filed a cross-bill asking a rescission of the
monstrous, and the proof was so strong, that
entire transaction, 1. e., the sale and the
"It was hardly possible that the transaction
lease, and tendering the stock which had
could stand," and the legal title was interbeen received by them as the consideration
of the sale. Numerous exhibits and afllda- fered with.
This is a leading case, and gives what we
vits have been adduced by each party upon

KLOTZ

&
et al.

v.
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find is the rule. The possession under the
title Is not disturbed unless the proof of
fraud is so strong as to lead the court to the
clear conviction that it will, on the final
hearing, be established.
The fraud set up
and relied upon by the defendant and intervenor is false and fraudulent representations by the agents of the complainant In
this: that they represented that the stock
was fully paid-up stock, whereas, in truth
and fact, it was none of it paid up in money,
and only paid up in part, and, to the extent
of that part, by transfer of plants or bakeries
and manufactories at an estimated value as
capital. The stock delivered to the defendant and intervener was not paid up until it
was issued to them, and was paid for by a
transfer of the bakery and good-will; and
then it became paid up, and they were discharged from all liability to be made to eonThe testribute as shareholders therefor.
timony as to what was represented by complainant's agents about the stock being paid
up is conflicting; but, when viewed in connection with the circumstances under which
the stock was received, fails to satisfy us,
upon this preliminary hearing, that any false
to have been
i-epresentations
are proved
made.
The case of the defendant and intervener,
set up in their cross-bill, whereby
they oppose the appointment of a receiver, is
that of parties who seek to rescind a deed
on the ground of fraud, which upon this
hearing they fail to establish.
So far we have considered the question of
appointing a receiver of the property in controversy inter partes, and mainly from the
by the defendant's
stand-point presented
showing, and thereon such appointment seems
proper, and we should accord it, but for an
aspect of the case originally suggested by
the defendant, when the case was pending in
the state court, apparently abandoned here,
but sufficiently brought to our notice by the
exhibits of both parties. We are not satisfied
that the complainant's business is legitimate.
While the nominal purpose of the complainant's corporation, as stated in its charter. Is
the manufacture and sale of biscuit and confectionery, its real scope and purpose seems
to be to combine

and pool the large

compet-

ing bakeries throughout the country into
practically what is known and called a
"trust," the effect of which is to partially, if
not wholly, prevent competition, and enhance
prices of necessary articles of food, and secure, if not a monopoly, a large control, of the
supply and prices in leading articles of breadstufCs. The case shows that an insignificant
number of shares of complainant's stock was
unconditionally subscribed for, apparently
enough to qualify directors; but the great
mass was taken and held by Irresponsible
parties, to be used in parceling out as fullpaid stock to such leading and successful
bakeries throughout the country as could be
induced to come in on an agreed value of the
property and a large estimate of good-wiU.

£:ach bakery when secured to be carried on
by its former managers, subject, however, as
to control of fimds, territory, prices, and
competition, to the central management;
all
profits pooled, and of course division thereof
to be made on the basis of the stock assigned to each bakery.
Under this arrangement
complainant has already secured the control,
and pooled the business, of 35 of the leading
bakeries in ]2 different states of the West
and South, and is evidently seeking more constituents. The act of congress approved July
2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and
commerce against unlawful
restraints and
expressly prohibits, under semonopolies,"
vere penalties, "every contract, combination,
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
pimishable
\b.e several states," and declares
"every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the common trade or comThe enmerce among the several states."
forcement of this act is, by the statute, devolved upon the circuit courts of the United
States.
The first and third sections of an act
of the legislature of Louisiana, approved July
5, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and
against unlawful restraints and
commerce
monopolies, and to provide penalties for the
violation of this act," declare:
"Section 1. That every contract, combination in the form of trust, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, or to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any article,
commodity, or merchandise to be manufactured, mined, produced, or sold in this state, is
hereby declared illegal."
"Sec. 3. That every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons to monopolize, any part of the trade
or commerce within the limits of this state,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by a. fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court."
In construing the federal and state statutes, we exclude from consideration all monopolies which exist by legislative grant; for
we think the word "monopolize" cannot be
intended to be used vrith reference to the
acquisition of exclusive rights under government concession, but that the law-maker has
used the word to mean "to aggregate" or

"concentrate" in the hands of few, practically, and, as a matter of fact, and according to
the known results of human action, to the
exclusion of others; to accomplish this end
by what, in popular language, is expressed in
the word "pooling," which may be defined
to be an aggregation of property or capital
belonging to different persons, with a view to
common liabilities and profits.
The expression in each law "combinatioa in the form
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trust" would seem to point to just what
in popular language, is meant by pooling.
Now it is to be observed that these statutes outline an offense, but require for its
complete commission no ulterior motive, such
as to defraud, etc.; and, further, that the
language is altogether silent as to what
means must be used to constitute the offense.
The offense Is defined to "combine in the
form of trust, or otherwise. In restraint of
trade or commerce," and "to monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, any of the trade or
commerce."
To compass
either of these
things, with no other motive than to compass
them, and by any means, constitutes the offense.
One just and decisive test of the
meaning of the expression "to monopolize"
is obtained by getting at the evil which the
law-maker has endeavored to abolish and restrict. The statutes show that the evil was
the hindrance and oppression in trade and
in the
commerce wrought by its absorption
hands of the few, so that the prices would be
in danger of being arbitrstrily and exorbitantly fixed, because all competition would be
-swallowed up, so that the man of small
means would find himself excluded from the
restrained or monopolized trade or commerce
as absolutely as if kept out by law or force.
If this is the meaning of the defining words,
does not this corporation, thus glutted with
the 35 industries of 12 states, disclose an
"attempt to monopolize?" So far, therefore,
AS the complainant's business is a combination in restraint of trade, or Is an "attempt
or combine, in the form of a
to monopolize,
trust, or otherwise, any part of trade or commerce," as these words are properly defined,
the law stamps it as unlawful, and the courts
should not encourage it. Aside from tnis, the
complainant's business, even if lawful, being
■of the kind shown above, is not of that meritorious kind that it should be encouraged by

•of

893

The appointment of a receiver by a court of equity is not a matter
of strict right, but of judicial discretion. Fosdlck V. SchaU, 80 U. S. 235. It falls within
that class of interlocutory remedies which
courts must grant or withhold, according to
a discretion conscientiously exercised, upon a
consideration of all the facts which a cause
presents, involving the rights of the parties
and the Interests of the public. The attempt
to accumulate in the hands of a single organization the business of supplying bread
itself to so large a portion of the poor, as
well as the rich, people of the United States
should not be favored by a court of equity.
It carries with it too much of danger of excluding healthy competition, thereby Increasing the difliculty to the general public of
participating in a most useful business, as
well as adding to the possibility of multitudes of citizens being temporarily, at least,
compelled to pay an arbitrary and high price
for daily food.
"Whatever we may feel compelled to do, on
the final hearing of this cause, towards recognizing the complainant's legal rights, and
compelling a faithless trustee to account, we
are clear that at this preliminary stage, with
our present impressions of the character and
general scope of complainant's business, the
court ought not, by the appointment of a reand
ceiver, to aid complainant to perfect,
perhaps to enlarge, his combination or trust;
and the refusal to appoint a receiver can result in no serious and lasting injury to complainant, because the shares of stock of complainant company, forming the entire consideration of complainant's purchase, have been
tendered in court, and may be Impounded,
to be held as security for any damages susceptible of proof resulting from defendant's
mismanagement of the property pending the
suit. The motion for a receiver is denied.
a court of equity.
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HAYWOOD

et

al t.

LINCX>LN
CO. et al.

LUMBER.

(26 N. W. 184, 64 Wis. 639.)
Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.

Dec 23,

1885.

Appeal from circuit court, lincoln county.
Pullings, Hoyt & Holway and D. S. Ordway, for appellants Murray Haywood and
Silverthorn, Hurley & Ryan, for
another.
respondents Lincoln Lumber Co. and others.

ORTON, J. This is an action brought by
the appellants to foreclose a mortgage given
by the defendant lumber company, by its
president

and

secretary,

lants and the defendant

to

the

said

appel-

T. P. Matthews and

G. Smith, on the fourth day of
February, 1884, on all of the real property of
said corporation, to secure a bond In the penal
sum of $100,000, given at the same time by
said company, to said mortgagees, conditioned to pay them certain indebtedness of the
in the
company past due them, respectively,
The Interest in
aggregate of over $50,000.
said mortgage of said George 0. Smith was
The defendant
assigned to said plaintiffs.
Robert C. Parcher was appointed receiver in
April, 1884, in a suit of one .T. C. Clark
against said company; and said Parcher, as
such receiver, in June, 1884, loaned of the' defendant the First National Bank of the City
of Wausau the sum of $10,000, to be used in
the management of the business and property
and, by the order
of said lumber company;
and leave of the court, executed, as such receiver, a mortgage upon the real property of
said company to said bank to seciu-e the
The said defendant Parcher and the
same.
defendant the Lincoln Lumber Company answered the complaint, alleging, substantially,
that the said mortgage sought to be foreclosed
was executed by the president and secretary
and
of said company,
without authority;
that, at the time, said corporation was insolvent, to the knowledge
of said mortgagees,
and owed large Indebtedness to others; and
that said mortgage was given by said officers, and authorized, if at all, by the directors
of said company to be given to themselves,
to secure their own claims against the company, as an unlawful and fraudulent preferas the creditors
of the
ence of themselves
in fraud and with intent to decompany,
fraud the other creditors and the company,
and that said bond and mortgage were thereThe said defendant the National
fore void.
Bank answered, setting up its mortgage by
the receiver, and alleging its priority to the
mortgage
in suit by the agreement of the
mortgagees
in said mortgage, and prays a
The circuit court subforeclosure
thereof.
stantially held that said mortgage was given
without authority, because the majority of
the quorum of the directors voting that said
bond and mortgage be given were interested
in the same, and that said company was then
and that the directors held the
inlelrent;
one George

property In trust for the creditors, and theexecution of said mortgage by the officers and
by the authority of the directors to themselves
to secure
their antecedent
claims
against the company was an unlawful preference, and was fraudulent and void; and that
the said mortgage to the bank has priority,
and was lawfully executed by said receiver.
The special findings are numerous, and the
case voluminous;
but the above are believed
to be substantially the findings, and upon the
substantial issues in the case.
The principles involved in this suit are
really very simple, and almost elementary,
and not at all complicated;
and we cannot
but think they have been greatly magnified
and more earnestly contested on account of
in controversy.
The plaintiffs
the amount
contest the power of the receiver, Parcher, to
give the mortgage to the bank on the ground
of the want of jurisdiction of the court to appoint him or any one receiver in the case of
These plaintiffs
Clark against the company.
were directors of the company, and one of them
the secretary, and both mortgagees, when the
such receiver,
said Parcher was appointed
and as directors and as mortgagees counseled
and consented
and advised his appointment,
thereto, and the directors over and over again
recognized and confirmed it by dealing with
him as such, and placing the property of the
company in his hands; and, after his appointment, the plaintiffs, together with the defendant Matthews, as said mortgagees, by writing under seal, authorized the said receiver to
borrow not exceeding $15,000, and give a
mortgage on the property of the company in
his hands to secure it, for the purpose of carrying on the business in running the mills
and sawing up the logs, and released their
said mortgage so far as It would have preference of the mortgage so given by the receiver, and so as to give the same priority to
There is abundant evitheir said mortgage.
dence of the plaintiffs' estoppel to dispute the
authority of said receiver, both in pais and
by deed. But accepting the allegations of the
complaint in that case as true, the court not
only had the power, but it was its duty, to
appoint a receiver. The directors and officers
had given the mortgage in suit alleged to be
in fraud of the creditors of the company,
nearly or quite insolvent af the time, and
threatened afterwards to sell out in gross all
the property of the company without notice,
and to bid the same off In their own names
and for their own benefit, in fraud of many
other creditors of the company, and in this
way to close up the business of the company.
These are some of the substantial allegations
of the complaint of Clark, the plaintiff, who
was himself one of the stockholders of the
company.
Within the general powers of a
court of chancery, which are preserved In the
fifth subdivision of section 2787, Rev. St..
this was a proper case for an Injunction and
receiver both.
The property of the company
was being mismanaged, and was in dangMr
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of being lost to the

stockholders
and creditors
through the collusion and fraud of Its officers
and directors. The only place of safety for
the business and property of the company
■was In the "hand" of the court through a receiver pendente lite.
A stronger case for a
receiver could scarcely be made, and the numerous authorities cited In the able brief of
the learned counsel of the respondents, and
the facts stated in the complaint, abundantly
authorize and justify his appointment in that
case.
We think the circuit court properly
held that the court had jurisdiction to appoint
Parcher a receiver; and, upon the evidence,
properly found that the mortgage to the bank
was not only valid, but has priority over the
mortgage in suit.
Under repeated decisions
of this court, the exceptions of the respondexcept to support
ent cannot be considered,
the judgment rendered, unless the respondent
Therefore this court cannot go
also appeal.
further than the circuit court In ordering a
foreclosure of the bank mortgage in this action.
But the matter of this bank mortgage is of
only Incidental importance in this case. The
main question is of the validity of the mortThere was abundant evidence
gage in suit
to justify the finding of the circuit court that
at the time It was given the company was inIn such case, the authorities seem to
solvent.
be uniform that the directors and officers of
the corporation are trustees of the creditors,
and must manage its property and assets
with strict regard to their interests; and, if
they are themselves creditors while the insolvent corporation is under their management, they cannot secure to themselves any
preference or advantage over other creditors.
The directors are, then, trustees of all the
property of the corporation, for all of its creditors, and an equal distribution must be made,
and no preference to any one of the creditors,
and much less to the directors or trustees, as
I have carefully examined all the ausuch.
thorities cited on both sides touching this
principle, and find it recognized in every case.
Many of the authorities cited by the learned
counsel of the appellants as holding a contrary doctrine state this doctrine as fully estabUshed, and cite many of the authorities In
Its favor cited here by the learned counsel of
the respondents, and cases are made an exception only because, in their facts, this T)rlnciple has no application. It is reiterated in
the text of elementary works, and numerous
cases are cited to sustain it Mor. Priv. Corp.
A few only of the cases holding
579-581.
this principle will be cited here, but many
others may be found in the brief of counsel
for citation.
too numerous
and elsewhere
Marr v. Bank, 4 Cold. 471, 484; Koehler v.
Iron Co., 2 Black, 715; Curran v. >4xkansas,
15 How. 306; Richards v. Insurance Co., 43
N. H. 263; Bradley v. Farwell, Holmes, 433;
Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299; Paine v. Railroad Co., 31 Ind. 353; Gas-Ught Co. v. Terhave been unable
rell, L. R. 10 Eq. 168.
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to hnd a single case, which In its facts is like
this, in which this doctrine is even questioned
and was not strictly applied.
But there is another principle equally unquestionable
which renders the mortgage in
suit void. The directors and officers made the
mortgage, or directly caused it to be made, to
They occupied a fiduciary relathemselves.
tion to the corporation, its stockholders, and
its creditors, and they had no right to use
such relation and their official position for
their own benefit, to the injury of others in
equal right
This principle was applied to
the taking of a mortgage by the directors on
the property of the corporation to secure their
liability as sureties, upon a note of the corporation, in Corbett v. Woodward, 3 Sawy.
403, Fed. Cas. No. 3,223, which is a strong
case, and very similar is the case of Koehler
V. Iron Co., supra.
See, also, Mor. Priv. Corp.
243; Hoyle v. Railroad Co., 54 N. T. 314;
Railway Co. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277; Butts v.
Wood, 38 Barb. 188; Railway Co. v. Huxon,
19 Eng. Law & Eq. 365; Scott v. Depeyster,
1 Edw. Ch. 513; and Verplanck v. Insurance
Co., Id. 85; Railway Co. v. Magnay, 25 Beav.
586; 1 Perry, Trusts, § 194, and cases cited.
But it is really unnecessary to cite cases from
abroad when the same principles have been
estabUshed in our own cases, as in Cook v.
Berlin Woolen Mills, 43 Wis. 434, and Pickett
V. School-district, 25 Wis. 553.
Directors, officers, and agents, and other
like trustees, cannot mortgage or convey to
themselves any more than one can contract
The Idea that the same perVTith himself.
different identities of themsons constitute
selves by being called directors or officers of
a corporation, so that, as directors or officers,
they can convey or mortgage to or contract
wili themselves as private persons, is in vioIn re Taylor Orlation of common sense.
phan Asylum, 36 Wis. 552, and cases above
See 1 Perry, Trusts, § 207, and Mor.
cited.
Priv. Corp. § 245; Walworth County Bank v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 16 Wis. 629;
Coal Co. V. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553.
It is unnecessary to decide the question
whether there was a quorum of disinterested
directors that directed the mortgage to be
The mortgage is an entirety, and it
given.
how many persons are
makes no difference
Interested in it as mortgagees.
severally
such mortgagees, as directors, authorized it,
they authorized an act in which they were
They may not have
all jointly interested.
been joint creditors, but they are joint mortgagees, because the mortgage as a security
is an entirety. Whether, in this view, the
mortgage was never authorized to be given by
the president and secretary of the company,
by the company through its directors, it may
not be necessary to decide; but it seems to
me rather illogical to say that, because there
is a quorum of directors who are creditors
severally, a majority of them may authoriz'
their claims to be secured by one mortg^
and do not act on their own claims, but ''
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one acts In respect to the claims of the other.
If A., B., and C. are several creditors and a
quorum of directors, and A. and B. vote to
give C. an Interest In the mortgage to secure
his claim, A. and C. so vote as to the claim
of B., and B. and C. as to the claim of A.,—
do they not vote for themselves in respect to
one mortgage?
This would be an ingenious
and convenient collusion to vote to themselves
all the property of the corporation at almost

any time, on the ground that the majority so
voting is disinterested and Impartial.
But It is very clear to us that the mortgage is void in view of the above principles,
and that disposes of the action of foreclosure.
Beyond that, the findings of the court are not
very important as to the rights of the defendants.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
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BANK

OV

FLORENCE

STATES SAVINGS
(16

South.

et al. v.
& LOAN

UNITED
00.

HO, 104 Ala. 297.)

Supreme

Court of Alabama.

-Appeal

from

Aug.

9, 1894.

district court, Lauderdale
county; w. P. Chitwood. Judge.
Suit by the United States Savings & Ijoan
Company against the Bank of Florence and
others. From a decree appoinOng a receiver, defendants appeal.
Reversed.
In addition to the aUegations of the bill,
which ai-e stated in the opinion, and upon
which is predicated the right to have the receiver appointed, the bill also averred that
the officers of the bank had, wrongfully and
without authority of its stockholders, turned
over the assets of the bank to one S. S.
Broadus, who had assumed complete control
of the same, and that he was pursuing reckless methods in disposing of the assets of
said bank.
Roulhac & Nathan and. Emmet O'Neal,
for appellants. Paul Hodges, for appellee.

BRICKBLL, 0. J. The material allegations of the original bill, on which is predicated the right to the appointment of a receiver, and the right to the ultimate equitable
relief which is prayed, are capable of being
reduced to a narrow compass.
The complainant is a corporation organized and eixisting under the laws of the state of Minnesota, having a place of business in the city
of Florence, in this state.
The Bank of
Florence was engaged in a general banking
business at Florence, and became the agent
of complainant for the collection of moneys
there dne and owing, and which were to
become due, and was charged with the duly
of remitting such moneys to the complainant
as collected. Neglecting the duty of remittance of these moneys, the bank suffered the
sum of $538.80 to accumulate tn its hands,
and suspended payments. Though insolvent,
the bank made no transfer or assignment of
its property and assets, but proceeded in
winding up its affairs, with the acquiescence
of its creditors. Judgments were being rendered against it, and it was making preferences in payment of its creditors.
These are
the material allegations of the bill, upon
which is founded the right to the appointment
of a receiver; and the specific relief prayed
is that, for the payment of the sum due, the
complainant be decreed a lien on all the
assets of the bank, in priority of all general
liens, by which we suppose is intended in
priority of all creditors not having a specific
lien. When an application is made for the
appointment of a receiver, the primary inquiry is whether there is shown a reasonable
probability that the plaintiff asking the appointment wUl ultimately succeed in obtaining the general relief sought by the suit If
ultimate success is a matter of grave doubt,
or if, as in the present case. It be clear that
H.& B.EQ.(2d Ed.j-oT
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obtained,
the general rdlef sought cannot be
2
the appointment ought not to be made.
High,
Rec.
1331;
Eq.
Jur.
§
Pom.
(2d Ed.)
Carter, 62 Ala. 95.
(2d Ed.) § 8; Randle v.
It Is ti-ue, as a general rule, that. In making
or refusing the appointment of a receiver,
the court

will not forestall or anticipate the

decision which may be made on final hearing.
This Is true when a case Is presented
upon which there is a reasonable probability the plaintiff may ultimately obtain
relief. In such cases the pleadings may
not be drawn with technical accuracy. The
bill may be subject to demurrer for the want
of proper parties, or because of defects of
form or the absence of substantial allegations, —insufficiencies curable by amendment
These Insufficiencies, of themselves, do not
form an impediment to the appointment of a
receiver, if a case be made by a party having interests to be protected and preserved
entitling him to the general relief which is
prayed. Ex parte Walker, 25 Ala. 81.
The relation between the complainant and
the Bank of Florence was that of principal
and agent, created by their agreement,— a
legal relation strictly, though, to attain the
ends of justice, and preserve the confidence
it involves, courts of equity, under some circumstances,
deal with it as a fiduciary relation. The debt created by the breach of
duty of the agent is a mere simple contract
debt, for the recovery of which legal remedies are adequate.
Crothers v. Lee, 29 Ala.
337; Knotts v. Tarver, 8 Ala. 743.
The demand being a simple contract debt, purely of
a legal character, the complainant in the absence of some peculiar equity, is not entitled
to the intervention of a court of equity to enforce its payment Reese v. Bradford, 13
Ala. 838; Sanders v. Watson, 14 Ala. 198.
These well-recognized principles are not controverted. The insistence is that as the agent
converted to his own use the money of the
principal, commingling it with his own money, or in some form with his other assets, so
that it cannot be identified or the specific
uses to which it was applied traced, it is sufficient to trace it into the general assets of
the agent to impress them with a trust for
the payment of the money,— a trust which is
It is
peculiarly of equitable cognizance.
true that a trustee or an agent or other person standing in a fiduciary relation cannot
derive benefit from commingling with his
own the moneys of his cestui que trust or
principal; and it is equally true that, if he
makes an Investment of such moneys, a
court of equity, so long as the moneys may
be distinctly traced, will follow them, and
impress upon the investment the trust to
which the moneys were subject The conversion of the trust moneys, as distinguished
from other moneys of the trustee or agent,
must be clearly shown. It is not sufficient
to show that there has been a conversion cv
trust fimds, and the acquisition or posf^
sioia by the trustee or agent of proper'^
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which may be supposed a substitute
said by the supreme
court of Massachusetts: "The court will go
as far as it can in traclns and following
trust money; but when, as a matter of fact,
it cannot be traced, the equitable right of the
cestui que trust to follow it fails.
Under
such circumstances,
if the trustee has become bankrupt, the court cannot say that
the trust money is to be found somewhere in
the general estate of the trustee that still remained.
He may have lost it with property
at his own, and in such case the cestui que
trust can only come in and share with the
general creditors."
Little v. Chadwick, 151
Mass. 109, 23 N. B. 1005. There is no question of tracing or identifying the moneys of
the principal. The naked averment of the
bill is that, in violation of duty, the agent
converted to his own use the moneys of the
principal, creating a mere simple contract
debt
There is no averment that the assets
upon which it Is sought to fasten the trust
had not been acquired by the agent before
the conversion; no averment that in any
form the moneys of the principal entered into their acquisition. All that can be said is
that which may be said of any delinquent
trustee or agent,— that he had converted the
moneys of his cestui que trust or principal;
and from the busiuess in which the agent
was engaged it may be presumed that, in
the com-se of the business, they were commingled and used with the moneys of the
agent
If a trust were raised to charge the
assets of the agent a like trust would arise
and be fastened on the general assets of
every delinquent agent or trustee,— a trust
which would prevail against all others than
The moneys of the
bona fide purchasers.
principal are incapable of being identified
and traced into any of the assets of the bank,
and, this being true, the principal, we repeat, is a mere simple contract creditor of
the agent, not entitled to any preference or
priority of payment over other creditors.
EUison V. Moses, 95 Ala. 223, 11 South. 347;
Association v. Austia (Ala.) 13 South. 908.
It is quite an error to suppose that the two
cases chiefiy relied on by counsel for the appellee (National Bank t. Insurance Co., 104
assets,

for such funds. As is

In re Hallett's Estate, 13 Ch. DIv.
support a contrary doctrine. It is apparent the original bill is without equity, the
complainant is not entitled to the general relief sought and the appointment of the receiver was erroneous.
If the case was of equitable cognizance, entitUng the complainant to reUef, a fatal objection to the regularity of the order appointing the receiver is that it was made
without notice to the defendants.
A receiver may be appointed without notice to the
defendant who is to be dispossessed of his
property or assets, but the cases in which notice may be dispensed with are exceptional.
There must be shown a strong case of pressing emergency, rendering immediate inter'ference necessary before there is time to give
notice; or It must be shown that notice
would jeopardize the delivery of the property over which the receivership [s to be exMoritz ▼. Miller, 87 Ala. 331, 6
tended.
South. 269; Dollins v. Lindsey, 89 Ala. 217,
7 South. 234.
The averment of the bill on
which the court below proceeded to the appointment without notice is expressed in
these words: "And complainant alleges the
necessity exists for the appointment of a receiver, to prevent the further unauthorized
and illegal action by the said Broadus, and
to prevent irreparable injury and total destruction of the assets of the said bank." It
is not on such vague and indefinite allegations, the opinions or conclusions of the
pleader, not accompanied by a statement of
the facts on which they are founded, that notice of a judicial proceeding can be dispensed with, and parties deprived of the possession or control of properly. The particuto
lar facts and circumstances supposed
create the necessity for the Immediate appointment should have been stated, submitting to the judgment of the court whether
they created
the necessity— the pressing
emergency— for judicial
interference. Verplank V. Insurance Co., 2 Paige, 438. Upon
the bill alone, without affidavits or other evidence, the appointment was made. The order appointing the receiver must be vacated
Reand annulled, and the cause remanded.
versed, rendered, and remanded.
D. S. 54;

696)

RECEIVERS.
COLTON

et al. ▼. DOVER PERPETUAL
BUILDING & LOAN ASS'N OF
BALTIMORE.

(45 Atl. 23, 90 Md. 85.)
Court of Appeals oi Maryland. Nov. 24, 1899.
Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore
city; Henry Stoekbridge, Judge.
Exceptions by the Doyer Perpetual Building & Loan Association of Baltimore to the
auditor's account distributing the assets of
the South Baltimore Bank, refusing to allow
said building association to set oS a deposit
against a note executed by it, and held by
the bank. Prom an order sustaining the exceptions, William Colton and Simon P. Schott,
receivers of the bank, appeal.
Affirmed.
Argued before McSHERRY, G J., and
PAGE, PEARCE, FOWLER, BOTD, and

SCHMUCKER,

JJ.

Wm. S. Bryan, Jr., and Martin Lehmayer,
tor appellants. L. P. Henninghausen and P.
C. Henninghausen, for appellee.
BOYD, J. A bill was filed in the court below against the South Baltimore Bank, a corporation of this state, on the 24th day ot
February, 1898, asking for the appointment
of a receiver, and that the bank be declared
An answer was filed the same
insolvent.
day, admitting that the bank was insolv^it,
and consenting to the appointment of a receiver. One of the appellants was appointed
on that day, and afterwards the other was
appointed co-receiver.
On the 1st day of
June, 1898, a decree was passed adjudicating the baJik Insolvent, and determining It
The rewas so when this bill was filed.
ceivers proceeded with the discharge of their
duties, and in due course the case was referred to the auditor to state an account distributing the assets of the bank. When the
bill was filed, the bank held a promissory
note of the appellee for $1,000, which became due on March 2, 1896, and the applies
had a deposit with the bank of $357.25. At
the maturity of the note the appellee tendered the receiver then In office the sum of
$642.75 in payment of said note, claiming
tiie amount of the deposit as a set-off, and
demanded the note, but the receiver refused
Subsequently that
to accept that amount
sum was accepted, under an agreement that
It should be credited on the note, without
prejudice to the receiver's claim for the balance, and that no suit should be Instituted
until it was determined whether the appellee
was entitled to set off the deposit against
The auditor
the balance due on the note.
refused to allow the set-off, but distributed
to the appellee its proportion dividend as a
creditor. £ixceptions were filed to the audit,
which were sustained, and a decretal order
was passed directing the receivers to allow
the association the deposit as a set-off
against the balance due on the note. From
that order this appeal was taken by the receivers, with the permission of the court; it
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that there were a number
be affected by
the decision. The question, therefore, to be
determined by us, is whether the appellee Is
entitled to set off the amount of its deposit
with the bank at the time of Its failure
against the balance due on the note, under
the circumstances we have stated.
Several
reasons have been assigned by the appellants
In support of the position that the appellee
Is only entitled to receive a distribution on
the amount of the deposit, as other creditors are.
1. One ground relied on E,t the argument
was that a depositor in a bank cannot maintain a suit for his deposit unless he has previously made a demand for it, and that no
lemand was made in this case. "It is now
perfectly well settled that the relation between banker and customer, who pays money
into the bank, or to whose credit money is
received there on deposit, is the ordinary
relation of debtor and creditor." Hardy v.
Bank, 51 Md. 585.
And it is equally well
settled that a depositor cannot, as a general
rule, maintain an action to recover his deposit until he has first made a demand for
its payment. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d
Ed.) 8S8. But, while that is true, there may
be circumstances under which no demand is
necessary prior to bringing suit; and, on
page 839 of the volume ot the Encyclopedia
of Law above referred to, it is said that
"where the bank has suspended, or where
for any other reason it would be manifestly
futile to make demand, none need be made."
In the case of Planters' Bank v. Farmers' &
Mechanics' Bank, 8 Gill. & J. 449, it was
held that the necessity for a demand would
^o dispensed with by the susi>ension of specie payments and discontinuance of banking
operations by the bank, provided those acts
were known to the plaintiff, and from the
time of such knowledge the statute of limitations would begin to run. It would have
been "manifestly futUe to make demand" on
the bank or the receiver for the amount of
deposit; and, if the appellee had sued, the
fact that a demand was not previously made
would not have defeated the action. If the
bank had not failed, and had sued the appellee for the amount of the note, it would not
have been necessary for the latter to have
proven a demand for the deposit prior to
the time suit was instituted by the bank. A
defendant can set off against a plaintiff's
demand a nole of the plaintiff which maof the actured after the commencement
tion. Clarke v. Magruder, 2 Har. & J, 77.
As early as Whittington v. Bank, 5 Har. &
J. 489, our predecessors held that the defendant in an action by a bank on a promissory
note against him may set off against the
claim of the bank any money he has In bank,
and it is not intimated that a previous demand was necessary In order to enable b'"'
to do so. The bank being a debtor to **®
depositor, the right to set off such dep"*^*
Deing represented

of other claims that would
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the very terms of our statute; and
in a suit by the bank the claim for
the deposit can be set off, although no previous demand for it has been made.
That
being so, It would seem to be clear that no
demand would be necessary in order to enable the defendant to set off the amount of
the deposit against a claim made by the receiver of the bank, if there be no other reason for not allowing it.
In Morse, Banks,
"Where the bank itself
§ 338, It is said:
stops payment and becomes insolvent, the
customer may avail himself, in set-off
against his Indebtedness to the bank, of any
indebtedness of the bank to himself,— as, for
example, the balance due him on his deposit
account. So, also, even though the debt to
him has not matured at the time of the insolvency."
This may be done whether a
demand had or had not been previously
made.
Fort v. McOully, 59 Barb. 87; Seymour V. Dunham, 24 Hun, 93.
2. We come then to the main question In
the case.
It is argued that to allow the set-off
would be, In effect, to give the appellee a.
preference
over the other creditors of the
bank, and that it is the duty of the receivers
to distribute the assets pro rata, and not to
pay In full any one creditor.
If the appellee
was merely a creditor, that argument might
prevail, but that was not the relation that existed between the two.
The appellee was not
only a creditor to the amount of its deposit,
but it was a debtor to the amount of the note
held by the bank.
Its debit was larger than
its credit, and, if the bank had not failed, it
could only have recovered the difference between the two.
Do the receivers occupy any
The general mle undoubtedly
better position?
Is that a receiver takes subject to set-offs
which the defendant might have set up against
See 22 Am. & Eng. Enc.
the original owner.
Law, 308, and Merrill y. Granite Co. (Mass.)
36 N. B. 797, 23 L. R. A. 313, note, where
There are
many authorities are collected.
some exceptions to the rule, one of which may
be mentioned, although not directly involved
in the case, as some of the authorities cited by
the appellants are to that point; and that is
that a claim obtained after the commencement
of the proceedings which resulted in the apwithin

hence

pointment of a receiver should not be allowed
as a set-off unless there be some statute authorizing it to be done. In this case, however,
the debt was due by the bank to the appellee
before the proceedings under which the appellants were appointed were instituted.
As
we have seen, the relation of debtor and
and the question discussed
creditor existed;
ibove, as to whether demand must be made
before suit can be brought, does not in any
wise reflect upon the question of Indebtedness,
but only on the right to sue for the indebtedBut it is said on
ness before demand Is made.
behalf of the appellants that, inasmuch as the
We fell due after the appointment of the
tot receiver, he took it free from all equities,
just as a bona fide purchaser for value would
|1

have done, and that a claim In favor of the
bank which did not mature until in the hands
of the receiver is not subject to a set-off by
a claim which existed against the bank before
the receiver's rights accrued;
in short, that
in one case the debt is due by the bank to
the customer, and In the other by the customer to the receiver.
If that were strictly correct, there would be some ground for the contention; for if, for example, the appellee had
purchased some property from the receiver, it
would not be permitted to set off its claim
against such indebtedness to the receiver, for
it would thereby not only obtain an unwarranted preference over other creditors, but it
would prevent a proper settlement of the insolvent estate, and, moreover, they would not
be mutual claims.
But when the receiver
was appointed he took the assets of the bank,
and among those assets was this note. It was
a debt already incurred by the appellee, and
By reason
payable to the bank when due.
of the fact that it was payable to and held by
the bank, it was an asset that became vested
In the receiver, and he took it subject to the
equities existing between the appellee and
Although there are some authorithe bank.
ties to the contrary, the great weight of authority is to the effect that the fact that tht
daim thus held by the receiver does not mature until after his appointment does not prevent a defendant from using his claim as a
Among other decisions are Berry v.
set-off.
Brett, 6 Bosw. 627; Scott v. Armstrong, 140
U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148, 36 L. Ed. 1059;
Piatt V. Bentley, 11 Ain. Law Reg. (N. S.)
171; In re Hatch, 155 N. Y. 401, 50 N. B. 49,
40 L. R. A, 664; Bank v. Balliet, 8 Watts &
S. 311;
Aldrich v. Campbell, 4 Gray, 284;
Smith V. Spengler, 83 Mo. 408; McCagg v.
Woodman, 28 111. 84; Armstrong t. Warner,
49 Ohio St. 376, 31 N. B. 877, 17 L. R. A. 466;
Yardley v. Oothier, 2 C. O. A. 349, 51 Fed.
506, 17 L. R. A. 462; Skiles v. Houston, 110
Pa. St. 254, 2 Atl. 30. See, also, Fera v. Wickham (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 1028, 17 L. R. A. 456.
note. Some of these cases make a distinction
between a technical set-off in suits at law, and
cross demands allowed by courts of equity,
but, as we are now considering a distribution
In a court of equity, all of the cases can properly be referred to here.
3. But It is contended by the appellants that
if It be conceded that the general rule Is as
we have stated, about the rights of the receivers, they occupy a different position, by reason
of our statute.
Section 264a of article 23, c.
349, Acts 1896, provides that when a corooration has been determined or proven to be insolvent and dissolved, in accordance with section 264, "all of its property and assets of every description
shall be distributed to the
creditors of said corporation in the sr'me manner that the property and assets of an insolvent debtor are distributed under the provisions of article 47 of the Code. * • • And
the date of the filing of the bill against such
corporation, upon which it may be dissolved
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deposit to the payment of the note?
Clearly
not, as the assignee of the claim would have
taken
subject to equities existing between
the appellee and the bank, and a court of
equity would have protected the bank or its
representatives,
Marshall v.
the receivers.
Cooper, 43 Md. 46. It would seem clear, then,
that at least In equity the deposit should be
allowed as counterclaim or set-off. But even
at law
should be allowed against the receivers. It
true that a trustee appointed under
our insolvent laws does not occupy precisely
the same position that an ordinary trustee under a conventional
deed of trust does, as he
has greater powers, and represents the creditors. He can, for example, have a deed made
by the insolvent in fraud of his creditors set
aside, which an assignee under a voluntary
deed of trust cannot do, because the latter can
only do what his assignor could.
But the insolvent law does not vest him with such powers as would enable him to collect more than
actually due the Insolvent, and there was
only actually due the balance between the two
accounts.
"All Oie property of every description, rights and claims of the insolvent," vest
In the trustee; and,
the insolvent has disposed of any of his property in violation of
void, and the trustee
the insolvent law.
can recover It. It could not be successfully
contended that the creditors of an insolvent
could deprive one who owes the insolvent of
the right of set-off, and how can the trustee
who represents them do so? Nor can he avoid
the right of set-off on the theory that he occupies the position of a bona fide purchaser
for value. Haitun v. Bishop,
Wend. 13, referred to by the appellants, tends to sustain
that position, but that case has not met with
approval.
See (N. Y. App.) 31 N. B. 1028, 17
L. R. A. 458, note. In Dowler y. Cushwa, 27
Md. 354, this court quoted with approval from
Van Wagoner v. Gaslight Co., 23 N. J. Law,
291, that:
"The rule pervades both bankrupt
and insolvent laws, founded on general principles of equity, that all cross demands, whether connected or independent, provided they be
mutual, as between the bankrupt or the insolvent and the creditor, shall be set off, and the
balance only shall be deemed the indebtedness
on one side or the other. The assignees take
bankrupt's property in the same condition,
as the
and subject to the same burthens,
bankrupt himself held It, on the principle that
they are not purchasers
for
valuable consideration, but as voluntary assignees and perand are therefore dissonal representatives,
Altinguished from particular assignees."
the distinction bethough fully recognizing
tween the trustee of an insolvent and one appointed by the debtor In a deed of trust, as
made by this court in previous cases, we cannot adopt the view urged upon us, that the
former
to be regarded as a bona fide purchaser for value of the assets that come into
his hands, and thereby permit him to depri^
right as that to set o*
debtor of such
titudebt due by the insolvent prior to the w*'
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shall be taken and treated for the purpose of
determining
the validity of preferences
and
for all other purposes as the date of the filing
of the petition in Insolvency by or against
a natural person."
In short, receivers of corporations that are dissolved under that statute are placed on the same basis as trustees in
insolvency of natural persons, and the date of
filing the bill is the time fixed to determine
the status of the parties affected by It. But
section 11 of article 47 of the Code provides
that "the estates of the Insolvent shall be
distributed under the order of the court according to the principles of equity." WhUe
set-off in equity is generally governed by the
same principles as at law, courts of . equity
sometimes allow a set-off where for some technical reason It could not be allowed at law.
The insolvency of the party against whom it
is claimed frequently affords equitable groimd
for allowing it. A technical set-off is wholly
of statutory origin, but courts of equity exercise an original jurisdiction over the subject,
and wiU, when reason and justice require it,
enforce a counterclaim,
though not within the
letter of the statute. Smith v. Donnell, 9 Gill,
S4, and Manning v. Thruston, 59 Md. 218, are
instances of such equitable relief.
It would
sometimes work great Injustice to customers
of banks if they should be required to pay in
full their indebtedness to the bank, and only
receive a dividend on their deposits.
A customer might from time to time make deposits
in bank with a view to meet his. note held by
and
would manifestly be
great hardship, if, under those circumstances,
he could
not apply his deposit towards the payment of
the note, because the bank had failed and
receiver had been appointed.
A court of equity would certainly not permit such unjust results in the distribution of funds before it, if
such facts were proven; and, although In this
case there is no evidence that the deposit
was made with special reference to the maturity of the note, yet, as
became due a few
might
days after the receiver was appointed,
well be inferred that the appellee had that
If the
(act In view in making the deposits.
could have applied the
bank had not failed,
deposit of the appellee towards the payment of
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.)
the note.
And
828, 835; Miller v. Bank, 30 Md. 392.
would be unreasonable to permit a receiver of
an Insolvent bank to collect the note in fuU,
without allowing the set-off, particularly as
"The
lien on the deposits.
the bank had
bank holds a lien upon the deposits in its
hands to secure the repayment of the depositor's indebtedness, and may enforce that lien
as the debts mature, by applying the debtor's
deposits upon them, thus setting the two off
Bug. Enc. Law
Am.
against each other."
If the
Bank,
supra.
v.
835;
Miller
(2d Ed.)
appellee was not financially responsible, and
had attempted to assign its claim for deposits
third person, could there
against the bank to
have been any question about the right of the
receiver to Insist upon the application of the
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non of the Insolvent proceedings;
and we find
nothing in our statute, or in the authorities we
feel called upon to follow, to cause us to
reach a conclusion that in our opinion would
work such manifest injustice. It Is not claimed that a
appointed under the sta^
receiT^r

ute referred to can occupy any better posdtlon than an insolrent tinistee, and. for the
reasons we haye given, we will attiiui the or^
der of the court appealed from.
Order affirmed; the costs to be paid out of the ins(dvent estate.
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share which each should be decreed to pay
plaintiffs, respectively.
Pending the
hearing upon this second reference to the
master William Vankirk, one of the original
defendants,
petitioned the court to grant
leave to said defendants to pay Bailey's
claim, and the costs of the t»roceeding, and
to vacate the appointment of the master,
alleging the want of an issue as to the creditors who had been permitted to become
plaintiffs with Bailey.
This was refused.
The master, under the court's order, filed his
supplemental report recommending a decree
against 14 of the 22 defendants, which was
made in accordance
with the recommendation, whereupon 4 of them, to-wlt, William
Vankirk, R. B. Brown, John F. Dravo, and
W. H. Aldred, appealed, assigning for error
(1) the decree of the court; (2) the appointment of the master, and the confirmation of
his report, "where said case was not at issue
as against the Pittsburgh
Coal Railroad
Company, defendant;" (3) the confirmation
of the report, and the making of the decree
as to the claims of Keams, Risher, and McClure, when "no issue was ever made up as
between them or any of them, and the said
defendants, or any of them."
said

Pa. 213.)

Coui^t of Pennsylvania.
Jan. 6, 1891.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county.
Bill in equity for the appointment of a receiver to collect unpaid stock subscriptions
from the stockholders of a company, for the
payment of a judgment creditor of said company. J. N. MeCreery, an employs of the
Pittsburgh Coal Raih:oad Company, obtained
a judgment against it. The plaintiff, his assignee, filed a bill against said company and
seven of the stockholders, for the appointment ot a receiver to collect sufficient unpaid
stock subscriptions to pay him his claim.
The said stockholders joined with said company as defendants, and filed demurrers to
the bill, which were all overruled.
Defendants were ordered to plead in 15 days. Said
stockholders then filed a plea and answer,
but the company filed no plea or answer at
any time, and no decree w£is ever taken
against it. A general replication was filed,
and a master was appointed. Subsequently,
pending the hearing before him, Keams,
Risher, and McClure, other creditors of said
company, presented petitions for leave to
intervene, and were allowed to become plalnti&s. On the same day R. B. Brown, one of
the seven stockholders, on behalf of himself
and his co-defendants, presented a petition,
setting forth the names of the other stockholders than those made defendants originally, and the amount of stock held by each,
and prayed that the petitions of Keams,
Risher, and McClure be granted only upon
condition that the said stockholders named
by him be made defendants. Keams, Risher,
and McClure were joined as plaintiffs, and
the stockholders named by Brown were made
defendants. The pleadings remained as they
were at tile appointment of the master, who
He recommendproceeded to hear the ease.
ed a decree in favor of -plaintlfiCs, in accordThe report
ance with the prayer in the bill.
was referred back to him, for a supplemental
report of the several sums due the respective
plaintiffs, the amount of the subscriptions of
each of aaJd defendants, and in pro rata

John S. Ferguson, for appellants.
Fetterman, for appellees.

C. S.

PER CURIAM. This appeal Is entitied as
though it had been taken by the Pittsburgh
Such Is not the
Coal Railroad Company.
fact, however.
The appeal was entered by
William Vankirk, R. B. Brown, John F.
Dravo, and W. H. Aldred, four of the deLane's Appeal, 105 Pa. 49,
fendants below.
and Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. 88, 8 Atl. 177, are
authority that such a bill can be maintained.
The record is voluminous, and consists principally of questions of fact
We must assume that the learned master has decided
these correctly, inasmuch as he is sustained
by the coiurt below, and no clear error has
been pointed out. The matters referred to in
the second and third assignments are purely
technical, and do not affect the merits. We
find nothing In the record to justify us in
Decree affirmed, and
reversing the decree.
the appeal dismissed, at the costs of the appellants.
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not traceable, 465.
misappropriation of trust funds by trustee,
466.
failure of bank after collection, 468.

funds followed into hands of third parties,

ACTTJAL FRAUD,
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ELECTL'ION,
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right of party to prove his own representations false, 101.
promise not to assert claim to property,

614.

threatening purchaser of goods with suits
for infringements of patents, 753.
disclosure by servant of trade secrets, 755.
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782.
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no wrong without a remedy, 3.
equity follows the law, 5, 9.
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dren, 377.
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EXPRESS
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0^ equity39, 55.
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47.
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tives, 393.
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creation of voluntary trust, 400.
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and reinstatecancellation of agreement
ment of contract, 268.
upon faith of fraudulent
deed executed
adequate

agreement,
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railway company

agreeing not to transport
goods at fates fixed by law, 734.
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vinVawful execution ground for injunction,
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reformation of contract on parol evidence
of mutual mistake, 234.
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donor, acts thereafter void, 177.
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tion of parties, 191.
mutual mistake of parties to contract, 193.
bond for judgment executed under mutual
mistake, 197.
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discharge of lien by refusal of tender, 212.
fraudulent representations to party ignorant of law, 213.
voluntary payment of money unaffected by
fraud, 216.
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intention of parties to contract, 244.
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to have rents and profits
applied to cancellation of debt, 555.
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562.
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protection of secret code, 817.
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iwwer of judges of trial courts to appoint,
823.

dissolution of mining partnership, 833.
right of creditor to ask for appointment of,
837.
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845.
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as ground for appointment, 849.
proper parties to be appointed, 855.
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foreclosure, 864.
attaching creditor interfering with mortgage foreclosure, 867.
collection of rents on property insufficient
to secure mortgage,
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debtedness, 879.
right to issue certificates to pay taxes, 881.
action by receiver to enforce liability of

stockholders, 886.
suits in foreign jurisdictloh, 888.
combinations in restraint of trade, 891.
mismanagement of property of insolvent
corporation, 894.
Injury and destruction of insolvents' assets,
897.

.set-off by insolvent
depositor, 899.

bank against note of

enforcement of liability of corporate stockholder,

903.

REFORMATION,

deed executed by party mentally weak, 788.
contract procured by fraud and mistake,
790.

RESULTING TRUSTS,

next of kin to take surplus of trust for his
own benefit, 442.
life estate of wife resulting to husband, 444.
deed from husband to wife, 446.
A. purchases estate with his money and
takes deed In name of B., a trust results
to A., 447.
legal estate taken jointly results to party
advancing purchase money, 452.
delivery of deed as affecting trust, 455.
evidence of intention of establishing trust.
459.

SATISFACTION,
legacy as satisfaction of bond debt, 140.
devise to satisfy debt, 142.
two bequests of the same sum of money to
the same legatee construed, 144.

INDEX.
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SATISFACTION— Cont'd.

intention of testator, 146.
ademption of legacies, 150.
ademption of legacies determined by parol
evidence,

152.

foundation of rule of ademption of legacies,
155.

.SFBCIPIC
PERFORMANCE
TRACT,

OF

CON-

heir entitled to land held by tenure of horn,
573.

enforcement of promise for conveyance

of

land, 574.
competency of party to contract, 575.
adjoining proprietor's right to compel building of party wall, 578.
of
sale of debts proved under commission

bankruptcy, 584.
sufficiency of description a defense to a
contract for a conveyance of land, 585.
jurisdiction of decree for conveyance of
land, 587.

delivery of shares

of stock loss of which
cannot be compensated, 588.
agreement between theater and stock company,

592.

of performance in enforcement of
contract of sale, 595.
refusal to deliver coal on account of advance in price, 599.
forfeiture of charter of railroad company
for failure to build and equip road, 602.
parties to action for enforcement of railroad building contract, 604.
penalty or liquidated damages for breach
of contract, 607.
agreement to write and report cases determined, not mutual, 612.
affirmative stipulation not enforceable. 614.
actor to perform at certain theater, 622.
negative stipulation in contract for sale of
chattels, 627.
injunction against rival manufacturers for
use of stamp on goods, 629.
right to reserve ball player for subsequent

tender

season, 631.
to execute formal contract, 635.
return qf personal chattels where detention
cannot be compensated, 637.
use of same tracks by street railway companies, 641.
covenant giving right to purchase premises
leased a continuing offer to sell, 644.
discretion of court governed by merits of
the case, 650.
stipulated damages for a refusal of peragreement

formance, 652.
insolvency as a defense to conveyance of
real estate, 654.
lease with option to purchase chattels, 655.
effect of desti-uction by Are of property to
be conveyed,

173.

time of acceptance
posal, 659.

or acquiescence

of pro-

SPECIFIC

PERFORMANCE
TRACT— Cont'd.
destruction of property by fire

OF

CON-

as a defense
to contract, 661.
agreement to repair as defense to contract,
6G2.

by mismanagement, 663.
execution of contract for sale of real estate
with part payment equivalent to trans-

deterioration of land caused

fer,

667.

vendee taking possession of property liable
for its destruction, 669.
right of vendee to compel conveyance of
property destroyed, 671.
release of homestead affecting the right to
compel conveyance, 675.
refusal of a wife to join in conveyance,
677.

parol variation of contract as affecting conveyance,

67^.

refusal of a wife to relinquish right of dower, 681.

uncertainty of description in contract, 682.
laches as a defense in action for performance of contract, 686.
payment and legal tender as gfound for
forfeiture, 695.
right of way granted to railroad in consideration of constructiiOn of road, 701.
removal of incumbrance pending suit, 703.
incumbrances as defense to contract for
conveyance,

706.

omission to affix stamp
collector,

by United States

709.

jurisdiction to enforce agreement to give
note for purchase price and secure it by
mortgage,

711.

public policy as defense to enforcement of
agreement,

713.

stockholder's agreement
to company,

to transfer shares

720.

construction of railroad stations in discretion of court, 723.
mutuality as ground for specific performance, 724.
acceptance of optional contract, 726.
liquidated damages agreed upon for breach

of contract, 730.
awarded for breach of contract,

damages
732.

SUBROGATION,
right of purchaser of void municipal aid
bonds to recover value, 568.

TRUSTS— ACTIVE AND PASSIVE,

consistent with contention of party
creating trust, 404.

estate

TRUSTS-PUBUC

OR CHARITABLE,

construction of charitable trusts, 410.
Intention of testator in a will creating
trusts, 431.
uncertainty of beneficiaries as ground foi
invalidating charitable trust, 438.
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